Federal Court Shortens Response Time for Access to Information Requests

OUTCOME: Allowed in Part

Date: 20260331 Docket: T-1297-25 Citation: 2026 FC 413 [ENGLISH TRANSLATION REVISED BY AUTHOR] Montréal, Quebec, March 31, 2026 PRESENT: Mr. Justice Gascon BETWEEN: [COMPANY_1]. Applicant and CANADIAN FOOD INSPECTION AGENCY Respondent

JUDGMENT AND

REASONS I. Nature of the matter [ 1 ] The applicant, [COMPANY_1]. [[NAME_2]], has applied for a review under subsection 41(1) of the Access to Information Act , RSC 1985, c A-1 [Access Act] in respect of an access request it made on November 21, 2023 — over 28 months ago — to the respondent, the Canadian Food Inspection Agency [[NAME_3]]. Although the unit responsible for processing access to information requests at the [NAME_3] [Unit] had initially given itself until November 10, 2032, to respond to [NAME_4], the Information Commissioner [Commissioner] ordered the government institution to respond to it by January 18, 2028, that is, within a little over four years. [ 2 ] [NAME_2] remains dissatisfied with this time frame and submits that neither the time limit set by the [NAME_3] nor that ordered by the Commissioner complies with the provisions of the Access Act. [NAME_2] is requesting immediate access to the pages the [NAME_3] has already reviewed as of the date of this judgment. Furthermore, as [NAME_2] considers that no extension of time is justified in this case, it is asking the Court to order the [NAME_3] to act on its entire access request within 30 days from the date of the judgment to be issued. For its part, the [NAME_3] is of the opinion that the Court should order the same extension of time as the Commissioner, namely, until January 18, 2028. [ 3 ] For the following reasons, [NAME_2]’s application for review will be allowed in part. Timely and prompt access to government records is the cornerstone of a democratic, healthy and open society. In this matter, the explanations provided and the steps taken by the [NAME_3] are neither sufficient nor satisfactory to justify the 50-month time frame it is asking the Court to approve for providing a response to [NAME_4]. After reviewing the evidence, the Court finds that an additional six-month time limit is reasonable and sufficient in the circumstances. Therefore, the [NAME_3] will be required to disclose to [NAME_2] all the pages covered by its access request by September 30, 2026.

II. Factual background [ 4 ] [NAME_2] is an environmental services company. It specializes in treating and composting organic materials collected through municipal waste segregation. With these organic materials, it produces compost and soil for various uses. [ 5 ] The [NAME_3] is in charge of applying various laws relating to the inspection of food, animals and plants. In particular, it oversees the development and application of safety and quality standards in the agri-food industry, as well as inspection systems. It is an agent of the federal government, and the Minister of Agriculture and Agri-Food is responsible for its overall direction ( Canadian Food Inspection Agency Act , SC 1997, c 6, sections 3–4). [ 6 ] Batches of [NAME_2] soil were sampled in May 2021. In July 2021, the [NAME_3] administratively seized two of these batches under the Fertilizers Act , RSC 1985, c F-10, on the ground that they did not comply with an administrative memorandum. The [NAME_3] identified these two seizures as notices of detention 339879 and 339881. In September 2023, new batches of [NAME_2] soil were sampled, and in November 2023, one of these batches was also seized by the [NAME_3] for the same reasons. It was tagged as notice of detention EL-7L2C4X3. [ 7 ] In April 2022 and December 2023, [NAME_2] filed two applications for judicial review in respect of these three seizures, in Court files T-758-22 and T-2595-23 respectively [together, the Disputes]. [ADDRESS] dismissed the first of these applications for judicial review ( [COMPANY_5] v Canada (Food Inspection Agency) , 2023 FC 1676, aff’d [COMPANY_1] v Canada (Food Inspection Agency) , 2025 FCA 150, leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada [SCC] filed, No 42060), whereas the second application is currently stayed pending the outcome of the first case. [ 8 ] In parallel with these legal proceedings, [NAME_2] made a three-part access to information request to the [NAME_3] on November 21, 2023, bearing number A-2023-00159 [Access Request]. As the [NAME_3] has sent [NAME_2] the information it had under parts one and three, only the second part of the Access Request remains in dispute. After certain changes were made to its wording on November 24 and December 15, 2023, this second part now reads as follows [Part Two]: [ translation ] All internal communications exchanged to date [December 18, 2023] relating to the notices of detention bearing detention tag numbers EL-7L2C4X3, 339879 and 339881, as well as the internal communications on the alleged non-compliances therein. [ 9 ] Because detention tags 339879 and 339881 are dated July 13, 2021, and detention tag EL-7L2C4X3 is dated November 1, 2023, the communications [NAME_2] requested essentially span over periods of a little less than two and a half years for the first two seizures (339879 and 339881) and a month and a half for the third (EL-7L2C4X3). [ 10 ] In December 2023, the [NAME_3] notified [NAME_2] that Part Two of the Access Request covered approximately 18,000 pages and that a minimum of three years would be needed to process this number of pages. This estimate was generated in two business days by the relevant [NAME_3] branches (there are three of them). In January 2024, [NAME_2] and the [NAME_3] met to seek solutions for reducing the number of pages captured by Part Two. When the [NAME_3] was questioned on the significant number of pages — 18,000 — then estimated as necessary to respond to Part Two, the [NAME_3] reportedly told [NAME_2] that this was due to a significant number of duplications, and that the total number of pages would be considerably lower once the records had been processed by a system that can delete these duplications. On January 12, 2024, the [NAME_3] initiated the records retrieval process ( “eTransfer” ) with the branches involved — namely, “Policy and Programs,” “Science,” and “Operations” — and explained that this retrieval would take about four weeks. In February 2024, [NAME_2] accepted to circumscribe Part Two to certain versions of the records to reduce the number of records. [ 11 ] In March 2024, the [NAME_3] advised [NAME_2] that 32,100 pages had been imported to date from two of its branches. On April 19, 2024, the [NAME_3] notified [NAME_2] that 51,781 pages had actually been imported and that it still had to obtain records from a third branch. That same day, the [NAME_3] sent [NAME_2] a letter under paragraph 9(1)(a) of the Access Act in which it indicated that it would not be possible for it to meet the statutory time limits — 30 days — without undue disruption to its operations. As a result, it stated that it was extending the time limit for processing the Access Request by 3,105 days, which is approximately eight and a half years, thereby giving itself until November 10, 2032, to respond to it [[NAME_3]]. That extension was based on the number of pages identified as of that date (51,781) and a processing rate of 500 pages per month. [ 12 ] [NAME_2] would later learn that the length of the [NAME_3] was based on an error and that the [NAME_3] wanted to instead adopt a processing rate of 750 pages per month and to therefore have December 19, 2029, be the time limit. [ 13 ] On April 23, 2024, the [NAME_3] informed [NAME_2] that the records had not all been imported yet, such that the final number of pages was still unknown. However, it seems as though 34 pages had been identified as corresponding to parts one and three of the Access Request, which meant that the rest of the pages — 51,747 — fell under Part Two. Also, the Unit officer, [NAME_6], explained that there had been a malfunction with the “Discovery Assistant Software” , their internal importation system supposed to remove duplicates, and that the [NAME_3] had to delete these duplicates manually as a result. That said, the officer noted that she had been able to eliminate 8,500 pages of duplicates in about seven business days. [ADDRESS] underscores that this translates to a processing rate of approximately 26,700 pages per month, assuming there are 22 business days per month. [ 14 ] In May 2024, [NAME_2] filed a complaint with the Commissioner under paragraph 30(1)(c) of the Access Act because it considered that the [NAME_3] was unreasonable and unjustified [Complaint]. In the Complaint, it submitted that the number of pages captured by Part Two, namely 51,747, seemed highly unrealistic. It recalled that the [NAME_3] itself had initially estimated that there would be 18,000 pages — which estimate the government institution had considered high in light of duplications — and that the revised number of pages would mean that the [NAME_3] had exchanged over 85 pages of internal communications regarding the two administrative files every day for two and a half years. [NAME_2] asked the Commissioner to order the [NAME_3] (i) to send the requested records as soon as possible; alternatively, (ii) to provide monthly progress updates on the processing of the Access Request; and (iii) to provide [NAME_2] with interim releases of records, at regular intervals. [ 15 ] On December 31, 2024, more than one year after receiving the Access Request, the [NAME_3] sent [NAME_2] the information it had under the first and third parts of the Access Request. The evidence is contradictory, but it appears that 17 pages were disclosed under part one and that 10 pages were disclosed under part three. This means that it took the [NAME_3] 13 months to identify and provide fewer than 30 pages in response to the Access Request. Also, most of the reports included in those pages were generated in November and December 2023, one year before they were disclosed to [NAME_2]. [ 16 ] In February 2025, the Commissioner issued her report regarding the Complaint in file number 5824-00884 [Report]. In the Report, she concluded that although the [NAME_3] had shown that the Access Request pertains to a large number of records and that processing it within the 30-day statutory time limit would unreasonably interfere with the operations of the government institution, the [NAME_3] was unreasonable in the circumstances. The Report reveals that on the basis of the [NAME_3]’s initial assessment, 67,827 pages were responsive to the Access Request; that the number of pages to review had tumbled to about 45,480 once the duplicates had been deleted; and that as of December 19, 2024, the [NAME_3] had [ translation ] “examined” 14,000 of these pages. The Report also notes that the [NAME_3] had indicated that it would be necessary to consult the Department of Justice as regards about 30,000 pages given the Disputes, and that this consultation could take 30 months. [ 17 ] The [NAME_3] proposed a new time limit of December 19, 2029, to the Commissioner. The Commissioner rejected it and ordered the [NAME_3] to provide a complete response to the Access Request by January 18, 2028 [Commissioner Extension], based on a processing rate of approximately 1,000 pages per month and a 180-day time frame for consultations with the Department of Justice. Moreover, the Commissioner encouraged the [NAME_3] to consider making interim disclosures to [NAME_2] while processing the Access Request. The [NAME_3] confirmed to the Commissioner that it would abide by the orders in the Report, stating that [ translation ] “the consultation with the Department of Justice will be launched as soon as possible and the institution will prioritize the processing of this request” . [ 18 ] In March 2025, [NAME_2] contacted the [NAME_3] (i) to obtain access to the 14,000 pages already examined and identified as of December 19, 2024, as well as any other pages ready for release; (ii) to agree on a schedule for the interim disclosures of the 31,000 pages left to analyze; and (iii) to obtain more information on the persons involved and topics discussed in order to circumscribe Part Two. Furthermore, to avoid the consultation with the Department of Justice on approximately 30,000 pages on account of the Disputes, [NAME_2] notified the [NAME_3] that it did not wish to receive the exchanges involving the [NAME_9] [NAME_10] of Canada [[NAME_11]]; in doing so, it hoped to remove those pages from the 45,480-page total. [ 19 ] Discussions between [NAME_2] and the [NAME_3] followed. Specifically, in an April 7, 2025 email, the [NAME_3] told [NAME_2] (i) that it intended to observe the Commissioner Extension; (ii) that most, if not all, of the file would have to be subject to a consultation with the Department of Justice; (iii) that the [NAME_3] was not yet [ translation ] “ready” to make interim disclosures; (iv) that if the Access Request was amended, narrowed or clarified in any way, the [NAME_3] would have to restart the process because it had already received the responsive records from its branches; (v) that the software used to process the access to information requests cannot sort files by name or by topic, unlike electronic document production software like “eDiscovery” ; and (vi) that an analyst must therefore manually review all the records page by page to assess their relevance. The [NAME_3] concluded by reiterating that it remained [ translation ] “determined” to release the records by January 18, 2028, in accordance with the Commissioner’s Report. [ 20 ] [ADDRESS] notes that in the [NAME_3], the government institution stated that it was granting itself a 3,105-day extension of time and a new deadline of November 10, 2032, to respond to the Access Request. In reality, this corresponds to an extension of time of 3,247 days, that is, the number of days between November 10, 2032, and the date of the Access Request — November 21, 2023 — minus the 30-day statutory time limit in the Access Act. This discrepancy was also raised in the Report of the Commissioner, who indicated that a 3,105-day extension of time to respond really amounts to a June 21, 2032 deadline.

