Federal Court Reverses Unreasonable Ruling on Refugee Status

OUTCOME: Allowed

Date: 20260616 Docket: IMM-10988-22 Citation: 2026 FC 810 Toronto, Ontario, June 16, 2026 PRESENT: The [NAME_1]: [NAME_2] Applicant and THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION Respondent

REASONS AND

JUDGMENT I. Overview [ 1 ] This application for judicial review challenges the decision of the Refugee Protection Division ([NAME_3]) to cease the Applicant’s refugee status which was recognized in 2018. The Applicant returned to Türkiye, his country of citizenship, for 20 days in 2020 to visit his ill mother. [NAME_4] determined that this visit constituted a re-availment of [NAME_5]. As such, the original determination of the Applicant’s refugee status was deemed rejected pursuant to section 108 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act , SC 2001, c 27 ( IRPA ). [ 2 ] For the reasons below, [NAME_4]’s decision is unreasonable due to its misapplication of relevant factors for the determination of re-availment and lack of responsiveness to the Applicant’s submissions on central issues. As such, the judicial review application is granted.

II. Background [ 3 ] The Applicant is a Turkish citizen who received refugee protection in Canada on February 26, 2018. His refugee claim was based on fears of persecution arising from his Kurdish ethnicity, from his political activism, and from his concerns about mandatory military service. [ 4 ] In July 2020, the Applicant obtained a deferral of his mandatory military service from the [NAME_6] in Toronto and then returned to Türkiye to visit his mother. His mother believed she was dying and expressed her wish to see the Applicant a final time. [ 5 ] After spending 20 days in Türkiye, the Applicant returned to Canada and proceedings to remove his refugee status were commenced. [ 6 ] [NAME_4] determined that the Applicant voluntarily re-availed himself of [NAME_5] and ceased his refugee status based on the following findings: - The Applicant did not dispute that he returned to Türkiye voluntarily; - The Applicant intended to re-avail himself of [NAME_5] because i) his reasons for returning did not constitute exceptional circumstances that would rebut the presumption of re-availment, ii) he did not have an ongoing subjective fear of persecution, iii) he trusted the Turkish authorities with his safety and iv) he prioritized travel over his risks in returning; - On a balance of probabilities, looking at the Applicant’s conduct in Türkiye where he was determined not to be in hiding, actual re-availment occurred, and the Applicant’s counsel conceded to this.

III. Issue and Standard of Review [ 7 ] The decision’s review is conducted pursuant to the presumptive standard of review of reasonableness ( Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov , 2019 SCC 65 [ Vavilov ] at para 10). A reasonable decision must be “based on an internally coherent and rational chain of analysis” and it must be justified in relation to the factual and legal constraints applicable in the circumstances ( Vavilov , at paras 85, 101).

