Federal Court Upholds Genuine Marriage Test for Immigration Purposes

Date: 20260421 Docket: IMM-2484-25 Citation: 2026 FC 530 Toronto, Ontario, April 21, 2026 PRESENT: Mr. Justice Diner BETWEEN: [NAME] Applicant and THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION Respondent

JUDGMENT AND

REASONS [ 1 ] The Applicant, Ms. [NAME], seeks judicial review of a decision of the Immigration Appeal Division [[NAME]] dated January 14, 2025 [Decision], where [NAME], pursuant to subsection 4(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations , SOR/2002-227 [IRPR], dismissed the Applicant’s appeal arising from a refusal of her sponsorship application [Application] on the basis that her marriage was not genuine and was entered into primarily for immigration purposes. For the reasons that follow, the Application will be dismissed.

I. Background [ 2 ] The Applicant is a Canadian citizen, who married a Nigerian citizen in the United States [U.S.] on October 25, 2019, and applied to sponsor him for permanent residence under the [NAME]. The Applicant and the sponsored individual [[NAME]] share a child, born on October 1, 2021. [ 3 ] Prior to their marriage, the [NAME] became acquainted in December 2018 through an online platform and developed their relationship through ongoing communication before meeting in person in June 2019. [ 4 ] At the time the relationship began, the [NAME] was residing in the U.S., where he had entered without status and subsequently obtained protection in the form of withholding of removal under Article III of the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment , Can. T.S. 1987 No. 36 [CAT]. The withholding of removal permitted the [NAME] to remain in the U.S. but did not provide a pathway to permanent residence or allow him to sponsor family members. [ 5 ] Following their marriage, the Applicant submitted a sponsorship application on behalf of the [NAME]. On September 13, 2023, an [NAME] officer [[NAME]] refused the application, concluding that the marriage was not genuine and had been entered into primarily for the purpose of acquiring permanent residence status under subsection 4(1) of the IRPR, and finding that the [NAME] did not satisfy subsection 11(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act [IRPA], SC 2001, c 27, having failed to meet the statutory requirements. [ 6 ] As a result of the [NAME]’s decision, the Applicant appealed the sponsorship refusal to [NAME]. In its Decision dated January 14, 2025, [NAME] dismissed the appeal, concluding that the Applicant had not established, on a balance of probabilities, that the marriage was genuine, or that it was not entered into primarily for immigration purposes. [NAME] found that the primary purpose of the marriage was for the [NAME] to obtain status in Canada and noted in its analysis that the [NAME] was in a challenging immigration situation in the U.S. at the time that he started communicating with the Applicant. Apart from his status under CAT, [NAME] noted that his U.S. work permit was expiring that year. [ 7 ] [NAME] found that the Applicant’s involvement in the relationship to be genuinely sincere, it had reservations, on the other hand, about the [NAME]’s intentions, and the resulting genuineness of the marriage. Specifically, [NAME] noted that the [NAME]’s uncertain immigration status, along with his apparent eagerness to quickly advance the relationship and marry the Applicant, raised significant concerns. It noted that the [NAME]’s primary motivation for pursuing marriage appeared to be driven by immigration benefits rather than a genuine emotional connection. [NAME] noted that the timing and nature of his actions aligned with achieving immigration goals rather than building a sincere, long-term relationship. [ 8 ] [NAME] acknowledged certain positive factors of a genuine relationship, including ongoing communication, financial support, and the existence of a child born to the [NAME] in 2021. However, it found that these factors did not outweigh concerns arising from the [NAME]’s immigration history, the rapid progression of the relationship, gaps in documentary evidence, certain inconsistencies between the evidence of the Applicant and [NAME], as well as deficiencies in their knowledge of one another, their family, and their future plans. In dismissing the appeal, [NAME] concluded its Decision at paragraph 66 as follows: [NAME] had the onus to prove, on a balance of probabilities, that her marriage with the [NAME] was not entered into for immigration purposes, and that it is genuine. There must be clear, cogent and convincing evidence to establish that the marriage is genuine, and that immigration was not the primary purpose of the marriage. Such evidence was lacking in this case. The panel concludes that the marriage was primarily entered into to facilitate the [[NAME]]’s immigration to Canada, and that the marriage is not genuine.

