Federal Court Orders IRCC to Process Permanent Residence Application Within 90 Days

Date: 20260521 Docket: IMM-5114-25 Citation: 2026 FC 647 Ottawa, Ontario, May 21, 2026 PRESENT: Madam Justice Sadrehashemi BETWEEN: [NAME] Applicant and THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION Respondent

REASONS AND

JUDGMENT I. Overview [ 1 ] The Applicant, [NAME], is married to a Canadian citizen and has two Canadian-born children (aged 6 and 2). [NAME] applied for permanent residence in the overseas spousal sponsorship category ( “PR Application” ) in April 2019, approximately seven years ago. There is no decision to date on his PR Application. During this time, [NAME] has, for the most part, been separated from his wife and children. [ 2 ] In April 2025, six years after filing his PR Application, [NAME] filed an application for leave and judicial review asking this Court to order a writ of mandamus to compel Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada [IRCC] to make a determination on his PR Application. [ 3 ] I find [NAME] has established that the delay in processing his PR Application has been unreasonable. The Minister did not provide evidence specific to [NAME]’s security screening and instead relied on entries in the Global Case Management System [GCMS] notes to support its view that the security screening was an adequate justification for the delay. I am not satisfied that the Minister has shown that there is an adequate justification for the lengthy delay in this case. I find that a mandamus order is warranted. I order the Minister to process the PR Application in 90 days, and I find there are special reasons to order costs.

II. Procedural History [ 4 ] [NAME] is a citizen of Iraq and currently living there. He is married to a Canadian citizen and has two Canadian-born children. [NAME]’s wife and children live in Ontario. In April 2019, he applied for permanent residence [PR] in the spousal sponsorship category. [ 5 ] During the first six months of processing the PR Application, the following steps were taken: [NAME]’s wife was notified that she met the eligibility requirements to be a sponsor; [NAME] completed his medical examination, and [NAME]’s biometrics were collected. [ 6 ] From October 2019 until approximately a week prior to the judicial review hearing in April 2026, neither [NAME] nor his spouse received any further requests from IRCC relating to the PR Application. During this time, over the course of six years, [NAME]’s wife sent at least 30 requests for information to IRCC, either personally or through her Member of Parliament. Sometimes these requests were not answered; other times a generic response was provided indicating that “background checks or further investigation are necessary” . [ 7 ] In the record before me, [NAME] was never advised by IRCC or other government agencies on what basis there were concerns with his inadmissibility to Canada. [ 8 ] The GCMS notes indicate that in January 2020, a “comprehensive security screening” was initiated. No evidence has been filed about the nature of this assessment as it relates to [NAME]. The generic information provided by the Respondent reveals a “comprehensive security screening” is undertaken for all in-Canada refugee claimants, and the steps involved in the process can vary widely, from a few additional checks by the Canada Border Services Agency [CBSA] or a much more detailed review, including a review by the [NAME] [[NAME]]. Neither the Applicant nor the Court understand the nature of the comprehensive security check that was done in [NAME]’s case. [ 9 ] From January 2020 until two weeks prior to the judicial review hearing (April 2026), an approximately six year period, there were only three notations in the GCMS notes that indicated IRCC took some action on the file: July 2021, a “follow up with NSSD [National Security Screening Division with CBSA]” was made; April 2022, “Follow-up done with CINSS [Centre for Immigration National Security Screening]. Security screening still pending” ; and in May 2023, “Status request sent to partners” . From May 2023 until April 2026, over a three-year period, there is no evidence of further action. [ 10 ] Approximately two weeks prior to the judicial review hearing, counsel for the Respondent sought leave to provide additional material. [ADDRESS] accepted the most recent GCMS notes that indicated the security checks by IRCC’s partner agencies had been completed and that IRCC was scheduling an interview with [NAME] by videoconference. The purpose of the interview was not disclosed. [ 11 ] At the hearing, counsel for the Respondent advised that this interview took place the day prior. Counsel also advised that they could provide the Court with the notes of this interview. Given that the proposal was to provide only notes of the interview – without any evidence explaining how [NAME]’s responses during the interview may impact the next stages required to process his PR Application – I did not see the relevance of this last-minute disclosure to the issues before me on the mandamus application.

