Federal Court Upholds Refugee Appeal Division Decision on Credibility Assessment

Date: 20260204 Docket: IMM-19025-24 Citation: 2026 FC 156 Toronto, Ontario, February 4, 2026 PRESENT: The [NAME]: [NAME] Applicant and THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION Respondent

JUDGMENT AND

REASONS I. Overview [ 1 ] The Applicant seeks judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Appeal Division [[NAME]], which had agreed with the conclusion of the Refugee Protection Division [[NAME]], that the Applicant was not a Convention refugee or person in need of protection pursuant to sections 96 or 97 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 [Act]. In particular, the [NAME] had determined that the [NAME] had erred in excluding the Applicant under Article 1F(b) of the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees , 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 137 [ Refugee Convention ] as reflected in Canadian law in section 98 of the Act. However, the [NAME] held that, even taking this into account, the Applicant still did not qualify for asylum in Canada as a Convention refugee or person in need of protection. This was because the [NAME] determined that the Applicant’s allegations as to his persecution lacked credibility, and this was sufficient to dispose of the claim. The Applicant alleges that the [NAME]’s decision [Decision] was unreasonable because the [NAME] failed to undertake an independent assessment of the objective evidence, erred in its assessment of credibility and had failed to refer the matter back to the [NAME] for a new hearing. [ 2 ] For the following reasons, this application is dismissed. I find the Applicant has not established that the Decision is unreasonable.

II. Background [ 3 ] The Applicant is a citizen of the Dominican Republic. He alleges that he fears persecution in that country due to his political opinion, as he had joined the Marcha Verde [[NAME]] Movement and participated in marches against government corruption. He states that these actions caused him to be targeted by the authorities and their supporters. [ 4 ] Before the [NAME], the Minister intervened with written submissions on issues of credibility and exclusion under Article 1F(b) of the Refugee Convention . The [NAME] found that the Applicant’s allegations contained significant credibility concerns and ultimately held that the Applicant did not qualify as a refugee in Canada, as they were further excluded pursuant to Article 1F(b) and section 98 of the Act. In particular, the [NAME] found that a past conviction in the United States relating to identity fraud and use of a false passport constituted evidence that the Applicant had committed a serious non-political crime sufficient to satisfy Article 1F(b). [ 5 ] Upon appeal, the [NAME] found that the [NAME] had erred in its Article 1F(b) determination. It noted that the Applicant was only given a four-month custodial sentence in the United States before being deported. It further determined that the [NAME] overlooked similar fact jurisprudence which indicated the Applicant’s likely sentence for such a crime in Canada would have been two years or less. The [NAME] therefore concluded that the [NAME] had erred in finding that the Applicant had committed a serious non-political crime warranting exclusion pursuant to Article 1F(b). [ 6 ] However, the [NAME] held that, despite this, the Applicant still did not qualify as a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. This was because the [NAME] found that his central allegations were undermined by serious credibility concerns, which led it to hold that there was insufficient credible evidence upon which to determine that he faced a serious possibility of persecution or, on balance of probabilities, a section 97 risk.

III. Issue [ 7 ] The sole issue at play in this matter is whether the decision under review is reasonable . [ 8 ] In this respect, the role of a reviewing court is to examine the decision maker’s reasoning and determine whether the decision is based on an “internally coherent and rational chain of analysis” and is “justified in relation to the facts and law that constrain the decision maker” ( Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v [NAME] , 2019 SCC 65 [ [NAME] ] at para 85; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2023 SCC 21 at para 64). Although the party challenging the decision bears the onus of demonstrating that the decision is unreasonable ( [NAME] at para 100), the reviewing court must assess “whether the decision bears the hallmarks of reasonableness, justification, transparency and intelligibility” ( [NAME] at para 99).

