Federal Court Rejects Claim for Refugee Protection Status

Date: 20260209 Docket: IMM-2580-25 Citation: 2026 FC 182 Ottawa, Ontario, February 9, 2026 PRESENT: The [NAME]: [NAME] Applicant and THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION Respondent

JUDGMENT AND

REASONS [ 1 ] The Applicant, a 67-year-old citizen of Turkey, and his wife were granted [NAME] protection in 2006 based on their fear of persecution from the Turkish authorities and police due to their Kurdish ethnicity, Alevi religion and membership in, and activities for, the [NAME] and the [NAME]. The Applicant obtained permanent resident status in April 2008. Since then, the Applicant has renewed his Turkish passport on three occasions and travelled back to Turkey on his Turkish passport three separate times, between October 2006 and December 2012, for a total duration of 344 days. [ 2 ] In 2015, the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness [Minister] brought an application, pursuant to subsection 108(2) of the Immigration and [NAME] Protection Act , SC 2001, c 27 [ IRPA ], for the cessation of the granting of [NAME] protection to the Applicant. Following a number of redeterminations of the application, the [NAME] Protection Division [[NAME]] granted the Minister’s application on January 23, 2025, and rejected the Applicant’s claim for [NAME] protection. [ 3 ] The Applicant now seeks judicial review of the [NAME]’s cessation decision, asserting that the [NAME] ignored or misapplied a number of the relevant factors detailed by the Federal Court of Appeal in Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v [NAME] , 2022 FCA 50, failed to consider the Applicant’s submissions and failed to engage in a proper analysis and weighing of the relevant factors. [ 4 ] For the reasons that follow, I am not satisfied that the Applicant has demonstrated a basis for the Court’s intervention.

Accordingly, the application for judicial review shall be dismissed.

