Federal Court Remands Criminal Rehabilitation Case for Redetermination

OUTCOME: Allowed

Date: 20260526 Docket: IMM-19084-24 Citation: 2026 FC 673 Ottawa, Ontario, May 26, 2026 PRESENT: Mr. Justice McHaffie BETWEEN: [APPELLANT] Applicant and THE MINISTER OF [APPELLANT] AND IMMIGRATION Respondent

REASONS AND

JUDGMENT I. Overview [ 1 ] The serious crimes [APPELLANT] committed before coming to [NAME] rendered him inadmissible to [NAME] and ineligible for refugee protection. He filed an application hoping to satisfy the Minister of [APPELLANT] and Immigration that he had been rehabilitated. A delegate of the Minister, relying on a recommendation from an immigration officer, refused that application. Mr. [APPELLANT] now seeks judicial review of that refusal. He argues the delegate unreasonably focused on the nature of the crimes leading to his inadmissibility and his use of false identification documents, and failed to reasonably assess the evidence he presented to show he did not pose a forward-looking risk of reoffending. [ 2 ] For the reasons below, I agree the delegate’s decision was unreasonable. The delegate and the recommending officer materially relied on Mr. [APPELLANT]’s use of fraudulent identity documents and unreasonably dismissed his submission that he did so to flee risk in Albania based solely on his two-month delay in filing a refugee claim after arriving in [NAME]. Their treatment of the supporting character evidence presented by Mr. [APPELLANT] was also unreasonable, as it characterized the entirety of that evidence as “self-serving” without justification, and ignored aspects of the evidence relevant to the question of rehabilitation. These errors were central to the delegate’s decision and pertained to important aspects of Mr. [APPELLANT]’s rehabilitation application. They are sufficient to render the decision as a whole unreasonable. [ 3 ] The application for judicial review is therefore granted, and Mr. [APPELLANT]’s rehabilitation application is remitted for redetermination by a different delegate.

II. Issue and Standard of Review [ 4 ] The only issue raised on this application for judicial review is whether the decision of the [NAME] was reasonable. [ 5 ] As the parties agree, reasonableness is the applicable standard of review. Mr. [APPELLANT]’s arguments pertain to the merits of the decision rather than the procedure by which it was reached, and there is no basis not to apply the presumptive reasonableness standard: [NAME] (Minister of [APPELLANT] and Immigration) v [APPELLANT] , 2019 SCC 65 at paras 16–17, 23–25; De [NAME] v [NAME] ([APPELLANT] and Immigration) , 2020 FC 748 at para 15. [ 6 ] Reasonableness is a deferential, but robust, standard of review: [NAME] at paras 12–13, 26. It requires the Court to begin with the reasons given for the decision and assess whether the decision as a whole, considered in light of the context and the record, is coherent, transparent, intelligible, and justified in light of the relevant legal and factual constraints that bear on it: [NAME] at paras 15, 81, 84, 94–95, 99–101. In making this assessment, the Court is not concerned with minor missteps or imperfections in the reasons. It will only find a decision unreasonable where it contains shortcomings or flaws that are sufficiently central or significant that the decision as a whole cannot be said to show the requisite degree of justification, intelligibility, and transparency: [NAME] at para 100; [NAME] at para 15.