III. Analysis A. Test for Mandamus [ 12 ] Mandamus is an equitable remedy used to compel the performance of a public duty. [ADDRESS]’s ability to grant a writ of mandamus is provided for under subsections 18.1(3)(a) and 18.1(4) of the Federal Courts Act , RSC, 1985, c F-7. The well-established criteria for mandamus are set out in [NAME] v Canada (Attorney General) , 1993 CanLII 3004 (FCA), [1994] 1 FC 742 (CA) [ [NAME] ]: (1) there must be a public legal duty to act; (2) the duty must be owed to the applicant; (3) there must be a clear right to performance of that duty; (4) where the duty sought to be enforced is discretionary, certain additional principles apply; (5) no other adequate remedy is available to the applicant; (6) the order sought will have some practical value or effect; (7) there is no equitable bar to the relief sought; and (8) on a balance of convenience an order of mandamus should be issued. [ 13 ] As recently explained by the Federal Court of Appeal in [NAME] v Canada (Royal Canadian Mounted Police External Review Committee) , 2026 FCA 53 [ [NAME] ] at paragraph 45, the first four criteria serve a different purpose than the remaining four: The first four criteria are considered by the reviewing court to determine whether the applicant has shown that they would be entitled to an order of mandamus . The final four criteria relate to reasons for which the reviewing court should exercise its discretion to deny the remedy to which the applicant would otherwise be entitled. [ 14 ] At issue is the third [NAME] factor and whether there is a clear right to the performance of the duty. In order to establish this, an applicant must show: i) they have satisfied all the requirements for a decision to be made; ii) they have made a prior request for a decision to be made; and iii) the decision-maker has either expressly refused to make a decision or has unreasonably delayed deciding ( [NAME] at 767). [ 15 ] The parties do not agree on whether there has been unreasonable delay in processing [NAME]’s PR Application. The three factors that the Court routinely considers in evaluating if the delay has been unreasonable are: i) the delay in question has been longer than the nature of the process required, prima facie ; (ii) the applicant is not responsible for the delay; and (iii) the authority responsible for the delay has not provided a satisfactory justification: [NAME] v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) , 1998 CanLII 9097 (FC) at 23 [ [NAME] ]. [ 16 ] The key points of dispute are the first and third [NAME] factors: whether the delay in question is longer than the process required prima facie and if it is, whether the Minister has provided a satisfactory justification in [NAME]’s case. [ 17 ] On both points, the Minister makes the same argument. The Minister argues that because [NAME]’s case required security screening, the delay is not longer than is necessary and if it is, there is adequate justification for that same reason. B. Unreasonable Delay and Security Screening [ 18 ] The Minister’s argument that [NAME]’s security screening adds complexity to the processing of his PR Application is properly considered at the third [NAME] factor - whether there is a satisfactory justification for the delay. The Federal Court of Appeal in [NAME] confirmed that the particular complexities of an applicant’s case that may justify delays above the inherent time requirements ought to be considered at the third stage. Satisfactory justification for the delay is the Minister’s burden to demonstrate – at the third stage – not the Applicant’s ( [NAME] at para 95). [ 19 ] At the first stage of the [NAME] test, the Applicant is required to show that the delay, on its face, is longer than the nature of the process required. [ADDRESS] is considering at this first stage: … the time requirements inherent to the administrative proceedings in light of the legal and factual complexities of the matters dealt with by the administrative decision-maker, and considering the requirements of a fair process, the purpose of the proceedings and the rights and interests of those affected by them ( [NAME] at para 77). [ 20 ] At issue here is IRCC’s processing of overseas spousal sponsorships. Paragraph 3(1)(f) and (f.1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act , SC 2001, c 27 [ IRPA ] recognize that immigration goals are subject to “consistent standards and prompt processing” , and the integrity of the immigration system is maintained through “the establishment of fair and efficient procedures” . Family sponsorships of spouses and children have long received prioritized processing presumably because of the nature of the interests at stake in these applications. [ 21 ] The Federal Court of Appeal in [NAME] confirmed that service standards, while not determinative, are relevant to the inquiry of whether processing has exceeded the inherent time requirements ( [NAME] at para 91). IRCC’s service standard, defined as “a commitment to a specific level of service that clients can expect to receive under normal circumstances” , is set at 12 months for Family Class Priority applications. The dynamic average processing time has generally mirrored this standard: it was 12 months at the time [NAME]’s PR Application was submitted, 11 months when the judicial review was initiated, and has since increased to 15 months. [ 22 ] The assessment at the first stage of the [NAME] test is straightforward in this case. The length of processing [NAME]’s PR Application is approximately six times the service standard and the average processing time, with evidence of long periods of unexplained inaction.