IV. Legal Framework [ 9 ] A person claiming refugee status pursuant to section 96 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act , SC 2001, c 27 [Act] must meet the applicable legal test to establish that there is a “serious possibility” or “reasonable chance” of persecution in the event of a return to the country they have fled. In particular, they must establish, on balance of probabilities, that they have a subjective fear of persecution on the basis of race, religion, nationality, membership in a social group or political opinion, and that objectively this fear of persecution is well-founded. The claimant must demonstrate that there is a serious chance that persecution will occur ( [NAME] v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) , 1989 CanLII 9466 (FCA), [1989] 2 FC 680). [ 10 ] In order to establish that one is a person in need of protection pursuant to subsection 97(1) of the Act, the claimant must establish that, on a balance of probabilities, they would be personally subject to a danger of torture or a risk to their life or of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment, were they to return to their country of origin. This is an objective test administered in the context of “ present or prospective risk for the claimant” ( [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration),  2007 FCA 99 [ [NAME] ] at paras 14-15, emphasis in original). [ 11 ] Article 1F(b) of the Refugee Convention is an exclusionary provision incorporated through subsection 2(1) and reflected in section 98 of the Act. Pursuant to this Article, the Refugee Convention does not apply to a person to whom there are “serious reasons for considering that” “he [sic] has committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge prior to his admission to that country as a refugee” . [ 12 ] [ADDRESS] has been clear in establishing that deference is owed to the [NAME] with respect to the assessment of credibility ( [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2023 FC 1106 at para 19; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2021 FC 1375 at para 23; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2016 FC 178 at para 23 [ [NAME] ]). As Justice Gascon noted in [NAME] , “[c]redibility issues are one of the [NAME]’s core competencies” (at para 23, citing [NAME] v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) , 2014 FC 938 at para 13). A finding that a claimant is not credible may be sufficient to conclude that they are neither a refugee nor a person in need of protection ( [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2024 FC 462 at para 24 citing [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2012 FC 1379 at paras 48 to 51, [2014] 2 FCR 3; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2019 FC 602 at para 23; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2022 FC 414 at para 20; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2022 FC 1575 at para 14). [ 13 ] Section 110 of the Act governs [NAME] appeals from decisions of the Refugee Protection Division. Though the [NAME] may, at its discretion, hold a hearing where new documentary evidence is introduced that meets three criteria set out in subsection 110(6), under subsection 110(3), the [NAME] generally determines appeals without a hearing, relying on the [NAME] record and written submissions. The [NAME] is not obliged to exercise its discretion to hold a hearing even if the three criteria of subsection 110(6) are met, but must exercise that discretion reasonably in the circumstances of the case ( [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2015 FC 911 [ [NAME] ] at para 11; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 FC 1389 at para 11). [ 14 ] Under the Act, the [NAME] may refer a matter back to the [NAME] for redetermination (para 111(1)(c)), though this is not routinely done. Pursuant to paras 111(2)(a) and (b), there are two prerequisites to the exercise of discretion to refer the matter back to the [NAME]: (a) the decision of the [NAME] must be “wrong in law, in fact or in mixed law and fact” and (b) the [NAME] “cannot make a decision under para 111(1)(a) or (b) without hearing evidence that was presented to the Refugee Protection Division” . This provision was interpreted by the Federal Court of Appeal in [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2016 FCA 93 at para 103 , which confirmed that the [NAME] has “robust powers of error-correction” and that “it is only when the [NAME] is of the opinion that it cannot provide such a final determination [in para 111(1)(b)] without hearing the oral evidence presented to the [NAME] that the matter can be referred back to the [NAME] for redetermination” (at para 103)

