Federal Court Rejects Extension Request for Judicial Review

Date: 20260706 Docket: 26-T-207 Citation: 2026 FC 902 Ottawa, Ontario, July 6, 2026 PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Duchesne BETWEEN: [NAME] Applicant and [NAME] Respondent

REASONS AND

ORDER [ 1 ] The proposed Applicant and [NAME] [[NAME]] has brought a motion in writing for an order pursuant to section 18.1(2) of the Federal Courts Act , RSC 1985, c F-7 [the FCA ] and Rules 359 and 369 of the Federal Courts Rules granting her an extension of time to file an application for judicial review of a March 5, 2026, decision made by the Canada [NAME] [the [NAME]] that rejected her request for a second review of her eligibility to receive the Canada Recovery Caregiving Benefit [CRCB] and the Canada Recovery Sickness Benefit [the CRSB] pursuant to the Canada Recovery Benefits Act , SC 2020, c 12, s 2. [ 2 ] The proposed Respondent and responding party Attorney General of Canada [[NAME]] opposes [NAME]’s motion. [ 3 ] [NAME]’s motion is dismissed for the reasons that follow.

I. The Law applicable to this motion [ 4 ] Section 18.1(1) and (2) of the FCA provides as follows: Application for judicial review Demande de contrôle judiciaire 18.1 (1) An application for judicial review may be made by the Attorney General of Canada or by anyone directly affected by the matter in respect of which relief is sought. 18.1 (1) Une demande de contrôle judiciaire peut être présentée par le procureur général du Canada ou par quiconque est directement touché par l’objet de la demande. Time limitation Délai de présentation (2) An application for judicial review in respect of a decision or an order of a federal board, commission or other tribunal shall be made within 30 days after the time the decision or order was first communicated by the federal board, commission or other tribunal to the office of the Deputy Attorney General of Canada or to the party directly affected by it, or within any further time that a judge of the Federal Court may fix or allow before or after the end of those 30 days. (2) Les demandes de contrôle judiciaire sont à présenter dans les trente jours qui suivent la première communication, par l’office fédéral, de sa décision ou de son ordonnance au bureau du sous-procureur général du Canada ou à la partie concernée, ou dans le délai supplémentaire qu’un juge de la Cour fédérale peut, avant ou après l’expiration de ces trente jours, fixer ou accorder. [ 5 ] The test that guides the Court in the exercise of its discretion with respect to an extension of time to commence an application for judicial review pursuant to section 18.1(2) of the FCA is the four part test set out in [NAME] v. Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration) , 1985 CanLII 5550 (FCA) that was reformulated succinctly in Canada (Attorney General) v. [NAME] , 1999 CanLII 8190 ( Canada (Attorney General) v. [NAME] , 2012 FCA 204 [ [NAME] ]; [NAME] v. Canada (Employment Insurance Commission), 2008 FCA 249). That test was explained in [NAME] at paragraphs 61 and 62 as follows: [61] The parties agree that the following questions are relevant to this Court’s exercise of discretion to allow an extension of time: (1) [NAME] have a continuing intention to pursue the application? (2) Is there some potential merit to the application? (3) Has the Crown been prejudiced from the delay? (4) [NAME] have a reasonable explanation for the delay? [NAME] v. Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration) , 1985 CanLII 5550 (FCA), [1985] 2 F.C. 263 (C.A.); [NAME] v. Canada (Employment Insurance Commission), 2008 FCA 249 at paragraph 8. [62] These questions guide the Court in determining whether the granting of an extension of time is in the interests of justice: [NAME] , supra at pages 277-278. The importance of each question depends upon the circumstances of each case. Further, not all of these four questions need be resolved in [NAME]’s favour. For example, “a compelling explanation for the delay may lead to a positive response even if the case against the judgment appears weak, and equally a strong case may counterbalance a less satisfactory justification for the delay”: [NAME] , at page 282. In certain cases, particularly in unusual cases, other questions may be relevant. The overriding consideration is that the interests of justice be served. See generally [NAME] , at pages 278-279; Canada ([NAME]) v. [NAME] , 2007 FCA 41 at paragraph 33; [NAME] v. Canada (Attorney General) , 2007 FC 195, 89 Admin LR (4th) 1. [ 6 ] Mr. Justice Strayer clarified in [NAME] v. Minister of Employment and Immigration (1995) , 88 F.T.R. 132 at 134, that the period of delay to be considered on a motion for an extension of time is the entirety of the period of the delay. The entirety of the period of delay means the delay beginning on the date on which [NAME] became aware of the order or matter to be judicially reviewed and the date on which they filed their request for an extension of time. This same point was echoed in the Federal Court of Appeal’s decision in [NAME] at paragraphs 67 to 69. [ 7 ] The interests of justice in connection with a motion for an extension of time to commence an application for judicial review were well canvassed and summarized by Mr. Justice Denis Gascon in Clinique Gascon Inc. v. Canada , 2023 FC 1757, at paragraphs 35 to 37 as follows: E. Weighing the factors and serving the interests of justice [35] Weighing each of the factors set out in [NAME] and [NAME] , and taking into account the circumstances of this case, I give determinative weight to the complete lack of justification for the very long delay and the failure to demonstrate the merit of Clinique Gascon’s application. After conducting my analysis, I cannot identify any reason that could allow me to grant an extension of time for filing Clinique Gascon’s application for judicial review. [36] It has been repeatedly acknowledged that undertaking judicial review of administrative tribunal decisions within the relatively short time limits prescribed by the Act reflects the public interest with respect to the finality of administrative decisions ( Canada v [NAME] , 2005 FCA 267 at para 60 [ [NAME] ], leave to appeal to the SCC refused, 31166 (May 25, 2006); Canada ([NAME]) v [NAME] , 2007 FCA 41 at para 24). That time limit is “not whimsical” and exists “in the public interest, in order to bring finality to administrative decisions” ( [NAME] at para 60). [37] I acknowledge that the interests of justice remain the paramount consideration in granting an extension of time. But the interests of justice do not exist in a vacuum and do not absolve applicants from their duty to satisfy the burden of proof. In this case, to exercise my discretion in favour of Clinique Gascon would require me to ignore all of the established criteria regarding an extension of time and turn a blind eye to the lack of evidence supporting each of the factors set out in case law to consider granting such an extension. The rule of law is based on the fundamental principles of certainty and predictability. Discretion must be based on the law. Exercising such a power would not be appropriate or judicious, or in the interests of justice, if it ignored the minimum requirements of the applicable law. [ 8 ] With the foregoing in mind, I turn to the substance of [NAME]’s motion.

