Federal Court Rejects Refugee Claim Due to Adequate State Protection in Jordan

Date: 20260108 Docket: IMM-12527-23 Citation: 2026 FC 17 Ottawa, Ontario, January 8, 2026 PRESENT: Mr. Justice McHaffie BETWEEN: [NAME] Applicant and THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION Respondent

JUDGMENT AND

REASONS I. Overview [ 1 ] The Refugee Appeal Division [[NAME]] refused [NAME]’s refugee claim on the basis that he could benefit from adequate state protection in Jordan. [NAME] seeks judicial review of that refusal, claiming [NAME]’s state protection analysis was unreasonable. He argues [NAME] unreasonably focused on efforts made by Jordanian police and not the operational adequacy of those efforts, noting that the criminal who targeted him was able to attack him twice, even after he made reports to the police, and continued to threaten him over the phone after he moved to another city. He also claims [NAME] unreasonably refused to recognize a tribal element to the threats he faced. [ 2 ] As detailed further below, [NAME] has not satisfied me that [NAME]’s analysis of the availability of state protection was unreasonable. [NAME]’s reasons show it considered the harms faced by [NAME], the evidence of his reports to the police and the occasions on which he did not seek police assistance, and the objective country condition evidence regarding state protection in Jordan. It applied the correct legal analysis to this evidence and found [NAME] had not rebutted the presumption that Jordan would be able to adequately protect him. This conclusion was reasonably open to [NAME] on the evidence, and [NAME]’s claims of analytical failures are not justified. Nor has [NAME] demonstrated that the threats and harms he faced were in any way connected to tribal matters or that [NAME]’s conclusions with respect to tribal justice issues were unreasonable. [ 3 ] The application for judicial review is therefore dismissed.

II. Issues and Standard of Review [ 4 ] The only issue raised on this application for judicial review is whether [NAME]’s conclusion that [NAME] had not rebutted the presumption of state protection was reasonable: Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov , 2019 SCC 65 at paras 16–17, 23–25. [ 5 ] When the Court reviews a decision on the reasonableness standard, it does not undertake its own assessment of the merits of the matter. Its role is limited to ensuring that the decision at issue meets the requirements of a reasonable decision by being internally coherent, transparent, intelligible, and justified in light of the factual and legal constraints that bear on it: Vavilov at paras 15, 82–86, 101–105.