V. Analysis A. It has not been established that the [NAME] Decision was unreasonable [ 15 ] For the reasons that follow, I cannot find the Decision to be unreasonable and I dismiss this application for judicial review. The Applicant has failed to establish any reviewable errors. [ 16 ] The Applicant raises two central arguments. First, they state that the [NAME] erred by failing to refer the matter back to the [NAME] for a hearing, once it had determined that the [NAME] had erred in holding that the Applicant was excluded under Article 1F(b). The Applicant submits that the credibility inference drawn by the [NAME] was “inextricably tied” to its exclusion finding under Article 1F(b) of the Refugee Convention , that the [NAME]’s Article 1F(b) finding thus calls into question the reasonableness of the [NAME]’s credibility findings, and that the [NAME] therefore erred in relying on the [NAME]’s credibility findings. They further assert that the [NAME]’s erroneous finding vis-à-vis exclusion denied the Applicant a fair hearing, and that as a result it was an error for the [NAME] not to refer the claim back for redetermination upon finding that the [NAME] erred in its 1F(b) exclusion analysis . [ 17 ] The Respondent asserts that, in this argument, the Applicant is suggesting that the [NAME] ought not to have conducted its own independent assessment and was instead required to refer the matter back for redetermination. The Respondent notes that [NAME] fails to cite any case law in support of this contention, and nor do they explain why the Applicant would have been entitled to an additional hearing before the [NAME] (a notion that oddly appears in the Applicant’s Notice of Application, but not in their Further Memorandum of Argument or application record). The Respondent further notes that the Applicant does not point to any specific errors in the [NAME]’s credibility assessment or, for that matter, explain why the serious inconsistency in his testimony underlying the [NAME]’s credibility determination ought to be overlooked. In its written materials, the Respondent also submits that the Applicant fails to provide case law in support of the contention that an oral hearing before the [NAME] was required, pointing out that pursuant to subsection 110(6) of the Act, the [NAME] may generally only convene an oral hearing where there has been new documentary evidence accepted by the [NAME]. They note that no such evidence has been submitted by the Applicant. [ 18 ] The Applicant secondly argues that the [NAME] erred in its assessment of credibility and failed to undertake an independent assessment of the objective evidence. In their written materials, [NAME] essentially states that the discrepancy in the evidence that led the [NAME] to find that the Applicant’s credibility was fatally undermined was merely a “minor detail […] and therefore something the RPO [sic] should not have expected him to repeat in his oral testimony” . The Applicant further argues that the [NAME] failed to consider the country condition evidence that had been submitted, and thus erred when it found that the negative credibility inference it drew due to the evidentiary discrepancy was sufficient to undermine the credibility of the Applicant’s allegations. Finally, the Applicant contends that the [NAME] failed to undertake an independent assessment of the available evidence, but rather “shirked its responsibility” by deferring to the credibility findings of the [NAME]. [ 19 ] In response, the Respondent asserts that the Applicant’s arguments are wholly without merit. They note that the Applicant argues that the [NAME] failed to conduct an independent assessment of the evidence, but then fails to identify or explain which portions of the objective evidence it believes were overlooked by the [NAME]. They assert that the Applicant seems to suggest that the country condition objective evidence can overcome the inconsistencies in his evidence and testimony, yet does not explain how this is and also fails to draw connections from the cited portions of the objective evidence to the claim. The Respondent further points out that the Applicant appears to simultaneously argue that the [NAME] failed to conduct its own investigation, yet quotes portions of the Decision in which the [NAME] explicitly did so. In the Respondent’s view, the Applicant has failed to identify any error with the Panel’s reasoning and is, in reality, merely challenging the weight assigned to his evidence. [ 20 ] Upon review of the evidence and submissions of the parties in this matter, I do not find the arguments of [NAME] to be persuasive, and I have little difficulty in finding that the Applicant has not established the Decision of the [NAME] to be unreasonable. [ 21 ] The Applicant’s first argument appears to be that since the [NAME] found that the [NAME] had erred in its Article 1F(b) analysis, incorrectly finding that the Applicant was excluded from Canada due to having committed serious non-political crimes, then the [NAME] should have referred the matter back to the [NAME] in order for a new hearing to be held before that body. The Applicant states that in failing to do so, the [NAME] erred and rendered its Decision unreasonable. As the Respondent has noted, the Applicant provides no relevant jurisprudence or authority