Tribunal Dismisses Discrimination Claim Against Employer for Refusal to Accommodate Disability

OUTCOME: Dismissed

Canadian Human Rights Tribunal Tribunal canadien des droits de la personne Citation: 2026 CHRT 23 Date: March 16, 2026 File No. : HR-DP-3002-24 Between: [NAME_1] Complainant - and - Canadian Human Rights Commission Commission - and - [COMPANY_2] Respondent Decision Member: [NAME_3] \o "1-3" \h \z \u I. OVERVIEW PAGEREF _Toc224215306 \h 1 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003200310035003300300036000000 II.

DECISION PAGEREF _Toc224215307 \h 2 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003200310035003300300037000000 III. ISSUES PAGEREF _Toc224215308 \h 2 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003200310035003300300038000000 IV. ANALYSIS PAGEREF _Toc224215309 \h 2 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003200310035003300300039000000 A) Should the Complaint be dismissed because it was filed with the Commission more than one year after the alleged acts on which it is based, or because of delay? PAGEREF _Toc224215310 \h 2 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003200310035003300310030000000 B) Credibility findings PAGEREF _Toc224215311 \h 4 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003200310035003300310031000000 C) [NAME_1] prove a prima facie case of discrimination? PAGEREF _Toc224215312 \h 5 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003200310035003300310032000000 1) Legal Framework PAGEREF _Toc224215313 \h 5 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003200310035003300310033000000 2) Issue 1: [NAME_1] have a characteristic that is protected from discrimination? PAGEREF _Toc224215314 \h 6 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003200310035003300310034000000 3) Issue 2: [NAME_1] experience an adverse impact involving his employment (a refusal of employment, a refusal of a continuation of employment, or an adverse differentiation)? PAGEREF _Toc224215315 \h 7 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003200310035003300310035000000 4) Issue 3: Was [NAME_1]’ protected characteristic a factor in the adverse impact that he experienced? PAGEREF _Toc224215316 \h 8 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003200310035003300310036000000 D) [NAME_2] prove that its refusal to continue to employ [NAME_1] was based on a bona fide occupational requirement, and that accommodating [NAME_1]’ needs would impose undue hardship, considering the factors of health, safety and cost? PAGEREF _Toc224215317 \h 8 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003200310035003300310037000000 1) Legal Framework PAGEREF _Toc224215318 \h 9 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003200310035003300310038000000 2) Analysis of events PAGEREF _Toc224215319 \h 11 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003200310035003300310039000000 3) Conclusion about accommodations PAGEREF _Toc224215320 \h 34 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003200310035003300320030000000 V.

ORDER PAGEREF _Toc224215321 \h 35 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003200310035003300320031000000 I. OVERVIEW [ 1 ] This decision is about [NAME_1]’ human rights complaint that his employer discriminated against him by not accommodating his requests to return to work. For the reasons below, I dismiss this complaint. [ 2 ] In 2011, [NAME_1] (the “Complainant”) started working as a machine operator for [COMPANY_4]. ([NAME_4]), a food and beverage milling company. [NAME_1] worked at [NAME_4]’s plant in Portage la Prairie, Manitoba. [ 3 ] In December 2017, [COMPANY_2] (“[NAME_2]” or the “Respondent”) acquired [NAME_4]. I refer below to the Respondent as “[NAME_4]” for events occurring until December 2017, and as “[NAME_2]” as of January 2018. [ 4 ] In October 2016, [NAME_1] had an epileptic seizure. He had to stop working. He received Employment Insurance sick benefits, followed by long-term disability benefits. In June 2017, [NAME_1] requested a return to work, but he did not return to work. [NAME_1] made the same request to [NAME_2] in 2018 and 2019, but [NAME_2] did not return him to work. [ 5 ] In 2019, [NAME_1] filed a complaint against [NAME_2] (the “Complaint”) with the Canadian Human Rights Commission (the “Commission”). [NAME_1] alleges that [NAME_2] discriminated against him by not allowing him to return to work with accommodations for his medical restrictions and disability-related limitations. [NAME_1] requests financial compensation for the alleged discrimination. [ 6 ] In 2024, the Commission referred the Complaint to the Tribunal for inquiry. The Commission participated in the inquiry based on its mandate to represent the public interest. It requests public interest remedies for the alleged discrimination. [ 7 ] [NAME_2] denies that it discriminated against [NAME_1], and it requests that the Complaint be dismissed. [ 8 ] In May 2025, the Tribunal held a hearing about the Complaint.

II.

DECISION [ 9 ] The Complaint is dismissed. [NAME_1] has established a prima facie case of discrimination, [NAME_2] has proven that accommodating his needs would result in undue hardship.

III. ISSUES [ 10 ] I consider the following issues in this case: A) Should the Complaint be dismissed because it was filed with the Commission more than one year after the alleged acts on which it is based, or because of delay? B) [NAME_1] prove a prima facie case of discrimination? This question requires me to decide the following issues: 1) [NAME_1] have a characteristic that is protected from discrimination? 2) If so, did [NAME_1] experience an adverse impact involving his employment (a refusal of employment, a refusal of a continuation of employment, or an adverse differentiation)? 3) If so, was [NAME_1]’ protected characteristic a factor in the adverse impact that he experienced? C) If [NAME_1] proved a prima facie case of discrimination, did [NAME_2] prove that its refusal to continue to employ him was based on a bona fide occupational requirement and that accommodating his needs would impose undue hardship considering the factors of health, safety, and cost? D) If not, what are the remedies? IV. ANALYSIS A) Should the Complaint be dismissed because it was filed with the Commission more than one year after the alleged acts on which it is based, or because of delay? [ 11 ] No. [ 12 ] [NAME_2] submits that the Commission should have dismissed the Complaint because it was filed more than one year after the last act or omission on which it is based, or because the delay has prejudiced [NAME_2]’s ability to respond to it. [NAME_2] argues that, although section 41(1)(e) of the Canadian Human Rights Act , R.S.C., 1985, c. H-6 (the CHRA) authorizes the Commission to decide whether to consider a complaint based on “such longer period of time as the Commission considers appropriate in the circumstances,” [NAME_2] requests that the Tribunal overturn the Commission’s decision to consider this Complaint. [ 13 ] The Commission submits that decisions under section 41 of the CHRA are within its authority, and that any challenge to its decision requires an application for judicial review to the Federal Court. [ 14 ] I agree with the Commission. The Tribunal is not an appellate body. It cannot review or overrule the Commission’s decisions. The Federal Court is the appropriate venue to seek the order that [NAME_2] requests (see [NAME_5] v. [COMPANY_6]. and [NAME_7] , 2024 CHRT 15 at paras 9 to 14; and [NAME_8] v. [NAME_9] , 2016 CHRT 21 at para 37). [ 15 ] [NAME_2] also argues that the length of the delay since [NAME_1] filed the Complaint warrants its dismissal. It submits that the Tribunal ought to dismiss the Complaint based on the fading memories of witnesses and the death of a key witness in the period between the filing of the Complaint in 2019 with the Commission and the Tribunal’s hearing in 2025. [ 16 ] The Commission submits that there must be proof of “significant prejudice” to support a request to dismiss a proceeding, and that the prejudice that [NAME_2] alleges does not meet this threshold. [ 17 ] I agree with the Commission. To succeed in a request to dismiss a complaint for delay, [NAME_2] must establish that either “the passage of time has impaired its ability to make its case and thus has compromised the fairness of the hearing,” or that “the delay is inordinate, directly causes significant prejudice, and amounts to an abuse of process in that it is manifestly unfair to a party, or otherwise brings the administration of justice into disrepute” (see [NAME_10] v. [COMPANY_11] , 2025 CHRT 104 at para 56 [ [NAME_10] ], citing Law Society of [NAME_12] v. [NAME_13] , 2022 [NAME_14] 29 at paras 42 – 43 and 101 [ [NAME_13] ]; and [NAME_15] v. [NAME_16] (Human Rights Commission) , 2000 [NAME_14] 44 at para 121). [ 18 ] Prejudice is a question of fact, and evidence is required to establish the extent of it (see [NAME_10] at para 57, citing [NAME_13] at para 69). [ 19 ] [NAME_2] has not established that the passage of time impaired its ability to make its case, or that the delay caused significant prejudice that amounts to an abuse of process. Although I agree with [NAME_2]’s submission that an earlier filing of the Complaint and an earlier hearing date might have resulted in “better evidence,” I do not find this submission to be determinative. The oral testimony of available witnesses, combined with the documentary record, was sufficient for [NAME_2] to make its case despite the passage of time. B) Credibility findings [ 20 ] Many of my findings in this case turn on my assessment of the witnesses’ credibility and the reliability, or accuracy, of their testimony. Where it is necessary to resolve a conflict in the evidence, I provide the reasons for my finding below. [ 21 ] [NAME_1]’ testimony is central to his human rights complaint. I acknowledge that [NAME_1] experienced the very difficult situation of having to stop working at a job that he enjoyed due to epileptic seizures and continuing to experience medical issues while also wanting to return to the workplace. Generally, I found him to be credible, in that he testified about what he believed to be true. However, his testimony frequently did not align with my findings based on the documentary record . He also drew inferences about facts that are not supported by the evidence as I find it. I find that [NAME_1]’ understanding of events is at least partly related to his mistrust of the employees of [NAME_4] and [NAME_2] that he interacted with about his request to return to work. Where disputes about facts exist, I have found the testimony of the witnesses for [NAME_2] to be more reliable.

