Federal Court Upholds CHRT's Racial Discrimination Ruling But Strikes Down Order

OUTCOME: Allowed in Part

Date: 20260715 Docket: T-1442-24 Citation: 2026 FC 954 Ottawa, Ontario, July 15, 2026 PRESENT: The [NAME_1]: [NAME_2] Applicant and [NAME_8] COMMISSION Respondents

REASONS AND

JUDGMENT I. Overview [ 1 ] This is an application for judicial review of a decision of the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal ( “CHRT” ) dated May 14, 2024 in [NAME_6] v [NAME_2] , 2024 CHRT 84 (the “Decision” ). The Decision found that [NAME_2]’s ( “[NAME_10]” ) decision to issue and administer a Protection of Property Act, RSNS, 1989 c 363, ( “NSPPA” ) Notice ( “PPN” ) against [NAME_6] was discriminatory and based on his race, contrary to the Canadian Human Rights Act, RSC, 1985, c H-6 ( “CHRA” ). [ 2 ] [NAME_10] argues that the Decision was unreasonable because the remedy ordered - the removal of “all obstacles” to permit the Respondent, [NAME_11], access to the [NAME_12], [NAME_14], [COMPANY_15] and [COMPANY_16] - exceeded [NAME_17]’s jurisdiction because it overturned the PPN issued pursuant to the NSPPA and encroached upon [NAME_10]’s inherent right to self-governance pursuant to the Indian Act, RSC, 1985, c I-5. In addition, [NAME_10] argues [NAME_17] findings of discrimination and/or retaliation are not reasonable and are contrary to the evidence. In addition, the Applicant argues that [NAME_17] breached its right of procedural fairness because [NAME_17] failed to consider contradictory evidence and argument submitted that disputed the Respondents’ claims. [ 3 ] The Respondent, the Canadian Human Rights Commission ( “[NAME_18]” ), argues that the Decision was reasonable and contains a clear and coherent chain of analysis that should not be disturbed by this Court. They argue that the remedy ordered was within its statutory authority set out in the CHRA . [ 4 ] The other Respondent party, [NAME_11], made oral argument at the hearing and he submitted that the Decision was reasonable and should not be disturbed by this Court. [ 5 ] For the reasons that follow, this application is granted in part.

II. Facts [ 6 ] The Applicant, [NAME_10], is a [NAME_4] located approximately twenty kilometers south-east of Digby, Nova Scotia. [ 7 ] [NAME_10] offers several services to its members residing both on and off the [NAME_10] reserve. Some of the services provided by [NAME_10] include payment for out-of-town medical transportation, provision of communal moose meat, freshwater services, social assistance, and a winter clothing allowance. [NAME_10] has several community hubs including a community centre, [NAME_13], [COMPANY_15], and [COMPANY_16]. In addition, [NAME_10] has a [NAME_14] where members may purchase tax-free gas and other convenience store products. [ 8 ] The Respondent, [NAME_19], is Afro-Indigenous, of Mi’kmaq and African descent, and is a member of [NAME_10]. He has resided in the community of Bear River with his partner and children since 2015. [ 9 ] [NAME_11] is alleged to have been involved in two incidents with [NAME_10] staff members. The Applicant submits that the Respondent exhibited rude and aggressive behaviour towards staff on numerous occasions, including: - In 2016 – An incident with [NAME_10] staff members over the phone, where the Respondent is alleged to have made rude, threatening and malicious comments. In addition, the Respondent allegedly threatened to go to the media and advised that he was recording the call; and - On August 30, 2018 – An incident involving a [NAME_10] summer student at the [NAME_13]. [ 10 ] On September 5, 2018, the [NAME_10] Chief and Council issued a written warning to [NAME_11] that stated, in part: … Any acts of aggression, bullying, intimidation, disrespectful or inappropriate conduct, including physical and verbal behavior, either directly or indirectly, towards any of our staff members will not be tolerated. This includes in person, by phone or via email. Be advised that should this occur again, you will be prohibited from attending the [NAME_13] and other Band buildings where Band employees are assigned. You will be restricted to only communicating via email with identified individuals to access Band services and address your questions. [ 11 ] [NAME_11] is alleged to have been involved in two other incidents involving [NAME_10] staff members, following the written warning: - October 29, 2018, an incident involving a [NAME_10] employee during a winter clothing shopping excursion with the Respondent and his spouse; and - November 8, 2018, an incident at the [NAME_10] [NAME_14] with a [NAME_10] council member. [ 12 ] On November 15, 2018, the [NAME_10] Chief and Council held a duly convened meeting of the Council and passed BCR 2018-73; where in council voted to prohibit [NAME_11] from attending at the [NAME_13], [COMPANY_16], [COMPANY_15] and [NAME_14]. [ 13 ] On November 15, 2018, the Applicant sent a letter to [NAME_11] which indicated that in response to the incidents on October 29 and November 8, 2018, a PPN was issued against him, which prohibited his entry from certain community hubs. The letter states in part: This letter also serves as official Notice under the Protection of Property Act (sections 3(1)(e) and 3(2)); hereby prohibiting you from entered the [NAME_13], [COMPANY_16], [COMPANY_15] or [NAME_14] premises until further notice. Failure to abide by this Notice, may result in charges under the Protection of Property Act (section 4). [ 14 ] On November 29, 2018, [NAME_11] sent an email to the [NAME_10] Chief and Councillors to appeal the PPN. The letter sets out [NAME_11]’s version of the two events that lead to the issuance of the PPN and requested reconsideration by the [NAME_10] Chief and Council. [ 15 ] On December 11, 2018, [NAME_10] responded to [NAME_11]’s request to appeal/lift the PPN. [NAME_10] advised that the PPN would not be lifted as they were of the view a “cooling off period” was required and they advised that the PPN would remain in place until “the Council is satisfied that the Protection of Property Notice is no longer required” . [NAME_10] advised that “[P]eriodically, the council will review whether the Notice should remain in effect.” In the meantime, [NAME_10] advised that programs and services would continue to be available, as set out in the November 15, 2018 letter. [ 16 ] On May 8, 2019, [NAME_10] responded to an email from [NAME_11] dated April 26, 2019, again advising that the PPN would remain in effect. [ 17 ] On October 11, 2019, [NAME_10] emailed [NAME_11] and advised that they were willing to partially lift the PPN to permit [NAME_11]’s attendance at the [COMPANY_15] from October 16 – 20, 2019, for the “Harvesters Gathering” ; and November 21, 2019, at the [COMPANY_15] to participate in the [NAME_10] election. The email indicates that the [NAME_10] council saw the partial lifting of the PPN as an opportunity for [NAME_11] to demonstrate that the PPN was no longer required. However, the email also makes it clear that these forums were not to be used to discuss the PPN or the ongoing [NAME_18] complaint with [NAME_10] staff or Chief and Council members. [ 18 ] On April 7, 2020, [NAME_11] and the [NAME_10], [NAME_20], exchanged several emails concerning [NAME_11]’s social assistance benefits. [NAME_23] advised [NAME_11] that [NAME_10] had not received certain required forms and that, as a result, his benefits would be disrupted. [NAME_10] characterised [NAME_11]’s emails as threatening and aggressive during this email exchange [NAME_11] informed [NAME_23] that he was going to the [NAME_13] to fill out the forms—despite being reminded of the PPN—and was advised that the forms would be left outside for him. When [NAME_11] arrived, the forms were not outside. He then attempted to enter the office but found the doors locked. [NAME_10] subsequently contacted the RCMP. The RCMP attended and following a tense exchange with the RCMP, [NAME_11] returned home. [ 19 ] On April 8, 2020, [NAME_10] sent a letter to [NAME_11] reminding him that the PPN is in effect, and prohibits his attendance at the [NAME_13], the [NAME_14], the [COMPANY_16], and the [COMPANY_15]. The Applicant stated that [NAME_11] attended the [NAME_13], despite the PPN, tried to gain access and made repeated calls to the office from the parking lot. The Applicant describes the behaviour as “threatening and disruptive” and resulted in “disruption and unneeded concerns for the safety and wellbeing of our employees and workplace.” Further, [NAME_10] put [NAME_11] on notice that the RCMP would be called for subsequent breaches the [NAME_10] would seek to have charges laid under the NSPPA . [ 20 ] [NAME_11] filed a complaint with the [NAME_18] on May 15, 2019 (HR-DP-2806-22) wherein he alleged that [NAME_10] had and continued to discriminate against him in employment and the provision of services on the grounds of race and disability, contrary to sections 5 and 7 of the CHRA. [ 21 ] On September 17, 2020, [NAME_11] received a letter from [NAME_10] that excluded him from a community moose hunt, the letter stated, in part: … [NAME_2] will not be supporting you to attend its Annual Moose Harvest this year. To be clear, [NAME_2] is not prohibiting you from exercising your right to hunt. Your rights remain as any other member of [NAME_2] in this regard. Bear River is simply not supporting you to attend this event. [ 22 ] On February 24, 2022, the [NAME_18] rendered its decision in respect of the complaint and on March 2, 2022, pursuant to subparagraph 44(3)(a)(i) of the CHRA , requested that [NAME_17] institute an inquiry into allegations of racial discrimination. However, the [NAME_18] determined that further inquiry into the allegations of discrimination based on disability was not warranted. [ 23 ] On August 11, 2022, [NAME_11] filed a second complaint (HR-DP-2953-23) with the [NAME_18] pursuant to section 14.1 of the CHRA , alleging that [NAME_10] had retaliated against him for filing a complaint. The Applicant alleged that [NAME_10] delayed and denied his request for social assistance, failed to protect him and his family from a violent neighbour and excluded him from the September 2020 community moose hunt. [ 24 ] On July 25, 2023, [NAME_17] joined [NAME_11]’s complaints into a single inquiry on consent of the parties. [ 25 ] [NAME_17] held a four-day hearing from January 16 to 19, 2024. The [NAME_18] did not participate in the hearing. [ 26 ] [NAME_17] issued its Decision on May 14, 2024. [NAME_17] found that: [5] [NAME_11] has established a prima facie case that [NAME_2] discriminated against him based on race when it issued an unnecessarily broad PPN preventing [NAME_11] from entering and attending activities most public buildings in the community. [NAME_2] also discriminated against [NAME_11] based on race in the way it administered the PPN on April 8, 2020. [6] [NAME_11] has also established a prima facie case that [NAME_2] retaliated against him for filing his complaint. This retaliation resides in the way in which the [NAME_4] failed to take measures to protect [NAME_11] and his family from the violent actions of their neighbour and in its exclusion of [NAME_11] from the September 2020 community moose hunt. … [8] There was insufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of retaliation by [NAME_2] in delaying and denying [NAME_11]’s request for social assistance; therefore, this claim was unsuccessful. [9] In terms of remedies, the Tribunal orders [NAME_2] to remove all obstacles to [NAME_11] entering and attending activities in the [NAME_13], the [COMPANY_15], the [COMPANY_16] and the [NAME_14]. The Tribunal also orders [NAME_2] to pay amounts as compensation for [NAME_11]’s pain and suffering and for [NAME_2]’s reckless misconduct. Finally, the Tribunal orders [NAME_2] to work with the Commission to develop a policy to support the issuing of PPNs and similar orders in a non-discriminatory way.

