Federal Court Upholds Denial of Retroactive Maternity Allowance

Date: 20260527 Docket: T-2437-25 Citation: 2026 FC 691 Vancouver, British Columbia, May 27, 2026 PRESENT: Mr. Justice Sébastien Grammond BETWEEN: [NAME] Applicant and THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA Respondent

REASONS AND

JUDGMENT [ 1 ] [NAME] seeks judicial review of the denial of her military grievance, which pertained to her ineligibility to receive the maternity and parental allowance. I am dismissing the application, because the Final Authority’s decision is reasonable. My reasons follow.

I. Background [ 2 ] [NAME] is a member of the Canadian Forces. She gave birth to her fourth child in May 2020. In preparation for this event, in March 2020, she applied for Excused Drill and Training [ED&T] or, in other words, maternity leave. [ 3 ] When on ED&T, members of the Forces may receive a maternity or parental allowance, intended to supplement the employment insurance [EI] benefits available to them. The conditions of entitlement to this allowance are set by the Treasury Board in section 205.461 of the Compensation and Benefits Instructions [CBI]. One of the conditions is that the member must agree in writing to complete a period of service of up to one year after the end of the ED&T. [ 4 ] When she applied for ED&T, [NAME] did not apply for a maternity or parental allowance. She understood that she had to undertake to complete a period of service upon returning from ED&T. However, she was unsure whether she would be in a position to honour the undertaking. She did not know whether her husband, who is also a member of the Forces, would have a tour of duty abroad in the following year. She was also uncertain about her future plans. She did not want to be in a position where she would need to reimburse the allowance she received. [ 5 ] Upon returning to service, [NAME]’s plans were more certain. She applied to receive the maternity and parental allowance retroactively. However, she was informed that this was not possible. [ 6 ] [NAME] then initiated a grievance pursuant to the National Defence Act , RSC 1985, c N-5 [the Act]. The grievance was denied by the Initial Authority. The matter was then considered by the Military Grievances External Review Committee [the Committee], who recommended the grievance be denied. The Final Authority adopted the Committee’s recommendation. [NAME] now seeks judicial review of the Final Authority’s decision.