For these reasons, I generally give more weight to the testimony of the witnesses for [NAME_2] than to [NAME_1]’ testimony. C) [NAME_1] prove a prima facie case of discrimination? 1) Legal Framework [ 22 ] Complainants in human rights cases must prove on a balance of probabilities (in other words, that it is more likely than not) that: a) They have a characteristic that is protected from discrimination under the CHRA; b) They experienced an adverse impact; and c) The protected characteristic was a factor in the adverse impact. (see [NAME_17] v. [NAME_16] (Education) , 2012 [NAME_14] 61 at para 33 [ [NAME_17] ]; and Québec (C ommission des droits de la personne et de la jeunesse) v. [COMPANY_18]. , 2015 [NAME_14] 39 at paras 44–52 [ [NAME_18] ].) [ 23 ] These three elements, when proven, establish a prima facie case of discrimination. A complainant must satisfy the Tribunal that they have proven these three elements on a balance of probabilities (see [NAME_18] at paras 56 – 59). [ 24 ] A respondent may provide evidence and submissions attempting to show that a complainant has not made out a prima facie case (see [NAME_18] at para 64). This may include evidence that the complainant did not experience an adverse impact or that something else fully explains the adverse impact on the complainant. [ 25 ] To prove the third element of prima facie discrimination, a complainant must establish a connection between their protected characteristic and the adverse impact that they experienced. It is not necessary to prove that their protected characteristic was the cause of the adverse impact or was the sole reason for it (see First Nations Child and Family Caring Society of Canada v. Attorney General of Canada (for the Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada) , 2016 CHRT 2 at para 25). [ 26 ] It is also not necessary to prove that a respondent intended to discriminate (see [NAME_18] at para 40). Direct evidence of discrimination is not required, as discrimination is often not obvious or clear. The Tribunal may draw inferences from the evidence to conclude that a complainant’s protected characteristic was a factor in their experience of an adverse impact. When the evidence supports such inferences on a balance of probabilities, a “subtle scent” of discrimination can be sufficient to establish the required connection (see Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Canada (Attorney General) , 2024 FC 1404 at para 19; and [NAME_19] v. [NAME_11] , 1988 CanLII 108). [ 27 ] The Commission submits that the Tribunal must avoid conflating a complainant’s burden to establish a case of prima facie discrimination with a respondent’s burden, where prima facie discrimination has been proven, to establish a statutory defence for their actions. In the case before me, in which the Respondent argues that the Complainant did not prove a prima facie case of discrimination and relies on defences under section 15 of the CHRA, the Commission submits that the Tribunal must not conflate these defences. The Commission argues that the Respondent’s defence that it has accommodated an employee to the point of undue hardship in accordance with section 15 of the CHRA is legally irrelevant to whether the Complainant has established a prima facie case of discrimination (see [NAME_20] v. Canada (Attorney General) , 2025 FCA 109 at para 59). [ 28 ] In following [NAME_18], I consider all the evidence in determining whether, on a balance of probabilities, the Complainant has made out the three elements of a prima facie case. However, I agree with the Commission that, in doing so, the Tribunal must not conflate the Respondent’s justifications of its conduct in support of its defences under section 15 of the CHRA with the facts supporting the defence that the Complainant has not proven a prima facie case of discrimination (see SM v. Canada (Attorney General) , 2025 FC 1893 at para 53).

2) Issue 1: [NAME_1] have a characteristic that is protected from discrimination? [ 29 ] Yes. Disability is a prohibited ground of discrimination (see section 3 of the CHRA). A disability consists of a physical or mental impairment, which results in a functional limitation or is associated with a perception of impairment (see [NAME_21] v. [NAME_22] (City), 2005 FCA 311 at para 15, citing [NAME_23] v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) , 2000 [NAME_14] 28 at para 34). [ 30 ] It is not disputed that [NAME_1] has epilepsy and that he experienced epileptic seizures that affected his ability to work.

Accordingly, [NAME_1] has a disability for the purposes of the CHRA.

3) Issue 2: [NAME_1] experience an adverse impact involving his employment (a refusal of employment, a refusal of a continuation of employment, or an adverse differentiation)? [ 31 ] Yes. The evidence satisfies me that [NAME_1] experienced an adverse impact based on the Respondent’s refusal to allow him to return to work after he had epileptic seizures. [ 32 ] [NAME_2] argues that it did not refuse to continue [NAME_1]’ employment, and that it was [NAME_1]’ choice not to return to work. I agree that [NAME_1] did not request a return to work until June 7, 2017, as set out in the timeline analysis of the evidence below. However, I am satisfied that, starting on June 8, 2017, when [NAME_1] met with his employers to discuss returning to work, he experienced the adverse impact of not being permitted to return to employment. [ 33 ] On June 8, 2017, [NAME_1] met with [NAME_24], the [NAME_4] plant manager, and [NAME_26], a [NAME_4] officer and manager responsible for the company’s finances and operations, to discuss his desire to return to work. However, [NAME_24] and [NAME_26] did not permit [NAME_1] to return to work at his position in the [NAME_4] plant, in another position in the warehouse, or in another capacity such as in the [NAME_4] administrative office. [ 34 ] The evidence satisfies me that [NAME_1] wanted to work, possibly even without medical confirmation that he could drive a forklift, which every position in the plant and warehouse required. As [NAME_1] stated in his June 9, 2017, email to [NAME_24]: “[as] for the forklift driving I will try to pawn that off at any given time but I will make an effort to become more comfortable with it.” [ 35 ] In [NAME_1]’ view, [NAME_4] refused to allow him to return to work in the plant or the warehouse without adequately considering the safety risks of him doing so. [NAME_1] testified that there were safety risks for every plant and warehouse employee, but that the risks could be mitigated by following safety procedures. He also testified that [NAME_4] did not appropriately consider other work that he could do with accommodations. I accept this experience of an adverse impact in relation to [NAME_1]’ employment. I assess it below against the evidence of [NAME_2]’s ability to accommodate [NAME_1]’ requests without experiencing undue hardship. [ 36 ] Similarly, [NAME_1]’ evidence was that, in 2018 and 2019, the information that he had provided in 2017 was sufficient for him to return to work with accommodations for his disability, but [NAME_2] did not return him to work.

