Federal Court Rejects Motion to Strike Climate Change Laws Challenge

Date: 20260714 Docket: T-211-20 Citation: 2026 FC 943 Ottawa, [NAME], July 14, 2026 PRESENT: The [NAME]: [NAME], also known as [NAME], on his own behalf and on behalf of all the members of [NAME] and [NAME], also known as [NAME], on his own behalf and on behalf of all the members of [NAME] and HIS MAJESTY THE KING IN RIGHT OF CANADA Defendant

REASONS AND

JUDGMENT [ 1 ] This is a motion brought by the Defendant [Canada] to strike [NAME]’ Second Further Amended Statement of Claim, filed on November 24, 2025 [the Second Further Amended Claim] without leave to amend, on the basis that it discloses no reasonable cause of action, pursuant to paragraph 221(1)(a) of the Federal Courts Rules , SOR/98-106 [the Rules].

I. Facts [ 2 ] The background and procedural history of this case were set out in this Court’s previous Judgment and Reasons in [NAME] v Canada , 2025 FC 1586 at paras 2–33 [ [NAME] ]. For the sake of convenience, it will be briefly summarized again here. A. Background [ 3 ] [NAME] are [NAME] and [NAME], who are respectively the Head Chiefs of the [NAME]) and [NAME]) which jointly comprise the Likhts’amisyu didikhni (Fireweed Clan). Likhts’amisyu is one of the five hereditary Clans constituting the [NAME]. [ 4 ] [NAME] law, a [NAME] Ze’ is obligated to protect their [NAME], other peoples, and the yintah , or spirit in the land. These and other principles of [NAME] law animate the present action which challenges Canada’s legislative efforts to address climate change. B. Procedural History [ 5 ] The action was commenced as a representative proceeding under Rule 114 of the Rules. The original Statement of Claim was filed on February 11, 2020. It challenged Canada’s laws, policies, and conduct on several constitutional grounds. [ 6 ] Canada brought a motion to strike the original Statement of Claim, which was granted on the basis of this Court’s determination that the pleadings failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action, and that the matters within were not justiciable ( [NAME] v Canada , 2020 FC 1059 at paras 71–72, 85, 104, 115). [ 7 ] [NAME] appealed that decision. The appeal was heard concurrently with another constitutional challenge to Canada’s climate change policies ( [NAME] v Canada , 2023 FCA 241 [ [NAME] ]). The Federal Court of Appeal held that both sets of appellants should be granted leave to amend their claims in order to properly plead the justiciable claim that their [NAME] 7 rights under the [NAME] of Rights and Freedoms , Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982 , being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982 c 11 [the [NAME] ] have been breached ( [NAME] at para 22). [ 8 ] [NAME] filed an Amended Claim on August 26, 2024, and a Further Amended Claim on December 16, 2024. Canada brought a motion to strike the Further Amended Claim which was granted based on this Court’s determination that the pleadings still failed to disclose a reasonable [NAME] 7 [NAME] challenge ( [NAME] at paras 106–107). [ 9 ] Recognizing that [NAME] could potentially cure the deficiencies in the Further Amended Claim to properly plead a [NAME] 7 [NAME] claim or a potentially novel common law tort based on a violation of customary international law, I granted further leave to amend the claim ( [NAME] at paras 113–115). [ 10 ] The Second Further Amended Claim was filed on November 24, 2025. Once again, Canada has brought a motion to strike the pleadings on the basis that they fail to disclose a reasonable cause of action.

II. The Second Further Amended Claim [ 11 ] The Second Further Amended Claim is structurally unchanged from its previous iteration. The core allegation remains that Canada has infringed [NAME]’ constitutional rights by failing to take the necessary legislative actions that would ensure compliance with its international commitment to keep mean global warming well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels [the Temperature Commitment] pursuant to the Paris Agreement , 12 December 2015, UNTS 3156 [ Paris Agreement ]. [ 12 ] The primary legal basis pleaded for the claim is that Canada has infringed [NAME]’ rights to life, liberty, and security of the person under [NAME] 7 of the [NAME] by making and facilitating laws which facilitate the development and operation of projects with high levels of greenhouse gas [GHG] emissions. [ 13 ] Paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Second Further Amended Claim are new additions alleging that Canada has either purposefully or inadvertently chosen an inconsistent approach to addressing GHG emissions and that it currently appears unlikely that Canada will meet its 2030 Nationally Determined Contribution [NDC] under the Paris Agreement . [ 14 ] Paragraphs 51 and 52 now state that the Temperature Commitment and Canada’s NDC have been incorporated into Canada’s domestic law through the Canadian Net-Zero Emissions Accountability Act , SC 2021, c 22 [CNZEAA], and the preamble to the Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act , SC 2018, c 12, s 186. [ 15 ] Schedule A, described at paragraphs 27–28 of [NAME] , has been revised and colour-coded to illustrate this alleged inconsistency in the federal government’s legislative response to climate change. It currently includes 34 statutory instruments. In schedule A, the legislation shaded in yellow is where [NAME] believe the instruments support the Temperature Commitment. The legislation shaded in grey is where [NAME] believe the instruments undermine the Temperature Commitment. The legislation left unshaded is where the instruments may variously support or undermine it. [ 16 ] The Attorney General estimates that [NAME] impugn at least 1,800 provisions, 40 schedules, and an indeterminate number of permits and licenses issued under the Export Development Act , RSC 1985, c E-20, the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012 , SC 2012, c 19, s 52, the Impact Assessment Act , SC 2019, c 28, s 10, the Canadian Energy Regulator Act , SC 2019, c 28, s 10, and the Canada Oil and Gas Operations Act , RSC 1985, c O-7. [ 17 ] Listed in Schedule A are 14 Acts of Parliament (one of which is repealed) and 17 regulations, a slight decrease from the previous version which listed 17 Acts of Parliament and 20 regulations ( [NAME] at para 28). The revised version of Schedule A included in the Second Further Amended Claim is attached as Annex A. [ 18 ] A review of the changes to Schedule A confirms that the entries for the Canada-[NAME] Act , SC 1984, c 20, the Renewable Fuel Regulations , SOR/2010-189, the Alternative Fuel Regulations , SOR/96-453, and the Energy Efficiency Regulations , SOR/2016-311 have all been removed from the amended version. Subsections 10(1) and 10(1.1) of the Export Development Act , RSC 1985, c E-20 have been identified as specific impugned provisions. A change from Schedule A in the previous pleading is the addition of short descriptions of the “Statutory Object” provided as a fourth column. The columns are now titled, from left to right: “Statute or Regulations” , “Impugned or Relevant Provision(s)” , “Summary of Provision(s)” and “Statutory Object” . [ 19 ] In formulating the [NAME] 7 [NAME] claim, [NAME] allege in this version of the pleadings that Canada has deprived [NAME], their members, and their future members of their rights to life, liberty and security of the person by: (a) enacting or continuing the provisions identified in the grey shaded entries in Schedule A which have the effect, either directly or indirectly, of increasing GHG emissions in Canada, thereby undermining any positive efforts or initiatives by Canada to meet the Temperature Commitment; (b) failing to include terms and conditions in any project approvals, authorizations or permits issued under the statutes identified in the non-shaded entries in Schedule A sufficient to ensure that Canada would meet its Temperature Commitment; (c) fail[ing] to ensure that sufficient, reasonable steps, consistent with the best available science, were taken in the measures implemented in the statutory instruments set out in the yellow shaded entries in Schedule A to ensure that Canada managed its [GHG] emissions in a manner that would meet the Temperature Commitment. [ 20 ] [NAME] assert that an infringement of their [NAME] 7 [NAME] rights would be arbitrary or grossly disproportionate to the objectives of any grey-shaded statutory instrument and would also be “directly contrary” to any yellow-shaded statutory instrument in Schedule A. [ 21 ] The relief sought by [NAME] in the Second Further Amended Claim is slightly modified from the previous version. They now seek: (a) a declaration that the defendant has a constitutional duty to act consistently with its Temperature Commitment; (b) an order declaring that the defendant has breached and continues to breach its obligations under paragraph (a) by failing to act and take the necessary legislative steps required to manage Canada’s [GHG] emissions in a manner that would meet the Temperature Commitment; (c) a declaration that the defendant’s failure to meet its obligations under paragraph (a) has unjustifiably infringed and continues to unjustifiably infringe on [NAME]’ members’ rights under s. 7 of the [NAME] , including the s. 7 rights of future members of [NAME]; (d) an order requiring the defendant to develop and implement a climate action plan to manage Canada’s [GHG] emissions in a manner that would meet the Temperature Commitment, including making amendments or such other changes, which may include repeal or replacement, as may be necessary to each of the statutes identified in Schedule A to this Second Further Amended Statement of Claim to make them consistent with its obligations under paragraph (a), including by amending, repealing or replacing each of its environmental assessment statutes that apply to extant high [GHG] emitting projects so as to give the Governor in Council the discretionary authority to cancel or vary the terms of Canada’s approval, under any of those statutes, of the operation such projects in the event that the defendant is demonstrably not be able to [ sic ], or does not, meet the Temperature Commitment, or in the event that the defendant determines global warming to be a national emergency; (e) an order requiring the defendant to cause to develop and provide a complete, independent and timely annual account of Canada’s cumulative [GHG] emissions, including emissions produced within Canada and emissions produced outside of Canada, but imported into Canada in the form of tangible goods, in a format that permits [NAME] to compare these cumulative GHG emissions with Canada’s fair carbon budget to meet its Temperature Commitment; (f) an order for this Court to retain jurisdiction of this proceeding until the defendant has fully complied with all the Court’s orders; (g) costs, including special costs on a full indemnity basis and any applicable taxes on those costs; and (h) such further and other relief that this Court deems just.

