Federal Court Rejects Discrimination Claims Against Employer

Date: 20260619 [NAME] : T-735-25 Citation: 2026 FC 847 Ottawa, Ontario , June 19, 2026 PRESENT: Madam Justice McDonald BETWEEN: [NAME] Applicant and ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA and [NAME] COMMISSION Respondents

REASONS AND

JUDGMENT [ 1 ] In this judicial review, the self-represented Applicant, [NAME], challenges a decision of the [NAME] Tribunal ([NAME]). [NAME] found that Correctional Service Canada ([NAME]) discriminated against her when it terminated her employment and awarded her damages. [NAME] now challenges [NAME]’s dismissal of her other claims against [NAME]. Although she said at the hearing that she was not disputing the damages awarded, her written submissions take issue with the amount awarded. [ 2 ] In her written and oral submissions, [NAME] raises several objections to [NAME] decision. However, she has not shown that the decision is unreasonable or identified any reviewable error or omission. [NAME] considered her evidence and arguments, and I am not persuaded that its decision is unreasonable. I will therefore dismiss this judicial review.

I. Background [ 3 ] On February 22, 2017, [NAME] was hired by [NAME] to fill a casual position as an Information Clerk. She advised her manager that, due to a disability, she could only work part-time and required a flexible start time. [ 4 ] Her employment began on May 31, 2017 and she worked part-time with a flexible start time. However, shortly into her new position, she communicated to her manager that she was unable to complete all the expected tasks on her accommodated work schedule. Through an exchange of emails, [NAME] suggested how she might be able to accomplish all her work by rectifying some inefficiencies. [ 5 ] [NAME]’s employment was terminated on June 16, 2017. [ 6 ] On February 22, 2018, [NAME] filed a complaint with the [NAME] Commission (Commission). She claimed that her disability contributed to the [NAME]’s decision to terminate her employment, contrary to section 7 of the [NAME] Act , RSC 1985, c H-6 [ CHRA ]. She also alleged that [NAME] employment policies and procedures systemically discriminated against a person unable to work full-time due to disability, contrary to section 10 of the CHRA . [ 7 ] The Commission referred the matter to [NAME] and a hearing was held in December 2023. II. [NAME] decision [ 8 ] [NAME] found [NAME]’s termination was based, in part, on her disability and therefore she had faced discrimination. [ 9 ] [NAME] dismissed her harassment claim, finding that the dispute was an interpersonal conflict, unrelated to [NAME]’s disability. [ 10 ] [NAME] rejected [NAME]’s claim that [NAME]’s employment practices systemically discriminated against persons with disabilities. [NAME] alleged that [NAME] failed to post part-time work opportunities and generally excluded individuals who needed part-time work. [ 11 ] [NAME] rejected this claim, noting the evidence that expected hours are not posted, and full-time work is usually assumed, because most job applicants prefer income from full-time work and that better fits [NAME]’s needs. [NAME] accepted [NAME]’s evidence that it considers accommodation requests for reduced hours. [NAME] also noted that [NAME] successfully obtained employment with [NAME] at least three times and refused another position because “it required too much walking” . [ 12 ] [NAME] also considered the evidence of [NAME]’s witnesses. [NAME] was a former supervisor of [NAME], who claims that [NAME] was given a casual position, while another, less capable employee in the same position who worked full-time received a term position. [NAME] found that [NAME]’ assessment of the other employee’s work performance was based on an assumption, rather than direct knowledge, and gave her testimony low weight. [ 13 ] [NAME]’s other witness, [NAME], was her former supervisor. Ms. [NAME] stated that [NAME] was the only individual she had encountered in the hiring process who preferred part-time work, as most people prefer full-time work. [NAME] found Ms. [NAME]’s testimony did not assist [NAME]’s claims that [NAME]’s policies discriminated against persons with disabilities. [ 14 ] Finally, [NAME] found that [NAME]’s arguments that casual employees are not offered certain benefits and are limited to 90 days of work per year were irrelevant to establishing systemic discrimination, because persons with disabilities were not ineligible for term or indeterminate employment. [ 15 ] [NAME] considered the “ancillary claims” made by [NAME]. [NAME] dismissed some of these claims as being outside its jurisdiction, including claims that: her employer breached obligations pursuant to the [NAME] , RSC 1985, c L-2 [ [NAME] ]; [NAME] wrongfully dismissed her; and her employer defamed her. [NAME] considered other allegations, such as claims that her employer humiliated her, in the context of damages. [ 16 ] [NAME] awarded [NAME] $5,000 in general damages for pain and suffering, and $2,000 as damages for [NAME] engaging in reckless discrimination under subsection 53(3) of the CHRA .

