Federal Public Sector Labour Relations and Employment Board Wage Rates Decision

OUTCOME: Allowed

Date: 202 60610 File : 485-HC-52052 Citation: 2026 FPSLREB 71 Federal Public Sector Labour Relations and Employment Board Act and Federal Public Sector Labour Relations Act Before a panel of the Federal Public Sector Labour Relations and Employment Board IN THE MATTER OF THE PARLIAMENTARY EMPLOYMENT AND STAFF RELATIONS ACT and a dispute affecting the [NAME_1] of Canada, as Bargaining Agent, and [NAME_2], as Employer in respect of the [NAME_3] as [NAME_1] of Canada v. [NAME_2] In the matter of the Parliamentary Employment and Staff Relations Act Before: [NAME_4], [NAME_5], and [NAME_6], deemed to form the Federal Public Sector Labour Relations and Employment Board For the Bargaining Agent: [NAME_7] and [NAME_8], [NAME_1] of Canada For the Employer: [NAME_9] , [NAME_10], and [NAME_11], counsel ADVANCE \y 657 Heard by videoconference March 3, 2026 . ARBITRAL AWARD I. Overview [ 1 ] This is an arbitral award to determine the terms and conditions of employment for the employees in the [NAME_3] employed by [NAME_2] ([NAME_2]) and represented by the [NAME_1] of Canada ([NAME_12]). [ 2 ] This award will begin by outlining the bargaining unit and the history of this round of negotiations for a collective agreement. Then, it will provide a short outline of the principles that the Board followed in preparing this award. Finally, the Board will go through the issues that remain in dispute and provide its decision for each of them.

II. The bargaining unit and the employer [ 3 ] The [NAME_2] is one of seven employers regulated by the Parliamentary Employment and Staff Relations Act (R.S.C., 1985, c. 33 (2nd Supp.); PESRA ). It provides administrative and other support for members of Parliament. [ 4 ] The employees in this bargaining unit prepare documents related to the Parliamentary business of the [NAME_2], such as preparing the Hansard reports of debates. The majority of the employees in the bargaining unit are either editors or transeditors. Transediting is an amalgamation of transcription and editing: they transcribe the debates and do a first pass of editing them. The editors then edit the transedited text. There are a handful of other positions in the bargaining unit as well. [ 5 ] There are approximately 83 employees in the bargaining unit, of whom approximately 34 are either editors or senior editors and 39 are transeditors. [ 6 ] The bargaining unit is also divided into full-time and [NAME_13] [NAME_14] [NAME_15] ([NAME_15]) employees. Full-time employees work a standard 35-hour week all year, while [NAME_15] employees work between 700 and 1820 hours each year. As of the date of this arbitration, there were approximately 49 full-time employees (or 59%) and 34 [NAME_15] employees (or 41%).

III. Bargaining history [ 7 ] The current collective agreement between the parties expired on June 30, 2022. [NAME_12] served notice to bargain on June 13, 2022, and the parties met in 10 negotiation sessions from October 2024 to December 2025. The parties agreed on many issues but were unable to reach a comprehensive collective agreement. [ 8 ] The terms of reference for the arbitration board deemed to form the Board were forwarded to the Board members on June 16, 2025. The parties continued negotiating after those terms of reference and modified their proposals up to and after the date on which the Board heard from them.