III. Standard of Review [ 27 ] The presumptive standard of review is reasonableness ( Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov , 2019 SCC 65 [ Vavilov ] at para 10). Reasonableness review is a deferential standard and requires an evaluation of the administrative decision to determine if the decision is transparent, intelligible, and justified ( Vavilov at paras 12–15, 95). The starting point for a reasonableness review is the reasons for decision ( Vavilov at para 13). Pursuant to the Vavilov framework, a reasonable decision is “one that is based on an internally coherent and rational chain of analysis and that is justified in relation to the facts and law that constrain the decision maker” ( Vavilov at para 85). To intervene on an application for judicial review, the Court must find an error in the decision that is central or significant to render the decision unreasonable ( Vavilov at para 100). [ 28 ] The standard of review for procedural fairness issues is correctness, or akin to correctness ( Vavilov at para 53; Canadian Pacific Railway Company v Canada (Attorney General), 2018 FCA 69 at paras 54–56). A reviewing court must consider what level of procedural fairness is necessary in the circumstances and whether the “procedure followed by the administrative decision maker respect[s] the standards of fairness and natural justice” ( [NAME_24] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2023 FC 733 at para 13). In other words, a court must determine if the process followed by the decision maker achieved the level of fairness required in the circumstances ( [NAME_25] v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) , 2020 FC 120 at para 23, citing with approval [NAME_26] v [NAME_27] , 2014 SCC 24 at para 79, see also [NAME_28] v [NAME_29] the [NAME_4] , 2024 FC 699 at para 27).