in support of this contention, and nor does he or his counsel provide any explanation of why he should be entitled to another hearing before the [NAME], beyond blithely saying that the [NAME]’s erroneous exclusion finding denied the Applicant a fair hearing, and so a new hearing should be held. No explanation has been provided as to how the exclusion finding denied the Applicant a fair hearing. Incidentally, I note that the jurisprudence relied on by the Applicant for the right to a fair hearing is a citation of [NAME] v Director of Kent Institution , 1985 CanLII 23 (SCC), [1985] 2 SCR 643 in [NAME] v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) , 2003 FCT 345 [ [NAME] ]. In [NAME], the Court granted the application for judicial review as the refugee claim tribunal failed to disclose a report to the claimant until the beginning of their hearing and then proceeded to rely on this report in rendering its decision. [ADDRESS] in that matter found that, as a result, the Applicant in [NAME] was denied a fair hearing. These circumstances are wholly unlike the matter now before this Court. [ 22 ] I also note that this demand by the Applicant that a second [NAME] hearing should have been required seemingly repudiates the role of the [NAME], which, unlike the Court, need not generally refer matters back to [NAME]. Instead, the [NAME] is empowered to conduct its own independent assessment, reweighing the evidence presented before the [NAME] and reaching its own determination as to the asylum status of the Applicant ( [NAME] at paras 56, 58-59, 78, 98, and 103; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2021 FC 549 at paras 37-39). The [NAME] having done so, rather than referring the matter back to the [NAME], is not an error and does not render its Decision unreasonable. I note that while relatively rarely done, the [NAME] certainly can decide to refer matters back to the [NAME] for redetermination – usually where it is unable to confirm the [NAME] decision or set it aside and substitute its own decision without hearing evidence that was presented to the [NAME] – however, no arguments have been made by the Applicant as to why this was necessary in this case. [ 23 ] As noted, while it is not entirely clear from the submissions of the Applicant, it does not appear as if they are arguing that the [NAME] erred by failing to itself hold an oral hearing. Instead, the thrust of the Applicant’s argument was rather that the matter should have been referred to the [NAME] for a fresh hearing. However, to be comprehensive, I note that with respect to the notion that a [NAME] oral hearing should have been held, the Respondent is correct that pursuant to subsections 110(3) and 110(6) of the Act, the [NAME] may only convene an oral hearing where there has been new documentary evidence accepted by the [NAME] which warrants doing so. In this case, the Applicant did not request a [NAME] oral hearing and nor did he seek introduce any such new documentary evidence. [ 24 ] The second argument of the Applicant casts the [NAME] Decision as unreasonable because, in the Applicant’s view, the [NAME] erred in its assessment of his credibility. In this regard, the Applicant first contends that the [NAME]’s credibility findings cannot be separated from its exclusion analysis and that the [NAME] erred in adopting or relying on the [NAME]’s credibility findings. Here, I first note that [NAME] has also provided little explanation as to how the credibility inference drawn by the [NAME] was “inextricably tied” to its exclusion finding, much less how that finding calls into question the reasonableness of the [NAME]’s credibility findings. Indeed, upon analysis of the Decision, the credibility finding in question appears to be wholly distinct from the exclusion concerns. [ 25 ] I note that it may be that the Applicant’s notion of the unexplained link between the exclusion finding and credibility is drawn from a single sentence in the [NAME] Decision which reads “I find that the issue of credibility is linked to the exclusion under Article 1F(b) of the Refugee Convention” . If this is the case, this would appear to be a misreading of that passage, which simply indicates that there are other credibility issues that accompany the facts that led to the exclusion finding. In the hearing, [NAME] argued that the meaning of this passage was not clear and urged the Court to find a link between the exclusion and credibility findings. Counsel for the Respondent pointed out that it is the [NAME] Decision that is at issue in this judicial review, not the [NAME] decision, and that [NAME] decisions can cure errors in the [NAME] decisions they review. Respondent’s counsel then also noted that, in any event, a contextual reading of the [NAME] decision, and particularly the paragraphs following the impugned sentence, establish that the [NAME]’s exclusion analysis was indeed distinct from its other credibility analysis. They assert this indicates that the Applicant’s interpretation of that sentence was acontextual and problematic. I agree. [ 26 ] In any event, a review of the [NAME] Decision establishes that the [NAME] did not “shirk its responsibility” by simply blindly relying on or adopting the finding of the [NAME] that the discrepancy in the Applicant’s evidence as to what incident had