Federal Court Rejects Refugee Claimant's Judicial Review Application

Date: 20260407 Docket: IMM-17466-24 Citation: 2026 FC 448 Ottawa, Ontario, April 7, 2026 PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Duchesne BETWEEN: [NAME] Applicant and THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION Respondent

JUDGMENT AND

REASONS [ 1 ] This is an application for judicial review of an August 28, 2024, decision [the Decision] by a panel of the [NAME]’s [the IRCC] Refugee Protection Division [[NAME]]. [NAME] determined that the Applicant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection pursuant to sections 96 and 97(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act , SC 2001, c 27 [the IRPA ]. [ 2 ] [NAME] also determined that the Applicant’s claim was manifestly unfounded pursuant to section 107.1 of the IRPA because it was clearly fraudulent. This last finding by [NAME] is consequential because, pursuant to paragraph 110(2)(c) of the IPRA , among others, it restricts the Applicant’s ability to appeal [NAME]’s decision to the Refugee Appeal Division. [ 3 ] The Applicant asks this Court to reweigh the evidence in order to make findings and come to conclusions that are different than those reached by [NAME]. Reweighing the evidence is not this Court’s function on judicial review. [ 4 ] The Applicant has not established that the Decision is unreasonable in light of the facts and the law that constrained [NAME] when the Decision was made. The Applicant’s application for judicial review is therefore dismissed for the reasons that follow.

