Human Rights Complaint Dismissed: Canadian Human Rights Tribunal Decision

Canadian Human Rights Tribunal Tribunal canadien des droits de la personne Citation: 2026 CHRT 42 Date: May 1, 2026 File No. : HR-DP-2915-22 Between: [NAME] Complainant - and - Canadian Human Rights Commission Commission - and - [COMPANY]. Respondent Decision Member: [NAME] \o "1-3" \h \z \u I. OVERVIEW PAGEREF _Toc227827318 \h 1 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320037003800320037003300310038000000 II.

DECISION PAGEREF _Toc227827319 \h 1 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320037003800320037003300310039000000 III. ISSUE(S) PAGEREF _Toc227827320 \h 2 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320037003800320037003300320030000000 IV. ANALYSIS PAGEREF _Toc227827321 \h 2 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320037003800320037003300320031000000 A. The allegations PAGEREF _Toc227827322 \h 2 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320037003800320037003300320032000000 B. [NAME] provide services to [NAME] within the meaning of section 5 of the CHRA? PAGEREF _Toc227827323 \h 4 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320037003800320037003300320033000000 (i) Legal framework PAGEREF _Toc227827324 \h 4 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320037003800320037003300320034000000 (ii) The acts of support that [NAME] alleges that the Respondent’s bus driver should have provided are not “services” within the meaning of the CHRA PAGEREF _Toc227827325 \h 5 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320037003800320037003300320035000000 (iii) The actions taken in the Respondent’s service complaints process are “services” within the meaning of the CHRA PAGEREF _Toc227827326 \h 6 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320037003800320037003300320036000000 (iv) Conclusions about the provision of services under section 5 of the CHRA PAGEREF _Toc227827327 \h 7 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320037003800320037003300320037000000 C. [NAME] deny services to [NAME], or treat him in an adverse differential manner in the provision of services to him, based on his protected characteristics? PAGEREF _Toc227827328 \h 7 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320037003800320037003300320038000000 (i) Legal Framework PAGEREF _Toc227827329 \h 7 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320037003800320037003300320039000000 (ii) [NAME] have one or more characteristics that are protected from discrimination under the CHRA? PAGEREF _Toc227827330 \h 8 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320037003800320037003300330030000000 (iii) [NAME] deny or deny access to a service, or did it adversely differentiate in providing a service to [NAME]? PAGEREF _Toc227827331 \h 9 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320037003800320037003300330031000000 (iv) Were [NAME]’ protected characteristics a factor in a denial or adverse differential treatment in the provision of a service? PAGEREF _Toc227827332 \h 10 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320037003800320037003300330032000000 (v) Conclusion PAGEREF _Toc227827333 \h 13 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320037003800320037003300330033000000 V.

ORDER PAGEREF _Toc227827334 \h 13 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320037003800320037003300330034000000 I. OVERVIEW [ 1 ] [NAME] (the “Complainant”) is a [NAME] man. [COMPANY]. (“[NAME]” or the “Respondent”) is the former operator of [NAME]/[NAME]. [NAME] alleges that [NAME] discriminated against him, contrary to section 5 of the Canadian Human Rights Act , R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6 (the CHRA), while he was a passenger on a [NAME] bus. [ 2 ] [NAME] alleges that, on July 8, 2019, a [NAME] bus driver denied a service to him or differentiated adversely in relation to him based on an incident on a [NAME] bus. He also alleges that [NAME] denied a service to him or differentiated adversely based on his race or colour in relation to a service complaint that he filed about the incident. [NAME] denies that it discriminated against [NAME]. [ 3 ] In 2024, [NAME] sold its assets and ceased its business operations in Canada following the bankruptcy of its parent company. The Tribunal proceedings continued despite the sale of [NAME]’s assets (see [NAME] v. [COMPANY]. , 2025 CHRT 30). [ 4 ] The Tribunal held a hearing of [NAME]’ complaint on October 8, 2025. [NAME] did not participate.

II.