IV. Principles applied in making this arbitral award [ 9 ] In rendering its decision, the Board is guided by s. 53 of the PESRA , which reads as follows: 53 In the conduct of proceedings before it and in rendering an arbitral award in respect of a matter in dispute, the Board shall consider (a) the needs of the employer affected for qualified employees, (b) the need to maintain appropriate relationships in the conditions of employment as between different grade levels within an occupation and as between occupations of employees, (c) the need to establish terms and conditions of employment that are fair and reasonable in relation to the qualifications required, the work performed, the responsibility assumed and the nature of the services rendered, and (d) any other factor that to it appears to be relevant to the matter in dispute, and, so far as consistent with the requirements of the employer, the Board shall give due regard to maintaining comparability of conditions of employment of employees with those that are applicable to persons in similar employment in the federal public administration. [ 10 ] The Federal Public Sector Labour Relations and Employment Board (“the Board”) has recently set out the basic principles of arbitration in [NAME_1] of Canada v. [NAME_2] , 2024 FPSLREB 82 (“ 2024 Operations Group ” ) , as follows: … [ 11 ] This Board is tasked with determining the terms and conditions of employment for employees in the Operations Group. In most jurisdictions, this exercise is called interest arbitration. Interest arbitrators have developed and applied several principles that they follow when making their decisions. These principles are broadly reflected in s. 53 of the PESRA as well, and the Board has been guided by those principles in this decision too. [ 12 ] Interest arbitration is a substitute for strikes and lockouts. Therefore, at its core, the task of an interest arbitration board is to determine what the parties would have agreed to after a strike or lockout, or the threat of one. Interest arbitrators commonly refer to this as the replication principle: that the job of this arbitration board is “to replicate what conventional bargaining would have produced” (see Construction and Labour Relations Assn. of [NAME_16] v. [NAME_17]’ and Cement Masons’ International Assn., Local 919 , [2006] B.C.C.A.A.A. No. 11 at para. 7). This does not permit the Board to speculate about how the issues would have played out at the bargaining table; instead, we are “required to act adjudicatively and to respond to objective criteria ” (see  [ADDRESS] of [NAME_18] (1985), 19 L.A.C. (3d) 288 at p. 304) . Section 53 of PESRA is an effort to list some of those objective criteria. However, despite the Board’s best efforts, collective bargaining and interest arbitration are not precise exercises, as explained in Sudbury (City) v. The [COMPANY_19] 527, [COMPANY_20] , 2017 CanLII 54143 (ON LA) at para. 15 as follows :

15. Collective bargaining is not a precise mathematical exercise. There is significant room for legitimate disagreement among experienced labour relations practitioners about the arbitrated result that would best replicate an agreement if it had been freely negotiated in a right to strike or lockout environment. All that an interest arbitrator can hope to do is to produce an award that falls within a reasonable range. Analysis of various data does not dictate a single ‘right’ answer immune from rigorous debate and credible differing opinion . [ 13 ] The most important way that interest arbitrators attempt to replicate a freely negotiated collective agreement is to examine the agreements reached in similar workplaces. In this way, the goal of replication is achieved through comparability — by comparing or even copying the results reached in similar workplaces. As one leading arbitrator has put it, “[c]omparability puts the flesh on the bones of replication, providing the surest guide to what the parties would likely have done, in all of the circumstances, had the collective agreement been fully and freely bargained” ( [COMPANY_21] v. [NAME_22] of Public Employees, Local 79 , 2011 CanLII 76737 (ON LA) at p. 4). [ 14 ] The criteria listed in s. 53(b) and in the provision that follows s. 53(d) reflect the principle of comparability — s. 53(b) providing for “internal comparability” (comparability within an employer) and the ending provision in s. 53 providing for “external comparability” (comparability with other employers, in this case in the federal public administration). In essence, s. 53 provides for an arbitration board to consider comparables as if they were concentric circles nested within one another. At the centre is the terms and conditions of the same [NAME_23]; the next circle is other Parliamentary employers; the next circle is the federal public administration; and finally, an arbitration board can consider other relevant employers. Typically, an arbitration board gives more weight to the innermost concentric circle, and then decreasing weight to each successive circle. … [ 11 ] One of the main differences between the parties in this case was about the choice of comparables. There are four bargaining units at the [NAME_2]: this one, the [COMPANY_24] (represented by [NAME_12]), the Procedural Clerks (represented by PIPSC), and a Technical group (represented by UNIFOR). [ 12 ] In its written brief, [NAME_12] submitted that “ [t]he three additional bargaining units at [NAME_2] represent the closest and most direct comparators of the [COMPANY_25].” However, in oral argument, [NAME_12] stated that the most important comparable was the [COMPANY_24] and that the Board should discount agreements reached with other bargaining agents. The [NAME_2] disagreed and stated that the most important comparables are all bargaining units with the same [NAME_23]. [ 13 ] In my opinion, there is no single right answer to that question. The answer depends on the bargaining history involving these parties along with the specific issue being discussed. Therefore, I will return to this question when addressing the bargaining proposals most acutely impacted by it.

