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DismissedFederal Public Sector Labour Relations and Employment Board·

Federal Public Sector Labour Relations and Employment Board Rules on Compensation for Sea Duties

Case No.

📌 In brief

The Federal Public Sector Labour Relations and Employment Board decided that workers performing sea duties aboard surface vessels were correctly compensated under clause 23.04 of the collective agreement. The claimant argued that the workers should have been compensated under clause 15.10, but the court found that the conditions of clause 23.04 were met.

⚖️ Legal holding

An employer must compensate employees according to the 'Sea duties aboard surface vessels' clause when they are required to perform duties beyond the harbour limits.

Topics

collective agreementscompensationsea duties

Provisions

Federal Public Sector Labour Relations and Employment Board ActFederal Public Sector Labour Relations Act

📖 Technical summary

The claimant argued that workers should be compensated under different clauses based on their location. The court disagreed, ruling that the workers were correctly compensated under the 'Sea duties aboard surface vessels' clause.

📜 Headnote Official document

The Federal Public Sector Labour Relations and Employment Board ruled that workers performing sea duties aboard surface vessels were correctly compensated under clause 23.04 of the collective agreement, rejecting the claimant's argument that they should have been compensated under clause 15.10.

📚 Full judgment Official document

Date: 202 60325 File : 567-02-51322 Citation: 2026 FPSLREB 26 Federal Public Sector Labour Relations and Employment Board Act and Federal Public Sector Labour Relations Act Before a panel of the Federal Public Sector Labour Relations and Employment Board Between Federal Government Dockyard Trades and Labour Council (East) [NAME] and [NAME] (D epartment of N ational D efence ) Employer Indexed as Federal Government Dockyard Trades and Labour Council (East) v. [NAME] (Department of National Defence) In the matter of a group grievance referred to adjudication Before: [NAME], a panel of the Federal Public Sector Labour Relations and Employment Board For the [NAME]: [NAME], counsel For the Employer: [NAME], counsel ADVANCE \y 657 Heard at Halifax, Nova Scotia, November 18, 2025, and decided on the basis of written submissions, filed April 15, November 17, and December 2, 16, and 19, 2025.

REASONS FOR

DECISION I. Introduction [ 1 ] The Federal Government Dockyard Trades and Labour Council (East) (“the [NAME] agent”) acts on behalf of [NAME] (“[NAME]”), who are tradespeople employed at the [NAME] (“[NAME]”) in Halifax, Nova Scotia. On May 23 to 25, 2023, they were required to assist a contractor carrying out the sea-trial testing of a new vessel’s propulsion system. The vessel in question left the jetty in Halifax Harbour on May 23, 2023, spent that day and some part of May 24, 2023, operating in the Bedford Basin (part of Halifax Harbour), before exiting the harbour limits later on May 24, 2023, and returning from the open ocean on May 25, 2023. [ 2 ] The [NAME] (“the employer”) compensated [NAME] for their work during the three days under the provisions of clause 23.04, entitled, “Sea duties aboard surface vessels”, of the collective agreement between the employer and the [NAME] agent for the [COMPANY] that expired on December 31, 2022 (“the collective agreement”). The [NAME] agent filed this grievance on June 7, 2023, alleging that [NAME] were improperly compensated. During the time (roughly 20 hours) that the vessel was in the Bedford Basin, they should have been compensated under clause 15.10, entitled, “Overtime compensation”, and not clause 23.04. [ 3 ] Based on the evidence before me and the wording of the relevant collective agreement clauses, I have decided to deny the grievance.

II. The hearing [ 4 ] The parties proceeded before me on November 17, 2025, by way of an agreed statement of facts. The statement was supplemented by the testimony of the following: ·  [NAME], on [NAME]’ behalf; and ·  [NAME], Production Manager at [NAME], on the employer’s behalf. [ 5 ] At the close of the hearing, the parties agreed to later file written submissions. The last submission, by way of reply, was filed on December 19, 2025.