Accordingly, I accept that [NAME_1] continued to experience an adverse impact in relation to his employment. [ 37 ] I conclude that, after June 8, 2017, [NAME_1] experienced an adverse impact in relation to his employment.

4) Issue 3: Was [NAME_1]’ protected characteristic a factor in the adverse impact that he experienced? [ 38 ] Yes. I find that, after June 8, 2017, [NAME_1]’ disability was a factor in his inability to return to work for [NAME_2]. [ 39 ] [NAME_2] submits that [NAME_1]’ own conduct resulted in him not returning to work, and that it did not impose any policy, condition, or term of employment to exclude him from work. [NAME_2] argues that [NAME_1] chose not to provide medical documentation, not to cooperate, and not to engage in attempts to retrain offered by the disability insurer. However, these factors do not fully account for the adverse impact that [NAME_1] experienced. The evidence about the meeting on June 8, 2017, and the fact that [NAME_1] continued to have medical restrictions but [NAME_2] did not return him to work satisfies me that [NAME_1]’ disability was a factor in the adverse impact that he experienced. [ 40 ] Based on the evidence, I conclude that, as of June 8, 2017, [NAME_1] has proven a prima facie case of discrimination. D) [NAME_2] prove that its refusal to continue to employ [NAME_1] was based on a bona fide occupational requirement, and that accommodating [NAME_1]’ needs would impose undue hardship, considering the factors of health, safety and cost? [ 41 ] Yes. For the reasons set out below, [NAME_2] has proven on a balance of probabilities that its refusal to return [NAME_1] to work was based on bona fide occupational requirements, and that accommodating [NAME_1]’ needs would impose undue hardship in relation to health, safety, and cost factors for [NAME_2].

1) Legal Framework [ 42 ] If a case of prima facie discrimination in relation to employment has been proven, a respondent may rebut the prima facie case by proving, on a balance of probabilities, that its actions were based on a bona fide occupational requirement (BFOR), and that accommodating the complainant’s needs would impose undue hardship on it, considering the issues of health, safety, and cost (see sections 15(1) and (2) of the CHRA). [ 43 ] To prove that [NAME_2]’s actions were based on a BFOR, it must prove that it is more likely than not that: a. Its decisions were taken for purposes that are rationally connected to the performance of [NAME_1]’ work; b. Its decisions were taken with an honest and good faith belief that they were necessary to fulfill a legitimate work-related purpose; and c. Its decisions were reasonably necessary to accomplish a legitimate work-related purpose, in the sense that it is impossible for [NAME_2] to accommodate [NAME_1]’ needs without the imposition of undue hardship on itself. (see [NAME_16] (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v. BCGSEU, 1999 CanLII 652 ([NAME_14]), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 3 at para 54 [ [NAME_27] ].) [ 44 ] I refer to these criteria as ‘the [NAME_27].” The Supreme Court of Canada established the [NAME_27] to determine, in situations where an employer adopted a general policy or a standard, whether the policy or standard is a BFOR. In the case before me, in which [NAME_2] did not rely on a broad policy or a defined standard but made decisions about [NAME_1]’ ability to return to work, the analysis below of [NAME_2]’s decisions applies the underlying principles of the [NAME_27]. However, the analysis focuses on whether [NAME_2] could accommodate [NAME_1]’ needs without undue hardship because the parties’ evidence and their submissions focus on that issue. [ 45 ] A search for accommodation of an employee’s needs begins when those involved in the search have at their attention the facts relating to discrimination (see [NAME_28] v. [NAME_29] , 2024 FC 1639 at para 58 [ [NAME_30] ], citing Central Okanagan School District No. 23 v. Renaud , 1992 CanLII 81 ([NAME_14]), [1992] 2 SCR 970 at 994 [ Renaud ]). A person seeking accommodation for a disability must bring to the attention of the employer the facts relating to discrimination (see [NAME_30] at para 63, citing Renaud at 994). Until an individual raises the issue and requests accommodation, there can be no “discrimination,” and the employer’s duty to accommodate is not triggered (see [NAME_30] at paras 58 and 66). [ 46 ] When a duty to accommodate has been triggered, the search for accommodation is a multi-party inquiry. Both parties have a duty to assist in securing the appropriate accommodation (see [NAME_30] at para 61, citing Renaud at 994). [ 47 ] An employee seeking accommodation for a disability has a duty to disclose sufficient information to their employer to enable it to fulfill its duty to accommodate. The sufficiency of the information that must be disclosed is fact-specific. It will depend on the employee’s experience of their disability, the work environment in which they are operating, the job description, and the specific ways in which the disability can be accommodated (see [NAME_30] at para 64). [ 48 ] At a minimum, an employer must have enough information to understand the extent of the person’s disability as it relates to their duties and environment (see [NAME_30] at paras 64 – 65). [ 49 ] The purpose of the duty to accommodate is to ensure that persons who are otherwise fit to work are not unfairly excluded where working conditions can be adjusted without undue hardship (see [NAME_31] v. Syndicat des employé-e-s de techniques professionnelles et de bureau d’[NAME_31], section locale 2000 (SCFP-FTQ) , 2008 [NAME_14] 43 at para 14 [ [NAME_31] ]). The goal is to address or accommodate the employee’s needs in order for them to be able to do the essential duties of their job. To that end, employers should be “innovative yet practical” when considering how best this may be accomplished in each case (see [NAME_32] v. [COMPANY_11], 2014 CHRT 16 at para 44, citing [NAME_27] at para 64). [ 50 ] An employer does not have to change its working conditions in a fundamental way, but it must be flexible, if such flexibility would enable a person to do their work and not cause undue hardship for the employer (see [NAME_31] at para   16). Considerations should be applied with common sense and flexibility in the context of the factual situation presented in each case (see [NAME_31] at para 12, citing [NAME_27] at para 63). The scope of the duty to accommodate varies according to the characteristics of each enterprise, the specific needs of each employee and the specific circumstances in which the decision is to be made (see McGill University Health Centre (Montreal General Hospital) v. Syndicat des employés de l'Hôpital général de Montréal, 2007 [NAME_14] 4 (CanLII), [2007] 1 SCR 161 at para 22). [ 51 ] The point of undue hardship is reached when reasonable means of accommodation are exhausted and only unreasonable or impracticable options for accommodation remain (see Council of Canadians with [NAME_33] v. [COMPANY_34]. , 2007 [NAME_14] 15 at para 130 [ Council of Canadians with [NAME_33] ]).

2) Analysis of events [ 52 ] The circumstances relating to [NAME_1]’ requests for accommodation and [NAME_2]’s response changed over time.

