Federal Court Rejects Restoration Application Beyond 90-Day Period

OUTCOME: Dismissed

Date: 20260703 Docket: IMM-156-25 Citation: 2026 FC 903 Ottawa, Ontario, July 3, 2026 PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Gleeson BETWEEN: [APPELLANT] Applicants and THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP [RESPONDENT] Respondent

REASONS AND

JUDGMENT I. Overview [ 1 ] The Applicants, [NAME] [APPELLANT] [Principal Applicant or [NAME]] and her spouse, [APPELLANT], are citizens of India. They seek judicial review under subsection 72(1) of the [RESPONDENT] Protection Act , SC 2001, c 27 [IRPA], of the December 13, 2024, decisions of an officer with [RESPONDENT], [NAME] [the Officer], dismissing their applications for restoration of temporary resident status. [ 2 ] The Applicants argue the Officer unreasonably and unfairly assessed the evidence – specifically, the circumstances in which the applications for restoration of temporary status were made. The Respondent takes the position that the Applicants’ restoration applications were reasonably refused because they were not submitted within the prescribed period set out at section 182 of the [RESPONDENT] Protection Regulations , SOR/2002-227 [IRPR]. [ 3 ] For the reasons that follow, the application for judicial review is dismissed.

II. Background [ 4 ] The [NAME] entered Canada in December 2018 on a visitor visa and was issued a Labour Market Impact Assessment [LMIA]-based work permit in April 2019 authorizing employment as a [NAME] with a salon in British Columbia. The [NAME]’s spouse was issued a Spousal Open Work Permit in November 2019. Both work permits were valid until April 2021. In March 2021, the Applicants reapplied for and obtained work permits, under the same categories, that remained valid until April 2023. [ 5 ] In April 2023, before their status expired, the Applicants again applied for work permits. Those applications were withdrawn on October 14, 2023. The Applicants assert their [NAME] representative “erroneously” undertook this action. [ 6 ] On October 26, 2023, the Applicants then submitted applications for restoration of their status and open work permits [First Application]. In a letter dated July 8, 2024 [First Decision], the applications were refused on the following grounds: You are eligible to restore your status as per R182. However, you are not eligible to apply for an Open work permit based on your Application for Permanent Residency. [ 7 ] Relying on the statement “[y]ou are eligible to restore your status as per R182” in the First Decision, the Applicants applied on July 31, 2024, for the restoration of their status and the issuance of new work permits under the same categories as their original work permits [Second Application].

III. Decision Under Review [ 8 ] On December 13, 2024, the Officer refused the Applicants’ Second Application. The Officer noted that the Applicants’ temporary resident status expired on October 14, 2023, and that the Second Application was made on July 31, 2024. The Officer in turn concluded that the Applicants were not eligible for restoration because the Second Application was submitted after the regulatory 90-day period. The Officer also noted that the Applicants no longer had temporary resident status in Canada and therefore refused their work permit applications. [ 9 ] The relevant portions of the [NAME] [[NAME]] notes addressing the [NAME]’s application, which form part of the decision, state: The [NAME] is requesting an LMIA based work permit for employment with [COMPANY]. as a [NAME]; however, the [NAME] was [NAME] to remain in Canada as a temporary resident on a work permit until 2023-10-14. They have remained in Canada since without authorization. They have failed to comply with the condition imposed under R185(a) to leave Canada by 2023-10-14. As per A47(a) temporary resident status has been lost. [NAME] submitted an application for restoration 2024 07-31 beyond the regulatory 90 day period described in R182 and is not eligible for restoration. Application refused; [NAME] advised status expired must leave Canada. [ 10 ] The decision letter and [NAME] notes with respect to the [NAME]’s spouse are substantially the same as those reproduced above.

IV. Issues and Standard of Review [ 11 ] This application raises two issues: Is the Officer’s decision unreasonable? Was there a breach of procedural fairness? [ 12 ] Although the Applicants assert their [NAME] representative “erroneously” withdrew their work permit applications in October 2023, they have not complied with the protocol that applies when allegations of incompetence are made before this Court against a [NAME] [NAME] representative ( Consolidated Practice Guidelines for Citizenship, [RESPONDENT], and Refugee Protection Proceedings issued on June 24, 2022, and amended on June 26, 2026, at paras 49–57). I have therefore not considered this issue. Even if I had been prepared to do so, the Applicants have not made any substantive submissions beyond the assertion that the applications were erroneously withdrawn. [ 13 ] A reasonable decision is “one that is based on an internally coherent and rational chain of analysis and that is justified in relation to the facts and law that constrain the decision maker” ( Canada (Minister of Citizenship [RESPONDENT]) v [NAME] , 2019 SCC 65 at para 85 [ [RESPONDENT] ]; [RESPONDENT] v Canada (Citizenship [RESPONDENT]) , 2023 SCC 21 at para 8). The party challenging a decision has the burden of demonstrating to a reviewing court “sufficiently serious shortcomings in the decision such that it cannot be said to exhibit the requisite degree of justification, intelligibility and transparency” ( [NAME] at para 100). [ 14 ] Questions of procedural fairness are to be reviewed on a standard akin to correctness. This requires the court to ask whether the procedure followed by the decision-maker was fair and just having regard to all the circumstances ( [COMPANY] v Canada (Attorney General) , 2018 FCA 69 at para 54 [ Canadian Pacific ]. The ultimate question is whether the party knew the case to meet and had a full and fair chance to respond ( Canadian Pacific at para 56).

