Federal Court Orders Decision on Study Permit Application

OUTCOME: Allowed

Date: 20260611 Docket: IMM-6964-25 Citation: 2026 FC 780 Toronto, Ontario, June 11, 2026 PRESENT: The [NAME]: [APPELLANT] Applicant and THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP [RESPONDENT] Respondent

REASONS AND

JUDGMENT I. Overview [ 1 ] The Applicant seeks an order of mandamus requiring a decision on his study permit application which has been in process for over two and a half years, since December 2023. For the reasons below, the requirements for an order of mandamus have been met, and the Respondent has not demonstrated why the remedy should not be provided.

II. Analysis [ 2 ] The criteria for an order of mandamus are described in [NAME] v Canada (Attorney General) , 1993 CanLII 3004 (FCA), [1994] 1 FC 742 (CA) [ [NAME] ] at 766-769: (1) there must be a public legal duty to act; (2) the duty must be owed to the applicant; (3) there must be a clear right to the performance of that duty; (4) where the duty sought to be enforced is discretionary, certain additional principles apply; (5) no other adequate remedy is available to the applicant; (6) the order sought will have some practical value or effect; (7) there is no equitable bar to the relief sought; and (8) on a balance of convenience an order of mandamus should be issued. [ 3 ] As recently explained by the Federal Court of Appeal, the requirements for mandamus are met when the Applicant establishes the first four criteria of the [NAME] test, and the remaining four criteria provide an opportunity for the respondent to demonstrate that the remedy should be withheld ( [NAME] v Canada (Royal Canadian Mounted Police External Review Committee) , 2026 FCA 53 [ [NAME] ] at paras 45-51). [ 4 ] At the hearing of this matter, the Respondent took the position that [RESPONDENT] has “limited relevance” to the present case. The Respondent stated that [RESPONDENT] only applies to situations in which no explanation has been provided for a delay, and according to the Respondent an explanation was provided in this case. Moreover, the Respondent took the position that [RESPONDENT] does not apply in cases such as the present matter in which “[RESPONDENT] levels are set by target categories.” [ 5 ] In my view, shared by judges of this Court who have applied [NAME] since its issuance (See e.g. [RESPONDENT] v Canada (Citizenship [RESPONDENT]) , 2026 FC 647 [ [RESPONDENT] ]; [RESPONDENT] v Canada (Citizenship [RESPONDENT]) , 2026 FC 550 [ [RESPONDENT] ]; [RESPONDENT] v Canada (Citizenship [RESPONDENT]) , 2026 FC 500), [RESPONDENT] is binding appellate authority relevant to judicial review applications involving requests for mandamus relief. There is no indication in [NAME] that its principles are restricted to circumstances in which no explanation for delay have been provided, and no substance to the Respondent’s argument that the establishment of [RESPONDENT] levels has any relation to the issues raised in this application. As such, the principles from [NAME] will be applied in the assessment of this application. [ 6 ] Like most applications involving requests for mandamus , the real dispute in this case concerns the third branch of the [NAME] test, which examines whether there is a clear right to the performance of the duty. This in turn requires an examination of whether the administrative delay is unreasonable based on the following criteria: (1) the delay in question has been longer than the nature of the process required, prima facie ; (2) the applicant and their counsel are not responsible for the delay; and (3) the authority responsible for the delay has not provided satisfactory justification. ( [RESPONDENT] v Canada (Minister of Citizenship [RESPONDENT]) (T.D.), 1998 CanLII 9097 (FC) at para 23). [ 7 ] There is no allegation in this case that the Applicant and their counsel are responsible for the delay, so the delay will be assessed on the first and third criteria from [NAME] , which I find to be satisfied in this case. A. The delay has been longer than the nature of the process required [ 8 ] Determining whether delay has been longer than required by the nature of the process examines the “time requirements inherent to the administrative proceedings” in light of the nature and purpose of the proceedings, and the rights and interests of those affected by the proceedings ( [NAME] , at para 77). Therefore, the manner in which “the administrative proceedings” or “the process” is defined will be essential in establishing an appropriate comparator to the length of proceedings in a specific case. [ 9 ] In