I. Background [ 5 ] On July 20, 2015, the Minister made an application to cease the Applicant’s [NAME] status (as well as that of his wife), pursuant to subsection 108(2) of the IRPA and Rule 64 of the [NAME] Protection Division Rules , SOR/2012-256 [ Rules ], because the Applicant had renewed his Turkish passport and visited Turkey since being granted [NAME] protection. The Minister also brought an application to vacate the decision granting the Applicant (and his wife) [NAME] protection under section 109 of the IRPA on the basis that he had failed to disclose when applying for [NAME] protection that, in 2001, he had committed and/or been charged in Turkey with the offence of exporting heroin. The [NAME] heard the cessation and vacation applications together on October 15, 2018, and August 7, 2019. [ 6 ] In a decision dated August 23, 2019, the [NAME] vacated the [NAME] protection for the Applicant, rejected the application to vacate the [NAME] status of his wife (as the Minister could not point to any misrepresentation that she had made) and granted the application to cease his wife’s [NAME] protection. As the panel had already determined that the claim for protection of the Applicant was vacated, the application to cease the Applicant’s protection consequently became moot [[NAME] Decision]. [ 7 ] The Applicant and his wife filed separate applications for leave and judicial review of the [NAME] Decision, although both applications were heard together. On July 30, 2021, this Court dismissed the Applicant’s wife’s application because she had not persuaded the Court that the [NAME]’s decision to cease her [NAME] protection was unreasonable. [ADDRESS] allowed the Applicant’s application, holding that the [NAME]’s decision to vacate the decision granting him [NAME] protection was unreasonable, and referred the matter back to the [NAME] for redetermination. [ 8 ] The Applicant’s second hearing before the [NAME] took place on April 24, 2023, wherein the [NAME] ruled that the only issue against the Applicant was cessation. On May 4, 2023, the [NAME] granted the Minister’s cessation application [[NAME] Decision]. [ 9 ] On July 17, 2023, this Court issued a Judgment, on the consent of the parties, setting aside the [NAME] Decision and referring the matter back to the [NAME] for redetermination. [ 10 ] The redetermination hearing took place on October 9, 2024. By that time, the Applicant’s health had deteriorated and the parties agreed that the best manner to proceed would be to conduct the hearing in chambers, based on the evidence and submissions to date, and without further testimony from the Applicant. As such, the [NAME] had before it, inter alia , the transcript of the Applicant’s oral testimony from the August 7, 2019 and April 24, 2023 hearings, his wife’s testimony from the August 7, 2019 hearing, the record from the proceeding before this Court and the Applicant’s updated medical evidence. [ 11 ] The evidence before the [NAME] established that the Applicant has been under psychiatric care since 2017 and has been diagnosed with schizophrenia and severe anxiety; and suffers from hallucinations, delusions, hearing voices and confused and disturbed thoughts for which he receives psychotropic medication. He suffers from chronic headaches and chronic lower back pain, with reduced mobility, to the extent that he is often bedridden or unable to leave his home as he cannot walk without assistance. The most recent medical evidence indicates that his mental health has deteriorated in recent years. His doctors opine that separation from his family would jeopardize his mental and physical health and would be associated with a high risk of immediate decline and mortality. His wife also suffers from both physical illness and mental health illness, including paraplegia, advanced major depression and suicidal thoughts. Both the Applicant and his wife are therefore reliant on their adult children for care. [ 12 ] The redetermination hearing was focused on the Applicant’s repeated renewals of his Turkish passport and his repeated trips to Turkey. In relation to his Turkish passport, the Applicant: [redacted] [ 13 ] With respect to his repeated trips to Turkey after having received [NAME] protection, the first trip was for 85 days from October 22, 2008, to January 15, 2009. The second trip was for 88 days from May 10, 2011, to August 6, 2011. The third trip was for 171 days from July 2, 2012, to December 20, 2012. The Applicant provided conflicting evidence about the purpose of the trips — at various times, he claimed that the trips were for a funeral, to visit his children, to relocate his daughter and for his son’s wedding. [ 14 ] On January 23, 2025, the [NAME] allowed the Minister's application for cessation of the Applicant's [NAME] protection and rejected the Applicant's [NAME] claim. The [NAME] found that: The cessation of his [NAME] status would have significant negative consequences for the Applicant, including those related to his physical and mental health. The Applicant acted voluntarily each time he renewed his passport and travelled to Turkey, and the Applicant had not rebutted the presumption of voluntary reavailment. The Applicant’s intention was to reavail himself of the protection of [NAME] and he did not rebut that presumption. The Applicant actually reavailed himself of the protection of the Turkey and he did not rebut this. In relation to the various [NAME] factors, the [NAME] found that: (a) each of the trips were not for exceptional circumstances and, even if the [NAME] accepted that there were compelling reasons warranting travel, they did not warrant the Applicant spending a cumulative duration of approximately 11 months in Turkey; (b) the Applicant did not understand the potential immigration consequences of his actions; (c) there was no evidence that the [NAME] had shown any interest in the Applicant during any of his return trips; (d) the Applicant believed that he would be protected by his Canadian permanent resident status; (e) the duration and frequency of the trips suggested a lack of fear of the [NAME]; (f) the Applicant lacked sophistication; and (g) the Applicant’s evidence regarding precautionary measures was inconsistent and the [NAME] found that the Applicant had failed to demonstrate that he needed assistance to enter or exit Turkey or that he took any serious precautions while in Turkey to avoid contact with the [NAME].

II. Issues and Standard of Review [ 15 ] The sole issue for determination is whether the [NAME]’s cessation decision is unreasonable. [ 16 ] The parties agree, and I concur, that the applicable standard of review is reasonableness. When reviewing for reasonableness, the Court must take a “reasons first” approach and determine whether the decision under review, including both its rationale and outcome, is transparent, intelligible and justified [see [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2023 SCC 21 at paras 8, 59]. A reasonable decision is one that is based on an internally coherent and rational chain of analysis and that is justified in relation to the facts and law that constrain the decision-maker [see Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov , 2019 SCC 65 at paras 15, 85]. [ADDRESS] will intervene only if it is satisfied there are sufficiently serious shortcomings in the decision such that it cannot be said to exhibit the requisite degree of justification, intelligibility and transparency [see [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2020 FC 418 at para 11].