Accordingly, I consider the evidence and the parties’ submissions in relation to events in the following time periods: a. October 2016 to March 2017; b. April 2017 to June 9, 2017; c. June 10, 2017, to December 31, 2017; d. January to December 2018; and e. January to March 2019. [ 53 ] For each period, I consider the evidence and submissions in relation to: a. [NAME_1] requested a return to work with accommodations; b. If so, whether [NAME_1] provided sufficient information to enable [NAME_2] to accommodate him; and c. If so, whether [NAME_2] has proven that accommodating [NAME_1]’ needs would impose an undue hardship considering the factors of health, safety, and cost. a. Events from October 2016 to March 2017 [ 54 ] [NAME_1] experienced his first seizure on October 11, 2016. He tried to return to work after one week, but he could not do his job because of the ongoing effects of the seizure and the side effects of his medication. [ 55 ] [NAME_4] prepared a Record of Employment form for [NAME_1], and he began to receive Employment Insurance sick benefits. The form included an initial expected return-to-work date of November 3, 2016. However, [NAME_1] provided notes from [NAME_35], his physician, which extended the period in which he could not work until at least March 27, 2017. [ 56 ] On February 1, 2017, [NAME_1] applied to [NAME_36] (“[NAME_36]”), [NAME_4]’s insurance provider, for long-term disability benefits. [NAME_1] testified that he completed the Group Benefits Member Application (the “[NAME_36] Application”) and that the information in it was accurate. [ 57 ] The [NAME_36] Application describes [NAME_1]’ conditions and how they prevented him from working, including symptoms such as dizziness, migraines, slowed reaction time due to medication, and sensitivity to light and movement around him. It states that [NAME_1]’ doctor advised him that he should not climb ladders or operate heavy machinery, that his driver’s licence was suspended for medical reasons, and that he was unable to operate a forklift. [ 58 ] [NAME_1]’ capacity to work, the [NAME_36] Application sets out both physical and cognitive limitations that impacted his ability to perform tasks. It outlines his inability to climb, bend, squat, reach side-to-side (due to dizziness), or drive (due to a suspended license). It confirms the restriction of working near moving machinery, at unprotected heights, or in environments with marked changes in temperature and humidity (which cause nausea). It refers to [NAME_1] being unsure if he could work if exposed to dust, fumes, or gases. It states that [NAME_1] could not: remember locations or routine procedures due to memory difficulties caused by medication; understand, remember, or carry out short and simple instructions due to being overwhelmed; understand or remember detailed instructions due to memory issues; maintain attention and concentration for extended periods (“lose track of tasks”); solve simple and straightforward or complex problems (“overwhelming”); ask questions or request assistance (“overwhelming”); get along well with others without distracting them (“overwhelmed by thought of being alone with equipment”); or juggle tasks and prioritize (“unable to do more than one task at a time”). [ 59 ] It indicates that [NAME_1] was also easily overwhelmed during too much ongoing activity, that he cannot handle large groups of people, and has frequent dizziness, nausea, and migraines. [ 60 ] The [NAME_36] Application refers to [NAME_1]’ education level as “GED,” which I understand to mean high school equivalency. [NAME_1] confirmed in his testimony that he finished high school. The [NAME_36] Application also refers to [NAME_1]’ work experience before his employment with [NAME_4] as a cook and delivery driver, a caterer (“cooking, serving, cleaning”), working in an abattoir (“cutting, weighing, sanitation”), sanitation and cleaning for McCains, and driving a school bus. As of 2011, his experience was working for [NAME_4] as a flour line operator. [ 61 ] The [NAME_36] Application lists [NAME_1]’ other acquired skills as CPR training, forklift training, and confined spaces, fire safety, and having a class 2 driver’s licence (which is noted as suspended for medical reasons). [ 62 ] On February 3, 2017, a representative of [NAME_4] prepared its Plan Sponsor Statement for [NAME_1]’ application. It checked a box on the statement to indicate that, at that time, modified duties or alternate work would not be available if [NAME_1] were to return to work, and that this had been discussed with him. However, [NAME_1] had not requested a return to work at this point, and [NAME_4] did not have sufficient information to consider the possibility of a later return to work. The evidence satisfies me that [NAME_4] completed this form so that [NAME_1] could obtain disability benefits. I do not infer from the information on the form that [NAME_4] had decided that it could not accommodate [NAME_1] if he provided information to show that he could return to work. [ 63 ] On March 1, 2017, [NAME_36] requested information from [NAME_1]’ doctor. I am satisfied that [NAME_1] provided it, based on [NAME_36]’s follow-up letter on March 16, 2017, confirming receipt of his application, and its March 27, 2017, letter confirming that it approved his application for disability benefits, retroactive to February 4, 2017. Both letters indicate that [NAME_36] sent copies of the letter to [NAME_4]. [ 64 ] [NAME_1] testified that he kept [NAME_4] informed about his medical situation, that he answered questions from both [NAME_36] and [NAME_4], and that he “sent everything to [NAME_36] and [NAME_4].” However, the documentary evidence satisfies me that [NAME_4] did not receive a copy of [NAME_1]’ [NAME_36] Application. I am also satisfied that, except for the doctor’s notes from November 2016 to February 2017 requiring him to be off work, [NAME_1] sent medical information to [NAME_36] but not to [NAME_4]. [ 65 ] [NAME_1]’ Statement of Particulars (SOP) alleges that he sent information about his disability claim to [NAME_36], and that [NAME_36] “in turn, kept in communication with [NAME_4].” However, as detailed below, I am satisfied that [NAME_36] sent information to [NAME_4] about [NAME_1]’ medical restrictions and work limitations, but it did not send a copy of his [NAME_36] Application to [NAME_4] or copies of any medical reports that he provided to it. My finding is also consistent with a later email exchange, in July 2017, in which [NAME_4] requested a document from [NAME_36] containing [NAME_1]’ medical restrictions, but [NAME_36] did not provide it based on the confidentiality of the medical report. [ 66 ] I conclude that, from October 2016 to March 2017, although [NAME_1] had the medical restrictions and work capacity limitations that he listed in the [NAME_36] Application, neither [NAME_36] nor [NAME_1] gave this information to [NAME_4]. [ 67 ] In any event, [NAME_1] testified that, during this period, the advice from his doctors was not to return to work. The evidence satisfies me that [NAME_1] did not request a return to work or any workplace accommodations during this period of applying for and obtaining [NAME_36] long-term disability benefits. b. Events from April 2017 to June 9, 2017 [ 68 ] In April and May 2017, [NAME_1] and [NAME_4] communicated only about questions related to [NAME_1]’ receipt of disability benefits. [ 69 ] On June 7, 2017, [NAME_1] asked to meet [NAME_26] to discuss a return to work. [NAME_26] was an owner of [NAME_4], and she was responsible for its finances and operations until [NAME_2] purchased [NAME_4] in December 2017. [ 70 ] [NAME_26] asked [NAME_24] to organize the meeting with [NAME_1]. From 2017 to approximately April 2019, [NAME_24] was the manager of [NAME_4]’s plant facility in Portage la Prairie. [ 71 ] During this meeting, [NAME_1] made his first request to return to work since going off work approximately eight months before. [ 72 ] [NAME_1] testified that, during the meeting, [NAME_24] or [NAME_26] asked him for a doctor’s note and that he provided it. However, I am not persuaded that [NAME_1] did so. The documents in evidence satisfy me that, as of the date of this meeting, [NAME_1] provided medical information to [NAME_36] but not to [NAME_4], and that [NAME_4] did not have any information about his medical restrictions or his ability to work. In any event, on cross-examination, [NAME_1] testified that, in June 2017, his medical condition had not changed much from the information he had provided in February 2017 to [NAME_36]. [ 73 ] The parties agree that the meeting took place on June 8, 2017, but they dispute what was said. According to [NAME_1], [NAME_26] and [NAME_24] informed him that [NAME_4] could not accommodate him. He informed [NAME_26] and [NAME_24] that he could work at a desk job, answer the phones and “do something,” but he testified that [NAME_26] chuckled “at the idea of me sitting at a desk doing something.” [NAME_1] said that he “could have [done] anything,” but that [NAME_26] laughed at the idea of him doing anything other than a machine operator’s job. According to [NAME_1], [NAME_26] “felt no need for [him] anywhere else.” [ 74 ] [NAME_24] testified at the hearing. He did not remember much about the June 8, 2017, meeting. However, I find that his testimony about [NAME_1]’ work as a machine operator, and about other work in the [NAME_4] plant and warehouse, was credible and honest. [NAME_24] was no longer employed with [NAME_4] at the time of the hearing, which satisfies me that his testimony was not influenced by continued employment as a [NAME_4] manager. [ 75 ] [NAME_24] remembers [NAME_1] coming to the office on June 8, 2017, but he did not remember meeting with him. He testified that [NAME_1] met with [NAME_26]. However, [NAME_24] confirmed that he made the handwritten notes in evidence dated June 8, 2017. They satisfy me that [NAME_24] met with [NAME_1]. The notes say: “No heights No stress/sleep [NAME_35] & [NAME_1] to meet. By the end of June with limitations Forklift? Angers easy” [ 76 ] [NAME_24] testified that [NAME_4] did not know whether [NAME_1] was able to drive a forklift at that time, and that this explains the question mark on the note after the reference to the forklift. [NAME_24] testified that [NAME_4] asked [NAME_1] to provide that information. [ 77 ] Importantly, [NAME_24] testified that, if [NAME_1] had been medically cleared to drive a forklift, he could have arranged for him to load trucks in the warehouse, but that driving a forklift would have been a safety issue without medical clearance. I accept [NAME_24]’s evidence on this point. [NAME_24]’s testimony is also consistent with the email exchanges between himself and [NAME_1] on June 9, 2017, the day after the meeting, in which [NAME_1] informed [NAME_24] that he had made an appointment to see his doctor on June 15, 2017, and [NAME_24] responded: “…we need to know [the] risks of it happening and forklift driving.” [ 78 ] [NAME_24]’s testimony and his June 9, 2017, email satisfy me that, from the outset of the return-to-work dispute between the parties, [NAME_4]’s decision-making about [NAME_1]’ ability to return was based on ensuring that its employees could safely operate equipment that was required for their work. The evidence meets the requirements of the first and second elements of the [NAME_27] described above. First, I accept that the need to operate equipment safely was rationally connected to [NAME_1]’ ability to perform his work. Second, the evidence convinces me that [NAME_4] decided honestly and in good faith that addressing this need was necessary before [NAME_1] could return to work. [ 79 ] [NAME_26] also testified at the hearing. I find that her testimony about the meeting with [NAME_1] was generally consistent with [NAME_24]’s testimony and with the documentary evidence. [NAME_26] remembered the meeting with [NAME_1], but she did not remember if [NAME_24] participated in it. [NAME_26] confirmed that, in the plant and warehouse, the only way for employees to move the inputs for milling operations and for all finished products was by forklift. That did not change until after [NAME_2] acquired [NAME_4]. [ 80 ] In [NAME_1]’ reply to [NAME_24]’s June 9, 2017, email that [NAME_4] needed to know the risks of [NAME_1] driving a forklift, he wrote that his neurologist did not have a definite answer about the cause of the seizures, and that “that will be something that will be learned as we go along.” Regarding his capacity to drive a forklift, [NAME_1] wrote that he would try to “pawn that off at any given time” and that he will “make an effort to become more comfortable on it.” I understand these statements to mean that [NAME_1] would try to become comfortable driving a forklift even if he did not have medical clearance to do so, or that he would ask other employees to do that task for him. [NAME_1] also testified that forklifts have built-in features that would have allowed him to safely drive one despite the risk of a seizure, and that he could drive a forklift on private roads if he drove properly, with the forks down. [ 81 ] I do not agree with [NAME_1]’ testimony or the content of his email about the work that he could do. [ 82 ] First, although [NAME_1] testified that he gave medical information to either [NAME_24] or [NAME_26] in June 2017, and that he thought he had previously provided another medical note, I have found that that he did not do so. Consequently, I am satisfied that, at the time of the meeting and in follow-up to it, [NAME_4] did not have medical information about [NAME_1]’ ability to drive a forklift or do other work. Without information about the extent of [NAME_1]’ disability and his work restrictions, [NAME_4] could not fulfill its duty to accommodate his needs (see [NAME_30] at paras 63 – 65). [ 83 ] Second, there is no evidence that the restrictions listed in [NAME_1]’ February 2017 [NAME_36] Application had changed by June 2017, or that his capacity for work had improved. Indeed, [NAME_1] confirmed on cross-examination that, as of June 2017, his medical condition had not changed much. The restrictions listed in the [NAME_36] Application (that [NAME_4] did not have) were inconsistent with working in the [NAME_4] plant or warehouse. These restrictions still affected [NAME_1]’ ability to work in June 2017. I am not convinced by [NAME_1]’ contention that [NAME_4] should have allowed him to drive a forklift without medical confirmation that he could do so safely. On the contrary, I find that [NAME_4] acted appropriately in asking [NAME_1] to provide medical authorization of his abilities, and in not allowing him to do work that required forklift driving without it. Without evidence indicating a change in [NAME_1]’ restrictions, I do not accept that, in June 2017, he might have been able to safely drive a forklift or be otherwise safely employed while “pawning off” forklift driving. In my view, this was not a reasonable understanding of what [NAME_1] could safely do at that time. I find that it would have imposed an undue hardship in relation to the health and safety of both [NAME_1] and other [NAME_4] plant and warehouse employees to have accommodated [NAME_1] as he was requesting. [ 84 ] I now turn to the evidence about [NAME_1]’ request to work in the [NAME_4] office and [NAME_26]’s response that [NAME_4] could not accommodate him. As set out below, I find that [NAME_1] could not have been employed as an administrative employee in the [NAME_4] office, and that making this accommodation would have imposed an undue financial hardship on [NAME_4]. [ 85 ] [NAME_1] had not provided [NAME_4] with medical information that would allow it to consider the possibility of employing him in an administrative position. [ 86 ] In addition, I find that the information in the [NAME_36] Application (that [NAME_4] did not have) continued to demonstrate that [NAME_1] did not have the capacity to work in the [NAME_4] office. The references to [NAME_1]’ inability to understand and remember both simple and detailed instructions, maintain attention and concentration for extended periods, solve simple and straightforward problems, ask questions or request assistance, or to get along well with others without distracting them, convinces me that he could not have worked in an office environment due to these effects on his health. [ 87 ] Furthermore, even if [NAME_1] had the health capacity to do administrative work, which I do not find, I am satisfied that [NAME_4] decided that it could not employ him in the [NAME_4] office without experiencing undue hardship, as described below. This finding is relevant to both the discussions that took place on June 8, 2017, and to [NAME_1]’ ongoing perception that [NAME_2] could have accommodated him but refused to do so. [ 88 ] [NAME_1] testified that [NAME_26]’s reaction of laughing “at the idea of [him] sitting at a desk doing something” demonstrated that she “felt no need for [him] anywhere else.” It also supported his perception that [NAME_4] would not accommodate his needs. [ 89 ] [NAME_26]’s testimony about this interaction with [NAME_1] is