V. Issues in dispute [ 14 ] There are 12 broad issues that remain in dispute between the parties: · the wage rate in 2023 · whether to change the current wage grid · the duration of the arbitral award · late implementation of the arbitral award · lump-sum payment to employees · technological change · leave for union business (ratification meeting) · statutory holidays · personal leave · changes to [NAME_15] employee rules · overtime meal allowance · telework VI. Arbitral award for issues that remain in dispute A. The wage rate in 2023 [ 15 ] The parties agreed on the wage increases for 2022, 2024, and 2025, as follows: · July 1, 2022: 3.5% salary increase + 1.25% wage adjustment · July 1, 2024: 2% salary increase + 0.25% wage adjustment · July 1, 2025: 2.5% salary increase (which the [NAME_2] agreed to on March 2, 2026) [ 16 ] These rates are all compounded (i.e., the wage adjustment is applied after the wage increase has been calculated). [ 17 ] The arbitral award will reflect that agreement. [ 18 ] The parties agree on a 3% salary increase effective July 1, 2023. However, they disagree about the size of the wage adjustment. [NAME_12] proposes a 1.25% wage adjustment, and the [NAME_2] proposes a 0.5% wage adjustment. [ 19 ] [NAME_12]’s argument is that the arbitral award in 2024 Operations Group awarded a 1.25% wage adjustment and that the arbitral award in [NAME_1] of Canada v. [NAME_26] of Canada , 2024 FPSLREB 89 (“ [NAME_26] 2024 ”), did so too. Therefore, this group should get the same thing. [NAME_12] states that the Operations Group at the [NAME_2] is the best comparator because of the long history of equality in wage increases between these two groups. [NAME_12] provided a table going back to 1998 showing that, with two minor exceptions, their wage increases were always the same. The Operations Group used to be composed of two groups (Operations and Postal), so the chart contains different line items until 2010, when the groups were merged. It reads (and I added the years 2022, 2024 and 2025): Year [COMPANY_24] 1998 2.5 2.5 2.5 1999 2 2 2 2000 2.5 2.5 2.5 2001 3 3 3 2002 2.5 2.5 2.5 2003 3 3 3 2004 3 3 3 2005 3 3 3 2006 2.5 2.5 2.5 2007 2.5 2.5 2.5 2008 1.5 1.5 1.5 2009 1.5 1.5 1.5 2010 1.5 1.5 1.5 2011 1.75 1.75 2012 1.5 1.5 2013 2 2 2014 1.5 1.5 2015 1.25 1.25 2016 1.5 1.5 2017 1.5 1.5 2018 2.8 2.75 2019 2.2 2 2020 1.5 1.5 2021 1.5 1.5 2022 3.5 + 1.25 3.5 + 1.25 2023 3 + ? 3+ 1.25 2024 2 + 0.25 2.25 2025 2.5 2.5 [ 20 ] As that table shows, the two bargaining units represented by [NAME_12] always had the same wage increase, except for 2018 and 2019, when they were very close. [ 21 ] The [NAME_2] argues that 2024 Operations Group was a special case. To explain, when that decision was made, there was no other agreement at the [NAME_2] to compare that bargaining unit to for comparison purposes. [NAME_12] argued in that case that the closest comparator was a bargaining unit at the [NAME_27] for labourers and tradespeople (the SV Group). As the Board pointed out in that case, “[t]he [NAME_2] did not contest the usefulness of the SV Group as a comparator…”. The SV Group is composed of many different classifications. For 2023, [NAME_12] and the [NAME_27] agreed to 3% wage adjustments for some of those classifications and 0.5% for others. In 2024 Operations Group , [NAME_12] argued that the entire unit should get a 3% wage adjustment, and the [NAME_2] argued that the entire unit should get a 0.5% wage adjustment. [ 22 ] The Board went through the classifications in the SV Group and compared them to the jobs in the Operations Unit at the [NAME_2]. It found this at paragraph 36: …there are 22 employees (drivers and locksmiths) whose comparator received a 3% wage adjustment in 2023, 192 employees whose comparator received a 0.5% wage adjustment in 2023, and 99 employees without a perfect comparator but with elements of comparators with 0.5% and 3% wage adjustments in 2023. [ 23 ] The Board decided to adopt what it called a “smoothing approach” (from paragraph 41) and ended up with a wage adjustment of 1.25% for the unit as a whole because “[t]his reflects the relative proportion of employees in each position and the fact that the Maintenance and Material Handling position has elements of different SV subgroups that negotiated different wage adjustments for 2023” (from paragraph 42). [ 24 ] The Board did something similar in the [NAME_26] 2024 case. It found that the positions at the [NAME_26] corresponded even less exactly with classifications in the SV Group at the [NAME_27] and awarded a 1.25% wage adjustment for 2023, stating this: … [33] In light of this lack of a perfect comparison with an SV subgroup, the Board has decided that the most apt comparison for wage purposes is the operations group at [NAME_2]. Since there is no perfect comparator in the SV group, the parties would most likely have copied the result from the similar bargaining unit at [NAME_2]. As set out in the [NAME_2] award, the Board