II. Issues [ 9 ] The parties agree that sole issue is whether [NAME]’s decision was reasonable. Under the framework articulated in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov , 2019 SCC 65 [ Vavilov ], a reviewing court must determine whether the decision is justified, transparent, and intelligible in light of the legal and factual constraints that bear on the decision. [ 10 ] The Applicant raises two principal arguments. First, the Applicant submits that [NAME] misunderstood the nature of the [NAME]’s immigration status in the U.S. The Applicant argues that [NAME] improperly treated the [NAME]’s protection against removal under the CAT as unstable or temporary status, and relied on this characterization to infer that the marriage was motivated by immigration considerations. According to the Applicant, there was no evidence before the tribunal that the [NAME]’s status was precarious or that he faced imminent removal. [ 11 ] Second, the Applicant argues that [NAME] failed to give proper weight to the existence of the child of the Applicant and [NAME]. The Applicant submits that the existence of a child of the relationship constitutes significant evidence of a genuine marriage. [ 12 ] The Respondent, on the other hand, contends that [NAME]’s Decision was reasonable. The Respondent argues that [NAME] accurately described the [NAME]’s immigration status and reasonably considered the limitations of that status in assessing immigration motivation. The Respondent further submits that [NAME] expressly acknowledged the existence of the child, which it treated as a positive factor, but reasonably concluded did not outweigh the other concerns that arose from the evidentiary record.