I. Background [ 5 ] The Applicant, [NAME], is a widowed citizen of Bangladesh. She has four adult children: three sons, [NAME] who resides in Bangladesh, [NAME] who resides in South Korea, and [NAME] who resides in Japan, and a daughter, [NAME], who resides in Canada. [ADDRESS] will refer to the Applicant’s children by their given names throughout these reasons in order to facilitate their identification and not out of any disrespect. [ 6 ] The Applicant applied for a temporary resident visa in 2018. The Applicant wished to visit and reside with [NAME] in Canada, and lend her assistance following the birth of her newest child. IRCC issued the sought visa in December 2018. The Applicant entered Canada on January 16, 2019, returned to Bangladesh, and then re-entered Canada in June 2020. [ 7 ] The Applicant experienced a significant decline in her physical and cognitive health since her June 2020 return to Canada. The Applicant filed an application for permanent residence in Canada based on humanitarian and compassionate grounds. Her application was refused on February 22, 2022. [ 8 ] The Applicant filed a refugee claim on August 4, 2022. A. The Basis of Claim [ 9 ] The Applicant claimed that she feared persecution at the hand of her son [NAME] if she was returned to Bangladesh. The Applicant explained that before his death in 2017 her husband had transferred all of his properties located in Bangladesh to her and to [NAME]. This transfer, she claimed, gave rise to a major crisis with her son [NAME]. [NAME] was alleged to be associated with the [NAME], a political party in Bangladesh, and was alleged to benefit from its and its cadres’ protection. She also claimed that the police in Bangladesh would not assist her because of their affinity for helping those in power or who have contacts with persons in power. [NAME] was alleged to be such a person. [ 10 ] The Applicant further claimed that [NAME] called her on June 15, 2022, and threatened to strangle her to death if she returned to Bangladesh. She also claimed that [NAME] had been abusive toward her in the past such as when, in May 2020, he pushed her to the floor during an argument. She also claimed that she would be a single woman without protection and would be subject to threats against her security, and to robberies, if she was removed to Bangladesh. She finally alleged that she could not simply give up the properties that had been transferred to her to [NAME] to appease him because she would be without means to provide for herself. [ 11 ] The Applicant resides with [NAME] and [NAME]’s husband, [NAME], in Canada since the filing of her refugee claim. B. The Vulnerable Person Application [ 12 ] On December 29, 2023, well before her hearing before [NAME], the Applicant filed an application to be recognized as a vulnerable person and to be represented in her refugee claim by her son in law, [NAME]. The vulnerable person application had been prepared by legal counsel and referred to new bases for the Applicant’s claim that had not been included in her basis of claim. These new bases of claim, that the Applicant had been persecuted in Bangladesh because of her membership in a particular social group as a woman and wife of a former Bangladesh Nationalist Party activist and because of her political opinion, ultimately were not included in her basis of claim. [ 13 ] The vulnerable person application represented that the Applicant had received death threats, was the subject of criminal accusations in Bangladesh, and was persecuted principally by her son [NAME], albeit without excluding the possibility that other individuals were also involved in her persecuting. The application also represented that the Applicant was targeted by [NAME]’s [NAME] cronies, the [NAME], and the Bangladesh police. [ 14 ] The Applicant’s application was supported by medical reports attesting to her declining physical and mental health. Among others, the documents set out that the Applicant was suffering from major neurocognitive disease and from end-stage kidney disease, such that she could not participate in her refugee claim proceedings. The application sought to have [NAME] appointed as the Applicant’s designated representative because: “It is seriously doubted that she [the Applicant] is capable of understanding the nature of the case and issues at hand which she faces in the present matter and her role in establishing the facts related to her asylum claim in her current state and condition. It will also be very physically taxing and difficult for her to be present for any length of time on the day and time of the hearing.” [ 15 ] The Applicant was found to be a vulnerable person by the IRCC through its decision of January 10, 2024. The IRCC designated [NAME] to give evidence on the Applicant’s behalf at [NAME] hearing to come. The Applicant was excused from having