Federal Court Rejects Military Police Complaints Disclosure Claims

Date: 20260514 Dockets: T-2174-23 T-2175-23 T-2696-23 Citation: 2026 FC 626 Ottawa, Ontario, May 14, 2026 PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Fothergill BETWEEN: MILITARY POLICE COMPLAINTS COMMISSION Applicant and [NAME] OF CANADA Respondent

REASONS AND

JUDGMENT I. Overview [ 1 ] The Military Police Complaints Commission [[NAME]] seeks orders of mandamus to compel the [NAME] [[NAME]], represented by the [NAME] of Canada [AGC], to disclose materials pursuant to s 250.31(2)(b) of the National [NAME] Act , RSC 1985, c N-5 [NDA]. The [NAME] also seeks declarations concerning its jurisdiction and the disclosure obligations of the [NAME] under the NDA. [ 2 ] The [NAME] is an independent [NAME] oversight body and tribunal established under Part IV of the NDA in 1999. It was formed in response to the reports of the Special Advisory Group on Military Justice and Military Police Investigation Services chaired by [NAME] Chief Justice of Canada [NAME], and the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of [NAME] Forces to Somalia. Both reports recommended legislative changes to protect the investigative independence of the military police and ensure an effective oversight mechanism . [ 3 ] The [NAME] oversees and reviews the investigation of complaints regarding the conduct of members of the military police in the performance of policing duties or functions. These are referred to as “conduct complaints” . The [NAME] also deals with “interference complaints” , which are complaints by members of the military police alleging that an officer, [NAME], or senior official of the Department of National [NAME] improperly interfered with an investigation. [ 4 ] The [NAME] is an officer of the [NAME] [[NAME]], appointed by the [NAME] [CDS] for a term not exceeding four years. The [NAME] is the functional authority for all military police in the [NAME] and is the commander of the [NAME] Forces Military Police Group. [ 5 ] Among other functions, the [NAME] is responsible for dealing with conduct complaints at first instance. In practice, these functions are delegated to the [NAME] [[NAME]], overseen by the [NAME]. If the [NAME] is the subject of a conduct complaint, the complaint is referred to the CDS (NDA, s 250.26(2)). If the complainant is not satisfied with the disposition of a complaint, they can refer the complaint to the [NAME]. [ 6 ] The central legal question raised by these applications for judicial review is whether military police members of the [NAME] who conduct the initial investigations of conduct complaints exercise policing duties and functions and are therefore themselves subject to conduct complaints. [ 7 ] For the reasons that follow, investigations by the [NAME] of conduct complaints do not involve the performance of “policing duties and functions” .

Accordingly, the conduct of military police members of the [NAME] is not subject to review by the [NAME], and s 250.31(2)(b) of the NDA does not impose an obligation on the [NAME] to disclose relevant materials to the [NAME]. [ 8 ] The NDA does not give the [NAME] the power to compel the [NAME] to disclose materials in the context of a [NAME] interest investigation. However, the [NAME]’s review of a conduct complaint may run concurrently with a [NAME] interest investigation. The [NAME] may therefore rely on s 250.31(2)(b) to compel the [NAME] to disclose relevant documents in connection with its review of a conduct complaint. [ 9 ] The [NAME] has not demonstrated that a psychologist’s report, the sole document that remains in dispute in Court File No T-2696-23, will assist in its assessment of the actions of the military police members who are the subject of the conduct complaint in that proceeding. [ 10 ] Accordingly, all three applications for judicial review must be dismissed.

II. Background A. The Statutory Scheme [ 11 ] Conduct and interference complaints are defined in ss 250.18(1) and 250.19(1) of the NDA: Complaints about military police 250.18 (1) Any person, including any officer or [NAME], may make a complaint under this Division about the conduct of a member of the military police in the performance of any of the policing duties or functions that are prescribed for the purposes of this section in regulations made by the Governor in Council. […] Complaints by military police 250.19 (1) Any member of the military police who conducts or supervises a military police investigation, or who has done so, and who believes on reasonable grounds that any officer or [NAME] or any senior official of the Department has improperly interfered with the investigation may make a complaint about that person under this Division. Plainte contre un policier [NAME] 250.18 (1) Quiconque — y compris un [NAME] ou [NAME] du [NAME] — peut, dans le [NAME] de la présente section, déposer une plainte portant sur la conduite d’un policier [NAME] dans l’exercice des fonctions de nature policière qui sont déterminées par règlement du gouverneur en conseil pour l’application du présent article. […] Plainte d’un policier [NAME] 250.19 (1) Le policier [NAME] qui mène ou supervise une enquête, ou qui l’a menée ou supervisée, peut, dans le [NAME] de la présente section, porter plainte contre un [NAME] ou un [NAME] du ministère s’il est fondé à croire, pour des motifs raisonnables, que celui-ci a entravé l’enquête. [ 12 ] Section 2 of the Complaints About the Conduct of Members of the Military Police Regulations , PC 1999-2065 [Complaints Regulations] defines “policing duties or functions” as follows: 2.(1) For the purpose of subsection 250.18(1) of the Act, any of the following, if performed by a member of the military police, are policing duties or functions: a. the conduct of an investigation; b. the rendering of assistance to the [NAME]; c. the execution of a warrant or another judicial process; d. the handling of evidence; e. the laying of a charge; f. attendance at a judicial proceeding; g. the enforcement of laws; h. responding to a complaint; and i. the arrest or custody of a person. (2) For greater certainty, a duty or function performed by a member of the military police that relates to administration, training, or military operations that result from established military custom or practice, is not a policing duty or function.

