Federal Court Rejects Claim for Permanent Residence Based on Humanitarian Grounds

Date: 20260709 Docket: IMM-3274-25 Citation: 2026 FC 914 Toronto, Ontario, July 9, 2026 PRESENT: Justice Andrew D. [NAME]: [NAME] Applicant and THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION Respondent

JUDGMENT AND

REASONS [ 1 ] The applicant applied for permanent residence with an exemption on humanitarian and compassionate ( “[NAME]” ) grounds under subsection 25(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 (the “ IRPA ” ). A senior immigration officer refused the application by decision dated February 4, 2025, which was sent to the applicant by letter dated March 3, 2025 (the “Decision” ). [ 2 ] In this judicial review application, the applicant asks the Court to set aside the Decision and remit her [NAME] application back for another officer to decide. She submitted that the decision was unreasonable under the principles in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. [NAME], 2019 SCC 65, [2019] 4 SCR 653. [ 3 ] For the reasons below, I have concluded that the application must be dismissed.

I. Background to this application [ 4 ] The applicant is a citizen of Pakistan. She is in her early 70s. [NAME] lives elsewhere. She has one child and two [NAME] who all live in Canada. Her parents and one sibling are deceased, and she has another sibling residing in Pakistan. She suffers from severe osteoarthritis in her knees. [ 5 ] The applicant’s daughter immigrated to Canada and is a citizen here. Her daughter’s children are ages 14 and 12. Her daughter is in the midst of a divorce, and the ex-husband also does not live in Canada. [ 6 ] In 2018, the applicant obtained a 10-year super visa. In August 2022, she entered Canada. She currently lives in Canada with her daughter and [NAME]. [ 7 ] In November 2023 the applicant filed the [NAME] application that led to the Decision. The basis of the [NAME] application was the hardship she would face living alone with limited mobility in Pakistan, separated from her daughter and [NAME]; the best interests of the children ( “BIOC” ); and her [NAME]. [ 8 ] The Decision refused the applicant’s request for permanent residence with an [NAME] exemption.