to attend the hearing of her refugee claim. C. Additional Allegations [ 16 ] The Applicant additionally alleged that, beginning in 2021, [NAME] filed a police complaint against her, had filed a court action against her, and that a court in Bangladesh had issued a warrant for her arrest in connection with [NAME]’s complaint. [ 17 ] On January 8, 2024, [NAME] wrote to the IRCC to inform it that: “My mother-in-law [NAME] is extremely sick . She can't talk or move by herself. Her adverse situation in Bangladesh is remained there what 1 learned from my conversations with her caretaker [NAME]. Her two sons and their ruling party gangs are responsible for her adverse situation in Bangladesh. That's why, we are very frightened to send her to Bangladesh.” [ 18 ] In 2024, the Applicant’s property caretaker in Bangladesh wrote to the police that an [NAME] “mafia group” would arrest the Applicant and [NAME], and seize their property, if they returned to Bangladesh. [ 19 ] In March 2024, a judgment was issued by Judge Kazi Abdul Hannan of the District and Circuit Judge Court Munshiganj in Bangladesh that acquitted the Applicant and [NAME] of all charges against them. D. The alleged agent of persecution arrives in Canada [ 20 ] [NAME] entered Canada on January 14, 2024, on a visitor visa that had been supported by a letter of invitation signed by [NAME]. [NAME] stated in her letter of invitation that the purpose of [NAME]’s visit was “[…] that my mother is very sick physically both my mother’s kidneys have failed. My mother is on dialysis three days a week. My mother is in the last stage of her life. She can leave the world at any time”. [ 21 ] [NAME]’s letter of invitation set out that [NAME] will be staying with [NAME] and [NAME], and by extension with the Applicant given that the Applicant resides with [NAME]. It also stated that the Applicant “is going to be very happy to see her son, since she is very ill”. [NAME]’s letter of invitation set out that she would bear all of [NAME]’s expenses during his stay in Canada, including his cost of travel and accommodation. The clear inference from the letter of invitation is that [NAME] was invited by his sister to visit their ailing mother in Canada at [NAME]’s home. [ 22 ] [NAME]’s letter of invitation also described [NAME] as “a registered Advocate of Bangladesh Bar Council and member of [COMPANY] and its membership 24563” who “practice regularly at [ADDRESS] in Dhaka”. [NAME] posts produced in the record reflect that [NAME] practices in criminal, civil and tax law at the District and [ADDRESS] in Dhaka. E. The Minister intervenes [ 23 ] The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration [the Minister] intervened on January 16, 2024, well before [NAME] hearing of the Applicant’s claim. [ 24 ] The Minister argued that the Applicant’s immigration history, together with [NAME]’s invitation-based visit, undermined her credibility. The Minister argued that [NAME] should find the Applicant’s claim manifestly unfounded pursuant section 107.1 of the IRPA . The Minister submitted records of [NAME]’s travel to Canada, [NAME]’s letter of invitation, screenshots of [NAME] posts of [NAME] with [NAME] in Montréal, and screenshots that appear to show [NAME] interacting with a [NAME] post made from [NAME]’s business account. [ 25 ] These submissions from the Minister were the first time [NAME]’s visit to Canada was brought to [NAME]’s attention. [ 26 ] The Applicant submitted additional documents following the Minister’s intervention. The Applicant filed an affidavit sworn by [NAME] on July 22, 2024. [NAME] deposed that their family invited [NAME] to Canada to discuss the land dispute between [NAME] and the Applicant, that [NAME] did not stay with them in their home but stayed with one of [NAME]’s friends while he was in Canada, and that [NAME] had asserted that [NAME] – the Applicant’s other son residing in Korea – had initiated the conflict about the Applicant’s properties. [ 27 ] [NAME] also deposed that [NAME] had agreed to engage in various harassing act against the Applicant and [NAME] on [NAME] and his associates’ behalf so that they could grab the properties. [NAME], through hearsay, would have stated that he and [NAME] would accept 2/3 of the properties with a fixed market value of $ 450,000 CAD to settle their dispute. He also deposed that [NAME] had threatened to kill the Applicant’s property caretaker in Bangladesh if he continued to try to collect rents generated by the Applicant’s properties. [ 28 ] One of [NAME]’s friends provided a statement dated July 22, 2024, and family friends provided an undated statement that are largely consistent with [NAME]’s affidavit. The Applicant, through [NAME], submitted a screenshot of a [NAME] post by [NAME] that purports to accuse [NAME] of betraying her older brother and taking their father’s property.