2. Pour l’application du paragraphe 250.18(1) de la Loi, « fonctions de nature policière » s’entend des fonctions ci-après lorsqu’elles sont accomplies par un policier [NAME] : a. enquêter; b. prêter assistance au [NAME]; c. exécuter les mandats ou autres actes de procédure judiciaire; d. gérer les éléments de preuve; e. porter des accusations; f. participer à l’instance; g. faire respecter la loi; h. donner suite aux plaintes; et i. arrêter ou détenir des personnes. Il est entendu que les fonctions exercées par le policier [NAME] qui se rapportent à l’administration ou à la formation, ou aux opérations d’ordre [NAME] qui découlent de coutumes ou pratiques militaires établies ne sont pas comprises parmi les fonctions de nature policière. [ 13 ] The [NAME] must resolve a conduct complaint within one year (NDA, s 250.261). Where a complaint is not resolved within 60 days, the [NAME] must give the complainant, the subject of the complaint, and the Chairperson of the [NAME] a case status report every 30 days (NDA, s 250.3(1)). After six months, the [NAME]’s case status report must explain why the complaint has not yet been resolved (NDA, s 250.3(2)). [ 14 ] Where a complainant refers the [NAME]’s disposition of a conduct complaint to the [NAME], the [NAME] conducts its review de novo . If the Chairperson considers it advisable in the [NAME] interest, the [NAME] may commence a [NAME] interest investigation and convene a [NAME] interest hearing into either a conduct or an interference complaint (NDA, s 250.38(1)). [ 15 ] Paragraph 250.31(2)(b) of the NDA provides that when a complaint is referred to the [NAME], the [NAME] must provide the [NAME] with “all information and material relevant to the complaint.” At the conclusion of the [NAME]’s review, the Chairperson must send the Minister of National [NAME], the CDS, and the [NAME] a report setting out its findings and recommendations (NDA, s 250.32(3)). The [NAME] is not bound by the [NAME]’s recommendations but must give reasons if they are not acted upon (NDA, s 250.51(2)). B. The Complaints (1) Court File No T-2174-23 [ 16 ] The complainant was a Corporal in the [NAME] and a member of the military police. In 2020, he participated in the execution of a search warrant and arrest as part of a military police investigation into an alleged theft. On August 28, 2020, the person who was arrested filed a conduct complaint with the [NAME] against the complainant and other members of the military police. [ 17 ] In 2021, while the [NAME] was investigating the complaint of wrongful arrest, the complainant made several conduct and interference complaints against the leadership of his own military police unit. These complaints arose from an incident that occurred on March 10, 2021, where bystanders allegedly observed a member of the military police attempting to drive a vehicle, with her children as passengers, while she was intoxicated. The complainant alleged that the leaders of his military police unit attempted to cover up the incident. [ 18 ] The complainant also assisted in submitting another complaint against the military police member who was involved in the March 10, 2021 incident. That complaint alleged that, following a welfare check and reporting signs of child neglect, the complainant was directed through his chain of command to suspend the investigation and was subjected to a unit disciplinary investigation for insubordination. On August 3, 2021, the Chairperson of the [NAME] commenced a [NAME] interest investigation into the complaints arising from the March 10, 2021 incident. [ 19 ] On June 22, 2022, the [NAME] concluded its investigation into the complaint of wrongful arrest and found most of the allegations against the complainant to be substantiated. That same day, the complainant submitted a complaint against the [NAME] and three members of the [NAME]. The complaint alleged that the [NAME] breached the NDA’s timelines and case status report requirements when handling the complaint of wrongful arrest. The complainant maintained that the [NAME] and [NAME] had intentionally delayed the investigation as a reprisal for his role in initiating the complaints that led to the [NAME] interest investigation. [ 20 ] On August 18, 2022, the [NAME] notified the complainant that his June 22, 2022 complaint did not concern conduct of a member of the military police “in the performance of policing duties or functions ” , as required under s 250.18(1) of the NDA . The [NAME] determined that no further investigation was warranted, noting that the complaint could more appropriately be dealt with through a grievance. On August 25, 2022, the complainant asked the [NAME] to review the [NAME]’s findings. By this point, the complainant had retired from the [NAME]. [ 21 ] On September 2, 2022, the CDS reached the same conclusion about the complaint against the [NAME], finding that it did not concern the performance of policing duties or functions. On September 21, 2022, the complainant requested a review by the [NAME]. The complainant also noted that, while the [NAME] had suggested he pursue a grievance, this was not possible because he had retired from the [NAME] (NDA, s 29(1)). (2) Court File No T-2175-23 [ 22 ] On June 30, 2021, the complainant participated in an arrest in his capacity as a member of the military police. On August 17, 2021, the person who was arrested commenced a civil action in the British Columbia Small Claims Court alleging violations of the [NAME] of Rights and Freedoms , being Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982 , Schedule B, Canada Act 1982 , 1982, c 11 (UK) [Charter] against the complainant and other members of the military police. [ 23 ] The notice of claim was forwarded to the [NAME], which determined that the allegations should be treated as a conduct complaint. On October 18, 2021, the [NAME] advised the person who was arrested, the complainant, and the other members of the military police implicated in the complaint that it would hold its investigation in abeyance pending the conclusion of the civil action. The complainant was told that he would not receive any correspondence from the [NAME] until the investigation resumed. The letter was copied to the [NAME]. [ 24 ] On February 16, 2023, the complainant submitted a complaint in which he alleged that the [NAME] and members of the [NAME] had failed to resolve or dispose of the arrest complaint within one year, contrary to the requirements of s 250.261 of the NDA. The complaint also alleged that the complainant was not provided with