III. Agreed statement of facts [ 6 ] I will proceed by setting out the agreed statement of facts which in its essence is reproduced from paragraphs 7 to 29 of this decision. A. Overview and issue [ 7 ] The parties disagree on whether clause 23.04 of the collective agreement, “ Sea duties aboard surface vessels” , applies to hours of work performed on May 23 and 24, 2023. B. Background [ 8 ] The [NAME] unit consists of various tradespersons engaged in the repair and maintenance of oceangoing vessels owned and operated by the Department of National Defence. [ 9 ] A majority of the [NAME] unit work is performed at Fleet Maintenance Facility Cape Scott. [NAME] unit members perform various duties including but not limited to the installation, testing, inspection, maintenance, repair, modification, quality control and sea trials of mechanical equipment, weapons, missiles, and torpedoes, and the propulsion systems of vessels. C. Relevant collective agreement provisions [ 10 ] Clause 2.01 of the collective agreement defines the following relevant terms: 2.01 … 2.01 … … […] h. “double time” h. « tarif double » means two (2) times the straight-time rate; désigne le taux des heures normales multiplié par deux (2); … […] k. “harbour limits” k. « limites du port » means an East-West line of 063 degrees (true) from York Redoubt through Maughers Beach on McNabbs Island. The area north of this line constitutes the Halifax harbour area and includes Bedford Basin; désigne une ligne est-ouest de 063 degrés (relèvement astronomique) allant de York Redoubt jusqu’à la plage Maughers sur l’île McNabbs. Le secteur situé au nord de cette ligne constitue la région du port de Halifax et comprend le bassin Bedford; … […] q. “sea trials” q. « essais en mer » means trials conducted outside the harbour limits; désigne les essais effectués hors des limites portuaires; r. “ straight-time rate ” r. « taux des heures normales » means the hourly rate of pay; désigne le taux de rémunération horaire; s. “time and one half” s. « tarif et demi » means one and one half (1 1/2) times the straight-time rate; désigne le taux des heures normales multiplié par une fois et demie (1 1/2); t. “triple time” t. « tarif triple » means three (3) times the straight-time rate …. désigne le taux des heures normales multiplié par trois (3); … […] [Emphasis in the original] [ 11 ] Clause 15.02 of the collective agreement provides for the following hours of work: 15.02 The hours of work shall be scheduled as follows: 15.02 La durée du travail est fixée comme suit : a. the first (night) shift shall be from 2345 hours to 0815 hours with an unpaid meal period from 0345 hours to 0415 hours; a. le premier poste (nuit) s’étend de 23 h 45 à 8 h 15 avec une pause repas non payée de 3 h 45 à 4 h 15; b. the second (day) shift shall be from 0745 hours to 1615 hours with an unpaid meal period from 1200 hours to 1230 hours; b. le deuxième poste (jour) s’étend de 7 h 45 à 16 h 15 avec une pause repas non payée de 12 h à 12 h 30; c. the third (evening) shift shall be from 1545 hours to 0015 hours with an unpaid meal period from 1945 hours to 2015 hours. c. le troisième poste (soir) s’étend de 15 h 45 à 0 h 15 avec une pause repas non payée de 19 h 45 à 20 h 15. [ 12 ] Clause 15.10 of the collective agreement sets out overtime compensation rates: 15.10 Overtime compensation 15.10 Rémunération des heures supplémentaires Subject to clause 15.14, overtime shall be compensated at the following rates: Sous réserve du paragraphe 15.14, les heures supplémentaires effectuées sont rémunérées aux taux suivants : a. double (2) time for all hours worked in excess of eight (8) hours in a continuous period of work or in excess of eight (8) hours in a day to a maximum of sixteen (16) hours in a continuous period of work; and for all hours worked on a day of rest to a maximum of sixteen (16) hours; a. deux (2) fois le taux normal pour chaque heure effectuée en sus de huit (8) heures au cours d’une période de travail ininterrompue ou en sus de huit (8) heures au cours de la même journée jusqu’à un maximum de seize (16) heures au cours d’une période de travail ininterrompue, ainsi que pour toutes les heures effectuées un jour de repos jusqu’à concurrence de seize (16) heures; b. triple (3) time for each hour worked in excess of sixteen (16) hours in a continuous period of work or in excess of sixteen (16) hours in any twenty-four (24) hour period, and for all hours worked by an employee who is recalled to work before the expiration of the nine (9) hour period referred to in clause 15.11. b. trois (3) fois le taux normal pour chaque heure effectuée en sus de seize (16) heures au cours d’une période de travail ininterrompue ou en sus de seize (16) heures au cours d’une période de vingt-quatre (24) heures, ainsi que pour toutes les heures effectuées par un employé qui est rappelé au travail avant l’expiration de la période de neuf (9)heures dont il est question au paragraphe 15.11. [ 13 ] Clause 23.04 provides for the specific compensation provisions applicable during sea duties aboard surface vessels: 23.04 Sea duties aboard surface vessels 23.04 Service en mer à bord d’un navire de surface When an employee is required to go to sea (that is beyond the harbour limits) in a vessel for the purpose of conducting trials, repairing defects, dumping ammunition, etc., the employee shall be compensated, from the time he/she reports aboard until one (1) hour after reaching the harbour limits on the final return, as follows: Lorsque l’employé est tenu de se rendre en mer, c’est-à-dire en dehors des limites d’un port, à bord d’un navire afin d’effectuer des essais, de réparer des défauts ou de se débarrasser de munitions, il est rémunéré pour toutes les heures passées à bord jusqu’à une (1) heure après avoir atteint les limites du port sur le chemin du retour définitif, selon les conditions suivantes : a. for the first twelve (12) hours aboard or less, at the applicable rate of pay; a. pour les douze (12) premières heures ou moins passées à bord, au taux de rémunération applicable; b. for all hours aboard in excess of twelve (12) hours, at the applicable rate of pay for all hours worked and at the regular rate of pay for all unworked hours. b. pour toutes les heures passées à bord en sus de douze (12) heures, au taux de rémunération applicable pour toutes les heures de travail et au taux de rémunération normal pour toutes les heures non travaillées. For the purpose of this clause, an employee is considered to be working if he/she is actually performing or assisting in the performance of the duties of the job or has received specific instructions to remain available for work at the specific location where the work is being performed. Aux fins du présent paragraphe, l’employé est censé travailler s’il remplit effectivement les fonctions de son poste ou aide à les remplir, ou s’il a reçu des instructions expresses d’être disponible pour travailler au lieu précis où le travail est exécuté. D. The work that is the subject of the grievance [ 14 ] [NAME] are, and were at all material times, tradespersons in the [NAME] unit. [ 15 ] As part of the [NAME] were required to assist a contractor, [NAME], in carrying out a “Main Machinery Performance Trial” (MMPT) scheduled to take place from May 23 to 25, 2023. [ 16 ] An MMPT is a large-scale ship operation during which multiple sea trials are conducted over a three-day period. [NAME] were required to assist [NAME] in preparing the vessel and repairing any defects. [ 17 ] [NAME] were told on or around May 18, 2023, that they were required to board the HMCS Harry DeWolf (HDW) on May 23, 2023, for a three-day, two-night trial. [ 18 ] The HDW was a relatively new first of class, [NAME] that required sea trials to demonstrate, among other things, the satisfactory operation of its propulsion system. [ 19 ] On May 23, 2023, at approximately 07:45, [NAME] boarded the vessel with the understanding that they would be away for three days and took care to bring their personal effects for that purpose. Upon boarding, they were assigned a sleeping quarters and went about their regular scheduled shift. [ 20 ] The vessel proceeded into the Bedford Basin where [NAME] worked until approximately 22:15. At that time, they had a meal and went to bed. They remained on the vessel overnight. [ 21 ] The vessel remained in the Bedford Basin into the following day, May 24, 2023. [NAME] woke and began work at approximately 07:45. [ 22 ] It is