Federal Court Reverses Denial of Permanent Residence on Compassionate Grounds

Date: 20260529 Docket: IMM-17324-24 Citation: 2026 FC 699 Ottawa, Ontario, May 29, 2026 PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Manson BETWEEN: [NAME] Applicant and THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION Respondent

REASONS AND

JUDGMENT I. Introduction [ 1 ] This is an application for judicial review of an [NAME] ( “[NAME]” ) officer’s (the “Officer” ) decision dated September 16, 2024 (the “Decision” ) denying the Applicant’s application for permanent residence from within Canada under subsection 25(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act , SC 2001, c 27 (the “IRPA” ) on humanitarian and compassionate ( “[NAME]” ) grounds. [ 2 ] For the reasons that follow, the application is granted.

II. Background [ 3 ] The Applicant, [NAME], is a citizen of India, who was 55 years old on the date of the Decision. She is widowed. [ 4 ] The Applicant entered Canada on July 22, 2014, after being issued a super visa by the [NAME] in New Delhi. She received several visitor record extensions. Her last visitor record was valid until October 1, 2022. She has been without temporary resident status since that date. [ 5 ] The Applicant submitted a prior application for permanent residence from within Canada on [NAME] grounds in 2017. That application was refused in 2019. [NAME] refused her later visitor record extension request on January 11, 2023. She submitted the [NAME] application now at issue on April 18, 2023. [NAME] refused a temporary resident permit application on November 24, 2023. [ 6 ] The Applicant’s son, [NAME], is a Canadian citizen. Her daughter, [NAME], is a permanent resident. Both live in Canada with their spouses and children. The Applicant has two grandchildren in Canada: [NAME], who was eight years old when the Decision was made, and [NAME], who was two years old. The Applicant also has two siblings in Canada. She has one sister in India, one sister in the United States, and one brother in Italy. [ 7 ] The Applicant has lived with her children and their families during her time in Canada. At the time of the Decision, she lived with her son, daughter-in-law, and granddaughter. Her evidence was that she helps her family, including through childcare, and that her family provides her with emotional and financial support. [ 8 ] The Applicant also relied on her personal history. She became widowed at a relatively young age, raised her children in India, completed a Grade 10 education, and had no formal employment history outside the home. She submitted that, if required to return to India, she would live without meaningful family support there. [ 9 ] The Applicant suffered a stroke in February 2023. The medical evidence before the Officer stated that she was expected to make an almost full recovery. The Applicant relied on that medical event as evidence of her vulnerability and of the importance of her family support network in Canada. [ 10 ] The Applicant’s [NAME] application relied on three principal grounds: a) establishment in Canada, focused mainly on her family life and length of residence; b) hardship in India, including her age, widowhood, lack of support, medical history, and country conditions for older women and widows; and c) the best interests of her two grandchildren in Canada.