DECISION [ 5 ] [NAME]’ complaint is dismissed. In relation to the July 8, 2019, incident on the bus, the evidence does not prove that [NAME] was providing “services” to [NAME] within the meaning of the CHRA. Secondly, in relation to the service complaint that [NAME] made to [NAME] about the incident on the bus, [NAME]’s process for addressing service complaints is a “service” within the meaning of the CHRA. However, the evidence does not establish a prima facie case of discrimination based on [NAME]’s actions in relation to [NAME]’ service complaint.

III. ISSUE(S) [ 6 ] I must decide the following issues: 1. [NAME] provide services to [NAME] within the meaning of section 5 of the CHRA? 2. If so, did [NAME] deny services to [NAME], or treat him in an adverse differential manner in the provision of services to him, based on his protected characteristics? To answer that question, I must consider the following three issues: a. [NAME] have one or more characteristics that are protected from discrimination under the CHRA? b. [NAME] deny a service or deny access to a service, or did it differentiate adversely in providing a service to [NAME]? c. Were [NAME]’ protected characteristics a factor in a denial or adverse differential treatment in the provision of a service? 3. If so, what remedies should the Tribunal order? IV. ANALYSIS A. The allegations [ 7 ] [NAME] alleges that [NAME] discriminated against him based on two related events. [ 8 ] The first event involves an alleged failure of a [NAME] bus driver to act in response to an incident on a [NAME] bus. [NAME] testified that on July 8, 2019, he went to the Toronto bus terminal to take a bus from Toronto to St. Catherines, Ontario. He presented his bus ticket to the driver and boarded. Shortly thereafter, two [NAME] boarded the bus. They approached [NAME] and asked to see his ticket. [NAME] showed them his ticket. They then left the bus, and the bus departed. The bus driver later told [NAME] that the [NAME] did not discuss this matter with him. [ 9 ] Later that day, upon returning to Toronto, [NAME] filed a customer incident report at the bus terminal. It stated that [NAME] had asked the [NAME] why they were asking to see his ticket, since the driver had previously verified it. One of the [NAME] said he matched a description of a person they were looking for. [NAME]’ customer incident report noted that “it was obvious they were in fact looking for [him],” and asked “who ordered them to board the bus and embarrass [him] on the full bus with a harsh approach, to contact [him] as if [he] had done something wrong or suspicious.” [ 10 ] The [NAME] were employed by a [COMPANY]. [NAME] filed a separate complaint about their actions to the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario, which he characterized as racial profiling. That complaint was settled. However, the complaint before me alleges that [NAME] also discriminated against him, based on the bus driver’s failure to closely monitor the [NAME] and to report this incident to [NAME]’s management. [ 11 ] In his submissions, [NAME] contends that the bus driver’s conduct can be characterized as “subconscious passive prejudice” that was manifested in three ways: · first, as a lack of concern when the [NAME] were questioning him; · second, as a failure to communicate with him immediately after the [NAME] left the bus, to ask about what had occurred or if he needed assistance; and · third, as “passive disdain” when he got off the bus, by not asking him if he needed assistance. [ 12 ] [NAME] submits that the driver’s inaction demonstrates racial bias, based on the view that mistreatment of [NAME] men is socially acceptable. [ 13 ] The second event involves [NAME]’s alleged failure to adequately respond to [NAME]’ service complaint about the incident on the bus. [NAME] testified that, despite filing a complaint with the manager of the bus terminal and sending follow-up emails to [NAME], he did not receive an appropriate response. In his reply to [NAME]’s Statement of Particulars (SOP), he alleged that its failure to adequately address his service complaint was a deliberate act and “a cover-up in which prejudice or bias is present.” In his submissions, [NAME] argues that [NAME] did not investigate his complaint because he was a [NAME] man, and that it would have acted differently if a White woman had made a similar complaint. [ 14 ] [NAME]’ SOP also refers to a later incident which occurred on a [NAME] bus in October 2023. [NAME] confirmed that he was not alleging discrimination in relation to that incident but had referred to it only to support his position that [NAME]’s service standards had declined. I informed [NAME] that the Tribunal only considers evidence involving allegations of discrimination. [NAME] did not provide evidence about this alleged event, and I have not considered it. B. [NAME] provide services to [NAME] within the meaning of section 5 of the CHRA? [ 15 ] Yes, in part. As explained below, I find that the support that [NAME] alleges that he should have received from the [NAME] bus driver are not “services” within the meaning of section 5 of the CHRA. However, I find