III. Issue [ 22 ] The issue to determine is whether it is plain and obvious that no reasonable cause of action is disclosed within the Second Further Amended Claim.

IV. The Law on Motions to Strike [ 23 ] Rule 221(1)(a) permits the Court to make an Order striking a pleading on the ground that it discloses no reasonable cause of action, with or without leave to amend. [ 24 ] The legal test is whether it is plain and obvious, assuming the facts as pleaded to be true, that the pleading discloses no reasonable cause of action ( R v [NAME] , 2011 SCC 42 at para 17). [ 25 ] The claim must have no reasonable prospect of success ( [NAME] at para 18). The onus is on the moving party to establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact requiring trial ( [NAME] v Canada , 2010 FCA 26 at para 5). Novel but arguable claims must be allowed to proceed to trial, and the pleadings must be read generously ( [NAME] at para 19). [ 26 ] To strike a pleading without leave to amend, any defect in the pleading must be one that cannot be cured by amendment ( [NAME] v Canada , 2011 FCA 6 [ [NAME] ] at para 8).

V. Parties’ Positions A. Defendant’s Position [ 27 ] The Defendant’s position is that the claim should be struck given the number of provisions impugned by [NAME], and [NAME]’ failure to plead material facts supporting the claim as set out as being necessary for a [NAME] 7 [NAME] claim and as directed by the FCA in [NAME] . [ 28 ] The Defendant notes that Schedule A is estimated to include at least 1,800 provisions across 34 statutory instruments. The Defendant argues that this is contrary to the Court’s previous admonitions in [NAME] as well as the instruction by the Federal Court of Appeal in [NAME] . [ 29 ] The Defendant indicates that the pleadings still do not fulfil their purpose of defining the issues in dispute between the parties for the purposes of production, discovery, and trial ( [NAME] v Canada , 2022 FCA 195 at para 34, citing [NAME] v R , 2001 CanLII 406 (TCC), aff’d 2002 FCA 330). The Defendant [NAME] that they would not know where to start with producing documents relevant to the impugned legislation and the permits and licenses issued under them. [ 30 ] The Defendant notes that this contrasts with the [NAME]’ amended claim. The [NAME] narrowed their claim to the CNZEAA, and discovery has still taken over six months and generated over 1,000 documents. This involved only one government department, while [NAME]’ claim would engage several departments. [NAME] will now proceed to an eight-week trial, while the Defendant argues that [NAME]’ claim remains unacceptably diffuse and broad in scope. B. [NAME]’ Position [ 31 ] [NAME] remind this Court that the present motion must be determined by assessing the Second Further Amended Claim on its own merits. They submit that the comments of this Court and the Federal Court of Appeal related to previous versions of the pleadings which suffered from different problems, such as not naming any statutes or specific provisions, or advancing other constitutional claims improperly. I do not disagree with these pronouncements. [ 32 ] [NAME] say they have responded to the instructions provided by the courts and have provided additional focus and particulars both to their claim and to the impugned statutes which had been missing in earlier versions. [NAME] voice that they have now pleaded the necessary material facts, including that the inadequacy of Canada’s legislative and regulatory response to its GHG emissions has caused their [NAME] 7 [NAME] deprivations. [ 33 ] [NAME] in advancing their argument state that they have now pleaded the statutory objects of each statute. They submit that these amendments answer the Court’s earlier concerns ( [NAME] at paras 96–100). If the Defendant believes the pleadings are still too vague, [NAME] suggest that the Defendant may move to request for further and better particulars under Rule 181(2) rather than bringing another motion to strike. [ 34 ] [NAME] maintain that the nature of the harm is such that it does not arise out of a single statutory instrument. Rather, they say that the harm is an aggregation and accumulation of Canada’s GHG emissions. In short, [NAME] argue that the measures taken by the government have not been adequate to address the threat of climate change. [ 35 ] [NAME] state because Canada has chosen to “wade in” to the issue of climate change, it must do so in a way that is consistent with its NDCs and the Temperature Commitment under the Paris Agreement , which it has domestically incorporated through the CNZEAA. [ 36 ] It is for that reason that [NAME] argue that all statutory instruments in Schedule A are relevant and need to be considered. [NAME] submit that the lion’s share of the provisions in Schedule A, shaded in yellow, are positive contributions to adhering to the Temperature Commitment. These yellow-shaded instruments constitute more than 90% of the provisions pleaded and [NAME] think they will weigh in favour of constitutionality. Although their purpose is positive, [NAME] say that whether those measures go far enough to prevent the harm at issue here must be established through evidence at trial. [ 37 ] [NAME] present that pleadings must only set the goalposts for the matters at issue. They say that the principle of proportionality may shape the discovery process. However, even if millions of documents need to be produced by Canada at the discovery stage, [NAME] say this would not provide a basis to strike the claim. [ 38 ] [NAME] state that there has never been any dispute as to whether the deprivation suffered by their members has been properly pleaded. But now, [NAME] say they have successfully pleaded the causal link between Canada’s legislative scheme to combat GHGs to the deprivation, and that they have properly pleaded the purpose of each of the statutory instruments included in Schedule A. [ 39 ] [NAME] submit that their claim is akin to the action in [NAME] v [NAME] , 2024 ONCA 762 [ [NAME] ]. In doing so, they reiterate their claim that Canada cannot escape the allegations against its climate policy by requiring a specific statute to be pleaded because its entire legislative scheme is what is at issue. [ 40 ] [NAME] say that the CNZEAA is a positive piece of legislation that incentivizes adherence to the Temperature Commitment, but that the entire legislative scheme under Schedule A constitutes Canada’s conduct with respect to its efforts to address climate change. I note here that the CNZEAA is not even included in Schedule A. Instead, it is presented by [NAME] as an apparently higher-order piece of legislation against which the laws in Schedule A must be measured. [ 41 ] [NAME] argued that the CNZEAA obliges Canada to set targets and set science-based plans to reach those targets to curb GHG emissions and meet international obligations under the Paris Agreement . [NAME] say they recognize there are always competing policy concerns, but that the Defendant’s decision to ratify its international commitments requires it to take legislative measures that help it achieve that end. [ 42 ] [NAME] submit that they are not pleading – and have never pleaded – that there is no need to carry out a “balancing” exercise in a [NAME] 7 [NAME] claim. They argue that the consideration of the alleged deprivation is contextual in nature. [NAME] say this is important because they are not attempting to compare the harm caused by a single statute against its statutory objective. Rather, they declare that the nature of the harm of climate change is extreme and irreversible, constituting an existential threat to humanity, and that this harm arises from all the measures in Schedule A as a single legislative scheme. [ 43 ] As such, [NAME] response is that the balancing exercise must be “significantly recalibrated.” [NAME] argue that the balancing required in a [NAME] 7 [NAME] claim has been defined in a myriad of ways and that it is always a contextual analysis. [NAME] state