recently awarded a 1.25% wage adjustment for 2023 for that group. For that reason, the Board has awarded a 1.25% wage adjustment for 2023. … [ 25 ] The [NAME_2] argues that this case is different from those two because there is no similar bargaining unit at the [NAME_27] that negotiated a 1.25% (or 3%) wage adjustment for 2023. It argues that this means that the Board should order the more standard 0.5% wage adjustment for 2023. The wage rates in 2023 in several bargaining units were as follows: Employer Union / Bargaining unit 2023 wage increase [NAME_2] [NAME_12] - [COMPANY_24] 3.0% + 1.25% (arbitral award) [NAME_2] Group 3.0% + 0.5% [NAME_2] 3.0% + 0.5% [NAME_26] of Canada [NAME_12] 3.0% + 1.25% (arbitral award) [NAME_26] of Canada PIPSC - Legislative Clerks 3.0% + 0.5% Library of [NAME_12]-LT Group 3.0% + 0.5% (arbitral award) Library of [NAME_12] - LS Group 3.0% + 1.0% (arbitral award) Library of Parliament CAPE - Analysts 3.0% + 0.5% [NAME_28] 3.0% + 0.5% [NAME_28] [NAME_12] 3.0% + 0.5% (arbitral award) [NAME_27] [NAME_12] - PA Group and TC Group 3.0% + 0.5% [NAME_27] [NAME_12] - SV Group and EB Group 3.0% + wage adjustments for specific classifications ranging between 1.0% and 6.0% [NAME_27] - TR and EC Groups 3.0% + 0.5% [NAME_27] - all groups 3.0% + 0.5% (one group had an arbitral award) Canada [NAME_12] 3.0% + 0.5% Parks Canada [NAME_12] 3.0% + 0.5% (with some subgroups getting between 1.0% and 4.0%) [ 26 ] There are examples of bargaining units with different wage adjustments in 2023; however, those bargaining units had some specific circumstances that are missing here (such as much lower wage increases in 2022). [ 27 ] After carefully considering the submissions of both parties, I have decided to award a 1.25% wage adjustment in 2023. [ 28 ] In essence, the difference between the parties is this: [NAME_12] says that the Board should copy what happened with its units in the [NAME_2] and the [NAME_26], while the [NAME_2] says that the Board should copy what [NAME_12] agreed to with the [NAME_27]. [ 29 ] If the Board agrees with [NAME_12]’s reasoning, the answer is 1.25%. [ 30 ] If the Board agrees with the [NAME_2]’s reasoning, the result is also 1.25%, not 0.5%, as it argued. [ 31 ] To explain, there is no exact match between this bargaining unit and a bargaining unit at the [NAME_27]. This unit is, in essence, composed of editors and transeditors. The editors in the core public administration are in the Program and Administrative Services (PA) bargaining unit, specifically in the Information Services (IS) classification. That unit negotiated a 0.5% wage adjustment in 2023. However, there are no transeditors in the core public administration. [NAME_12] submitted that the most analogous workers in the core public administration to transeditors are intercept monitors employed at the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) in the Law Enforcement Support and Police Operations Support (PO) bargaining unit, and the [NAME_2] did not propose any other analogous unit. That unit negotiated a 3% general increase, a 0.5% wage adjustment, plus an additional increment meaning that employees already at the top of the wage grid got an additional 4% wage increase (approximately) — meaning that some employees got an over 7.5% increase that year. Following the “smoothing” approach adopted in 2024 Operations Group (of 44% transeditors and 56% others), this would lead to an overall increase of approximately 5.26% — which is almost exactly what [NAME_12] is asking for when the 3% increase is added to the 1.25% wage adjustment that it proposes. [ 32 ] Therefore, the Board awards a wage increase of 3% plus a wage adjustment of 1.25% for 2023, compounded in the way already agreed on by the parties. B. Wage grid [ 33 ] [NAME_12] proposes changing the wage grid for this bargaining unit to reduce the number of steps on that wage grid from seven or nine (depending on the classification) to four. [ 34 ] The Board has decided not to award this change because [NAME_12] has not demonstrated a need for it. While having seven steps on a wage grid for this type of employment seems high, compressing a wage gride is usually not awarded in interest arbitration unless the wage grid is an “extreme outlier” (from [NAME_29] v. [COMPANY_30] , 2023 CanLII 33967 (ON LA)) or it is different from the “overwhelming norm in the industry” (from [NAME_31] v. [NAME_32] Union, Local 1 Canada , 2016 CanLII 59378 (ON LA)). [NAME_12] has not convinced the Board that it needs to compress the wage grid or that the wage grid is such an outlier that it needs to be compressed. C. Term of the arbitral award [ 35 ] The parties have agreed that the arbitral award should expire on June 26, 2026. While this is less than the one year after the date of this award set out in s. 58(2) of PESRA , the Board is satisfied that this shorter term is justified under s. 58(1)(b)(i) of PESRA since a longer term would create an award of five years’ duration, which is longer than the term of any earlier collective agreement reached between the parties (which have always been four years or less). [ 36 ] [NAME_12] has proposed that every term of the arbitral award be made retroactive to the expiry of the previous collective agreement. There is no precedent for doing so, and [NAME_12] made no submissions in support of this proposal. The Board orders that the award will come into force on the day this decision is issued, except for the wage increases, which are retroactive to the dates of those wage increases. D. Late implementation of the arbitral award [ 37 ] [NAME_12] proposes a term stipulating that, if the [NAME_2] is late paying the retroactive wage increases owing as a result of this award, each employee whose retroactive pay takes more than 90 days to pay will be paid $200 if the outstanding sum is more than $500 and then an additional $50 for each additional 90-day period of delay. Those are identical to terms awarded by other panels of the Board in 2024 Operations Group and [NAME_1] of Canada v. [NAME_28] , 2024 FPSLREB 73. [ 38 ] The [NAME_2] argues that the Board does not have the jurisdiction to grant this proposal. In essence, the [NAME_2] argues if it is late implementing an arbitral award, it needs to apply to the Board for an extension of time under s. 59 of PESRA . It argues that [NAME_12]’s proposal would negate its right to apply for that extension of time. It also argues that this proposal is not a “term and condition of employment” and, therefore, cannot be included in an arbitral award. Finally, the [NAME_2] argues that any consequences for late implementation must be dealt with by way of a complaint under s. 13 of PESRA . [ 39 ] The [NAME_2] made the same objection in 2024 Operations Group (see paragraph 56), and the panel of the Board in that case rejected the jurisdictional objection. [ 40 ] The [NAME_2] argues that the law changed as a result of [NAME_26] of Canada v. [NAME_1] of Canada , 2025 FPSLREB 61. In [NAME_26] 2024 , [NAME_12] initially proposed this same article for late implementation. However, it withdrew that proposal shortly before arbitration because the [NAME_26] did not have a history of late implementation. The [NAME_26] was then late implementing the wage increases awarded in 2024. [NAME_12] wrote to the panel of the Board assigned to the 2024 arbitration to address that issue. That panel declined, stating (in an unpublished letter decision reproduced in the Board’s 2025 decision): … The bargaining agent’s complaint is that the employer has not or will not comply with s. 59 of PESRA. A complaint about a breach of s. 59 of PESRA is dealt with under s. 13(1)(b) of PESRA, which states that “the Board” (by which it means the Federal Public Sector Labour Relations and Employment Board, not the arbitration board deemed to be the Board) shall examine and inquire into any such complaint. The arbitration board does not have the jurisdiction to hear a complaint under s. 13(1) of PESRA because its jurisdiction only extends “for the purposes of the arbitration” and a complaint under s. 13(1) is not “the arbitration.” The arbitration board only remained seized to resolve any differences that arose in respect of the implementation of the award – which is limited to clarifying any ambiguity about the terms of the award or correcting any typographical errors. The arbitration board also remained seized for the purposes of resolving the two outstanding issues (wage grid and uniforms) that the bargaining agent states have been resolved. A complaint about late implementation of the arbitral award falls outside of the scope of the arbitration board’s reserved jurisdiction. This is confirmed in [NAME_1] of Canada v. [NAME_2] , 2021 FPSLREB 45 at para. 87 where the arbitration board stated: “... if the employer is unable to meet the 90-day timeline, it would need either to negotiate an implementation extension with the bargaining agent or to apply to the Board under s. 59 of the PESRA for such an extension.” I also reviewed Federal Government Dockyard Chargehands Association v. [NAME_27] (Department of National Defence) , 2013 PSLRB 139 where a similar dispute under what is now the Federal Public Sector Labour Relations Act was heard by the Board, not by the arbitration panel. This is a further indication that any applications about late-implementation of the award need to be addressed to the Board, not this arbitration board whose mandate is limited. … [ 41 ] The [NAME_2] argued that this decision changed the legal framework and was inconsistent with those earlier arbitral awards. I disagree. All that decision states is that, once a panel issues an arbitral award, it does not have any jurisdiction to hear a complaint about the late implementation of the award. [NAME_12]’s proposal is not about a complaint of late implementation; it is about fixing the compensation owed by an employer if it is late implementing one of the many items in