III. Analysis A. [NAME]’s Claim [ 6 ] [NAME] was a process server in Irbid, Jordan. In August 2021, he was tasked with serving court papers on a criminal gang member identified by [NAME] as “[NAME].” When [NAME] arrived at [NAME]’s address, two men tricked him into following them to an abandoned house, where they attacked him at gunpoint and detained him. [NAME] came into the room and opened the papers, to discover that the court had sentenced him to ten years in prison for attempted homicide. [NAME] was furious but told [NAME] he would be released on the condition that he report that he had neither seen nor served [NAME] with the papers. [ 7 ] Returning to his office, [NAME] reported the incident to his manager and advised the police, who told him they had been trying to arrest [NAME] for over two years. [NAME] chose not to press charges, for fear of retaliation by [NAME]. The next day, he received a call from [NAME], who accused him of calling the police on him and threatened him. The police had found the abandoned house and had arrested [NAME]’s brother and his right-hand man, but had not located [NAME]. [ 8 ] Eleven days later, [NAME] was running an errand when three men attacked him and tried to kidnap him. He evaded the attempt with the assistance of passersby. While escaping the scene, the attackers threatened that [NAME] would find him again. After recovering from the attack for a week, [NAME] filed a complaint with the police station. He received another threatening call from [NAME] the same day. A few days after, a colleague reported that a suspicious man had been asking after him at work and looking for his home address. [NAME] decided to move to his parents’ home in another village while continuing to work as a process server in Irbid. [ 9 ] A couple of months later, [NAME] was driving home when another car drove alongside him. [NAME] saw [NAME], who demanded that he pull over. When he refused, another man in [NAME]’s car started shooting, but he managed to speed away. [NAME] again reported this incident to the police. He transferred to another city and resumed work. Ten days later, [NAME] received another call from [NAME], who said that he knew [NAME] had relocated, and that he would find him. Fearing for his life, [NAME] fled to Canada, while his family remained in Jordan. In July 2022 and in early 2023, he received reports from his wife that men had asked after him at his new home. In April 2023, [NAME] himself appeared at his home asking after [NAME], but left when his wife threatened to call the police. These incidents were not reported to the police. [ 10 ] At his hearing before the Refugee Protection Division [RPD], [NAME] noted that [NAME] was the member of a very large tribe. He said his father had reached out to the tribe to try to resolve the problem, but was unsuccessful because the tribe did not control [NAME] and his gang. B. [NAME]’s Decision [ 11 ] [NAME], like the RPD, accepted [NAME]’s narrative as credible. However, it found he had not rebutted the presumption that his state of nationality could adequately protect him from the risks posed by [NAME]. The availability of adequate state protection obviates the need for the surrogate protection that Canada gives to refugees. [NAME] therefore found that [NAME] did not meet the definition of a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection under sections 96 or 97, respectively, of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act , SC 2001, c 27 [ IRPA ]. [ 12 ] [NAME] cited a number of well-established principles in respect of the state protection analysis, flowing from the Supreme Court of Canada’s pivotal decision in [NAME] and subsequent cases applying it: Canada (Attorney General) v [NAME] , 1993 CanLII 105, [1993] 2 SCR 689; Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) v Villafranca , 1992 CanLII 8569 (FCA); Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v [NAME] , 1996 CanLII 3981, [1996] FCJ No 1376 (FCA); [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2015 FC 1044; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2018 FC 367; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2020 FC 966. [ 13 ] In particular, [NAME]’s reasons, and the parties’ arguments on this application, place in juxtaposition two of these well-accepted principles. The first is that the adequacy of state protection must be assessed as a matter of operational effectiveness and not simply one focused on the state’s efforts to protect: [NAME] at para 26; [NAME] at para 21; [NAME] at para 25. The second is that the standard for assessing state protection is not that of perfection or of guaranteed protection but rather the state’s inability to adequately protect the claimant: [redacted] [ 14 ] [NAME] found that [NAME] had not exhausted all steps reasonably available to him to seek state protection in Jordan, noting that he had not reported the various phone threats he had received both before and after moving away from Irbid. Nor had he or his wife reported [NAME]’s more recent visits to their home after [NAME] had left Jordan. [NAME] recognized that [NAME] had not reported these calls due to his subjective belief that the police would not take any action. However, it found this belief was not justified