Federal Court Rules Unauthorized Use of 'MARTINIZING' Trademark Infringes Registered Rights

Date: 20260612 Docket: T-1160-24 Citation: 2026 FC 787 Ottawa, Ontario, June 12, 2026 PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Manson BETWEEN: [NAME] Applicant and [COMPANY]. Respondent

REASONS AND

JUDGMENT I. Introduction [ 1 ] This is an application for declaratory, injunctive, monetary, and ancillary relief regarding the Applicant’s registered MARTINIZING Trademarks. [ 2 ] For the reasons that follow, the application is granted in part.

II. Background [ 3 ] The Applicant, [NAME], is a Delaware limited liability company. It owns an international franchise system for [NAME] operating under the MARTINIZING brand. The Applicant’s evidence is that the MARTINIZING brand has been used in Canada by the Applicant or its predecessors since at least 1988. The record identifies four current Canadian franchise locations: Coquitlam, British Columbia; Calgary, [COMPANY]; Bolton, Ontario; and London, Ontario. [ 4 ] The Applicant owns 11 Canadian trademark registrations that comprise or include MARTINIZING, including word-mark registrations TMA343,040 and TMA1,035,361 for dry-cleaning and laundry services, fabric cleaning and processing services, and the operation of stores providing those services. [ 5 ] MARTINIZING is a coined word that is inherently a strong trademark that has been used and promoted in Canada through franchise locations, the Applicant’s website, social media, online listings, and customer-facing advertising. The Applicant’s evidence of use in Canada includes revenue figures, website traffic from Canadian users, and customer review evidence associated with Canadian franchise locations. [ 6 ] The Respondent, [COMPANY]., is a [NAME]. It operates a dry-cleaning business at [ADDRESS], Halifax, Nova Scotia. It also operated a second location at [ADDRESS], Halifax, Nova Scotia, which has since closed. [ 7 ] The Respondent is not, and has never been, a franchisee or licensee of the Applicant and its use of MARTINIZING, in Canada, has been and is unauthorized. [ 8 ] The Respondent has used MARTINIZING prominently in connection with its dry-cleaning and alteration business. The record includes evidence of outdoor signage displaying MARTINIZING DRY CLEANING & ALTERATIONS, interior signs using MARTINIZING, and printed materials advertising MARTINIZING alteration services. The record also includes evidence that receipts issued by the Respondent displayed MARTINIZING or MARTINIZING HALIFAX. [ 9 ] The Respondent has also used MARTINIZING online, including on its website at maritimedrycleaners.ca, and a Facebook profile. [ADDRESS] evidence indicates that the Respondent used MARTINIZING on outdoor signage since at least May 2009. [ 10 ] The Applicant learned of the Respondent’s activities by September 29, 2023. On that date, the Applicant’s U.S. counsel wrote to the Respondent, objected to the Respondent’s use of MARTINIZING, and offered the Respondent the possibility of seeking a licence. The Respondent did not obtain a licence and continued using MARTINIZING. On February 13, 2024, the Applicant’s Canadian counsel sent a further cease-and-desist letter. The Respondent did not respond and continued to use MARTINIZING. [ 11 ] The Applicant commenced this application on May 10, 2024. The Respondent was personally served with the Notice of Application on May 17, 2024. The Respondent did not file a notice of appearance. On June 10, 2024, the Applicant’s Canadian counsel sent a further letter to the Respondent giving the Respondent another 10 days to respond. The Respondent still did not participate. This application therefore proceeds based on the Applicant’s record only.