III. Issues and standard of review [ 17 ] [NAME] challenges various findings of [NAME], she focuses on the following issues: (i) Misinterpretation or misrepresentation of evidence; (ii) Dismissal of systemic discrimination claim; (iii) Dismissal of claims for defamation and [NAME] breaches; and (iv) Damages and interest awarded. [ 18 ] The applicable standard of review on these issues is reasonableness ( [NAME] v [COMPANY] , 2022 FCA 182 at para 4). [ 19 ] Reasonableness requires a decision to have justification, transparency, and intelligibility, be based on an internally coherent and rational chain of analysis and be justified in relation to the facts and law that constrain the decision maker ( Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v [NAME] , 2019 SCC 65 at paras 85-86 [ [NAME] ]).

IV. Analysis A. Misinterpretation or misrepresentation of evidence [ 20 ] [NAME] points to various paragraphs in [NAME] decision that she argues are “misrepresentations” or “misinterpretations” of the evidence by [NAME]. I will address some of these below. [ 21 ] I will start with [NAME]’s argument that paragraph 40 of the Decision is taken out of context. This paragraph states: As a result of [NAME]’s confidence in her ability to do the role, [NAME] testified that he did not immediately address accommodating the workload or tasks to match the reduction in working hours with [NAME], as he felt that it may have been unnecessary. He testified that since different people worked differently, he believed [NAME] may have been able to handle the entire workload of her predecessor, even while working less hours. He noted that [NAME] presented as very capable, and that she herself had indicated that she believed that she would require more work to fill her time. [ 22 ] This paragraph appears after [NAME] found that [NAME] had established a prima facie case of discrimination. Paragraph 40 falls within the portion of the decision in which [NAME] found that [NAME] had not established a bona fide occupational requirement. [ 23 ] [NAME] concluded this issue by finding, at paragraph 70, that [NAME] had not met its evidentiary burden to show that [NAME] could not be accommodated. At paragraph 71, it found that [NAME] had discriminated against her. Given that [NAME] succeeded on her discrimination claim, I cannot accept that paragraph 40 of [NAME] decision mischaracterized the evidence. [ 24 ] With respect to paragraph 78 of [NAME] decision, [NAME] submits that it misrepresents evidence related to her harassment claim, because knowledge of her disability was not required. The paragraph states: [NAME]’s disability was not known to her predecessor. Though not determinative, [NAME]’s disabiltiy [sic] was not mentioned, even obliquely, in any of the communication. [ 25 ] This paragraph appears in [NAME]’s analysis of [NAME]’s harassment claim under subsection 14(1). To the extent that she alleged harassment based on disability, knowledge of that disability was relevant to [NAME]’s assessment. [NAME] was entitled to consider this factor and, in doing so, did not misapprehend the evidence. [ 26 ] With respect to paragraph 88 of [NAME] decision, which appears in the systemic discrimination analysis, [NAME] found that [NAME] told [NAME] that they could not accommodate her because the position was not fully remote. [NAME] submits that the paragraph is erroneous because she did not request fully remote work. [ 27 ] In the email exchange between [NAME] and [NAME] stated: Thank you for considering me. I am interested but am limited to working part-time for health reasons and may be restricted in a few duties due to some mobility issues. Is this a full-time position or is there ability to accommodate me otherwise as had been done in the past? … If you are able to accommodate my disability needs including working part-time and having a more flexible start time, then it may work out. If the duties are such that I can work from home, then I would likely be able to work more hours within a week. In response, the [NAME] recruiter stated: This particular position is to backfill one of our full time assistants, who carries fairly regular responsibilities, and we’ve exhausted our options to shift any other duties to others right now. The duties for our department do require staff to be on site and to interact with offenders on a regular basis, as well as periods to work from home as part of a cohort schedule. As we’re one of the few departments having to take on regular on-site duties, we are unable to accommodate those who can only work from home at this time. [ 28 ] In my view, this appears to be a misunderstanding, rather than a refusal, of [NAME]’s accommodation request. The [NAME] recruiter stated that the position could not be fully remote, but [NAME] only requested partial remote work. I note that [NAME] did not attempt to clarify that she only sought to partially work remotely, and in any event, this misunderstanding is not compelling evidence that [NAME] was denied employment due to a disability, or that [NAME] generally denies work to persons with disabilities. [ 29 ] Even if the statement in paragraph 88 is a misunderstanding on [NAME]’s request in the email chain, it is a minor misstatement and just one factor of many considered by [NAME] in the analysis of the systemic negligence claim. [ 30 ] Next, [NAME] says paragraph 89 is derogatory and inappropriate because the reference “too much walking” related to her disability. Paragraph 89 states: However, [NAME] was successful in obtaining work at least three times with the Respondent, including immediately after she was terminated from her role as an information clerk, at a time when her limitations were well known to the Respondent. She also refused one position that she was being considered for, on the basis that it required too much walking. [ 31 ] She does not deny the accuracy of this statement;