my view, “the process” should be defined by the general category of proceedings, taking into account the complexities inherent to the particular category of proceedings. [ 10 ] A point of confusion may arise because [NAME] prescribes the consideration of “complexities” at both the first and third prongs of the [NAME] test ( [NAME] , at paras 62, 95). [ 11 ] In my view, the complexities referred to in the first prong relate to the general procedural and substantive complexities inherent in the nature of the proceeding being dealt with by the decision-maker. For example, tribunals that generally deal with complex areas of law in their proceedings, proceedings that are quasi-judicial in nature or matters that require higher procedural fairness standards may require more time than routine, administrative processes. By contrast, complexities of a specific case under review, such as cases involving particularly intricate facts or specific issues, are appropriately dealt with in the third prong of [NAME] as a justification for the delay. [ 12 ] Security screening is an inherent part of processing study permit applications. To the extent that security screening is the justification being advanced by a respondent for a delay, I agree with my colleagues who have determined that it is best considered as a justification for the delay under the final prong of the [NAME] test ( [RESPONDENT], at para 18; [RESPONDENT] v Canada (Citizenship [RESPONDENT]) , 2024 FC 1593 [ [RESPONDENT] ] at para 94). [ 13 ] Indeed, [NAME] explicitly states that complex facts or issues raised by a specific case, when being used to explain delay, are appropriately addressed under the third prong of [NAME] ( [RESPONDENT] , at para 95). Otherwise, there is a risk that a respondent’s justifications will bleed into other criteria and assume a disproportionate weight in the overall test. [ 14 ] The nature of the process in this case is therefore the general process for study permit applications made by Iranian citizens, which includes routine security screening. [ 15 ] While not determinative, service standards for study permit applications are relevant to the inquiry of how much time is required by the nature of the process ( [NAME], at paras 91-92). At the time of submitting the study permit application, the service standard was 60 days. That increased to 41 weeks as of February 2025 under the dynamic processing time. As stated above, the delay in processing the Applicant’s study permit application has been two and a half years, which greatly exceeds both benchmarks. [ 16 ] The study permit process by its nature is intended to allow people to study in Canada, advancing the statutory objective of facilitating the entry of students to Canada ( [RESPONDENT] Protection Act , SC 2001, c 27, [ IRPA ] s 3(1)(g)). Another relevant statutory purpose is to maintain the integrity of the [RESPONDENT] system through “efficient procedures” and to attain [RESPONDENT] goals through “prompt processing” ( IRPA , ss 3(1)(f), 3(1)(f.1)). [ 17 ] Finally, regarding the interests of the Applicant, he attests that the delay has placed his studies in the Mechanical Engineering PhD program at the [COMPANY] in jeopardy, because he has deferred the program three times and has received a final deferral. [ 18 ] Based on the service standards for study permit applications, the statutory purposes, and the Applicant’s interests, I find that the delay is longer than the nature of the process required. B. The excess delay in processing the study permit application has not been justified [ 19 ] When an applicant demonstrates that the impugned delay exceeds the time requirements inherent in their proceedings, the onus shifts to the respondent to demonstrate that the delay remains reasonable because it is justified ( [NAME] , at para 98). Many requests for mandamus will succeed or fail on a Court’s assessment of whether a delay is justified (See e.g. [RESPONDENT] v Canada (Citizenship [RESPONDENT]) , 2024 FC 789 at paras 34, 40-41; [RESPONDENT], at para 2; [NAME], at para 98; [RESPONDENT] v Canada (Citizenship [RESPONDENT]) , 2024 FC 564 at paras 37-38). [ 20 ] The question for a reviewing court at this stage is how to evaluate a justification for delay advanced by a respondent. This justification is effectively the reasons given for the delay in an administrative process, and it is appropriately treated as administrative reasons. A respondent’s justification can be apparent from recent Global Case Management System note (GCMS) entries ( [RESPONDENT] v Canada (Minister of Citizenship [RESPONDENT] ), 1999 CanLII 