II. The Decision [ 29 ] The Applicant’s evidence before [NAME] was led by [NAME] with the assistance of legal counsel. [ 30 ] [NAME] dismissed the Applicant’s refugee claim on the basis of credibility and found that the Applicant’s refugee claim was manifestly unfounded pursuant to section 107.1 of the IRPA . [ 31 ] [NAME] noted that the Applicant provided an original narrative corroborated by documents that showed that [NAME] physically abused her and repeatedly threatened her in an attempt take control of her properties in Bangladesh. [NAME] also found that [NAME] was allegedly threatened and faced legal action at [NAME]’s hand alongside the Applicant. [NAME] also took note that a [NAME] had been filed against the Applicant by [NAME]. [ 32 ] [NAME] then took note of the events described above that were inconsistent with the Applicant’s basis of claim. [ 33 ] [NAME] found that [NAME]’s letter of invitation for [NAME] to visit the Applicant and [NAME] in Canada significantly undermined the allegations that the Applicant or [NAME] were threatened by [NAME]. The letter of invitation was incongruous with the allegations that [NAME] was the agent of persecution and had made threats against the Applicant. [NAME] content was produced that reflected that [NAME] and [NAME] appeared to have a positive relationship, much like photographic evidence that reflected that [NAME] and [NAME] appeared to have a friendly relationship. [NAME] found that it was not reasonable that [NAME] was invited to visit his mother and sister in Canada at his sister’s invitation, and that his mother could be happy to see him, if he had allegedly expressed death threats against both of them and had physically harmed the Applicant. [NAME]’s explanation as to [NAME]’s visit was not accepted by [NAME]. [ 34 ] [NAME] found that the new storyline involving the Applicant’s older son, [NAME], emerged only after the Minister’s intervention and his production of documents. [NAME] found that the appearance of [NAME] as a new principal agent of persecution after the Minister’s intervention and the disclosure of [NAME]’s invited visit to Canada to be fortuitous and suspicious. [NAME] wrote: [36] Furthermore, the panel finds it fortuitous and suspicious that, following the Minister’s intervention, a new storyline has emerged with suggests another son, [NAME], actually originated the problems with the claimant and her land. In other words, the panel finds it suspicious that once the Minister cast doubt on the veracity of the claimant’s allegations against [NAME], blame shifted to the other son. The panel also notes that in Idugboe , the Federal Court upheld the [NAME]’s rejection of new evidence on the basis of the suspicious timing on a rash of threats allegedly arising immediately after [NAME] had relied on the absence of threats for a significant period. [37] Post-intervention material submitted by the claimant also seems to wrap-up some of the claimant’s alleged legal problems between the claimant and [NAME]. The panel also finds the timing of this wrap-up both suspicious and fortuitous. [ 35 ] [NAME] found that the Applicant had created a false narrative in an effort to remain in Canada, perhaps for family or healthcare purposes, and that she had not faced threats from her sons. [NAME] found that the invitation letter and subsequent visit by [NAME] to Canada established that the alleged conflict at the heart of the refugee claim did not exist. [ 36 ] [NAME] considered the documentary evidence provided by the Applicant in support of her claim and gave little weight to it because the facts underlying the claim were deemed to be not credible ( [NAME] v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 1241 at paragraphs 28 and 29). [NAME] also found that the post-intervention submissions made on behalf of the Applicant showed the Applicant’s or her designated representative [NAME]’s willingness to adapt the Applicant’s narrative to discount or deny the information provided by the Minister. [ 37 ] [NAME] found that the Applicant’s claim was clearly fraudulent, that false allegations formed the core of her claim, and that the entirety of her narrative was undermined. [NAME] found that the Applicant did not satisfy the burden of establishing that she faces a serious possibility of persecution on a Convention ground, or that, on a balance of probabilities, she would personally be subjected to a risk to life or a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment, or a danger of torture, should she return to Bangladesh. [ 38 ] As directed by section 107.1 of the IRPA and after considering the direction provided [NAME] v Canada (MCI) , 2016 FC 596 [ [NAME] ], given [NAME]’s finding that the Applicant’s clam was clearly fraudulent, [NAME] found that the Applicant’s claim was manifestly unfounded. [NAME] wrote: [45] In making this decision, the panel recognizes the severe impact that a manifestly unfounded decision has on the claimant, and that she will not have a right to appeal the decision to the [NAME]. As well, the panel notes that the claimant will not automatically be entitled to a stay of removal if she seeks to apply for leave to judicially review the decision at the Federal Court. [46] Consequently, the panel does not make this decision lightly, especially considering the health challenges facing the claimant. However, the panel also notes that section 107.1 of the IRPA states that it is mandatory that the panel find the claim to be manifestly unfounded where the panel believes the claim to be clearly fraudulent. In this case, the panel finds that the evidence establishes the claim is clearly fraudulent.