III. Issues [ 21 ] For the following reasons, the Court is of the opinion that the issues [NAME_2] has put forward are not suited to its application for review, because this is not a matter of assessing the validity of the [NAME_3] or the Commissioner Extension; rather, it is a matter of carrying out a de novo analysis. [ 22 ] Therefore, the Court will reword the issues the parties have proposed as follows: (1) Has the [NAME_3] demonstrated that an extension of time under paragraph 9(1)(a) and/or paragraph 9(1)(b) of the Access Act is justified to respond to Part Two of the Access Request?; (2) If so, what extension of time is appropriate? [ 23 ] [NAME_2] considers that the first issue should be answered in the negative, which means that the second issue is moot. It is asking the Court to order that the [NAME_3] respond to Part Two of the Access Request within 30 days of the date of this judgment. In reply, the [NAME_3] states that it has shown that an extension of time is needed to answer Part Two of the Access Request, and seeks for the Court to provide for the same extension as that ordered by the Commissioner, that is, until January 18, 2028.

IV. Standard of review [ 24 ] Under subsection 41(1) of the Access Act, an access [NAME_12] may apply to the Court for a review of the matter that is the subject of a complaint to the Commissioner. The conditions for making such an application for review are as follows: (i) the complaint must be described in any of paragraphs 30(1)(a) to (e) of the Access Act; (ii) the complaint must have been the subject of a report by the Commissioner; and (iii) the application must be made within 30 business days after the day on which the head of the government institution received the report. It is accepted that [NAME_2] is raising, under paragraph 30(1)(c) of the Access Act, an allegedly unreasonable extension of the time limit for the provision of access to requested records and that it meets all the applicable conditions; therefore, this application for review is admissible. [ 25 ] The relevant provisions of the Access Act read as follows: Review by Federal Court — complainant Révision par la Cour fédérale : plaignant 41 (1) A person who makes a complaint described in any of paragraphs 30(1)(a) to (e) and who receives a report under subsection 37(2) in respect of the complaint may, within 30 business days after the day on which the head of the government institution receives the report, apply to the Court for a review of the matter that is the subject of the complaint. 41 (1) Le plaignant dont la plainte est visée à l’un des alinéas 30(1)a) à e) et qui reçoit le compte rendu en application du paragraphe 37(2) peut, dans les trente jours ouvrables suivant la réception par le responsable de l’[NAME_13] du compte rendu, exercer devant la Cour un recours en révision des questions qui font l’objet de sa plainte. … … De novo review Révision de novo 44.1 For greater certainty, an application under section 41 or 44 is to be heard and determined as a new proceeding. 44.1 Il est entendu que les recours prévus aux articles 41 et 44 sont entendus et jugés comme une nouvelle affaire. [ 26 ] The enactment of section 44.1 of the Access Act in 2019 put an end to some debate in the case law as to the Court’s role when carrying out a review under section 41 of the Access Act (see, in particular, Canada (Office of the Information Commissioner) v Canada (Prime Minister) , 2019 FCA 95 at para 29). It is now clear that this role must be distinguished from that of the Court when determining an application for judicial review under section 18.1 of the Federal Courts Act , RSC 1985, c F-7. [ 27 ] Section 44.1 provides for an exception to the presumption established in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v [NAME_14] , 2019 SCC 65 [ [NAME_14] ] that the reasonableness standard applies, because the standard of review is instead set out through statute ( [NAME_14] at paras 34–35). In carrying out a de novo review, the Court must hear and determine the matter “as a new proceeding” — that is, it must step into the shoes of the first-level decision-maker and rule on the merits on its own ( Export Development Canada v Canada (Information Commissioner) , 2025 FCA 50 at para 31; [NAME_15] v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) , 2024 FCA 11 at para 61 [ [NAME_15] ], leave to appeal to the SCC ref’d, No 41139 (August 29, 2024); [NAME_16] v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) , 2023 FCA 167 at para 34 [ [NAME_16] ]; Canada (Health) v Preventous Collaborative Health , 2022 FCA 153 at paras 12–13 [ Preventous ]; Canada (Health) v [COMPANY_17] , 2021 FCA 191 at para 23 [ [NAME_18] ]). [ 28 ] As part of this application, the Court is therefore not reviewing the government institution’s or the Commissioner’s decision to determine whether it was reasonable ( [NAME_16] at para 34; Preventous at para 13; [NAME_18] at para 23). Nor is the Court limited to the submissions that were before the government institution or the Commissioner ( Preventous at para 14). Rather, the Court must analyze the evidentiary record of the parties in this case, which record must be built afresh ( Preventous at para 14). This record is likely to contain new evidence given the evolution of the file ( [COMPANY_19] v Canada (Health) , 2012 SCC 3 at para 250 [ [NAME_20] ]). After receiving the parties’ submissions, the Court is to make its own findings of fact on the basis of the fresh evidentiary record filed before it, apply the provisions of the Access Act and the existing jurisprudence to that evidentiary record, and ultimately decide the time frame for disclosing the information ( Preventous at para 14, by analogy). In other words, and as the parties acknowledge, the Court itself must determine the appropriate duration for the extension of time, if any, on the basis of all the evidence before it. [ADDRESS] owes no deference to the government institution or to the Commissioner ( [NAME_15] at para 61). [ 29 ] [ADDRESS] is aware that despite the clear wording of section 44.1, the reasonableness standard has been applied in certain decisions involving the exercise of a government institution’s discretion. Thus, decisions of government institutions regarding exceptions to non-disclosure under subsection 19(2) of the Access Act have been considered discretionary ( [NAME_21] v Canada (Indigenous Services) , 2025 FC 1843 at paras 38–39; [NAME_22] v Canada (Global Affairs) , 2024 FC 88 at para 14; [COMPANY_23] v Canada (Public Safety) , 2022 FC 1459 at paras 38–42), as have decisions of government institutions regarding exceptions to non-disclosure under sections 21 to 23.1 of the Access Act ( [NAME_24] v [NAME_26] , 2024 FC 1616 at paras 28–33 [ Geophysical ]; [NAME_29] v Canada (Foreign Affairs) , 2023 FC 1051 at paras 41, 71 [ [NAME_29] ]). [ 30 ] That said, the Court is satisfied that in this case, and as submitted by the parties, there are no purely discretionary issues. As a result, a de novo review must be conducted.