this arbitral award. [ 42 ] The proposal does not negate s. 59 of PESRA . It is only about one of the many terms in this arbitral award, so the [NAME_2] still has access to s. 59 about those other terms. As for this one term impacted, the proposal does not prevent the [NAME_2] from applying to the Board for an extension of time to implement the arbitral award — in fact, it must do so despite this proposal, to avoid a complaint by [NAME_12]. All the proposal would do is compensate employees affected by a late implementation of the wage increases. [ 43 ] Finally, this proposal falls within the meaning of a “term or condition of employment” for the purposes of s. 50 of PESRA , which provides that an arbitral award may only be in respect of a term or condition of employment. PESRA does not define the phrase “term or condition of employment”. However, the Supreme Court of Canada has explained that a condition of employment is something with a “… real connection with the contract of employment …” (see [NAME_33] v. [NAME_34] , 2006 SCC 2 at para. 26). [ 44 ] The Supreme Court of Canada has also described terms and conditions of employment for federal public servants very broadly, as follows (see [NAME_35] v. Canada , 2005 SCC 11 at para. 1): [1] The terms and conditions of employment of the federal government’s quarter of a million current workers are set out in statutes, collective agreements, [NAME_27] directives, regulations, ministerial orders, and other documents that consume bookshelves of loose-leaf binders. Human resources personnel are recruited into the system, spend a career attempting to understand it and die out of it. Procedures for the enforcement of employment rights and obligations also differ in some respects from those in the private sector. Almost any workplace issue can be grieved  but only some disputes can be carried onwards to third-party arbitration. .... [Emphasis added] [ 45 ] Compensation for late payment of wages has a real connection to an employee’s employment. Therefore, a term stipulating compensation for late payment is a “term or condition of employment”. [ 46 ] As for the merits of [NAME_12]’s proposal, while I acknowledge that the [NAME_2] did not delay implementing the award for the 2024 Operations Group , it confirmed that the government-wide pay centre still plays some role in implementing this award. This is what caused the problem in the [NAME_26]. Therefore, despite the [NAME_2]’s best efforts, there may still be a need for this proposal. To be blunt, the pay centre burned the employees in the [NAME_26], and once burned, twice shy. [ 47 ] For each employee who is employed in the bargaining unit on both the date of this arbitral award and 90 days after that date and who does not receive a wage increase, wage adjustment, or retroactive pay within 90 days of the date of this award, the [NAME_2] must pay that employee 1) the sum of $200 if the outstanding amount owing is greater than $500, plus 2) an additional $50 for each additional 90-day period of delay. E. Lump-sum payment to employees [ 48 ] The parties initially referred this issue to arbitration, but during the hearing, [NAME_12] confirmed that it agreed with the proposal by the [NAME_2] on this topic. Therefore, the Board will order as follows: The Employer will provide a one-time lump-sum payment/ allowance of $2,500 to incumbents of positions who are within the Bargaining Unit ([NAME_36]) on the date of ratification of the collective agreement by both parties [from date of arbitral award]; this one-time lump-sum payment/allowance will be paid for the performance of regular duties and responsibilities associated with their position. For greater certainty, if an employee has already received this lump-sum payment/allowance from the Employer, they are not eligible to receive it again. F. Technological change [ 49 ] [NAME_12] made proposals to amend the provisions in the collective agreement dealing with technological change. For context, it stated that the employees in this bargaining unit are especially susceptible to recent technological developments in artificial intelligence. That is fairly self-evident, and the [NAME_2] does not seriously dispute it. [ 50 ] The [NAME_2] initially opposed [NAME_12]’s proposal and, in fact, made its own proposal that would have reduced the topics about which it would consult [NAME_12]. During the hearing, it modified its proposal, and then it modified its proposal again after the hearing. For ease of reference, these are [NAME_12]’s and the [NAME_2]’s final proposals side-by-side (with the changes from the status quo in bold): [NAME_12] [NAME_2] 9.2 In this Article “Technological Change” means: 9.2 In this Article “Technological Change” means: a) the introduction by the Employer of equipment, material , system or software of a different nature than that previously utilized; a) the introduction by the Employer of equipment, material, system or software of a substantially different