III. The Issue [ 39 ] The sole issue before the Court is whether the Decision is reasonable.

IV. The Standard of Review [ 40 ] The applicable standard of review is the reasonableness standard of review described and articulated in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v [NAME], 2019 SCC 65 at para 25 [ [NAME] ] ( [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 456 at para 21 [ [NAME] ]). [ 41 ] Reasonableness is a deferential standard of review ( [NAME] at paras 12-13). The reviewing court must review the decision of the administrative decision maker with “respectful attention” to the reasons provided and seek to understand the reasoning process followed by the decision maker to arrive at its conclusion ( [NAME]  at para 84 ). In doing so, the reviewing court seeks to determine whether the decision under review, including both its rationale and outcome, is transparent, intelligible, and justified ( [NAME] at para 15). A reasonable decision is one that is based on an internally coherent and rational chain of analysis and that is justified in relation to the facts and law that constrain the decision maker ( [NAME] at para 85). Whether a decision is reasonable depends on the relevant administrative setting, the record before the decision maker, and the impact of the decision on those affected by its consequences ( [NAME] at paras 88-90, 94, 133-135). [ 42 ] The applicant seeking judicial review of a decision must establish that the decision contains flaws that are sufficiently central or significant to make the decision as whole unreasonable ( [NAME] at para 100). Not all errors or concerns about a decision will warrant intervention. Flaws or shortcomings must be more than superficial or peripheral to the merits of the decision, or a “minor misstep” ( [NAME] at para 100). Reasonableness review is not a “line-by-line treasure hunt for error” ( [NAME] , at para 102). [ 43 ] A reviewing court must refrain from reweighing the evidence that was before the decision maker and it should not interfere with factual findings absent exceptional circumstances ( [NAME] at para 125). The reviewing court must adopt an attitude of restraint and intervene “only where it is truly necessary to do so in order to safeguard the legality, rationality and fairness of the administrative process” ( [NAME] at para 13 ). The administrative decision maker alone considers the evidence, decides on issues of admissibility and weight, assesses whether inferences may be drawn, and makes a decision. The reviewing court can interfere only where the decision maker has committed fundamental errors in fact-finding that undermine the acceptability of the decision under review ( [NAME] v Canada (Attorney General), 2021 FCA 237, at para 3).