Accordingly, I am satisfied that the process in [NAME]’s case has taken longer on its face than is required for Family Class Priority applications. [ 23 ] The remaining question is the third stage of the [NAME] test that requires the Minister to explain if there is a satisfactory justification for this delay. The Minister argues that the need for a comprehensive security screening, which involved contact with IRCC’s partner agencies, is the justification for the delay. While certainly security screening is a critical step in processing PR applications, the difficulty with the Minister’s position is their failure to provide evidence of the steps taken and/or required to account for the six-year delay in processing [NAME]’s PR Application. [ 24 ] As explained by Justice McHaffie in [NAME] v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 FC 1253 [ [NAME] ] at paragraph 20: “For the Court to assess whether the length of a security review is reasonable, it must have some information about the review and the reasons for its length” . [ADDRESS] has repeatedly stated that relying on “security screening” as a blanket justification without any evidence about the nature of the screening required will not be an adequate justification for the delay (see for example: [NAME] v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) , 2005 FC 729 at para 26; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2015 FC 1248 at paras 49-50; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2021 FC 712 at para 40; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2023 FC 854 at paras 36-37; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2023 FC 1447 at paras 30-31; and [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2024 FC 564 at para 34; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2024 FC 1593 [ [NAME] ] at para 103; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration),  2025 FC 1675 [ [NAME] ] at para 17; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2025 FC 987 [ [NAME] ] at para 15; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 FC 1718 [ [NAME] ] at para 13; [NAME] v Canada, (Citizenship and Immigration), 2026 FC 181 [ [NAME] ] at para 18). [ 25 ] The Minister argues that the security screening justification here is not a “blanket statement” because in January 2020, the GCMS notes indicate that a comprehensive security screening was needed. I am not persuaded by this argument. As I have already explained, there was no detail provided about the nature of the security check process involved in [NAME]’s case. As noted in the generic evidence provided by the Minister, the nature of a comprehensive security screening can vary widely. I also note, that other than the notation “(A34)” beside the “comprehensive security screening” entry in the GCMS notes for January 2020, there is no indication on what basis the Minister has a security concern. There is no evidence in the record, if there is indeed a section 34 inadmissibility concern, as to which specific ground under section 34 of IRPA is the basis for an admissibility concern. [ 26 ] The Minister also argued that they could not provide evidence emanating from their partner agencies. The Minister did not provide any evidence explaining the nature of the involvement of any government partners. [ADDRESS] has said numerous times, in the same context, that it is not a sufficient justification to say that another government agency is involved. As noted by Justice Turley in [NAME] at paragraph 20: “Even if one of IRCC’s federal government partners is seized of the Applicant’s security screening, this does not relieve the Respondent of its onus of adducing sufficient evidence to explain the processing delay” (see also: [NAME] at para 19; [NAME]  at paras 5, 21–23, 25; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2020 FC 452 at paras 30, 32). [ 27 ] Further, I find the Respondent’s heavy reliance on Justice Brown’s decision in [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 FC 1664 [ [NAME] ], to argue that the need for security screening constitutes sufficient justification, is misplaced. First, that decision arose in a distinct factual context very different from the case before me: it involved a visitor visa application where the mandamus application was initiated nine months after the application had been filed, a specific security concern - espionage- was raised and the applicant lost contact with their counsel and no one appeared on their behalf at the hearing. Second, [NAME] was decided before [NAME] , which assessed and clarified the overall structure of the [NAME]  and [NAME]  frameworks. Elements of [NAME] are inconsistent with [NAME] and, to this extent, cannot be relied upon. Lastly, [NAME] does not address the long line of jurisprudence (set out above) directly applicable to the Applicant’s circumstances about the problem with relying on blanket security justifications without providing evidence about the steps taken to justify delay. [ 28 ] The Respondent’s reliance on [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2026 FC 550 [ [NAME] ] is also misplaced. While, like [NAME] involves a lengthy delay on a PR application due to security screening, the similarities end there. In [NAME] , the Court was satisfied that: (1) there were “serious security concerns” due to the applicant’s background as a former diplomat and governor of several provinces in Afghanistan; (2) that “the assessment conducted for IRCC by the CINSS and the Security Screening Brief prepared by [NAME] demonstrate that the security screening is necessary and has been comprehensive” ; and (3) that “the record does not show large gaps without any action on the part of IRCC.” None of the key factors that led the Court to conclude that the Minister was relying on more than just a “blanket statement” to justify delay are present in this case. [ 29 ] Given the length of the delay in this case and the failure to provide any evidence about the specific nature of the security screening process involved in [NAME]’s case over the last six years, I am not satisfied that the Minister has met their onus of satisfactory justification at the third stage of the [NAME] test. [ 30 ] As the first four factors in the [NAME] test are met, mandamus should be ordered unless one of the remaining four factors is a bar to relief ( [NAME] at paras 47-51). The Minister argued that the balance of convenience favours denying relief given the importance of thorough security checks. As explained by the Federal Court of Appeal in [NAME], “mandamus relief will not lightly be denied on grounds of the balance of convenience” (para 151; [NAME] at para 42). As already canvassed, the Minister chose not to file any direct evidence about the particular steps required in conducting security screening in the Applicant’s case, relying only on evidence from staff at the Department of Justice that attached GCMS notes and website links to generic information about security screenings. The Minister’s assertion is not supported by the evidence as is required ( [NAME] at para 156). [ 31 ] I am satisfied that there is no bar to ordering mandamus.