there is a “spectrum” of approaches to [NAME] 7 [NAME] claims which demand different analyses for different kinds of harms. [ 44 ] In cases like this one, [NAME] state that a “coarser” balancing exercise is permitted as the extreme nature of the harm “shocks the conscience” and therefore becomes the controlling issue which “overwhelms the rest of the analysis” (citing [NAME] v [NAME] , 2001 SCC 7 [ [NAME] ] at paras 67, 69; [NAME] v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) , 2002 SCC 1 [ [NAME] ]). [ 45 ] The difference of opinion between Canada and [NAME], according to [NAME], is that Canada advocates a very narrow focus, while [NAME] say that the nature of the harm at issue precludes that approach. [NAME] state that the question for the Court is whether the law is flexible enough to accommodate this type of claim. [ 46 ] The metaphor used in oral submissions was whether the square peg of the claim can be rounded off enough to fit into the circular hole of an ordinary [NAME] 7 [NAME] analysis. [NAME] submit that it can. In their submission, [NAME] 7 of the [NAME] is all about assessing the harm, and [NAME] say that recognizing the coarser balancing exercise, which they allege to have been endorsed by the Supreme Court in [NAME] , would sand the square corners off the claim, so to speak, and allow it to fit. [ 47 ] [NAME] submit that the principles of fundamental justice in a [NAME] 7 [NAME] claim are not immutable but must be contextually determined in each specific case. In this case, they present that the analysis will require a consideration of Canada’s international commitments. [NAME] say they are not attempting to rely on customary international law or the direct justiciability of international law itself. Rather, they argue that the NDCs and Temperature Commitment are also relevant factors to consider when determining the relevant principles of fundamental justice applicable to the second stage of the [NAME] 7 [NAME] analysis in this case. [ 48 ] [NAME] submit that the nature of the harms in cases like [NAME] are similar to the nature of the harm alleged in the current case: extreme, irreversible, and not possible to eliminate by a simple exercise of judicially striking down a single law. [ 49 ] In [NAME] argue that the Supreme Court recognized that judicial use of the phrase “shocks the conscience” may signal a punishment so extreme that it tilts the balancing in favour of finding an infringement (at para 69). According to [NAME], the Court’s statement that such extreme punishment “overwhelms the rest of the analysis” indicates that where the harm is so significant, there is a clear signal to the Court that there is probably nothing or very little that could be put on the other side of the scale to outweigh an extreme and irreversible harm, such as the harm posed by the existential threat of global warming (ibid). [ 50 ] In [NAME] , the Supreme Court balanced Canada’s interest in combatting terrorism with an asylum claimant’s interest in not being deported to face torture. Commenting on its task, the Court stated that it had previously held that “some responses are so extreme that they are per se disproportionate to any legitimate government interest” (at para 47). [ 51 ] In the present case, [NAME] argue that the statutory objectives at issue are not even as compelling as the statutory objectives of the provisions at issue in the case of [NAME] . [NAME] submit that [NAME] was “further to the middle of the spectrum” than the grey-shaded laws identified in Schedule A. [NAME] say that most of the provisions at issue have to do with encouraging economic and industrial activity, which may be valid, but not as constitutionally compelling as the protection of Canadian residents from torture. [ 52 ] Applying the language from [NAME] to the present case, [NAME]’ position is that the question is whether Canada’s response to global warming, comprising Schedule A, is justifiable in relation to the existential threat of global warming, or whether that threat is per se grossly disproportionate to any statutory objective. The answer for the grey-shaded entries in Schedule A, [NAME] submit, is that they are all per se grossly disproportionate. That is the recalibrated balancing exercise that [NAME] say arises in this case. [ 53 ] [NAME] submit that the terminology used to analyze proportionality in [NAME] was refined in Canada (Attorney General) v [COMPANY] , 2011 SCC 44 [ PHS ] at paragraph 133. [ADDRESS] stated that “[g]ross disproportionality describes state actions or legislative responses to a problem that are so extreme as to be disproportionate to any legitimate government interest.” They say the same approach was taken in Canada (Attorney General) v [NAME] , 2013 SCC 72 [ [NAME] ] at paragraphs 164–165 and [NAME] v Canada (Attorney General) , 2015 SCC 5 [ [NAME] ] at paragraph 89. [ 54 ] [NAME] point out that both [NAME] were unanimous decisions where it was acknowledged that the fundamental justice inquiry is informed by the Canadian perspective and jurisprudence as well as Canada’s international obligations (see [NAME] at para 46; [NAME] at paras 79–81). What this establishes, according to [NAME], is that there are circumstances where the harm is so extreme that per se – or by itself – the harm outweighs any legitimate government interest or purpose. That does not entail that the law cannot then be saved under [NAME] 1 of the [NAME] ; but [NAME] say this line of authority establishes that the nature of the harm can be such that it will be clear that there is no legitimate government interest which could outweigh the harm at the second stage of the [NAME] 7 [NAME] analysis. [ 55 ] [NAME]’ position in summary is that [NAME] allow for the possibility that the harm alone could overwhelm the purpose of a statutory provision. They state that it is a relatively small leap to find that the kind of harm that is at issue in the face of climate change is such a harm. [ 56 ] Whether the actual effects of the harm are extreme enough to overwhelm the analysis will be a matter of evidence, [NAME] argue. [NAME] submit that the Supreme Court has previously recognized that climate change is a threat of the highest order to the country and the world at large, and that it is specifically threatening to Indigenous communities’ ability to sustain themselves and maintain their traditional ways of life ( References re Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act , 2021 SCC 11[ References re GGPPA ] at paras 11–12, 167, 171, 187). [ 57 ] [NAME] submit that the facts highlighted by Chief Justice Wagner in References re GGPPA are facts. Although the Defendant alleges that those comments would not have been intended to have been accepted in this regard, [NAME] argue that they are entitled to rely on facts, including concessions which have been made by Canada in open court. I note that these facts are not a matter of dispute between the parties. Canada has accepted in the context of this proceeding that climate change is a real and an urgent problem but responds that this does not absolve [NAME] of their responsibility to formulate a reviewable constitutional claim. [ 58 ] [NAME] say that Canada is not being put in a position where they do not know the case against them. [NAME]’ position is that they have pleaded the statutory objectives of every law impugned, and that they have pleaded that the harm or detriment that is being alleged is so extreme that all such impugned laws are either arbitrary or per se grossly disproportionate. [ 59 ] [NAME] submit that it is not plain and obvious that the current pleadings fail to disclose a reasonable cause of action, when read in light of the jurisprudence relating to the contextualized nature of the [NAME] 7 [NAME] analysis. To the contrary, they submit, all the necessary material facts have now been pleaded and that any remaining deficiencies in the pleadings could be addressed by demands for further and better particulars.