III. Analysis [ 17 ] Paragraph 108(1)(a) of the IRPA provides that a claim for [NAME] protection shall be rejected, and a person is not a [NAME] nor a person in need of protection, where a person has voluntarily reavailed themselves of the protection of their country of nationality. The provision is read disjunctively, meaning that, where a person who was granted protection by Canada voluntarily reavails themselves of the protection of their country of nationality under paragraph 108(1)(a), they are considered to have ceased to be a [NAME] and their claim for protection is deemed to have been rejected as of the time it was initially determined. [ 18 ] A decision to cease an individual’s [NAME] protection has serious and particularly harsh consequences for the affected individual. Finding that an individual has voluntarily reavailed themselves of the protection of their country of nationality will not only result in the cessation of their [NAME] status but, also, the loss of their permanent residency status in Canada [see [NAME] , supra at paras 50–51(a); [NAME] v Canada (Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship) , 2022 FC 1295 at para 39]. Given the significant impact of a cessation decision on an individual’s rights, the [NAME]’s reasons must “reflect the stakes” and, thus, there is an increased duty to provide reasons that explain the decision-maker’s rationale and meaningfully engage with the central issues and arguments raised by an applicant [see Vavilov , supra at para 133; [NAME] , supra at paras 49–51; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 1481 at para 28]. [ 19 ] The test for reavailment consists of three conjunctive elements: (i) the [NAME] must have acted voluntarily; (ii) the [NAME] must have intended to reavail themselves of the protection of their country of nationality; and (iii) the [NAME] must have actually obtained that protection [see [NAME] , supra at para 79]. [ 20 ] On voluntariness, an applicant is deemed to have acted voluntarily where their actions are free from administrative or government compulsion. Here, the Applicant does not contest the [NAME]’s finding that he acted voluntarily in renewing his passports and returning to Turkey. [ 21 ] On intention, there is a presumption that an applicant intended to reavail themselves when they apply for and obtain a passport from their country of nationality. This presumption is “particularly strong” in cases such as this one where a [NAME] uses their national passport to travel to their country of nationality [see [NAME] , supra at para 63]. Upon actual reavailment, the focus is on whether an applicant received the diplomatic protection of their country of nationality, rather than state protection. [ 22 ] The initial burden falls on the Minister to prove reavailment on the balance of probabilities. However, once the Minister establishes that a presumption of reavailment exists, the burden of proof reverses and the individual must then adduce sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption [see [NAME], supra at para 65]. In this case, the Applicant does not contest the [NAME]’s finding that the Minister had established that the presumption of reavailment exists. Rather, the Applicant contests the [NAME]’s finding that he had failed to rebut said presumption. [ 23 ] In considering whether an individual has rebutted the presumption of reavailment, the [NAME] should have regard to the following list of [NAME] factors: (i) the provisions of subsection 108(1) of the IRPA ; (ii) the provisions of relevant international conventions and guidelines; (iii) the severity of the consequences that a cessation of [NAME] protection will have on the affected individual; (iv) the submissions of the parties; (v) the state of the individual’s knowledge with respect to the cessation provisions; (vi) the personal attributes of the individual, such as their age, education and level of sophistication; (vii) the identity of the agent(s) of persecution (especially whether it is the government or a non-state actor); (viii) whether obtaining a passport was done voluntarily; (ix) whether the individual actually used the passport to travel and, if so, where they travelled to; (x) the purpose of the travel; (xi) the frequency and duration of the travel; (xii) what the individual did while in the country in question; (xiii) whether the individual took precautionary measures while in their country of nationality; (xiv) whether the actions of the individual demonstrate they no longer have a subjective fear of persecution in the