status reports or an explanation for why the investigation was not completed within six months, contrary to s 250.3(2) of the NDA. [ 25 ] On April 14, 2023, the [NAME] notified the complainant that the complaint did not concern the performance of policing duties or functions, as required by s 250.18(1) of the NDA. The [NAME] also advised the complainant that, because he was no longer a member of the [NAME], he had been administratively removed from the complaint but would still receive notifications of observations made about him in the course of the investigation. If he sought to rejoin [NAME], the file would be reviewed to determine his suitability. [ 26 ] On June 23, 2023, the CDS disposed of the complaint against the [NAME] on substantially the same grounds, holding that it did not concern the performance of policing duties or functions. On July 5, 2023, the complainant referred the complaint to the [NAME] for review pursuant to s 250.21(1) of the NDA. (3) Court File No T-2696-23 [ 27 ] On July 18, 2016, the complainant submitted a conduct complaint against members of the [NAME] Forces National Investigation Service – Western Region [[NAME]] concerning the conduct of an investigation into a house fire that occurred on a [NAME] base in 2015. [ 28 ] The fire occurred at the residence of the [NAME] and their three children shortly after the complainant was awarded primary custody of the children. [NAME] completed its investigation on May 10, 2016. Although the fire appeared to have been set deliberately, [NAME] concluded that there was insufficient evidence to charge the [NAME] with any criminal offence. [ 29 ] In the conduct complaint, the complainant alleged that [NAME] did not carry out its investigation with professionalism or due diligence. He claimed that his [NAME] was improperly allowed to have unsupervised access to the children, putting their safety at risk. [ 30 ] In August 2016, a letter bearing the signature of the [NAME] was discovered. The letter indicated that by the time it was read by the intended recipient, the author would either be dead or in jail. [NAME] initiated a new investigation. The [NAME] held its conduct complaint investigation in abeyance pending [NAME]’s consideration of the letter. [ 31 ] On July 6, 2017, [NAME] completed its investigation without laying any charges. [NAME] concluded that the letter was ambiguous, did not include threats of self-harm or harm to others, and did not indicate when or by whom it was written. [NAME] noted that the [NAME] had refused an interview. [ 32 ] The [NAME] resumed its conduct complaint investigation in September 2017. On December 11, 2017, it found that the complaint was not substantiated. The [NAME] concluded that [NAME] had conducted its investigation with professionalism and due diligence. It advised the complainant that he could request a review by the [NAME]. [ 33 ] On January 8, 2018, the complainant sent the [NAME] a letter in which he expressed concern about its investigation of the conduct complaint. He sent the same letter to the [NAME] on January 18, 2018. The [NAME] determined that the letter should be treated as a request to review the conduct complaint. [ 34 ] On February 20, 2018, the [NAME] sent the [NAME] some materials relating to the house fire investigation. The documents contained redactions of personal information that the [NAME] considered irrelevant, information that would reveal police tactics or procedures, third-party information, and information that was subject to solicitor-client privilege. [ 35 ] On April 10, 2018, the [NAME] advised the complainant that the [NAME] had determined it would not reopen the investigation, and reaffirmed its conclusion that [NAME]’s investigation was conducted professionally and with due diligence. The [NAME] was also informed of this decision on April 16, 2018. [ 36 ] As the [NAME] reviewed the documents that had been disclosed, it developed serious concerns about [NAME]’s investigation. The Chairperson of the [NAME] met with the [NAME] in November 2018 and recommended that the matter be re-investigated by a different police service. [ 37 ] The [NAME] directed [NAME] to reopen its investigation and assigned an investigator from the [NAME] [RCMP] to oversee it. The [NAME] held its own review in abeyance pending the outcome of the re-investigation. [ 38 ] The re-investigation led to criminal charges against the [NAME] for arson and three counts of attempted murder against the children. She was convicted of all charges on February 24, 2023. An appeal of her conviction was dismissed in May 2024 ( R v [NAME] , 2024 ABCA 168). [ 39 ] The [NAME] resumed its review of the conduct complaint in February 2023. On February 23, 2023, it made further requests to the [NAME] for disclosure of documents. In August 2023, the [NAME] declined to disclose further documents while the conviction of the [NAME] was still under appeal. The [NAME] insisted that it was entitled to disclosure under s 250.31(2)(b) of the NDA and requested all relevant materials by September 6, 2023. [ 40 ] On September 6, 2023, the [NAME] provided the [NAME] with additional documentation pertaining to its investigation and re-investigation of the house fire, and a copy of its investigation report concerning the letter. Redactions were applied for personal information, third-party information, police tactics, and information subject to solicitor-client privilege. [ 41 ] On September 28, 2023, the [NAME] commenced a [NAME] interest investigation into [NAME]’s investigation of the house fire, [NAME]’s investigation of the letter, and the [NAME]’ investigation of the complainant’s conduct complaint. [ 42 ] On October 19, 2023, the [NAME] wrote to the [NAME] to express concerns about incomplete disclosure and improper redactions. The [NAME] requested disclosure of unredacted documents, with the exception of those that contained information that was subject to solicitor-client privilege. [ 43 ] On November 14, 2023, the [NAME] advised the [NAME] that all relevant materials had been provided. The following day, the [NAME] informed the [NAME] of her position that the [NAME] lacked jurisdiction to investigate members of the [NAME] on the ground that they were not performing policing duties or functions, as required by the NDA. [ 44 ] On April 29, 2025, the [NAME] provided the [NAME] with further disclosure. The only document that remains in dispute in Court File No T-2696-23 is a copy of a psychologist’s report prepared following interviews with the [NAME] four years after the house fire.