not uncommon for vessels to proceed to the Bedford Basin prior to going out to sea as the calmer waters of the basin provide for an opportunity to repair defects and ensure the vessel is in a state of readiness. [ 23 ] At approximately 09:30 on May 24, 2023, the vessel left harbour limits; i.e., crossed the east-west line of 63 degrees (true) from York Redoubt, Nova Scotia, through Maugher’s Beach on McNabs Island, Nova Scotia. [NAME] continued working in support of the trial until 00:45 on May 25, 2023, at which time they had a meal and went to bed. [ 24 ] The vessel remained at sea until later in the day on May 25, 2023. [ 25 ] In the 3 days between May 23 and 25, 2023, the employer paid [NAME] pursuant to clause 23.04. That is, they were paid at the applicable rate for the first 12 hours from the time they boarded the ship, then they were paid straight time for all hours spent on the vessel eating, sleeping, or otherwise not working, including the time spent eating and sleeping on the vessel in the Bedford Basin, 22:15 on May 23, 2023, to 07:45 on May 24, 2023. [NAME] were paid in accordance with clause 23.04 up until 1 hour after reaching the harbour limits on the final return. E. The grievance [ 26 ] On June 7, 2023, the [NAME] agent filed the grievance. [ 27 ] In the grievance, the [NAME] agent alleges the employer paid [NAME] improperly. [ 28 ] [NAME] designed, built, and installed the propulsion system for the HDW, which, as already noted, was a new first of class [NAME] ([NAME]). The MMPT’s objective was “… to demonstrate the satisfactory operation of the propulsion system, including associated controls and ancillary machinery at various power levels up to and including full power.” IV. Testimonies of the witnesses [ 29 ] [NAME] is an industrial mechanic working out of the internal combustion engine shop mainly on Canadian Navy ship diesel engines. He received training on the new [NAME] engines. [NAME] specifically asked that he be one of the mechanics on the MMPT. [ 30 ] He explained that in ordinary course, he would work on ship engines while the ship was moored alongside the jetty. He added that between five to eight times a year, he would be required to perform his work while on board the vessel and during a sea trial. On a typical sea trial, he would walk onto the vessel from the jetty and then remain on it while the vessel was under steam outside the harbour. He added that before the May 2023 trial, he had never performed a trial in which the vessel did not leave the harbour. [ 31 ] [NAME] testified that while the HDW was underway in the Bedford Basis on May 23, 2023, he performed routine tasks, like checking for leaks and ensuring that the engine was operating smoothly. He said that the tasks associated with the MMPT did not start until the HDW left the harbour limits and was in the open ocean. [ 32 ] He explained that the purpose of the MMPT is to push the ship’s engines to their limit by running them at full speed or in reverse to a crash stop, with all or only some of them engaged. He said that conducting such tests in the harbour would pose a risk of collision with other vessels or the land and so were always carried out in the open ocean. He thought as a result that the actual trial did not start until the vessel left the harbour and reached the open ocean. [ 33 ] He was not cross-examined. [ 34 ] As of the hearing, [NAME] was the production manager at [NAME] and had been in that role since leaving the Canadian Navy in 2019. He did not contradict [NAME]’s evidence. [ 35 ] His testimony elaborated on the amount of planning necessary for — and the expense of — sea trials. He testified that the work done on the engines while a vessel was still in Bedford Basin — that is, before leaving the harbour — was a very important part of the trial process. It involved fine-tuning the engines and resolving any problems or defects before the high-performance testing involved in an MMPT took place in the open ocean. He agreed with [NAME] that the bulk of the MMPT had to happen in the open ocean, away from land, but thought that some parts of it — like steering or bow thruster tests — could be started in the Bedford Basin, in calmer water. [ 36 ] He was not cross-examined.