II. Evidence and Arguments A. [NAME] (1) Evidence [ 9 ] [NAME]’s evidence in support of her motion is brief and contains no documentary evidence. Its narrative content is as follows:

1. I am the Applicant in this matter.

2. On March 5, 2026, I received a decision from the Canada [NAME] refusing to consider my request for a second review on the basis that it was submitted after the 30-day deadline. ([NAME] No: C0069397857-001-45)

3. On March 6, 2026, I contacted the Canada [NAME] to ask what options were available to me.

4. During that call, I was advised that I could either file an application for judicial review or seek assistance from my [NAME], and that the [NAME] may be able to help reopen the case.

5. Based on that information, I chose to first seek assistance from my [NAME] in an effort to resolve the matter without court involvement.

6. On March 9, 2026, I contacted my [NAME]'s office and requested assistance.

7. It took approximately three weeks for the [NAME]'s office to respond to my request, followed by additional time to complete and submit the required authorization forms.

8. On April 13, 2026, the [NAME]'s office informed me that the Canada [NAME] would not reopen my case and that I would need to proceed with a judicial review.

9. On the same day, April 13, 2026, I promptly submitted my Notice of Application for Judicial Review to the Federal Court.

10. I acted diligently at every stage and did not intentionally delay the process.

11. The delay in filing my application for judicial review was caused by my efforts to follow the guidance provided and to resolve the matter through my [NAME] before turning to the Court.