III. The Decision [ 11 ] The Decision consists of the September 16, 2024 refusal letter and the accompanying reasons form advising the Applicant that [NAME] refused her application for permanent residence from within Canada on [NAME] grounds under subsection 25(1) of the IRPA . [ 12 ] The Officer identified the purpose of the assessment as determining whether the Applicant should be exempted, on [NAME] grounds, from the requirement to apply for permanent residence from outside Canada and from the obligation to meet the requirements of a permanent resident category. [ 13 ] The Officer set out that the Applicant bore the onus to provide clear and appropriate evidence to explain the [NAME] reasons that prevented her from leaving Canada. The Officer also stated that subsection 25(1) of the IRPA is an exceptional measure and not simply an alternate means of applying for permanent residence in Canada. [ 14 ] On establishment, the Officer acknowledged that the Applicant had lived in Canada for approximately 10 years and had two adult children, two grandchildren, and two siblings in Canada. The Officer also acknowledged that she lived with her son and his family, and that she had close relationships with her children and their families. [ 15 ] The Officer found, however, that the record contained little evidence that the Applicant could not maintain contact with her family if she returned to India, referring to telecommunications, social media, and visits. The Officer noted that the Applicant had lived in India from 2011 to 2014 after her children had left India and found little evidence that the family could not maintain contact during that period. [ 16 ] The Officer also considered the Applicant’s stroke. The Officer found that, although the Applicant had suffered a stroke in February 2023, the evidence indicated that she was almost fully recovered by March 2023. The Officer found little contrary evidence showing that she had not recovered, that she required treatment available only in Canada, or that she could not live independently. [ 17 ] The Officer addressed the fact that the Applicant’s daughter had submitted an expression of interest to sponsor the Applicant under the [NAME] but had not been invited to apply. The Officer found that this did not preclude a future sponsorship attempt. The Officer also referred to the possible future availability of a super visa. [ 18 ] The Officer concluded that the Applicant had provided little detail about establishment outside her family and gave establishment neutral weight. [ 19 ] On hardship and country conditions, the Officer acknowledged the Applicant’s position that: a) she wished to remain close to her family; b) she had no one to care for her in India; c) her sister in India could not provide care; d) she faced health concerns; and e) she would encounter inadequate elder care infrastructure, public safety issues, gender-based violence, corruption, terrorism, and financial difficulty. [ 20 ] The Officer found that there was little objective evidence that the Applicant’s stroke would prevent her from travelling or living independently in India. The Officer also found that there was no evidence that that the Applicant required treatment in Canada or that her prescribed medication would be unavailable in India. [ 21 ] The Officer further found that the Applicant’s family in Canada could continue to provide financial support and could assist with suitable living arrangements, repairs to her home, equipment, care, and safety arrangements if needed. [ 22 ] The Officer accepted that the Applicant raised public safety concerns but found that those concerns were general conditions in India and that the evidence did not establish that the Applicant was at risk of becoming a victim. The Officer gave little weight to adverse generalized country conditions and differences in standard of living. [ 23 ] On the best interests of the children, the Officer identified the Applicant’s grandchildren, [NAME] and [NAME], by name and age. The Officer acknowledged that the Applicant had a relationship with both children, that she had helped care for them, that they were attached to her, and that grandparents can contribute positively to a child’s growth and development. [ 24 ] The Officer found that the children’s parents were their primary caregivers. The Officer found that there was little evidence that the parents could not care for the children without the Applicant, could not arrange alternative childcare, could not teach the children about culture and values, or could not help them maintain contact with the Applicant through telecommunication means. The Officer accepted that remote contact would not replace physical presence but treated it as a mitigating factor. [ 25 ] The Officer concluded that the children may experience sadness if the Applicant returned to India but was not satisfied that they would be deprived of emotional, physical, or financial care. The Officer stated that they were alert, alive, and sensitive to the best interests of the children, but found that the children’s interests did not warrant [NAME] relief when weighed with all other factors. [ 26 ] The Officer stated that they had reviewed the information provided, made a global assessment of all factors raised, and concluded they were not satisfied that the [NAME] considerations justified an exemption under subsection 25(1) of the IRPA .

IV. Issues [ 27 ] The only issue in this application is whether the Decision was reasonable.

V. Standard of Review [ 28 ] [NAME] decisions under subsection 25(1) of the IRPA are discretionary administrative decisions and the standard of review with respect to the Officer’s substantive findings is reasonableness ( Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v [NAME] , 2019 SCC 65 [ [NAME] ] at para 25; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2015 SCC 61 [ [NAME] ] at paras 44-45).