VI. Analysis A. Do the pleadings now disclose a reasonable [NAME] 7 [NAME] claim? [ 60 ] In [NAME] at paragraphs 69–70, I described the steps in pleading a [NAME] 7 [NAME] claim in the following way: [69] As the first step, a [NAME] must identify how the impugned laws deprive them of life, liberty, or security of the person ( Canadian Council for [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2023 SCC 17 at para 56 [ Canadian Council for [NAME] ]). There must be a sufficient causal connection between the state-caused effect and the prejudice suffered by the claimant ( [NAME] at para 75). This causal nexus may be “sensitive to the context of the particular case” but requires “a real, as opposed to a speculative, link” ( [NAME] at para 76). [70] Second, a [NAME] must show that the alleged deprivation is not in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. The claimant must show that “the means by which the state seeks to attain its objective is fundamentally flawed, in the sense of being arbitrary, overbroad, or having effects that are grossly disproportionate to the legislative goal” ( [NAME] at para 105). [71] Once a breach of [NAME] 7 is established, the government bears the burden of showing that the infringement of rights is justified under [NAME] 1 of the [NAME] ( [NAME] at para 126). [ 61 ] I previously acknowledged that, however broad the pleadings remained, at least some of the laws in Schedule A could plausibly engage [NAME]’ [NAME] 7 [NAME] rights and establish a sufficient causal connection between the legislative scheme identified and the deprivation of each [NAME] 7 [NAME] interest for the purposes of the first stage of the analysis ( [NAME] at paras 85–86). [ 62 ] I add that the Supreme Court has recognized that arguments seeking to bring courts’ attention to “competing social interests or public benefits conferred by the impugned law” are not relevant at the second stage of a [NAME] 7 [NAME] analysis (i.e., when determining whether a deprivation is in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice), but rather that those arguments should arise when considering whether a breach is justified under [NAME] 1 of the [NAME] ( [NAME] at para 79). [ 63 ] To show that a deprivation is not in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice, the claimant must demonstrate that the impugned legislation conflicts with basic constitutional values, such as by being arbitrary, broad, or grossly disproportionate. The Supreme Court recently summarized the meaning of these terms: [138] A law is arbitrary if “there is no connection between the effect and the object of the law” … [139] A law is overbroad when it is “so broad in scope that it includes some conduct that bears no relation to its purpose” … [140] Finally, a law will be grossly disproportionate only “in extreme cases”, if the seriousness of the s. 7 deprivation is “totally out of sync with the objective of the measure”, such that the law “cannot be rationally supported” … ( R v [NAME] , 2025 SCC 25 at paras 138–140) [ 64 ] With this in mind, I find that [NAME] still have not properly pleaded a [NAME] 7 [NAME] claim that is capable of passing through the second stage of the analysis. (1) What are the enduring formal problems with the Second Further Amended Claim? [ 65 ] [NAME] reiterate one of their submissions made in the previous motion to strike in [NAME] : namely, that the amendments made to the Original Claim and Further Amended Statement of Claim as seen through the tracked changes to the document “speak for themselves in terms of their nature and extent.” While I agree that the changes do speak for themselves, it is not in a way that benefits [NAME]’ position. The changes are limited, superficial, and do not go to the root of the problems previously identified by the courts. [ 66 ] [NAME] seek to argue that they need not do what the courts have advised because the harm is so extreme the usual framework for analysis of a [NAME] 7 [NAME] claim does not apply. This either ignores or directly rejects a clear pronouncement in the previous motion to strike: namely, that “[t]here is no legal principle to support the position that, where several laws are alleged to contribute to a severe [NAME] 7 deprivation, the objectives of those laws do not need to be compared against the deprivation” ( [NAME] at para 99). [ 67 ] [NAME] rely on language from the Supreme Court’s Judgment in its References re GGPPA to support their position. But this language was used in the context of a judicial reference considering the constitutional validity of carbon pricing legislation. Chief Justice Wagner’s reasons may be quoted directly to clarify: The essential factual backdrop to these appeals is uncontested. Climate change is real. It is caused by greenhouse gas emissions resulting from human activities, and it poses a grave threat to humanity’s future. The only way to address the threat of climate change is to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. In the Paris Agreement , … [NAME] around the world undertook to drastically reduce their greenhouse gas emissions in order to mitigate the effects of climate change. In Canada, Parliament enacted the GGPPA as part of the country’s effort to implement its commitment. However, none of these facts answer the question in these appeals. The issue here is whether Parliament had the constitutional authority to enact the GGPPA . … ( References re GGPPA at paras 2–3) [ 68 ] Similarly, the facts are not contested in this action. The issue before this Court is whether [NAME] have shown how impugned laws deprive them of their [NAME] 7 [NAME] interests, and how such deprivation is not in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. Judicial commentary on global climate change and Canada’s efforts to address it does not provide a foundation sturdy enough to foist such a sweeping constitutional challenge without further effort. [ 69 ] [NAME] have repeatedly said that any outstanding issues with the pleadings can be addressed by motions for further and better particulars. I have already rejected this suggestion ( [NAME] at para 111). [ 70 ] [NAME] continue to compare their claim to the case of [NAME] . The comparison does not work. [NAME] was a challenge to the constitutionality of two provisions in one specific piece of legislation: sections 3 and 16 of the Cap and Trade Cancellation Act, 2018 , SO 2018, c 13. I have already made this point to [NAME] ( [NAME] at para 83). [ 71 ] There is no basis for [NAME]’ suggestion that there is a spectrum of approaches available to a [NAME] 7 [NAME] analysis. I agree that context does inform the test, but context does not alter the necessary structure of the analysis altogether. [ 72 ] I do not find any legal principle supporting the idea that a law which, on its own, is compliant with [NAME] 7 of the [NAME] , could be found as infringing that [NAME] entirely based on its comparison to other laws. Nor have [NAME] convincingly explained why the CNZEAA should be treated as a quasi-constitutional statute in carrying out an assessment of the constitutionality of the laws in Schedule A (see para 40, above). [ 73 ] There is no general or high-level weighing of an “overwhelming harm” at the second stage of a [NAME] 7 [NAME] analysis. Each provision’s statutory objective must only be weighed against the harm alleged to be caused by that provision. [ 74 ] One of the changes implemented by [NAME] is the division by colouring of provisions, as described at paragraph 90 of the Second Further Amended Claim. The colour-coding creates new arguments about Canada’s failure to take “sufficient, reasonable steps, consistent with the best available science” but there is no clarity as to what this is supposed to be – is it part of the [NAME] 7 test? If so, to what effect? The claim is still pleaded at such a level of generality and with so many impugned provisions that it does not suddenly result in a workable [NAME] challenge. [ 75 ] In [NAME]’ written materials, they cite to specific paragraphs of the Second Further Amended Claim to argue that they have adequately pleaded sufficient particulars to make out the fundamental justice analysis they are required to do. While these paragraphs have added references to the three colour-coded categories, this does not effectively respond to the courts’ previous reasons. [ 76 ] [NAME] made several points which they say justify the form of their pleadings. First, they say all the provisions “relate to the encouragement or regulation of GHG emissions” which they argue narrows the claim. But this does not result in a workable claim. A giant basket of provisions does not result in a workable claim simply by virtue of their shared subject matter without even the material facts pleaded to tie the provisions together. [ 77 ] [NAME]’ insistence that the only way they can bring the claim is to have it assessed cumulatively is simply unresponsive to Justice Rennie’s findings in [NAME] . [NAME] are still raising the entirety of Canada’s climate policy in their Second Further Amended Claim, including many provisions which they assert as having a positive effect on climate change. They continue to improperly rely on other cases involving challenges to more than one provision to argue that their Schedule A would not be too complex to litigate ( [NAME] at paras 92–93). (2) Do [NAME] succeed in arguing that an alternative analytical framework should prevail? [ 78 ] It is not a sufficient argument to say that the policy direction of multiple laws is inconsistent. A [NAME] 7 [NAME] claim must proceed by identifying whether a specific law has deprived a claimant of life, liberty, or security of the person. [ 79 ] [NAME] now argue that this “narrow focus advocated by Canada and accepted by the Courts on the earlier [motions to strike], is not required under the jurisprudence.” They say that this “delicate” balancing exercise should be jettisoned in favour of a “coarser” balancing exercise as exemplified in the cases of [NAME] . [ 80 ] In [NAME] , the Supreme Court’s comments on the judicial use of the phrase “shocks the conscience” came in the context of rejecting one of the Minister of Justice’s arguments in favour of extradition. [ADDRESS] affirmed the correctness of the balancing process, and rather clearly stated that this phrase was “not intended to signal an abdication by judges of their constitutional responsibilities in matters involving fundamental principles of justice” (at para 67). [ 81 ] The Supreme Court of Canada plainly did not say, as [NAME] contend, that an extreme or extraordinary harm mandates a different analytical approach to a [NAME] 7 [NAME] claim. But rather the Supreme Court of Canada said that the finder of fact may accord an “overwhelming” weight to some particular factor in an extradition case, such as a sympathetic personal characteristic of the [NAME] or a morally repugnant type of punishment or treatment ( [NAME] at paras 68–69). [ 82 ] In [NAME] , the Court considered the jurisprudence on extradition in the context of determining whether it analogously applied to the deportation of an asylum claimant. In analyzing whether the deportation of a suspected terrorist to face torture in Sri Lanka was inconsistent with the principles of fundamental justice, the Court considered at length both the Canadian perspective as well as international treaty norms including, most significantly, multilateral instruments prohibiting torture ( [NAME] at para 62). [ 83 ] Contrary to [NAME]’ pleadings, there is no indication that the Supreme Court of Canada formulated a new approach to the [NAME] 7 [NAME] analysis in [NAME] . Rather, the Court affirmed that the correct approach is to conduct a balancing and expressly rejected the idea that a specific alleged deprivation (namely, deportation to torture) inevitably led to an inconsistency with the principles of fundamental justice: The approach is essentially one of balancing. As we said in [NAME] , “[i]t is inherent in the . . . balancing process that the outcome may well vary from case to case depending on the mix of contextual factors put into the balance” (para. 65). Deportation to torture, for example, requires us to consider a variety of factors, including the circumstances or conditions of the potential deportee, the danger that the deportee presents to Canadians or the country’s security, and the threat of terrorism to Canada. In contexts in which the most significant considerations are the general ones, it is likely that the balance will be struck the same way in most cases. It would be impossible to say in advance, however, that the balance will necessarily be struck the same way in every case. ( [NAME] at para 45, emphasis added) [ 84 ] Nor do [NAME] or [NAME] provide support for [NAME]’ position, as they contend. In [NAME] , the Court declined to conduct an analysis of gross disproportionality because they had concluded that the law at issue was overbroad (at para 90). In [NAME] , the Court reviewed in detail the reasoning of the application judge and appellate court below with respect to their assessment of empirical evidence and the laws’ compliance with the principles of fundamental justice (at paras 133–136; 148–159). Again, in analyzing one provision, the Court declined to consider gross disproportionality upon finding that the law was overbroad (at para 145). [ 85 ] Even if I were inclined to accept the applicability of [NAME] to [NAME]’ case in the way that they propose that those cases should be interpreted, I would first have to accept that this constitutional challenge is similarly framed, which it is not. The claimants in [NAME] were subject to discrete ministerial decisions with penal consequences bearing a clear causal nexus to the alleged deprivation of their [NAME] 7 [NAME] rights. Here, [NAME]’ claim continues to lack such causal connection: the laws in Schedule A are impugned insofar as they have failed to ensure Canada’s effective adherence to the Temperature Commitment, and [NAME] claim that the deprivations suffered by them are caused by the inadequacy of the legislative scheme as a whole. [ 86 ] The core problem is that [NAME]’ argument that the effects of climate change essentially “shock the conscience” of the Canadian public and therefore cannot be consistent with the principles of fundamental justice amounts to the assertion of a legal conclusion. The courts have occasionally used this language when giving particular weight to some part of the evidence in proceedings related to extraditions or deportations. It is not part of the analysis that claimants are expected to contribute to during litigation, which is limited to the two-step process discussed above. [ 87 ] The “shocks the conscience” language from [NAME] cannot be easily analogized to the harms arising from climate change, as the harms from climate change are not clearly analogous to the risks arising from extradition or deportation to a risk of very great harm from a foreign government. But [NAME] are not adopting the analysis used in those cases at all – they are simply importing the phrase “shocks the conscience” to assert that the extremity of the harm alleged overrides the need for any further balancing or analysis. This misstates the legal principle in [NAME] – the Court still undertook a lengthy analysis rather than simply accepting, as [NAME] suggest, that the extremity of the harm automatically outweighed any legal objective (at paras 76–99). [ 88 ] I conclude that the Supreme Court did not create the analytical framework which [NAME] propose should apply to their case. (3) What would an analysis of Schedule A look like? [ 89 ] [NAME] claim with a reasonable prospect of success must be capable of undergoing a [NAME] analysis. In that respect, it may be prudent to demonstrate what a [NAME] analysis of Schedule A would entail. Taking the very first provision listed in Schedule A as a working example, [NAME] 66.1 of the