III. Issues [ 45 ] This application for judicial review raises the following issues: Has the [NAME] satisfied the preconditions for an order of mandamus ? Should the Court grant the declaratory relief sought by the [NAME]? IV. Analysis A. Mandamus [ 46 ] An applicant must meet eight preconditions for an order of mandamus ( [NAME] v Canada ([NAME])(CA) , 1993 CanLII 3004 (FCA), [1994] 1 FC 742 at 766-769, aff’d 1994 CanLII 47 (SCC); [NAME] v Canada (Transportation Agency) , 2016 FCA 202 at para 29): (1) there must be a legal duty to act; (2) the duty must be owed to the applicant; (3) there must be a clear right to performance of that duty; (4) where the duty sought to be enforced is discretionary, certain additional principles apply; (5) no adequate remedy is available to the applicant; (6) the order sought will have some practical value or effect; (7) the Court finds no equitable bar to the relief sought; and (8) on a balance of convenience an order of mandamus should be issued. [ 47 ] The parties have addressed only the first of these preconditions: whether there is a legal duty to act. (1) [NAME] [ 48 ] The central issue raised in these applications is whether investigations of conduct complaints by the [NAME] involve the exercise of “policing duties or functions” within the meaning of s 2 of the Complaints Regulations. If so, then complaints about the conduct of military police members of the [NAME] fall within the [NAME]’s jurisdiction, and s 250.31(2)(b) of the NDA requires the [NAME] to disclose “relevant” materials. [ 49 ] In the First Independent Review by the Right Honourable Antonio Lamer of the provisions and operation of Bill C-25 (2003), the [NAME] Chief Justice of Canada considered whether the [NAME] performed policing duties or functions when investigating a conduct complaint (at p 76): Policing duties or functions are prescribed in the Complaints About the Conduct of Members of the Military Police Regulations . The definition of policing duties or functions as prescribed by the regulations is overly broad and therefore a problem. While some leeway will obviously be required to determine each case on its facts, clarification would be helpful. For example, the question has arisen as to whether the [NAME] is performing a policing duty or function when conducting an investigation into a conduct complaint. One cannot look to Bill C-25 or the NDA to determine Parliament’s intent by reviewing the provisions that govern the position of [NAME], as the [NAME] was not created by Bill C-25 or the NDA. Recourse to the [NAME] leaves the question unanswered. While I am inclined to believe that the [NAME] is indeed performing a policing duty or function when conducting a conduct complaint investigation, a final pronouncement on this question would be unwise until the role of the [NAME] is set out in the NDA. [citations omitted] [ 50 ] Several years later, [NAME] Chief Justice Patrick LeSage of the Ontario Superior Court authored the Second Independent Review Authority to The Honourable Peter G. MacKay (2011) and revisited the question, but said only that greater clarity would be helpful in describing “policing duties or functions” (at p 68): A question frequently arises as to whether the MP member is subject to a [NAME] review. The conduct of a military police member is subject to review by the [NAME] if the military police member was performing “policing duties or functions” as provided in subsection 250.18(1) of the NDA. The difficulty arises because “policing duties or functions” as prescribed in the Complaints About the Conduct of Members of the Military Police Regulations is broadly defined. While I agree that greater clarity would be helpful in describing “policing duties or functions”, the issue of the [NAME]’s mandate is complex. It has been before Parliament more than once and may well be again. It has also been the subject of a number of judicial pronouncements. I reiterate and adopt the Lamer Report recommendation that the CF [NAME] draft a framework setting out criteria to be applied by the [NAME] to conduct complaints in order to determine whether the conduct triggers the jurisdiction of the [NAME]. [citations omitted] [ 51 ] Following these reports, Parliament enacted the Strengthening Military Justice in the [NAME] of Canada Act , SC 2013, c 24 to amend the NDA, and further define the role of the [NAME] in s 18.4 of the NDA: Duties and functions 18.4 The [NAME]’s responsibilities include (a) investigations conducted by any unit or other element under his or her command; (b) the establishment of selection and training standards applicable to candidates for the military police and the ensuring of compliance with those standards; (c) the establishment of training and professional standards applicable to the military police and the ensuring of compliance with those standards; and (d) investigations in respect of conduct that is inconsistent with the professional standards applicable to the military police or the Military Police Professional Code of Conduct . Fonctions 18.4 Le grand prévôt est notamment responsable : a) des enquêtes menées par toute unité ou tout autre élément sous son commandement; b) de l’établissement des normes de sélection et de formation applicables aux candidats policiers militaires et de l’assurance du respect de ces normes; c) de l’établissement des normes professionnelles et de formation applicables aux policiers militaires et de l’assurance du respect de ces normes; d) des enquêtes relatives aux manquements à ces normes professionnelles ou au Code de déontologie de la police [NAME] . [ 52 ] The AGC argues that the functions assigned to the [NAME] in s 18.4 of the NDA resolve the ambiguity identified by the Lamer and LeSage reports, and favour an interpretation that excludes the investigation of conduct complaints by the [NAME] from policing duties or functions. Specifically, the AGC notes that s 18.4 distinguishes between investigations conducted by units under the [NAME]’s command (s 18.4(a)) and