given the police’s prior responses to [NAME]’s reports. [ 15 ] In this regard, [NAME] considered that the police had taken “appropriate and significant steps to bring [NAME] and his gang to justice,” referring to the ten-year sentence given to [NAME] and to the arrest of senior members of his gang. It agreed with the RPD that these steps were strong evidence of the operational adequacy of the state protection from [NAME], a finding that [NAME] had not challenged on appeal to [NAME]. [NAME] also noted that [NAME]’s evidence was that the police continued to pursue [NAME] in response to the complaints he had filed. [ 16 ] [NAME] did not accept [NAME]’s argument that the fact that [NAME] was still at large, and that the police had not provided him with ongoing physical protection, was sufficient to rebut the presumption of adequate state protection. It again noted that [NAME] had not reported significant actions by [NAME] to the police and underscored that the standard of protection was adequacy and not perfection. [ 17 ] [NAME] reviewed the objective documentary evidence regarding policing and protection in Jordan, finding that the preponderance of that evidence supported a finding that Jordan provides operationally adequate protection in the circumstances. It considered the state of democracy in Jordan and the evidence regarding policing structures and responsiveness. While recognizing a recent rise in crime and the presence of official corruption in Jordan, it found that neither was sufficient to rebut the presumption of state protection, noting that both the documentary evidence and [NAME]’s own experiences showed that police were responsive to requests for assistance. [ 18 ] [NAME] also rejected the contention that the threats and attacks from [NAME] amounted to a tribal dispute. It agreed that the evidence indicated that the matter was simply a personal vendetta and that [NAME]’s membership in a tribe did not render the matter a tribal one. Nor was there evidence that the Jordanian police perceived the matter as one engaging tribal justice. [NAME] therefore concluded that there was no nexus to a Convention ground that would bring his claim within the scope of section 96 of the IRPA and that, in any case, the availability of state protection was determinative of [NAME]’s claim under both sections 96 and 97 of the IRPA . C. [NAME]’s Decision is Reasonable [ 19 ] On this application for judicial review, [NAME] challenges two aspects of [NAME]’s decision: (1) its finding that the protection provided by Jordanian police was adequate; and (2) its finding that the dispute with [NAME] had no tribal connection. For the following reasons, I conclude that [NAME] has not established that [NAME]’s decision was unreasonable in either regard. (1) [NAME] reasonably considered operational adequacy [ 20 ] As [NAME] concedes, [NAME] recognized that state protection had to be considered at the operational level, rather than simply as a matter of state efforts to provide protection. However, [NAME] contends that [NAME] unreasonably failed to consider that his own unsuccessful efforts to obtain state protection showed that he was unable to receive operationally adequate protection in Jordan. He notes that his reports to the police after the initial incident with [NAME], the attempted kidnapping, and the car shooting incident, simply resulted in continued threats and escalating violence. He argues that [NAME] failed to consider this background and therefore failed to analyze operational adequacy against the relevant accepted facts. [ 21 ] I cannot agree. [NAME] directly addressed the fact that [NAME]’s complaints to the Jordanian police had not resulted in [NAME] being located and captured. [NAME] cannot therefore be said to have failed to consider this background in assessing whether state protection was operationally adequate. Rather, [NAME] found that the fact that [NAME] was still at large did not suffice to rebut the presumption of adequate state protection, particularly since [NAME] had not provided the police with information about [NAME]’s telephone threats and his appearance at his house. [NAME] concluded that the evidence, both from [NAME] and the country condition documents, indicated that state protection was operationally adequate even though [NAME] had not himself been apprehended. [ 22 ] [NAME]’s arguments effectively amount to an assertion that since [NAME] had not been caught—such that he remained able to continue to attack [NAME] and threaten him by phone—the state protection offered by the police was by definition inadequate, and the contrary conclusion was by definition unreasonable. However, this argument does not accord with the Federal Court of Appeal’s recognition that adequate state protection does not require a guarantee of protection or perfection in policing: Villafranca at para 7; [NAME] at paras 3–5; [NAME] at para 24. While “protection must be real, and it must be adequate,” this does not turn the requirement for adequate state protection into an invariable requirement that a criminal agent of harm be successfully apprehended: [NAME] at para 21. [ 23 ] Ongoing attacks and threats are certainly relevant to the question of whether police have the ability to protect a claimant. Depending