different. She testified that she remembered the discussion on June 8, 2017. She testified that it had come to the point where [NAME_4] realized that [NAME_1] would not be able to work in the plant, and he wanted [NAME_4] to accommodate him by creating a job for him in the office. [NAME_26] said that [NAME_1] asked to “sit at a desk like those other people.” She had a specific memory of the discussion. She thought that [NAME_1]’ comment was disrespectful to [NAME_4]’s office employees. She remembered [NAME_1] being angry and frustrated and that it made her nervous. She did not remember laughing, but she testified that: “I would have scoffed at it for sure.” [NAME_26] recalls that she and [NAME_24] concluded that they could not accommodate [NAME_1]’ needs at that time. [ 90 ] I accept [NAME_26]’s detailed testimony about this interaction. I find that [NAME_26]’s testimony was more detailed and convincing than [NAME_1]’ testimony. Additionally, [NAME_1]’ testimony indicates that he had little information about the actual work that the [NAME_4] office employees performed. For example, when asked in cross-examination about the work that the office employees did, [NAME_1] said that they did data entry and “whatever they needed to do.” For employees on the “order desk,” his response was that they answered the phones, took down information, and sent emails to suppliers and customers. I found [NAME_1]’ responses to be vague and lacking in substance. Based on the evidence about what [NAME_1] knew about the administrative positions, I am satisfied that [NAME_26]’s reaction to his question of whether he could “sit at a desk like those other people” was understandable. [ 91 ] [NAME_1] inferred from [NAME_26]’s reaction to his question that [NAME_4] refused to consider any accommodations for him, I do not draw that inference. [NAME_4] considered how it could accommodate [NAME_1], as indicated by [NAME_24]’s testimony that he could have employed [NAME_1] in the warehouse if he provided medical clearance to drive a forklift. Without that clearance, the only alternative was employment in [NAME_4]’s office, but [NAME_1] did not have the experience or skills for administrative work. [ 92 ] [NAME_26] had extensive experience in managing [NAME_4]. Since 2006, she had been responsible for all finances and operations except for the sales and marketing of [NAME_4]’s products. Based on her experience, [NAME_26]’s testimony about [NAME_4]’s administrative positions was credible and reliable despite the passing of almost seven years between the meeting with [NAME_1] in June 2017 and the Tribunal hearing in May 2025. [ 93 ] [NAME_26] described [NAME_4] in 2017 as a small company. It had a milling facility in Portage La Prairie, Manitoba and a separate plant about a six hours’ drive away in [NAME_37], near Regina, [NAME_12]. According to information that [NAME_26] gave to the Commission in 2023, [NAME_4] had approximately 24 to 25 employees between 2017 and 2019. [ 94 ] [NAME_26] testified that [NAME_4]’s office positions were: • Employees who coordinate transportation logistics, arrange shipments to customers, and receive goods; • A food safety and quality position. [NAME_26] formerly performed this work herself but later hired one staff member and a part-time assistant. The work involved the monitoring of microbes in the plant facility by swabbing at random locations and sending them for laboratory testing, taking samples of [NAME_4]’s finished product and sending them for testing, and preparing certificates to indicate that the lab testing results were acceptable for all products to be shipped; and • One, or when needed, two accounting staff who have credentials from a community college and significant experience in bookkeeping and accounting. The accounting staff at the Portage La Prairie facility also did the bookkeeping for the mill in [NAME_37]. [ 95 ] [NAME_1] suggested that [NAME_4] could have employed him to cut the grass at the Portage La Prairie site, along with other tasks. [ 96 ] I accept the evidence that grass cutting was a limited task, that there was no employed position for it, and that it could not reasonably be created. [NAME_24] estimated that this work took approximately two hours per week. [NAME_26] testified that the grass would be cut twice per week in the summer, and once per week at other times. She said that [NAME_4] had initially hired an employee’s son for this work and then contracted with a lawn care service. [ 97 ] I accept [NAME_26]’s descriptions of the [NAME_4] administrative positions. Her overall testimony was also consistent with the notes in evidence of a Commission human rights officer’s interview of her on April 5, 2023, two years before the Tribunal hearing, which includes the following information: a. In response to a question about the efforts that [NAME_4] made to accommodate [NAME_1] before it was determined that he could not be accommodated, [NAME_26] said that all the jobs that he was qualified to do required the operation of equipment, that there was nothing he could do that required operating machinery, and that there was “no getting away” from using a forklift or operating equipment. b. In response to a question about what alternate positions were considered and rejected for [NAME_1], and why could he not be assigned to modified work in other positions and departments, [NAME_26] said that: “he didn’t have any skills to do accounting. He didn’t have computer skills to work on our food safety program. People who organized the shipping had to have computer skills. His skills were in running milling equipment.” c. The Commission’s officer referred to [NAME_1]’ discussion on June 8, 2017, with [NAME_26] and [NAME_24], and asked why he could not return to work by answering phones, cutting grass, or bagging samples of [NAME_4]’s products. The officer asked why these positions were not suitable for [NAME_1] and whether these positions existed. [NAME_26] replied: “Those positions don’t exist. Bagging samples would be part of food safety. People prepare samples to be sent. Lots of data recording. He didn’t understand the positions he was asking to be put in. Mowing the grass happened once a week and we had an external person doing that. I can’t remember all the limitations but the milling was also shift work (working 3 [shifts] a day) and he couldn’t do shift work.” d. In response to whether there was a position for answering phones, [NAME_26] said: “We had a person on the phone that was organizing our shipping. The person also had to deal with all the documentation for oversea shipping, bills, etc. It wasn’t that simple a job.” e. In response to the question of whether it would have been possible to provide training to [NAME_1] on how to use the computer and do tasks on the computer, [NAME_26] said: “ … the food safety person has a [Master’s] degree. All the accounting people had designations. The person doing the shipping had a lot of experience. The positions were already filled. It’s a small operation. The office was maybe 5 people. No vacancies. Would we have had to train him and then get rid of someone already there? I’m not sure that these jobs would have been right for him.” [ 98 ] The scope of an employer’s duty to accommodate an employee with a disability is fact-specific and individualized (see [NAME_31] at paras 12 – 18; and McGill University Health Centre at para 22). I accept that, in 2017, [NAME_4] was a small company with few categories of employment. Its small size created practical limits on its flexibility to adjust its workforce. These features are important factors for my finding that [NAME_4] was highly constrained in its ability to accommodate [NAME_1]’ disability. [ 99 ] I distinguish [NAME_4]’s situation from the larger corporate respondents that are frequently the subject of Tribunal and court decisions. I distinguish the facts in the case before me from the references to [NAME_38] v. [NAME_11], 2006 CHRT 25, and [NAME_39] v. [NAME_28] , 2024 CHRT 102 in the Commission’s submissions, both of which involve corporations with large workforces and, accordingly, more flexibility to accommodate employees with a disability. [ 100 ] Based on the limited size of [NAME_4]’s office staff, the required credentials and job requirements for [NAME_4]’s administrative positions, the fact that there were no unfilled administrative positions and no other available positions outside of the plant and warehouse, I find that accommodating [NAME_1] would have required [NAME_4] to reorganize and make significant changes to its