V. Analysis A. Preliminary issue: admissibility of the written reply filed by [NAME_2] [ 31 ] Prior to the hearing, [NAME_2] brought a motion under Rule 55 of the Federal Courts Rules , SOR/98-106 [Rules] for leave to file a memorandum in reply. [ADDRESS] dismisses [NAME_2]’s motion primarily for the reasons argued by the [NAME_3], as the motion does not meet the applicable threshold and is also tardy. [ 32 ] The Rules do not provide for the possibility of filing a memorandum in reply. Therefore, Rule 55 is indeed the mechanism through which [NAME_2] could be authorized to submit such a written reply, if it establishes that “special circumstances” exist. This test has a high threshold ( [NAME_30] v St. John’s International Airport Authority , 2021 FC 259 at paras 5–6 [ [NAME_30] ]). [ 33 ] [ADDRESS] agrees with the factors relied on by the [NAME_3] to justify this high threshold in these circumstances. First, the application for review under section 41 of the Access Act is to be heard and determined in a summary way (section 45 of the Access Act), like ordinary applications for judicial review (section 18.4 of the Federal Courts Act ). These applications are specifically designed to proceed with celerity, and procedural incidents such as the bringing of motions are generally to be avoided so that the record can be perfected expeditiously for trial ( [NAME_31] v Canada (Transport) , 2024 FC 1330 (CanLII) at paras 10–11; Canada (Information Commissioner) v Canada (Minister of Environment) , [1999] FCJ No 1760, 179 FTR 25 at paras 17, 65–68, rev’d in part on appeal, but not on this point, in Canada (Information Commissioner) v Canada (Minister of Environment) , [2000] FCJ No 480, 96 ACWS (3d) 341 at paras 16–18, leave to appeal to the SCC ref’d, No 27956 (November 23, 2000)). [ 34 ] Second, Rule 70(4) provides that unless otherwise ordered by the Court, a memorandum of fact and law filed by a party shall not exceed 30 pages in length. Leave to exceed the usual 30-page limit is discretionary and exceptional and should be granted sparingly. “Special circumstances” must be present, along with specific demonstrations of need ( Forest Ethics Advocacy Association v Canada ([NAME_9] [NAME_10]) , 2014 FCA 182 at para 24; Canada v [COMPANY_32] , 2010 FCA 92 at para 5(a)). In this case, [NAME_2] is seeking to file a relatively succinct 9-page reply, but these pages, when added to its memorandum of fact and law already produced in August 2025, would still bring the total number of pages of written submissions to 34. [ 35 ] When read together, Rule 55 and Rule 70(4) therefore place on [NAME_2] a double burden to show that there are special circumstances. [ 36 ] [ADDRESS] is not persuaded that this threshold has been met in this case. [NAME_2] submits that it should be granted leave to file a reply because under section 48 of the Access Act, the burden to justify the [NAME_3] rests on the [NAME_3] and not on [NAME_2]. Therefore, it argues that it is incongruous that [NAME_2] must be the first to file its memorandum, even though it is the applicant in this proceeding. But that is not a special circumstance. In an application for review under subsection 41(1) or 41(2) of the Access Act, the burden of proof will always rest on the government institution to justify refusals, redactions, or extensions of time limits for disclosure. Despite this, Parliament has not provided for a specific mechanism in the Access Act, the Federal Courts Act or the Rules to justify departing from the [NAME_10] rule that a written reply cannot be submitted in such cases. [ 37 ] Moreover, [NAME_2]’s motion is dated January 26, 2026, which means that it was brought to the Court four months after the [NAME_3]’s record was filed and barely more than two weeks prior to the hearing scheduled in this case. The motion is therefore very tardy, and [NAME_2] has not brought forth any elements to justify this late filing. Although this factor is not determinative as regards to the test or threshold applicable under Rule 55, it certainly does not favour the exercise of the Court’s discretion to grant leave to file the written reply. [ 38 ] More importantly, at the hearing of an application for review, a party has the opportunity to reply orally to the opposing party’s arguments. Indeed, that is what the Court expects ( [NAME_30] at para 6). In practice, this opportunity renders motions for leave to file a written reply relatively useless. Oral replies already serve the function intended for written replies, that is, to address any unanticipated arguments raised by the opposing party. In the Court’s view, an applicant should focus its efforts on adapting its oral submissions and preparing a robust oral reply in light of the respondent’s memorandum of fact and law rather than invest them in preparing and bringing a motion to file a written reply. [ 39 ] That said, although its motion to file a reply memorandum is dismissed, [NAME_2] had the opportunity, during its oral submissions at the hearing, to take up and present all the arguments it wanted to include in its written reply. Thus, there was no breach of procedural fairness or of [NAME_2]’s right to be heard. [ 40 ] Lastly, the Court does not consider that, as claimed by the [NAME_3], the government institution would have suffered harm had [NAME_2]’s motion been allowed. Quite the contrary — through [NAME_2]’s motion and the pre-drafted reply attached to it, the [NAME_3] was made aware of [NAME_2]’s additional arguments before the hearing and was able to prepare for them accordingly. It should be recalled that the [NAME_3] would have ordinarily learned about the content of this reply only at the hearing, and not prior to it as in the present matter. [NAME_2]’s pre-drafted reply was far from harmful to the [NAME_3] — rather, it provided it with a head start. B. New information obtained at the hearing [ 41 ] On February 9, 2026 — namely, a few days before the hearing — the Court issued the following direction [Direction]: [ translation ] Considering that the most recent information provided by the Canadian Food Inspection Agency [[NAME_3]] in the Court file refers to the state of affairs as at June 2025, the Court issues the following Direction: At the February 12, 2026 hearing, the [NAME_3] will have to provide the Court with a progress update as of February 10, 2026, on the processing of part two of [COMPANY_1].’s access to information request, particularly as regards to the capacity of the resources that the [NAME_3] has assigned to this access request, the number of pages left to process, and the status of consultations between the [NAME_3] and the Department of Justice. [ 42 ] At the hearing, the [NAME_3] therefore provided [NAME_2] and the Court with a copy of a February 11, 2026 email from [NAME_34] manager and signatory of a prior affidavit that was already in the Court file — on the progress in processing Part Two of the Access Request [[NAME_36]]. However, [NAME_37], the Unit consultant assigned to [NAME_4], among other things, was on vacation, so it was not possible to reach him to obtain more information. [ 43 ] Although the [NAME_3] gave the Court this progress update in response to the Direction, the government institution opines that the Court should consider only the information that was known on the date the evidence was closed — that is, on July 10, 2025, the date of [NAME_39]’s cross-examination — and not the information known on the date of the hearing. As for [NAME_2], it is of the view that given the Direction, the Court should take this new evidence into account because the Court is carrying out a de novo review and this evidence paints a more up-to-date picture of the file’s progress. It should be noted that [NAME_2] does not oppose the admission of this new evidence even though it cannot cross-examine [NAME_39] on the content of her email and even though the statements in the email were not sworn. [ 44 ] For the following reasons, the Court will consider the [NAME_36] within the context of this judgment. Part 5 of the Rules governs, among other things, applications for review made under subsection 41(1) of the Access Act, in accordance with Rule 300(b) ( Preventous at para 17). Rule 313 allows the Court to ask that other material be filed where the Court considers that the application records of the parties are incomplete or to enable the Court to meaningfully and adequately adjudicate the dispute ( Southern Railway of British Columbia Limited v [NAME_40] Authority , 2024 FCA 175 at para 33; Preventous at paras 18–19; [NAME_41] v Canada (National Revenue) , 2022 FCA 63 at para 61). Although this power must be exercised carefully, it can occasionally be necessary to ensure that the evidentiary record before the Court is complete and that the Court can therefore properly discharge the role conferred on it. As the SCC highlighted in [NAME_20] , which dealt with access to information, “[b]y the time the matter reaches that court, the content of the file will often have evolved” ( [NAME_20] at para 250). [ 45 ] That is the case here. Insofar as (i) the Court is carrying out a de novo review; (ii) the Court itself must determine the reasonable time frame in which the [NAME_3] should respond to [NAME_4]; and (iii) on the date of the hearing, the information in the records filed by [NAME_2] and the [NAME_3] dated from seven months earlier, the Court considered that it had to obtain the most recent information available in order to properly perform the review incumbent on it under the Access Act. In exercising this prerogative and with this statutory responsibility in mind, the Court issued the Direction asking the [NAME_3] to provide it with an update on the file at the hearing. It must also be added that the Court has complete jurisdiction over the management of its proceedings. [ 46 ] Admittedly, the [NAME_36] provided by the [NAME_3] is not appended to an affidavit sworn by [NAME_39], in breach of the requirements of Rule 80(3) and Rule 307. Also, certain communication problems between the Court Registry and counsel for the [NAME_3] led to counsel receiving the Direction only the day before the hearing. Although the Court can appreciate that administrative issues occurred, it seems obvious to the Court that, even without the Direction and considering that the review under the Access Act is de novo , this was information that the [NAME_3] should have been prepared to give the Court at the hearing. In addition, excluding this new evidence adduced by the [NAME_3] at the hearing on the ground that the [NAME_36] was not attached to an affidavit would amount to allowing the [NAME_3] to invoke its own turpitude, which would be contrary to the interests of justice. C. Statutory framework and relevant provisions [ 47 ] Let us now turn to the statutory framework governing the extension of the statutory time limit for responding to an access request. [ 48 ] The SCC has asserted that access to information promotes government transparency, contributes to an informed public, and supports an involved, open and democratic society. Access to information is intended to improve the workings of government by making it more effective, responsive and accountable to both the legislative branch and the public ( Ontario ([NAME_9] [NAME_10]) v Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner) , 2024 SCC 4 at para 2; [NAME_20] at paras 1, 22; Canada (Information Commissioner) v Canada (Minister of National Defence) , 2011 SCC 25 at para 15 [ National Defence 2011 ]; Ontario (Public Safety and Security) v Criminal Lawyers’ Association , 2010 SCC 23 at para 1; [NAME_42] v Canada (Minister of Finance) , 1997 CanLII 358 (SCC), [1997] 2 SCR 403 at paras 61, 63 (Justice La Forest dissenting, but not on this point); see also [NAME_43] v [NAME_27] and [NAME_28] , 2018 FCA 10 at para 20 [ [NAME_43] ]; [NAME_44] v [NAME_45] , 2010 FCA 315 at para 1 [ [NAME_44] ]). Parliament has stated that it enacted the Access Act specifically to “enhance the accountability and transparency of federal institutions in order to promote an open and democratic society and to enable public debate on the conduct of those institutions” (subsection 2(1) of the Access Act). [ 49 ] It is with this in mind that the Access Act (i) extends the present laws of Canada to provide a right of access to information in records under the control of a government institution; (ii) enshrines the principle that government information should be available to the public; (iii) provides for certain limited and specific exceptions to the right of access; (iv) establishes that decisions on the disclosure of government information should be reviewed independently of government, in particular before this Court; (v) sets out requirements for the proactive publication of information; and (vi) complements and does not replace existing procedures for access to government information (subsections 2(2) and 2(3) of the Access Act). [ADDRESS] must give the provisions of the Access Act a broad and purposive interpretation while keeping in mind the objectives expressly laid out by Parliament ( [NAME_20] at para 22). [ 50 ] The head of a government institution that is the subject of an access request shall make every reasonable effort to respond to the request accurately and completely and provide the [NAME_12] with timely access to the record (subsection 4(2.1) of the Access Act). Specifically, when they receive an access to information request, the head of the government institution in question shall, within 30 days after the request is received , give written notice to the person who made the request as to whether or not access to the record or a part thereof will be given and, if access is to be given, give the person who made the request access to the record or part thereof (section 7 of the Access Act). Generally, the head is bound by the time limits in the Access Act, as one of the responsibilities of the head is to provide access requesters with timely and prompt access to the record ( [NAME_20] at para 87 in fine ; [NAME_44] at para 1). [ 51 ] However, this time limit may be extended by the head of the relevant government institution “for a reasonable period of time, having regard to the circumstances” , in particular if “the request is for a large number of records or necessitates a search through a large number of records and meeting the original [statutory] time limit would unreasonably interfere with the operations of the government institution” (paragraph 9(1)(a) of the Access Act) or where “consultations are necessary to comply with the request that cannot reasonably be completed within the original [statutory] time limit” (paragraph 9(1)(b) of the Access Act). A notice of the extension is then sent to the person who made the access request, noting the new time limit determined by the government institution and the person’s right to make a complaint to the Commissioner (subsection 9(1) of the Access Act). Where the head of a government institution extends a time limit for more than 30 days, the government institution shall give notice of the extension to the Commissioner at the same time as notice is given under subsection (1) (subsection 9(2) of the Access Act). [ 52 ] It is helpful to reproduce here the whole text of section 9 of the Access Act: Extension of time limits Prorogation de délai 9 (1) The head of a government institution may extend the time limit set out in section 7 or subsection 8(1) in respect of a request under this Part for a reasonable period of time, having regard to the circumstances, if 9 (1) Le responsable d’une [NAME_13] peut proroger le délai mentionné à l’article 7 ou au paragraphe 8(1) d’une période que justifient les circonstances dans les cas où : (a) the request is for a large number of records or necessitates a search through a large number of records and meeting the original time limit would unreasonably interfere with the operations of the government institution, a) l’observation du délai entraverait de façon sérieuse le fonctionnement de l’institution en raison soit du grand nombre de documents demandés, soit de l’ampleur des recherches à effectuer pour donner suite à la demande; (b) consultations are necessary to comply with the request that cannot reasonably be completed within the original time limit, or b) les consultations nécessaires pour donner suite à la demande rendraient pratiquement impossible l’observation du délai; (c) notice of the request is given pursuant to subsection 27(1) c) avis de la demande a été donné en vertu du paragraphe 27(1). by giving notice of the extension and, in the circumstances set out in paragraph (a) or (b), the length of the extension, to the person who made the request within thirty days after the request is received, which notice shall contain a statement that the person has a right to make a complaint to the Information Commissioner about the extension. Dans l’un ou l’autre des cas prévus aux alinéas a), b) et c), le responsable de l’[NAME_13] envoie à la [NAME_46] qui a fait la demande, dans les trente jours suivant sa réception, un avis de prorogation de délai, en lui faisant part de son droit de déposer une plainte à ce propos auprès du Commissaire à l’information; dans les cas prévus aux alinéas a) et b), il lui fait aussi part du nouveau délai. Notice of extension to Information Commissioner Avis au Commissaire à l’information (2) Where the head of a government institution extends a time limit under subsection (1) for more than thirty days, the head of the institution shall give notice of the extension to the Information Commissioner at the same time as notice is given under subsection (1). (2) Dans les cas où la prorogation de délai visée au paragraphe (1) dépasse trente jours, le responsable de l’[NAME_13] en avise en même temps le Commissaire à l’information et la [NAME_46] qui a fait la demande. [ 53 ] Although Canada (Office of the Information Commissioner) v Canada (National Defence) , 2015 FCA 56 [ National Defence 2015 ] was rendered prior to the enactment of section 44.1 of the Access Act, the Court is of the opinion that the principles laid out therein by the Federal Court of Appeal [FCA] generally continue to be applicable to applications for review made under section 41 of the Access Act on grounds of time limits. [ 54 ] Therefore, given the underlying objectives of access to information, a government institution cannot act as though it is accountable to no one when it unilaterally decides to grant itself an extension ( National Defence 2015 at para 81). It cannot simply assert the existence of a statutory justification for an extension and claim an extension of its choice ( National Defence 2015 at para 76). On the contrary, it must make an effort to demonstrate the link between the justification advanced and the length of the extension taken. [ 55 ] When paragraph 9(1)(a) of the Access Act is invoked, as is the case here, this will mean demonstrating not only that a large number of documents are involved, but also that the work required to provide access within any materially lesser period of time than the one asserted would result in unreasonable or undue interference with the operations of the institution ( National Defence 2015 at paras 76, 78). In the case of paragraph 9(1)(b) of the Access Act, it must be shown that it is not reasonable, or practically possible, to expect that the necessary consultations can be completed without an extension ( National Defence 2015 at paras 76, 78). [ 56 ] In an application for review made under subsection 41(1) or 41(2) of the Access Act, the burden of establishing that the head of a government institution is authorized to make the decision on the extension of the time limit for disclosure is on the government institution concerned (subsection 48(1) of the Access Act). Whether the extension is based on paragraph 9(1)(a) or paragraph 9(1)(b) of the Access Act, a government institution confronted with a request involving a great number of documents and/or necessitating broad consultation must, in both cases, make a serious effort to assess the required duration and ensure that the estimated calculation be “sufficiently rigorous, logic and supportable to pass muster under reasonableness review” ( National Defence 2015 at para 79). [ 57 ] The [NAME_3] submits that the “rigorous, logic and supportable” calculation requirement from National Defence 2015 no longer applies because that passage of the judgment is about reviewing an extension on the basis of the reasonableness standard as established in the teachings of [NAME_47] v [NAME_48] , 2008 SCC 9, which was applicable when National Defence 2015 was rendered by the FCA in 2015. The [NAME_3] relies on the words “to pass muster under reasonableness review” — “ pour tenir la route lors d’un examen de son caractère raisonnable ” in the French version — used by the FCA ( National Defence 2015 at para 79 in fine ). The [NAME_3] argues that the notion of “reasonableness” no longer applies since the enactment in 2019 of section 44.1 of the Access Act, which instead provides for a de novo review. [ 58 ] With respect, the Court is not convinced by the [NAME_3]’s arguments. It is the very wording of subsection 9(1) of the Access Act that provides that the time limit may be extended “for a reasonable period of time, having regard to the circumstances” — “ d’une période que justifient les circonstances ” in the French version. Thus, according to the Court, a careful reading of National Defence 2015 necessarily leads to the conclusion that the “sufficiently rigorous, logic and supportable” calculation requirement set out by the FCA relates to the text of subsection 9(1) of the Access Act, which has not changed, and not to the applicable standard of review (see National Defence 2015 at paras 72, 77). In other words, regardless of the standard of review, the requirement that the extension’s duration be reasonable is inherent to the very wording of this provision of the Access Act. And it is in that context that the FCA established in National Defence 2015 that the government institution must show that sufficiently rigorous, logical and supportable calculations were made to demonstrate that the extension sought is reasonable, having regard to the circumstances. [ 59 ] Furthermore, the Court observes that in the past, it has required the government institution to state cogent, genuine reasons for the extension and its duration in order for such extension to comply with subsection 9(1) of the Access Act” ( Canada (Information Commissioner) v Canada (Minister of External Affairs) (TD) , 1990 CanLII 12960 (FC), [1990] 3 FC 514 at 526, para 22(g) [ External Affairs ]). Also, and although it is not bound by these precedents, the Court adds that the Commissioner still uses the test the FCA elaborated in National Defence 2015 , namely, the requirement that a “sufficiently rigorous, logic and supportable” estimated calculation be made to assess the reasonableness of an extension of time ( Library and Archives Canada (Re) , 2025 OIC 18 at para 6; Library and Archives Canada (Re) , 2023 OIC 24 at para 15 [ LAC 24 ]; see also Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (Re) , 2022 OIC 42 at para 28). Similarly, the Commissioner also requires in certain cases that the government institution demonstrate that it applied “sufficient rigour and logic as part of a serious effort to determine the duration of the extension of time” ( Public Health Agency of Canada (Re) , 2024 OIC 48 at para 12; Public Health Agency of Canada (Re) , 2024 OIC 7 at para 10; LAC 24 at para 18). [ 60 ] These elements therefore support the view that the extensions of time government institutions give themselves should be centred on the factual circumstances of each access request, reflect a real and serious attempt to measure the length of the extension required, and not stem from an arbitrary calculation or be based simply on averages ( National Defence 2015 at para 80). The requirement that a “sufficiently rigorous, logic and supportable” calculation be carried out thus remains the applicable test. As [NAME_2] rightly submits, an access [NAME_12] must be able to understand why they are facing an extension of the statutory time limit and a delay in their access rights. D. Extension of the time limit to respond to Part Two [ 61 ] First, the Court must determine whether an extension of the 30-day statutory time limit that is provided for under section 7 of the Access Act is justified in light of the evidence before it. To justify such an extension in this case, the [NAME_3] relies on the large number of records [NAME_2] requested and the fact that these records are likely to contain information captured by several exemptions from disclosure under the Access Act. The [NAME_3] adds that the need for external consultations also explains why an extension of time is necessary. The [NAME_3] indicates that meeting the 30-day time limit in such a context would unreasonably interfere with its operations. [ 62 ] Each of these elements will be analyzed in turn. (1) The number of records requested and the necessary search through a large number of records [ 63 ] In December 2023, the [NAME_3] estimated that Part Two of [NAME_4] covered 18,000 pages. In April 2024, this figure rose to 51,747 pages. Then, in February 2025, the [NAME_3] instead referred to 67,827 pages in its exchanges with the Commissioner. The evidence in the record shows that this final number of pages reflects what the [NAME_3] branches sent the Unit in response to the Access Request. [ 64 ] In the present matter, the [NAME_3] produced an affidavit signed by [NAME_39] on June 13, 2025, to support its contentions regarding the significant amount of work involved in responding to the Access Request and to provide more details on the pages concerned. In that affidavit, [NAME_39] noted that of the 67,827 pages imported from the branches, about 26,000 had been marked as duplicates, about 27,000 had been identified as irrelevant, and about 4,000 (7% of the 57,000 pages reviewed as of that date) had been determined to respond to Part Two. As of June 13, 2025, there remained approximately 10,000 pages to review to eliminate duplicates and assess relevance. [ADDRESS] observes that the data breakdown [NAME_39] provided in her affidavit adds up to 67,000 pages, not the specific number of 67,827 imported pages. [ 65 ] Less than one month later, during her cross-examination on July 10, 2025, [NAME_39] stated that there were only between 4,000 and 5,000 pages left to review for duplicates and relevance, and that the 4,000 pages responding to Part Two had increased to a range of 7,500 to 8,000 pages, out of the roughly 62,500 pages analyzed as of that date (67,000 minus 4,500 pages). Therefore, as of July 10, 2025, the number of relevant