on the circumstances, extensive and continued violence despite police involvement may point to a state’s inability to protect. However, the assessment of adequate state protection is necessarily specific to the facts and the claim, and the existence of ongoing threats after police have been informed does not automatically dictate a conclusion that state protection is operationally inadequate. [ 24 ] In the present case, [NAME]’s prior criminal activity had already resulted in his conviction and sentencing. [NAME]’s reports to the police resulted in concrete action, investigation, and even the arrest of [NAME]’s brother and right-hand man. It was reasonable for [NAME] to find that in these circumstances, the fact that the police’s actions did not result in the arrest of [NAME] himself was not sufficient to rebut the presumption of adequate state protection. As [NAME] noted, [NAME]’s ongoing telephone threats and his appearance at [NAME]’s house after he fled to Canada were not reported to police such that they might have used them in their investigations or acted on them to provide greater protection to [NAME] and his family. [NAME] considered these facts together with the other evidence of the adequacy of state protection in Jordan and found that, while not perfect, the protection available to [NAME] was adequate. This was a reasonable conclusion that was available to [NAME] on the record before it. (2) [NAME] reasonably found that there was no tribal connection [ 25 ] [NAME] argues that [NAME]’s finding that [NAME]’s personal vendetta against him had no tribal connection was unreasonable and contrary to the evidence. He contends that serving [NAME] with court documents “can be seen as dishonoring” [NAME]’s tribe, which can spark tribal vengeance. He refers to country condition documents that refer to a system of tribal law and justice that co-exists with civil law in Jordan. [ 26 ] The central difficulty with this submission is that there is no evidence that [NAME] serving [NAME] with court documents was in fact viewed by [NAME] or his gang as dishonouring [NAME]’s tribe. Despite the fact that [NAME] and his gang had spoken to [NAME] on a number of occasions, there was no evidence that they ever referred to the matter as a tribal one or as an issue of dishonour to the tribe. As [NAME] reasonably held, there was no evidence that [NAME]’s actions were motivated by tribal issues rather than personal and criminal ones. [NAME]’s assertion that his service of documents “can be seen” as dishonouring [NAME]’s tribe is therefore little more than speculation. Notably, the country condition evidence that [NAME] cites refers to “honour crimes.” However, it particularly indicates that tribal law applies when “there is a crime or conflict among tribes, for example, if someone kills or dishonors a woman from another tribe.” It similarly states that tribal law “seems to be focused on the control of women and family issues.” None of these descriptions apply to [NAME]’s targeting of [NAME]. [ 27 ] Nor was there any evidence that the police’s response to [NAME]’s complaints, or their efforts to protect [NAME] or bring [NAME] to justice, were in any way affected by tribal affiliations. To the contrary, the only evidence that raised the question of tribal justice was [NAME]’s evidence that his father’s independent efforts to speak to leaders of [NAME]’s tribe were unsuccessful because he was not controlled by them. [ 28 ] It was therefore not unreasonable for [NAME] to conclude that there was no tribal connection that would provide a nexus to a Convention ground. In any event, as [NAME] noted, the existence of adequate state protection means that an applicant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection: [NAME] at pp 718–721; [NAME] at para 18. Since there was no evidence that any tribal issue affected either the nature of the risk to [NAME] or the availability of protection available to him, [NAME]’s conclusion that there was adequate state protection precluded a positive finding under section 96 of the IRPA even if there had been a nexus to a Convention ground.

IV. Conclusion [ 29 ] As [NAME] has not established that [NAME]’s analysis of state protection was unreasonable, the application for judicial review must be dismissed. [ 30 ] Neither party proposed a question for certification pursuant to paragraph 74(d) of the IRPA . I agree that no question suitable for certification arises in the matter. [ 31 ] Finally, to reflect the correct spelling of [NAME]’s name, the style of cause will be amended to identify the applicant as [NAME].

JUDGMENT IN IMM-12527-23 THIS COURT’S

JUDGMENT is that The application for judicial review is dismissed. The style of cause is amended to identify the applicant as [NAME]. “Nicholas McHaffie” Judge FEDERAL COURT SOLICITORS OF RECORD DOCKET: IMM-12527-23 STYLE OF CAUSE: [NAME] v THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION PLACE OF HEARING:

HELD BY VIDEOCONFERENCE DATE OF HEARING: July 2, 2025

JUDGMENT AND

REASONS: MCHAFFIE J. DATED: January 8, 2026 APPEARANCES : Hart A. Kaminker For The Applicant [NAME] For The Respondent SOLICITORS OF RECORD : [NAME], Ontario For The Applicant Attorney General of Canada Toronto, Ontario For The Respondent