III. Analysis A. [NAME] [ 7 ] Subsection 36(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act , [NAME] 2001, c 27 [ IRPA ] sets out a number of grounds on which a foreign national or permanent resident may be inadmissible on grounds of serious criminality. Relevant in this case is paragraph 36(1)(b), which provides that a foreign national or permanent resident is inadmissible if they have been convicted outside [NAME] of an offence that, if committed in [NAME], would constitute an offence punishable by a maximum of 10 years’ imprisonment. [ 8 ] This inadmissibility may be relieved by the operation of paragraph 36(3)(c) of the IRPA . That section states that the matters referred to paragraph 36(1)(b), among other sections, do not constitute inadmissibility if the person “satisfies the Minister that they have been rehabilitated,” or if they are members of a prescribed class that is deemed to have been rehabilitated. The latter concept—deemed rehabilitation for a prescribed class—does not apply in this case. Rather the issue is the possibility of satisfying the Minister that an applicant has been rehabilitated. [ 9 ] The term “rehabilitated” is not defined in the IRPA . However, this Court has accepted definitions from various Government of [NAME] publications over time that refer to “a stable lifestyle” and being “unlikely to be involved in any further criminal activity” : [APPELLANT] at paras 23–24; [NAME] v [NAME] ([APPELLANT] and Immigration) , 2016 FC 1184 at para 24; [NAME] v [NAME] (Minister of [APPELLANT] and Immigration) , 2001 FCT 177 at para 16. Similarly, Justice Diner in [NAME] interpreted the term as “the likelihood of returning to those negative ways” : [NAME] v [NAME] ([APPELLANT] and Immigration) , 2018 FC 1279 at para 21. [ 10 ] In assessing whether an inadmissible foreign national is rehabilitated, officers have significant flexibility to consider a variety of relevant factors and the unique facts of each particular case: [APPELLANT] at para 17, citing [NAME] v [NAME] ([APPELLANT], [NAME]) , 2011 FC 1503 at para 43. This may include factors such as the nature of the offence, the circumstances under which it was committed, the length of time that has elapsed, and whether there have been previous or subsequent offences: [APPELLANT] at para 43, citing [NAME] v [NAME] (Minister of [APPELLANT] and Immigration) , 2005 FC 1369 at para 18; [NAME] v [NAME] ([APPELLANT] and Immigration) , 2018 FC 1280 at para 11. However, rehabilitation is forward-looking, such that the “most important” or “primary” factor or inquiry is the likelihood that the individual will reoffend: [NAME] at para 44; [NAME] at para 24; [NAME] at paras 15–17, 21; [APPELLANT] at paras 17, 24–27. B. Background to Mr. [APPELLANT]’s inadmissibility and rehabilitation application [ 11 ] Mr. [APPELLANT] is a citizen of Albania. According to the evidence he filed on his rehabilitation application, the [APPELLANT] family has been in a blood feud with a family named [APPELLANT] since 2000, after Mr. [APPELLANT]’s [NAME], a police chief, killed a member of the [NAME] during a forcible arrest. About a year later, the dead man’s son, named [APPELLANT], tried to kill Mr. [APPELLANT]’s [NAME] but failed. [APPELLANT] was arrested, convicted, and imprisoned. Other members of the [NAME] family later tried to kidnap the [NAME]’s sons from their schoolyard. The [NAME] fled to the United States and successfully applied for asylum. [ 12 ] Mr. [APPELLANT] left Albania in 2006 as a minor, to join two of his brothers in Italy. He began working in Italy shortly thereafter. In early 2009, when Mr. [APPELLANT] was 18 years old, his employer replaced him while he was away visiting his mother in Albania and refused to pay Mr. [APPELLANT] the wages he was owed. Mr. [APPELLANT] responded by waiting for the employer at his factory, grabbing him, threatening him with a knife, and forcing him to open his safety deposit box to give him money. [ 13 ] Mr. [APPELLANT] pleaded guilty and was convicted by an Italian court in February 2009 of Uttering Threats, Kidnapping, Robbery, and Possession of a Weapon. He served 26 months in prison. While Mr. [APPELLANT] was serving his sentence in Italy, [APPELLANT] escaped from police custody in Albania and was not found. [ 14 ] Upon his release from prison in 2011, Mr. [APPELLANT] met with his victim and made peace with him. [NAME] ordered him to leave Italy and he returned to Albania. Shortly thereafter, two of his cousins in Albania (the brothers of the targeted police chief) were murdered. [NAME] took responsibility and was again arrested. Feeling threatened by the blood feud, Mr. [APPELLANT] left Albania again in October 2011, using a fraudulent Greek passport to travel to Italy before being caught trying to enter France. He was convicted in Italy of Possession and Manufacture