country of nationality such that surrogate protection may no longer be required; and (xv) any other factors relevant to the question of whether the individual has rebutted the presumption of reavailment in a given case [see [NAME] , supra at para 84]. [ 24 ] No individual factor will necessarily be dispositive. The [NAME] should consider and balance all the evidence relating to the given factors in order to determine whether the actions of the affected individual are such that they have rebutted the presumption of reavailment [see [NAME] , supra at para 84]. [ 25 ] The Applicant here asserts that the [NAME]’s assessment and analysis of a number of the [NAME] factors was flawed, such that the decision lacked the required degree of justification necessary, given the significant consequences to the Applicant of cessation of his [NAME] protection. [ 26 ] The Applicant asserts that, in relation to the severity of the consequences of a cessation factor identified in [NAME] , the [NAME] failed to consider and analyze the Applicant’s evidence and the expert medical evidence that the severity and seriousness of consequences for this particular Applicant were critical, exceptional and compelling. The Applicant asserts that the evidence before the [NAME] demonstrated that: (a) without a support system in Turkey, the Applicant is at risk of dying due to his medical conditions; and (b) he is facing a long period of imprisonment as a result of the information contained in an INTERPOL Red Notice, issued on March 12, 2012, related to a conviction by the High Criminal Court in Istanbul for exporting addictive or exciting drugs. The Applicant asserts that, instead of considering these severe consequences as a stand-alone factor to be weighed, the [NAME] improperly dismissed them as humanitarian and compassionate considerations which could not be taken into account (as a cessation determination does not consider forward-facing risk). [ 27 ] I find that there is no merit to these assertions. The [NAME] set out, in great detail, the severity and seriousness of the consequences of cessation that were specific to the Applicant at paragraphs 32–34 and 153–154 of its decision. The [NAME] further detailed his medical condition, and the evidence in support thereof, at paragraphs 14–19. The [NAME] was aware of, and expressly considered, the Applicant’s personal circumstances and the severe consequences that could arise from granting the Minister’s application. [ 28 ] As recognized by the [NAME], where the impact of a decision on an individual’s rights and interests is severe, the reasons provided to that individual must reflect the stakes. The principle of responsive justification means that if a decision has particularly harsh consequences for the affected individual (such as here), the decision-maker must explain why its decision best reflects the legislature’s intention [see Vavilov , supra at para 133; [NAME] , supra at para 50]. I find that the [NAME]’s reasons are robust and its decision is well justified, thus meeting the [NAME]’s obligation of responsive justification. While the [NAME] did not expressly refer to the INTERPOL Red Notice, I do not find that this omission was material, as the [NAME] is presumed to have considered all of the evidence before it. In any event, the obligation on the [NAME] to provide responsive justification was already extremely high in light of the medical evidence before it and would not have been any higher by virtue of the INTERPOL Red Notice. Moreover, contrary to the Applicant’s submissions, the severe impact of cessation on the Applicant is not a stand-alone factor that must be assessed under [NAME] . Rather, it is a consideration that must be recognized by the [NAME] as it dictates the degree of justification required for its decision. [ 29 ] Further, I find that the [NAME] committed no error in concluding that humanitarian and compassionate considerations and forward-facing risk cannot be considered on a cessation application [see [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2024 FC 837 at para 58; [NAME] v Canada ([NAME]) , 2015 FC 765 at paras 19 – 21]. [ 30 ] The Applicant further asserts that the [NAME]’s reasons related to the Applicant’s subjective knowledge of the consequences of reavailment are illogical and contrary to the jurisprudence. The Applicant points to paragraph 96 of the [NAME] ’s reasons, where the [NAME] concluded that the Applicant’s lack of understanding of the cessation provision or the loss of his permanent residence status due to his reavailment “is not