II. Analysis A. Standard of Review [ 9 ] On an application for judicial review of the substance of an [NAME] decision, the standard of review is reasonableness: [NAME] v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 SCC 61, [2015] 3 SCR 909, at para 44; [NAME] v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2026 FC 745, at para 8; [NAME] v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2026 FC 384, at para 13. [ 10 ] Reasonableness review is a deferential and disciplined evaluation of whether an administrative decision is transparent, intelligible and justified: [NAME], at paras 12-13 and 15; [NAME] v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 SCC 21, at paras 8, 63. The starting point is the reasons provided by the decision maker, which are read holistically and contextually, and in conjunction with the record that was before the decision maker. A reasonable decision is based on an internally coherent and rational chain of analysis and is justified in relation to the facts and law that constrained the decision maker: [NAME], esp. at paras 85, 91-97, 103, 105-106 and 194; [NAME], at paras 8, 59-61, 66. [ 11 ] It is not the role of the Court to re-assess or re-weigh the evidence, or to provide its own view of the merits. Thus, it is not permissible for the Court to come to its own view of the merits of the [NAME] application and then measure the impugned decision against the Court’s own assessment: [NAME], at para 62; [NAME], at para 83; [NAME] v. Canada (Attorney General), 2015 FCA 117, at para 28. B. [NAME] Applications [ 12 ] Subsection 25(1) of the IRPA gives the Minister discretion to exempt foreign nationals from the ordinary requirements of that statute and grant permanent resident status in Canada, if the Minister is of the opinion that such relief is justified by humanitarian and compassionate considerations. The Minister must “tak[e] into account the best interests of a child directly affected” . The [NAME] discretion in subsection 25(1) is a flexible and responsive exception to the ordinary operation of the IRPA , to mitigate the rigidity of the law in an appropriate case. [ 13 ] Humanitarian and compassionate considerations refer to “those facts, established by the evidence, which would excite in a reasonable [person] in a civilized community a desire to relieve the misfortunes of another — so long as these misfortunes ‘warrant the granting of special relief’ from the effect of the provisions of the [ IRPA ]” : [NAME] v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1970), 4 I.A.C. 338, at p. 350, as quoted in [NAME] , at paras 13 and 21. The purpose of the [NAME] provision is provide equitable relief in those circumstances: [NAME], at paras 21-22, 30-33 and 45. [ 14 ] In [NAME] v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2025 FC 47, Justice Kane provided an overview of the guidance in [NAME], and this Court’s case law since it, as follows (at para 80): · An [NAME] exemption is a discretionary provision and is exceptional or special relief; · Reviewing courts must not substitute their discretion for that of the officer; · While undue, undeserved and disproportionate hardship is not the standard, hardship remains a relevant consideration [see also [NAME] , at paras 33, 70]; · Some hardship is the normal consequence of removal and that hardship, on its own, does not support granting the exemption; · Applicants must demonstrate with sufficient evidence that the misfortunes or hardships they will face are relatively greater than those typically faced by others seeking permanent residence in Canada; · All other relevant [NAME] factors—not just hardship—must be considered and weighed; and, · The best interest of the child is an important factor to be given significant weight, but is not determinative of an [NAME] application. [ 15 ] When assessing [NAME] applications, an officer must be alert, alive and sensitive to the best interests of the children. Those interests must be well identified and defined, and examined with a great deal of attention in light of all the evidence: see [NAME], at paras 35 and 38-40. The children’s interests must be given substantial weight and be a significant factor in the [NAME] analysis, but are not necessarily determinative of the application: [NAME], at para 41; [NAME] v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) , 2009 FCA 189, [2010] 1 FCR 360, at para 24. As Kane J. noted in [NAME] , while the children’s interests must be given substantial weight and be a significant factor, their interests are not necessarily determinative of an [NAME] application: [NAME], at para 41; [NAME] v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 FCA 475, [2003] 2 FCR 555, at para 2. [ 16 ] The onus on the applicant to present [NAME] evidence generally, and to provide evidence to support the BIOC in particular, is well established: [NAME] v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FCA 38, [2004] 2 FCR 635, at paras 5 and 8; [NAME], at paras 35, 45 and 61. C. The present case [ 17 ] In addition to the relevant forms, the applicant’s [NAME] application included one-page statutory declarations from the applicant and from her daughter; photographs of the family; a one-sentence letter from the applicant’s physician; some laboratory records related to the applicant’s medical condition; three brief letters of support; identity documents; bank statements, insurance information, and other financial documentation; and written submissions to support the applicant’s position. [ 18 ] The Decision assessed the [NAME] application under the following headings: Return to country of nationality; BIOC; [NAME]; Family reunification; and Conclusion. The applicant argued that the Decision contained reviewable errors in the analysis under most of the headings, so I will use the same headings to organize these Reasons. (1) Return to country of nationality [ 19 ] The applicant made two submissions about this section of the Decision. [ 20 ] The applicant’s first submission was that the Decision overlooked relevant evidence about the applicant’s vulnerability as a single elderly woman with limited mobility, did not properly assess the implications of the osteoarthritis in her knees and underestimated the degree of interdependency with her daughter and [NAME]. [ 21 ] In my view, the Decision did not make a reviewable error in its consideration