V. Submissions A. Submissions for the [NAME] agent [ 37 ] [NAME] first addressed the modern principles of contractual interpretation, as most recently set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in [NAME]. v. [NAME]. , 2014 SCC 53. One is to start with the words in their ordinary and grammatical sense, locating them and their meaning within the entire agreement, considering at the same time the agreement’s object and the parties’ intention. The evidence of the surrounding circumstances should be objective and have been knowledge that both parties had or ought reasonably to have had before or when they entered the agreement (see [NAME] v. Canada Revenue Agency , 2017 FPSLREB 17). [ 38 ] [NAME] noted that clause 23.04 was considered in [NAME] v. [NAME] (Department of National Defence) , 2015 PSLREB 32. He emphasized the Federal Public Sector Labour Relations and Employment Board’s (“the Board”) view that the entire time that [NAME] spent on board a vessel while on a sea trial was “captive” time. He distinguished that decision on the ground that its facts were different. [ 39 ] In [NAME] , the grievor’s claim was pay for the time he spent on board the vessel on its return from the sea trial — in particular, for the period one hour after it crossed the harbour limits on its return to port. In contrast, the grievance before the Board is about the time spent before the vessel crossed the harbour line on its way to the open sea. [ 40 ] [NAME] submitted that the time that [NAME] spent on the vessel while it was in the Bedford Basin was captive time. It was not spent on the purpose for which the sea trial was intended. No testing of the [NAME] equipment underway was conducted. The vessel had steamed around Bedford Basin for an unknown reason or purpose. They performed their usual work, consistent with their regular job duties and tasks. It did not require them to be at sea (that is, beyond the harbour limits). It did not fall within the intent, meaning, or purpose of clause 23.04. It did not require [NAME] to be at — or go to — sea beyond the harbour limits. [ 41 ] [NAME] submitted that suggesting that, as he thought the employer might, the limit on overtime operated “from the time he/she reports aboard” would be unreasonable. It would allow the employer to assign workers to work on a vessel that remained within the harbour limits for extended periods. Such an interpretation, he submitted, “… would allow the Employer to utilize Article 23.04 for a voyage that never leaves the Harbour limits if the stated purpose of the voyage is conducting sea trials.” The [NAME] agent also pointed to the heading of the article “Sea duties aboard surface vessels.” The [NAME] agent submitted that this heading meant that the article was not intended to shield the employer from incurring overtime rates when an employee is captive on a vessel in the harbour. Rather, article 23.04 is limited to “sea duties.” [ 42 ] [NAME] concluded by submitting that [NAME] should be paid at the applicable rate under clause 15.10 for all the time that they spent within the harbour limits. He estimated that time at approximately 20 hours for each of the 2 grievors. B. Submissions for the employer [ 43 ] In making his submissions, counsel for the employer relied on similar principles of contractual interpretation. He emphasized that the context in which the words appear should not outweigh the words themselves (see [NAME] v. Canada Revenue Agency , 2025 FPSLREB 132). He noted too that adjudicators are not to modify the text of an agreement, to address an issue that should be left to the next [NAME] round (see [NAME] v. Canada (Attorney General) , 2015 FCA 117). [ 44 ] [NAME] submitted that the wording of clause 23.04 does not differentiate between the work that was performed on board the vessel while in the Bedford Basin and the work that was performed while at sea. Clause 23.04 was triggered once these three conditions were met: … 11. … a. An employee is required to go to sea beyond the harbour limit, b. In a (surface) vessel c. For the purpose of conducting trials, repairing defects, etc. … [ 45 ] All that matters then is whether the purpose of the assignment was to be on a vessel for the purpose of conducting a sea trial beyond the harbour limits. If so, it does not matter whether during that trial the vessel went back and forth across the harbour line. Indeed, the vessel could have remained docked for hours before going outside the Bedford Basin, and clause 23.04 “… would have still applied from the moment the employees set foot on board.” [ 46 ] [NAME] further submitted that clause 23.04 does not reference the type of work being done while on board the vessel. That being the case, [NAME]’ evidence that the work they did while in the Bedford Basin was materially different from that done while at sea is irrelevant. What matters is not what [NAME] did while on board but instead whether the vessel was going to sea. [ 47 ] When he made that submission, [NAME] pointed to the different approach in clauses 23.02, entitled “Height pay”, or 23.03, entitled “Submarine trials”, which expressly focus on task-based conditions. [NAME]’ specific duties had to be performed to trigger the provided allowance or compensation. Had the parties intended a similar task-defined approach to work on sea trials, they would have set it out. [ 48 ] [NAME] submitted further that the [NAME] agent’s interpretation of clause 23.04 would mean that the purpose of the trip would no longer matter, only the vessel’s location while underway, not its purpose. Yet, clause 23.04 is not worded in that way. [ 49 ] Counsel concluded by submitting that the Board should conclude that clause 23.04 applied to the trip between May 23 and 24, 2023, and that the two grievances be dismissed. C. The [NAME] agent’s reply submissions [ 50 ] [NAME] submitted that clause 23.04 was designed solely for the employer’s benefit. In its absence, employees would be compensated under either clause 15.10 (at double or triple time) or would be taken by a rigid hulled inflatable boat (RHIB) back to the jetty, giving them back their personal time, which would otherwise be spent captive on the vessel. [ 51 ] [NAME] submitted that the proper interpretation of clause 23.04 is that it does not apply to a situation in which the employees “… have not boarded a vessel for the purpose of conducting sea trials past the Harbour limits, and stay in the Bedford Basin for an extended period …”. There was no reason that the time in the Bedford Basin should not have been treated as it was on an ordinary workday when an employee was transported back to shore by an RHIB. [ 52 ] [NAME] further pointed to the definition of a “sea trial” as “trials conducted outside the harbour limits”. The evidence was clear that the sea trial began only after the vessel left the harbour limits. [ 53 ] [NAME] also submitted that the employer’s interpretation of clause 23.04 would produce an absurd result in the following situation: … 19 … the Employer’s stated purpose is to conduct a sea trial. The vessel proceeds into the Bedford Basin and remains there until the next day. The vessel proceeds past the Harbour limits for a brief period, less than an hour, and no trials are conducted. No defects are repaired. It then returns to the shore. Based on the Employer’s position that location and tasks are not relevant, there is nothing to resolve the apparent absurdity that a vessel may not actually perform a sea trial, but the Employer can claim this purpose and limit their financial obligations under Article 23.04. … [ 54 ] [NAME] also pushed back against the employer’s interpretation of the [NAME] agent’s position. He acknowledged that once a sea trial begins outside the harbour limits, then clause 23.04 is triggered. Once that happens, it does not matter how many times the vessel goes back and forth across the harbour limit. At issue, rather, is “… the extended period of time before the sea trial begins that the [NAME] contends cannot properly be considered boarding the vessel for the purpose of a sea trial such that Article 23.04 applies.” [ 55 ] [NAME] concluded by repeating his request for a declaration that the employer breached clause 23.04 and that the Board retains jurisdiction to resolve any issues related to implementing the declaration.