pages that were indeed captured by the Access Request had shrunk from 67,827 to a maximum of 8,000, with 4,000 to 5,000 pages left to examine. The pages identified as corresponding to Part Two therefore represented a maximum of 12.7% of the pages reviewed as of that date. If we apply this percentage to the total of 67,827 pages imported from the branches, the number of pages actually covered by the Access Request was a little more than 8,600 pages at most. On the basis of this data, which was pulled from [NAME_39]’s cross-examination, it is also possible to conclude that in the weeks between June 13 and July 10, 2025, the [NAME_3] processed an additional 5,000 to 6,000 pages to remove duplications and irrelevant pages. [ 66 ] At the hearing, the Court reviewed the [NAME_36], which indicates that the initial review of the records was finally complete in late November 2025. [NAME_39] specified that by the end of this first step, more than 26,000 pages had been identified as duplicates, approximately 30,000 pages were considered irrelevant to Part Two, and about 10,000 pages had been marked as responding to the Access Request. [ADDRESS] again notes that these figures, which were gleaned from information the [NAME_3] provided at the hearing, total 66,000 pages and do not add up to the specific 67,827-page total calculated by the [NAME_3] in February 2025. [ 67 ] Thus, it appears from the evidence submitted by the [NAME_3] that, of the 67,827 pages initially imported, a maximum of 8,600 to 10,000 pages turned out to be relevant to the Access Request at the end of the first step of processing and would have to undergo a more in-depth review. [ 68 ] [ADDRESS] pauses to make the following observation. From the evidence, the Court gathers that “Phase I” , or the first step of processing an access request, refers to identifying the records and determining their relevance to the request in question. This first processing step consists of deleting duplicate pages and pages that are clearly irrelevant to the request. “Phase II” , or the second processing step, involves a more detailed analysis of the relevant pages identified during the first step, and particularly the application of the access restrictions set out in the Access Act, which can result in the exclusion of certain pages from potential disclosure. [ 69 ] In their submissions, [NAME_39] and counsel for the [NAME_3] discussed the various phases or steps in the processing of access requests, but at no time did the [NAME_3], or even the Commissioner, provide specific information or data making it possible to measure how the number of pages [ translation ] “processed” or [ translation ] “examined” can vary from one processing step to the other. In fact, the [NAME_3]’s evidence reveals that the pages [ translation ] “examined” or [ translation ] “processed” often referred, without distinction, to one of these two steps of processing the Access Request. Yet it is undeniable — and [NAME_39] acknowledged — that there is a significant difference between the processing timelines for the first step, which is much simpler and quicker, and those for the second step, which is much more tedious and time-consuming. [ 70 ] [ADDRESS] adds that processing an access request also includes a third step: any necessary consultations. According to the [NAME_3], this final step takes place once the first two steps are complete, that is, once the relevant pages that are not excluded through one of the exemptions in the Access Act have been identified. [ADDRESS] will return to this later. [ 71 ] In the [NAME_36], which was adduced at the hearing, [NAME_39] also informed the Court that between late November 2025 and February 10, 2026, the [NAME_3] had indeed initiated Phase II of processing the Access Request and had analyzed, one by one, [ translation ] “at least” 450 of the 10,000 pages considered relevant. Of these roughly 450 pages, 283 turned out to be duplicates, 9 were not relevant, 111 were identified for partial disclosure, and 60 were identified as being exempt from disclosure under the Access Act. Again, the Court notes that the total number of pages in the breakdown provided by [NAME_39] is not 450 pages, but 463 pages. [ 72 ] On the basis of this initial analysis in Phase II, the Court notes that only 171 pages (111 plus 60) — namely, just about 37% of the 463 pages reviewed — were marked as relevant and subject to possible disclosure. Moreover, 61% of the pages examined during the second step turned out to be duplicates, and 2% were not relevant (even though these pages should have been eliminated during the first step of the review). In actuality, and if we extrapolate from the results of this first sample, it would therefore seem that of the 10,000 pages determined to be [ translation ] “relevant” at the end of Phase I, 6,100 will really be duplicates and 200 will not respond to the Access Request. Thus, at the end of Phase II, only 3,700 pages will turn out to actually be relevant and to possibly be subject to disclosure in response to the Access Request. [ 73 ] Once again, the Court takes a moment to note that the [NAME_36], which was filed at the hearing, is the first document to describe the second processing step and to provide more detailed information on the page processing rate during the first step and the second step. [ 74 ] According to the evidence provided by the [NAME_3] on the date of the hearing, the breakdown of the number of pages at issue in Part Two of the Access Request can be summarized as follows. Of the roughly 68,000 pages that the [NAME_3] had initially considered to be captured by the Access Request: ¾ about 30,200 pages, that is, 30,000 plus 200, will turn out to be irrelevant; ¾ about 32,100 pages, that is, 26,000 plus 6,100, will be duplicates; and ¾ about 3,700 pages will be relevant and could be disclosed, depending on the results of the analysis regarding the exemptions from disclosure under the Access Act. [ 75 ] [ADDRESS] is keenly aware that this analysis is far from perfect and remains an estimate in several respects. However, in the absence of more detailed assessments and information from the [NAME_3], the Court has no choice but to make such calculations and estimates itself. [ 76 ] In any event, in view of this data, the Court is satisfied that the number of records covered by [NAME_4] is significant and justifies an extension of the statutory time limit. The numbers are as follows: 67,827 pages initially imported, 8,600 to 10,000 pages at the end of the first review step, and about 3,700 pages at the end of the second step of the analysis, which is ongoing. At the end of the day, the number of pages might not be [ translation ] “exceptionally large” , as the [NAME_3] contends, but it is still significant. Although there is no range in the Access Act, the Court accepts that an access request where 10,000 pages are covered at the end of the first processing step and where 3,700 pages are actually subject to the request at the end of the second step is, objectively speaking, a large number of records within the meaning of paragraph 9(1)(a) of the Access Act. [ 77 ] [ADDRESS] adds the following regarding the number of pages gathered in response to the Access Request. [ 78 ] The [NAME_3] criticized [NAME_2] for complaining about the [NAME_3] importing too many pages, while not providing any practical solutions for what could have been done to avoid it. With respect, the Court is of the opinion that this criticism is unfounded. [NAME_2] is not familiar with and does not control the internal policies and processes of the [NAME_3] responsible for access to information requests, nor those of the branches in relation to such requests. [ 79 ] In addition, the figures that the [NAME_3] used to justify the [NAME_3] (51,747 pages) and that the Commissioner used to order the Commissioner Extension (31,000 pages) seem unduly inflated. This appears to be for two reasons. [ 80 ] First, the duplicates would have normally been automatically deleted by the “Discovery Assistant Software” upon their import from the branches. In the case of the [NAME_2] file, however, this system malfunctioned by identifying as duplicates records that were actually highly similar but not identical. As a result, the government institution had to stop using this system, and an analyst had to manually eliminate the duplications during the review process. Although the [NAME_3] had every reason to abandon this method out of caution to ensure that relevant records were not improperly omitted, this led to the identification of more pages from the outset. It should be recalled that about 47% of the total volume of imported pages turned out to be, or will turn out to be, duplicates (32,100 out of 68,000). This technical malfunction of the [NAME_3]’s system can of course not be attributed to [NAME_2]. [ 81 ] Second, it appears that many irrelevant pages were sent by the branches and imported by the Unit. One may wonder about the way the branches responded to the Unit’s importation request given that approximately 44% of the pages imported and processed by the Unit by the end of Phase I turned out to be, or will eventually turn out to be, irrelevant (30,200 out of 68,000). The Commissioner herself made a similar observation in her Report when she mentioned that [ translation ] “the President of the [NAME_3] should remind his public servants that the sound management of information on key actions is essential to efficiently respond to access requests” . [ 82 ] [ADDRESS] does not accept [NAME_2]’s argument that the branches transferred external communications to the Unit when Part Two of the Access Request concerned only the internal communications related to the seizures that are the subjects of the Disputes. [ADDRESS] notes that the notion of [ translation ] “internal communication” was not specifically defined in the wording of Part Two. It was only in March 2025 — approximately 16 months after the Access Request was made — that [NAME_2] specified that it did not want the communications with the [NAME_11]. The [NAME_3] could reasonably believe that Part Two also covered its [ translation ] “internal” communications with its government partners. In light of the principles underpinning access to information, it is preferable that government institutions adopt a broad and liberal interpretation of access requests so as to not improperly deprive access requesters from relevant records and information. Therefore, [NAME_2]’s tardy clarification was of little use to the phase in which the Unit imported the records from the branches. [ 83 ] Lastly, [NAME_2] is surprised that so many records correspond to Part Two of the Access Request because in its opinion, the records requested necessarily cover a maximum period of two and a half years, as the first seizures occurred on July 13, 2021. Given that the Access Request is rather targeted and concerns only three very specific notices of detention — and not, for example, all the [NAME_3]’s seizures or policies — it is true that the number of imported pages may seem abnormally high. However, the Court considers that the [NAME_3]’s explanations — namely, that when many people receive email updates regarding a dispute, the number of pages falling within the scope of an access request concerning that file increases considerably — are tenable. These people could include the [NAME_3] employees and managers involved in the seizures, as well as the [NAME_3]’s in-house counsel and counsel for the Department of Justice involved on account of the Disputes. [NAME_2]’s position is also speculative because it is not excluded that certain exchanges captured by the Access Request could have taken place prior to the seizures themselves, notably in preparation for them, during the laboratory analyses, and during the decision-making process leading to said seizures. (2) A search through a large number of records [ 84 ] The [NAME_3] also submits that meeting the 30-day statutory time limit would unreasonably interfere with its operations because the Access Request concerns a relatively large number of records. [ 85 ] [ADDRESS] is satisfied that that is the case here. [ 86 ] In her June 13, 2025 affidavit, [NAME_39] explained that in total, the Unit has 16 full-time employees, two students and four consultants. The Unit’s “Operations” branch has 10 employees, two students and four consultants. The responsibilities of a consultant are similar to those of an analyst, save for informal requests and internal and external consultations. One of these consultants is [NAME_49], the main analyst tasked with [NAME_4]. For the 2023–2024 year, the Unit’s budget allowed it to hire the equivalent of 11 person-years. This figure rose to about 13.5 person-years in 2024–2025. [ 87 ] In 2023–2024, the Unit processed 210,380 pages, that is, about 17,531 pages per month, and analyzed 223 access requests. In 2024–2025, the Unit processed 105,602 pages and received 272 access requests. In its submissions, the [NAME_3] indicated that the decline in 2024–2025 did not reflect all the work the Unit had truly done on access requests and that it was more accurate to state that the Unit processes approximately 200,000 pages per year on average. At the hearing, counsel for the [NAME_3] explained that this data is not entirely reliable for the purposes of this case because pages are considered [ translation ] “processed” when they are released to the access [NAME_12] and not when they have been processed by an analyst. Therefore, according to counsel, the data for 2023–2024 and 2024–2025 does not contain the pages the Unit [ translation ] “processed” in [NAME_2]’s file. [ 88 ] In any event, it appears that the number of pages initially covered by the Access Request (68,000) represents about one-third of the number of pages the Unit usually processes every year. It was the largest access request the Unit had to process during the relevant period, in terms of retrieved and imported pages. In fact, [NAME_39] specified that since the Access Request was received, 20% of the pages the Unit has processed have been connected to [NAME_2]’s request. [ 89 ] Therefore, there is no doubt that in light of the usual volume of access requests the Unit processes, the amount of work needed to respond to [NAME_4] is considerable and helps justify the need for a time limit extension. (3) The complexity of the analysis [ 90 ] The [NAME_3] also alleges that the records captured by the Access Request contain information covered by several exemptions from disclosure under the Access Act and that this complexity also favours an extension of the statutory time limit. [NAME_2] replies that the only complexity in this file stems from the large number of records that might be exempted on account of solicitor-client privilege and/or litigation privilege under section 23 of the Access Act, given the pending Disputes between the parties. [ 91 ] [ADDRESS] agrees with [NAME_2] on this point. [ 92 ] During the second step of the analysis of the relevant records, the complexity of an access request flows from the possible application of the various exemptions under sections 13 to 24 of the Access Act. In the present matter, there are no allegations or evidence that [NAME_4] requires restrictions other than those that proceed from solicitor-client privilege or litigation privilege to be analyzed (section 23). More specifically, the Access Request does not in any way involve exemptions that could be linked to responsibilities of government (sections 13 to 18), personal information (section 19), third party information (section 20), other operations of government (sections 21–22.1, 23.1) or statutory prohibitions (section 24). [ 93 ] The one and only complexity of [NAME_4] is tied to the restrictions set out in section 23 of the Access Act and consultations with the Department of Justice that are supposedly necessary because of the Disputes. Although the [NAME_3] and its counsel claimed that the complexity of this file was also attributable to other factors, counsel could refer only to vague assertions in this regard. In addition, the Court did not find any probative element in the evidence pointing to complexity arising from any other exemption factor laid out in the Access Act. [ADDRESS] adds that the number of records and the necessary consultations are dealt with as separate elements and therefore do not make an access request more complex in itself. [ 94 ] There is also no evidence that the Access Request is connected to or depends on other access requests the [NAME_3] received. Thus, if it was intended to cover anything other than the Disputes to which the Access Request relates, [NAME_39]’s statement on-cross examination — that this file contains a good deal of information that is “intertwined” with information from other files — is purely speculative and has no basis in the evidence. Furthermore, this was an impression that [NAME_39]’s subordinates had formed but that she herself had not had. [ 95 ] That said, the Court accepts that having to analyze 3,700 pages during the second processing step to determine whether there are any exemptions from disclosure stemming from solicitor-client privilege and/or litigation privilege adds a certain amount of complexity to the analytical work. This complexity is sufficient to help justify an extension of the statutory time limit. (4) Necessary consultations [ 96 ] Lastly, the [NAME_3] argues that an extension of time is necessary because of the consultations it must carry out with the Department of Justice regarding the records the Access Request concerns. The government institution submits that although the Unit analysts are trained on the application of privileges, it also has the right to have this work cross-checked by lawyers at the Department of Justice, particularly in a context where the [NAME_3] and [NAME_2] are opposing parties in the ongoing Disputes. [ 97 ] Although the [NAME_3] was based on paragraph 9(1)(a) of the Access Act and the Commissioner issued her Report solely under that provision, [NAME_2] asserts that the Court should ask itself whether the Commissioner Extension complies both with paragraph 9(1)(a) and paragraph 9(1)(b) of the Access Act. In response, the [NAME_3] initially contended that the two paragraphs are mutually exclusive and that the consultations with the Department of Justice should be considered within the context of the paragraph 9(1)(a) analysis. At the hearing, however, the government institution acknowledged that the two paragraphs are not mutually exclusive ( National Defence 2015 at para 72) and that the Court therefore must conduct a separate analysis of the extension of time in light of the two paragraphs. [ 98 ] Given the context surrounding [NAME_4], namely, the Disputes, a cautious approach should be adopted. [ADDRESS] is of the opinion that the [NAME_3] is entirely justified to want to hold consultations with the Department of Justice, and the need for these consultations also justifies an extension of time. In fact, the necessary consultations with the Department of Justice alone make it impossible to meet the 30-day statutory time limit. [ 99 ] Admittedly, it seems that in the end, the consultations with the Department of Justice will target only 3,700 pages at most, which will certainly have an impact on the reasonable duration of the extension of time in the circumstances. However, that information was known only on the date of the hearing, and not on the date of the Access Request, the [NAME_3] or the Commissioner Extension. It would clearly not have been possible to carry out a consultation with the Department of Justice relating to 51,747 pages — the number of pages the [NAME_3] believed to be involved in April 2024, at the time of its extension — within the 30-day statutory time limit. Indeed, the Commissioner granted 180 days to consult the Department of Justice as regards about 30,000 pages. Lastly, it was only in March 2025 that [NAME_2] advised the [NAME_3] that it did not wish to obtain the exchanges with the [NAME_11]. (5) Conclusion on the extension of time [ 100 ] For the reasons outlined above, it is undeniable that an extension of the 30-day statutory time limit was justified in this case. [ADDRESS] is satisfied that meeting this time limit would have unreasonably interfered with the operations of the [NAME_3] on account of (i) the large number of records to process in order to respond to the Access Request; (ii) the large amount of work needed to comply with the request; (iii) the complexity attributable to the records containing information protected by solicitor-client privilege or litigation privilege; and (iv) the need to hold consultations with the Department of Justice. E. Extension period justified by the circumstances [ 101 ] Although the [NAME_3] was justified in extending the 30-day statutory time limit to respond to [NAME_4], that does not mean that the time limit it gave itself or the time limit the Commissioner established were justified. [ADDRESS] must now determine what extension period is justified by the circumstances, keeping in mind that the duration of the extension of time must be “reasonable when regard is had to the circumstances set out in paragraphs 9(1) (a) and/or 9(1) (b) ” ( National Defence 2015 at para 72). [ 102 ] [ADDRESS] recalls that when the extension of time a government institution granted itself to respond to an access to information request is reviewed, the government institution must demonstrate that there is a rational link between the justification advanced and the length of the extension ( National Defence 2015 at para 76). Such situations are infrequent, but when they occur, a government institution cannot hide behind generalities or hollow assertions. Rather, the government institution must make serious efforts to assess the required duration in the circumstances, focusing on the particularities of the access request in question and relying on specific and tailored evidence to arrive at a calculation that is sufficiently rigorous, logical and supportable. [ 103 ] Unfortunately, that is not what happened here. In this case, it was particularly difficult for the Court to determine the reasonable time frame in which the [NAME_3] should process [NAME_4] by reason of the incomplete and rather fragmented information the [NAME_3] provided to calculate the duration of the extension of time. [ADDRESS] does not doubt the [NAME_3] and the Unit’s good faith, but much more than what was submitted was required to justify the length of the extension sought. [ 104 ] For the following reasons, the Court is of the view that the [NAME_3] and the Commissioner Extension are neither justified nor reasonable in the circumstances. Following its analysis of the evidence, the Court instead finds that the number of pages indeed relevant to the Access Request, the amount of work left to be done, and the need for consultations with the Department of Justice do not justify such a lengthy extension of time. It considers that a much more modest extension — an additional six months — would be sufficient to finish processing the Access Request. [ 105 ] Of course, the Court cannot decide what the [NAME_3] should have done retroactively between the filing of the Access Request and the date of this judgment. It can consider only the most recent situation — the situation on the date of the hearing — to determine the time frame in which the [NAME_3] should finish processing Part Two of [NAME_4]. This was also the approach adopted by the Commissioner who, in an October 2024 email, stated that she was [ translation ] “focusing on the work the [NAME_3] has left to do to process the request” [emphasis added]. [ 106 ] However, the context certainly remains relevant. Without claiming that that is the case here, a government institution cannot drag its feet, particularly during the Commissioner’s investigation and the review proceeding, to persuade the Court to grant it a lengthier time limit. (1) Number of pages [ 107 ] When the [NAME_3] was made in March 2024, the government institution had gathered 51,747 pages from its three branches regarding Part Two of the Access Request. When the Commissioner Extension was made, the [NAME_3] had indicated to the Commissioner that the number of pages to process, [ translation ] “after the duplicates had been deleted” , was 45,480; this figure fell to 31,000 as of December 19, 2024. However, it must be noted that given the evidence before the Court, the picture as regards the number of pages to process now looks quite different. [ 108 ] Of the roughly 68,000 pages that were ultimately identified by the branches and sent to the Unit, only 10,000 pages turned out to be truly relevant to the Access Request by the end of the first processing step. About 58,000 pages were therefore excluded, either because they were duplications or because they were not considered relevant to the Access Request. [ 109 ] On February 12, 2026, which was the date of the hearing, the second step of processing the Access Request had begun. As of that date, 463 of the 10,000 pages that had gone through Phase I had been reviewed as part of Phase II, and of this figure, only 111 pages had been identified for partial disclosure and 60 other pages had been marked as exempt from disclosure. The start of Phase II also revealed that 63% of the pages analyzed were still duplicates or irrelevant pages that should have been removed during Phase I. On the basis of this first part of the analysis, it seems that, of the 10,000 pages considered relevant at the end of the first processing step, only about 3,700 pages will likely be subject to potential disclosure in response to the Access Request by the end of the second processing step. [ 110 ] On the date of the hearing, there were therefore about 9,537 pages left to analyze during the second step of processing the Access Request. According to the evidence in the record, about two and a half months — from late November 2025 to mid-February 2026 — had been needed to analyze these 463 pages during the second step; this represents a processing rate of approximately 231 pages per month, if we exclude two workweeks to take the end-of-year holiday period into account. Considering that one and a half months have gone by since the date of the hearing, the Court is of the view that the [NAME_3] will have been able to process about 346 more pages (at a rate of 231 pages per month) as of the date of this judgment, so there should now be about 9,200 pages left to review as part of Phase II. (2) Processing rate [ 111 ] [ADDRESS] is deeply skeptical about the evidence on the processing rate for the 68,000 pages initially sent to the Unit. [ 112 ] Although the Access Request was made in November 2023, the [NAME_3] notified [NAME_2] in April 2024 — six months later — that all the pages had not yet been imported. Yet the [NAME_3] told the Commissioner in the document it sent her that the pages began to be reviewed on March 4, 2024, which the Commissioner noted in her Report. It is this date that the Court will consider in its analysis as marking the moment the government institution started processing the pages identified and retrieved by the branches in response to the Access Request. [ 113 ] The [NAME_3] was based on a processing rate of 500 pages per month. After discussion, the [NAME_3] acknowledged that this rate should have instead been 750 pages per month. As for the Commissioner, she relied on a rate of 1,000 pages per month to order the Commissioner Extension in the Report. The [NAME_3] eventually stated that it agreed with this rate of 1,000 pages per month. However, the Court notes that, as [NAME_2] underscored, other than vague references to the [NAME_3]’s own experience with the typical processing of access requests, no explanations or calculations have been provided in the evidence to support this estimate of 1,000 pages per month. [ 114 ] Furthermore, the rate of 1,000 pages per month that was accepted by the [NAME_3] and ordered by the Commissioner is an overall average for the complete processing of an access request; that average does not distinguish between the first step, which is much quicker and focuses on identifying duplicates and irrelevant records, and the second step, which is much more time-consuming and centres on analyzing restrictions. In short, the [NAME_3] simply applied a [NAME_10] average to the processing of the Access Request even though it is clear that the work is completed at very different paces during these two phases of processing an access request and that the relative extent of the phases will vary from one access request to another. It goes without saying that the more the imported pages contain duplicates and irrelevant pages that are eliminated during the first processing step, the more an access request’s processing rate will increase and depart from the average of 1,000 pages per month. This is a factor that the [NAME_3] completely disregarded in the case of [NAME_4]. [ 115 ] In the same vein, the [NAME_3] did not provide any clear and convincing evidence, either for [NAME_4] or for all the access requests it processes, regarding the average amount of time it takes to process records during Phase I in comparison to the average amount of time it takes during Phase II. [ 116 ] To borrow the wording used by the FCA in National Defence 2015 , the rate of 1,000 pages per month retained by the [NAME_3] “has on the face of it a deficient logic and falls short of demonstrating that a genuine attempt was made to assess the required duration” for processing [NAME_4] ( National Defence 2015 at para 80). This is sufficient to find that neither the [NAME_3] nor the Commissioner Extension is justified or reasonable in the circumstances. [ 117 ] In addition, even the evidence available on the page processing rate during Phase I makes it difficult for the Court to arrive at any probative conclusions regarding this step of the Access Request’s processing. [ 118 ] Thus, despite the issue with the duplication deletion system, the evidence shows that as of April 2024, [NAME_50] was able to process 8,500 duplicates in 7 business days, which amounts to a rate of more than 26,700 pages per month, assuming there are 22 business days per month. In the Report, the Commissioner noted that 36,347 pages were processed between March 4, 2024, and December 19, 2024, and that there were 31,000 pages left to process; this means that over a period of nine and a half months, the [NAME_3] reviewed 3,826 pages per month during the first step. [ 119 ] In her affidavit and on cross-examination, [NAME_39] provided different data that paint a rather confusing picture of the rate at which the Unit processed the Access Request during Phase I. In her affidavit, [NAME_39] indicated that the Unit processed 20,000 pages between the receipt of the Report in late February 2025 and the date of her affidavit, which translates to about 5,714 pages per month over three and a half months. Then, [NAME_39] asserted on cross-examination that 5,000 to 6,000 pages were processed in two weeks at the end of June 2025, which represents a rate of 11,000 to 13,200 pages per month. On the date of her cross-examination, it was also understood that a total of approximately 62,500 pages had been processed during the first step, which amounts to a rate of about 3,906 pages per month for the 16 months of processing between March 2024 and July 2025. However, in the [NAME_36], which was adduced at the hearing, [NAME_39] mentioned that Phase I had ended on November 25, 2025, which implies that roughly four and a half months were needed to finish reviewing the 4,000 to 5,000 pages left to process at the time of her cross-examination. This would mean that the processing rate suddenly plummeted to 1,000 pages per month... Then, on the basis of the entire period from early March 2024 to late November 2025 — that is, close to 21 months — in which the [NAME_3] stated it completed Phase I, it seems that the [NAME_3] carried out the initial review of all 68,000 pages at an average processing rate of approximately 3,240 pages per month. [ 120 ] Therefore, the evidence on the processing rate during Phase I of the Access Request shows significant variations of 1,000 to 26,700 pages per month. This is enough to leave the Court at a total loss! Given the substantial dichotomy between these work paces and the inconsistency between all these pieces of evidence, it is difficult for the Court to determine the actual rate at which [NAME_2]’s file was processed during Phase I. What is certain is that the processing rate far exceeded the 1,000 pages per month ordered by the Commissioner. But this is a far cry from calculations that could be characterized as “sufficiently rigorous, logic and supportable” to make it possible to identify a reasonable duration for an extension ( National Defence 2015 at para 79). [ 121 ] Incidentally, the processing rate during Phase I, regardless of what it was, would have probably been quite a bit higher if, as previously discussed, the “Discovery Assistant Software” had worked properly in order to identify duplications. [ 122 ] As for the processing rate during Phase II, which involves analyzing each page one by one to determine whether an exemption from disclosure applies, the only evidence available is the [NAME_36], which was produced at the hearing. This email makes it possible to deduce that since the beginning of Phase II in late November 2025, the Unit processed 463 pages during a two-and-a-half-month period that included the end-of-year holiday period; this represents a processing rate of about 231 pages per month. [ 123 ] But this processing rate of 231 pages per month is surprising and, in the Court’s opinion, hard to justify as the evidence from the [NAME_36] reveals that nearly two-thirds — more precisely, 63% — of the 463 pages reviewed during the second step of processing the Access Request were still duplicates and irrelevant pages that should have been identified during the first step. Considering that [NAME_49] spent 6.75 hours per week reviewing the Access Request during this step (50% of his 13.5 hours per week), or approximately 30 hours per month, this means that he was processing just under eight pages per hour, five of which were duplicates or irrelevant to the Access Request. [ 124 ] Therefore, it is particularly difficult for the Court to rely solely on such data to determine what would be a reasonable and justified duration for the remaining extension of time in the present matter. (3) Allocation of available resources [ 125 ] Moreover, the Court notes that given the evidence in the record, it is difficult to determine exactly what resources the [NAME_3] allocated to the Access Request and how much time was really spent on this file. [ 126 ] From November 2023 to May 2024, [NAME_50] was the analyst in charge of the file, until she was promoted to a management position in which less time could be devoted to processing access requests. [NAME_4] was then assigned to [NAME_49], but only in October 2024. [NAME_39] acknowledges that it would have been preferable to reassign the Access Request following [NAME_50]’s promotion, but that the Unit did not have the necessary resources to do so before October 2024. On cross-examination, [NAME_39] also stated that between May and June 2025, staff had worked on the [NAME_2] file and that [ translation ] “some reviewing” was done between June and October 2025, but she was unable to indicate how many hours were spent on it. [ 127 ] According to [NAME_39], only one analyst at a time was assigned to [NAME_4], as is the case for all access requests, because assigning more than one analyst to a file is generally inefficient and risks duplicating the work. [NAME_49] has been the consultant in charge of the Access Request since October 2024. According to the [NAME_36], he works an average of 13.5 hours per week and dedicates 50% of his time to [NAME_4]. In short, [NAME_49] spent about 6.75 hours per week on [NAME_4] during the most recent period. [ 128 ] This data ties in to what counsel for the [NAME_3] mentioned in his written submissions. He highlighted that the evidence demonstrates that the Unit allocates about 3 hours per week to a typical access request file and that since [NAME_49] was spending between 6.25 and 9.38 hours per week on [NAME_4] (that is, 50% to 75% of his 12.5 weekly hours), the number of resources working on [NAME_2]’s file was double or triple the number of resources assigned to other access requests. [ 129 ] However, the hours allocated to the [NAME_2] file must be put into perspective. [ADDRESS] recalls that in her affidavit, [NAME_39] explained that the Unit’s budget for 2023–2024 allowed it to hire 11 person-years. That figure increased to about 13.5 person-years in 2024–2025. This means that the Unit spent 412.5 hours per week in 2023–2024 and 506.25 hours per week in 2024–2025 reviewing access requests, based on each employee working 37.5 hours per week. [ 130 ] Moreover, as counsel for the [NAME_3] reiterated many times in both his written and oral submissions, the Unit receives about 250 access requests every year and [NAME_4] is by far the most voluminous request the government institution has to process. Counsel for the [NAME_3] stressed that [NAME_4], which contains nearly 68,000 identified and transmitted pages, accounts for one-third of the pages the Unit usually processes in a year. Also, [NAME_39] stated that since the Access Request was received, about 20% of the pages the [NAME_3] has processed under the Access Act have been part of [NAME_2]’s request. [ 131 ] Yet, despite the relative importance of [NAME_4], the Unit dedicated and is still dedicating only 6.75 hours per week to this request (based on the most recent data). This represents a tiny fraction of the hours available to process the access requests the [NAME_3] received: 1.3% in 2024–2025 and 1.6% in 2023–2024. [ 132 ] [ADDRESS] considers it incomprehensible, unreasonable, and completely illogical that so few resources have been allocated to an access request whose volume and administrative burden the [NAME_3] itself considers so significant and staggering. [ 133 ] Although the Court appreciates that all access requests have the same priority level under the Access Act, it is not logical, reasonable, or fair to process all access requests in exactly the same way, particularly in terms of assigned resources. Proceeding in this way can only make the time needed to process larger requests skyrocket. In the Court’s opinion, there should instead be a certain proportionality between the allocated resources and the size of the access request. [ 134 ] If [NAME_4] is indeed [ translation ] “exceptionally large” , as the [NAME_3] states, and represents such a notable proportion of the number of pages the Unit processes each year, it should logically be afforded much more than 6.75 hours per week or less than 2% of the [NAME_3]’s resources. [NAME_4] is obviously not a typical or average request, and the Court finds it difficult to see how it could be reasonable and justified to apply to it a typical or average performance standard, number of hours, or processing rate. This is not preferential treatment, but treatment that is fair, logical and reasonable in the circumstances. [ 135 ] For example, if only 10% (rather than 1.3%) of the hours available for processing access requests were allotted to [NAME_2]’s file, which would still translate to less than one-third of its relative size, this would amount to 51 hours per week and a processing rate of approximately 1,777 pages per month during the second step, based on the very conservative rate of 231 pages per month observed for the 463 pages. Even at that speed, a time frame of a few months would be reasonable to finish analyzing the remaining 9,200 pages. What is more, the number of pages that must actually undergo a detailed analysis during the second step is only about 3,700 pages, according to the evidence in the record. [ 136 ] Admittedly, it is generally not for the Court to supervise the gathering of the records in the possession of a government institution or to dictate the manner in which government institutions respond to access requests ( [NAME_51] v Canada (Justice) , 2016 FCA 189 at para 36). However, the Court cannot help but observe that the data on the processing rates, which are highly variable from Phase I to Phase II; the relative magnitude of [NAME_4] within the framework of all the Unit’s work; the very large quantity of duplicates and irrelevant pages in this file; and the final number of relevant pages suggest that the [NAME_3] has tools to complete its analysis of Part Two of the Access Request within a time frame that is quite a bit shorter than the extension sought by the [NAME_3]. [ 137 ] [ADDRESS] adds that the [NAME_3] mentioned at the hearing that [NAME_49]’s contract would be ending in late March 2026 and that [NAME_4] will have to be transferred to a new resource. This will surely be an appropriate time to assign the Access Request to resources who, together, will be able to dedicate much more than 6.75 hours to it per week. (4) Necessary consultations [ 138 ] The backdrop to the Access Request is the Disputes; for this reason, the [NAME_3] anticipates that several pages will be protected by solicitor-client privilege and/or litigation privilege. This is why the [NAME_3] considers it necessary to carry out consultations with the Department of Justice. [ 139 ] The only evidence the [NAME_3] submitted on the amount of time these consultations could take is an email dated December 2024 in which [NAME_49] relates to the Commissioner that the Department of Justice apparently told the [NAME_3] that, for a consultation covering 30,000 pages, it would take about 30 months to review the records. In her Report, the Commissioner determined that this consultation time frame was unreasonable and that 180 days would be sufficient for the Department of Justice to analyze 30,000 records. No calculations or explanations were provided to support the time frames mentioned for either of these estimates. [ADDRESS] notes that it is rather surprising that the record does not contain any evidence from the Department of Justice itself laying out what, in its opinion, would truly be required and acceptable to properly hold these consultations. [ 140 ] It is now established that, given the evidence before the Court, Part Two of the Access Request will cover only 3,700 pages once the second step of processing the request is complete. This represents a little over 12% of the 30,000 pages with respect to which the Commissioner had found that a consultation time frame of six months was reasonable. Thus, this estimate alone seems to show that for 3,700 pages, a time limit of less than one month — three weeks, in fact — would be sufficient and reasonable to complete the consultations with the Department of Justice. [ 141 ] Furthermore, the Court is of the opinion that this time limit is very conservative for two reasons. First, there is nothing to indicate that all 3,700 pages will have to be subject to consultations with the Department of Justice. In fact, after analyzing the first 463 pages during Phase II, the [NAME_3] identified 111 pages for partial disclosure and 60 pages as having to be exempted from disclosure under the Access Act. It is based on this 171-page total that the Court calculated that, at the end of Phase II, about 3,700 pages would turn out to actually be relevant and possibly be subject to disclosure in response to the Access Request. However, it is not clear whether both the pages [ translation ] “for partial disclosure” and those [ translation ] “having to be exempted from disclosure” must be covered by consultations with the Department of Justice. If consultations are limited only to the pages marked as having to be exempted from disclosure under the Access Act, the 3,700 pages that the Department of Justice must review would drop to roughly 1,300 pages. If consultations are limited only to the pages identified for partial disclosure, the 3,700 pages that the Department of Justice must review would become 2,400 pages. [ 142 ] Second, during the second processing step, it is possible that the government institution’s in-house counsel will have conducted an analysis to determine whether any disclosure restrictions apply. In other words, when consultations take place with the Department of Justice, the [NAME_3]’s in-house counsel might have already carried out, as the examination of the records by the Unit’s analysts was progressing, a first review of the records to identify information protected by solicitor-client privilege and/or litigation privilege. This initial sorting and pruning could undoubtedly facilitate and accelerate verifications the Department of Justice will do as part of the consultations. Indeed, counsel for the [NAME_3] and [NAME_39] both recognized, at the hearing and on cross-examination respectively, that the purpose of the consultations with the Department of Justice will be to validate whether the [NAME_3] correctly pinpointed and delineated the access restrictions relating to litigation privilege or solicitor-client privilege. (5) Conclusion on reasonable time limit [ 143 ] In this case, given the time frames that have passed, the work completed to date, the number of relevant records, and the relative size of [NAME_4], the Court finds that an additional time limit of about five months is sufficient to finalize Phase II of reviewing the Access Request. As of the date of this judgment, there should be about 9,200 pages left to analyze. A total of 63% of these pages should turn out to be duplicates or irrelevant pages, which will surely be much quicker to analyze based on the [NAME_3]’s data on the processing rate during this first step. About 37% of the pages will be marked as relevant and will be subject to a more in-depth analysis regarding the application of exemptions from disclosure. The five-month time limit would translate to a processing rate of approximately 1,840 pages per month, which the Court considers entirely achievable, reasonable and justified in the circumstances if the breakdown of the remaining 9,200 pages is considered and if the [NAME_3] assigns to [NAME_4] the resources that the relative volume of this request warrants. [ 144 ] As for the consultations with the Department of Justice, the Court is of the opinion that a time limit of less than one month is more than sufficient. In fact, this time limit is proportionate to that set out by the Commissioner in her Report. Incidentally, the [NAME_3] could also consider initiating the consultation step while the second processing step is progressing and send to the Department of Justice the pages that might be subject to disclosure as they are identified, which would speed up the consultation process. [ 145 ] Therefore, the Court concludes that the [NAME_3]’s time limit to respond to Part Two of the Access Request should be September 30, 2026, namely, six months after the issuance of the present judgment. This would correspond to a total extension of 33 months, which is a little less than three years, for a request that initially contained 68,000 pages but that will contain only about 3,700 pages once the duplicates and the pages irrelevant to the Access Request have been removed. [ADDRESS] is of the view that this time limit is not only reasonable for the [NAME_3] in the circumstances, but will also allow [NAME_2] to receive the records captured by its Access Request in a timely manner. F. The weight to give the Commissioner’s Report [ 146 ] The [NAME_3] submits that the Report reflects the Commissioner’s expertise and that the Court should show deference to the Commissioner and her Report. The [NAME_3] states that for this reason, the Court should uphold the Commissioner Extension, which is to January 18, 2028. [ 147 ] [ADDRESS] does not entirely agree. [ 148 ] First, the Court recalls that this is a de novo review. This is therefore not a matter of applying the reasonableness standard to the [NAME_3]’s extension of time, much less to the Commissioner’s decision. However, even though it is not the Commissioner’s decision that is subject to this review, it is true that her opinion and investigation deserve significant weight given her expertise in access to information ( [NAME_51] v Canada (Justice) , 2010 FCA 183 at para 35; [NAME_51] v Canada (Minister of Justice) , 2005 FCA 405 at para 12; Geophysical at para 90; [NAME_29] at para 76; [NAME_52] v Canada (Minister of National Defence) , 2023 FC 461 at para 47; [NAME_55] v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) , 2022 FC 333 at para 49; [NAME_56] v Canada ([NAME_9] [NAME_10]) , 2021 FC 896 at para 83). [ 149 ] [ADDRESS] is not claiming that the Commissioner’s investigation in this case contains any deficiencies. But the fact remains that the Commissioner based her findings on the information that was known at the time, which was communicated by the [NAME_3] as part of her investigation. Thus, the Commissioner Extension was based on (i) a processing rate of 1,000 pages per month, which includes both the first phase (the elimination of duplicates and irrelevant elements) and the second phase (the analysis of the applicable exemptions from disclosure); (ii) 31,000 outstanding pages to process as of December 19, 2024; and (iii) six months of consultations with the Department of Justice for the 30,000 pages in question. However, the landscape is very different now because Phase I is complete and Phase II has begun, 10,000 pages must undergo this second step, and 3,700 pages will truly be relevant and could be covered by consultations with the Department of Justice. [ 150 ] Moreover, the reasons for choosing a rate of 1,000 pages per month are not explained in the Report, and the evidence before the Court shows that this rate is not at all rooted in the [NAME_3]’s concrete data surrounding the processing of [NAME_4]. According to [NAME_39], this was actually [ translation ] “a preference” of the Commissioner, noted in an unknown decision. [ 151 ] In addition, for the consultations with the Department of Justice, the Commissioner had established a processing rate of 5,000 pages per month, which at the time meant that analyzing 30,000 pages would take six months, or 180 days. As it now seems that a maximum of roughly 3,700 pages will indeed respond to the Access Request once the second step is complete, it goes without saying that the six-month time frame the Commissioner set for the consultations no longer holds water. The shortened time frame of less than one month that the Court has ordered above for these consultations is entirely reasonable in the circumstances. [ 152 ] Thus, the Court did give significant weight to the Commissioner’s Report, but it adapted her findings to the current situation. G. Interim releases of pages [ 153 ] In the conclusions to its notice of application, [NAME_2] asks the Court to order that the [NAME_3] disclose to it [ translation ] “the 14,000 pages already reviewed as of December 19, 2024, as well as any other pages reviewed as of the date of the forthcoming judgment.” This is the same request [NAME_2] had made to the [NAME_3] in a March 2025 email, shortly before this proceeding was instituted. [ 154 ] [ADDRESS] is not satisfied that it is possible or appropriate to order the interim release of records that is sought by [NAME_2] in this case, because no records can be disclosed so long as the validation of the exemptions that might apply is not completely over. Clearly, the sole purpose of the third step — the consultations with the Department of Justice — is to determine whether the disclosure of certain pages might not be possible on account of the exemption related to solicitor-client privilege and/or litigation privilege (section 23 of the Access Act). [ 155 ] Therefore, no interim releases of the pages covered by [NAME_4] can be conducted before all the steps of the Access Request’s analysis, including the consultations with the Department of Justice, have been themselves completed. [ 156 ] It is true that the Court has already determined that withholding records ready for release until all the records had been processed rather than releasing the records as they became available breached section 9 of the Access Act ( External Affairs at 526, para 22(e)). However, the situation in that case is different from the situation here: in the present matter, it is not possible to determine whether a record can be disclosed to [NAME_2] as long as the three review steps, including consultations with the Department of Justice, have not been completed. [ 157 ] Of course, once pages have been identified as relevant and subject to possible disclosure, nothing would prevent the [NAME_3] from initiating consultations with the Department of Justice regarding these pages while the Unit is continuing to process the other pages during the second step. This would not only speed up the overall processing of [NAME_4], but it might also allow the [NAME_3], once the Department of Justice has validated the processing of the pages in question, to release these pages prior to the final date of the extension of time ordered by the Court. [ 158 ] That said, the Court is mindful that the [NAME_3] might be forced to dedicate certain resources to this interim release process, who would therefore have less availability to process the remaining pages of the Access Request within the time limit ordered by the Court.