IV. Issues [ 29 ] This application raises the following issues: a) Is the Decision reasonable? b) Was there a breach of procedural fairness? c) Is the Damages award reasonable? d) [NAME_17] act without or beyond its jurisdiction in respect of the order to remove “all obstacles for [NAME_11] to access the [NAME_13], the [NAME_14], the [COMPANY_15], and the [COMPANY_16]” ? V. Applicable Legislative and Policy Framework [ 30 ] The CHRA states: Purpose of Act 2 The purpose of this Act is to extend the laws in Canada to give effect, within the purview of matters coming within the legislative authority of Parliament, to the principle that all individuals should have an opportunity equal with other individuals to make for themselves the lives that they are able and wish to have and to have their needs accommodated, consistent with their duties and obligations as members of society, without being hindered in or prevented from doing so by discriminatory practices based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, age, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, marital status, family status, genetic characteristics, disability or conviction for an offence for which a pardon has been granted or in respect of which a record suspension has been ordered. Proscribed Discrimination 3(1) For all purposes of this Act, the prohibited grounds of discrimination are race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, age, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, marital status, family status, genetic characteristics, disability and conviction for an offence for which a pardon has been granted or in respect of which a record suspension has been ordered. Discriminatory Practices 5 It is a discriminatory practice in the provision of goods, services, facilities or accommodation customarily available to the general public. (a) to deny, or to deny access to, any such good, service, facility or accommodation to any individual, or (b) to differentiate adversely in relation to any individual, on a prohibited ground of discrimination. Retaliation 14.1 It is a discriminatory practice for a person against whom a complaint has been filed under Part III, or any person acting on their behalf, to retaliate or threaten retaliation against the individual who filed the complaint or the alleged victim. Exceptions 15(1) It is not a discriminatory practice if (g) in the circumstances described in section 5 or 6, an individual is denied any goods, services, facilities or accommodation or access thereto or occupancy of any commercial premises or residential accommodation or is a victim of any adverse differentiation and there is bona fide justification for that denial or differentiation. Special Programs 16(1) It is not a discriminatory practice for a person to adopt or [NAME_29] out a special program, plan or arrangement designed to prevent disadvantages that are likely to be suffered by, or to eliminate or reduce disadvantages that are suffered by, any group of individuals when those disadvantages would be based on or related to the prohibited grounds of discrimination, by improving opportunities respecting goods, services, facilities, accommodation or employment in relation to that group. Advice and assistance (2) The Canadian Human Rights Commission, may (a) make general recommendations concerning desirable objectives for special programs, plans or arrangements referred to in subsection (1); and (b) on application, give such advice and assistance with respect to the adoption or carrying out of a special program, plan or arrangement referred to in subsection (1) as will serve to aid in the achievement of the objectives the program, plan or arrangement was designed to achieve. (3) It is not a discriminatory practice to collect information relating to a prohibited ground of discrimination if the information is intended to be used in adopting or carrying out a special program, plan or arrangement under subsection (1). Complaint dismissed 53(2) If at the conclusion of the inquiry the member or panel finds that the complaint is substantiated, the member or panel may, subject to section 54, make an order against the person found to be engaging or to have engaged in the discriminatory practice and include in the order any of the following terms that the member or panel considers appropriate: (a) that the person cease the discriminatory practice and take measures, in consultation with the Commission on the general purposes of the measures, to redress the practice or to prevent the same or a similar practice from occurring in future, … (b) that the person make available to the victim of the discriminatory practice, on the first reasonable occasion, the rights, opportunities or privileges that are being or were denied the victim as a result of the practice; (c) that the person compensate the victim for any or all of the wages that the victim was deprived of and for any expenses incurred by the victim as a result of the discriminatory practice; (d) that the person compensate the victim for any or all additional costs of obtaining alternative goods, services, facilities or accommodation and for any expenses incurred by the victim as a result of the discriminatory practice; and (e) that the person compensate the victim, by an amount not exceeding twenty thousand dollars, for any pain and suffering that the victim experienced as a result of the discriminatory practice. [ 31 ] The NSPPA states: Entry or certain activity on premises 3(1) Every person, who without legal justification, whether conferred by an enactment or otherwise, or without the permission of the occupier or a person authorized by the occupier, the proof of which reses upon the person asserting justification or permission, (e) enters on premises where entry is prohibited by notice; or (f) engaged in an activity which is prohibited on the premises by notice, Is guilty of an offence and on summary conviction is liable to a fine of not more than five hundred dollars. (2) a notice under this Section may be given orally or in writing.

VI. Analysis A. Was the Finding of Discrimination Reasonable? [ 32 ] The Applicant argues that the jurisdiction of [NAME_17] was limited to determining if the Respondent’s race, colour or ethnic origin was a factor in [NAME_10]’s decision to issue and enforce the PPN. The Applicant argues that the record illustrated that [NAME_10] had valid and justified reasons for issuing and enforcing the [NAME_17]’s finding that the issuance and enforcement were motivated by discrimination is unreasonable. The Applicant argues that [NAME_17] ignored contradictory evidence in rendering its decision. [ 33 ] The Applicant highlighted the following factors that they argue justified the issuance and enforcement of the PPN: - In 2016, [NAME_11] was allegedly rude and threatening in a phone call with [NAME_10] staff; - On August 30, 2018, [NAME_11] was allegedly rude and aggressive with a summer student at the [NAME_12]; - On September 5, 2018, [NAME_11] was sent a warning letter that advised continued aggressive behaviour, bullying, intimidation, disrespectful and inappropriate conduct towards staff members would not be tolerated and could result in a prohibition from community spaces ; - On October 29, 2018, [NAME_11] was allegedly rude and intimidating with a [NAME_10] staff member during a winter clothing shopping excursion; - On November 8, 2018, [NAME_11] was allegedly rude and intimidating with a [NAME_10] staff member at the [NAME_14]; - On November 15, 2018, [NAME_10] passed BCR 2018-73 and sent a letter to [NAME_11] advising that the PPN had been issued, banning him from the [NAME_13], [COMPANY_16], [COMPANY_15] and [NAME_14]; - On October 11, 2019, [NAME_10] partially lifted the PPN to permit [NAME_11]’s participation in the October 16 – 20, 2019 “Harvesters Gathering” and the November 21, 2019 [NAME_10] election; - On April 7, 2020, [NAME_11] presented at the [NAME_13] and was allegedly rude, aggressive and threatening in email and phone conversations with [NAME_10] staff; and - On April 8, 2020, the Applicant sent a further letter to [NAME_11] reminding him of the PPN. [ 34 ] The Applicant argues that [NAME_11] was provided opportunities to correct his behaviour to avoid having the PPN issued and after it was issued lifted. The Applicant argues that [NAME_11] chose to ignore warnings and did not take advantage of opportunities to have the PPN lifted. [ 35 ] The Applicant argued that [NAME_10] had legitimate concerns with respect to [NAME_11]’s behaviour and actions, that placed the safety of [NAME_10] employees at risk. They argue that the measures taken, the issuance and enforcement of the PPN were proportionate measures in view of the circumstances and [NAME_11]’s conduct prior to the issuance of the PPN.