III. Analysis [ 13 ] I will address each of the Applicant’s arguments in turn, first providing a brief review of the applicable statutory provisions. Under section 12 of the IRPA, the selection criterion applicable to a foreign national who wishes to immigrate to Canada as a member of the [NAME] is their spousal relationship with a Canadian citizen or permanent resident. As a result, [NAME] was required to determine whether the Applicant had established, on a balance of probabilities, that her marriage satisfied both branches of the test set out in paragraphs 4(1)(a) and (b) of the IRPR, which state: Bad faith Mauvaise foi 4 (1) For the purposes of these Regulations, a foreign national shall not be considered a spouse, a common-law partner or a conjugal partner of a person if the marriage, common-law partnership or conjugal partnership 4 (1) Pour l’application du présent règlement, [NAME] n’est pas considéré comme étant l’époux, le conjoint de fait ou le partenaire conjugal d’une personne si le mariage ou la relation des conjoints de fait ou des partenaires conjugaux, selon le cas: (a) was entered into primarily for the purpose of acquiring any status or privilege under the Act; or a) visait principalement l’acquisition d’un statut ou d’un privilège sous le régime de la Loi; (b) is not genuine. b) n’est pas authentique . A. Alleged Mischaracterization of the [NAME]’s U.S. Immigration Status [ 14 ] The Applicant submits that [NAME] erred in law by misunderstanding the nature of the [NAME]’s immigration status in the U.S., and specifically, the protection afforded by withholding of removal under the CAT, and that [NAME]’s conclusion was thus unreasonable. [ 15 ] First, the Applicant points to a letter from the [NAME] [Attorney’s Letter] contained in the Certified Tribunal Record [CTR], which confirmed that the [NAME] was granted withholding of removal under CAT. After taking this into consideration, [NAME], however, found the [NAME]’s immigration status to be evidence supporting that the primary purpose of the marriage was immigration. According to the Applicant, the [NAME]’s CAT withholding of removal status demonstrates that his immigration status was stable rather than precarious. The Applicant also asserts that there was no evidence before [NAME] to for it to have speculated that the [NAME]’s protection could be revoked. [ 16 ] Furthermore, the Applicant relies on [NAME] v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) , 2008 FC 1230 (CanLII), [2009] 4 FCR 46 [ [NAME] ] where Justice Mosely of this Court held that the status of withholding of removal in the United States is the equivalent of being recognized as a Convention refugee in Canada (at para 75). The Applicant adds that the Federal Court of Appeal endorsed Justice Mosely’s reasons on appeal ( [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2009 FCA 344 at para 6). Thus, the Applicant argues that [NAME] unreasonably found the [NAME]’s withholding of removal status would motivate him to enter a marriage to secure “refuge or economic opportunity” when he has a status equivalent to holding Convention refugee status, in additional to a work permit in the U.S. [ 17 ] I am not convinced by these arguments. First, I note that [NAME] accurately described the key features of the [NAME]’s immigration status when the [NAME]’s relationship began, being that: (a) his refugee claim in the U.S. had been refused; (b) he was granted protection against removal under the CAT; (c) his status did not provide a pathway to permanent residence or citizenship in the U.S.; (d) his status did not permit family reunification; and (e) his status could be revisited if country conditions changed in Nigeria. [ 18 ] Furthermore, there was nothing inconsistent between [NAME]’s findings and the information set out in the Attorney’s Letter. The Decision reasonably characterized the Applicant’s status in the U.S. Contrary to the Applicant’s arguments, [NAME] did not conclude that the [NAME] faced imminent removal, nor did it treat the protection afforded in the U.S. as illusory. [ 19 ] Rather, [NAME] considered the objective limitations of the [NAME]’s U.S. status when assessing the broader context in which the marriage arose. I find that it was open to [NAME] to consider whether the absence of long-term security and family reunification options in the U.S. could and did incent the [NAME] to seek permanent status elsewhere (see, for instance, [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2019 FC 923 at para 30 [ [NAME] ]). Like in [NAME] , this was a contextual inference of [NAME]’s, grounded in the evidence before it. [ 20 ] In short, [NAME] did not misunderstand the law governing protection under the CAT, nor does it amount to speculation untethered from the record. Furthermore, and with regard to the Applicant’s reference to [NAME] , I note that Justice Mosley’s conclusion about the withholding of removal status in that case was made in the context of reviewing an officer’s finding that the applicant was ineligible to seek protection in Canada ( [NAME] at para 77). In fact, Justice Mosely noted that the refugee claimant was seeking a more favourable status in Canada where he would enjoy more rights which he could not have enjoyed from withholding status in the U.S.: [74] [NAME] is attempting to do just that by leaving the United States and seeking protection in Canada. Through his own admissions, [NAME] is implicitly asylum shopping as he is seeking a more favorable status in Canada to take advantage of the benefits that accrue from permanent residence, including the right to travel abroad and to sponsor others which he could not have enjoyed from withholding status in the U.S. [Emphasis added.] [ 21 ] [NAME] did not mention [NAME] in its analysis, I find that Justice Mosely’s finding regarding the limited range of rights of the withholding status, in fact, goes to the reasonableness of [NAME]’s consideration of the [NAME]’s immigration status in the context of determining the genuineness of the marriage. [ 22 ] Furthermore, I note that [NAME] considered other aspects of the [NAME]’s immigration status beyond the withholding of his removal under CAT, before concluding that his status was not permanent. Indeed, [NAME] also referenced the imminent expiration of his work permit, which led to its finding on the [NAME]’s economic need. [NAME] wrote at paragraphs 36-37 of its Decision: First, the evidence shows that the [NAME] was in a challenging immigration situation at the time he started communicating with [NAME]. As stipulated in this decision, the [NAME] was granted a withholding of removal under Article III of the Convention Against Torture in 2017. He was also granted a work permit that expires in 2025 by the American authorities. Therefore, the [NAME] is undoubtedly in need of refuge and economic opportunities outside of the USA. [Emphasis added.] [ 23 ] [NAME]’s conclusion that the [NAME]’s economic opportunities outside of the U.S. is clearly linked to his non-permanent residency status, along with the expiry of the work permit which provided his economic opportunities. [ 24 ] I also note that [NAME] assessed the [NAME]’s immigration status for the purpose of determining his primary intention to marry the Applicant. The overall assessment of the [NAME]’s intention behind the marriage engaged credibility considerations arising from the parties’ testimony and the inconsistencies identified in the CTR. For instance, [NAME] noted that the [NAME] had different opinions about the development of their relationship, and that the Applicant initially had reservations about the [NAME]’s intentions regarding the marriage, based on his initial conduct, including the fact that he failed to disclose his correct age to the Applicant. At paragraphs 40-43 of its decision, [NAME] noted that: … [the [NAME]] testified his relationship with [NAME] became serious in January 2019. However, the evidence shows that in April 2019, [NAME] still had doubts about the relationship, but [the [NAME]] reassured her that meeting in person would help them decide their future together. He expressed his fear of losing everything due to her concerns, while she emphasized her happiness with her children and life. In April 2019, five months after the [NAME]’s first contact, [the [NAME]] revealed he was 28 years old but looked older. [NAME] at that time was 36 years old. He also expressed his growing affection for her and asked her to trust him so they could be happy together… [43] The panel has carefully reviewed the relationship development