12. I respectfully request that the Court grant an extension of time so that my application for judicial review may be heard. (2) Argument [ 10 ] [NAME]’s argument is that she acted in good faith at all times and acted diligently in following the guidance proposed to her by [NAME]. She argues that her delay in seeking judicial review was caused by waiting for a response from [NAME]’s office, and that she proceeded promptly in seeking judicial review once notified by [NAME] that the [NAME] would not reopen her matter. [ 11 ] The Applicant argues that she has an arguable case and that it is in the interests of justice that she be granted an extension of time to argue her case. B. [NAME] (1) Evidence [ 12 ] [NAME]’s affidavit evidence is supported by 8 exhibits. The affidavit evidence and supporting exhibits are largely consistent with [NAME]’s evidence up to the date of March 6, 2026, with the significant exception that there is no record of the content of any communications between [NAME] and the [NAME] on March 6, 2026. [NAME]’s evidence contains no admission, denial or any other position with respect to the alleged guidance offered to [NAME] by the [NAME] on March 6, 2026. [ 13 ] [NAME] also notes that [NAME] filed the motion under consideration here on April 27, 2026, approximately 2 weeks after [NAME] learned from [NAME] that the [NAME] would not reopen her matter and that she should proceed to judicial review. (2) Argument [ 14 ] [NAME] argues that [NAME] does not meet the requirements of the applicable jurisprudence for an extension of time to be granted and, moreover, that it is not in the interests of justice for the extension of time sought to be granted.

III. Analysis [ 15 ] After having considered the evidence led and the parties’ respective arguments, I conclude that [NAME] has not demonstrated that the interests of justice require that I exercise my discretion to grant the extension of time sought. I come this conclusion for the following reasons. [ 16 ] Many decisions of this Court and of the Federal Court of Appeal have consistently held that time limitations as fixed by a statute, in this case in section 18.1(2) of the FCA , are not whimsical and exist “in the public interest, in order to bring finality to administrative decisions so as to ensure their effective implementation without delay” ( Canada v. [NAME] , 2005 FCA 267, at para 60). As has been noted repeatedly and quite correctly by my colleague Mr. Justice Denis Gascon, “undertaking judicial review of administrative tribunal decisions within the relatively short timeframes prescribed by the Act reflects the public interest in the finality of administrative decisions” ( [NAME] , at para 36 and the jurisprudence cited therein). [ 17 ] Extensions of time to commence an application for judicial review are determined on a principled basis in light of the jurisprudence that requires a [NAME] to explain why they did not act sooner than they did and explain and justify their delay in acting in light of what they believe is a proceeding that has some merit. Consideration of [NAME]’s evidence here reveals that she has not done so. A. Continuing intention [ 18 ] It has been held by this Court that pursuing a matter through means or measures other than an application for judicial review when an application for judicial review is required does not demonstrate a continuing intention to pursue judicial review within the statutory time limit fixed by the FCA ( [COMPANY]. v. Canada (Attorney General) , 2024 FC 947, at para 15). [ 19 ] The jurisprudence is consistent in noting that the demonstration of a proposed applicant’s continuing intention to pursue judicial review must include evidence of the steps taken by the proposed applicant to pursue judicial review and not any other remedial route that is not judicial review. Similarly, the continuing intention must be shown to exist prior to the expiry of the period during which the proposed applicant could have commenced their proceeding as of right ( Attorney General) v [NAME] , 1999 CanLII 8190 (FCA), [1999] F.C.J. No. 846, at para 3; [NAME] v. Canada (National [NAME]) 2023 FCA 112, 2023 A.C.W.S. 2239 at paras. 2-3; ( [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 1251, at para 27; Canada ; Canada (Attorney General) v [NAME] , 2012 FCA 204, among others). [ 20 ] [NAME]’s evidence here reflects that she had the intention of having [NAME]’s decision to decline her request for a second review of her eligibility re-opened. It also reflects that she elected to seek assistance through [NAME] to resolve her matter, as she deposes explicitly in her affidavit, “without involving the Court”. As [NAME] admits to having desired to proceed without involving the Court from March 9, 2026, to April 13, 2026, it cannot be said on the evidence before the Court that [NAME] had a continuing intention to seek judicial review prior to the expiry of the 30-day period fixed by subsection 18.1(2) of the FCA that expired on April 4, 2026. [ 21 ] The absence of other evidence with respect to any steps taken by [NAME] that might demonstrate her continuing intention to seek judicial review of the [NAME]’s March 5, 2026, decision between March 5, 2026, and April 4, 2026, suggests that no steps with respect to judicial review were taken because there was no continuing intention to seek judicial review. [ 22 ] While the Court is prepared to accept that the Applicant had an intention to pursue judicial review at various point in time and that that intention culminated in her filing the motion now under consideration, the Court would have to infer from the fact that this motion was filed on April 27, 2026, several weeks after the expiry of the 30 days provided by subsection 18.1(2) of the FCA, that the Applicant’s intention was a continuing one from March 5, 2026, when her affidavit evidence states otherwise. The inference of a continuing intention cannot be made on the record before the Court.