accordingly, to the extent the statement is true, it cannot be said to be derogatory or inappropriate in the context of the issues raised by [NAME] in the human rights complaint. [ 32 ] Finally, she challenges [NAME] finding in paragraph 91 regarding the weight given to the evidence of [NAME]. On judicial review, this Court owes deference to the evidentiary findings of [NAME] ( Ottawa (City) v Todd , 2022 FC 579 at para 77, citing O’[NAME] v [NAME], 2020 FC 535 at para 31 and [NAME] at para 24), and there is no demonstrated basis for this Court to intervene. [NAME]’s objections amount to a disagreement with the findings and is a request to reweigh the evidence considered by [NAME], which is not the Court’s role on judicial review. [ 33 ] As noted by the Supreme Court, reviewing courts should not conduct a “line-by-line treasure hunt for error” and it is not sufficient for an applicant to simply point to errors; rather, the errors must be “sufficiently central and significant to render the decision unreasonable” ( [NAME]  at paras 100, 102). In this case, there is no error that is sufficient to find the whole decision unreasonable. [ 34 ] [NAME]’s challenges to the various findings of [NAME] are more properly characterized as disagreements with the findings. They do not rise to the level of misinterpretation or misapprehension of the evidence, as alleged. B. Dismissal of systemic discrimination claim [ 35 ] On this judicial review, [NAME] reiterates the arguments she made before [NAME] on systemic discrimination. [NAME], she argued that [NAME] engaged in systemic discrimination by preferring to hire full-time employees and offering few part-time opportunities, and by labelling part-time positions as “casual” rather than “term” or “indeterminate” . According to her, such classification deprives part-time employees of benefits that are otherwise available to full-time employees. Further, she claims that [NAME]’s preference for full-time employees constitutes discrimination against persons with disabilities who can only work part-time. [ 36 ] In considering this issue, [NAME] noted the applicable legal principles necessary to establish systemic discrimination and noted that the burden was on [NAME] to prove, on a balance of probabilities, that [NAME] was pursuing a policy or practice that deprived or tended to deprive disabled persons of employment opportunities. [ 37 ] [NAME] noted [NAME]’s evidence that hours of employment are not posted with jobs and, while full-time hours are assumed, [NAME] still considers accommodation requests from applicants with disabilities. Further, [NAME] noted that [NAME] herself had secured three positions with [NAME] and quickly found a new position after she was terminated from her previous position. She was also offered a term position but preferred a casual position because it provided more flexibility, she did not have to pay union dues, and found the benefits of limited value. [ 38 ] Overall, [NAME] found there was insufficient evidence that [NAME] excluded persons with disabilities from employment, noting that persons with disabilities were not denied access to term or indeterminate positions with [NAME]. [ 39 ] [NAME]’s dismissal of [NAME]’s claim under section 10 of the CHRA was reasonable. [NAME] determined that the evidence did not support the claims made. There are no grounds for this Court to interfere with [NAME] finding. C. Dismissal of claims on jurisdictional grounds [ 40 ] [NAME] also challenges the dismissal of claims that [NAME] found were outside its jurisdiction. [ 41 ] [NAME], she advanced claims for defamation and claims that [NAME] breached the [NAME] . The Applicant does not offer any evidence or arguments as to why [NAME] made an error on these issues; rather, she repeats her view on why she believes these claims are meritorious. [ 42 ] On these issues, [NAME] stated that “the Tribunal is confined to assessing whether there have been breaches to the [ CHRA ]” . This is the Tribunal finding that it does not have jurisdiction to hear certain claims. This finding is presumptively reviewed on