Accordingly, they argue that [NAME_17] findings were not reasonable and do not support findings of racial discrimination. [ 36 ] The Applicant also argued that the findings of [NAME_17] in respect of the community moose hunt and the altercation between [NAME_11] and his neighbour in June 2020 were not reasonable. They argue that these incidents do not support [NAME_17]’s findings that [NAME_10] discriminated against him or retaliated in response to his complaint to the [NAME_18]. [ 37 ] The Applicant argues that a retaliation complaint is independent of discrimination, and the onus is on a complainant to establish retaliation. [ 38 ] The [NAME_18] argues that the Decision is reasonable and contains a clear and coherent chain of analysis that falls within the range of acceptable outcomes which ought not be disturbed by this Court on judicial review. [ 39 ] The [NAME_18] argues that [NAME_17] was best placed to review and assess the evidence, and make findings of credibility and reliability, and that this Court ought to defer to those findings; Vavilov at para 125. [ 40 ] The [NAME_18] argues that [NAME_17] applied the factors set out by the Supreme Court of Canada ( “SCC” ) in [NAME_30] v [NAME_31] (Education), 2012 SCC 61 at paragraph 33. Complainants must demonstrate on a balance of probabilities that: i) They have one or more characteristics protected from discrimination under the CHRA; ii) They were subject to adverse treatment or disadvantage; and iii) On or more of their protected characteristics was a factor in the adverse treatment or disadvantage. [ 41 ] The [NAME_18] notes, and I agree, that it is not necessary for a complainant to establish that discriminatory considerations were the sole or dominant reasons for the respondent’s actions or decision. Nor is it necessary that a complainant illustrate that the discrimination was intentional; Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v [COMPANY_32]. ([COMPANY_33]) 2015 SCC 39 at para 41-54; [NAME_34] v [NAME_35] , 2015 CHRT 19 [ [NAME_34] ] at para 138; Ontario Human Rights Commission and [NAME_36] v [NAME_38], 1985 18 (SCC) at para 13. [ 42 ] The [NAME_18] argues that [NAME_17] properly applied the test set out by the SCC in [NAME_30] . Specifically, [NAME_17] reasonably found that [NAME_11], a Black man of Afro-Indigenous descent, was a member of a designated group. It also reasonably found that the imposition of the PPN, and the manner in which [NAME_10] administered it, deprived [NAME_11] of access to services customarily available to the public, including the administration of social assistance, cultural, social and educational programming, and access to tax-free gas and convenience store products. Finally, [NAME_17] found that [NAME_11] experienced adverse differential treatment as a result of [NAME_10]’s actions. [NAME_17] found that, on a balance of probabilities, it was more probable than not that race was a factor. The Respondent submits that these findings were based on [NAME_17]’s assessment of all the evidence. [ 43 ] The Respondent argued that [NAME_17] reasonably found that [NAME_10] had retaliated against [NAME_11] for filing his complaint, contrary to section 14.1 of the CHRA . The retaliatory conduct included [NAME_10]’s failure to take steps to protect [NAME_11] from a violent neighbour and its exclusion of him from a community moose hunt. [ 44 ] The [NAME_18] submits that [NAME_10] attempts to re-argue the facts and invites this Court to make different findings of fact, which is not the proper role of a court on judicial review. B. Issuance of the PPN [ 45 ] A review of the Decision illustrates that [NAME_17] set out the proper legal test for assessing claims of discrimination at paragraphs 44 – 52 of the Decision. Of note, [NAME_17] highlights jurisprudence that underscores that a prohibited ground of discrimination need not be the sole factor in the decision that led to adverse impacts, and direct proof of discrimination or intention to discriminate is not necessary. Further, [NAME_17] noted that discrimination is generally not “open or intentional” . Rather, [NAME_17] is to consider the evidence to determine if there is a “subtle scent of discrimination” and may draw probable inferences from its review of the evidence. If [NAME_17] concludes, on a balance of probabilities, that a complainant has sufficient evidence to make a finding of discrimination, the burden shifts to the respondent, who may attempt to justify its conduct or decision, pursuant to section 15 of the CHRA . [ 46 ] [NAME_17] found that, as a Black man, [NAME_11] established race as the prohibited ground of discrimination. The Applicant, [NAME_10], did not contest this fact. Therefore, [NAME_17] found that the first element of the test for discrimination set out in [NAME_30] was established. I agree. [ 47 ] [NAME_17] found that [NAME_10]’s actions giving rise to the discrimination occurred in the provision of services. Specifically, [NAME_17] found that, “in imposing the PPN against [NAME_11] and in administering it, [NAME_2] altered which of its services were available to [NAME_11]” . This included denying him access to tax-free gas and convenience store products, as well as cultural and other programing, and affecting the manner in which social and income assistance were administered. [NAME_17] found that these services were generally available to [NAME_10] members. [ 48 ] [NAME_10] denies that the PPN denied [NAME_11] access to services and points to a letter dated November 15, 2018, wherein they advised that they were not refusing to provide services, and that he could contact them if he had questions regarding delivery of said services. [NAME_10] acknowledged that [NAME_11] was not permitted to enter the [NAME_14] but took the position that this was not a denial of service, as he could access tax-free gas at other reserves; the nearest being an hour drive from [NAME_10]. [ 49 ] [NAME_17] found that “asking a band member to drive an hour to another community to access tax-free gas is not a modification of a service but a denial of a service” . A review of the record for [NAME_17] proceeding indicates that it was open to [NAME_17] to make this finding. [ 50 ] Also, before [NAME_17], [NAME_11] argued his prohibition from the [NAME_13], the [COMPANY_15] and the [COMPANY_16] denied his participation in community, cultural and holiday events and programs. He expressed feelings of alienation and testified that this impacted his children, who did not want to attend events where their father was not welcome. [NAME_11]’s exclusion from events included a community ceremony for high school graduates which his son, [NAME_39], was eligible to participate in. [ 51 ] [NAME_17] found that [NAME_10] “provided no evidence of how [NAME_11] is able to participate in the programming or events available at the [COMPANY_15] or the [COMPANY_16] and did not explain why this is not a denial of services.” Again, based on a review of the record, in my view, this finding was open to [NAME_17]. [ 52 ] Finally, [NAME_17] found that [NAME_11] was differentiated in the manner in which [NAME_10] provided certain services to him. [NAME_10] maintained that it had not denied [NAME_11] services and that the modified means of providing those services did not result in an adverse impact, noting that he was able to communicate with the Band by email and telephone and that documents, cheques, and goods were delivered to his home or sent by email or regular mail, [NAME_17] concluded otherwise. [NAME_17] found that “[D]espite attempts by [NAME_5] to provide certain services in a modified manner, I find that [NAME_11] was adversely impacted by the differentiation.” In reaching this conclusion, [NAME_17] noted that it was “persuaded by [NAME_11]’s testimony” . [ 53 ] [NAME_17] further found that the incident on April 20, 2020, in which police were called after [NAME_11] attended the [NAME_13] to urgently obtain forms needed for the processing and administration of social assistance benefits illustrates the differential treatment he experienced in respect of the provision of services. [ 54 ] A review of the record for this application indicates that there was a heated exchange of emails between [NAME_11] and [NAME_12] staff, where [NAME_11] clearly indicates his intention to go to the office to fill in forms and to wait for a social assistance cheque. I agree that the exchange was heated and emotions on all sides were running high. I understand that the Band Administrator, [NAME_40], gave evidence of feeling threatened by [NAME_11]’s aggressive behaviour, and that this stems from “several years” of communications that she described as “demanding and aggressive” . However, it is not lost on me that [NAME_11] was extremely stressed over the idea of losing necessary social assistance benefits, and this was happening during a time of unprecedented lockdowns and general uncertainty sparked by a global pandemic. Persons in crisis are often not at their best; However, I note that the email exchanges do not involve threats of violence. [ 55 ] [NAME_17] notes that “[T]he hearing for this complaint was highly emotional on both sides. The evidence shows that animosity and lack of trust between [NAME_11] and [NAME_2] staff and council have been building for many years and have only worsened since the issuance of the PPN.” [ 56 ] A review of the Record indicates that [NAME_17] understood the position of [NAME_10]; that the PPN was necessary to protect the safety of staff. [NAME_17] engaged with the evidence of the events that led to the issuance of the PPN and found: - On September 28, 2016, in a phone call between [NAME_11] and [NAME_10] staff, while [NAME_11] was “rude” , there was no evidence to support a conclusion that staff were unsafe. - On August 20, 2018, while [NAME_11] was in the [NAME_13] to fill in forms, witnesses did not see [NAME_11] speak with the student receptionist, and this employee did not provide evidence; however other staff indicated that his posture was “intimidating” . [NAME_11] and his son, [NAME_39], commented on the receptionist’s rude behaviour toward them. It appears that the receptionist heard the comments and was upset. [NAME_17] found on balance it was more likely that the receptionist was upset about the comments concerning her behaviour rather than anything [NAME_11] did or said to her. - On October 29, 2018, at Canadian Tire during a winter clothing shopping trip, [NAME_11] was alleged to have acted inappropriately toward a Band employee. The employee did not testify or provide an affidavit; in an unsigned note where she describes the event, she does not indicate that [NAME_11] was bullying her or that she felt unsafe. - On November 18, 2018, [NAME_11] and [NAME_42] had an angry exchange of words at the [NAME_14] concerning funding for [NAME_11]’s son to attend an award ceremony. [NAME_17] did not find that [NAME_11] made physical or verbal threats. [ 57 ] [NAME_17] found that [NAME_11] “was upset and demanded various services” and he was angry about the level of services he received. [NAME_17] also noted that [NAME_11] could be “at times, rude” . However, [NAME_17] found that there was no objective evidence from these events that could “objectively lead staff to conclude they would be unsafe in [NAME_11]’s presence.” [NAME_17] noted that there was no evidence that [NAME_11] acted violently or made threats of violence or illegal acts, and none of the [NAME_10] staff members testified that their physical safety was threatened or that he had a history of violence. A review of the record indicates that it was open for [NAME_17] to make those findings. [ 58 ] The Applicant argues that these findings illustrate that [NAME_17] equated the rationale behind the issuance of the PPN to dangerous violent behaviour. They note that that is not the test for the issuance of a PPN. [ 59 ] I agree that a PPN does not require violent or dangerous behaviour. However, I am not persuaded that [NAME_17] found that the PPN required dangerous or violent behaviour. [ 60 ] [NAME_17] noted that after a review of the events that allegedly precipitated the issuance of the PPN, that while, “at times” , “[NAME_11] was angry and rude” and that “some intervention by the Band Council may have been appropriate to ensure staff felt comfortable with [NAME_11], the PPN went far beyond what would have been necessary to achieve that aim.” Ultimately, [NAME_17] noted that it is normal for clients of service providers to be dissatisfied and that clients may act out. [NAME_17] agreed that it is important for staff members to feel safe and agreed that repercussions for a lack of basic courtesy and respect may be necessary; but those repercussions must be proportionate. Here, [NAME_17] found that, “race was a factor in the decision to issue the PPN” . [ 61 ] I note that later in the reasons, [NAME_17] found that the one other PPN and three other warning letters issued to other [NAME_10] members by [NAME_10] involved individuals engaged in violent and/or criminal behaviour. [NAME_17] found that this illustrated that [NAME_10]’s approach in this case was disproportionate to his behaviour, leading to the conclusion that race was a factor. [ 62 ] The Applicant suggests that [NAME_17] failed to engage with evidence to demonstrate an escalation of repercussions, in particular, the September 5, 2018 warning letter. [ 63 ] It is trite law that administrative decision makers are presumed to have considered and weighed all evidence submitted, including evidence not specifically mentioned, and reasons need not mention every piece of evidence. Rather, reasonableness review requires Courts to take a holistic approach by reference of the entire application and record, and to have proper deference to the expertise of the tribunal member. [ 64 ] I am persuaded that [NAME_17] considered and weighed all the available evidence and found that, on a balance of probabilities, race was a factor in the decision to issue the PPN. The reasons demonstrate engagement with the facts and set out a transparent, intelligible, and justified Decision. It was open to [NAME_17] to make the findings it did based on the entirety of the record. [NAME_10] disagrees with those findings, that is not sufficient to warrant this Court’s intervention on judicial review. C. Breach of Procedural Fairness [ 65 ] The Applicant argues that [NAME_17]’s approach of relying on systemic racism against Black men in Canada was a breach of procedural fairness, as the Applicant did not have a fair opportunity to address this in their submissions. [ 66 ] [NAME_17] notes that to understand and assesses the actions of the [NAME_10] staff in response to [NAME_11]’s behaviour, it is important to understand the context of anti-Black racism in Canadian society. [ 67 ] To determine if it was more likely than not that race was a factor, these broader social contexts must be understood. [NAME_17] notes that “[N]egative black stereotypes are present across Canadian society, subconsciously impacting decision-making among many people and institutions … [NAME_4] governments and staff are not immune from such social conditioning” . [ 68 ] After reviewing the evidence, [NAME_17] found that, while they accepted that [NAME_10]’s staff thought that the issuance of the PPN was not related to race, it was of the view that unconscious bias was a factor. [ 69 ] [NAME_17]’s reasons on this point are transparent, intelligible and justified, and draw from jurisprudence that has recognised the systemic discrimination of Black men in Canada; ( [NAME_44] v [COMPANY_45] , 2020 CHRT 1, Young Worker v [NAME_46] and another , 2023 BCHRT 137). Further, this analysis logically follows the complaint filed by [NAME_11], where in he states his race is African Nova Scotian and Mi’kmaq [NAME_4], and notes that he is “very dark skinned” . [NAME_10] was on notice that the basis of [NAME_11]’s complaint was tied to his race. [ 70 ] [NAME_17] afforded each party to make submissions, present evidence and examine witnesses.