that [NAME]’s process for considering the service complaints of bus passengers is a service within the meaning of the CHRA. (i) Legal framework [ 16 ] The first step for considering allegations of discrimination under section 5 of the CHRA is to determine whether the actions at issue are “services” within the meaning of section 5 (see [NAME] v. Canada (Attorney General) , 2008 FCA 170 at para 33 [ [NAME] ]). [ 17 ] “Services” under section 5 of the CHRA mean something of benefit being held out as services and offered to the public (see [NAME] at para 31). In addition, the services must take place “in the context of a public relationship” between the service provider and the service user (see [NAME] v. [NAME] , 1996 CanLII 231 (SCC) at paras 16, 58, and 68 [ [NAME] ]). [ 18 ] The Supreme Court of Canada has found that every “service” has its own “public” (see [NAME] at para 57, citing [COMPANY] v. [NAME] , 1993 CanLII 89 (SCC), [1993] 2 SCR 353). (ii) The acts of support that [NAME] alleges that the Respondent’s bus driver should have provided are not “services” within the meaning of the CHRA [ 19 ] Regarding the allegations that [NAME]’s bus driver failed to act in response to the [NAME]' actions, [NAME] asserts that the driver either denied him certain services or adversely differentiated in relation to him. [NAME] argues that the bus driver failed in his obligations to monitor the [NAME]’ actions on the bus, to communicate with him about the [NAME]’ actions, and to report the incident to [NAME]’s management. [ 20 ] The Respondent did not participate in the hearing of this complaint. In its SOP, it denies that it violated section 5 of the CHRA. [ 21 ] For actions or obligations to be “services” within the meaning of section 5 of the CHRA and accordingly fall within the scope of the CHRA’s anti-discrimination provisions, [NAME] and [NAME] require that they be a benefit that is “held out” and “offered” to the public. To succeed in this complaint, [NAME] must prove as a preliminary matter that the obligations that he alleges the bus driver failed to provide are “services” under section 5 of the CHRA. In other words, he must establish that they are a type of benefit that [NAME] offers to the public. He must also establish that they occur in “a public relationship” between the parties. [ 22 ] Evidence is required to prove that [NAME]’s bus drivers are expected to provide the acts of support for bus passengers that [NAME] claims he did not receive. I am not persuaded that the evidence supports this position. [NAME] would be expected to have safety and security obligations to its passengers, such as standards for safe driving between destinations, these general obligations are not at issue in this case. To succeed in this case, [NAME] must establish, as he has alleged, that [NAME]’s drivers provide the specific services of monitoring incidents of the type that arose for him, communicating with passengers about them, and reporting to management when they arise. A bald allegation that bus drivers are required to provide these services is not sufficient, and evidence to substantiate these alleged responsibilities was not provided. Without a factual foundation for this allegation, I am not satisfied that [NAME]’s bus drivers provide the types of benefits to the bus-passenger “public” that [NAME] has alleged. [ 23 ] Accordingly, I find that the alleged failure of [NAME]’s bus drivers to take the actions that [NAME] alleges he should have received are not “services” under section 5 of the CHRA. Consequently, the Tribunal does not have the jurisdiction to determine whether the evidence about the bus driver’s alleged inaction could support a finding of a discriminatory practice under the CHRA. (iii) The actions taken in the Respondent’s service complaints process are “services” within the meaning of the CHRA [ 24 ] To succeed in proving that [NAME] engaged in a discriminatory practice by not properly responding to [NAME]’ service complaint about the bus driver, [NAME] must establish that the actions that [NAME] takes in addressing service complaints are “services” under section 5 of the CHRA. The evidence satisfies me that they are. [ 25 ] The evidence confirms that [NAME] had a customer service representative, that [NAME] sent them three emails in 2019 but received no response, that he followed up in 2020 and received a response from a [NAME] customer service agent who was “eager to address [his] concern,” and that they requested more information so they could investigate and respond. [NAME] provided information, and a customer service supervisor responded. The evidence also includes an undated email from the Vice President of [NAME], who apologized for [NAME]’s “mistake” in not following up on [NAME]’ request according to its procedures. [ 26 ] These communications satisfy me that [NAME] had procedures for addressing its passengers’ complaints. They are sufficient evidence of a benefit that [NAME] provided to members of the public who travel on its buses, as [NAME] requires, and that it takes place in the context of a public relationship between [NAME] and its passengers, as required by [NAME].