VI. Analysis and decision [ 56 ] I agree with both parties that the issue before me turns on the interpretation and application of clause 23.04. I also agree (as I must) that when interpreting a contract, one must “… read the contract as a whole, giving the words used their ordinary and grammatical meaning, consistent with the surrounding circumstances known to the parties at the time of formation of the contract” (see [NAME]. at para. 47; and [NAME] v. [NAME] (Department of Justice) , 2021 FPSLREB 30). [ 57 ] For ease of reference, I repeat clause 23.04, as follows: 23.04 Sea duties aboard surface vessels 23.04 Service en mer à bord d’un navire de surface When an employee is required to go to sea (that is beyond the harbour limits) in a vessel for the purpose of conducting trials, repairing defects, dumping ammunition, etc., the employee shall be compensated, from the time he/she reports aboard until one (1) hour after reaching the harbour limits on the final return, as follows: Lorsque l’employé est tenu de se rendre en mer, c’est-à-dire en dehors des limites d’un port, à bord d’un navire afin d’effectuer des essais, de réparer des défauts ou de se débarrasser de munitions, il est rémunéré pour toutes les heures passées à bord jusqu’à une (1) heure après avoir atteint les limites du port sur le chemin du retour définitif, selon les conditions suivantes : a. for the first twelve (12) hours aboard or less, at the applicable rate of pay; a. pour les douze (12) premières heures ou moins passées à bord, au taux de rémunération applicable; b. for all hours aboard in excess of twelve (12) hours, at the applicable rate of pay for all hours worked and at the regular rate of pay for all unworked hours. b. pour toutes les heures passées à bord en sus de douze (12) heures, au taux de rémunération applicable pour toutes les heures de travail et au taux de rémunération normal pour toutes les heures non travaillées. For the purpose of this clause, an employee is considered to be working if he/she is actually performing or assisting in the performance of the duties of the job or has received specific instructions to remain available for work at the specific location where the work is being performed. Aux fins du présent paragraphe, l’employé est censé travailler s’il remplit effectivement les fonctions de son poste ou aide à les remplir, ou s’il a reçu des instructions expresses d’être disponible pour travailler au lieu précis où le travail est exécuté. [ 58 ] As discussed in the Board’s 2015 decision in [NAME] , clause 23.04 was introduced in an attempt to deal with the problem of compensation for what is known as “captive time” — that is, when the nature of the work requires an employee to spend extended periods away from home but for which they might not actually be working. An example of such time is that spent sleeping on board a ship when the employee is not actually working. Absent words to the contrary in a collective agreement, such captive time could be considered time “at work” and so compensated, as if the employee actually worked (see [NAME] , at paras. 45 to 50). The Board summarized that situation at paragraph 51, as follows: 51 … one may say then that, in the case of hourly paid employees, the definition of “work” in a collective agreement is not necessarily limited to that time during which an employee performs the tasks for which he or she has been employed. In the appropriate situation (subject to anything to the contrary in the collective agreement), it may be extended to include non-work time that is nevertheless no longer truly the employee’s own, whether because they must travel away from their base of normal operations in order to perform the task, or because their freedom of action is restricted or limited by the employer for its own purposes in some way: see the Federal Court of Appeal decision in Paton . [ 59 ] Before clause 23.04 was introduced, the employer tried to deal with the issue of compensation for “captive time” by issuing base standing orders, but because they were not terms in the relevant collective agreement, they were found ineffective. [NAME] , at para. 62, notes as follows the parties’ response: 62 … would appear to have been the negotiation of what became clause 23.04 in the collective agreement with which we are concerned. (I note in this regard that the wording of clause 23.04 mirrors to some degree-though is not identical to-the BSO referenced in the 1986 decision of [NAME] .)