Income Tax Act , RSC 1985, c 1 (5th Supp) allows up to a 100% deduction against income for expenses incurred by taxpayers searching for mineral resources or oil and gas in Canada. [ 90 ] [NAME]’ challenge to the constitutionality of Canadian exploration expenses under [NAME] 66.1 would have to begin by establishing that there is a sufficient causal connection between the subsidy it provides and the deprivations of [NAME]’ life, liberty, or security of the person. In the context of this analysis, we may simply accept as pleaded that by incentivizing exploration for fossil fuels through a tax subsidy, the federal government has indirectly increased GHG emissions and that there is a real link between the granting of these subsidies and the harms to [NAME] food security and traditional ways of life. [ 91 ] At the second stage, [NAME] appear to simply assert that everything in Schedule A is either arbitrary or grossly disproportionate, or both. [NAME] ascribe the purpose of “encourag[ing] taxpayers to explore for oil and gas in Canada” to [NAME] 66.1, the implicit argument for arbitrariness would be that its actual operation bears no relation to, or is inconsistent with, that objective. The implicit argument for gross disproportionality is that the administration of [NAME] 66.1 itself results in deprivations to [NAME]’ life, liberty, or security of the person that are grossly disproportionate to Canada’s interest underpinning the law ( [NAME] at para 103). [ 92 ] Once again, accepting one or both of these arguments as true, the Defendant would then have the opportunity to argue that the legislative objective of [NAME] 66.1 relates to “pressing and substantial” concerns which are reasonable and demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society ( R v [NAME] , 1986 CanLII 46 (SCC) at para 69). [ 93 ] I use this example to demonstrate that a trial involving each of these steps repeated for 1,800 provisions and innumerable permits and licences would exhaust this Court’s resources. This wholesale attack was already rejected by the Federal Court of Appeal. As both this Court and the Federal Court of Appeal have repeatedly told [NAME], such a trial – plainly and obviously – is not how [NAME] claims work ( [NAME] at paras 131–132). [ADDRESS] is more than capable of conducting complex and long trials, but such an extensive use of judicial resources is only warranted where the pleadings properly disclose a reasonable cause of action. [ 94 ] [NAME] argue that the novelty and complexity of the claim cannot be a bar to the action. At the same time, they continue to insist that all of Schedule A must be litigated as a single legislative scheme. This shows a fundamental adherence to the position and strategy set out in the original and unamended form of the pleadings: that is to say, [NAME] remain committed to the idea that no narrowed claim will adequately capture the systemic nature of the federal government’s liability for climate change. [ 95 ] The Federal Court of Appeal pronounced that such claims simply cannot meet “the threshold standard in constitutional litigation that specific laws or actions be targeted” ( [NAME] at para 130). [ADDRESS] stated that the companion case [NAME]’ claim illustrated this problem, as it impugned “legislative and regulatory responses involving transportation, methane emissions, mining of fossil fuels, export and import of fossil fuels, carbon pricing standards, financing of the fossil fuel industry and acquisition of the Trans Mountain Pipeline” (ibid). The [NAME] followed the instruction of the Federal Court of Appeal and amended their pleadings accordingly. [ 96 ] The Second Further Amended Claim under review in the present motion is not very different from the [NAME]’ original claim as described by the Federal Court of Appeal: it, too, impugns legislative and regulatory responses ranging from tax subsidies, overseas trade, transportation, and emissions of GHGs, nitrogen oxide, and sulfur, among other things. [ 97 ] [NAME]’ concession that up to 1,722 provisions “will likely not genuinely be at issue” only raises more questions. Why have so many provisions which are not anticipated to infringe on [NAME]’ [NAME] 7 [NAME] interests been pleaded at all? [ 98 ] The answer to this question presents itself through the pleadings: because the action that [NAME] want to bring is not one that is grounded in a violation of [NAME] 7 [NAME] rights at all, but instead in Canada’s non-compliance with its commitments under the Paris Agreement . [ 99 ] The Federal Court of Appeal said that an earlier version of [NAME]’ “[NAME] 7 claims [were] overly broad and fail[ed] to zero in on the specific provision or provisions which constitute a deprivation” (at para 128). I find that the Second Further Amended Claim is still overly broad and still fails to zero in on the specific provision or provisions which constitute a deprivation. [ 100 ] I find it plain and obvious that the Second Further Amended Claim fails to disclose a reasonable cause of action and consequently that it may be struck out under Rule 221(1)(a). B. [NAME] be granted leave for further amendment? [ 101 ] [NAME] have been advised by this Court as well as the Federal Court of Appeal that they must identify a specific, bounded set of legislative or executive decisions that caused a particular and traceable harm to the [NAME] and [NAME] to ground their [NAME] 7 [NAME] claim ( [NAME] at paras 128–134; [NAME] at paras 93–100). [ 102 ] Rather than doing so, [NAME] persist in arguing that narrowing the claim is impossible because the aggregative and cumulative effects of Canada’s climate policy must be addressed all at once. This is unsurprising, because the relief sought by [NAME] with respect to the infringement of their [NAME] 7 [NAME] rights is subsidiary to the primary remedy they request: a declaration constitutionalizing Canada’s Temperature Commitment under the Paris Agreement . [ 103 ] [NAME] said a core aspect of their claim is that they do not wish for specific laws to be amended or repealed. This is not strictly true, when paragraph (d) of their sought remedies is reviewed, as it expressly contemplates the repeal and replacement of legislation. Additionally, the [NAME] 7 [NAME] breach claimed is dependent on the remedy sought, which is inappropriate. [ 104 ] There is no indication from [NAME]’ submissions on this motion that they are willing to undertake a substantial and structural reorganization of their claim. Even selecting a single subset of laws from one of the five categories of measures relating to GHG emissions identified in Schedule A would have been more responsive to this Court’s reasons on the previous motion to strike than the colour-coding amendment they have opted for instead. [ 105 ] [NAME] have doubled down on the strategy which has been rejected by the courts three times. They now claim that both this Court and the Federal Court of Appeal’s instructions with respect to [NAME] litigation were incorrect because the case law exemplified by [NAME] supposedly establishes an alternative analytical framework. [ 106 ] [NAME]’ logic defies not only the earlier reasoning of this Court, but also of the Federal Court of Appeal with respect to the workability of their [NAME] claim. [ADDRESS] is bound by vertical stare decisis , and accordingly [NAME]’ argument that neither this Court nor the Federal Court of Appeal have understood what a [NAME] 7 [NAME] claim requires must be rejected. [ 107 ] I am not persuaded that any further amendments will address the fundamental unworkability of [NAME]’ [NAME] 7 [NAME] claim which they have now sought to advance on three separate occasions. The defects in the claim are clearly incurable within the parameters of [NAME]’ legal theory. Granting leave to amend will only serve to delay an ultimate dismissal of this case if the past amendments are a harbinger of the future ( Chad v Canada (National Revenue) , 2025 FCA 102 at para 32; [NAME] at para 8).