Accordingly, the Applicant was provided a full and fair opportunity to make submissions, which were considered by [NAME_17]. Further, in my view, upon consideration of the nature of [NAME_11]’s complaint, issues related to discrimination of Black men were raised and ought to have been anticipated and responded to by the Applicant.

Accordingly, I am not persuaded that the Applicant was denied procedural fairness. D. Administration of the PPN [ 71 ] [NAME_17] considered the evidence relating to [NAME_10]’s administration of the PPN, including the events of April 20, 2020. In particular, [NAME_17] assessed whether race was a factor in how [NAME_10] administered the PPN; including its decision to call the police on an urgent basis. [ 72 ] [NAME_17] found that it was more likely than not that race was a factor. [NAME_17] notes that, had [NAME_11] entered the [NAME_13], this likely would have been a breach of the PPN. However, the evidence illustrated that [NAME_11] emailed [NAME_10] staff and informed them he was going to the [NAME_13]. The emails were heated, but [NAME_17] found the emails were not threatening towards staff and that they were driven by his concern that his social assistance benefits may be interrupted. [ 73 ] Ultimately, [NAME_11] did not enter the [NAME_13] and no staff members were outside. [NAME_10] chose to contact police and informed them the situation was urgent. [NAME_17] found the response was “disproportionate and not reasonable” in view of all the circumstances, and I agree. [NAME_17] finds that the reaction was motivated by race, as they note that [NAME_11] had no history of threatening criminal or violent behaviour. Yet, [NAME_10] chose to treat [NAME_11] “like a violent criminal” . [ 74 ] Accordingly, [NAME_17] found that [NAME_11] established that [NAME_10] had discriminated against him on the basis of race in the imposition and the administration of the PPN. [NAME_17] also found that [NAME_10] did not present a bona fide justification defence.