For these reasons, the Court will not order the [NAME_3] to carry out interim releases of pages, but it does invite the [NAME_3], as the Commissioner did in her Report, to consider making interim disclosures to [NAME_2] if doing so does not slow down its processing of the remaining pages. H. The insufficiency of resources at the Unit is not a valid justification [ 159 ] A certain lack of resources within the [NAME_3]’s Unit clearly underlies the present matter. [ 160 ] In her affidavit, [NAME_39] stated that the “focus” on [NAME_4] is unlikely to be sustainable in the long term because the Unit’s resources and workload can fluctuate. [NAME_39] explained that the Unit’s budget does not enable it to hire an unlimited number of employees or consultants — “quite the contrary” — and that the Unit’s processing efficiency and capacity, particularly in sorting pages and identifying senders and recipients of emails, are limited by the software at its disposal. At the hearing, the Court was also advised that [NAME_49]’s contract was ending on March 31, 2026, meaning that [NAME_4] will have to be assigned to another resource; according to [NAME_39], this “will likely slow down the overall progress of the file” . [ 161 ] [ADDRESS] has also reviewed the discussions that took place between the [NAME_3] and the Commissioner as part of the Commissioner’s investigation between May 2024 and January 2025. These discussions clearly show that the [NAME_3]’s Unit was stretched thin. In particular, in June 2024, [NAME_50] told the Commissioner that two managers and one director were away, either on leave or on vacation. In October 2024, [NAME_50] indicated that she was covering three positions at that time so that she would be unable to respond to the Commissioner within the deadlines set. In November 2024, the [NAME_3] mentioned to the Commissioner that [NAME_49] had been unable to analyze the file [ translation ] “for a certain period” because his tablet stopped working and had to be replaced. In December 2024, [NAME_49] notified the Commissioner that there were no managers in the office to answer his questions. Additionally, throughout the Commissioner’s investigation, the [NAME_3] sought numerous deadline extensions, some of which were for several weeks, and failed to meet the extended deadlines that it had itself requested from the Commissioner. The Commissioner had to follow up with the [NAME_3] many times. All these obstacles unduly delayed the Commissioner’s investigation, to the point that she was able to finish her Report only in February 2025. The [NAME_3]’s unwarranted delay in collaborating with the Commissioner’s investigation in turn delayed [NAME_2]’s opportunity to institute these review proceedings and obtain judgment. [ 162 ] [ADDRESS] is of the opinion that [NAME_2], and Canadian taxpayers, are entitled to expect better when exercising their access rights under the Access Act. The right to access information is neither a luxury nor a privilege; it is a quasi-constitutional right ( National Defence 2011 at para 40; [NAME_43] at para 20; [NAME_44] at para 1) and a fundamental public right in an open, free and democratic society such as our own. On this point, the Court quotes the Commissioner, the lead official overseeing access to information, who stated the following in Health Canada (Re) , 2025 OIC 34: [15] Timely access to government records is the linchpin to a healthy and open democratic society. In the field of access, access delayed is too often access denied. When an institution fails to respond to an access request within the statutory time limits, it is not a minor, inconsequential or insignificant oversight. Rather, it is a violation of both the letter and the spirit of the Act that affects the public’s confidence not only in its government institutions, but in the access to information system as a whole. [ 163 ] In other words, any delay undermines the access system’s credibility. Government institutions must aim to do their best to comply with statutory time limits. [ 164 ] [ADDRESS] would like to underscore [NAME_39]’s transparency and her efforts, as Unit manager, to respond to the Access Request. There is absolutely no issue here of bad faith on her part or on the part of anyone at the Unit. Quite the contrary — the Court takes note of the [NAME_3]’s complaints regarding the volume of access requests submitted, the Unit’s limited resources, the pressure it can be under, and the limits or inadequacy of the software currently used to process the access to information requests filed with the [NAME_3]. [ADDRESS] is also quite conscious that the Unit carries out tasks extraneous to the line responsibilities and very raison d’être of the [NAME_3]. But when Parliament lays down additional statutory responsibilities for government departments and other organizations of government, as it does through the Access Act, then one must comply ( External Affairs at 525, para 20). [ 165 ] Furthermore, as the Commissioner recently stated in Environment and Climate Change Canada (Re) , 2025 OIC 51 at paragraph 17, the fact that the team responsible for processing an access request must manage multiple access to information complaints, as well as other large requests, should not unduly affect the right of all requesters to a timely response. The [NAME_3] should therefore ensure that there are enough employees at the Unit to respond to both access requests and complaints in a timely manner. It could also consider investing in reliable tools designed to automate repetitive processes — such as the identification of duplications in Phase I — so that human resources can be reallocated to tasks requiring decision-making — such as the exemptions from disclosure in Phase II. [ 166 ] Lastly, the Court notes that the responsibility for ensuring compliance with the Access Act does not rest solely on the [NAME_3]. This is a departmental and collective responsibility. In this regard, the Court endorses the statements recently made by the FCA in Jennings-Clyde ([COMPANY_57]) v Canada ([NAME_9] [NAME_10]) , 2025 FCA 225, in which Justice David W. Stratas encouraged the government to provide its departments and public servants with the resources and tools they need to discharge their statutory responsibilities: [19] From my own multi-decade experience with administrative decision-makers, I suspect another problem: inadequate resources and funding. If so, the Agency must complain. And those responsible for considering the complaint, including the politicians who oversee and instruct them, had better take note. Ensuring the wheels of justice, both administrative and judicial, turn quickly, adequately and properly is not a luxury, frill, or optional extra; it’s one of the most basic things governments owe to those they govern.