particularly prompted him to flee the Dominican Republic for Canada undermined his credibility. Rather, such a review of the Decision establishes that the [NAME] analyzed this evidence and came to the same conclusion as the [NAME], as it was entitled to do. The issue identified by both the [NAME] and the [NAME] was an inconsistency between the Applicant’s Basis of Claim [BOC] narrative and his testimony. The Applicant testified that he had fled the Dominican Republic for Canada because he began to receive threatening calls, in contrast to his BOC narrative in which he recorded that he had rather fled after he was physically assaulted by the agents of harm. In the [NAME]’s determination, this discrepancy, where the Applicant’s testimony completely omitted the central incident in his BOC narrative, fatally undermined his credibility. In addition, the [NAME] found the Applicant’s explanation that he had forgotten this incident was not reasonable. [ 27 ] From this, it is evident that the [NAME] engaged in an independent analysis and drew its own conclusion. Clearly, this conclusion was not to the liking of the Applicant, who now argues that the credibility discrepancy was a “minor detail […] and therefore something the RPO [sic] should not have expected him to repeat in his oral testimony” . I cannot agree with the characterization of this as a minor detail. However, regardless, it is simply not accurate to claim that the [NAME] had merely adopted the credibility findings of the [NAME]. Most importantly, it is also not the role of the Court to reweigh the evidence presented before the [NAME], but rather to consider whether its decision reached was reasonable ( [NAME] at paras 125-126). While I agree that not every decisionmaker might have concluded that the noted disparity was sufficient to fatally undermine the Applicant’s overall credibility, given the primacy of that incident and the [NAME]’s explanation as to why it was key, I find the [NAME]’s logic in this regard to be at least discernable, and I do not find that Decision to be unreasonable ( [NAME] at para 102-103). [ 28 ] Finally, the Applicant argues that the [NAME] failed to consider the country condition evidence submitted and this also caused it to err, when it determined that the negative credibility inference it drew due to the evidentiary discrepancy was sufficient to undermine the credibility of the Applicant’s allegations. As the Respondent pointed out, beyond baldly making this assertion the Applicant did not specifically explain how the submitted country condition evidence about the [NAME] should have impacted the [NAME]’s evidentiary assessment. But in any event, it was again clearly inaccurate to claim that the [NAME] failed to consider the country condition evidence, as the [NAME] specifically mentioned that same evidence, noting that the credibility of the Applicant had been further undermined by his utter lack of supporting documentation, apart from the submission of this general country documentation. [ 29 ] In short, and at best, in their arguments Applicant and his counsel are merely asking this Court to reweigh and reassess the evidence that was before the [NAME]. While I can appreciate that the Applicant has a different perspective on how the information before the [NAME] and [NAME] should have been considered, this effort to have the Court re-evaluate the evidence does not correspond with its role on judicial review, as I have mentioned. The [NAME] did not disregard or ignore evidence or somehow err by not referring the matter back to the [NAME], rather than conducting its own independent assessment. Rather, the Applicant simply disagrees with the way the [NAME] weighed the evidence and is essentially asking this Court to also do so and to step in to displace the [NAME]’s findings with its own. That is not the role of this Court on judicial review ( [NAME] at para 125; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2022 FC 1547 at para 27 citing [NAME] v Canada (Attorney General) , 2021 FCA 237 at para 3). [ 30 ] The burden is on the Applicant to show that the Decision is unreasonable by establishing that there are sufficiently serious shortcomings in the Decision such that it could not be said to exhibit the requisite degree of justification, intelligibility and transparency ( [NAME] at para 100). Having considered the evidence on the record and the submission of the parties, I am not satisfied this burden has been met. I do not find the Decision to be unreasonable.

VI. Conclusion [ 31 ] This application for judicial review is dismissed. The parties proposed no question for certification, and I agree that none arises.

JUDGMENT in IMM-19025-24 THIS COURT’S

JUDGMENT is that : The application for judicial review is dismissed.

2. No question of general importance is certified.

3. No costs are awarded. “[NAME]” Judge FEDERAL COURT SOLICITORS OF RECORD Docket: IMM-19025-24 STYLE OF CAUSE: [NAME] v THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION PLACE OF HEARING: videoconference DATE OF HEARING: JANUARY 14, 2026

JUDGMENT AND

REASONS: [NAME] j. DATED: FEBRUARY 4, 2026 APPEARANCES : [NAME] For The Applicant [NAME] For The Respondent SOLICITORS OF RECORD : [COMPANY] [NAME], Ontario For The Applicant Attorney General of Canada Toronto, Ontario For The Respondent