VI. Analysis A. The Statutory Framework [ 29 ] Subsection 25(1) of the IRPA gives the Minister discretion to grant permanent resident status or an exemption from applicable requirements, where justified by [NAME] considerations, taking into account the best interests of a child directly affected. The provision has an equitable purpose and is intended to mitigate the rigidity of the law in appropriate cases ( [NAME] at paras 19, 21, 33). [ 30 ] The best interests of a child directly affected must be treated as a significant factor, though it is not necessarily determinative ( [NAME] v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) , [1999] 2 SCR 817 at paras 74-75; [NAME] at paras 38-41). [ 31 ] The Applicant bore the onus to provide evidence sufficient to justify the exemption sought. [ 32 ] The Officer’s reasons reflect general [NAME] guidance that subsection 25(1) of the IRPA relief is discretionary and does not replace regular immigration streams. While such guidance can assist an officer in structuring their analysis, it does not bind an officer and cannot displace the statute or the equitable approach required by [NAME] . I am satisfied that the Officer treated the guidance in that limited way. B. Reasonableness [ 33 ] The Applicant submits that the Officer acknowledged the evidence but did not meaningfully assess it. The Applicant argues that the Officer: a) minimized her establishment; b) improperly relied on alternative immigration pathways; c) misconstrued the best interests of the child evidence; d) wrongly required personalized country condition evidence; and e) failed to conduct a true global assessment. [ 34 ] The Respondent submits that the Officer considered and weighed the evidence. The Respondent argues that the Applicant’s submissions largely ask the Court to reweigh the [NAME] factors and substitute a more favourable outcome. [ 35 ] The Applicant submits that the Officer unreasonably minimized her establishment by finding that she had provided little detail outside her family. The Applicant argues that this approach was too rigid because her establishment is family centred. She submits that she is an older widow, has lived in Canada for approximately 10 years, has no employment history outside the home, lives with her family, has close relationships with her children and grandchildren, and lacks support in India. [ 36 ] The Applicant relies on cases cautioning officers against using a checklist approach to establishment. She relies in particular on [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2024 FC 482 at paragraph 23, where the Court found that an officer unreasonably discounted the establishment of a retired applicant because of limited evidence of employment, friendships, and community involvement in a rigid, checklist-like approach. She also relies on [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2022 FC 746 at paragraphs 25-27, and [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2021 FC 582 at paragraph 21, for the principle that officers must meaningfully consider an applicant’s particular circumstances, including age, dependency, family support, and isolation. [ 37 ] I accept those principles. An officer must assess the applicant before them and must not mechanically discount family relationships because they are not employment, property ownership, community membership, or friendships outside the home. Here, the Officer failed to appreciate the family-based establishment of the Applicant’s particular circumstances. While the Officer accepted that the Applicant had close relationships with her children and grandchildren in Canada, the Officer gave establishment “neutral weight” because the Applicant had provided little detail about establishment “outside of her family” . [ 38 ] That reasoning is not justified on this record. The Applicant’s evidence was that her social, emotional, and practical life in Canada centred on her children and grandchildren. The Officer did not explain why a decade of residence, family co-residence, financial dependence, emotional dependence, and daily caregiving within her family counted only as neutral establishment. The Officer’s statement that the Applicant had little establishment outside the family does not answer that question. The Officer’s assessment of the Applicant’s establishment is unreasonable. [ 39 ] I next address the Officer’s references to the Applicant’s other immigration options. [ 40 ] The Applicant also submits that the Officer erred by referring to the [NAME] and a possible future super visa. The Applicant argues that those references were speculative, that her daughter had already attempted to sponsor her unsuccessfully, and that a temporary status document cannot be treated as a substitute for permanent residence. The Applicant argues that it is unreasonable for an officer to not consider whether the Applicant had barriers to applying through the alternate stream and to suggest a temporary remedy as a suitable alternative for permanent residence. [ 41 ] An officer cannot