Accordingly, the actions that [NAME] takes in managing its service complaints process are “services” within the meaning of section 5 of the CHRA. (iv) Conclusions about the provision of services under section 5 of the CHRA [ 27 ] The Respondent’s bus driver did not provide services under section 5 of the CHRA.

Accordingly, the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to consider the allegations involving the bus driver’s conduct or actions. [ 28 ] The Respondent’s actions in addressing its passengers’ service complaints are services under section 5 of the CHRA.

Accordingly, the Tribunal will consider the allegations involving this part of [NAME]’ human rights complaint. C. [NAME] deny services to [NAME], or treat him in an adverse differential manner in the provision of services to him, based on his protected characteristics? [ 29 ] No. Based on the evidence presented in the hearing, while I find that [NAME] denied services to [NAME], I am not satisfied that his protected characteristics were a factor in the denial of services. (i) Legal Framework [ 30 ] To establish that a respondent has engaged in a discriminatory practice within the meaning of the CHRA, a complainant must prove that the way they were treated by the respondent was, on its face, discriminatory. This is referred to as establishing a prima facie case. To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under section 5 of the CHRA, [NAME] must prove that it is more likely than not (in other words, on a balance of probabilities) that: a. he has one or more characteristics that are prohibited grounds of discrimination under the CHRA; b. he was denied, or denied access to, a “service” within the meaning of section 5 of the CHRA, or he was treated in an adverse differential manner in relation to the service; and c. the prohibited ground of discrimination was a factor in the denial of service or adverse differential treatment. (see [NAME] v. [NAME] (Education ), 2012 SCC 61 at para 33) [ 31 ] To prove the third element of a prima facie case, a complainant must establish a connection between their protected characteristic and the denial of service or the adverse differential treatment that they experienced. It is not necessary to prove that their protected characteristic was the cause of the adverse treatment or the sole reason for it (see First Nations Child and Family Caring Society of Canada v. Attorney General of Canada (for the Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada) , 2016 CHRT 2 at para 25). [ 32 ] It is also not necessary to prove that a respondent intended to discriminate (see C ommission des droits de la personne et de la jeunesse v. [COMPANY]. , 2015 SCC 39 at para 40 [ [COMPANY] ]). Direct evidence of discrimination is not required, as discrimination is often not obvious or clear. Racial discrimination can be particularly challenging to prove because racial stereotyping will usually be the result of subtle unconscious beliefs, biases, and prejudices (see [NAME] v. [COMPANY] of Nova Scotia , 2025 CHRT 82 at para 95, citing Peel Law Association v. [NAME] , 2013 ONCA 396 at para 111). [ 33 ] Where a finding of discrimination is not obvious or clear through direct evidence, the Tribunal should assess the entire circumstances and facts of the case to evaluate whether, on a balance of probabilities, an inference of discrimination is more probable than the other possible inferences (see Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Canada (Attorney General) , 2024 FC 1404 at para 19). [ 34 ] If a complainant establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden shifts to the respondent to justify its decision or conduct based on the exemptions set out in the CHRA or developed by the Courts (see [COMPANY] at para 37). However, in this case, because the Respondent did not participate in the hearing, the Tribunal would find in favour of [NAME] if he establishes a prima facie case of discrimination. (ii) [NAME] have one or more characteristics that are protected from discrimination under the CHRA? [ 35 ] Yes. [NAME] is a [NAME] man. He has the characteristics of colour and race that are protected from discrimination under the CHRA. (iii) [NAME] deny a service or deny access to a service, or did it adversely differentiate in providing a service to [NAME]? [ 36 ] Yes, I find that [NAME] denied a service to [NAME] within the meaning of section 5 of the CHRA. [ 37 ] [NAME] testified that he made a complaint about the July 8, 2019, incident on the [NAME] bus, but that [NAME]’s front-line employees