II. Analysis [ 7 ] I am dismissing the application because the Final Authority’s decision is reasonable. [ 8 ] On judicial review, the Court intervenes only if the applicant shows that the administrative decision is unreasonable or was reached through an unfair process. [ADDRESS] does not merely substitute its decision for that of the administrative decision maker, in this case the Final Authority. In matters of interpretation, a decision may be unreasonable if it cannot be justified by the provision’s text, context and purpose: Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov , 2019 SCC 65 at paragraphs 120–122, [2019] 4 SCR 653 [ Vavilov ]. With respect to factual determinations, courts will intervene only in exceptional circumstances, where “the decision maker has fundamentally misapprehended or failed to account for the evidence before it” : Vavilov at paragraphs 125–126. [ 9 ] Judicial review is focused on the reasons given by the administrative decision maker: Vavilov at paragraph 84. In this case, pursuant to section 29.13(2) of the Act, the Final Authority is required to provide reasons only if it departs from the Committee’s recommendation. Where the Final Authority accepts the recommendation of the Committee, however, the Committee’s reasons will typically play a crucial role in assessing the reasonableness of the Final Authority’s decision. [ 10 ] I will now review [NAME]’s four arguments in support of her assertion that the Final Authority’s decision is unreasonable. A. Eligibility [ 11 ] The first and most central issue is whether the Final Authority reasonably interpreted the provisions governing the maternity and parental allowance. [ 12 ] After setting out the relevant provisions, the Committee found that [NAME] did not qualify because she did not undertake to serve for the required period upon returning from ED&T. Upon an “ordinary reading” of the provisions, the Committee found that “the undertaking must be given before leave period ends and cannot be done after the fact.” The Committee gave two additional reasons supporting its interpretation. First, it relied on Defence Administrative Orders and Directives [DAOD] 5001-2, which requires an application to be made prior to the birth of the child. Second, it noted that the concurrent receipt of EI benefits is a condition of eligibility, which supports the implicit requirement that a member needs to apply for the maternity and parental allowance before the ED&T period ends. [ 13 ] The Final Authority adopted the reasoning of the Committee. It also stated: . . . providing financial compensation after the fact does not align with the intent of Defence Administrative Orders and Directives (DAOD) 5001-2, Maternity and Parental Benefits, which is to enable time away from military duties, along with compensation, to care for a newborn or adopted child. The application process for these benefits is outlined in DAOD 5001-2 and does not provide for retroactive requests. In fact, it states that the application should be submitted at least two months prior to the anticipated birth of the child. [ 14 ] To show that this interpretation is unreasonable, [NAME] first argues that it is not based on the clear wording of the provision; rather, the Committee and the Final Authority had to infer it. This, however, does not render their interpretation unreasonable. The modern method of interpretation, adopted by the Supreme Court in Vavilov and other cases, does not require every consequence of the law to be spelled out explicitly. In truth, the need for interpretation often arises because the law needs to be applied to circumstances that the drafters did not foresee or for which they did not explicitly provide. [ 15 ] Second, [NAME] argues that the Committee and the Final Authority misunderstood the purpose of the provisions by focusing on alignment with the period for admissibility to EI benefits. She points to DAOD 5001-2, which describes the purpose as facilitating recruitment, employment and retention of members. [ 16 ] In this regard, the Committee’s reference to EI benefits is an application of the contextual method of interpretation. In interpreting a statutory provision, it is acceptable to refer to related provisions of the same statute or related statutes. Here, CBI 205.461 expressly refers to EI benefits. It was reasonable for the Committee to refer to the EI regime as an aid for the interpretation of the CBI. [ 17 ] More generally, [NAME] appears to be arguing that the eligibility conditions should be interpreted in a way that maximizes the purpose of the maternity and parental allowance, which is to help families with newborn children and facilitate retention. Purpose, however, is rarely determinative of the interpretation process. Text and context must still be considered and may show that the author of the text did not intend to pursue a particular purpose at all costs or without limitation. An interpretation is not unreasonable merely because an alternative interpretation would better achieve the provision’s purpose. The fact that the maternity and parental allowance is intended to help families and facilitate retention does not necessarily entail that it may be claimed retroactively. [ 18 ] In my view, the Final Authority’s interpretation of the CBI is reasonable. The text and context tend to show that the intention was that the maternity and parental allowance would complement EI benefits and would be paid concurrently with them. While the text does not explicitly say that a member cannot apply retroactively, it is reasonable to infer this from the text and context, as the Committee and the Final Authority did. B. Lack of Notice [ 19 ] [NAME] then asserts that there was a breach of procedural fairness because she was never told that she could not apply for the maternity and parental allowance retroactively. In reality, this does not relate to the fairness of the process before the Committee or the Final Authority. Rather, it is a substantive issue that the latter had to decide. For this reason, their decision will be reviewed on the standard of reasonableness. [ 20 ] The Committee found that there was no evidence that [NAME] had discussed the precise issue of a retroactive application with the clerk who assisted her in the application process. Therefore, she was not misinformed about the issue. Moreover, the Committee found that [NAME] “understood the eligibility requirements and made an informed decision not to apply.” The Final Authority adopted the recommendation of the Committee and added that [NAME] had not “identified any instance where [she was] provided with incorrect advice.” [ 21 ] The finding that [NAME] was never provided with incorrect advice is a finding of fact that the Court will not normally overturn. In this regard, [NAME] did not show that the Final Authority fundamentally misapprehended the evidence before it. [ 22 ] More generally, the gist of the Committee’s reasoning is that it was not reasonable for [NAME] to believe she could apply for the allowance retroactively upon finding out that she would be able to meet the service obligation. In other words, if her intention had always been to apply retroactively, it was incumbent upon her to ask the question directly in March 2020. I do not see anything unreasonable in this conclusion. C. Failure to Address Submissions [ 23 ] [NAME] also argues that the Final Authority failed to respond to her submissions in response to the recommendation of the Committee. In particular, she states that the Final Authority disregarded her arguments regarding the lack of an explicit prohibition on claiming the allowance retroactively and the Committee’s improper reliance on the EI regime. [ 24 ] In assessing this argument, one must not forget that the Final Authority is required to give reasons only if it departs from the recommendation of the Committee. This did not happen in the present case. Nevertheless, the Final Authority explicitly endorsed the Committee’s reasons and added a paragraph that summarized its main conclusions. [ 25 ] In my view, the Final Authority was not required to address [NAME]’s submissions explicitly. The Final Authority’s silence simply means that it thought that the Committee had adequately addressed those issues. This way of proceeding does not render the decision unreasonable: see, for example, [NAME] v Canada (Attorney General) , 2022 FC 968 at paragraph 23. D. Delay for Claiming Allowance [ 26 ] Lastly, [NAME] challenges the Committee’s treatment of section 203.05 of the King’s Regulations and Orders, which sets a twelve-month time limit to claim money payable pursuant to the CBI and provides for the possibility of seeking an extension where there is “sufficient reason for the delay.” The Committee found that this provision was not applicable because this was not a situation where a member did not receive a payment to which they were entitled. Rather, the Committee reiterated that [NAME] was never eligible to receive the allowance. The Final Authority did not address this specific issue but, as mentioned above, generally endorsed the Committee’s reasoning. In my view, the Committee’s reading of section 203.05 is reasonable.

III. Disposition [ 27 ] As [NAME] failed to show that the Final Authority’s decision is unreasonable, her application for judicial review will be dismissed. [ 28 ] I do not see any reason to depart from the usual practice of awarding costs to the successful party. In my view, an amount of $1,000 is just and appropriate in the circumstances.

JUDGMENT in T-2437-25 THIS COURT’S

JUDGMENT is that : The application for judicial review is dismissed. The applicant is condemned to pay $1,000 in costs to the respondent, inclusive of disbursement and taxes. "Sébastien Grammond" Judge FEDERAL COURT SOLICITORS OF RECORD Docket: T-2437-25 STYLE OF CAUSE: [NAME] v THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA PLACE OF HEARING: Ottawa, Ontario DATE OF HEARING: May 20, 2026

REASONS AND

JUDGMENT: GRAMMOND J. DATED: MAY 27, 2026 APPEARANCES : [NAME] (self-represented) For The Applicant [NAME] For The Respondent SOLICITORS OF RECORD : Attorney General of Canada Ottawa, Ontario For The Respondent