VII. Conclusion [ 108 ] For the reasons above, the Second Further Amended Claim is struck without leave to amend. Pursuant to Rule 334.39, there shall be no award of costs.

JUDGMENT in T-211-20 THIS COURT’S

JUDGMENT is that : The Second Further Amended Claim is struck with no leave to amend. No costs are awarded. "[NAME]" Judge ANNEX A Statute or Regulation Impugned or Relevant Provision(s) Summary of Provision(s) Statutory Object 1. SUBSIDIES Income Tax Act , RSC 1985, c 1 To raise revenues for the federal government Canadian Exploration Expenses, ITA s. 66.1 Oil & gas explorers may deduct 100% CEEs in the year they are incurred. To encourage taxpayers to explore for oil and gas in Canada. Canadian Development Expenses, ITA s. 66.2(2)(c) Oil & gas producers may deduct 30% of CDEs each year on a declining balance. To encourage taxpayers to produce oil and gas in Canada. Flow-Through Share Deductions, ITA ss. 66(12.6), 66(12.61), 66(12.62), 66(12.63) Unused CDEs and CEEs may be passed on to company shareholders. To encourage taxpayers to explore for, and produce, oil and gas in Canada Canadian Oil and Gas Property Expense, ITA s. 66.4 Taxpayers may deduct up to 10% of costs to acquire or preserve rights to il and gas wells. To encourage taxpayers to acquire and preserve oil and gas well rights in Canada Foreign Resource Expenses, ITA s. 66.21 Canadian taxpayers may deduct up to 30% of a declining balance of oil & gas exploration expenses incurred in a foreign country To encourage taxpayers to explore for oil and gas outside of Canada Accelerated Capital Cost Allowances, Income Tax Regulations, CRC c 945 CCAs are deducted from income to allow for the depreciation of capital property. When accelerated, they benefit the taxpayer due to the “time value of money” . For example: LNG capital costs incurred from 2015 to 2025 may be depreciated at 30% instead of the 8% base rate. Other oil & gas capital costs may be accelerated between 3% and 15% above the base rate. To encourage taxpayers to invest in certain activities, including oil and gas production, refining and transport 2. PUBLIC FINANCING Export Development Act , RSC 1985, c E-20 EDA , ss. 10(1) and 10(1.1) The Act facilitates business by providing direct financing, loan guarantees and investments ( EDA , ss. 10(1) and 10(1.1)). For example: it has financed the Trans Mountain Pipeline, Trans Mountain Expansion Pipeline Project, TransCanada Pipelines, and [NAME]. To facilitate overseas trade by providing direct government financing, loan guarantees and investments to Canadian exporters, including of oil and gas.