…. [ 60 ] Turning now to the interpretation of clause 23.04, on its face, it is triggered when the following occurs: ·  an employee is required ·  to go to sea (that is beyond the harbour limits) in a vessel ·  for the purpose of conducting trials, repairing defects, dumping ammunition, etc. [ 61 ] There is no ambiguity in the wording. The description of the elements to satisfy is clear. On the facts before me, all three are satisfied. The parties agree that [NAME] were required to board the HDW for the purpose of conducting trials at sea (that is, outside the harbour limits) of the [NAME] propulsion equipment. The parties agree that the intended sea trial was in fact carried out, despite that for whatever reason, it took more than a day to go beyond the harbour limits. And they agree that the purpose of the trial — the MMPT — was conducted beyond the harbour limits and in the open ocean. That being the case, compensation for [NAME]’ time on board during the voyage (whether they actually worked or rested on their personal time) must have been paid under clause 23.04. [ 62 ] The [NAME] agent argues that that conclusion cannot be right. They state that before exiting the harbour, they performed the ordinary routine tasks associated with regular operating engine maintenance. They state that those tasks were not part of the MMPT. They state that the work performed while the HDW was in the harbour was not part of the MMPT because it was not required to be performed at sea beyond the harbour limits. So, it should be compensated as regular work for which overtime was available under clause 15.10. [ 63 ] The [NAME] agent further argues that to read clause 23.04 as including work that did not need to be performed at sea would allow the employer to use that provision for a voyage that never leaves the harbour, as long as its stated purpose is to conduct a sea trial. [ 64 ] I was not persuaded by their arguments. [ 65 ] First, I am not dealing with a situation in which the vessel’s stated purpose of carrying out a sea trial never happened — that is, the vessel never in fact left the harbour. In such a case, there might be an argument over the applicability of clause 23.04. But those are not the facts before me. [ 66 ] Indeed, on this point, I note [NAME]’s evidence that he had never been required to go to sea on a vessel that did not in fact exit the harbour limits. The point then is whether clause 23.04 applies when on the agreed facts and evidence before me, its conditions have been met. I am satisfied that they have been met. [ 67 ] Second, the wording of clause 23.04 focuses on the purpose of the requirement to go to sea — not the type of work being performed while getting there. Had the parties intended to make the compensation under clause 23.04 dependent on the type of work being performed, they could have said so, as they did with clause 23.01, entitled, “Dirty work”, or clause 23.02, entitled, “Height pay”. [ 68 ] This conclusion is supported by the conceptual difficulty that arises if one tries to draw a line between routine work done to first make sure that the engines are working properly and the work associated with the MMPT once it commences. How can one say that the first type of work is not part of the second type of work if the MMPT cannot be started unless the engines first work smoothly? [ 69 ] Third, had the parties intended to differentiate between time spent in the harbour and time spent at sea beyond the harbour they would have said so — as they did when dealing with the time after the vessel returns from the sea trial to the harbour. And there is the problem that a vessel going to sea has to spend at least some time in the harbour to get out of it. [ 70 ] I note that the definition of “harbour limits” in clause 2.01(k) makes it clear that the Bedford Basin is considered part of Halifax harbour. To accept the [NAME] agent’s argument would lead to serious problems of application. How much time in the harbour would fall within clause 23.04, and how much out of it? What if a vessel that intended to go to sea to conduct trials were delayed in its harbour exit for some reason? Would the delayed time fall outside clause 23.04, and, if so, how much and by what calculation or formula? None of those questions, which the [NAME] agent’s preferred interpretation raises, are answered by it. Such ambiguity of result augurs against the interpretation that they pressed upon me (see [NAME] v. Canada Revenue Agency , 2013 PSLRB 55 at para. 28). [ 71 ] For all these reasons, I am satisfied on the facts before me that the time that [NAME] spent and their work from the time they stepped on board the HDW on May 23, 2023, to its exit from the harbour sometime on May 24, 2023, was time and work that fell within the meaning of clause 23.04 of the collective agreement.