investigations concerning conduct that may be inconsistent with applicable professional standards (s 18.4(d)). [ 53 ] In [NAME] v Canada (National Revenue) , 2025 SCC 13 [ [NAME] ], the Supreme Court of Canada ( per [NAME]) summarized the modern principle of statutory interpretation as follows (at para 43): The modern principle requires a court to interpret statutory language “according to a textual, contextual and purposive analysis to find a meaning that is harmonious with the Act as a whole” ( [NAME]. v. Canada , 2005 SCC 54, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 601, at para. 10; R. v. Downes , 2023 SCC 6, at para. 24). Even so, a court need not address text, context, and purpose separately or in a formulaic way, since these elements are often closely related or interdependent ( [NAME], at para. 31; [NAME] v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) , 2002 SCC 3, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 84, at para. 28). [ 54 ] Statutory interpretation cannot be founded on the wording of the legislation alone. Words that appear clear and unambiguous may in fact prove to be ambiguous once placed in their context. As a result, plain meaning is not determinative, and a statutory interpretation analysis is incomplete without considering the context, purpose, and relevant legal norms ( [NAME] at paras 44-45). At the same time, “just as the text must be considered in light of the context and object, the object of a statute and that of a provision must be considered with close attention always being paid to the text of the statute, which remains the anchor of the interpretative exercise” ( Ibid at para 45, citing [NAME] ( Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v Directrice de la protection de la jeunesse du CISSS A , 2024 SCC 43 at para 24). [ 55 ] This approach to statutory interpretation is reinforced by s 12 of the Interpretation Act , RSC 1985, c I-21, which states that “[e]very enactment is deemed remedial, and shall be given such fair, large and liberal construction and interpretation as best ensures the attainment of its objects” . [ 56 ] Subsection 2(1) of the Complaints Regulations lists activities that, “if performed by a member of the military police, are policing duties or functions” . One of the enumerated items is “the conduct of an investigation” . This is qualified by s 2(2), which states that a duty or function performed by a member of the military police that “relates to administration, training, or military operations that result from establish military custom or practice” is not a policing duty or function. [ 57 ] One possible interpretation of this provision supports the conclusion that the [NAME]’s and [NAME]’ investigation of conduct complaints fall within the meaning of “the conduct of an investigation” . As the [NAME] notes, there are places in the legislative scheme where Parliament has restricted the meaning of “investigation” to only certain kinds of investigation. For example, in s 71.01 of the NDA, the definition of “military justice system” is limited to investigations of “service offences, the processes for the laying and referral of charges of service offences and their prosecution.” The [NAME] maintains that the absence of any qualification of “investigation” in s 2(1) of the NDA implies a legislative intent to capture all manner of investigations, including those into conduct complaints. [ 58 ] However, as the Supreme Court of Canada ( per Iacobucci J) recognized in [COMPANY] v [NAME] , 2002 SCC 42, “words, like people, take their colour from their surroundings” (at para 27, quoting [NAME], “Statute Interpretation in a Nutshell” (1938), 16 Can Bar Rev 1 at 6). The “associated words” , or “ noscitur a sociis ” , rule of interpretation is applicable here. A term or an expression should not be interpreted without taking the surrounding terms into account. “The meaning of a term is revealed by its association with other terms: it is known by its associates” ( [NAME] v [NAME] , 2012 SCC 55 at paras 40-43, citing 2747-3174 [COMPANY] v [NAME] (Régie des permis d’alcool ) , 1996 CanLII 153 (SCC) at para 195). [ 59 ] The conduct of an investigation may be considered a policing duty or function together with: […] b. the rendering of assistance to the [NAME]; c. the execution of a warrant or another judicial process; d. the handling of evidence; e. the laying of a charge; f. attendance at a judicial proceeding; g. the enforcement of laws; h. responding to a complaint; and i. the arrest or custody of a person. [ 60 ] With the exceptions of handling evidence and responding to a complaint, none of these powers or functions is likely to be exercised by the [NAME] in the course of investigating a conduct complaint. The [NAME] is not bound by criminal rules of evidence, and so it is doubtful that “the handling of evidence” in the formal sense may be included among the powers and functions of the [NAME]. [ 61 ] Subsection 2(2) is intended to provide “greater certainty” regarding what is excluded from the ambit of s 2(1), including what is excluded from “the conduct of an investigation” . The meaning of “relates to administration” in s 2(2) of the Complaints Regulations, in the English version of the text, supports two possible interpretations. The English text reads: For greater certainty, a duty or function performed by a member of the military police that relates to administration, training, or military operations that result from established military custom or practice, is not a policing duty or function. [ 62 ] The phrase “that result from established military custom or practice” may apply only to “military operations” or to all three activities: administration, training, and military operations. However, as noted by the AGC, the French version of the text precludes the latter interpretation. It states: Il est entendu que les fonctions exercées par le policier [NAME] qui se rapportent à l’administration ou à la formation, ou aux opérations d’ordre [NAME] qui découlent de