III. Issues [ 12 ] The issues are: Is an application an appropriate procedure for this matter? Has the Respondent infringed the Applicant’s registered trademark rights contrary to sections 19 and 20(1)(a) of the Trademarks Act , RSC 1985, c T-13 [ Trademarks Act ]? Has the Respondent directed public attention to its services or business in a way likely to cause confusion in Canada, contrary to section 7(b) of the Trademarks Act ? Has the Respondent used the Applicant’s registered trademarks in a manner likely to depreciate the value of the goodwill attaching to them, contrary to section 22(1) of the Trademarks Act ? What remedy should be granted? IV. Analysis A. Appropriateness of Proceeding by Application [ 13 ] The Applicant submits that an application is appropriate and I agree. [ 14 ] Section 53.2 of the Trademarks Act permits proceedings under the Trademarks Act to be brought by application. The Federal Court of Appeal has confirmed that trademark proceedings, including infringement and passing off claims, may proceed by application in appropriate cases ( BBM Canada v [COMPANY] , 2011 FCA 151 at para 28). [ 15 ] [ADDRESS] must consider whether the application record permits a fair determination of the issues. Relevant considerations include the number and complexity of the issues, the number of parties, whether credibility is central, whether cross-applications or related proceedings are likely, and whether the procedures available on an application provide sufficient safeguards ( BBM Canada v [COMPANY] , 2011 FC 960 at para 19). [ 16 ] Here: a) there are two parties; b) the claims arise from a defined course of conduct: the Respondent’s use of MARTINIZING in association with dry-cleaning and related services; c) no serious credibility dispute arises that requires viva voce evidence; d) nothing in the record suggests that the Applicant selected the application procedure to deprive the Respondent of a fair opportunity to respond; and e) the record includes evidence of: i) the Applicant’s trademark registrations, ii) the nature of the Applicant’s business, iii) the Respondent’s signage and online presence, iv) the Applicant’s objection letters, and v) the Respondent’s non-participation in this proceeding. [ 17 ] The application procedure is therefore appropriate. B. The Statutory Framework [ 18 ] The relevant provisions of the Trademarks Act are sections 4, 6, 7(b), 19, 20(1)(a), 22(1), 53.2, and 54(3). [ 19 ] Section 4(2) of the Trademarks Act provides that a trademark is deemed to be used in association with services if it is used or displayed in the performance or advertising of those services. [ 20 ] Section 6 of the Trademarks Act considers the factors with respect to the likelihood of confusion and section 6(5) of the Trademarks Act requires the Court to consider all surrounding circumstances, including: a) the inherent distinctiveness of the trademarks or trade names and the extent to which they have become known; b) the length of time the trademarks or trade names have been in use; c) the nature of the goods, services or business; d) the nature of the trade; and e) the degree of resemblance between the trademarks or trade names, including in appearance or sound or in the ideas suggested by them. [ 21 ] Section 7(b) of the Trademarks Act prohibits a person from directing public attention to their goods, services, or business in such a way as to cause or be likely to cause confusion in Canada between their goods, services, or business and those of another. [ 22 ] Section 19 of the Trademarks Act gives the registered owner of a trademark the exclusive right to use that trademark throughout Canada in respect of the goods or services specified in the registration. Section 20(1)(a) of the Trademarks Act provides that the right of the owner of a registered trademark is deemed to be infringed by a person not entitled to its use who sells, distributes, or advertises goods or services in association with a confusing trademark or trade name. [ 23 ] Section 22(1) of the Trademarks Act prohibits use of a registered trademark in a manner likely to have the effect of depreciating the value of the goodwill attaching to it. [ 24 ] Section 53.2 of the Trademarks Act confers remedial authority on the Court. Section 54(3) of the Trademarks Act provides that a copy of an entry in the trademark register, certified by the Registrar, is evidence of the facts set out in it. C. Use of MARTINIZING by the Respondent [ 25 ] The record shows that the Respondent has displayed MARTINIZING on outdoor signage, indoor signage, receipts, its website, and social media in connection with dry-cleaning and alteration services, in Nova Scotia, and the Respondent’s website and Facebook profile has advertised these services in association with MARTINIZING to Canadian customers. D. Infringement Under Sections 19 and 20 [ 26 ] The Respondent advertised and performed dry-cleaning and alteration services using MARTINIZING in association