of the evidence. It recognized that she had been diagnosed with “severe osteoarthritis” and that she is “dependent on others for her daily needs” . It referred to laboratory reports and the doctor’s letter. The Decision also noted the absence of objective evidence to support the applicant’s position that the [NAME] is inferior and suffers from underfunding and a shortage of nurses, and that the applicant could not access suitable health care there. [ 22 ] The evidence before the officer did not contain significant details about how the applicant’s medical condition affected her daily life. The applicant’s statutory declaration stated that she “suffer[s] from severe osteoarthritis knees, among many age-related health concerns, leading to a significant requirement of support from [her] daughter.” The daughter’s statutory declaration stated that her mother, “in her elderly age and worsening health conditions, … is reliant on me for physical and medical support ….” The doctor’s letter advised that the applicant “cannot perform her daily living activities due to her health condition severe osteoarthritis knees, patient is dependent on her daughter …” [ 23 ] The evidence did not explain the applicant’s day-to-day mobility problems that could affect her ability to live and obtain health care in Pakistan. While the applicant argued that the Decision did not appreciate the difficulties the applicant would have in accessing health care in Pakistan, the filed evidence (particularly the statutory declarations) provided no detailed information on which to base an assessment of those challenges. [ 24 ] In my view, the Decision did not fundamentally misapprehend or ignore any material evidence, reasonably accounted for the evidence filed, and was sufficiently responsive to her [NAME] submissions on the impact of her medical condition. [ 25 ] The applicant’s second submission was that the Decision improperly relied on the fact that the applicant could apply for permanent residence under the [NAME] ([NAME]), which the applicant advised is currently closed to new applications. As such, the applicant argued that the consideration of this immigration pathway was unreasonable. [ 26 ] This factor arose immediately following a recognition that the applicant wished to stay in Canada and already possessed a super visa. [ 27 ] I agree with the applicant that an unavailable alternative immigration pathway was not a salient or proper consideration in an [NAME] assessment. However, its mention in this case was not so fundamental or central to the overall reasoning to be a reviewable error that warrants setting aside the Decision: [NAME] , at para 100. (2) BIOC [ 28 ] The applicant’s submissions on the BIOC began by noting that the Decision did not follow the three-step approach contemplated in [NAME] v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2012 FC 166, at para 63. The applicant did not submit that a failure to follow the [NAME] steps was, in itself, a reviewable error or that the Decision entirely ignored the substance of those steps. She contended that the Decision appeared to address the first step (what is in the child’s best interest) but did not properly address the second (the degree to which the child’s interests are compromised). The third step is the weight the BIOC factor should play in the ultimate balancing of positive and negative factors assessed in the application, which will be addressed at the end of these Reasons. [ 29 ] I note that the Court has stated repeatedly that the [NAME] assessment, and the BIOC analysis in particular, is not a rigid formula that must be followed: see, e.g., [NAME] v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2026 FC 363, at para 34; [NAME] v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2023 FC 95, at para 14; [NAME] v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2022 FC 854, at para 32; [NAME] v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2017 FC 724, at paras 23-24; [NAME] v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2016 FC 1082, at paras 25-26. [ 30 ] The three-step approach in [NAME] is often useful and helpful to give structure and substance to the BIOC analysis in a particular case: see [NAME] v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2023 FC 1654, at paras 20-21. However, I do not believe that a failure to analyze the BIOC in an [NAME] decision using the three steps in [NAME] , without more, constitutes a reviewable error requiring the Court to set the decision aside. [ADDRESS] must assess whether a reviewable error exists in the actual BIOC analysis conducted in the decision under review and, in doing so, may consider whether that analysis followed the approach in [NAME] : see e.g., [NAME] , at paras 117-126. [ 31 ] As noted, in this case the applicant did not contend that the Decision completely ignored the substance of the three steps in [NAME] . The applicant submitted that rather than identifying the best outcome for the children’s interests (effectively at the second step), the Decision focused on how the hardships to the children would be mitigated. The applicant submitted that while the Decision understood the relationship between the applicant and her [NAME], it did not reasonably assess their best interests as opposed to the hardships they would experience. [ 32 ] I find no reviewable error in the Decision on this basis. The Decision adequately recognized that the focal issue was the BIOC, rather than the hardships the children could experience. The Decision found that the applicant’s submissions did not “sufficiently” establish that a return to Pakistan by the applicant may negatively impact the [NAME] to an extent that an [NAME] exemption should be granted. The Decision found that “[NAME] to no evidence” was presented to support the BIOC. [ 33 ] While the reasoning did not refer expressly to “interdependence” , the Decision considered the evidence of the interdependence of the applicant and her [NAME] in substance, describing their daily interactions (the children help to ensure the applicant takes her medication) and how the applicant has provided a “sense of stability” to the children during their mother’s divorce. The Decision appreciated that the applicant and the [NAME] share a close bond but found that the evidence did not show that her departure would be contrary to their best interests.