I therefore find that the Applicant has failed to satisfy the first component of the [NAME] test. B. The intended application’s potential merit [ 23 ] [NAME]’s proposed notice of application [Proposed NOA] does not allege any grounds upon which the court could grant judicial review as it does not engage with the March 5, 2026, decision beyond baldly affirming that the March 5, 2026, is unreasonable and procedurally unfair. No allegations of material fact are alleged to show why the decision is unreasonable or how it was reached in breach of [NAME]’s rights of procedural fairness ( [COMPANY]. v. Canada (National [NAME]) , 2013 FCA 250, at paras 38 to 46; Rule 301(e), Federal Courts Rules ). [ 24 ] The Proposed NOA does not disclose a case that has merit. [NAME] has not satisfied the second component of the [NAME] test. C. Prejudice to the Respondent arising from the delay [ 25 ] [NAME] has not led evidence that [NAME] would not suffer any prejudice from her delay in moving forward. [NAME] has not satisfied the third component of the [NAME] test. D. Reasonable explanation for the delay [ 26 ] [NAME] argues that her delay in acting is explained by her having sought the assistance of [NAME] prior to seeking judicial review. [NAME] concedes that [NAME] has led evidence of an explanation for her delay and that that explanation is that she pursued a course of action that is other than judicial review. [NAME] does not concede [NAME]’s explanation is reasonable. [ 27 ] While the Court understands that seeking assistance from one’s [NAME] in a matter involving an administrative decision-maker’s unfavourable decision may appear reasonable, the reasonableness evaporates when one considers that Members of [NAME] have no ability or authority to reverse or interfere with an administrative decision maker’s decision. The recourse available for a constituent who seeks to have an administrative decision maker’s decision reviewed or changed is before the courts. [ADDRESS] does not find [NAME]’s explanation for her delay to be reasonable in light of the circumstances. [ 28 ] [NAME] has not satisfied the fourth [NAME] factor. E. The interests of justice [ 29 ] The Applicant has not met any of the four [NAME] factors. Considering those factors holistically and weighing them along with the interests of justice leads me to conclude that it is not in the interests of justice to grant the extension of time sought by the Applicant ( Clinique Gascon Inc. v. Canada , 2023 FC 1757, at paras 36 and 37).

ORDER in 26-T-207 THIS COURT’S

ORDER is that : [NAME]’s motion for an extension of time pursuant to subsection 18.1(2) of the FCA is dismissed. The responding party has not sought his costs of this motion. No costs are awarded to either party. “Benoit M. Duchesne” Judge FEDERAL COURT SOLICITORS OF RECORD DOCKET: 26-T-207 STYLE OF CAUSE: [NAME] v. [NAME]

REASONS aND Order: duchesne, j. DATED: July 6, 2026 MOTION IN WRITING PURSUANT TO RULE 369 OF THE FEDERAL COURT RULES WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS BY: [NAME] For The Applicant (SELF-REPRESENTED) [NAME] of Canada For The Respondent