IV. Disposition [ 32 ] Similarly to Justice Zinn’s recent decision in [NAME], I find that the eleventh-hour interview with [NAME] represents a step towards the completion of the outstanding security screening, after a long period of unexplained inactivity. As in [NAME], there is no assurance that a final decision will be made shortly. Mandamus is still required. The Minister has not provided evidence about the further steps required to make a decision on [NAME]’s PR Application ( [NAME] at para 29; [NAME] at para 18). In these circumstances, I am of the view that 90 days is a sufficient time period for a final decision. I will also remain seized of this matter if issues arise with compliance with timeframe for either party. [ 33 ] [NAME] asked for costs. Costs are generally not awarded to either party in citizenship, immigration or refugee protection matters before this Court. Rule 22 of the Federal Courts Citizenship, Immigration and Refugee Protection Rules , SOR/93-22 provides that costs may only be awarded where there are “special reasons” . Misleading or abusive conduct or unreasonable and unjustified delay have been found to constitute a “special reason” that may justify making a cost award ( [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2011 FCA 208 at para 7; M.F.S. v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2023 FC 321 at para 5). [ 34 ] [NAME] is not arguing misleading or abusive conduct on the part of the Minister but is asking for costs because of the unreasonable and unjustified delay in processing his PR Application. [ 35 ] [ADDRESS] has awarded costs based on unreasonable and unjustified delay by decision-makers in mandamus cases: [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2025 FC 1260 at para 91; [NAME] v at para 29; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) 2024 FC 1756 at paras 15-17; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2024 FC 1847 at para 9; [NAME] paras 129–130; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2024 FC 1132 [ [NAME] ] at paras 28–29; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2023 FC 946 [ [NAME] ] at paras 46–49; [NAME] at paras 46–48; [NAME] v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) , 2017 FC 288 at para 78. [ 36 ] I am satisfied that the circumstances of this case warrant costs. [NAME] and his family have waited an exceptionally long time for a decision, or even for a further request from IRCC. There is evidence of long periods of unexplained delays in the record. Despite a delay of almost seven years and repeated requests for information, [NAME] has been kept in the dark about the reasons for the delay. Even before this Court, long after the application for a mandamus was filed, the Respondent has not provided evidence about the nature of the security concern in [NAME]’s case, or the specific steps taken in his case that justify the delay (see [NAME] at paras 47-48). [NAME] and his sponsor’s requests for information have either been ignored or responded to with generic information (see [NAME] at para 29). This is despite the repeated explanations of the toll the delays were having on [NAME] in Iraq, his spouse and their young children in Canada. [ 37 ] I am satisfied that, in light of the combination of these circumstances, [NAME] has met the high threshold required to demonstrate special reasons for an award of costs in his favour.

Accordingly, I am of the view that he is entitled to receive costs in the all-inclusive, lump-sum amount of $2 000.

JUDGMENT in IMM-5114-25 THIS COURT’S

JUDGMENT is that The application for judicial review is allowed; A writ of mandamus is ordered compelling IRCC to process and determine the Applicant’s permanent residence application within 90 days of this Order; Costs in the lump sum all-inclusive amount of $2000.00 are payable by the Respondent; No serious question of general importance is certified; and I will remain seized of this matter. "Lobat Sadrehashemi" Judge FEDERAL COURT SOLICITORS OF RECORD Docket: IMM-5114-25 STYLE OF CAUSE: [NAME] v. [NAME] OF HEARING: TORONTO, ONTARIO DATE OF HEARING: MAY 5, 2026

REASONS FOR

JUDGMENT AND

JUDGMENT: SADREHASHEMI J DATED: MAY 21, 2026 APPEARANCE : [NAME] For The Respondent SOLICITORS OF RECORD : [NAME] of Canada Toronto, Ontario For The Respondent