V. Analysis: A. The Officer’s decision is reasonable [ 15 ] The Applicants do not dispute that their temporary resident status expired on October 14, 2023, when their work permit applications were withdrawn. However, they argue that in finding the Second Application was made beyond the 90-day period provided for in the IRPR, the Officer erred by: ignoring that the First Application had been made on October 26, 2023, within the 90-day regulatory period; failing to meaningfully assess the First Decision, and in particular the statement that the [NAME] was eligible to restore her status under section 182 of the IRPR – a statement, the Applicants assert, that informed the [NAME] that she remained eligible to restore her status and that caused the Applicants to believe that, in submitting the Second Application, they were complying with the First Decision; and not considering the “merits of the applications” and instead relying on an “incorrect technical ground” (making the Second Application beyond the 90-day period) to refuse the restoration applications. [ 16 ] The Respondent acknowledges that the Applicants’ First Application was made 12 days after the expiration of their temporary status, but submits the application was refused on July 8, 2024, because the Applicants did not meet the requirements of the IRPA and the IRPR, a decision that was not challenged on judicial review. As a result, their temporary status expired on the day they withdrew their work permit applications. The Second Application being submitted after the 90-day period provided for in the IRPR, the Officer reasonably refused the Applicants’ restoration applications. I agree with the Respondent. [ 17 ] The Applicants argue that the statement made in the First Decision – “you are eligible to restore your status as per R182” (emphasis added) – indicated the effect of that decision was to extend the 90-day eligibility period. The Officer was therefore required to consider and grapple with the First Decision in considering the Second Application. I disagree. [ 18 ] As was noted by Justice Danièle Tremblay-Lamer in [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship [RESPONDENT]) , 2012 FC 393, “[t]he language in section 182 of the Regulations is not discretionary: if the application for restoration is brought outside of the 90-day period imposed by law, the officer must refuse the application” (at para 9, citing [RESPONDENT] v Canada (Minister of Citizenship [RESPONDENT]) , 2004 FC 243 at para 30). In this case, it is not disputed that the Second Application was brought more than 90 days after the loss of temporary status on October 24, 2024; the Officer therefore was required to refuse it. Contrary to the Applicants’ submission, there was no “proper legal basis under which to extend status” ( [RESPONDENT] v Canada (Citizenship [RESPONDENT]) , 2024 FC 952 at paras 6, 8). [ 19 ] While it may have been preferable for the Officer to have expressly addressed the First Decision, the Officer was under no obligation to do so in this instance. [ 20 ] Similarly, the Officer having reasonably concluded the Applicants had submitted the Second Application beyond the regulatory 90-day period, the Officer was not required to consider the merits of the restoration applications. B. No breach of fairness [ 21 ] The Applicants argue that the First Decision gave rise to a legitimate and reasonable expectation that they would qualify for restoration of status and, this being the case, it was not open to the Officer, in considering the Second Application, to backtrack and conclude the Applicants are “not entitled for restoration of status.” [ 22 ] While I accept that the language used in First Decision may suggest that restoration remained an option in July 2024, the use of this potentially misleading language does not give rise to a legitimate expectation that the Applicants’ temporary status would be restored if a second application were made. Even if I were to accept the First Decision did have this effect, the resulting expectation cannot create a substantive right ( [NAME] v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) , 2013 SCC 36 at para 97). As I have noted above, it is not disputed that the Applicants’ Second Application was submitted beyond the 90-day period, and the Officer was therefore required to refuse the restoration applications. [ 23 ] There was no breach of procedural fairness.

VI. Conclusion [ 24 ] The application for judicial review is dismissed. [ 25 ] Neither Party has proposed a serious question of general importance for certification, and I agree that none arise.

JUDGMENT IN IMM-156-25 THIS COURT’S

JUDGMENT is that : This application for judicial review is dismissed. No question is certified. Blank "Patrick Gleeson" Blank Judge FEDERAL COURT SOLICITORS OF RECORD DOCKET: IMM-156-25 STYLE OF CAUSE: [APPELLANT] v THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP [RESPONDENT] OF HEARING:

HELD BY VIDEOCONFERENCE DATE OF HEARING: May 27, 2026

REASONS AND

JUDGMENT: [NAME] J. DATED: JULY 3, 2026 APPEARANCES : [RESPONDENT] [COUNSEL] [NAME] [RESPONDENT] For The Respondent SOLICITORS OF RECORD : [RESPONDENT] and Solicitor Toronto, [NAME] of Canada Vancouver, British Columbia For The Respondent