V. Arguments and Analysis A. The Applicant’s Submissions [ 44 ] The Applicant argues that [NAME] erred in negating her credibility on the basis of [NAME]’s invitation letter to [NAME] and the family’s effort to pursue a safe, in person meeting in Canada to resolve the property conflict with [NAME] given the Applicant’s age and deteriorating health. [ 45 ] The Applicant submits that [NAME] did not stay with the family during his visit, a culturally unusual fact that corroborates the strained relationship and the stated purpose of the meeting, as supported by [NAME]’s statement and the witnesses’ statement. [ADDRESS] observes that there is no objective evidence in the record that suggests that [NAME] staying with a family friend rather than with family directly is a culturally unusual fact that corroborates a strained relationship. [ 46 ] The Applicant argues that third-party documentary evidence, including a June 2020 news article confirming a May 2020 assault, corroborates the persecution she suffered from [NAME] in Bangladesh. She argues that [NAME] failed to assess that evidence independently, contrary to Federal Court guidance in [NAME] v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) , 2005 FC 1339, requiring independent consideration of third-party materials when credibility is in issue. [ 47 ] The Applicant also submits that [NAME] improperly relied on two social media interactions and a photograph of [NAME] and [NAME] to infer a positive relationship between [NAME] and [NAME] to discount the Applicant’s claim despite translated chat screenshots that show threats from [NAME], Bangladesh court documents, and a [NAME] that [NAME] filed against her and [NAME]. [ 48 ] The Applicant also argues that [NAME] unreasonably characterized the later identification of [NAME] as an instigating actor as fortuitous and suspicious, when [NAME]’s affidavit explains [NAME]’s involvement from the beginning despite that the fact emerged at the meeting with [NAME] in Canada. The Applicant argues that [NAME] erred in treating her submissions after the Minister’s intervention as an adaptation that proved falsity, when her new submissions updated ongoing developments, including property disputes, [NAME]’s visits to Bangladesh, and her property caretaker’s new complaint. [ 49 ] The Applicant asserts that these cumulative errors led [NAME] to make an unreasonable Decision, which should be set aside. The Applicant submits that she meets the test set out in [NAME] v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) , [1989] 2 FC 680, [1989] FCJ No 67, since she has established good grounds for fearing persecution, and that her fear is genuine and objectively reasonable. B. The Respondent’s Submissions [ 50 ] The Respondent argues that the presumption of truth that applied to the Applicant’s claim and narrative was rebutted because the Applicant omitted that [NAME], the alleged agent of harm, visited her in Canada at [NAME]’s invitation during the period of alleged threats, an omission that goes to the core of risk, and was disclosed only after the Minister’s intervention. [ 51 ] The Respondent argues that the letter of invitation which set out that the Applicant would be happy to see [NAME], together with the decision to facilitate his visit, could not be reconciled with allegations of violence and that [NAME] reasonably rejected the claim that an in-person meeting was essential to resolve their dispute given available electronic communications. [ 52 ] The Respondent argues that the family’s conduct was inconsistent with the alleged fear and significantly undermined the claim. The Respondent submits that the Applicant also failed to disclose that [NAME] is a practising lawyer in Bangladesh, notwithstanding her portrayal of him as an Awami-League-connected mafioso, a fact that bears on risk assessment and further erodes credibility. [ 53 ] The Respondent argues that social media exchanges between [NAME] and [NAME], as well as photographs showing a friendly relationship between [NAME] and [NAME], contradict the narrative of [NAME]’s threats. [NAME], argues the Respondent, reasonably rejected [NAME]’s explanation regarding those social media exchanges in light of the totality of the evidence. These contradictions taken together provided a reasonable basis for [NAME]’s adverse credibility finding. [ 54 ] The Respondent argues that the Applicant advanced a new storyline implicating [NAME] only after the Minister’s disclosures, and that the post-intervention documents showing that the legal problems with [NAME] were settled reinforced the inference that the narrative had shifted to preserve the claim. The Respondent argues that the [NAME]’s evasive explanation in answer to [NAME]’s questions about [NAME]’s supposed larger role, supports an adverse inference. The Respondent asserts that [NAME]’s claim of [NAME]’s early involvement is not support by the record, since the Applicant did not initially identify him as an agent of harm, and the [NAME] lists [NAME] as complainant and [NAME] only as a witness, all of which undermines the Applicant’s revised narrative.

Accordingly, the Respondent submits that [NAME] reasonably treated the Applicant’s new storyline as an attempt to salvage her claim following the Minister’s intervention. The Respondent submits that the Applicant’s cumulative omissions, evolving narrative, and contradictions justify [NAME]’s adverse credibility finding. [ 55 ] The Respondent argues that [NAME] reasonably assigned little weight to the Applicant’s documents because a general adverse credibility finding can affect the weight given to related evidence, and because reliable country information shows fraudulent documents are readily obtainable in Bangladesh. The Respondent argues that the little weight [NAME] gave to the document is further supported given that [NAME] is a practising lawyer with access to documents. [ 56 ] The Respondent argues that the claim is manifestly unfounded since [NAME] reasonably concluded it was clearly fraudulent on matters material to the outcome, relying on the invitation and visit by [NAME], the post-intervention narrative shift, the limited probative value of the documents, and the prevalence of fraudulent documentation in Bangladesh. The Respondent submits that the Applicant’s position asks the Court to reweigh evidence.