the standard of reasonableness ( [NAME] at para 10). [ 43 ] While the CHRA does not have a specific section on jurisdiction, section 2, titled “Purpose” , states that: The purpose of this Act is to extend the laws in Canada to give effect…to the principle that all individuals should have an opportunity equal with other individuals to make for themselves the lives that they are able and wish to have and to have their needs accommodated, consistent with their duties and obligations as members of society, without being hindered in or prevented from doing so by discriminatory practices based on…disability… [Emphasis added.] [ 44 ] The “discriminatory practices” noted in section 2 are provided in CHRA sections 5 to 14.1. None of these provisions relate to defamation, or breaches of the [NAME] for insufficient termination notice or delayed payment of wages. [ 45 ] [NAME] stated that it could not decide [NAME]’s ancillary claims because it can only determine whether there were breaches of the CHRA . Since there is no “discriminatory practice” related to defamation or breaches of the [NAME] , there could be no breach of the CHRA on these bases, and therefore [NAME]’s conclusion was reasonable. [NAME]’s reasoning on this point, while brief, was sufficient for the Court to understand [NAME]’s reasoning process and meet the requirements of justification, transparency, and intelligibility ( [NAME] at para 99). D. Damages and interest [ 46 ] In her written submissions, [NAME] challenges her award of $7,000 in damages, plus simple interest. [ 47 ] [NAME] relies on Alberta Human Rights Commission cases, where damages of $20,000 to $75,000 were awarded. However, as [NAME] herself points out, the Alberta Human Rights Act , RSA 2020, c A-25.5 does not have an upper limit for damages awards. [NAME] does not have the ability to award damages based on another jurisdiction’s human rights legislation, and the precedential value of such cases is limited, given that the CHRA has a damages cap while the Alberta legislation does not. [ 48 ] In addressing damages, [NAME] noted the upper limit for damages for pain and suffering under the CHRA is $20,000. [NAME] awarded [NAME] $5,000, relying upon [NAME]’s decision in [NAME] v [NAME] , 2012 [NAME] 30, which awarded $5,000 in a case that concerned a part-time employee being dismissed due to disability. She was also awarded an additional $2,000, under CHRA subsection 53(3), finding that [NAME] was reckless in its discrimination towards [NAME]. [ 49 ] In this case, [NAME] explained how it reached the $7,000 total, based on previous [NAME] cases and the CHRA . [NAME]’s arguments, which rely on extra-jurisdictional caselaw and legislation, do not identify any error in [NAME]’s assessment of damages that would render their conclusion unreasonable. [ 50 ] Finally, while she argues that [NAME] should update the CHRA to index damage awards to cost of living, that is a matter beyond the mandate of this Court on judicial review.

V. Conclusion [ 51 ] This judicial review application is dismissed. [NAME] has used the judicial review to reargue her human rights complaint, which is not the purpose of judicial review. She has not identified any reviewable errors on the part of [NAME]. The decision of [NAME] is well-reasoned, and there is no basis for this Court’s intervention. [ 52 ] As the successful party, the Respondent is entitled to costs which I award in the amount of $500.

JUDGMENT IN T-735-25 THIS COURT’S

JUDGMENT is that : This judicial review application is dismissed. The Respondent is awarded costs, in the all-inclusive amount of $500. blank "Ann Marie McDonald" blank Judge FEDERAL COURT SOLICITORS OF [NAME] : T-735-25 STYLE OF CAUSE: [NAME] v ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA AND [NAME] COMMISSION PLACE OF HEARING : Edmonton, Alberta DATE OF HEARING: june 10, 2026

REASONS AND

JUDGMENT : McDonald J. DATED: June 19, 2026 APPEARANCES : [NAME] (ON HER OWN BEHALF) [NAME] FOR THE RESPONDENTS SOLICITORS OF RECORD : N/A FOR THE APPLICANT Attorney General of Canada Saskatoon, Saskatchewan FOR THE RESPONDENTS