of False Identification. He received a conditional sentence of 5 months and 10 days imprisonment before again returning to Albania. [ 15 ] In June 2012, Mr. [APPELLANT] fled Albania again and returned to Italy. Once there, he acquired a fraudulent Italian identification card to travel to the United Kingdom but was again caught and returned to Albania. After hiding at his parents’ home for about two years, Mr. [APPELLANT] again left Albania and returned to Italy, where he paid a smuggler to acquire a false Italian passport. He travelled to [NAME] in January 2015 and made a refugee claim in March 2015. [ 16 ] Mr. [APPELLANT] was found ineligible to have his refugee claim referred to the Refugee Protection Division because he was inadmissible to [NAME] for serious criminality in light of his prior convictions: IRPA , s 101(1)(f). His subsequent application for a Pre-Removal Risk Assessment [PRRA], filed in November 2015, was refused in November 2017. That PRRA decision is not in the record before the Court. After this rejection, Mr. [APPELLANT] remained in [NAME], although he was no longer entitled to work. [ 17 ] Meanwhile, in May 2017, Mr. [APPELLANT] applied for (a) Canadian permanent residence, sponsored by his then spouse; (b) a work permit; and (c) [NAME] pursuant to paragraph 36(3)(c) of the IRPA . In 2022, the spousal sponsorship was withdrawn, refiled, and withdrawn again due to marital problems. The work permit application has not been processed. The [NAME] application was refused in December 2022. Mr. [APPELLANT] filed an application for leave and for judicial review of that refusal, which was settled in 2024 after leave was granted and the application was sent back for redetermination. [ 18 ] In the interim, Mr. [APPELLANT] filed a second PRRA application in April 2022, which was rejected in January 2023. That decision is also not in the record on this application. A production order was issued in that application in February 2024, after Mr. [APPELLANT] had already been removed to Albania, where he currently resides. That application for leave and for judicial review was subsequently discontinued. C. Mr. [APPELLANT]’s rehabilitation application [ 19 ] In his rehabilitation application, Mr. [APPELLANT] accepted that his earlier crimes were serious, but contended that they were the actions of an immature 18-year-old. In supplementary submissions filed in June 2024, he asserted that, as a 34-year-old man who had been free of criminal activity for 12 years, it was highly unlikely that he would reoffend. In his affidavit filed in support of the application, Mr. [APPELLANT] expressed his regret regarding his 2009 crimes, stating he had done them when he was young and immature, and that he “would never do something like that again.” [ 20 ] Mr. [APPELLANT]’s submissions noted that his 2011 conviction arose from his use of false documents to escape Albania to make a refugee claim and argued that offences committed in order to claim asylum should be afforded protection from prosecution, citing section 133 of the IRPA . That section provides that refugee claimants cannot be charged with certain offences under the IRPA or the Criminal Code , RSC 1985, c C‑46, including offences related to the possession of false or forged documents, including passports. His affidavit expressed regret for using false documents to flee Albania, stating that he did so because he “was at risk of harm and needed to get to safety.” [ 21 ] His submissions and affidavit also referred to his life in [NAME] between 2015 and August 2023, including the [NAME] he had created in that time. In addition to his own affidavit, Mr. [APPELLANT]’s application was supported by documents pertaining to his criminal history, an affidavit from his new fiancée, and letters of support from a dozen individuals in [NAME] who knew him, including friends, colleagues, his own family members, and his fiancée’s family members. D. The decision under review [ 22 ] Mr. [APPELLANT]’s rehabilitation application was initially reviewed by an immigration officer on September 19, 2024, who recommended that the application be refused. The officer’s notes in the [NAME] [[NAME]] maintained by [NAME] [APPELLANT] [NAME] [IRCC] set out Mr. [APPELLANT]’s immigration history and the offences of which he was convicted. They noted that the 2011 false passport conviction would, if committed in [NAME], constitute an offence under subsection 57(1) of the Criminal Code (knowing use of a forged passport), which carries a maximum sentence of 14 years of imprisonment. [ 23 ] The officer referred to Mr. [APPELLANT]’s submission that he had been free of criminal activity for 12 years. They attributed this submission to a September 2022 letter from counsel, and calculated that the 12-year period began in 2010. The officer noted that