3. GHG EMISSION LIMITS Canadian Environmental Protection Act , 1999, SC 1999, c 33 To contribute to sustainable development through pollution prevention Heavy-duty Vehicles and Engine Greenhouse Gas Emission Regulations, SOR/2013-24 Regulates GHG emission performance standards for heavy-duty vehicles and engines made or imported into Canada. To reduce GHG emissions from heavy-duty vehicles and engines Marine Spark-Ignition Engine, Vessel and Off-Road Recreational Vehicle Emission Regulations, SOR/2011-10 Sets performance-based emission standards for small gasoline-fueled engines. To reduce emissions of hydrocarbons, oxides of nitrogen and carbon monoxide from engines, vessels and vehicles Multi-Sector Air Pollutants Regulations, SOR/2016-151 Sets standards for nitrogen oxide emissions from a variety of gaseous fuel-fired industrial applications. To protect the environment and human health from nitrogen oxide emissions Off-Road Compression Ignition (Mobile and Staionary) [ sic ] and Large Spark-Ignition Engine Emission Regulations, SOR/2020-258 Sets performance-based emission standards for new off-road diesel and large spark-ignition engines To prevent air pollution Off-Road Small Spark-Ignition Engine Emission Regulations, SOR/2003-355 Sets performance-based emission standards for new small spark-ignition engines. To reduce emissions of hydrocarbons, oxides of nitrogen and carbon monoxide from small engines On-Road Vehicle and Engine Emission Regulations, SOR/2003-2 Sets air pollution standards for cars, light trucks and heavy trucks beginning with 2004 model year. To reduce emissions of hydrocarbons, carbon monoxide, oxides of nitrogen, formaldehyde and particulate matter from on-road vehicles and engines Passenger Automobile and Light Truck Greenhouse Gas Emission Regulations, SOR/2010-201 Sets GHG emission standards for cars and light trucks beginning with 2011 model year and, beginning in model year 2026, sets standards that will result in all new vehicles being zero-emission by model year 2035. To reduce GHG emissions from cars and light trucks Reduction of Carbon Dioxide Emissions from Coal-fired Generation of Electricity Regulations, SOR/2012-167 Sets a performance standard to reduce GHG emissions from coal-fire electricity generation. To reduce carbon dioxide emissions from coal-fired electricity generation Regulations Limiting Carbon Dioxide Emissions from Natural Gas-fired Generation of Electricity, SOR/2018-261 Sets a performance standard to reduce GHG emissions from natural gas-fired electricity generation. To reduce carbon dioxide emissions from natural gas-fired electricity generation Reduction in the Release of Methane and Certain Volatile Organic Compounds (Upstream Oil and Gas Sector), SOR/2018-66 Sets standards for upstream oil and gas facilities to reduce [NAME] or venting emissions of methane. To protect the environment and to reduce immediate and long-term effects of methane and certain volatile organic compound emissions Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act , SC 2018, c 12, s 186 Incentivises GHG emission reductions by an emission-pricing regime throughout Canada with increasing stringency over time. To reduce GHG emissions Canadian Emission Reduction Incentives Agency , SC 2005, c 30, s 87 The Agency is intended to acquire eligible credits from GHG emission reduction or removal and thus to provide incentives for the reduction or removal of GHGs. The agency has yet to become operational. To reduce or remove GHG emissions necessary to fight climate change Canada Shipping Act , SC 2001, c 26 To protect health, promote safety, protect marine environments, and encourage marine transportation and recreation Vessel Pollution and Dangerous Chemical Regulations, SOR/2012-69 Sets emission standards for nitrogen oxides and sulphur oxides from ships To prevent pollution from ships Railway Safety Act, RSC 1985 , c 32 To provide for railway safety and security Locomotive Emissions Regulations, SOR/2017-121 Sets emission standards for nitrogen oxides and other pollutants from railway locomotives. To protect the environment by reducing hydrocarbon emissions from railway locomotives 4. GHG EMISSION PERMITS Canadian Environmental Assessment Act , 2012, SC 2012, c 19, s 52 Repealed (Included for completeness due to transition provisions of the IAA as noted) Comprehensive studies, environmental assessments and decision statements started under CEAA 2012 when the IAA came into force are continued under the IAA : s. 179(2), s. 179(3), s. 181(1), s. 182 and s. 184. To achieve sustainable development and considers environmental quality Impact Assessment Act , SC 2019, c 28, s 1 s. 22(1)(i), s. 63(e), s. 95(2) An impact assessment and subsequent determinations must take into account, among other things, the extent to which a project hinders or contributes to Canada’s ability to meet its climate change commitments To prevent or mitigate significant adverse effects caused by carrying out designated projects. Canada Energy Regulator Act , 2019, c. 28, s. 10 s. 183(2)(f), s. 262(2)(f), s. 298(3)(f), In making a recommendation, issuing a certificate, or issuing an authorisation, the Commission must take into account, among other things, the extent to which a project hinders or contributes to Canada’s ability to meet its climate change commitments. To ensure energy projects are built and operated so as to protect [NAME], property and the environment. Canada Oil and Gas Operations Act , RSC 1985, c O-7 Canada Oil and Gas Certificate of Fitness Regulations, SOR/96-114 A certificate of fitness may be issued if the installation may be operated safely “without polluting the environment” (s. 4(2)) To promote safety, environmental protection, oil and gas conservation and accountability in oil and gas exploration and exploitation Canada Petroleum Resources Act , RSC 1985, c 36 s. 29, s. 37(1) Allows leasing of federal oil and gas rights on “frontier lands” , which effectively allows fossil fuel projects to proceed. To issue tenues for petroleum development and extraction in frontier and other federal lands 5. GHG EMISSION STANDARDS Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999, SC 1999, c 33 To contribute to sustainable development through pollution prevention Sulphur in Diesel Fuel Regulations, SOR/2002-254 Sets limits for sulphur in diesel fuel. To reduce air pollution, particularly sulfur dioxide aerosols, which affect atmospheric energy balance and hence global warming Sulphur in Gasoline Regulations, SOR/99-236 Sets limits for sulphur in gasoline. To reduce air pollution, particularly sulphur dioxide aerosols, which affect atmospheric energy balance and hence global warming Ozone-depleting Substances and Halocarbon Alternatives Regulation, SOR/2016-137 Sets out rules for ozone-depleting substances To control ozone-depleting substances and to restrict hydrofluorocarbons, which are powerful GHGs. Alternative Fuels Act , SC 1995, c 20 To better control GHG emissions from vehicles operated by federal bodies and Crown corporations Energy Efficiency Act , SC 1992, c 36 To prescribe minimum energy performance standards for certain products FEDERAL COURT SOLICITORS OF RECORD DOCKET: T-211-20 STYLE OF CAUSE: [NAME], ALSO KNOWN AS [NAME], ON HIS OWN BEHALF AND ON BEHALF OF ALL THE MEMBERS OF [NAME] AND, [NAME], ALSO KNOWN AS [NAME], ON HIS OWN BEHALF AND ON BEHALF OF ALL THE MEMBERS OF [NAME] v HIS MAJESTY THE KING IN RIGHT OF CANADA PLACE OF HEARING: VANCOUVER, BRITISH COLUMBIA DATE OF HEARING: APRIL 27, 2026

REASONS AND

JUDGMENT: [NAME] J. DATED: July 14, 2026 APPEARANCES : [NAME], K.C. For [NAME] For [NAME] For The DEFENDANT SOLICITORS OF RECORD : [COMPANY], British Columbia For [NAME], British Columbia For [NAME] of Canada Vancouver, British Columbia For The DEFENDANT