Accordingly, on the facts, they were properly compensated for that time and work. [ 72 ] For all of the above reasons, the Board makes the following order: (The Order appears on the next page)

VII. Order [ 73 ] The grievance in Board file no. 567-02-51322 is denied. March 25, 2026. [NAME], a panel of the Federal Public Sector Labour Relations and Employment Board

⚖️ What tends to weigh in cases like this

✅ Tends to be accepted

  • The time spent on board a vessel for the purpose of conducting sea trials beyond the harbor limits is covered by clause 23.04.
  • The purpose of the trip is what triggers clause 23.04, not the specific location or type of work performed while on board.
  • The vessel's stated purpose of conducting sea trials beyond the harbor limits was fulfilled, even if it took longer to reach that location.

❌ Tends to be rejected

  • Time spent on board a vessel while it remains within the harbor limits (such as in the Bedford Basin) should be compensated under clause 15.10 for overtime.
  • The nature of the work performed while in the harbor should determine whether clause 23.04 applies or not.
  • The compensation for time spent in the Bedford Basin should be treated the same as regular workdays, allowing for overtime under clause 15.10.

Patterns observed in similar cases in this collection — every case is unique.

❓ Frequently asked questions

What did this decision decide?

The court decided that workers performing sea duties aboard surface vessels were correctly compensated under clause 23.04 of the collective agreement.

What was the dispute about?

The dispute was about whether workers performing sea duties aboard surface vessels should be compensated under clause 23.04 or clause 15.10 of the collective agreement.

How did the court decide, and why?

The court decided in favour of the employer's compensation method, stating that the conditions of clause 23.04 were met and that the Bedford Basin was considered part of Halifax harbour.

Which laws or rules were applied?

The Federal Public Sector Labour Relations and Employment Board Act and the Federal Public Sector Labour Relations Act were applied.

What was the argument that mattered most?

The central argument was whether the work performed in the Bedford Basin should be considered 'sea duties' under clause 23.04 or 'regular work' under clause 15.10.

Was the decision for or against the person who brought the case?

The decision was against the person who brought the case.

What does this mean for someone in a similar situation?

Someone in a similar situation should ensure that the conditions of the relevant clause in their collective agreement are met before disputing compensation.

What evidence or documents mattered?

The judgment does not specify the exact evidence or documents that mattered.

Official source: Federal Public Sector Labour Relations and Employment Board headnote and full judgment reproduced from the court's public records. View on the official source ↗Summary, holding, technical summary and questions: produced by Artificial Intelligence based on the official headnote and judgment. These are VadeLab’s own material and are not the work of the Court.This decision was issued by the Federal Public Sector Labour Relations and Employment Board and is reproduced from its published records. VadeLab is not affiliated with, and this page is not endorsed by, that court or tribunal.
Compensation for Sea Duties - FPSLREB Decision | VadeLab