I. Evidence required in reviewing an extension time limit [ 167 ] [ADDRESS] would like to make one final observation. Challenges brought before the Court under subsection 9(1) and subsection 41(1) of the Access Act are obviously few and far between. Indeed, a person who has submitted an access request will rarely be faced with an extension of the 30-day statutory time limit so lengthy that they have to apply for a review of that extension. [ 168 ] When such cases arise, the government institution must demonstrate that the requested extension and its duration are necessary. The burden of proof rests with the government institution (subsection 48(1) of the Access Act). Once again, the Court underscores that to meet this burden, the government institution must demonstrate that there is a rational link between the reasons invoked and the length of the extension sought, make a serious effort to assess the required duration, and ensure that its estimated calculation is sufficiently rigorous, logical and supportable to pass muster ( National Defence 2015 at paras 76, 79). [ 169 ] In this case, the evidence submitted by the [NAME_3] was deficient and incomplete at best; as a result, the Court was very poorly equipped to estimate the reasonable duration of the required time limit extension. This approach is not advisable. On the contrary, a government institution should ensure that a complete evidentiary record is placed before the Court completing the review ( Preventous at para 19). [ 170 ] In the Court’s opinion, to meet the requirements set out by the FCA in National Defence 2015 and allow the Court to properly calculate the reasonable duration of the time limit extension, a government institution should, in the context of such proceedings, provide the following factual elements, at the very least: (1) the resources of the access to information team, in terms of person-years and number of hours per week and year spent processing access requests received by the government institution; (2) the number of access requests received by the government institution and the number of pages processed every year; (3) the average response time (in days) and the average size (in pages) of responses to the access requests the government institution receives; (4) the average processing time frame (in pages processed per hour or per month) of the government institution for each of the different phases of processing an access request (that is, the review intended to eliminate duplicates and determine relevance, the analysis of the exemptions set out in the Access Act, and external consultations); (5) the size of the access request in question, in terms of the number of pages included at each of the request’s processing steps; and (6) the complexity of the access request at issue in light of the exemptions provided for in the Access Act. [ 171 ] The government institution should also be able to present, at the hearing, data that is both up-to-date and as specific as possible on the progress in processing the access request at issue, which will have surely been at least partly processed at the time of the review before the Court.