answer a subsection 25(1) application by pointing to uncertain future immigration options. Nor can an officer treat temporary status as equivalent to permanent residence. However, the Officer did not do that here. [ 42 ] The Officer was responding to the Applicant’s submission that separation from family in Canada would cause hardship and that permanent residence was needed to prevent that hardship. The Officer used the possible availability of future visits and applications as one consideration in assessing the practical consequences of refusal. The Officer did not treat speculative mitigation as determinative or evade the statutory task required in making an [NAME] finding. To the extent that the Officer’s references to other immigration options overstated their relevance, any error was immaterial. [ 43 ] I turn to the Officer’s analysis of the best interests of the children ( “BIOC” ). [ 44 ] The Applicant submits that the Officer misconstrued the evidence by finding that the children’s parents were their primary caregivers. The Applicant argues that the evidence showed she played a primary caregiving role, particularly for [NAME]. The Applicant points to her son’s evidence that [NAME]’s day begins with the Applicant, that the Applicant takes care of [NAME]’s daily needs, and that [NAME] is very attached to and reliant on the Applicant. [ 45 ] The Applicant also submits that the Officer applied the wrong test by asking whether the children’s interests would be “breached” or “compromised” , rather than asking what outcome would best serve their interests. The Applicant relies on: a) [NAME] at paragraphs 38-41, for the premise that children “will rarely, if ever, be deserving of any hardship” , and that the best interests principle must be applied “in a manner responsive to each child’s particular age, capacity, needs and maturity” ; b) [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2012 FC 166, for the premise that it is erroneous to conflate the BIOC factor with hardship; c) [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2019 FC 3 at paragraph 50, for the premise that a decision maker should have regard to the child’s circumstances from the child’s perspective and that a failure to take such perspective into consideration can render a BIOC assessment unreasonable; d) [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2012 FC 749, for the premise that an assessment of whether a child’s best interests are affected must start with the identification of the child’s best interests; and e) [NAME] v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) , 2002 FCA 475 at paragraphs 4-6, for the premise that, absent unusual circumstances, the typical starting point for the assessment of the BIOC factor is the premise that non-removal is in favour of the best interests of the child. [ 46 ] The Respondent submits that the Officer acknowledged the Applicant’s important role but reasonably found that the parents were the children’s primary caregivers. The Respondent argues that the Officer considered the children’s interests and reasonably found that those interests did not require [NAME] relief. [ 47 ] The Officer was required to be alert, alive, and sensitive to the interests of the children directly affected ( [NAME] at para 38, citing [NAME] v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) , 1999 CanLII 699 (SCC), [1999] 2 SCR 817 at para 74). The children’s interests had to be given substantial weight, but they were not determinative ( [NAME] at paras 39-41). The Officer’s BIOC analysis meets that standard. [ 48 ] The Officer: a) identified both children by name and age; b) recognized that both were attached to the Applicant; c) referred to the Applicant’s role in caring for [NAME] and [NAME]; and d) accepted that a grandparent can contribute positively to a child’s growth and development. [ 49 ] The Officer then considered the evidence about the children’s care. The Officer found that the children lived with their parents and that the parents were their primary caregivers. That finding was open on the record. While the evidence showed that the Applicant provided important care, particularly for [NAME], it did not require the Officer to conclude that the parents were not the children’s primary caregivers. A grandparent may play a central caregiving role while the parents remain the child’s primary legal, emotional, and practical caregivers. [ 50 ] The Officer also considered cultural and emotional factors. The Officer acknowledged the submission that the Applicant could teach the children about manners and culture. The Officer found little evidence that the parents could not also provide that guidance. That finding was open to the Officer. [ 51 ] The Applicant correctly notes that some of the Officer’s language was not ideal, specifically the Officer’s references to whether the children’s interests would be “breached” or “compromised” . However, reasonableness review does not require the Court to isolate imperfect language from the reasons as a whole, as