Accordingly, the complaint under section 5 of the CHRA was substantiated. [ 75 ] I agree. The reasons for Decision bare all the hallmarks of reasonableness. The Applicant’s arguments invite this Court to re-weigh the evidence and reach a different conclusion, which is not the proper role of a court on judicial review. The Applicant has not pointed to specific errors that would warrant this Court’s intervention. E. Retaliation for [NAME_18] [ 76 ] [NAME_11] alleged that [NAME_10] retaliated against him for filing a complaint with the [NAME_18]. The acts of retaliation included: a delay and denial of requests for social assistance in 2023, a failure to protect him from a violent neighbour in 2022, and his exclusion from the community moose hunt in 2020. [ 77 ] Pursuant to section 14.1 of the CHRA, it is a discriminatory practice to retaliate against an individual who has filed a complaint of discrimination under the CHRA. [ 78 ] In [NAME_47] [NAME_4] v [NAME_48], 2016 FC 895 [ [NAME_47] ] at paras 26 and 62, this Court set out a test to establish a case of retaliation. Claimants must illustrate that: a) They have made a complaint under the CHRA ; b) They experienced adverse treatment following the filing of the complaint by the persons against whom the complaint was filed; and c) The human rights complaint was a factor in the adverse treatment. [ 79 ] [NAME_17] notes that intention to discriminate need not be established; rather, it is sufficient to establish that the human rights complaint was a factor; [NAME_34] at para 138 and [NAME_47] at paras 27 and 62-64. [ 80 ] [NAME_17] found that two of the allegations of retaliation were substantiated: the failure of [NAME_10] to protect [NAME_11] from his neighbour and [NAME_11]’s exclusion from the 2020 moose hunt. [ 81 ] [NAME_11]’s neighbour, [NAME_49], was arrested and charged in relation to an incident on June 17, 2020, where [NAME_49] shouted racial slurs while damaging [NAME_11]’s yard with an ATV. This led to an undertaking by [NAME_49] to stay away from [NAME_11]’s home and family. A few months after this incident, [NAME_49] again came onto [NAME_11]’s property and shouted racial slurs. [ 82 ] Following this event, [NAME_11]’s son, [NAME_39], emailed the [NAME_10] and the Band Administrator, [NAME_40], asking that [NAME_10] take action to protect his family from [NAME_49], a non-member. Despite an initial email indicating that [NAME_10] would look into the situation, there was no response. A year later, in response to a follow-up inquiry, [NAME_40] indicated that the RCMP were dealing with the situation. [ 83 ] [NAME_17] found that, while there was an undertaking in place that prevents [NAME_49] from going onto the Curries’ property or near individual family members, there are no restrictions on [NAME_49]’s movement within the community. This, [NAME_17] found, was unreasonable, as the Curries had a reasonable fear that [NAME_49] may be at community events and places. [ 84 ] [NAME_17] found that [NAME_10]’s lack of response in this situation amounted to adverse treatment within the meaning of section 14.1 of the CHRA. [ 85 ] The Applicant argued that [NAME_17] reached the conclusion that the failure to take additional steps to protect [NAME_11] and his family were motivated by the existing complaint. The Applicant argued that there is no clear or direct evidence to support this conclusion. [ 86 ] [NAME_11] gave evidence to illustrate that [NAME_49] had been treated differently than him by [NAME_10] and suggested that this difference in treatment was a result of [NAME_49]’s relationship with certain members of the [NAME_10] staff. [NAME_17] noted that [NAME_40]’s testimony demonstrated clear distress in respect of the August 2018 incident and her concerns for staff safety, however, “she showed no similar concern or need to respond to the racist attacks against the [NAME_9] family and the family’s fear when going around the community” . [ 87 ] In addition, [NAME_17] noted that in September 2020, a community moose hunt was announced and persons wishing to participate were to confirm attendance with the Band Administrator. [NAME_11] was advised he would be added to the list of attendees. [ 88 ] On September 17, 2020, [NAME_10] sent [NAME_11] a letter indicating that they would no longer support his involvement. Witnesses for [NAME_10] indicated that this was largely in response to the April 20, 2020 incident at the [NAME_13] where police were called. [ 89 ] [NAME_10] argued that they did not prevent him from hunting. Rather, he was not invited to participate in the organised community hunt which would also include a ceremony to honour a respected community member who had passed. It is not clear if [NAME_11] was prohibited from attending the cultural ceremony, as it took place on the land, which was outside the scope of the PPN. [NAME_11] testified that he felt he could not attend the cultural ceremony due to his exclusion from the community hunt. [ 90 ] [NAME_17] found that based on the evidence, [NAME_11] had established that his exclusion from the hunt was retaliation for his CHRA complaint. [ 91 ] Accordingly, [NAME_17] found that [NAME_11] established prima facie evidence of retaliation in respect of the incident with his neighbour and the community moose hunt. I am persuaded by the [NAME_18] that the reasons for this Decision are transparent, intelligible and justified and consider the relevant legal framework and evidence. [ 92 ] The Applicant invites this Court to reconsider the evidence and reach a different conclusion. As noted, that is not the proper role for a reviewing court on judicial review. I am not persuaded by the Applicant’s assertions that there is no clear or direct evidence to substantiate findings of retaliation. In my view, based on the record, it was open to [NAME_17] to make the findings of retaliation. F. Damages Awards [ 93 ] The Applicant argues that [NAME_17]’s findings in respect of the damages awarded to [NAME_11] were unreasonable and inappropriate. [ 94 ] The Applicant argues that [NAME_11] was not denied access to his son’s graduation from [COMPANY_51], which is outside of the [NAME_10] reserve. The Applicant argues that [NAME_17] failed to consider alternative measures to permit [NAME_11]’s continued access to services, such as arranging for others in his household to attend the [NAME_14]. In addition, he had access to the Band Administrator to raise any questions via email concerning services provided by [NAME_10]. Further, the Applicant argues that [NAME_11]’s claims of mental, physical and emotional impacts, and the impacts on his health were not supported by evidence. Similarly, the Applicant submits that there was no evidence of his or his family’s long-term loss of connection to [NAME_10]. The Applicant argues that the findings were unreasonable and lacked coherence and justification. [ 95 ] The [NAME_18] argues that [NAME_17] reasonably ordered [NAME_10] to remove any and all obstacles to [NAME_11] entering and attending at the [NAME_13], the [COMPANY_15], the [COMPANY_16] and the [NAME_14]. In addition, [NAME_17] ordered damages totalling $30, 000 for [NAME_11]’s pain and suffering and for [NAME_10]’s reckless misconduct. [ 96 ] The [NAME_18] argues that [NAME_17] has broad statutory authority to award remedies under the CHRA . The [NAME_18] argues that the damages awarded were based on the evidence accepted by [NAME_17] and ought to be accorded deference. [ 97 ] The [NAME_18] argues that parties are not required to provide medical evidence to substantiate claims of pain and suffering; [NAME_52] v [NAME_53] , 2020 CHRT 35 at para 113. [ 98 ] Further, the [NAME_18] argues that [NAME_17] reasonably found that [NAME_10] acted in a reckless manner. They argue that this conclusion is supported by evidence that [NAME_10] failed to consider alternatives to the PPN and that there were no efforts to remove the PPN. [ 99 ] [NAME_17] ordered that, pursuant to section 53(2)(a) of the CHRA , [NAME_10] cease discriminating against [NAME_11]. This will be addressed in the jurisdictional section below. [ 100 ] [NAME_17] also ordered monetary damages to compensate for pain and suffering experienced by [NAME_11], pursuant to section 53(2)(e) of the CHRA . [ 101 ] In so ordering, [NAME_17] noted that the maximum award for damages of this nature as set out in the statute is “reserved for the very worst case or the most egregious of circumstances” . [ 102 ] [NAME_17] considered testimony from [NAME_11] with respect to the impacts that the PPN has had on his mental, physical and emotional health. I note, there were no corroborating medical or other reports submitted into evidence. In addition, [NAME_11] and his family members gave testimony in respect of their feelings of a “loss of connection to their community and culture” because of the PPN. [ 103 ] [NAME_17]’s reasons for the Decision highlight the numerous community events from which [NAME_11] was excluded. The Decision also notes that [NAME_11]’s sons feel similarly excluded and often do not participate in community events because their father is not welcome. In addition, the Decision references [NAME_11]’s reliance on [NAME_10] for many needs, including financial support, and his limited or inability to access certain services elsewhere. [NAME_17] acknowledged that the PPN did not explicitly ban [NAME_11] from the Health Centre, it found that the duration of the PPN (over five years at the time) and its broader impact on his sense of identity resulted in significant and long-lasting effects. [ 104 ] [NAME_17] finds that [NAME_10]’s conduct was “very serious, and the effect of the discrimination on [NAME_11] has been enormous” .