nature than that previously utilized; and and b) a significant change in the Employer’s operation directly related to the introduction of that equipment, material, system or software . b) a significant change in the Employer’s operation directly related to the introduction of that equipment, material, system or software. [ 51 ] As can be seen, the only difference between the two proposals is the word “substantially” in the [NAME_2]’s proposal for clause 9.2(a). The [NAME_2] states that this word is necessary to ensure that minor changes, such as small upgrades to existing equipment, are not captured by the clause. However, a small upgrade of existing equipment would not be caught by the clause anyway, since it would not be the introduction of anything of a different nature from that previously utilized. As [NAME_12] pointed out, its proposed language is the same used in bargaining units represented by [NAME_12] in the core public administration. While other bargaining agents have agreed to include the word “substantially”, the [NAME_2] was unable to explain why it needed that word included. Therefore, the Board awards [NAME_12]’s proposed changes to clause 9.2. [ 52 ] In addition, [NAME_12] proposed adding a new sub-paragraph 9.2(c) that would read as follows: “Consultations provided for under this clause shall be in addition to those provided for under Appendix B.” Appendix B provides that technological change is a standing item for joint consultation at local consultation meetings. I agree with the [NAME_2] that this provision is unnecessary. The consultation required under article 9 is different from that required under Appendix B, and the [NAME_2] does not suggest otherwise. The proposed sub-paragraph 9.2(c) is unnecessary, so the Board will not award it. [ 53 ] Therefore, the Board awards the following change to clause 9.2 of the collective agreement (with the changes in bold ): 9.2 In this Article “Technological Change” means: a) the introduction by the Employer of equipment, material , system or software of a different nature than that previously utilized; and b) a significant change in the Employer’s operation directly related to the introduction of that equipment, material, system or software . G. Leave for union business [ 54 ] During bargaining, the parties agreed to add a new clause to the collective agreement granting employees one hour’s paid leave to attend a meeting for the ratification of the collective agreement. However, the parties could not agree on the terms of that leave. Namely, the [NAME_2] wanted the timing of the leave to be subject to operational requirements, and [NAME_12] wanted the leave to be conditional on giving notice and the timing to be subject to consultation. [ 55 ] This provision is largely a moot point at this stage. This is an arbitral award, so there will be no ratification meeting. The parties can always negotiate the timing of the ratification meeting, or any other issues, during the next round of collective bargaining. Therefore, the Board awards the [NAME_2]’s proposal as being the lowest common denominator for this issue. [ 56 ] The collective agreement will add the following clause: 12.XX Ratification of the collective agreement Subject to operational requirements and on receipt of reasonable advance notice, the Employer will grant leave of absence with pay for one (1) hour at straight-time to members of the bargaining unit for the purpose of attending a meeting for the ratification of the collective agreement following negotiations. The leave of absence with pay will be granted on one occasion following negotiations of the collective agreement. H. Statutory holidays [ 57 ] [NAME_12] proposed adding Ontario’s Family Day as an extra designated paid holiday. The Board declines to award that proposal, just as every single previous arbitration board have refused to award that proposal since 2009 (see [NAME_1] of Canada v. [NAME_2] , 2009 PSLRB 161 at para. 23). [ 58 ] [NAME_12] also proposed increasing the premium paid to [NAME_15] employees in lieu of designated paid holidays from 4.6% to 4.98%. After the hearing concluded, the [NAME_2] consented to that change effective January 1, 2025, because it ties into the agreement to add the National Day for Truth and Reconciliation as a designated paid holiday. In light of that agreement, the Board orders as follows (the change is in bold ): 40.1 [NAME_37] working thirty-five (35) hours per week or less and part-time employees whose normal scheduled hours of work are on average less than thirty-five (35) hours per week shall be entitled to the following benefits: … c) These employees shall not be paid for the designated holidays but shall be paid a premium of four point six (4.6%) percent for all straight-time hours worked. Effective January 1, 2025, these employees shall not be paid for the designated holidays but shall, be paid a premium of four point nine-eight (4.98%) percent for all straight time hours worked.