699 (SCC) at para 44) or presented to a court in an affidavit from a representative of the respondent who is familiar with the delay. [ 21 ] In my view, when the reasonableness of administrative delay is challenged, the appropriate standard for assessing a respondent’s justification is the default standard for assessing administrative reasons, which is the reasonableness standard described in Canada (Minister of Citizenship [RESPONDENT]) v Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 [ [RESPONDENT] ] at paragraphs 99-107. [ 22 ] The reasonableness standard of review has not to date been formally used in applying the criteria for mandamus . However, I see no difficulty in applying reasonableness review to the assessment of government justification for delay in the context of applications for mandamus . The reasonableness standard is respectful of institutional roles and recognizes that, aside from issues of procedural fairness, administrative actors have been authorized by the legislature to act with a minimum of judicial interference ( [NAME] , at para 24). At the same time, robust reasonableness review of justifications offered by a respondent guards against arbitrariness and threats to the rule of law ( [NAME] , at para 72). Threats to the rule of law posed by inordinate delay were described thoroughly by the Supreme Court of Canada decades ago ( Blencoe v B.C. Human Rights Commission 2000 SCC 44 at paras 140, 145-148). [ 23 ] While an applicant on judicial review may challenge administrative delay as unreasonable, delay may also be challenged as unfair, such as situations characterized as abuse of process. ( Law Society of Saskatchewan v [NAME], 2022 SCC 29 at para 38; [NAME] , at para 126). [ 24 ] In my view, when delay is challenged as unreasonable, the deferential reasonableness standard of review is applied to a respondent’s justification and prejudice does not have to be established ( [NAME] , at paras 120-128). However, when delay is characterized as unfair, a non-deferential standard of review is applied to a respondent’s justification ( [COMPANY] v Canada (Attorney General) , 2018 FCA 69 at paras 54-56) and prejudice should be demonstrated, at least when the unfairness is alleged to rise to the level of abuse of process ( [NAME], at para 125). In either case, mandamus is available for relief. [ 25 ] This framework respects the conceptual structure of judicial review in which remedial considerations follow an assessment of whether government conduct is unreasonable or unfair. Mandamus is a species of remedy, not a species of judicial review. In my view, technical remedial requirements should not eclipse the primary exercise animating them, which in this case is judicial review. In other contexts, the Court has recognized the conceptually distinct stages of substantive judicial review and remedy ( [NAME] v [COMPANY] [RESPONDENT] [NAME], 2025 FC 692 at paras 33-39; [NAME]. v. Canada (Citizenship [RESPONDENT]) , 2025 FC 1296 at paras 67). Inordinate delay is simply another form of administrative unreasonableness or unfairness, remedied by the specifically tailored relief of mandamus. [ 26 ] There is no evidence before the Court in the present case that identifies a justification for the delay. There is a clerical affidavit filed by the Respondent attaching GCMS notes which end in May 2025, and another clerical affidavit attaching a request for information from the Applicant in April 2025, which indicates that security screening was in process at that time. [ 27 ] Given that this evidence is more than a year old, I am not prepared to accept that the continuing delay relates to security screening as opposed to the misallocation or inefficient use of resources. When leave was granted in this matter, the Respondent was provided an opportunity to file an affidavit by April 21, 2026, but did not do so. As previously stated, the onus is on the Respondent to provide a justification. [ 28 ] In written argument, Counsel for the Respondent submitted that security screening is the reason for the delay. However, Counsel for the Respondent is prohibited from providing evidence through the content of a memorandum alone; evidence must be introduced by way of affidavit ( Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98-106, s 174; [RESPONDENT] v Canada (Citizenship [RESPONDENT]) , 2026 FC 682 at para 20). [ 29 ] As a result, there is nothing before the Court identifying the source of the current delay or providing justification for it. The Respondent has therefore failed to discharge its onus to provide a justification for the delay.