the reasons must be read holistically and contextually ( [NAME] at para 97). When read as a whole, the Officer did identify the children’s interests, recognized the Applicant’s positive role, considered the consequences of separation, and weighed those interests with the rest of the application. [ 52 ] The Officer found that the children would remain in Canada with their parents, who would continue to care for them emotionally, physically, and financially. The Officer did not treat the children’s interests as irrelevant or nominal. The Officer gave them explicit attention and then weighed them with the application as a whole. [ 53 ] The Officer’s BIOC analysis was not unreasonable; the Applicant’s argument asks the Court to draw a different inference from the caregiving evidence. [ 54 ] I next turn to the Officer’s analysis of country conditions and hardship in India. [ 55 ] The Applicant submits that the Officer wrongly required personalized evidence, arguing that her country condition evidence was directly linked to her circumstances as an older widowed woman who would be living alone in India without family support. The Applicant relies on [NAME] at paragraphs 52-56, where the Supreme Court held that discrimination and adverse conditions may be inferred from evidence about a group to which an applicant belongs. [ 56 ] The Respondent submits that the Officer did not reject country condition evidence merely because it was general. The Respondent argues that the Officer considered the Applicant’s circumstances and reasonably found that hardship would be mitigated by family support, financial assistance, and the absence of evidence that the Applicant could not live independently or obtain medication. [ 57 ] [NAME] rejects an unduly narrow approach requiring direct proof of individual targeting in circumstances where systemic discrimination or adverse conditions are relevant ( [NAME] at paras 52-56), it does not eliminate the need to connect country evidence to an applicant’s actual circumstances. [ 58 ] Here, the Officer summarized the Applicant’s concerns about elder care, her sister’s inability to provide care, health care, public safety, gender-based violence, corruption, terrorism, housing, and finances. The Officer found little objective evidence that the Applicant’s stroke prevented travel, independent living, or living alone. The Officer relied on the medical evidence indicating that the Applicant was expected to recover. The Officer also found no evidence that the Applicant’s medication would be unavailable in India. The Applicant bore the onus to establish the hardship she alleged. On the record before the Officer, it was open to them to find that the medical evidence did not show the Applicant’s need to remain in Canada. [ 59 ] The Officer further found that the Applicant’s family could provide financial support and help arrange housing, repairs, care, safety measures, and equipment. While the Applicant submits that financial support from Canada is not the same as in-person support, the Officer did not equate the two. The Officer found that financial and practical assistance could mitigate the hardship asserted. [ 60 ] The Officer giving little weight to generalized public safety concerns was also reasonable. The evidence regarding violence, elder mistreatment, and public safety in India was relevant, but it did not compel a finding that the Applicant herself would face hardship sufficient to warrant [NAME] relief. It was reasonable for the Officer to find the evidence insufficient when considered with the mitigating factors specific to the Applicant. [ 61 ] The question is whether the Decision is internally coherent and justified in light of the legal and factual constraints bearing on it ( [NAME] at paras 85-86, 99-101). The Officer’s assessment of the Applicant’s establishment is not justified. The Decision is unreasonable and is set aside, with the matter remitted to a different visa officer for redetermination.

VII. Conclusion [ 62 ] The application for judicial review is granted. [ 63 ] The Decision is set aside. The matter is remitted to a different visa officer for redetermination in accordance with these reasons. [ 64 ] The parties did not propose a question for certification, and none arises.

JUDGMENT in IMM-17324-24 THIS COURT’S

JUDGMENT is that : The application for judicial review is granted. The Decision is set aside, and the matter is remitted to a different visa officer for redetermination in accordance with these reasons. There is no question for certification. "Michael D. Manson" Judge FEDERAL COURT SOLICITORS OF RECORD DOCKET: IMM-17324-24 STYLE OF CAUSE: [NAME] v THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION PLACE OF HEARING: Toronto, Ontario DATE OF HEARING: May 11, 2026

REASONS AND

JUDGMENT: MANSON J. DATED: May 29, 2026 APPEARANCES : [NAME] For The Applicants [NAME] For The Respondent SOLICITORS OF RECORD : [NAME] and Solicitors Toronto, Ontario For The Applicants Attorney General of Canada Toronto, Ontario For The Respondent