with these registered services. The Respondent had no licence or authorization, and therefore contravenes section 19 of the Trademarks Act . [ 27 ] The Respondent has also infringed the Applicant’s MARTINIZING trademarks under section 20(1)(a) of the Trademarks Act . [ 28 ] The test for confusion is assessed as a matter of first impression in the mind of a casual consumer somewhat in a hurry, with an imperfect recollection of the prior mark ( [NAME] v [NAME] , 2006 SCC 23 [ Veuve Clicquot ] at para 20). [ADDRESS] must consider all surrounding circumstances, with reference to the factors in subsection 6(5) set out above. The degree of resemblance is often the statutory factor likely to have the greatest effect on the analysis ( [COMPANY] v [COMPANY] , 2011 SCC 27 at para 49). [ 29 ] Each factor clearly favours the Applicant. [ 30 ] MARTINIZING is a coined word, which is an inherently strong mark and therefore possesses a high degree of inherent distinctiveness. The Applicant’s evidence establishes long-standing use in Canada, franchise locations in multiple Canadian provinces, Canadian revenue, online promotion, and significant goodwill. [ 31 ] The Applicant or its predecessors have used MARTINIZING in Canada since at least 1988. On the record, the Respondent’s use dates back to at least May 2009 and continued after written notice in 2023 and 2024. Prolonged unauthorized use does not defeat the Applicant’s registered rights on this application, particularly when that use was localized and unknown to the Applicant until sometime in 2023. [ 32 ] Both parties operate, or license the operation of, [NAME]. The parties’ services are offered to ordinary consumers through retail locations and customer-facing advertising. [ 33 ] The degree of resemblance strongly favours the Applicant. The trademarks are not merely similar, they are the identical word, MARTINIZING, used for the same services. In some instances, the Respondent’s use was paired with terms such as “dry cleaning” and “alterations” . Those words do not reduce confusion; they describe the same services covered by the Applicant’s trademark registrations. [ 34 ] A casual consumer encountering the Respondent’s MARTINIZING dry-cleaning services in Nova Scotia would likely infer that the business was operated, licensed, affiliated with, or approved by the Applicant. The Applicant has established infringement under sections 19 and 20(1)(a) of the Trademarks Act . E. Passing Off Under Section 7(b) [ 35 ] The Applicant has also established passing off under subsection 7(b) of the Trademarks Act . [ 36 ] As the Supreme Court affirmed in [NAME] v [COMPANY] , 2005 SCC 65 at paragraphs 66-68, for a passing off action to succeed, a plaintiff must meet the three prongs of the test set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in [COMPANY] v [COMPANY] , 1992 CanLII 33 (SCC), [1992] 3 SCR 120 at 132: a) there must be reputation or goodwill established in the trademark as used with the goods or services; b) there must be a deception of the public due to a misrepresentation; and c) there must be actual or potential damage to the trademark owner. [ 37 ] The Applicant has proven both a reputation and goodwill in MARTINIZING in Canada. The record shows: a) long-standing Canadian use in association with dry-cleaning and related services; b) Canadian franchise locations; c) Canadian revenues; d) website traffic from Canadian users; e) public-facing promotion in Canada; and f) favourable customer review evidence associated with Canadian franchisees. [ 38 ] The Respondent’s use of the identical word for identical services is a misrepresentation; its conduct is likely to lead the public to believe that its goods, services, or business are those of the Applicant, or are connected with the Applicant. [ 39 ] The Applicant has also established actual or potential damage, in that use of an owner’s trademark may cause the owner to suffer an actual loss of control over its trademark, and such loss is sufficient to ground the third component of the tripartite test for passing off ( [NAME] v [COMPANY]. , 2010 FCA 255 at para 28). F. Depreciation of Goodwill Under Section 22 [ 40 ] The Applicant has also established depreciation of goodwill under section 22(1) of the Trademarks Act . [ 41 ] The test under section 22(1) of the Trademarks Act has four elements. The Applicant must show that ( Veuve Clicquot at para 46): a) the Respondent used the Applicant’s registered trademark in connection with goods or services; b) the Applicant’s trademark is sufficiently well known to have significant goodwill attached to it; c) the Applicant’s trademark was used in a manner likely to have an effect on that goodwill through linkage; and d) the likely effect would be to depreciate the value of the goodwill. [ 42 ] Here, those elements are met: a) the Respondent used the Applicant’s registered word mark in connection with dry-cleaning and alteration services; b) the Applicant has goodwill in