FPSLREB Dismisses Complaint Over Appointment Process

Date: 20260127 File : 771-02-49428 Citation: 2026 FPSLREB 8 Federal Public Sector Labour Relations and Employment Board Act and Public Service Employment Act Before a panel of the Federal Public Sector Labour Relations and Employment Board [NAME] Complainant and deputy head ( Department of Citizenship and Immigration ) Respondent and OTHER PARTIES Indexed as [NAME] v. Deputy Head (Department of Citizenship and Immigration) In the matter of a complaint of abuse of authority under sections 77(1)(a) and (b) of the Public Service Employment Act Before: [NAME], a panel of the Federal Public Sector Labour Relations and Employment Board For the Complainant: Himself For the Respondent : [redacted] For the Public Service Commission: [NAME] \y 657 Decided on the basis of written submissions, filed May 22, 23, and 29, July 25, August 19, September 9, and October 13, 2025 .

REASONS FOR

DECISION I. Overview [ 1 ] This is a staffing complaint made by [NAME] (“the complainant”) under ss. 77(1)(a) and (b) of the Public Service Employment Act (S.C. 2003, c. 22, ss. 12, 13; “the PSEA ”). [ 2 ] The complainant alleged that the deputy head of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration (“the respondent”) abused its authority when it chose to use a non-advertised process to make an appointment and for making that appointment without merit, as is required under s. 30(2) of the PSEA . He alleged there was bias and personal favouritism in the appointment process. The respondent department is commonly referred to as [NAME] ([NAME]). [ 3 ] The appointment in question was an extension to an acting assignment of [NAME] (“the appointee”) in the position of Case Processing Officer, classified at the [COMPANY], at the [NAME] in Etobicoke, Ontario. The appointee had initially been appointed to that position on an acting basis starting in May 2023. On March 19, 2024, the respondent published a Notice of Acting Appointment (NAA), announcing that the appointee’s acting appointment was being extended to March 31, 2025. The NAA stated that a non-advertised process was used to make the appointment. The appointment process in question bore the number 2023-IMC-INA-ACIN-44946. This complaint was made in response to that announcement. [ 4 ] The respondent denied abusing its authority in the appointment process. [ 5 ] The Public Service Commission ([NAME]) provided written submissions to address the applicable policies and guidelines. It did not take a position on the merits of the complaint. [ 6 ] For the following reasons, the complaint is dismissed. [ 7 ] I will begin with an explanation of why I chose to use a written submission process to decide this complaint. This will be followed by a description of the nature of the evidence provided and then a summary of it. I then provide a summary of the legal principles applicable to this complaint, followed by explanations of why I find that the complainant failed to substantiate his complaint under each of ss. 77(1)(a) and (b) of the PSEA . The two final sections address the complainant’s arguments with respect to his alleged constructive dismissal from his [NAME] and the issue raised by the respondent regarding the complainant’s personal interest in the appointment. [ 8 ] In this decision, references to “the Board” include the Federal Public Sector Labour Relations and Employment Board and its predecessors, including the Public Service Staffing Tribunal (PSST).