Accordingly, I cannot conclude that the BIOC analysis focused unreasonably on the mitigation of the hardships that the [NAME] may experience in Canada if their grandmother returns to Pakistan. [ 34 ] As the Decision found, the record before the officer was sparse concerning the children or any factors that could affect their individual interests. It related mainly to their grandmother’s presence to assist them with daily life and to provide cultural guidance. The applicant’s statutory declaration stated that she had “developed a great interdependence” with her [NAME], without elaboration. The evidence before the officer could not have been found to meet the level of interdependence described by the Court in, for example, [NAME] v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2022 FC 773, at para 29. The Decision was sufficiently responsive to the applicant’s written submissions on the BIOC. In the circumstances, I find no reviewable error in the assessment of the BIOC on the grounds raised by the applicant. [ 35 ] The applicant also argued that the Decision unreasonably relied on the use of video calls between the applicant and the [NAME]. The Decision found that the applicant taught the [NAME] about culture, values and family heritage but that that the evidence did not demonstrate that such teachings could not occur by other methods, such as their parents or [NAME]. The Decision stated that the applicant could continue to teach the children and bond with them via alternate communications methods while in Pakistan, such as video calls. [ 36 ] [ADDRESS] has found that a reviewable error may occur if a BIOC assessment concludes that immediate family relationships can be maintained through video calls without accounting for the material evidence about the individuals and relationships involved. Boilerplate language in a decision that does not account for the evidence on the individuals’ interpersonal relationships, or the specific interests of a child, will raise concerns: [NAME] v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2025 FC 752, at para 14; [NAME] v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2024 FC 1266, at para 18; [NAME] v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2024 FC 364, at para 26; [NAME] v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2023 FC 412, at paras 26-27; [NAME] v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2022 FC 1590, at para 59; [NAME] v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2015 FC 1201, at para 16. I remain of the view expressed in [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2022 FC 816, at paragraph 39: Statements about the use of technology to maintain relationships must be sensitive to the particular circumstances – for example, an adult’s ability to use technology to keep up with adult friends from afar is quite different from a parent and a child attempting to maintain a meaningful relationship as the child grows up. Concerns may arise if the reasons do not reflect the circumstances of those affected, particularly a child’s best interests. [ 37 ] However, as the respondent observed, there are also circumstances in which a reference to video calls to help maintain relationships in a BIOC analysis may be reasonable, if the decision contains a meaningful assessment of the BIOC on the evidence provided and otherwise follows the BIOC requirements in the appellate cases: [NAME] v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2024 FC 849, at paras 8, 23-28 (citing [NAME] , at para 22). A similar analysis arises in respect of evidence of personal ties and video calls for the purposes of establishment: [NAME] v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2025 FC 609, at paras 19-21; [NAME] v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2024 FC 1418, at para 33. [ 38 ] The present Decision did not fail to account for the specific evidence about the individuals and relationships involved, because the evidence filed on the [NAME] application did not provide much detail. In addition, the reference to video calls arose in a relatively limited context – the applicant teaching the children about culture, values and family heritage – and without any meaningful evidence elaborating on what guidance the applicant has provided to the children while in Canada or what would be provided to the [NAME] in the coming years. [ 39 ] On an application for judicial review, the Court can only determine whether the Decision reasonably considered and assessed the information provided in the [NAME] application concerning the relationship between an individual applicant and the child(ren) involved. Given the reasoning in this case, the information before the officer, and the onus on an applicant to file BIOC evidence, the reference to video calls in the BIOC analysis does not constitute an error that rendered the overall Decision unreasonable. (3) [NAME] [ 40 ] The applicant submitted that the Decision applied a standard of exceptionality to the assessment of her [NAME]. The applicant also underlined that her establishment was based on her interdependence with her daughter and [NAME], the analysis of which she submitted was unreasonable. [ 41 ] I am unable to agree. By the time it assessed establishment, the Decision had analyzed interdependence under the BIOC. The evidence before the officer on establishment related to the applicant’s family and her attendance and volunteering at her place of worship. The Decision stated that the evidence to support establishment was “minimal” . The officer found that attending a place of worship and engaging in volunteer work was “not uncommon” for individuals residing in Canada and, for establishment purposes, not beyond what is “typically expected under similar circumstances” . [ 42 ] While the applicant’s activities are very meaningful to her and her family, and presumably to others present at her mosque, the Decision reasonably assessed the evidence of the applicant’s [NAME] based on the information in the record. The analysis did not apply a substantive standard of exceptionality to establishment. [ 43 ] I note that in previous cases, the Court has found the language used in the Decision to be reasonable: [NAME] v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2025 FC 192, at para 41; [NAME] v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2023 FC 99, at paras 19-21; [NAME] v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2022 FC 697, at paras 12-13. (4) Alleged failure to conduct a proper global assessment in the Conclusion [ 44 ] The applicant submitted that the Decision contained a reviewable error because it did not expressly describe the weight given to any factor other than the BIOC, rendering the Decision unintelligible. The applicant argued that it was not possible to trace the strength of establishment, hardship in Pakistan and the hardship of separation as individual factors in the [NAME] assessment, and how each one affected the global assessment. According to the applicant, these omissions made the Decision unintelligible. The applicant referred to [NAME] v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2026 FC 644 ( “ [NAME] 2026 ” ). [ 45 ] I am unable to accept this argument. Near the outset, the Decision recognized the need for a holistic and global assessment, giving weight to the cumulative nature of the applicant’s personal circumstances. Following the assessment of each of the factors at issue, its Conclusion section again stated that the Decision was based on a cumulative assessment of the evidence submitted by the applicant. [ 46 ] The Decision expressly stated that it gave significant weight to the BIOC (as it had to do). It is true that the Decision did not expressly state the weight given to the other factors. However, read as a whole and in light of the evidence in the record before the officer ( [NAME] , at paras 96, 103), the Decision can only be understood to conclude that [NAME] or no weight was given to each of the factors other than the BIOC. The Decision contained several findings that the evidence did not demonstrate or support what the applicant submitted. The applicant’s “evidence did not persuade [the officer] that she may incur hardship in Pakistan” . In addition, there was no objective evidence related to health care in Pakistan, “minimal” evidence to support establishment and “[NAME] to no evidence” presented to support the BIOC. [ 47 ] As such, I believe it is evident from the reasons why this [NAME] application did not succeed. The chain of reasoning is apparent even in the absence of express statements describing how the factors other than the BIOC were weighed.