ignored him and did not forward it to the head office. In his view, [NAME] deliberately refused to respond to his complaint. [ 38 ] The documentary evidence confirms that [NAME] did not respond to [NAME]’ complaint for more than a year. On July 8, 2019, [NAME] filed a complaint with the bus terminal manager. On July 29, August 6, and August 28, 2019, [NAME] sent emails to [NAME]’s customer service agent, but [NAME] did not respond. [ 39 ] In June 2020, [NAME] contacted the Better Business Bureau about [NAME]’s failure to respond to his 2019 complaint. On July 23, 2020, a customer service agent of [NAME]’s parent company in the United States followed up with [NAME] and apologized for the delayed response. In a later undated note from the Vice President of [NAME] also acknowledged that its failure to properly respond was not in keeping with its procedures. [ 40 ] In my view, the delay of almost one year in responding to [NAME]’ service complaint was inordinate. [NAME] acknowledged that the delay did not meet its standards. There is no evidence of justification for it. Although a response was ultimately provided, I find that the delay in responding to [NAME]’ complaint, despite his three follow‑up emails, amounts to a denial of service under section 5 of the CHRA. (iv) Were [NAME]’ protected characteristics a factor in a denial or adverse differential treatment in the provision of a service? [ 41 ] No. I find that the evidence does not establish a connection between [NAME]’ protected characteristics of race and colour and either [NAME]’s delay in responding to his service complaint or the manner in which it responded. [ 42 ] [NAME]’ testimony did not establish a link between his protected characteristics under the [NAME]’s failure to properly respond to his service complaint. I also find that the documentary evidence does not establish a connection between [NAME]’ colour or race and [NAME]’s treatment of his service complaint. [ 43 ] The incident report that [NAME] completed on July 8, 2019, refers to the actions of the [NAME]. It did not suggest that [NAME]’s conduct was at issue. [NAME] did not have information to that effect. In the incident report, [NAME] asks: “[Who] ordered them to board the bus and embarrass me on the full bus with a harsh approach, to contact me as if I had done something wrong or suspicious[?]” [ 44 ] [NAME] filed a follow-up report on the following day, but it also referred to the [NAME]’ actions and not to the bus driver’s conduct. [ 45 ] [NAME]’ first email to [NAME], on July 29, 2019, complained about the [NAME]’ actions. It characterized their conduct as an abuse of power. Its only suggestion in relation to [NAME] was that it should enact new rules that require [NAME] to give “valid grounds” to a bus driver before boarding a bus, and that require bus drivers to “closely monitor/follow the guards in their actions with passengers.” [ 46 ] [NAME] did not respond, so [NAME] sent a follow-up email on August 6, 2019. It asked whether [NAME] has determined that its driver was not responsible for the [NAME]’ conduct. It suggested that “[NAME] drivers are seemingly untrained regarding what authority they have in allowing deceptive [NAME] charging onto buses without grounds, to intimidate [paid riders].” [ 47 ] Again, [NAME] did not reply. [NAME] sent a further email on August 28, 2019, and again [NAME] did not respond. However, this is not sufficient evidence on which to infer that [NAME]’ race or colour was a factor in [NAME]’s lack of response. [ 48 ] [NAME] sent further emails in June and July 2020. [NAME]’s parent company in the United States replied to them on its behalf. The evidence about these email exchanges in 2020 also does not convince me or lead me to infer that [NAME]’ race or colour was a factor in the company’s actions. [ 49 ] [NAME]’s initial response in 2020 was that it could not find his account and asked him to resend information. He did so on July 6, 2020. His email referred to “the mysterious conduct of the bus driver” during the incident in 2019 and asked for a satisfactory resolution of the complaint. [NAME] wrote again on July 21, 2020, stating that he will escalate his complaint to other authorities if [NAME] did not respond, and he referred to the human rights complaint he had filed with the Canadian Human Rights Commission (the “Commission”). [ 50 ] [NAME] responded on July 23, 2020. It stated that, after researching the matter, it concluded that the bus driver had allowed the [NAME] to access the bus at their request, that the drivers must obey law enforcement