Accordingly, [NAME_17] awarded $15,000 and $1000 for each instance of retaliation by [NAME_10] in damages for pain and suffering. [ 105 ] In addition, pursuant to section 53(3) of the CHRA , [NAME_17] made an award for wilful and reckless conduct. [ 106 ] [NAME_17] notes that recklessness “usually denotes acts that disregard or show indifference to the consequences” . [NAME_17] also notes that recklessness does not required proof of intent to discriminate; whereas a finding of willfulness does ; [NAME_54] v [COMPANY_55].., 2021 CHRT 15 at para 107. [ 107 ] [NAME_17] does not find that [NAME_10] was willful as there was no evidence of a conscious intent to discriminate based on race. However, [NAME_17] does find [NAME_10]’s conduct was reckless. [NAME_17] finds this in part because there was limited evidence that [NAME_10] considered alternatives such as: limiting the time of the PPN; limiting the PPN to the [NAME_13] alone; limiting staff in the [NAME_13] that [NAME_11] could communicate with; requiring [NAME_11] be accompanied by a family member when attending at the [NAME_13]; ordering all in person interactions be recorded; or use of mediation. [NAME_17] notes that [NAME_10]’s choice to implement and enforce a complete prohibition was reckless. [NAME_17] finds that the broad nature of the PPN was disproportionate and the long period of time it had been in place was disproportionate and extreme.

Accordingly, [NAME_17] awarded an additional $8,000 in special compensation, and an additional $5,000 in respect of the retaliation allegation with respect to the actions of his neighbour. [NAME_17] notes that [NAME_10] has not shown concern for the safety of [NAME_11] and his family “in the face of serious racist attacks” , not withstanding the PPN was issued against him to protect [NAME_10] staff. [ 108 ] The Applicant has not pointed to any error that would warrant this Court’s intervention on judicial review. [ 109 ] Based on a review of the record, the reasons for the award of special damages are reasonable. The Decision is transparent, intelligible and justified in view of the relevant legal and factual matrix. [ 110 ] Finally, section 53(2)(a) of the CHRA permits [NAME_17] to order a respondent party to “take measures, in consultation with the Commission” to prevent discriminatory practices. [ 111 ] [NAME_17] notes that [NAME_10] had no policy or guidance for the issuance of PPNs. [NAME_17] ordered [NAME_10] to work with the Commission to ensure future policies and guidance for the issuance and administration of PPNs are non-discriminatory. [ 112 ] The Applicant as not pointed to specific errors that would render this order unreasonable. G. Jurisdiction of [NAME_17] [ 113 ] The Applicant argues that where a Tribunal acts beyond its jurisdiction or exceeds its statutory authority, the appropriate standard of review is correctness. [ 114 ] The Applicant argues that [NAME_17] does not have the jurisdiction to overturn a PPN lawfully issued pursuant to the provincial legislation and that [NAME_17] lacks the statutory authority to revoke, modify or declare PPNs invalid. The Applicant submits that, for this reason, the Decision is incorrect and should be set aside. [ 115 ] The Applicant argues that section 16 of the CHRA does not extend jurisdiction to [NAME_17] to adjudicate on matters falling within provincial jurisdiction or enable [NAME_17] to apply provincial statutes. [ 116 ] Accordingly, the Applicant argues that the order to “remove all obstacles for [NAME_11] to access the [NAME_13], [NAME_14], the [COMPANY_15] and the [COMPANY_16]” exceeded [NAME_17]’s jurisdiction. [ 117 ] In addition, the Applicant argues that the order encroaches on [NAME_10]’s right to govern pursuant to the Indian Act . [ 118 ] In support of their position, the Applicant relies on [NAME_57] v [NAME_58] , 2009 CHRT 39 [ [NAME_57] ] at paragraph 9, where [NAME_17] held: … Section 16 of the CHRA does not extend the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to adjudicate on matters falling within provincial jurisdiction, nor does it enable the Tribunal to apply provincial statutes. [ 119 ] In addition, the Applicant relies on [NAME_59] v [COMPANY_60] (Ontario), 2011, [NAME_61] 432, whereby the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario ( “[NAME_61]” ) found that it did not have jurisdiction to determine if the ban at question was valid under the provincial Trespass to Property Act “in the abstract and apart from any issue of discrimination” . Rather, the [NAME_61]’s jurisdiction was to determine if race, colour or ethnic origin was a factor in the decision to arrest the applicant for trespassing. In that case, a protection of property notice was issued against an individual who was banned from a shopping mall for refusing to clean up garbage left behind at the food court and for loud swearing. [ 120 ] The [NAME_18] argues that [NAME_17]’s findings are within its jurisdiction. In support of their position, the Respondent relies on [NAME_62] (on behalf of the members of the [NAME_63]) v [NAME_64] , 2022 CHRT 4 [ [NAME_65] ] at paragraph 34, aff’d 2025 FCA 24. [ 121 ] In [NAME_65] , [NAME_17] held that the basis of the complaint against [NAME_64] ( “[NAME_66]” )—alleging adverse and detrimental treatment in the provision of services under the First Nations Policing Program —was on the basis of race. [NAME_66] argued that the complaint constituted a collateral attack on Quebec’s Police Act , CQLR, c P-13.1, which governs police servicing in the province. On that basis, it submitted that [NAME_17] lacked jurisdiction, as the matter engaged a provincial statutory scheme. [NAME_66] further argued that any challenge to the adequacy of funding under the tripartite agreements between the [NAME_4], the province and Canada, which are linked to the provincial legislation, properly lies within the jurisdiction of the provincial superior court. [ 122 ] [NAME_17] found it had jurisdiction to hear the complaint and did not agree that it was a collateral attack on the provincial legislation. In so finding, [NAME_17] notes: It is undisputed that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction over a provincial act, because it can only address issues under the Parliament of Canada’s jurisdiction, at paragraph 38. … It is undisputed that police services are under provincial jurisdiction, in accordance with the authority the provinces have over the administration of justice, at paragraph 39. [ 123 ] However, [NAME_17] notes that the First Nations Police Program ( “FNPP” ) is a federal initiative implemented through tripartite agreements, under which all three parties have defined obligations; at para 40 - 44. The federal government contributed to the funding as part of a model designed to support Indigenous police services in communities. As a result, [NAME_17] found that the FNPP and its implementation fell within the scope of its jurisdiction. [ 124 ] Further, consistent with [NAME_17]’s analysis in Family Caring Society 2016 , [NAME_17] noted Parliament’s exclusive jurisdiction over “Indians and lands reserved for Indians” , pursuant to subsection 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867; at paras 45 – 55. Ultimately, because of the role of the federal government in respect of the partial funding of police services offered on reserve and noting the overlapping jurisdictions of the federal and provincial/territorial government in respect of the provision of police services, [NAME_17] found it had jurisdiction to determine if [NAME_66] discriminated against the complainant; at para 55. [ 125 ] In Canada (Attorney General) v [NAME_62] , 2025 FCA 24, the Federal Court of Appeal notes that the Attorney General did not, on appeal, raise arguments that the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to determine the complaint because it required a decision in the context of a provincial statute; at para 38. [ADDRESS] also noted that it was of the view that the Attorney General’s argument of collateral attack raised a “false problem” and that the argument was not before the Court in the context of the appeal; at para 99. [ 126 ] It is important to set out some basic principles that govern administrative law and the jurisdiction of tribunals. As a creature of statute, tribunals cannot make orders that impact rights without a grant of authority from the enabling statute.