VI. Analysis A. [NAME]’s findings that the Applicant was not credible are reasonable [ 57 ] [NAME]’s Decision on the Applicant’s refugee claim rests on its findings that the Applicant was not credible. As Madam Justice Vanessa Rochester, as she then was, set out in [NAME] v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 1765 at paragraph 10: [10] Credibility determinations are part of the fact-finding process, and are afforded significant deference upon review ( [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2021 FC 966 at para 29 [ [NAME] ]; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2021 FC 721 at para 35 [ [NAME] ]; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 1160 at para 6). Such determinations by [NAME] and the [NAME] demand a high level of judicial deference and should only be overturned “in the clearest of cases” ( [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 720 at para 12). Credibility determinations have been described as lying within “the heartland of the discretion of triers of fact […] and cannot be overturned unless they are perverse, capricious or made without regard to the evidence” ( [NAME] at para 29; [NAME] at para 35; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2017 FC 644 at para 22, citing [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2017 FC 165 at para 9). [ 58 ] Mr. Justice Denis Gascon’s oft-cited summary of the principles governing the manner in which [NAME] must assess the credibility of refugee applicants set out in [NAME] v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 924, at paragraphs 20 to 26 are also apposite in this case. These principles, cited here without jurisprudential references, are as follow: The presumption that a refugee claimant is telling the truth is a rebuttable presumption that can be rebutted when the evidence led is inconsistent with the applicant’s sworn testimony or where [NAME] is unsatisfied with the applicant’s explanation for the inconsistencies. The decision-maker must not conduct a too granular or overzealous analysis of the evidence. In other words, not all inconsistencies or implausibilities will support a negative finding of credibility; such findings should not be based on a “microscopic” examination of issues irrelevant to the case or peripheral to the claim. A lack of credibility concerning central elements of a refugee protection claim can extend and trickle down to other elements of the claim and be generalized to all of the documentary evidence presented to corroborate a version of the facts. Similarly, it is open to [NAME] not to give evidentiary weight to assessments or reports based on underlying elements found not to be credible. [NAME] is also entitled to draw conclusions concerning an applicant’s credibility based on implausibilities, common sense and rationality. It can reject evidence if it is inconsistent with the probabilities affecting the case as a whole, or where inconsistencies are found in the evidence. [ 59 ] The record before [NAME] panel was replete with inconsistencies and laid out an evolving factual matrix that sought to address perceived deficiencies in the narrative advanced when contradictory elements were established. The events and documents surrounding [NAME]’s visit to Canada support [NAME]’s conclusion that the Applicant’s claim lacked merit or foundation. It was open to [NAME] to find that it was incongruous for the Applicant to allege that she is being threatened and persecuted by her son only to later be pleased to see him in the home where she is residing while she is ill and, apparently, still fearing being persecuted by him. It would follow that [NAME], who was also the subject of [NAME]’s alleged persecution, would also continue to fear her [NAME]. The attempt to explain away the representations made in [NAME]’s letter of invitation and to provide after the fact evidence to mitigate their detrimental effect on the Applicant’s claim when the same representations were made to induce IRCC to issue a visitor visa to [NAME] supports and justifies [NAME]’s finding that the Applicant’s claim was not credible. [ 60 ] While it is possible that the mastermind of the Applicant’s alleged persecution in Bangladesh was [NAME] and that [NAME] simply fell in line with his brother’s scheme, it was open to [NAME] to consider the sum of the inconsistences in the record regarding the alleged persecution and its bases, the late disclosure of [NAME]’s role in the alleged persecution, and the last minute clearing up of the Bangladesh legal matters against the Applicant as parts of a larger narrative that lacks credibility at multiple turns. [ 61 ] [NAME] mentioned, considered and engaged with each of the documents led by the Applicant. [NAME] assigned them little weight considering the remainder of the evidence led. [NAME] explained that the Applicant's evidence did not displace the adverse inferences arising from the factual omissions and the parties’ conduct. [NAME]’s approach accords with the requirement to engage with independent materials while recognizing that credibility findings can affect the weight a decision maker assigns to related evidence ( [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2017 FC 410 at paras 64-68). [ 62 ] This is not a clear case of [NAME]’s credibility determinations being made without regard to the evidence. It seems to be the precisely the opposite. There is no basis in these circumstances for the Court to intervene with respect to [NAME]’s credibility determinations. B. [NAME]’s findings that the Applicant did not meet the requirements of sections 96 or 97 of the IRPA were reasonable [ 63 ] The test applied to determine whether an individual is persecuted within the meaning of section 96 of the IRPA is whether, on a balance of probabilities, there is a “serious possibility” for persecution ( [NAME] v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), 1989 CanLII 9466 (FCA) at page 683, [1989] 2 FC 680 [ [NAME] ]; [NAME] v Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration), (1992), 1992 CarswellNat 1161 (FCA)). The “serious possibility” threshold does not require an applicant to show more than a 50% chance of persecution. The Applicant has the burden of establishing the factual allegations that support her claim ( [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2025 FC 1609 at para 22; [NAME] at 682). [ 64 ] In this case, [NAME] found that the substratum of the Applicant’s claim lacked credibility with the result that the Applicant had not established a serious possibility of persecution at the hand of her son [NAME] should she be returned to Bangladesh. [NAME]’s conclusion is reasonable and justified considering the record and [NAME]’s findings as to the Applicant’s credibility. [ 65 ] Determining whether an individual is a refugee pursuant to section 97 of the IRPA requires inquiring into the facts and determining whether removal to their country of origin would subject the them to, among others, a risk to their life or to a risk of unusual treatment or punishment if they are unable or, because of that risk, unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country. The Applicant has not presented meaningful evidence or argument that she is a refugee claimant pursuant to section 97 of the IRPA , or established that [NAME] made any fundamental error in its decision that she does not meet the requirements of section 97 of the IRPA . [ 66 ] The Applicant has not established that the Decision is unreasonable in this regard. C. [NAME]’s finding that the claim is manifestly unfounded was reasonable [ 67 ] [NAME] correctly identified the legal test to apply when considering whether a claim is manifestly unfounded: [NAME] must believe that the claim itself is clearly fraudulent, and that falsehoods have a material effect concerning the determination of the claim ( [NAME] at paras 23-27, 30-31; [NAME] v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 456, at para 47). [ 68 ] [NAME] applied this test to the core facts: the positive invitation and facilitation of [NAME]'s visit to Canada during the alleged threat period, the nondisclosure of [NAME]’s visit until after the Minister's intervention, social-media interactions and the photograph inconsistent with the asserted fear of [NAME], and the late shift to implicate [NAME] after the Minister's intervention. [NAME] weighed these facts against the Applicant's documents, to which it gave limited weight due to the adverse credibility findings. [ 69 ] [NAME] found that the Applicant had created a false narrative in an effort to remain in Canada, perhaps for family or healthcare purposes, and that she had not faced threats from either of her sons [NAME] or [NAME]. Considering the whole of the record before it, the precise elements of the Applicant’s claim and being cognizant of the heavy consequences that arise from its determination that the claim was manifestly unfounded, [NAME] nevertheless found that the core of her refugee claim was based on false allegations. [ 70 ] It was reasonable for [NAME] panel to conclude that the Applicant’s claim was manifestly unfounded since it was based on false statements that touched the core the claim itself. The Applicant has not established that the Decision is unreasonable on this issue.

VII. Conclusion [ 71 ] The Applicant has not established that the Decision is unreasonable. This application for judicial review is therefore dismissed. [ 72 ] Neither party has suggested that a certified question arises from the facts of this proceeding, and the Court agrees that none arises.

JUDGMENT in IMM-17466-24 THIS COURT’S

JUDGMENT is that : The Applicant’s application for judicial review is dismissed. There is no certified question within the meaning of section 79 of the IRPA to be stated. “Benoit M. Duchesne” Judge FEDERAL COURT SOLICITORS OF RECORD DOCKET: IMM-17466-24 STYLE OF CAUSE: [NAME] v. [NAME] OF HEARING: Montréal, québec DATE OF HEARING: october 21, 2025 judgment AND

REASONS: duchesne, j. DATED: April 7, 2026 APPEARANCES : [NAME] For The Applicant [NAME] For The Respondent SOLICITORS OF RECORD : [NAME], Québec For The Applicant Attorney General of Canada Montréal, Québec For The Respondent