II. Why a written submission process was used to decide this complaint [ 9 ] I decided to use a written submission process to decide this complaint following a case management process that took place over the course of three months, entirely in writing. [ 10 ] The case management process began after the complaint was scheduled to be heard via videoconference on May 21 to 22, 2025. The parties were notified of the hearing on December 27, 2024. [ 11 ] On February 7, 2025, I requested that the complainant provide a response to the respondent’s reply to the complaint. By way of background, in the staffing complaint process, following the exchange-of-information period, the complainant is required to file their allegations. Once that is done, the respondent is required to file what is termed a “Deputy Head Reply” (“[NAME]”) to those allegations. [ 12 ] In its [NAME], the respondent questioned the complainant’s personal interest in the appointment in question. According to it, the complaint concerned a position in a [NAME] that the complainant had requested to be transferred out of. I requested the complainant’s response to that assertion. [ 13 ] The complainant replied later that day, alleging that my request demonstrated bias and procedural unfairness on the part of the Board. I provided directions to him in reply, emphasizing that I had not reached a conclusion that he had no personal interest in the position, only that this was what the respondent had said. He was told that he was being asked to respond to the respondent’s assertion. [ 14 ] Shortly after that, the complainant stated that he would not provide a response to the [NAME] until he was presented with the information on which the respondent had relied when it made that assertion. [ 15 ] The lengthy written case management process followed. During this process, the complainant requested to be accommodated with an in-person hearing (instead of one held via videoconference). [Sentence redacted] When I initiated the convening of a case management conference to discuss the preparation for the hearing, he requested that it be held in person, as an accommodation measure. He also requested that any case management conference be held after 8 p.m. on a weekday or on a weekend. [ 16 ] Taking note that the complainant was representing himself, I made sure that he had access to several resources on the Board’s website, including the Board’s Procedural Guide for Staffing Complaints , its guide to Hearings Before the Federal Public Sector Labour Relations and Employment Board , and its Policy on Accommodation Requests . He was provided with information as to how he could make requests for documents from the respondent or through the Board. He was also provided with guidance as to the kind of information that he would need to provide for the Board to consider his accommodation request. He was told that he would have to identify which protected ground listed in the Canadian Human Rights Act (R.S.C., 1985, c. H-6) gave rise to his accommodation request. [Sentence redacted] [ 17 ] In the context of this exchange, on April 23, 2025, the complainant stated that it would be better for him to have his complaint decided via written submissions. Both the respondent and the [NAME] were asked for their positions on this proposal. The respondent said that it was amenable to proceeding in that way; the [NAME] did not take a position. [ 18 ] On May 5, 2025, I informed the parties that following their input, I would exercise the power granted to the Board under s. 22 of the Federal Public Sector Labour Relations and Employment Board Act ( S.C. 2013, c. 40, s. 365 , “the Board Act ”) and determine the complaint without an oral hearing. The hearing dates were cancelled. [ 19 ] I then set out a proposed written submission schedule, beginning with a deadline for both parties to provide affidavit and documentary evidence. I indicated that the schedule would be adapted to allow for a written cross-examination process, if requested. The process was to conclude with written arguments submissions from the [NAME], the complainant, and the respondent. [ 20 ] I wish to emphasize that the complainant never fully completed his request for an accommodation. My decision to use a written submission process to determine this complaint was made because both parties supported using it and because I expected that I would be able to render a decision without hearing oral evidence.

III. Nature of the evidence before the Board [ 21 ] The complainant did not file an affidavit. At the evidence stage, he submitted four documents and a covering email, explaining their relevance. [ 22 ] The respondent submitted a book of documents consisting of 10 documents and the sworn affidavit of [NAME]. She was the assistant director at [NAME] who made the decision to use a non-advertised process to make the appointment in question. The complainant exercised his right to cross-examine [NAME] in writing. The respondent objected to several of his questions on the basis of relevance; he then amended his cross-examination. I did not have to rule on the objections. [ 23 ] When the respondent made its arguments, it submitted a supplementary book of documents, consisting of two tabs. The first tab contained the appointee’s résumé. The second tab contained the respondent’s Policy on Staffing Management . [ 24 ] The complainant objected to the respondent’s attempt to add additional evidence at the argument stage. In support of his objection, he cited the Board’s Procedural Guide for Staffing Complaints . He made a motion requesting that the Board not accept the additional documents as evidence and that it require the respondent to resubmit its arguments without reference to the new documents. [ 25 ] After hearing from the respondent on the complainant’s motion, I denied it. In my decision, I explained that in a staffing complaint under s. 77(1)(a) of the PSEA (relating to merit), it is normal for one or both parties to submit the appointee’s résumé and make arguments with respect to it. Furthermore, I noted that the appointee’s résumé had been incorporated by reference (via a hyperlink) in emails included in the respondent’s initial book of documents. I also noted that the respondent’s Policy on Staffing Management could have been included in its book of authorities, rather than in its book of documents. [ 26 ] However, in the interest of fairness, I decided to extend the deadline for the complainant’s reply submissions, to provide him with additional time to review the two documents. He was provided with three additional weeks to make his reply arguments. [ 27 ] I have accepted the above-noted affidavits and documents as evidence in accordance with s. 20(e) of the Board Act , which allows me to “accept any evidence, whether admissible in a court of law or not,” and the case law of the Board; see [NAME] v. [NAME] (Department of Western Economic Diversification , 2023 FPSLREB 4 at paras. 64 and 66, and [NAME] v. National Research Council , 2025 FPSLREB 76, at paras. 21 and 22.