coutumes ou pratiques militaires établies ne sont pas comprises parmi les fonctions de nature policière. [ 63 ] When interpreting federal legislation, the English and French versions are equally authoritative ( Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, s 133; R v [NAME] , 2024 SCC 34 at para 58). Courts should search for the shared meaning between the official language versions ( R v [NAME] , 2004 SCC 6 at para 26). [ 64 ] The use of the word “ ou ” between each subordinate clause reveals that the phrase “established military custom or practice” (in French, “ coutumes ou pratiques militaires ” ) applies only to “military operations” (in French, “ opérations d’ordre [NAME] ” ). [ADDRESS] must adopt this shared meaning. [ 65 ] Subsection 2(1) of the NDA defines “military police” as “the officers and non-[NAME] members appointed under regulations made for the purposes of section 156” of the NDA. Pursuant to the Queen’s Regulations and Orders for the [NAME] Forces [[NAME]], Volume I, Chapter 22, article 22.02, a credentialed member of the military police must be qualified in a military police occupation and be in lawful possession of a military police badge and official military police identification card. The powers of credentialed military police members are defined in s 156(1) of the NDA as follows: Powers of military police (a) detain or arrest without a warrant any person who is subject to the Code of Service Discipline, regardless of the person’s rank or status, who has committed, is found committing, is believed on reasonable grounds to be about to commit or to have committed a service offence or who is charged with having committed a service offence; and (b) exercise such other powers for carrying out the Code of Service Discipline as are prescribed in regulations made by the Governor in Council. Pouvoirs des policiers militaires a) détenir ou arrêter sans mandat tout justiciable du code de discipline [NAME] — quel que soit son grade ou statut — qui a commis, est pris en flagrant délit de commettre ou est accusé d’avoir commis une infraction d’ordre [NAME], ou encore est soupçonné, pour des motifs raisonnables, d’être sur le point de commettre ou d’avoir commis une telle infraction; b) exercer, en vue de l’application du code de discipline [NAME], les autres pouvoirs fixés par règlement du gouverneur en conseil [ 66 ] Credentialed members of the military police are also “peace officers” ( Criminal Code , RSC 1985, c C-46, s 2; [NAME], art 22.01). In this capacity, they can perform any lawful duty related to the maintenance or restoration of law and order; the protection of property; the protection of persons; the arrest or custody of persons; and the apprehension of persons who have escaped from lawful custody or confinement, as well as certain other assigned duties ([NAME], art 22.011). These duties and functions are broadly similar to those enumerated in s 2(1) of the Complaints Regulations. [ 67 ] This may be contrasted with the duties and functions performed by the [NAME], whose responsibilities include: (a) administrative investigations in respect of conduct inconsistent with the professional standards applicable to members of the military police under Part IV of the NDA; (b) administrative investigations into potential breaches of the military police Professional Code of Conduct ; and (c) administrative processes related to the military police Credential Review Board ([NAME], art 22.04(11)). [ 68 ] Not all those who work in the [NAME] are members of the military police, nor are they required to be. It is not even essential that they be members of the [NAME]. The [NAME] currently consists of eight members of the military police, three [NAME] and a [NAME]. Two of the six investigators are civilians. The AGC notes that it would be possible to configure the [NAME] to comprise only civilians, with no members of the military police, which would preclude the possibility of it performing any policing duties or functions at all. [ 69 ] Nothing in the record suggests that military police and [NAME] members of the [NAME] perform distinct functions when conducting reviews of conduct complaints. There is no principled reason for subjecting the [NAME] to [NAME] oversight, while exempting the latter. [ 70 ] A textual, contextual, and purposive analysis of s 2 of the Complaints Regulations leads to the conclusion that investigations by the [NAME] of conduct complaints do not involve the performance of “policing duties and functions” . As noted by the AGC, s 18.4 of the NDA distinguishes between investigations under the [NAME]’s command and investigations into conduct that is incompatible with professional standards. [ 71 ] Accordingly, the conduct of military police members of the [NAME] is not subject to review by the [NAME], and s 250.31(2)(b) of the NDA does not impose an obligation on the [NAME] to disclose relevant materials to the [NAME]. [ 72 ] There are other forms of recourse available to those who are dissatisfied with the manner in which the [NAME] conducts its initial investigations of conduct complaints. Any member of the [NAME] may submit a grievance against another member of the [NAME] or a [NAME]. A complainant concerned about delay in an [NAME] investigation may bring an application for mandamus in this Court. Alternatively, any shortcomings in investigations conducted by the [NAME] are subject to administrative review under [NAME] [DAOD] 5019-2, a remedial measure under DAOD 5019-4, or investigations under the Professional Code of Conduct (for military police members) or the Federal [NAME] Act , SC 2003, c 22, s 2 (for civilians). Allegations of reprisal may be reported to the Department of National [NAME]/[NAME]. [ 73 ] The applications for orders of mandamus in Court File Nos T-2174-23 and T-2175-23 must therefore be dismissed. However, the application in Court File No T-2696-23 is also brought in the context of a conduct complaint against members of the military police in their usual investigative capacity, and