IV. Analysis [ 8 ] [NAME_4]’s reasons for allowing the cessation application did not need to involve a microscopic examination of every possible issue ( Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v [NAME_7] , 2022 FCA 50 [ [NAME_7] ] at para 82). However, the Federal Court of Appeal (FCA) identified fifteen factors which, at a minimum, must be considered when determining whether the presumption of re-availment has been rebutted ( [NAME_7] , at para 84). Some of these factors are also described by the SCC as constraints for reasonable decision-making ( Vavilov , supra). [ 9 ] The Applicant made extensive submissions on some of these factors which were ignored or unreasonably addressed by [NAME_4]. This rendered the decision unreasonable for its inconsistency with the principles of justification and transparency ( Vavilov , at paras 127-128; [NAME_7] at para 84). [ 10 ] At the beginning of its analysis, [NAME_4] stated that the [NAME_7] factors were obiter and therefore not binding on [NAME_4]. This is false; [NAME_7] is appellate judicial authority that is binding on [NAME_4] and it would be unreasonable for [NAME_4] to fail to consider any evidence related to these factors ( [NAME_8] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2023 FC 443 at paras 12, 15-17; [NAME_9] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2022 FC 1541 at paras 18-19, 40). [ 11 ] [NAME_4]’s incorrect statement about the non-binding nature of [NAME_7] is not a sufficiently serious shortcoming to render the decision unreasonable. However, given [NAME_4]’s unreasonable treatment of relevant factors from [NAME_7] and its failure to respond to central submissions made by the Applicant, the statement contributes to the Court’s loss of confidence in the decision. A. [NAME_4] failed to assess the frequency and duration of the Applicant’s travel [ 12 ] The frequency and duration of a refugee’s travel to their country of nationality is identified as a relevant consideration in [NAME_7] . The Applicant argued that this factor favoured him because he only returned once to Türkiye, for a short duration of 20 days. [ 13 ] The duration and frequency of a refugee’s return to their country is a key factual constraint in cessation matters because it is the actus reus component of the test and the trigger for the cessation application. [NAME_4]’s failure to address its weight in the analysis is a failure of transparency in the decision ( Vavilov , at paras 125-128). B. [NAME_4] unreasonably assessed the Applicant’s purpose of the travel [ 14 ] The Applicant submitted that a consideration of his purpose of travel — to visit his mother who believed herself to be dying — was the most important factor in his case. The Applicant argued that the purpose of travel had to be considered from his subjective perspective, and his desire to see his mother was “understandable and deeply empathetic.” [ 15 ] The FCA has identified the purpose of a refugee’s travel as a relevant consideration: What was the purpose of the travel? [NAME_4] may consider travel to the country of nationality for a compelling reason such as the serious illness of a family member to have a different significance than travel to that same country for a more frivolous reason such as a vacation or a visit with friends; ( [NAME_7] , at para 84) [ 16 ] [NAME_4] treated the Applicant’s submission and evidence regarding his purpose of travel unreasonably. Specifically, rather than assessing the Applicant’s evidence of his subjective intent ( [NAME_7], at para 66), [NAME_4] objectively assessed whether the reasons for the Applicant’s travel were “absolutely necessary.” [NAME_4] questioned the basis for the Applicant’s mother’s fear for her life and then concluded that even if she did fear for her life the Applicant’s travel was not necessary because he did not provide necessary care for her and other relatives were available to assist her. [ 17 ] In applying a test of absolute necessity to assess the Applicant’s purpose, [NAME_4] unreasonably imposed an elevated test. The FCA has stated that “the question of whether one intended to re-avail oneself of the protection of one’s country of origin has nothing to do with whether the motive for travel was necessary or justified” ( [NAME_7] , at para 72). [ 18 ] [NAME_4] also misapplied Federal Court jurisprudence to justify its conclusion that the Applicant’s travel was not “absolutely necessary.” [NAME_4] cited two cases of this Court for the proposition that “return travel to meet the needs of relatives does not constitute exceptional circumstances if it is not necessary in the circumstances” ( [NAME_10] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2018 FC 1224 [ [NAME_10] ] at para 41; [NAME_11] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2019 FC 104 [ [NAME_11] ] at para 24). The Applicant submitted that these cases do not establish this proposition. [ 19 ] The Applicant was correct. In [NAME_10], the Court recited [NAME_4]’s finding regarding the necessity of travel but did not explicitly endorse a “necessity” test. In [NAME_11], the Court found [NAME_4]’s determination that it was not necessary for the Applicant to return to China to care for his elderly parents to be reasonable in combination with other factors. [ 20 ] In any case, these decisions pre-dated [NAME_7] which frames the issue of the purpose of travel in more general terms, and does not require a consideration of necessity. [NAME_4] unreasonably applied the Court’s jurisprudence, particularly in view of the individualized fact-specific nature of the cessation inquiry ( [NAME_7] , at para 66). C. [NAME_4] unreasonably determined that the Applicant lacked a subjective fear in Türkiye [ 21 ] [NAME_4] determined that the Applicant’s behaviour was inconsistent with someone who has a subjective fear of the [NAME_12] or Turkish nationals. The evidence cited by [NAME_4] to support this conclusion included the fact that the Applicant returned using the state-owned [NAME_13], entered and exited via normal immigration channels and his travel to another city to attend Eid celebrations. [ 22 ] In assessing the Applicant’s subjective fear, [NAME_4] unreasonably failed to engage with the original basis on which the Applicant was found to have a well-founded fear of persecution ( [NAME_14] v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2025 FC 1626 at paras 60, 63). [NAME_4] panel that recognized his refugee status stated: The panel also accepts the evidence of the claimant that if he were to return to [Türkiye], he would continue with his political activism. The panel finds that if the claimant were to do so, there is a serious possibility that he would experience persecution. [Emphasis added] [ 23 ] The Applicant’s risk was therefore attached to the prospect of his political activism. There was no evidence before the [NAME_15] that the Applicant engaged in activism during his 20-day stay in Türkiye. [ 24 ] Moreover, the assessment of subjective fear is intrinsically bound with an assessment of a person’s credibility; if someone claims to be afraid, it is difficult to reasonably doubt them without also making an adverse finding of credibility ( [NAME_16] v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) , 1992 CarswellNat 822, [1992] FCJ No 583 (CA) (QL) at para 3; [NAME_17] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2025 FC 1331 at paras 28-29). The Applicant testified that he possessed a subjective fear, but [NAME_4] unreasonably doubted him in the absence of an adverse credibility finding. D. [NAME_4] unreasonably failed to assess the severity of consequences for the Applicant [ 25 ] The assessment of consequences of a cessation decision is identified as a relevant factor in [NAME_7] , and the Applicant made specific submissions on the issue. The Applicant drew [NAME_4]’s attention to the fact he would be at risk if he returned to Türkiye due to his political activism. [NAME_4] did not assess or mention this submission at all. [ 26 ] As stated by the Supreme Court of Canada: Where the impact of a decision on an individual’s rights and interests is severe, the reasons provided to that individual must reflect the stakes. The principle of responsive justification means that if a decision has particularly harsh consequences for the affected individual, the decision maker must explain why its decision best reflects the legislature’s intention. This includes decisions with consequences that threaten an individual’s life, liberty, dignity or livelihood. ( Vavilov , at para 133) [ 27 ] Given that the consequence of [NAME_4]’s decision was to remove the Applicant’s permanent residence as well as the protection which was previously conferred by another [NAME_3] panel, and given that the Applicant alleged that the removal of such protection would expose him to risks of persecution, [NAME_4] had a duty to explain how the impact of its decision reflects legislative intention. [NAME_4]’s duty to provide responsive justification was not discretionary: an explanation “must” have been given regarding why the decision best reflects legislature’s intent ( [NAME_18] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2025 FC 1719 at para 35). [NAME_4]’s failure to grapple with the consequences alleged by the Applicant was unreasonable.