IV. Summary of the evidence [ 28 ] I will start with the respondent’s evidence, as it provides a timeline of the events relevant to the complaint. [ 29 ] The appointee was initially appointed on an acting basis to a [COMPANY] position in the domestic network [NAME] of the [NAME] in Toronto, Ontario, (“the [NAME]”) effective May 15, 2023. Her substantive position was a PM-01 position. The acting appointment was scheduled to end on March 29, 2024. That appointment (“the first appointment”) was also made through a non-advertised process, and the manager responsible for it was [NAME]. The complainant did not make a complaint about the first appointment. [ 30 ] [NAME] was appointed as the acting director of the [NAME] beginning in September 2023 and ending in March 2024. [ 31 ] [NAME]’ evidence was that she did not know the appointee when she joined the [NAME] and that she did not have a personal relationship with her. She also stated that she did not have personal knowledge of the complainant when she joined the [NAME]. [ 32 ] [NAME]’ evidence was that in anticipation of the end of the 2023-2024 fiscal year, one of the [NAME] undertook a planning exercise, to review all acting appointments that would require extending. The appointee’s acting position was one of the positions identified. [NAME] said that an acting manager, [NAME], validated the Statement of Merit Criteria (SOMC) for the position and the appointee’s assessment against it and then signed a statement of impartiality and reviewed the area of selection. Ms. [NAME] also validated that the appointee’s assessment against the SOMC done by [NAME] for the first appointment still applied. [ 33 ] [NAME] then completed and signed a document entitled the Articulation of Selection Decision (ASD), which is used when the respondent decides to make an appointment via a non-advertised process. The ASD was dated March 19, 2024. The document outlined the reasons for the appointment. In the ASD, [NAME] also stated that she had contacted all employees who had pre-qualified through a [COMPANY] pool list and determined that they had already been offered acting positions at a higher or an equal level with the current team or were not interested in joining the [NAME]. [ 34 ] The NAA announcing the appointment was released that same day (March 19, 2024). The duration of the appointee’s extension to her acting position was from March 29, 2024, to March 31, 2025. [ 35 ] [NAME]’ evidence was that the complainant occupied a substantive term position at the [COMPANY] level in the [NAME] when the appointment was made. She stated that this was why he was not considered for an acting [COMPANY] position. The [NAME] stated that his term position in the [NAME] was in place until March 31, 2025, which coincided with the end of the appointment in question. The end date to the complainant’s term was also reflected in an organizational chart submitted by the respondent. [ 36 ] The respondent submitted as part of its book of documents a chain of emails concerning the complainant’s transfer to a different [NAME] at [NAME], the Asylum Operations Division (“AOD”). The chain began December 1, 2023, with the complainant reaching out to the director of the AOD to express an interest in joining it. According to the email, the AOD’s director, [NAME], met with the complainant later in December. In January 2024, he reached out to her again to say that he was still interested in joining the AOD. On March 25, 2024, Ms. [NAME] contacted the complainant and asked if he was still interested in joining the [NAME]. He replied the next day, said that he was still very much interested, and said, “Thank you for the wonderful news.” He was scheduled to start in the [NAME] as of April 2, 2024. [ 37 ] As noted, the complainant did not file an affidavit. He provided four documents and a covering email as his evidence. [ 38 ] The first document that he included was the ASD dated May 1, 2023, when the appointee was initially appointed on an acting basis to the [COMPANY] position, signed by [NAME]. The second and third documents were emails that demonstrated that [NAME] was not the director when the ASD for that first appointment was signed. He stated that it would be inappropriate for [NAME] to provide evidence and that the respondent should have required [NAME] to do so. [ 39 ] The fourth document submitted by the complainant consisted of notes from a “fact-finding” meeting that took place on November 15, 2023, and subsequent fact-finding meetings in January 2024. The complainant’s covering email stated that the report showed the following: “…deliberate coordination between employees [including the appointee]… to defame me and get me constructively removed from the [NAME].” He added the following: “… management encouraged the defamation and failed to stop it, thereby facilitating my constructive removal from the [NAME], whereby I was replaced by the [appointee] … the very next day after my departure.” [ 40 ] The fact-finding notes were compiled by another acting director, [NAME]. The fact-finding appears to have been conducted as a result of concerns raised by some employees, including the appointee, about comments that the complainant was alleged to have made during an anti-racism training session in the fall of 2023. The notes end with some “overall thoughts”, concluding that the comments were said without malicious or racist intent but were unprofessional in nature. The report suggested that management address the unprofessional comments but that it take no disciplinary action. [ 41 ] In his final reply arguments, the complainant made a series of additional factual assertions. He stated that he was neither informed nor interviewed as part of the fact-finding process. He stated that the appointee sought to have him removed from the [NAME]. He alleged that the respondent sought to constructively dismiss him from his position. He said that the [NAME] was a toxic environment, from which he was ostracized. He stated that he made harassment complaints that are yet to be closed. He said that he sought the transfer to the AOD only because he was constructively dismissed and that he is now doing only routine work that does not involve subjectivity or original thinking. [ 42 ] It is important to note that none of those factual assertions made in his reply arguments were backed by either affidavit evidence or documentary evidence submitted during the evidentiary portion of the written submission process.