the [NAME]’s [NAME] interest investigation. Further analysis is therefore necessary. (2) [NAME] [ 74 ] The [NAME] argues that the [NAME]’s disclosure obligations arising from conduct complaint reviews under s 250.31(1) of the NDA extend to [NAME] interest investigations. In the alternative, the [NAME] says it is entitled to disclosure of relevant materials because the conduct complaint investigation which preceded the [NAME] interest investigation remains ongoing. [ 75 ] According to the AGC, statutory disclosure obligations do not extend to [NAME] interest investigations initiated by the [NAME]. The [NAME]’s cooperation in [NAME] interest investigations is voluntary, subject to the [NAME]’s power to issue a subpoena in the course of a [NAME] interest hearing. [ 76 ] The power of the [NAME] to compel the disclosure of documents is addressed in ss 250.31(2)(b) and 250.41(1)(a) of the NDA. Paragraph 250.31(2)(b) is found within Subdivision 2 of Division 2 and concerns the information the [NAME] must provide to the [NAME] “if a complainant refers a complaint to the [[NAME]] under subsection (1)” . Subsection 250.31(1) permits a complainant to refer a complaint to the [NAME] where they are dissatisfied with the [NAME]’s disposition of, or refusal to investigate, the complaint. [ 77 ] [NAME] interest investigations are governed by Division 3 of the NDA. The [NAME] may initiate a [NAME] interest investigation into a conduct complaint or interference complaint “at any time” (NDA, s 250.38(1)). The [NAME] may therefore initiate a [NAME] interest investigation even if no complaint is referred to the [NAME] pursuant to s 250.31(2) of the NDA. It is clear from the text and context of s 250.31(2)(b) that this disclosure obligation does not extend to [NAME] interest investigations. [ 78 ] Nor may the [NAME] rely on s 250.41(1)(a) to compel the [NAME] to disclose documents for the purpose of a [NAME] interest investigation. As the [NAME] acknowledges in its written argument, s 250.41(1)(a) applies only when the [NAME] convenes a [NAME] interest hearing. [NAME] interest investigations and [NAME] interest hearings are distinct (NDA, s 250.38(1)). [ 79 ] These conclusions are consistent with the observations of [NAME] of Canada Justice Morris Fish in his Report of the Third Independent Review Authority to the Minister of National [NAME] (at para 569): If it is in the [NAME] interest, the Chairperson of the [NAME] may at any time initiate an investigation into a complaint about police conduct or interference in a police investigation. The Chairperson may cause a [NAME] investigation to be held even if the complainant withdraws the complaint. If the Chairperson thinks it is warranted, a [NAME] hearing may be held. Where a [NAME] interest hearing is called, the [NAME] has the power to compel witnesses to attend, answer questions and produce documents and other material under their control. Otherwise, cooperation with the investigation is voluntary. [citations omitted] [ 80 ] Justice Fish acknowledged the [NAME]’s concern regarding its inability to compel the [NAME] to disclose documents in a [NAME] interest investigation (para 574): In its submission, the [NAME] indicates that it can only compel the production of records in the case of a conduct inquiry or a [NAME] interest hearing. It recommends that it be given the power to compel production in the case of interference complaints and in [NAME] interest investigations. [ 81 ] [NAME] recommended that the disclosure obligations in the NDA be expanded to require the [NAME], and Department of National [NAME] to disclose any information that the [NAME] considers relevant (at para 578). Parliament has yet to act on this recommendation. [ 82 ] [ADDRESS] cannot grant the [NAME] powers beyond those provided in the statute ( [NAME] v [NAME] , 2011 FC 1099 [ [NAME] ] at para 90). Policy considerations, however laudable, cannot be relied upon to change the actual words of the statute ( [COMPANY] v [NAME] , 2019 SCC 19 at para 79). [ 83 ] However, there is nothing in the NDA to suggest that a [NAME] interest investigation supersedes the [NAME]’s review of a conduct complaint or prevents the latter from proceeding once a [NAME] interest investigation has been commenced. The grammatical and ordinary sense of s 250.38(1), which permits the Chairperson to initiate a [NAME] interest investigation “at any time” , confirms that a [NAME] interest investigation may be initiated while a review is ongoing. [ 84 ] I therefore agree with the [NAME] that its review of the complainant’s conduct complaint runs concurrently with its [NAME] interest investigation. Although the NDA does not give the [NAME] the power to compel the [NAME] to disclose materials in the context of a [NAME] interest investigation, it may rely on s 250.31(2)(b) to compel the [NAME] to disclose relevant documents in connection with its review of the conduct complaint. The AGC acknowledges that the [NAME] may make use of documents it obtains in the course of its review of the conduct complaint to further the [NAME] interest investigation. (3) Relevance of Psychologist’s Report [ 85 ] When the [NAME] reviews an investigation into a conduct complaint, s 250.31(2)(b) of the NDA requires the [NAME] to provide the [NAME] with all information and materials that are “relevant” to the complaint. In [NAME] , Justice Yves de Montigny observed that “[t]he Commission must be given some leeway in determining the documents that are relevant for the purposes of its inquiry” (at para 89). Later in the decision, he noted (at para 96): If the Commission does not have full access to relevant documents, which are the lifeblood of an inquiry, there cannot be a full and independent investigation. [ 86 ] The [NAME] says that it must be the sole arbiter of which documents are relevant, not the [NAME]. The [NAME] cannot serve as an effective review mechanism if the entity subject to oversight, namely the [NAME], selects the evidence to be disclosed. [ 87 ] The [NAME] has received a summary