the MARTINIZING trademark in Canada; c) linkage is established because the trademark and services are identical; and d) the likely effect is depreciation through loss of distinctiveness, loss of control, and association with a business outside the Applicant’s franchise system. [ 43 ] The evidence of lower reviews for the Respondent’s business, compared with the reviews for the Applicant’s Canadian franchisees, supports a risk of reputational harm. Nevertheless, I need not rely on that evidence to decide the Applicant’s claim under subsection 22(1) of the Trademarks Act , given the unauthorized use of the identical trademark for identical services creates linkage and likely depreciation through loss of control and distinctiveness. G. Appropriate Remedies (1) Declaratory Relief [ 44 ] Declaratory relief is appropriate. The Respondent used the Applicant’s registered trademarks without authorization, did so over a prolonged period, and continued after repeated notice of infringement and opportunities to cease the unauthorized use. [ 45 ] A declaration will issue that the Respondent has: a) infringed the Applicant’s rights in the MARTINIZING trademarks, contrary to sections 19 and 20(1)(a) of the Trademarks Act ; b) directed public attention to its services and business in such a way as to cause or be likely to cause confusion in Canada, contrary to subsection 7(b) of the Trademarks Act ; and c) used the Applicant’s registered trademarks in a manner likely to depreciate goodwill attaching to them, contrary to subsection 22(1) of the Trademarks Act . (2) Injunctive Relief [ 46 ] A permanent injunction is appropriate. [ 47 ] The Respondent’s use has been prolonged, has occurred across physical and online channels, and continued after written notice that the Applicant objected. The record does not show that the Respondent has undertaken to stop use and the Respondent has not participated in this proceeding. An injunction is necessary to prevent further infringement and to protect the Applicant’s registered trademark rights. [ 48 ] The Respondent, including its officers, directors, employees, agents, successors, assigns, and all persons or entities over whom it exercises control, will be restrained from using MARTINIZING, or any trademark, trade name, business name, social media account name, domain name, or other designation confusing with MARTINIZING, in association with dry-cleaning, laundry, alteration, fabric cleaning, fabric processing, or related services. (3) Delivery Up, Destruction, and Online Removal [ 49 ] The Respondent will be ordered to remove MARTINIZING and any confusing designation from all signage, advertising, receipts, websites, social media accounts, business listings, promotional materials, and other customer-facing materials within its possession, power, or control, within 30 days of the date of this Judgment. The Respondent will also be ordered to destroy or deliver up to the Applicant or the Applicant’s counsel any physical materials bearing MARTINIZING or a confusing designation. (4) Damages (a) Governing Principles [ 50 ] The Applicant seeks damages of USD $145,400, which it converts to CAD $209,866.92. The Applicant submits that, because the Respondent did not participate and did not provide financial records, the Court should estimate damages by reference to the licensing and franchise fees that the Respondent would have paid had it been an authorized MARTINIZING franchisee. The Applicant relies principally on [COMPANY] v [NAME] ([NAME]) , 2002 FCT 918 [ [NAME] ], 3925928 [COMPANY] v [COMPANY] , 2005 FC 1465 [ 3925928 [COMPANY] ], [COMPANY] v [NAME] , 2021 FC 64 [ [NAME] ], and [NAME], Ltd v Paris Baguette Patisserie Inc (23 October 2025), Court File No. T-2021-25 (FC) [ [NAME] ]. [ 51 ] The Respondent’s non-participation obviously renders the damages assessment more difficult; it leaves the Court without evidence of the Respondent’s revenues, customers, profits, and financial benefit from its use of MARTINIZING. The Respondent should not obtain an advantage from failing to participate in a proceeding. However, the Applicant still bears the burden of proving damages, which remain compensatory. [ 52 ] Damages need not be proved with mathematical precision. In [NAME] , the Court held that once infringement and damage are proven, the claimant is entitled to the Court’s best estimate of damages and is not necessarily limited to nominal damages ( [NAME] at paras 45, 48). [ 53 ] It is trite law that the party seeking damages must prove them, but where a defendant’s failure to participate frustrates the plaintiff’s ability to establish actual damages, the Court may be inclined to award at least nominal damages. In each case, the Court attempts to estimate the actual harm to the claimants’ business, reputation, and goodwill arising from the trademark infringement, and does its best to treat like cases alike to the extent possible on the evidentiary record before it and the factors described