V. The legal principles that apply to this complaint [ 43 ] I will summarize the legal principles that apply to this complaint, which was made under ss. 77(1)(a) and (b) of the PSEA . This summary draws from cases cited by the respondent and the case law of the Board. The complainant submitted no case law and cited none in his arguments, save one related to constructive dismissal that I do not find relevant to the complaint before me, for reasons that I will explain later. [ 44 ] It is well established that the complainant bears the burden of demonstrating on a balance of probabilities that an abuse of authority has occurred in an appointment process; see, for example, [NAME] v. [NAME] of National Defence , 2006 PSST 8 at paras. 49 to 55; [NAME] v. Canada ([NAME] of Justice) , 2009 FC 684 at para. 81; and He v. [NAME] of the Canadian International Development Agency , 2011 PSST 40 . [ 45 ] To substantiate an abuse-of-authority allegation, a complainant must also establish that there was serious wrongdoing or a flaw in the process; s ee [NAME] v. Deputy Head of Service Canada , 2006 PSST 14 at para. 50; and [NAME] , at para.

62. It takes more than mere errors and omissions to substantiate a complaint; see [NAME] , at paras. 73 and 74. [ 46 ] With respect to complaints under s. 77(1)(a) of the PSEA , it must be noted that the legislation provides managers with broad discretion to establish the essential qualifications for a position, to use the assessment method they consider appropriate when making an appointment based on merit, and to choose the person who not only meets the essential qualifications but also is the right fit; see ss. 30(2) and 36(1) of the PSEA ; [NAME] v. Deputy Head of Service Canada , 2007 PSST 11 at para. 28; and [NAME] v. [NAME] of Justice , 2007 PSST 24 at para. 42. [ 47 ] To find that there was an abuse of authority due to personal favouritism, it has long been established that there must be evidence of a personal relationship between the hiring manager and the appointee or evidence that the appointment was made as a personal favour or to gain personal favour with someone else; see [NAME] v. [NAME] of Public Works and Government Services Canada , 2008 PSST 7 at paras. 39 and 41. The fact that a respondent has offered series of acting appointments to one person does not, in and of itself, demonstrate bias or personal favouritism; see [NAME] v. [NAME] of the Canada Border Services Agency , 2017 PSLREB 22 at para. 88. [ 48 ] With respect to complaints under s. 77(1)(b) of the PSEA, it must be noted that the legislation specifically permits the use of non-advertised appointments as a mechanism for making appointments and does not require a deputy head to consider more than one candidate; see the PSEA , at ss. 30(4) and 33. [ 49 ] Broad discretion is given to managers to choose between appointment processes, and the choice to use a non-advertised process is not, in and of itself, an abuse of authority; see [NAME] v. the Deputy Head of Service Canada , 2006 PSST 17 at para. 36; and [NAME] v. [NAME] of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness , 2008 PSST 22 at para. 32. [ 50 ] It takes serious errors or omissions, or a series of minor errors and omissions, to establish that the choice to use a non-advertised process represented an abuse of authority; see [NAME] v. [NAME] of Natural Resources Canada , 2009 PSST 7 at paras. 133 to 151; [NAME] v. [NAME] of Industry , 2019 FPSLREB 83 at paras. 56, 90, and 91; and [NAME] v. Commissioner of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police , 2024 FPSLREB 141 at para. 158.