of the psychologist’s report but maintains that it cannot assess the accuracy of the summary without access to the report itself. Although the psychologist’s report post-dates [NAME] investigation, it concerns the same events. The [NAME] argues that the report is relevant to the question of what information was discoverable by [NAME] investigators at the time of the original investigation, and whether concerns about the children’s safety should have been apparent at the time. [ 88 ] The AGC submits that the psychologist’s report cannot be relevant because it was provided to [NAME] only after the [NAME] was arrested following the re-investigation. That re-investigation is not part of the conduct complaint; only the first investigation is. [NAME] relied on its interview with the psychologist, that has already been provided to the [NAME]. [ 89 ] The AGC disagrees that the psychologist’s report will enable the [NAME] to determine what the first [NAME] investigation could have discovered with sufficient diligence. First, the AGC submits that the children were very young at the time of the initial [NAME] investigation and may not have been as articulate as when the psychologist conducted the assessment four years later. Second, what the children said about the house fire has already been provided in the summary. Finally, the AGC submits that the [NAME] is free to obtain any additional family court document it thinks necessary from the court registry. [ 90 ] It is useful to distinguish between the disclosure obligations owed to the [NAME] and those owed to the [NAME] Commission for the RCMP. Section 45.39 of the [NAME] Act , RSC, 1985, c R-10, states: Right of access 45.39 (1) Subject to sections 45.4 and 45.42, the Commission is entitled to have access to any information under the control, or in the possession, of the Force that the Commission considers is relevant to the exercise of its powers, or the performance of its duties and functions, under Parts VI and VII. Droit d’accès 45.39 (1) Sous réserve des articles 45.4 et 45.42, la Commission a un droit d’accès aux renseignements qui relèvent de la Gendarmerie ou qui sont en sa possession et qu’elle considère comme pertinents à l’égard de l’exercice des pouvoirs et fonctions que lui attribuent les parties VI et VII. [ 91 ] This may be contrasted with s 250.31(2) of the NDA, which states: Information to be provided (2) If a complainant refers a complaint to the Complaints Commission under subsection (1), (a) the Chairperson shall send to the [NAME] a copy of the complaint; and (b) the [NAME] shall provide the Chairperson with a copy of the notice sent under subsection 250.27(5) or 250.28(3), or of the report sent under section 250.29, in respect of the complaint and all information and materials relevant to the complaint. Documents à transmettre (2) Le cas échéant, le président transmet une copie de la plainte au grand prévôt, lequel, en retour, lui communique une copie de l’avis donné au titre des paragraphes 250.27(5) ou 250.28(3) ou du rapport transmis au titre du paragraphe 250.29 ainsi que tout renseignement ou document pertinent. [ 92 ] Unlike the RCMP Act, the NDA does not give the [NAME] the power to determine what information is relevant. Instead, the NDA contemplates an objective assessment of relevance. This places the Court in a difficult position, because no party has included a copy of the psychologist’s report in the record. [ 93 ] The disclosure obligation in s 250.31(2)(b) of the NDA arises from the conduct complaint concerning the initial [NAME] investigation, not the [NAME]’s broader [NAME] interest investigation. [ADDRESS] must therefore assess the relevance of the psychologist’s report only in relation to the conduct complaint. [ 94 ] It is unclear how the views of the children, expressed to a psychologist four years after the fact, will assist the [NAME] in determining whether [NAME] investigators could have discovered the same information when the children were much younger. Furthermore, the [NAME] has been given a detailed summary of [NAME]’s interview with the psychologist.

Accordingly, the only conceivable use of the psychologist’s report would be to assess the accuracy of information previously provided. [ 95 ] The [NAME] has not demonstrated that the psychologist’s report will assist in its assessment of the actions of the military police members who conducted the initial investigation into the house fire. The application for mandamus in Court File No T-2696-23 must be dismissed. B. Declaratory Relief [ 96 ] In light of the Court’s conclusions respecting the legal issues raised by these applications for judicial review, the [NAME]’s requests for declaratory relief must be refused. Counsel for the AGC confirmed in oral submissions that they do not seek declaratory relief; the Court’s Judgment and Reasons will speak for themselves.

V. Conclusion [ 97 ] The applications for judicial review are dismissed. [ 98 ] If the parties are unable to agree upon costs, they may make written submissions, not exceeding three (3) pages, within fifteen (15) days of the date of this Court’s Judgment and Reasons. The parties should bear in mind that all participants in these proceedings are funded by the [NAME] purse.

JUDGMENT THIS COURT’S

JUDGMENT is that : The applications for judicial review are dismissed. If the parties are unable to agree upon costs, they may make written submissions, not exceeding three (3) pages, within fifteen (15) days of the date of this Court’s Judgment and Reasons. “Simon Fothergill” Judge FEDERAL COURT SOLICITORS OF RECORD DOCKETS: T-2174-23 T-2175-23 T-2696-23 STYLE OF CAUSE: MILITARY POLICE COMPLAINTS COMMISSION v [NAME] OF CANADA PLACE OF HEARING: BY VIDEOCONFERENCE DATE OF HEARING: February 12, 2026 rEASONS AND jUDGMENT: FOTHERGILL J. DATED: May 14, 2026 APPEARANCES : [NAME] For The Applicant [NAME] For The Respondent SOLICITORS OF RECORD : [COMPANY] and Solicitors Toronto, Ontario For The Applicant [NAME] of Canada Ottawa, Ontario For The Respondent