in the jurisprudence ( H-D U.S.A., LLC v [NAME] , 2021 FC 620 at para 56 [ [NAME] ]). [ 54 ] Damages may include lost sales, franchise fees, or royalties that a plaintiff might otherwise have received, but only where the evidence establishes the necessary causal link ( 3925928 [COMPANY] at paras 19-23). (b) The Applicant’s Proposed Damages Calculation [ 55 ] The Applicant’s proposed calculation has four components: a) an initial franchise fee of USD $62,500; b) a conversion or rebranding package fee of USD $8,000; c) a grand opening marketing fee of USD $8,900; and d) ongoing amounts for two years, consisting of royalty fees and brand development fees equal to 8% of estimated gross revenues, plus two annual fees of USD $2,500 each. [ 56 ] The Applicant uses its Canadian franchisee revenue for 2022 and 2023 to estimate average per-store annual revenue of USD $381,250. Applying 8% to that figure, the Applicant estimates annual royalty and brand development fees of USD $30,500. For two years, that amount is USD $61,000. Adding two annual fees produces USD $66,000 in ongoing fees. [ 57 ] The Applicant then adds the one-time franchise-related amounts of USD $79,400, producing a total claim of USD $145,400. It converts that amount to CAD $209,866.92. [ 58 ] However, this calculation as a measure of damages is not wholly appropriate as a damages model on this record. [ 59 ] The Applicant relies on [NAME] for the proposition that damages may be estimated where a defendant’s conduct prevents precise calculation. [NAME] involved counterfeit merchandise and motions for default judgment. [ADDRESS] in that case recognized that precise damages are often impossible where [NAME] do not provide business records and held that claimants should not be penalized for failing to prove facts that are not realistically provable because of the [NAME]’ conduct ( [NAME] at paras 44-48). [ 60 ] However, the Court must still estimate the actual harm to the Applicant’s business, reputation, and goodwill ( [NAME] at para 56). [ 61 ] 3925928 [COMPANY] provides limited assistance to the Applicant. In 3925928 [COMPANY] , the Court treated damages as compensation for actual loss and required proof of a causal link between the infringement and the claimed lost franchise sales, fees, or royalties. In that case, the Court held that the amounts received by the infringer were, at most, some indication of possible loss, but did not prove what the plaintiffs would have earned or whether the infringer’s clients would have contracted with them, and further noted that franchise fees received by the infringer were revenues, not profits ( 3925928 [COMPANY] at paras 19-23, 27). Here, the Applicant has not shown that the Applicant lost a prospective Nova Scotia franchisee, or that any customer or franchise opportunity was diverted from the Applicant. [ 62 ] [NAME] provides some support for the Applicant’s position. In that case, Justice Southcott awarded damages against certain infringers by reference to the plaintiff’s usual franchise fee and royalty structure. In [NAME] , the [NAME] are the closest comparator: the Court accepted an average $50,000 franchise fee and prorated annual royalties for the period of proven infringing operation at a single business location ( [NAME] at paras 22-29). The [NAME] in [NAME] also involved an unauthorized restaurant operator, but the damages calculation there was supported by the defendant’s own financial statements ( [NAME] at paras 35-39). Other aspects of [NAME] involved unauthorized master-franchising or sub-franchising activity, which are circumstances not present here ( [NAME] at paras 5, 41-50, 54-59, 64-68). [NAME] supports the use of franchise economics—specifically, (a) the average franchise fee payable to the plaintiff upon execution of a franchise agreement; and (b) an estimate of the range of annual royalties per location in the franchise network payable to the plaintiff—as an evidentiary proxy to assist the Court in calculating damages where an infringer operates a business under a [NAME]’s trademarks without authorization and the record establishes both the [NAME]’s usual franchise fee and royalty structure and the period and scope of the infringing operation. That approach—using an initial franchise fee together with ongoing royalty and marketing fees to calculate damages—was later followed by Justice Gascon in [NAME] . (c) The One-Time Fees, Royalties, and Annual Fees [ 63 ] I accept the initial franchise fee of USD $62,500 and the claimed royalty and brand development fees for two years as the evidentiary proxy for assessing damages in this case. [NAME] and [NAME] support the use of an initial franchise fee, together with ongoing royalty, marketing, and brand-related fees, as an evidentiary proxy to assist the Court in calculating damages for unauthorized use of a [NAME]’s trademark. [ 64 ] The Applicant’s U.S. counsel’s letter dated September 29, 2023 offered the Respondent the possibility of