I. Personal leave [ 59 ] [NAME_12] proposed adding a second day of personal leave and changing the meaning of “operational requirements” in the collective agreement for the purposes of personal leave. The Board does not award this proposal, for the same reasons as previous arbitration boards refused to award this same proposal. As the Board said in [NAME_26] 2024 at paragraph 45 “no other [NAME_23] has two days’ personal leave.” J. Changes to [NAME_15] employees [ 60 ] As stated earlier, [NAME_15] employees are those that work between 700 and 1820 hours each year. They comprise just under half of the bargaining unit. [ 61 ] [NAME_12] proposed two changes with respect to [NAME_15] employees. [ 62 ] First, [NAME_12] proposed that the [NAME_2] be required to give “due consideration” to [NAME_15] employees for full-time positions. The [NAME_2] objected to the Board’s jurisdiction to award that proposal. The Board agrees that it has no jurisdiction to award that proposal. [ 63 ] Subsection 55(2) of PESRA states, “ No arbitral award shall deal with the standards, procedures or processes governing the appointment … of employees …” [emphasis added]. A requirement that an employer give due consideration to certain types of applicants for a position clearly deals with the standards and processes governing the appointment of employees. In [NAME_1] of Canada v. [NAME_26] of Canada , 2011 FCA 214, the Federal Court of Appeal upheld an arbitration board’s decision that a proposal that job vacancies be posted touched upon the topics prohibited in s. 55(2) of the PESRA . If simply posting a job touches on s. 55(2), then a requirement limiting the employer’s discretion when deciding whom to appoint must also touch on the topics prohibited in that provision. Therefore, the Board will not award [NAME_12]’s first [NAME_15] proposal. [ 64 ] [NAME_12]’s second proposal is that [NAME_15] employees receive paid leave to enhance their employability skills. [NAME_12] initially proposed 70 hours of leave for each [NAME_15] employee over the life of this collective agreement, it reduced that to 35 hours in its submissions. [ 65 ] While the [NAME_2]’s position at this arbitration was that the Board should not award this proposal, it filed a copy of a global proposal that it made to resolve all outstanding issues that included three hours for this leave, showing that it was prepared to do something along the lines proposed by [NAME_12]. [ 66 ] Considering the parties’ negotiation history, the Board will award paid leave to [NAME_15] employees for the purpose of enhancing their employability skills. The leave will be limited to 7 hours for each employee throughout their employment with the [NAME_2] (i.e., not just for the life of this collective agreement, which is about to expire in a matter of weeks in any event). The leave may be taken in two increments of 3.5 hours (i.e., half-days). [ 67 ] Therefore, the Board awards that the parties will add the following provision to Appendix F of the collective agreement:

14. One-time leave a) The Employer will provide a one-time period of 7 hours of paid leave, or two periods of 3.5 hours of paid leave, for each [NAME_15] employee to enhance their employability skills through learning activities. b) Scheduling of this leave is subject to operational requirements. c) This leave is in addition to article 22. K. Overtime meal allowance [ 68 ] The collective agreement between the parties provides for an overtime meal allowance. The [NAME_2] proposed eliminating the allowance when the employee is working overtime at home. The [NAME_2] points out that the purpose behind the allowance is to pay for the extra cost of a meal while an employee is working overtime; if the employee is at home, there is no increased cost because they would have to eat anyway. [ 69 ] The Board does not award the employer’s proposal and retains the status quo. [ 70 ] While I agree with the [NAME_2] that paying this allowance to an employee who works overtime at home may not serve the purpose of the allowance, there are any number of provisions in a collective agreement that were negotiated years earlier and may not be as relevant today. In this case, the parties negotiated (and then argued in this arbitral award over) a one-hour’s leave for a ratification meeting that may never happen unless the parties can wean themselves off of their addiction to arbitration. The parties have shown that rationality is not the only factor used when negotiating terms and conditions of employment. [ 71 ] The proposal of the [NAME_2] would impact certain employees in a significant way. This is the type of proposal that needs to be purchased in collective bargaining. [ 72 ] Finally, the parties informed the Board that most of the employees in this bargaining unit work from home most of the time. There are many working conditions that are impacted by a shift to work from home, including the telework issue that is discussed later. The Board encourages the parties to seriously examine all terms and conditions of employment impacted by this change in the working arrangement of employees in this bargaining unit and negotiate a comprehensive set of changes instead of asking this Board to look them piecemeal. L. Telework [ 73 ] Both parties requested that the issue of telework be held in abeyance, to give them the opportunity to discuss it further. [ 74 ] The Board agrees to hold this issue in abeyance until June 26, 2026 (i.e., the expiry date of this arbitral award). Unless the parties advise the Board that they want it to deal with this issue before that date, the issue of telework is best left for the next round of bargaining, which will begin on or after that date.

VII. Order [ 75 ] The Board will remain seized of this matter for a period of 90 days, in the event that the parties encounter any difficulties implementing the arbitral award or a party requests that the Board address the issue of telework. June 10, 2026. [NAME_4], For the Federal Public Sector Labour Relations and Employment Board