officers’ requests to board their buses, and that, in any event, [NAME] did not manage the company that employed the [NAME]. [ 51 ] [NAME] responded that his complaint was about the lack of protocols for drivers to monitor “an aggressive boarding of the bus by [NAME]” and to report to management about incidents like this one, and about [NAME]’s refusal to respond to his service complaint. He characterized the refusal to respond to him as unprofessional, as deliberately neglectful, and as misconduct. [ 52 ] [NAME] replied that its drivers will not question the motives of security officers and will accept their requests to board buses and speak with passengers. It stated that the company will not interfere with officers’ investigations. [NAME] refunded the cost of [NAME]’ bus ticket and said that the matter was closed. In response, [NAME]’ final email stated that [NAME] should keep the cost of his bus ticket, and that “overdue internal accountability [cannot] be bought off nor deflected off onto others.” [ 53 ] There is no evidence of other communications between the parties. In an undated email, the Vice President of [NAME] apologizes for its delay in responding to [NAME]’ service complaint, asserts that the company’s inaction was not based on “prejudice or bias,” and asks that [NAME]’ human rights complaint be dismissed. I am satisfied that [NAME] sent this email to the Commission during its investigation of [NAME]’ human rights complaint. [ 54 ] I find that the evidence does not establish a connection between [NAME]’ protected characteristics under the [NAME]’s delay in responding to his service complaint or the manner in which it handled the complaint. [ 55 ] I have also considered [NAME]’ submissions. He submits that, because [NAME] knew that he was a passenger on its bus, and because he had complained to the company about alleged misconduct that, in his view, required investigation, it is “strongly probable” that the fact that he is a [NAME] male was a factor in its decision not to investigate. He argues that, if a White female had made a similar complaint, “one can venture that the management would have tended [to] the complaint with immediacy and full attention.” [ 56 ] With respect, I disagree. Drawing the inferences that [NAME] suggests requires evidence on which to base an inference of a connection (in other words, a nexus) between [NAME]’s actions and the legally protected personal characteristics of [NAME]’ race and colour. Without such evidence, these inferences cannot reasonably be drawn. I acknowledge that biases, racial profiling, and racial stereotyping persist, and that [NAME] men are particularly vulnerable to the negative impacts of these often-subconscious behaviours (see [NAME] v. Correctional Service Canada , 2024 CHRT 89 at para 182 [ [NAME] ], citing [NAME] v. [NAME] , 2010 HRTO 1589 at paras 129–131). However, I cannot attribute racial discrimination to the situation that [NAME] perceived to be discriminatory without factual findings based on the evidence to support such an inference (see [NAME] at para 183). [ 57 ] [NAME] also submits that he has personally witnessed a different situation in which a bus driver took no action while a rider on a city bus made racial slurs to a [NAME] with her children. He makes the point that public displays of prejudicial behaviour are not unusual. I accept [NAME]’ submission that he has witnessed discriminatory events based on a person’s race and that he has “countless experiences of prejudice to know valid instances of it.” However, as I have found above, the Tribunal cannot make a finding that a discriminatory practice under section 5 of the CHRA has occurred without evidence that establishes a link between an individual’s race or colour and the denial of a service or adverse differential treatment in relation to the service (see [NAME] v. [COMPANY]., 2020 BCHRT 208 at para 109). (v) Conclusion [ 58 ] In the absence of evidence establishing that [NAME]’ protected characteristics were a factor in [NAME]’s actions, I conclude on a balance of probabilities that the third element of a prima facie case of discrimination has not been established.

Accordingly, I must dismiss this complaint.

V.

ORDER [ 59 ] This complaint is dismissed. Signed by [NAME] Tribunal Member Ottawa, Ontario May 1, 2026 Canadian Human Rights Tribunal Parties of Record File No. : HR-DP-2915-22 Style of Cause: [NAME] v. [COMPANY]. Decision of the Tribunal Dated: May 1, 2026 Date and Place of Hearing: October 8, 2025 Zoom Videoconference Appearances: [NAME] , Self-represented