seeking a licence. The Respondent did not obtain a license and instead continued to infringe the Applicant’s registered trademarks. Whether or not the Respondent knew the applicable licensing terms, it was wilfully blind to them. [ 65 ] The record shows that the Applicant’s franchise agreement requires royalty fees of 6% of gross revenues and brand development fees of 2% of gross revenues. Those ongoing fees are tied to the continuing use of the MARTINIZING trademarks and the continuing benefit of the Applicant’s brand system and advertising. They are a reasonable proxy for the value of the Respondent’s unauthorized use. [ 66 ] The Applicant estimates the Respondent’s annual gross revenue by using average per-store revenue from the Applicant’s four Canadian locations for 2022 and 2023. While that estimate is imperfect, since the Respondent’s Nova Scotia business may have generated more or less revenue than the Applicant’s average Canadian franchise location, in the absence of Respondent records, the Applicant’s average Canadian store revenue is a reasonable proxy. It is grounded in evidence and relates to the same general type of business. [ 67 ] Using that proxy, the Applicant estimates annual royalties and brand development fees at USD $30,500. Over the two-year compensable period, that amount totals USD $61,000. [ 68 ] The Applicant also claims two annual fees of USD $2,500 each. The annual fees are tied to ongoing participation in the franchise system. They are a reasonable additional proxy for the value of the Respondent’s continued unauthorized use during the two-year compensable period. [ 69 ] I decline to award the conversion or rebranding package fee of USD $8,000 or the grand opening marketing fee of USD $8,900. Those fees appear to correspond to services or benefits provided to an authorized new or converting franchisee. The Respondent did not receive those services from the Applicant, and the record does not show that the Applicant incurred related costs because of the Respondent’s conduct. Awarding those amounts would move the damages award beyond compensation for unauthorized trademark use. [ 70 ] The recoverable damages are therefore USD $128,500, consisting of: a) the initial franchise fee of USD $62,500; b) USD $61,000 in royalty and brand development fees; and c) USD $5,000 in annual fees. [ 71 ] Applying the Applicant’s implied exchange rate, USD $128,500 equals CAD $185,473.86. I award damages in that amount. (5) Punitive and Exemplary Damages [ 72 ] I decline to award punitive or exemplary damages. [ 73 ] Punitive and exemplary damages are awarded against a defendant in exceptional cases for malicious, oppressive and high-handed misconduct that offends the Court’s sense of decency ( [COMPANY]. v [NAME] ([NAME]), 2024 FC 2089 at para 44, citing [NAME] v [NAME]. , 2002 SCC 18 [ [NAME] ] at para 36; [COMPANY] v [COMPANY]. , 2014 FC 559 at para 68). Punitive and exemplary damages are not compensatory in nature, but are rather a punishment or a deterrent ( [NAME] at para 36; [COMPANY] v [COMPANY]., 1998 CanLII 7797 (FC) at para 5). [ 74 ] The Respondent’s conduct was deliberate and persistent and continued after notice. The Respondent used an identical trademark for identical services. The Respondent failed to participate in this proceeding. [ 75 ] However, the Respondent will be subject to declarations, a permanent injunction, removal and destruction obligations, damages, interest, and costs. The Applicant has not established that those requested remedies are insufficient to denounce and deter the Respondent’s conduct. (6) Interest [ 76 ] The Applicant seeks post-judgment and pre-judgment interest. Interest is appropriate. [ 77 ] Post-judgment interest is awarded at 5% per annum from the date of this Judgment until payment, in accordance with section 37(1) of the Federal Courts Act , RSC 1985, c F-7 [ Federal Courts Act ]. The Respondent is a [NAME] and operates dry-cleaning locations in Nova Scotia. Nova Scotia’s Interest on Judgments Act , RSNS 1989, c 233, Part -1, provides that every judgment debt bears interest at 5% per annum . [ 78 ] Pre-judgment interest will run on the damages award at 5% per annum , simple, from May 10, 2024, the date the application was commenced, to the date of this Judgment. H. Costs [ 79 ] The Applicant seeks costs at 50% of actual amounts incurred. An award of costs that compensates the Applicant for 50% of its actual expense may be justified in a clear case of deliberate trademark misuse and non-participation ( [COMPANY] v [NAME] , 2021 FC 57 at para 34). [ 80 ] The Respondent’s conduct supports an award above the ordinary scale. It used the Applicant’s registered trademarks for identical services, continued after notice, and did not participate in this proceeding. [ 81 ] The Applicant submitted a draft bill of costs. While the disbursements totalling CAD $2,684.66 are reasonable, the fees for preparation with regards to the hearing are somewhat excessive.