VI. Reasons A. There was no abuse of authority in the application of merit [ 51 ] In relation to his complaint under s. 77(1)(a) of the PSEA , the complainant has failed to provide any evidence that the respondent abused its authority in the application of merit. [ 52 ] First of all, he provided no evidence or argument to convince me that the respondent’s appointment was affected by personal favouritism. He provided no evidence of a personal relationship between the appointee and [NAME] or anyone else involved in making the appointment. [NAME] swore an affidavit that she did not know the appointee before joining the [NAME] and that she did not have a personal relationship with her. There was no evidence to contradict her testimony. [ 53 ] Second, the complainant provided no evidence or argument that the appointee did not meet any of the essential qualifications of the position. He argued that the respondent demonstrated bias by not submitting a rating guide or a list of keywords relevant to the appointment. He argued that therefore, the respondent’s assessment of the appointee was inadequate or non-existent. But he provided no specific example of where that assessment failed to examine the qualifications of the appointee against the essential qualifications of the position. [ 54 ] The respondent, on the other hand, provided evidence that a thorough assessment had been made of the appointee’s qualifications during the first appointment process and that that assessment was reaffirmed during the appointment process in question. The assessment demonstrated that the respondent assessed the appointee against each of the essential qualifications and that she met them. [ 55 ] I find nothing in the respondent’s assessment of the appointee, or in her résumé, to suggest that the appointment was made without merit. The complainant’s allegations about merit amount to nothing more than a disagreement with the choice to assess only one candidate and not to run a competitive process, which relate to the choice of a non-advertised process allegation, which I shall address in the next section. He made no arguments with respect to the extensive case law cited by the respondent that affirms that [NAME] have broad discretion to choose an assessment process appropriate to the appointment being made. B. There was no abuse of authority in the respondent’s choice to use a non-advertised process [ 56 ] In relation to his complaint under s. 77(1)(b) of the PSEA , the complainant failed to provide any evidence of an error or omission in the respondent’s choice to use a non-advertised process to make the appointment. [ 57 ] As noted, it is well established that the PSEA permits the use of non-advertised appointments and permits [NAME] to consider only one candidate and that the decision to use a non-advertised process is not, in and of itself, an abuse of authority; see the PSEA , at ss. 30(4) and 33; [NAME] ; and [NAME] . When the Board has found an abuse of authority in the choice to use a non-advertised process, respondents have made significant errors in the quality, thoroughness, and accuracy in the documentations of their decision (see [NAME] ) or have failed to produce an ASD that corresponded with the facts on the ground (see [NAME] and [NAME] ). [ 58 ] In this case, the respondent’s decision to use a non-advertised process was transparent, thorough, and clear. All its documentation was in order: the ASD, the SOMC, the appointee’s assessment against those criteria, and the use of a tool to mitigate bias and barriers in assessments. [ 59 ] The complainant did not produce evidence of any error in the respondent’s documentation. He made no arguments whatsoever that would put this appointment on par with the Board’s decisions in [NAME] , or [NAME] . His complaint under s. 77(1)(b) of the PSEA amounts to nothing more than a disagreement with the respondent’s decision to use a non-advertised appointment process. C. This staffing complaint cannot address the complainant’s allegations of constructive dismissal [ 60 ] The majority of the complainant’s arguments focus on his allegation that he was constructively dismissed from his [NAME]. [ 61 ] The complainant argued that the respondent’s constructive dismissal of him forced him to explore opportunities in other work units. He argued that the appointee complained of his behaviour and statements and that she colluded with other employees in so doing. He argued that he had to leave the [NAME] and that the appointee was appointed in his place shortly after his departure was confirmed. [ 62 ] Although he provided no affidavit evidence of it, I accept the complainant’s documentary evidence that other employees, including the appointee, had complained to management about remarks that he allegedly made during an anti-racism training session. I accept that a fact-finding process was conducted as a result. I accept that the report from that process led to a conclusion that he had made some unprofessional comments and that the manager completing the fact-finding concluded they were not racist in nature. I also accept that the report from that process concluded that disciplinary action against the complainant was not warranted. [ 63 ] However, the complainant has not demonstrated any causal relationship between those events and the respondent’s decision to appoint the appointee and not to appoint him. He provided no evidence of a direct link between the manager who conducted the fact-finding process and the manager who made the decision to make the appointment. In his arguments, he referred to having received poor performance reviews and his decision to challenge those reviews, but he provided no evidence of these events. He made no causal link between those reviews and the appointment process in question. In short, he failed to demonstrate that the respondent was biased against him, let alone that bias against him influenced the respondent’s decision to appoint the appointee. [ 64 ] Furthermore, the complainant failed to convince me through evidence or argument that the respondent required his departure from the [NAME] to appoint the appointee. According to the respondent’s uncontested evidence, the complainant was already in a [COMPANY] term position in the [NAME], and that term was in effect until March 31, 2025. The appointee had been acting in a different position for about 10 months and was extended in that position for an additional 12 months. It is quite simply illogical to conclude that the complainant’s transfer to the [NAME], confirmed in an email exchange only on March 26, 2024, somehow facilitated the appointee’s appointment, which was announced via the NAA on March 19, 2024. [ 65 ] Finally, it must be noted that the Board does not have jurisdiction, in the context of this staffing complaint, to reach a conclusion about whether the complainant was constructively dismissed from his position, whether the [NAME] was a toxic work environment for him, whether the allegations made about his behaviour and remarks in the anti-racism training were founded, whether he was afforded due process in the fact-finding process, or whether he was defamed. A staffing complaint under s. 77 of the PSEA is quite simply the wrong venue for these parts of the complainant’s allegations. The Board’s jurisdiction is limited to determining whether there was evidence of bias, in the respondent’s appointment process, and for the reasons that I have noted, I have found that there is none. [ 66 ] As noted earlier, it is in this context that I find that the single authority cited by the complainant is irrelevant to this complaint. That authority, titled Constructive Dismissal – IPG-033 , is an interpretation guideline published by the Labour Program of Employment and Social Development Canada. It has no bearing on the complaint before the Board.