Mr. [APPELLANT] had bought a Greek passport in 2011, which led to the second conviction referred to above. The officer also referred to Mr. [APPELLANT]’s subsequent use of false documents, notably the false Italian identification document he used when trying to get to the United Kingdom and the false Italian passport he used to get to [NAME]. The officer found that this showed Mr. [APPELLANT] was not free from criminal activity but “displayed a criminal pattern” in which he “continued disregarding the law and the immigration regulations of several countries.” The officer gave “no value” to Mr. [APPELLANT]’s claim that he had used the false documents to flee to safety, for the following reasons: [NAME] [principal applicant] repeatedly committed the same offence, which seems to indicate this was not a ‘youth error’. Moreover, it appears unreasonable that being already in [NAME], did not immediately claim refugee status if his concern for safety was paramount. [NAME] waited two months after arriving in [NAME] before making his refugee claim, which raises questions about the genuineness of his safety concerns. [ 24 ] With respect to Mr. [APPELLANT]’s life in [NAME], the officer noted that he had worked without authorization after his work permit expired, which “shows a disregard for legal conditions of his stay, undermining the assertion that he has become law-abiding.” [ 25 ] The officer gave “little value” to Mr. [APPELLANT]’s statement of remorse regarding the 2009 crimes, as they considered there was “no evidence regarding any attempt of restitution for the victim or explanation as to how [NAME] came to the realization that his actions were wrong or how he is taking full responsibility of his actions.” Moreover, the officer concluded that Mr. [APPELLANT] appeared to “minimize the seriousness and the pattern of his actions” by making excuses for his past behaviours, such as working without authorization. [ 26 ] The officer went on to give negative weight to the violent nature of the original offences, and the subsequent crimes involving forged documents, noting that his use of a fraudulent passport to travel to [NAME] “speaks of the character of the applicant and his tendency of recidivism.” The passage of time since 2011 was similarly discounted on the basis that Mr. [APPELLANT] continued to use forged documents and worked without authorization, again indicating a “broader pattern of unlawful behavior.” [ 27 ] Under the heading “Lifestyle,” the officer repeated their concerns about the convictions not being an “isolated event,” the use of false travel documents, and working without authorization. Finally, the officer referred to the letters of support, describing them as “self-serving,” while acknowledging that they indicate that Mr. [APPELLANT] “made connections during his time in [NAME] and he built a [NAME].” [ 28 ] On October 2, 2024, a [NAME] reviewed and agreed with the officer’s recommendation, writing the following reasons in the [NAME] notes: I have reviewed the file information and the Officer’s recommendation. The applicant ([NAME]) entered [NAME] in 2015 but was found ineligible for asylum due to serious criminality. He lived and worked in [NAME] without authorization until his removal in August 2023. [NAME] has prior convictions outside [NAME] for uttering threats, kidnapping, and using a fraudulent passport, which make him criminally inadmissible under A36(1)(b) and A36(2)(b). These convictions indicate a pattern of disregarding the law and violating regulations in the countries where he has resided. This includes a violent offense in Italy, failure to follow proper procedures for obtaining valid travel documents, and engaging in fraud by acquiring a false passport from smugglers. While I acknowledge that he formed some connections in [NAME], I do not consider them significant enough to outweigh his criminal inadmissibility. Based on the information available, I am not convinced that the risk is low. The application for [NAME] is therefore, refused. [ 29 ] The reasons of the [NAME] are brief. However, they must be read in their administrative context, and in particular the context of the officer’s recommendation: [NAME] at paras 91, 94. Given the delegate’s indication that they reviewed the officer’s recommendation, the absence of any disagreement with the officer’s analysis, the use of language echoing that of the officer’s analysis, and the delegate’s agreement with the recommendation, I agree with the parties that the reasons for the officer’s recommendation should be considered part of the reasons for decision of the delegate: see [NAME] at para 10. E. The decision is unreasonable [ 30 ] For the following reasons, I agree with Mr. [APPELLANT] that the delegate’s decision is unreasonable. The delegate’s reasoning regarding Mr. [APPELLANT]’s past use