Accordingly, the applicant’s submission that the Decision was not intelligible cannot succeed: [NAME] , at para 103. The Decision does not suffer from the same transparency and justifications concerns that arose in [NAME] 2026 . [ 48 ] The applicant also submitted that the BIOC reasoning suffered from an internal inconsistency, because the Decision gave the BIOC “significant weight” but found [NAME] evidence to support the BIOC. However, significant weight is to be given to the BIOC as a matter of law. On this record, it was reasonably open for the officer to find there was [NAME] or no evidence presented to support the BIOC. These statements do not render the Decision unreasonable due to unintelligibility. [ 49 ] Overall, while the Decision under review was not flawless, I conclude that the applicant has not shown that it contained a reviewable error that would justify this Court’s intervention.

III. Conclusion [ 50 ] For these reasons, I conclude that the application must be dismissed. [ 51 ] Neither party raised a question to certify for appeal. No question will be stated. [ 52 ] I thank both counsel and appreciate their careful and helpful submissions on this judicial review application, including at the hearing.

JUDGMENT IN IMM-3274-25 THIS COURT’S

JUDGMENT is that: The application for judicial review is dismissed. No question is certified under paragraph 74(d) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act . blank “Andrew D. [NAME]” blank Judge FEDERAL COURT SOLICITORS OF RECORD DOCKET: IMM-3274-25 STYLE OF CAUSE: [NAME] v THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION PLACE OF HEARING: TORONTO, ONTARIO DATE OF HEARING: JUNE 3, 2026

REASONS AND

JUDGMENT: [NAME]. DATED: JULY 9, 2026 APPEARANCES : [NAME] For The Applicant [NAME] For The Respondent SOLICITORS OF RECORD : [NAME], Ontario For The Applicant Deputy Attorney General of Canada Toronto, Ontario For The Respondent