V. Conclusion [ 28 ] Not all of the factors identified in [NAME_7] for assessing re-availment need to be addressed in a cessation decision. However, when some of those factors are central submissions of the refugee, and there is relevant evidence supporting the submissions, they must be addressed in a manner that is intelligible, transparent and justified ( Vavilov, at paras 125-127; [NAME_7], at para 84). [ 29 ] [NAME_4] unreasonably assessed factors which formed the central submissions of the Applicant and failed to address others. The decision is accordingly unreasonable and the application for judicial review is granted.

JUDGMENT in IMM-10988-22 THIS COURT’S

JUDGMENT is that : The application for judicial review is granted, the decision of the Refugee Protection Division to allow the cessation application of the Applicant’s refugee status is set aside, and the matter is remitted to a differently constituted panel of the Refugee Protection Division for redetermination. There is no question for certification and no order regarding costs. "[NAME_1]" Judge FEDERAL COURT SOLICITORS OF RECORD DOCKET: IMM-10988-22 STYLE OF CAUSE: [NAME_2] v THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION PLACE OF HEARING: Toronto, Ontario DATE OF HEARING: JUNE 10, 2026

REASONS AND

JUDGMENT: [NAME_1] J. DATED: JUNE 16, 2026 APPEARANCES : [NAME_19] For The Applicant [NAME_20] For The Respondent SOLICITORS OF RECORD : [NAME_19], Ontario For The Applicant Attorney General of Canada Toronto, Ontario For The Respondent