determinative and not relevant to the test of reavailment.” The Applicant asserts that, while it may not be determinative, it is certainly relevant. Moreover, the Applicant asserts that the [NAME]’s reasons fail to include any meaningful analysis of the evidence provided by the Applicant as to his subjective knowledge, including his personal attributes. [ 31 ] I am not satisfied that the Applicant has demonstrated that the [NAME] erred in considering his subjective knowledge of the consequences of reavailment. I agree with the Applicant that his lack of actual knowledge of the immigration consequences of his actions may not be determinative of the question of intent, but it certainly is relevant [see [NAME] , supra at para 70]. However, the extracted statement relied upon by the Applicant does not reflect the balance of the [NAME]’s assessment, where the [NAME] confirmed that subjective knowledge is relevant, found that the Applicant lacked subjective knowledge and weighed this factor in the Applicant’s favour. The [NAME] certainly would not have conducted an analysis of the Applicant’s subjective knowledge and made the finding that it did if it truly held the view that his knowledge was irrelevant. I accept the Respondent’s submission that, in reading the reasons as a whole, this was simply a typographical error. [ 32 ] Contrary to the Applicant’s assertion, I find that the [NAME]’s assessment of the Applicant’s subjective knowledge was sufficient. The reasons contain a detailed analysis of this issue, with the [NAME] accepting that the Applicant was totally ignorant of the potential immigration consequences of his passport renewals and return trips to Turkey and concluding that this factor weighed in the Applicant’s favour. [ 33 ] The Applicant asserts that the [NAME]’s statement at paragraph 136 of the reasons that “[g]iven the consequences of cessation, a narrow interpretation is the only reasonable approach to the cessation provisions” is confusing, as [NAME] advocates for an expansive approach when considering whether an applicant has rebutted the presumption of reavailment. However, if one reviews the authorities cited by the [NAME] in support of its use of the term “narrow” , one sees that the [NAME] was referring to statements made about the need to interpret the cessation provisions of the IRPA restrictively [see, for example, Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) v Bashir , 2015 FC 51 at para 44]. In [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2020 FC 213, Justice Fuhrer accepted [NAME]’s similar restrictive interpretation and noted that the only reasonable approach was a “narrow” interpretation of the cessation provisions of the IRPA . As such, the [NAME]’s statement regarding a narrow interpretation was to the Applicant’s advantage, not disadvantage. In any event, the Applicant conceded at the hearing that, even if the [NAME] had erred in taking a narrow approach to the rebuttal of the presumption of reavailment (which I find that it did not), such an error on its own is not sufficient to warrant this Court’s intervention. [ 34 ] The Applicant further asserts, with minimal submissions, that the [NAME] erred by conflating its analysis of intent to reavail with whether the motive for travel was necessary or justified. I find that there is no merit to this assertion. I agree with the Respondent that referring to the purpose of the Applicant’s trips when assessing intention was not unreasonable, as the purpose of travel is one of the many [NAME] factors that the [NAME] must consider in determining whether the Applicant had rebutted the presumption that he intended to reavail himself of the protection of Turkey. [ 35 ] As the Applicant has failed to demonstrate that the [NAME]’s decision was unreasonable, the application for judicial review shall be dismissed. [ 36 ] The parties propose no question for certification and I agree that none arises.

JUDGMENT in IMM-2580-25 THIS COURT’S

JUDGMENT is that: The application for judicial review is dismissed. The parties proposed no question for certification and none arises. “[NAME]” Judge FEDERAL COURT SOLICITORS OF RECORD DOCKET: IMM-2580-25 STYLE OF CAUSE: [NAME] v THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION PLACE OF HEARING: TORONTO, ONTARIO DATE OF HEARING: FEBRUARY 3, 2026

JUDGMENT and reasons: [NAME] J. DATED: FEBRUARY 9, 2026 APPEARANCES: [NAME] For The Applicant [NAME] FOR THE RESPONDENT SOLICITORS OF RECORD: [NAME], Ontario For The Applicant Attorney General of Canada Toronto, Ontario FOR THE RESPONDENT