administrative roles. I am satisfied that the cost of doing so was beyond the scope of accommodations that [NAME_4] should have considered to fulfill its duty. [ 101 ] [NAME_1] testified that [NAME_4] failed to offer him training for administrative positions, but the evidence also satisfies me that the training to attain the prerequisite academic requirements for positions that became available would have imposed an undue financial burden. The evidence is considered below. In my view, [NAME_4] gave these issues sufficient consideration. [ 102 ] In summary, I find that, at the time of [NAME_1]’ June 8, 2017, meeting with [NAME_24] and [NAME_26], [NAME_4] had not received medical information from [NAME_1] or from [NAME_36] that would have enabled it to accommodate his request to return to work in some capacity. I also find that, if [NAME_4] had received medical information indicating that [NAME_1] could return to work with accommodations, which I do not find, it would not have changed the outcome. [NAME_1] in an administrative role or training him for such a position when he did not have the foundational credentials, skills, or experience, would have imposed an undue financial hardship on [NAME_4]. Creating a new position for [NAME_1] that did not previously exist or placing him in a position that another employee was holding would have also imposed an undue hardship. [ 103 ] [NAME_1] was an experienced machine operator who unfortunately developed a medical condition that restricted his ability to return to his job. I am satisfied that [NAME_4]’s managers considered whether it could accommodate [NAME_1] with other types of work, but they reasonably concluded that he did not have the skills or experience to do so, and they informed him of that conclusion. c. June 10 to December 31, 2017 [ 104 ] On June 16, 2017, eight days after the meeting on June 8, 2017, [NAME_40], Long-Term Disability Case Manager at [NAME_36], wrote to [NAME_24]. According to [NAME_40]’s email, she knew that [NAME_1] had spoken to [NAME_24] “about returning to work in an alternate position.” She asked [NAME_24] to contact her to discuss possible accommodations. [ 105 ] On June 26, 2017, [NAME_24] replied by email that [NAME_4] is a small company and that the day shifts were covered. He wrote that [NAME_4] could “keep him on days and evenings” if he could “operate a line,” which required climbing ladders and driving a forklift. An undated further note from [NAME_40] states that she will continue to follow up about any changes to the restrictions and limitations. [ 106 ] On July 17, 2017, [NAME_40] wrote again to [NAME_24]. She had reviewed [NAME_1]’ restrictions and limitations and stated that “at this time it appears [NAME_1] would not be able to safely complete his job tasks.” [NAME_24] asked [NAME_40] for the document confirming the restrictions. [NAME_40] replied that she could not provide it because it included confidential medical information. However, she confirmed that [NAME_1] cannot use machinery and cannot do “activities that may cause bodily harm such as heights or ladders.” [NAME_40] added that [NAME_36] would review the restrictions in November 2017. [ 107 ] Unfortunately, [NAME_40] passed away before the Tribunal hearing. However, the documentary evidence satisfies me that the information accurately reflected [NAME_1]’ medical restrictions. There is no medical evidence to suggest otherwise. [ 108 ] I also find that [NAME_40]’s communications with [NAME_24] are the first instance in which [NAME_4] received information about [NAME_1]’ medical restrictions. However, the information does not support [NAME_1]’ position that he could return to work with accommodations, or that [NAME_4] could accommodate him without undue hardship by employing him in an administrative position. [ 109 ] In September 2017, [NAME_24] requested that [NAME_1] pick up his belongings from the [NAME_4] plant. In a later email that [NAME_1] sent to [NAME_2], he asked if this request meant that [NAME_4] had decided not to re-employ him. I do not draw that inference from [NAME_24]’s email. At this time, approximately eleven months had passed since a seizure required [NAME_1] to stop working. No medical information indicated that [NAME_1] was able to return to work. There is no evidence that [NAME_4] informed [NAME_1] that it had terminated his employment. [NAME_4] continued to pay the insurance premiums for [NAME_1]’ extended health plan coverage. These facts satisfy me that [NAME_4] had not ended [NAME_1]’ employment. [ 110 ] In December 2017, [NAME_24] and [NAME_1] exchanged emails about inviting [NAME_1] and his family to attend the [NAME_4] party. [NAME_1] testified about feeling uncomfortable at the party. [ 111 ] [NAME_1]’ spouse, [NAME_42], also testified briefly at the hearing. I found [NAME_42]’s testimony to be credible and reliable. She testified that she felt uncomfortable at the Christmas party. Her view was that there was “an air of judgement” during the event. However, without more than testimony about how [NAME_1] and [NAME_42] experienced the events at a holiday party, the evidence does not support the inference that [NAME_4] would not continue employing [NAME_1] or that it would refuse to accommodate his needs. Again, at this time, [NAME_4] had still not received medical information to indicate that [NAME_1] could safely return to the workplace. In my view, [NAME_4] had reasonably concluded that it was not able to accommodate [NAME_1]’ needs. [ 112 ] [NAME_2] completed its purchase of [NAME_4] on December 29, 2017. [NAME_44], Vice-President of Finance for [NAME_2], testified that the transition in the company’s operations after the purchase was challenging, especially in the first year. d. Events from January to December 2018 [ 113 ] In 2018, the evidence confirms that [NAME_2] received updated information from [NAME_36] about [NAME_1]’ medical restrictions and work limitations. Direct communication between the parties in 2018 was inadequate on the part of both parties. However, the lack of direct communication does not detract from my finding below that the medical information continued to support the conclusion that [NAME_2] could not accommodate [NAME_1]’ needs without experiencing undue hardship. [ 114 ] In January and February 2018, [NAME_36] informed [NAME_2] that [NAME_1] had restrictions and limitations of “no driving, no heights, no night shifts, no flashing lights.” They are confirmed in notes of a March 11, 2019, phone call from [NAME_40] to [NAME_26], in which [NAME_40] reminded [NAME_26] of their discussions in early 2018. [ 115 ] A further [NAME_36] note summarizes a telephone call on January 10, 2018. I accept that it describes a discussion between [NAME_26] and [NAME_40]. The note indicates that [NAME_26] informed [NAME_36] that [NAME_2] could not accommodate [NAME_1] based on his restrictions and limitations, because his position as a machine operator and the other positions in the warehouse require that he operate a forklift. The note confirms that [NAME_26] said that [NAME_2] is a “very small operation” and does not have other “areas to look into” for the planning of a gradual return to work. [ 116 ] Further evidence confirms these discussions between [NAME_40] and [NAME_26]. In a recording that [NAME_1] made of a phone call in 2019 between himself and [NAME_40], [NAME_40] referred to [NAME_26]’s January 10, 2018, statements to her that [NAME_2] could not accommodate [NAME_1]. [ 117 ] [NAME_1] testified that his doctor said that he could start a gradual return to work, that he had informed [NAME_24] and [NAME_26] of that position, and that there was a plan for his gradual return to work in effect between 2017 and 2018, but that [NAME_2] “chose not to” implement it. [ 118 ] I do not agree with this characterization of the evidence. There continued to be no documentary evidence that [NAME_4] or [NAME_2] had received medical information indicating that [NAME_1] could gradually return to work in a position at [NAME_2]. As of January 2018, [NAME_2] only had information that [NAME_1]’ restrictions were “no driving, no heights, no night shifts, no flashing lights.” Two months later, [NAME_2] received [NAME_36]’s letter dated March 29, 2018, discussed below, indicating that [NAME_1] was able to perform “a number of alternate occupations.” I find that this letter was the source of [NAME_1]’ statements that he was able to start a gradual return to work. [ 119 ] I am satisfied that [NAME_1]’ doctor informed [NAME_36] in January 2018 that [NAME_1] would be able to work with restrictions. This