of fraudulent passports and other identity documents is central to their decision and is not transparent, intelligible, and justified in light of the relevant factual and legal constraints. Several other analytical and factual errors, notably in the treatment of supporting character evidence, also undermine the reasonableness of the decision. (1) Treatment of the use of fraudulent identification [ 31 ] Both the delegate and the recommending officer pointed to Mr. [APPELLANT]’s use of fraudulent identity documents, including passports, as an important part of a “pattern of disregarding the law and violating regulations” or a “criminal pattern.” However, their consideration of Mr. [APPELLANT]’s reasons for having used those documents—his need to flee Albania owing to the risks he faced there—was limited to two statements found in the recommending officer’s reasons, namely that (1) it was not a “youth error” since Mr. [APPELLANT] had done so repeatedly; and (2) he waited two months after arriving in [NAME] before making his refugee claim, and this raised questions about the genuineness of his safety concerns. [ 32 ] The first of these statements is difficult to understand. Mr. [APPELLANT] at no time suggested that his use of false passports was a “youth error.” He certainly referred to his violent crime in 2009 as occurring when he was “young and immature.” But his explanation for using false documents solely related to his risk of harm and need to get to safety. [ 33 ] The second statement is therefore the only direct consideration of Mr. [APPELLANT]’s evidence and submissions on his risk of harm by either the recommending officer or the delegate. I agree with Mr. [APPELLANT] that this statement does not reasonably address his submissions and evidence. [ 34 ] Mr. [APPELLANT] submitted evidence related to his fears of being a victim of the blood feud that had arisen in Albania. This included reference to the source of the feud, the attempted murder of a [NAME] who had since been granted asylum in the United States, and the murder of two others. Neither the recommending officer nor the delegate addressed this evidence beyond referring to the two-month delay as a basis for raising questions about the genuineness of his fears. [ 35 ] A delay in making a refugee claim may be a relevant consideration in assessing the genuineness of an alleged fear. However, this Court has frequently held that delay before making a refugee claim—even a longer delay than two months—is not, in itself, a sufficient basis to reject a refugee claim on the basis of credibility or a lack of subjective fear without reviewing the other facts on the record: [NAME] v [NAME] ([APPELLANT] and Immigration) , 2013 FC 84 at para 11; [NAME] v [NAME] ([APPELLANT] and Immigration) , 2016 FC 173 at para 14; [NAME] v [NAME] ([APPELLANT] and Immigration) , 2019 FC 1097 at para 15; [NAME] v [NAME] ([APPELLANT] and Immigration) , 2019 FC 933 at para 13. Notably, there is no indication that Mr. [APPELLANT]’s PRRA application was denied on the basis of credibility or a lack of subjective fear. Yet the recommending officer (and, implicitly, the delegate) dismissed Mr. [APPELLANT]’s entire account of his fears in Albania, and the fact that he had obtained false documents simply to escape those fears, on the basis of the two-month delay between his arrival in [NAME] and his refugee claim. [ 36 ] In doing so, the recommending officer did not otherwise address Mr. [APPELLANT]’s express submission that his use of false documents to flee the risk he faced should not be held against him, a submission that referred to section 133 of the IRPA and the UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status. As this Court has held, travelling on false documents to claim refugee status is “peripheral and of very limited value to a determination of general credibility” : [APPELLANT] v [NAME] (Minister of [APPELLANT] and Immigration) , 2003 FCT 116 at para 11. The delegate in this case was evidently not deciding Mr. [APPELLANT]’s refugee claim or directly assessing his risk. However, in considering whether his use of false identification documents demonstrated a “pattern of disregarding the law” that was material to a forward-looking likelihood of reoffending, the delegate was required to reasonably assess the context for the use of those documents. [ 37 ] In this regard, the Minister relies on this Court’s decision in [NAME] v [NAME] ([APPELLANT] and Immigration) , 2011 FC 495. There, the Court noted that section 133 of the IRPA was intended to allow bona fide [NAME] and claimants to use false passports for the purpose of coming to [NAME], and that it shields them from prosecution while a refugee claim is outstanding, but that it does not “legalize the use of false identification” : [APPELLANT] at para 24, citing [APPELLANT] v [NAME] (Minister of [APPELLANT] and Immigration) , 2006 FC 338 at para 21. In the context of that case, the Court agreed that the applicant was not a bona fide refugee claimant and that it was reasonable for the officer assessing his rehabilitation application to consider his use of a false passport: [NAME] at paras 24–25. [ 38 ] In my view, [NAME] , while relevant, is not determinative, for two reasons. First, I do not read [APPELLANT] as holding that every applicant whose refugee claim or PRRA application has been dismissed is necessarily not a bona fide claimant, or that the use of a false passport is invariably an indicator of a forward-looking risk of offending, regardless of whether it was used to escape a subjective fear of harm: see [NAME] v [NAME] (Attorney General) , 2014 FC 651 at paras 841–848. In this regard, there is no evidence before the Court that either of Mr. [APPELLANT]’s PRRA refusals was based on a finding that he was not credible or that he did not have a subjective fear of harm. [ 39 ] Second, and in any event, neither the officer nor the delegate assessed or responded to Mr. [APPELLANT]’s submissions on this central point, beyond referring to the two-month delay in filing. Those submissions cited not only section 133 of the IRPA , but the principles underlying it, stemming from Article 31(1) of the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of [NAME] , Can TS 1969 No 6. [ 40 ] I conclude that dismissing Mr. [APPELLANT]’s explanation for his use of false identification as effectively not being credible solely on the two-month delay in filing his application, with no further consideration of his evidence and submissions, shows a failure to take into account relevant evidence and to “meaningfully grapple” with the central arguments raised, rendering the analysis unreasonable: [NAME] at paras 125–128. [ 41 ] I note two additional matters with respect to the recommending officer’s reasons related to Mr. [APPELLANT]’s conviction for using a false Greek passport in 2011. First, the officer erred in pointing to the 2011 event as contradicting Mr. [APPELLANT]’s submission that he had been crime-free for 12 years. Contrary to the officer’s understanding, Mr. [APPELLANT]’s reference to being free of criminal activity for 12 years was made in a letter filed in June 2024, not September 2022. The submission clearly refers to the 12 years after the 2011 conviction. This updated counsel’s submissions in November 2022, which referred to a 10-year period without criminal activity. While this is a fairly minor error on the part of the officer, it does raise some concern about the thoroughness of their analysis. [ 42 ] Second, I note some uncertainty in the record regarding the penalty imposed and served for the 2011 conviction. The recommending officer states that Mr. [APPELLANT] “spent five months and ten days in jail” in connection with the conviction. This may be correct, as Mr. [APPELLANT]’s counsel made a similar statement in submissions on this application for judicial review. However, the Italian criminal record document Mr. [APPELLANT] submitted in 2017 states that he received a “[s]uspension of the execution of the sentence” with the notation “Sentence suspension: Imprisonment of 5 months and 7 days.” This accords with Mr. [APPELLANT]’s “Application for [NAME]” form, which refers to a suspension of execution. Both Mr. [APPELLANT]’s 2017 statutory declaration and his 2024 affidavit similarly refer to a “conditional sentence,” and state that he was released from jail but told that authorities might contact him through his lawyer. Given the emphasis placed by the recommending officer on the seriousness of Mr. [APPELLANT]’s convictions and the period of imprisonment, and the fact that the matter will be remitted for reconsideration, I consider it a relevant matter to note. (2) Treatment of the supporting character evidence [ 43 ] I also agree with Mr. [APPELLANT] that the delegate and the recommending officer’s treatment of the supporting character evidence he filed was unreasonable. [ 44 ] Evidence that speaks to an applicant’s character and/or their “stable lifestyle” may be relevant to the question of whether they have been rehabilitated, i.e. , whether it is likely they will reoffend: [NAME] at para 23; [APPELLANT] at para 46; [APPELLANT] at para 16; [NAME] v [NAME] ([APPELLANT] and Immigration) , 2025 FC 1831 at paras 9, 18, 24; [APPELLANT] v [NAME] (Minister of [APPELLANT] and Immigration) , 2005 FC 77 at paras 45–46. To be probative, such evidence will evidently have to come from those who can speak to the applicant’s character and circumstances, such as those “who had known and worked with the Applicant in [NAME]” : [APPELLANT] at para 45. [ 45 ] Mr. [APPELLANT] filed such evidence from family members, colleagues, and friends. As