between the [Applicant and [NAME]]. The panel finds [NAME]’s involvement in this relation to be genuinely sincere. However, the panel has reservations about [the [NAME]]’s intentions. [ 25 ] Assessments of credibility and weight lie at the core of [NAME]’s expertise and attract significant deference on judicial review ( [NAME] v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) , 2026 FC 434 at para 34; Vavilov at para 29). [NAME] considered the [NAME]’s immigration status as a part of these credibility assessments. Read as a whole, I find that [NAME]’s conclusions in this regard were intelligible and justified. B. Treatment of the Child of the Relationship [ 26 ] The Applicant argues that [NAME] failed to give sufficient weight to the fact that the parties have a child together, which she submits constitutes prima facie evidence of a genuine marriage. The Applicant points to [NAME]’s treatment of this factor in its Decision: [47] The panel acknowledges the [Applicant] and [[NAME]] have a child together. However, the panel does not find their son, who was born in 2021, to be persuasive evidence that the [[NAME]] did not enter a marriage in 2019 primarily for immigration purposes. The birth of their son is a positive factor, but it does not outweigh the concerns above in relation to the primary purpose of the marriage. [ 27 ] The Applicant submits that [NAME] failed to grapple with the evidence before it, namely the fact that the child in question is now over four years old and that the Applicant has formed a family with the [NAME]. Specifically, the Applicant asserts that [NAME] only considered the birth of the child, rather than the significant role of the [NAME] in the child’s life. [ 28 ] I disagree with the Applicant. The record does not support the assertion that [NAME] ignored or minimized the evidence regarding the child. Rather, [NAME] expressly acknowledged the existence of the child and treated him as a positive factor, but concluded that this factor, along with other positive factors cited, did not outweigh other concerns arising from the evidence. [NAME] elaborated this further below in the Decision, which includes the rapid progression of the relationship, inconsistencies in the parties’ testimony, limited mutual knowledge of each other’s respective backgrounds and lives, and the circumstances surrounding their marriage. [ 29 ] The existence of a child is a relevant consideration for the bona fides evaluation of a marriage within the IRPA context. However the presence of a child, while relevant, is not determinative of whether a marriage is genuine ( [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2021 FC 68 at para 28 [ [NAME] ]; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2022 FC 1420 at para. 26 [ [NAME] ]). [ 30 ] The Applicant argues that [NAME]’s concerns did not meet the standard of “strong countervailing evidence” required to displace the significance of the birth of the child: [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2010 FC 122 [ [NAME] ]. I do not agree. I find that [NAME] cited evidence that met this standard. Unlike the Court’s conclusions in [NAME] , here I do not find that [NAME] cited “trivial inconclusive or irrelevant matters” . [ 31 ] Indeed, [NAME] pointed to numerous points in the [NAME]’s testimony before it during their two-day hearing, which demonstrate the lack of knowledge in each other’s lives, weaknesses in their compatibility, and deficiencies around their plans for the future. [NAME], in arriving at its conclusion, noted that: there was no evidence that the [NAME] has been involved in the Applicant’s two prior children’s lives (they were two and three years of age respectively, when the [NAME] met), or that “ as a husband to their mother, he is involved in the children’s lives or has taken a certain stand in terms of being a parental figure for the children” (Decision at para. 52); the [NAME] did not know details about the Applicant’s past, such as her previous spouse’s name nor how long she had been married (Decision at para. 55); The Applicant, for her part, “was uncertain about her husband’s current status [in the U.S.] and what it entailed” (Decision at para. 54); The [NAME]’s knowledge of each other was also “deficient in regard to important daily routine” , and in short, “inconsistent with what is expected from partners having frequent and meaningful contacts and being married for more than five years” (Decision at para. 56). [ 32 ] In addition, [NAME] found that their planned future together was deficient, finding that the: lack of clear and decisive evidence in their plans is a concern. Indeed, it is reasonable to expect that a [NAME] who has been married for more than five years would make such plans and have alternate courses of action they have agreed upon if they could not live in Canada together. (Decision at para. 63). [ 33 ] Again, both [NAME] and [NAME] confirm, that while the presence of a child may constitute a positive factor in the analysis, that factor does not in and of itself compel a finding that the relationship is genuine. This decision is entirely consistent with the jurisprudence in that regard: [NAME] was entitled to weigh the factor of the child alongside the totality of the evidence. [ 34 ] Furthermore, a marriage entered into for the purpose of acquiring immigration status will still be flawed even if it subsequently becomes genuine (see Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v [NAME] , 2017 FC 1004 at para 15 [ [NAME] ]). As Justice Fothergill stated at paragraph 17 of [NAME] : In [ [NAME] ] , Justice Yvan Roy confirmed that s 4(1) of the Regulations requires the applicant to demonstrate, on a balance of probabilities, that the marriage is genuine and not entered into primarily for the purpose of acquiring immigration status. The genuineness of the marriage is evaluated at the time of the [NAME] officer’s decision. The intent behind the marriage is evaluated as of the time of the wedding (at paras 15-16): […] Indeed, a marriage is disqualified if either of the conditions set out in paragraphs 4(1)(a) and (b) is not met ( [NAME] v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2015 FC 546 and [NAME] v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2014 FC 1077). In other words, the [applicant] must meet both conditions. A marriage entered into for the purpose of acquiring a status or privilege will be flawed even if it subsequently becomes genuine. As well, a marriage that is validly entered into can become flawed for immigration purposes if it loses its genuineness. On its face, the provision sets forth two different times when evaluations must be conducted. Regarding the genuineness of the marriage, the Regulations use the present tense, meaning that the genuineness of the marriage is evaluated at the time of the decision. On the other hand, the evaluation of the intent with which the marriage was entered into, i.e . primarily to acquire a status or a privilege, is in the past. The English reads “was entered” while the French reads “visait”; the evaluation is therefore conducted at the time of the marriage. [ 35 ] Again, while weight must be attributed to the birth of a child in the assessment of the legitimacy of a marriage, this fact – or weight – is not determinative. And like in [NAME] , while [NAME] took the child into account in its analysis, it was reasonable for it not to find the child to be determinative of the outcome. [ 36 ] Ultimately in the present circumstances, [NAME] concluded as follows at paragraphs 64-65 of its Decision, which serve as a précis of its reasons: In conclusion, the panel is of the opinion that, despite the presence of several positive factors to demonstrate whether this relationship is genuine, they do not collectively outweigh the significant concerns mentioned regarding the primary purpose of marriage. While there are indeed some favourable aspects to consider, the panel remains unconvinced that these elements are sufficient to address the core issues. The primary concern revolves around whether the marriage was entered into for genuine reasons or as immigration benefits. The positive factors, though noteworthy, do not adequately mitigate the doubts about the true intent behind the marriage. [ 37 ] These are reasonable findings, and I agree with the Respondent that the Applicant’s submissions amount to a request that the Court reassess the weight assigned to the evidence, which is not the function of judicial review ( [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2026 FC 92 at para 10).