VI. Conclusion [ 172 ] For the above reasons, [NAME_2]’s application for review is allowed in part. The order in the Commissioner’s Report is set aside, and the [NAME_3] will now have to respond to Part Two of [NAME_4] by September 30, 2026. [ 173 ] The parties agreed on costs following the hearing. On the basis of that agreement, [NAME_2] is ordered to pay $720 to the [NAME_3] because its motion to file a reply is dismissed. Also, since [NAME_2] is successful on the issue of the time limit extension, it is awarded costs of $5,580 as well as an additional $857.15 for stenographer services.

JUDGMENT in T-1297-25 THE COURT’S

JUDGMENT is as follows: [COMPANY_1].’s application for review is allowed in part. The order of the Information Commissioner, which is included in her Report of February 27, 2025, in file number 5824-00884, is set aside. The Canadian Food Inspection Agency will have to respond to Part Two of [COMPANY_1].’s Access Request, which bears number A-2023-00159, by September 30, 2026. [COMPANY_1]. is ordered to pay the Canadian Food Inspection Agency costs in the amount of $720. The Canadian Food Inspection Agency is ordered to pay [COMPANY_1]. costs and stenographer fees in the total amount of $6,437.14. The parties are authorized to effect a set-off in respect of the costs owed by both parties. “Denis Gascon” Judge FEDERAL COURT SOLICITORS OF RECORD DOCKET: T-1297-25 STYLE OF CAUSE: [COMPANY_1]. v CANADIAN FOOD INSPECTION AGENCY PLACE OF HEARING: MONTRÉAL, QUEBEC DATE OF HEARING: FEBRUARY 12, 2026

JUDGMENT AND

REASONS: GASCON J DATED: March 31, 2026 APPEARANCES : [NAME_58] [NAME_61] FOR THE APPLICANT [NAME_66] FOR THE RESPONDENT SOLICITORS OF RECORD : [NAME_70], Quebec FOR THE APPLICANT [NAME_9] [NAME_10] of Canada Montréal, Quebec FOR THE RESPONDENT