VII. On the issue of the complainant’s personal interest in the appointment [ 67 ] As noted, in the [NAME] to this complaint, the respondent questioned the complainant’s personal interest in the appointment in question. It explained that he was already in a term position in the [NAME], classified at the [COMPANY] until March 31, 2025. It explained that he had sought a transfer outside the [NAME] and that he was appointed to a term position in the [NAME] with the same end-of-term date, March 31, 2025, before this complaint was made. [ 68 ] As explained, shortly after this complaint was scheduled for a hearing, I asked the complainant to provide his response to the [NAME] and in particular the respondent’s assertion that he did not have a personal interest in the appointment. He refused to until he had evidence from the respondent supporting its assertion. [ 69 ] The respondent did not make a motion to dismiss the complaint on the basis that the Board does not have jurisdiction when a complainant did not have a personal interest in the position. The Board has considered such motions; see [NAME] v. Deputy Head (Canada Border Services Agency) , 2022 FPSLREB 36 at paras. 6 and 8; and [NAME] v. Chief Administrator of the Courts Administration Service , 2023 FPSLREB 13. [ 70 ] When a respondent makes a motion to dismiss a complaint on the basis that the complainant lacks a personal interest in being appointed to the position, it is expected that the complainant provide evidence or submissions to counter those of the respondent; see [NAME] v. [NAME] of Indian Affairs and Northern Development , 2007 PSST 4 at paras. 11 to 18. [ 71 ] Given that the respondent did not make such a motion, I have not dismissed the complaint on that basis. However, given that the issue was raised in the [NAME], I believe it was appropriate for the Board to request that the complainant provide a response to the respondent’s assertion that he did not have a personal interest in the position. Through the written submission process, the respondent provided evidence that the complainant was already in a term position in the [NAME] at the [COMPANY] until March 31, 2025. In other words, he was already employed in the [NAME] at the same group and level as the appointment in question. The complainant never did provide evidence or submissions to counter the respondent’s evidence. He did not explain why he was interested in an acting position at the [COMPANY] until March 31, 2025, when he was already in a term position at the [COMPANY] until March 31, 2025. He did not demonstrate any difference between the position that he was already in and the position to which the appointment was made. [ 72 ] For all of the above reasons, the Board makes the following order: (The Order appears on the next page)

VIII. Order [ 73 ] The complaint is dismissed. January 27, 2026. [NAME], a panel of the Federal Public Sector Labour Relations and Employment Board