IV. Conclusion [ 38 ] Ultimately, [NAME] engaged with the evidence before it, identified the correct legal test under subsection 4(1) of the IRPR, and explained why it was unsatisfied that the Applicant had met her burden. Its reasons demonstrate a rational chain of analysis, which was transparent, intelligible, and justified, and fall within the range of outcomes that were open to it on the record ( Vavilov at para 15). While another decision-maker might have weighed the evidence differently, that is not a basis for intervention of this Court, the role of which is not to reweigh the evidence or to substitute its own assessment of the facts. The application for judicial review is accordingly dismissed. Neither party proposed that a question be certified for appeal, and none arises.

JUDGMENT in IMM-2484-25 THIS COURT’S

JUDGMENT is that: The application for judicial review is dismissed. No questions for certification were argued, and I agree none arise. There is no award as to costs. "Alan S. Diner" Judge FEDERAL COURT SOLICITORS OF RECORD DOCKET: IMM-2484-25 STYLE OF CAUSE: [NAME] v [NAME] OF HEARING: Toronto, Ontario DATE OF HEARING: March 02, 2026

JUDGMENT and

REASONS: DINER J. DATED: APRIL 21, 2026 APPEARANCES: [NAME] For The Respondent SOLICITORS OF RECORD: [NAME] of Canada Toronto, Ontario For The Respondent