III. Conclusion [ 30 ] The Applicant has satisfied the [NAME] requirements for an order of mandamus . The Respondent has not advanced any basis for withholding relief other than balance of convenience submissions that repeat an unsupported justification for the delay and references to “queue jumping” that have been rejected by the Federal Court of Appeal as a justification ( [APPELLANT] , at paras 144-147).

IV. Costs [ 31 ] The Applicant has requested costs on a solicitor and client basis in the amount of $10,000.00 to compensate him for expenses, such as legal fees and school expenses, which he has incurred because of the delay in the processing of his application. [ 32 ] Cost requests in judicial review applications are subject to Rule 22 of the Federal Courts Citizenship, [RESPONDENT] Protection Rules , SOR/93-22, which requires “special reasons” for costs to be awarded. [ 33 ] A finding that mandamus is warranted is not sufficient to warrant costs; additional factors such as oppressive, unfair or bad faith conduct is required ( [RESPONDENT] v Canada (Citizenship [RESPONDENT]) , 2022 FC 584 at para 23). Special reasons can include the behaviour of the Minister or an [RESPONDENT] official, or the behaviour of counsel for the Respondent ( [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship [RESPONDENT]) , 2011 FCA 208 at para 7). [ 34 ] Special reasons have been recognized in mandamus cases where there was excessive delay, and where the Respondent repeatedly ignores the reasonable requests and queries of the Applicant ( [APPELLANT] v Canada (Citizenship [RESPONDENT]) , 2024 FC 1132 at para 29; [RESPONDENT] v Canada (Citizenship [RESPONDENT]) , 2024 FC 1847 at para 9; [RESPONDENT] v Canada (Citizenship [RESPONDENT]) , 2023 FC 946 at paras 45-49; [RESPONDENT] v Canada ([NAME]) , 2011 FC 131 at paras 19-22). [ 35 ] Special reasons for an award of costs are present in this case. The Respondent has repeatedly ignored the Applicant’s requests for a decision on his study permit application, requiring him to file access to information requests and this application for judicial review in order to even understand the basis for the delay in his application. Despite his efforts and expenses, he has still not received information regarding the reason for the delay or when a decision can be expected. [ 36 ] Moreover, the Respondent has encouraged the Court to ignore recent binding appellate authority regarding principles applicable to the issuance of mandamus , despite the absence of any indication in [NAME] that its principles are irrelevant to the disposition of this application, and despite other recent mandamus decisions of the Court finding the decision to be relevant. [ 37 ] The Applicant has established entitlement to an award of costs but has provided no support for the amount requested. In these circumstances the Applicant is awarded costs in the amount of $1000.00. [APPELLANT] in IMM-6964-25 THIS COURT’S

JUDGMENT is that : The application for judicial review and request for an order of mandamus is granted. A decision shall be rendered on the Applicant’s study permit application within 30 days. The Applicant shall be paid costs in the amount of $1000.00. "[NAME]" Judge FEDERAL COURT SOLICITORS OF RECORD DOCKET: IMM-6964-25 STYLE OF CAUSE: [APPELLANT] v THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP [RESPONDENT] OF HEARING:

HELD BY WAY OF ZOOM VIDEOCONFERENCE DATE OF HEARING: JUNE 9, 2026

REASONS AND

JUDGMENT: [NAME] J. DATED: JUNE 11, 2026 APPEARANCES : [APPELLANT] For The Applicant [APPELLANT] For The Respondent SOLICITORS OF RECORD : [NAME], Ontario For The Applicant Attorney General of Canada Toronto, Ontario For The Respondent