I therefore find CAD $95,000 as being reasonable fees, which at 50% results in CAD $42,500. Together with the CAD $2,684.66 disbursements, the resulting costs award totals CAD $45,184.66.

V. Conclusion [ 82 ] The application is granted in part. [ 83 ] [ADDRESS] declares that the Respondent, [COMPANY]., has infringed the Applicant’s registered MARTINIZING Trademarks contrary to sections 19 and 20(1)(a) of the Trademarks Act , has directed public attention to its services and business in a manner likely to cause confusion contrary to section 7(b) of the Trademarks Act , and has used the Applicant’s registered trademarks in a manner likely to depreciate the value of the goodwill attaching to them contrary to section 22(1) of the Trademarks Act . [ 84 ] The Respondent, its officers, directors, employees, agents, successors, assigns, and all persons or entities over whom it exercises control, are permanently enjoined from using MARTINIZING, or any trademark, trade name, business name, social media account name, domain name, or other designation confusing with MARTINIZING, in association with dry-cleaning, laundry, alteration, fabric cleaning, fabric processing, or related services. [ 85 ] Within 30 days of this Judgment, the Respondent shall remove MARTINIZING and any confusing designation from all signage, advertising, receipts, websites, social media accounts, business listings, and promotional materials within its possession, power, or control. Within the same 30-day period, the Respondent shall destroy or deliver up to the Applicant or the Applicant’s counsel, all physical materials within its possession, power, or control that bear MARTINIZING or any confusing designation. [ 86 ] The Respondent shall pay the Applicant damages of CAD $185,473.86, together with pre-judgment interest on the damages amount at 5% per annum , simple, from May 10, 2024 to the date of this Judgment, and post-judgment interest at 5% per annum from the date of this Judgment until payment. [ 87 ] The claim for punitive and exemplary damages is dismissed. [ 88 ] The Applicant is awarded costs in the amount of CAD $45,184.60.

JUDGMENT in T-1160-24 THIS COURT’S

JUDGMENT is that : [ADDRESS] declares that the Respondent, [COMPANY]., has infringed the Applicant’s registered MARTINIZING Trademarks contrary to sections 19 and 20(1)(a) of the Trademarks Act , has directed public attention to its services and business in a manner likely to cause confusion contrary to section 7(b) of the Trademarks Act , and has used the Applicant’s registered trademarks in a manner likely to depreciate the value of the goodwill attaching to them contrary to section 22(1) of the Trademarks Act . The Respondent, its officers, directors, employees, agents, successors, assigns, and all persons or entities over whom it exercises control, are permanently enjoined from using MARTINIZING, or any trademark, trade name, business name, social media account name, domain name, or other designation confusing with MARTINIZING, in association with dry-cleaning, laundry, alteration, fabric cleaning, fabric processing, or related services. Within 30 days of this Judgment, the Respondent shall remove MARTINIZING and any confusing designation from all signage, advertising, receipts, websites, social media accounts, business listings, and promotional materials within its possession, power, or control. Within the same 30-day period, the Respondent shall destroy or deliver up to the Applicant or the Applicant’s counsel, all physical materials within its possession, power, or control that bear MARTINIZING or any confusing designation. The Respondent shall pay the Applicant damages of CAD $185,473.86, together with pre-judgment interest on the damages amount at 5% per annum , simple, from May 10, 2024 to the date of this Judgment, and post-judgment interest at 5% per annum from the date of this Judgment until payment. The claim for punitive and exemplary damages is dismissed. The Applicant is awarded costs in the amount of CAD $45,184.60. "Michael D. Manson" Judge FEDERAL COURT SOLICITORS OF RECORD DOCKET: T-1160-24 STYLE OF CAUSE: [NAME] v [COMPANY]. PLACE OF HEARING: Toronto, Ontario DATE OF HEARING: May 26, 2026

REASONS AND

JUDGMENT: MANSON J. DATED: June 12, 2026 APPEARANCES : [NAME] For The Applicant SOLICITORS OF RECORD : [COMPANY] and Solicitors Toronto, Ontario For The Applicant