noted above, the recommending officer described the letters collectively as “self-serving,” but allowed that they showed Mr. [APPELLANT] “made connections during his time in [NAME] and […] built a [NAME].” The delegate indicated that those connections did not “outweigh” his criminal inadmissibility. [ 46 ] [ADDRESS] has criticized the rejection or undue diminution of the value of evidence on the basis that it is “self-serving,” in the sense that it comes from people interested in the outcome of a proceeding, such as family members, and/or that it supports the applicant: [redacted] [ 47 ] Of greater concern, though, is the recommending officer’s dismissal of these letters as simply establishing that Mr. [APPELLANT] “made connections.” This dismissive summary ignores material aspects of the evidence that speak to Mr. [APPELLANT]’s honesty, sense of responsibility, hard work, and character, and thus to his likelihood to reoffend. This omission carries forward into the delegate’s decision, which again refers only to Mr. [APPELLANT]’s “connections.” Further, the delegate then concludes that these connections do not “outweigh” Mr. [APPELLANT]’s inadmissibility. As Mr. [APPELLANT] argues, the question before the delegate was not whether issues such as community connections “outweigh” his inadmissibility (as it might be in an application based on humanitarian and compassionate factors), but whether the evidence shows that he is unlikely to reoffend: [NAME] ([APPELLANT] and Immigration) , 2019 FC 543 at para 9. [ 48 ] It is the delegate’s role to determine the weight to be given to Mr. [APPELLANT]’s character evidence in their overall assessment of whether he is likely to reoffend. However, it is not open to them to simply acknowledge the evidence without addressing its most relevant aspects or assessing the extent to which it speaks to his likelihood of reoffending: [NAME] at para 46; [NAME] at paras 23–24; [NAME] at para 8. (3) Other factors considered [ 49 ] The Minister submits that the recommending officer’s assessment considered the violent nature of Mr. [APPELLANT]’s 2009 crimes, the passage of time, his non-compliance with the IRPA , and his current lifestyle. The Minister submits that these are relevant factors for consideration and suggests that the recommending officer and the delegate reasonably assessed them. [ 50 ] I agree with the Minister that these are relevant factors for consideration, consistent with the jurisprudence referred to above. In this regard, I do not accept Mr. [APPELLANT]’s argument that his working without a permit was not criminal and that it was therefore improper to take it into account. [ADDRESS] has recognized that it is reasonable for an officer to draw a negative inference from “past disrespect for [NAME]’s immigration laws” : [APPELLANT] at para 16; [NAME] v [NAME] ([APPELLANT] and Immigration) , 2017 FC 933 at para 20, citing [NAME] ([APPELLANT] and Immigration) , 2003 FCT 710 at para 20. [ 51 ] Nonetheless, I conclude that the unreasonableness of the analysis with respect to the two issues referred to above is sufficient to render the decision as a whole unreasonable. It is far from clear whether the delegate’s decision on whether Mr. [APPELLANT] was rehabilitated would have been the same if the fraudulent identification documents and/or the supporting character and lifestyle evidence had been treated in a reasonable manner. Given this conclusion, I need not address Mr. [APPELLANT]’s remaining arguments, including those regarding the officer’s treatment of his statement of remorse.

IV. Conclusion [ 52 ] I therefore conclude that the delegate’s decision must be set aside, and that Mr. [APPELLANT]’s rehabilitation application be remitted for redetermination by a different delegate, to be based on a new recommendation conducted by a different officer. [ 53 ] Neither party proposed a question for certification pursuant to paragraph 74(d) of the IRPA and I agree that none arises in the matter.

JUDGMENT IN IMM-19084-24 THIS COURT’S

JUDGMENT is that The application for judicial review is allowed. The decision of a delegate of the Minister of [APPELLANT] and Immigration dated October 2, 2024, is set aside and the applicant’s application for [NAME] is remitted for redetermination by a different delegate, based on a new recommendation conducted by a different officer. “Nicholas McHaffie” Judge FEDERAL COURT SOLICITORS OF RECORD DOCKET: IMM-19084-24 STYLE OF CAUSE: [APPELLANT] v THE MINISTER OF [APPELLANT] AND IMMIGRATION PLACE OF HEARING:

HELD BY VIDEOCONFERENCE DATE OF HEARING: April 21, 2026

REASONS AND

JUDGMENT: [NAME] J. DATED: May 26, 2026 APPEARANCES : [APPELLANT] For The Applicant [APPELLANT] For The Respondent SOLICITORS OF RECORD : [APPELLANT], Ontario For The Applicant Attorney General of [NAME], Ontario For The Respondent