Accordingly, to determine a tribunal’s remedial jurisdiction, the court must consider its enabling statute. A tribunal order that is outside of its enabling statute, exceeding its jurisdiction, is void. [ 127 ] [NAME_62] is distinguishable. Unlike in [NAME_62] , the federal government is not a party. Rather, the present complaint under review arises from a decision by a [NAME_4]. Here, [NAME_10] issued a PPN pursuant to provincial legislation. [NAME_10] argues that this is a decision made pursuant to an exercise of their inherent right of self-governance protected by section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 . [ 128 ] In the Decision, [NAME_17] notes that the Respondent requested that the PPN be overturned because race was a factor in its issuance. [NAME_17] notes that “making an order to overturn a notice, such as the PPN, made under provincial legislation goes beyond the jurisdiction of this Tribunal as recognised in the CHRA” ( [NAME_57] at paras 9 and 11). However, [NAME_17] goes on to find that pursuant to section 53(2)(b) of the CHRA , they have broad discretion to make orders to victims of discriminatory practice and to make available at the first reasonable occasion the rights, opportunities and privileges that were denied because of the discrimination. [ 129 ] In [NAME_57], [NAME_17] notes that its jurisdiction arises from section 2 of the CHRA , which clearly states that the legislation applies to matters within the legislative authority of Parliament. [NAME_17] goes on to note that the Tribunal is established pursuant to section 48.1 of the CHRA , and “only has those powers which are assigned to it by statute, or which arise therefrom by necessary implication” . [ 130 ] I agree that [NAME_17] has broad discretion to order relief. With respect, they must also have jurisdiction. In this case, [NAME_17] appears to acknowledge that generally they do not have jurisdiction to overturn the PPN, which was issued pursuant to provincial legislation. However, effectively, that is precisely what they did. Section 53 cannot be interpreted in a manner that grants [NAME_17] jurisdiction where they otherwise do not have it. Tribunals cannot rely on broad remedial powers to bootstrap jurisdiction. Section 2 of the CHRA states that “within the purview of matters coming within the legislative authority of Parliament” . Broad remedial jurisdiction as set out in this section 53(2) of the CHRA cannot extend the sphere of [NAME_17]’s jurisdiction over matters that are beyond the “legislative authority of Parliament” . [ 131 ] The PPN was enacted pursuant to provincial legislation. Indeed, [NAME_17] notes that “making an order to overturn a notice such as the PPN, made under provincial legislation goes beyond the jurisdiction of this Tribunal recognized in the CHRA” . However, effectively, [NAME_17]’s remedy that [NAME_10] remove “any obstacles to [NAME_11] accessing the [NAME_13], the [NAME_14], the [COMPANY_15] and the [COMPANY_16]” effectively did what [NAME_17] found it did not have jurisdiction to do; overturn the PPN. [ 132 ] There were other remedies available to [NAME_17] that did not exceed its scope of jurisdiction. Notably, monetary damages, which it did award.

VII. Conclusion [ 133 ] A review of the record for this application illustrates that [NAME_17]’s findings in respect of racial discrimination by [NAME_10] in the issuance and administration of the PPN against [NAME_11] are reasonable. The Applicant has not pointed to any errors that would warrant this Court’s intervention, and the Court is of the view that the Applicant is requesting that this Court intervene to substitute its findings of fact for those of [NAME_17]. This is not the proper role of a reviewing court on an application for judicial review. [ 134 ] The Applicant does not persuade the Court that [NAME_17] breached the Applicant’s right of procedural fairness in its reliance on and consideration of systemic racism directed towards Black men in Canada in its analysis of the allegations of racial discrimination. [ADDRESS] finds that the issue of race-based discrimination was a clear basis for the complaint. The record illustrates that the Applicant was provided notice of the complaint and given a full and fair opportunity to respond to the complaint. [ 135 ] [NAME_17]’s awards of damages for pain and suffering and special damages are reasonable. The Applicant has not persuaded the Court that [NAME_17] committed any errors that warrant this Court’s intervention. [ 136 ] In addition, [NAME_17]’s order that [NAME_10] is to work with the Commission to develop a policy to guide the issuing and enforcement of PPNs is reasonable. [ 137 ] However, [NAME_17]’s order that [NAME_10] remove any obstacles preventing [NAME_11] from entering and attending activities at the [NAME_13], [COMPANY_15], [COMPANY_16], and the [NAME_14] pursuant to section 53(2)(b) of the CHRA exceeds its jurisdiction. Effectively, this order purports to overturn the PPN, which is outside the scope of [NAME_17]’s jurisdiction, as the PPN was enacted pursuant to provincial legislation.

JUDGMENT in T-1442-24 THIS COURT’S

JUDGMENT is that : The Application is granted in part. The Canadian Human Rights Tribunal’s order that [NAME_2] remove any obstacles to [NAME_11] attending activities in the [NAME_13], [COMPANY_15], [COMPANY_16] and the [NAME_14], pursuant to section 53(2)(b) of the Canadian Human Rights Act, exceeded its jurisdiction. The Canadian Human Rights Tribunal’s findings of discrimination based on race are reasonable. The Canadian Human Rights Tribunal’s findings of retaliation based on race are reasonable. The Canadian Human Rights Tribunal’s award of damages for pain and suffering in respect of the issuance and administration of the Protection of Property Notice is reasonable. The Canadian Human Rights Tribunal’s award of damages for pain and suffering in respect of the incidents of retaliation is reasonable. The Canadian Human Rights Tribunal’s award of special damages in respect of the issuance and administration of the Protection of Property Notice is reasonable The Canadian Human Rights Tribunal’s award of special damages in respect of the incident of retaliation is reasonable. No award of costs. "[NAME_67]" Judge FEDERAL COURT SOLICITORS OF RECORD DOCKET: T-1442-24 STYLE OF CAUSE: [NAME_2] v [NAME_8] COMMISSION PLACE OF HEARING: Halifax, Nova Scotia DATE OF HEARING: April 28, 2026

REASONS AND

JUDGMENT: [NAME_1] J. DATED: July 15, 2026 APPEARANCES : [NAME_69] [NAME_71] For The Applicant [NAME_74] For The Respondent CANADIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION ON THEIR [NAME_6] FOR THE RESPONDENT [NAME_6] ON HIS OWN BEHALF SOLICITORS OF RECORD : [NAME_76] and Solicitors Halifax, Nova Scotia For The Applicant