finding is based on [NAME_40]’s March 21, 2019, email to [NAME_26] stating that the restrictions and limitations were made “when a gradual return to work was approved by the attending doctor,” along with [NAME_40]’s email that she had notified [NAME_2] in January and February 2018 about [NAME_1]’ restrictions. [ 120 ] However, at that time, I find that [NAME_2] was only aware of the medical restrictions, and its decision that it could not accommodate [NAME_1] was based on them. Although these restrictions had more detail than [NAME_2] had received in 2017, I find that there was no change in [NAME_2]’s ability to accommodate [NAME_1]’ needs. [ 121 ] Following the above, on January 25, 2018, [NAME_1] sent an email to [NAME_26], stating as follows: “[NAME_26], I hope all is well. I was contacting you in hopes of a reference letter. I would also like to thank you for the pleasure and opportunity to work for you (Not to sound like a kiss ass). Throughout my years being there I would honestly say I have only a had a handful of days [where] I could say I just didn't want to be there. The saying "Do what you love and never work a day in your life", I never [truly] understood that until now. So thanks is what I'm getting at [and] hope you the best in your future endeavors. To end on [an] odd ball question but in my file (if I have one) if there is a copy of my resume in it could [I] ask you send it or email it to me. [NAME_1]” [ 122 ] [NAME_26] testified that, in response, she remembered writing a general reference letter for [NAME_1]. However, there is no documentary evidence to confirm that she did so. [ 123 ] [NAME_26] also testified that she understood the email to mean that [NAME_1] was looking for work elsewhere where his medical condition could be accommodated, and that he was ending his employment with [NAME_2] on good terms. [ 124 ] [NAME_1] testified that his January 25, 2018, email did not say that he was resigning from his position, and that he sent it to initiate a conversation, to see what training he could be offered to continue with his job. He said that he was trying to open a dialogue about coming back to work. On cross-examination, [NAME_1] acknowledged that he was probably not being transparent about his purpose for sending the email. In his submissions, [NAME_1] argues that his email “tried to open some sort of communication” but that “[n]othing was returned.” [ 125 ] I find that [NAME_1]’ testimony and submissions about why he sent the January 25, 2018, email to [NAME_26] are not credible. Despite not explicitly stating it, I am satisfied that the email indicates his intention to leave his employment. It does not suggest a desire to open communications or to start a conversation about training. In my view, [NAME_26]’s understanding was reasonable. If [NAME_1] indeed wanted to “initiate a conversation” about accommodations, he was obliged to openly engage in this inquiry, but the approach that he took did not do so. [ 126 ] The next communication between [NAME_1] and [NAME_26] was a telephone call five days later, on January 30, 2018. [NAME_26] testified that she did not remember the call. [ 127 ] [NAME_1] testified that [NAME_40] at [NAME_36] told him on January 30, 2018, that [NAME_2] could not accommodate him, but that [NAME_26] did not tell him that when they spoke. His testimony is supported by [NAME_1]’ recording of his telephone call in 2019 with [NAME_40]. On the recording, [NAME_1] says that he spoke to [NAME_40] on January 30, 2018, then he called [NAME_26], who said that she would get back to him in two weeks, and then he sent [NAME_26] a follow-up email when he did not hear back from her. [ 128 ] [NAME_1]’ follow-up email on February 14, 2018, also confirms that he spoke with [NAME_26] on January 30 and that he told her that he still had no information about his employment status other than that [NAME_2] could not accommodate him, that there is “[nowhere] for [him] and [he is] a safety concern.” He expressed concern about whether he would continue receiving disability benefits and asks why “[his] insurance company was informing [him] of [his] work status and not [his] employer [itself].” He asked if he should assume that he has “been fired,” referring to his communications in September 2017 with [NAME_24] about retrieving his belongings. [ 129 ] [NAME_26] replied that she has contacted [NAME_36], that [NAME_36] was getting in touch with the person responsible for his disability benefits, and that [NAME_2] will contact [NAME_1] when it hears back from [NAME_36]. [ 130 ] I accept [NAME_1]’ explanation of the reason for his phone call on January 30, 2018, with [NAME_26]. I find that he was dissatisfied that he was hearing from [NAME_36] and not directly from [NAME_2], that [NAME_2] was unable to accommodate his request to return to work, and that he wanted further information from his employer. The February 14, 2018, email also states [NAME_1]’ view that [NAME_2] should have been communicating with him periodically. [ 131 ] The evidence satisfies me that [NAME_2] was not directly communicating with [NAME_1] about its continued inability to accommodate him, and that it relied instead on communicating with [NAME_36] and expecting [NAME_36] to relay the information. However, I also note that [NAME_1]’ February 14, 2018, email, where he raised concerns about [NAME_2]’s lack of direct communication, came soon after his January 25, 2018, email to [NAME_26] that he was intending to leave his employment with [NAME_2]. [ 132 ] Communications about accommodations must flow from both parties (see Renaud ). I am satisfied that they did not. However, [NAME_36] had informed [NAME_2] about [NAME_1]’ medical restrictions, and it had informed [NAME_1] about [NAME_2]’s continued position that it could not accommodate his return to work. This indirect communication through the disability insurer is not ideal, but in the circumstances, I find that it was sufficient for communicating each party’s information to the other party. [NAME_36] had informed [NAME_1] of [NAME_2]’s ongoing view that it could not accommodate him. In response, [NAME_1] should have provided any new information that he had about his ability to return to work at [NAME_2]. Doing so would have required the parties to continue engaging in discussions about accommodations. However, the evidence satisfies me that [NAME_1] did not have new information to provide. There is also no evidence of further direct communications between the parties in 2018. [ 133 ] In 2019, [NAME_44] assessed [NAME_1]’ ability to work in the positions that [NAME_2] had available in January 2018 . I consider this evidence below. [NAME_2] conducted this review after the fact, I find that it is additional credible evidence of [NAME_2]’s inability to accommodate [NAME_1] in 2018. [ 134 ] On March 29, 2018, [NAME_40] informed [NAME_2] that [NAME_1]’ long-term disability benefits would terminate on February 3, 2019. According to the letter, [NAME_36]’s decision was based on the change in the definition of “disability” in [NAME_2]’s insurance contract following the initial period of benefits. According to [NAME_36], [NAME_1] had the capacity “to perform a number of alternate occupations” and, as a result, he no longer had a “disability” under the contract. The letter also states that [NAME_36] sent a separate detailed letter to [NAME_1], and that “[NAME_1] has also been provided with assistance from [[NAME_36]’s] Vocational rehabilitation specialist for career and job search exploration.” This notification about the future termination of [NAME_1]’ benefits did not change the circumstances between him and [NAME_2]. [ 135 ] Further medical reports dated April 11, September 12, and November 16, 2018, about [NAME_1]’ medical situation are in evidence, but I am satisfied that [NAME_2] did not have copies of them in 2018. They confirm that [NAME_1] experienced further seizures in April and August 2018. I also note that, in the recording of [NAME_1]’ telephone call with [NAME_40], he had informed her that he had six seizures in 2018. [ 136 ] In my view, the evidence confirms the unfortunate result that, at the end of 2018, [NAME_1]’ ongoing medical impairments and his work restrictions meant that [NAME_2] could not realistically bring him back to work in any position, and that he was also faced with [NAME_36]’s decision that his disability benefits would end in early 2019. e. Events from January to March 2019 [ 137 ] On January 2, 2019, [NAME_40] again informed [NAME_2] that [NAME_1]’ benefits would end on February 3, 2019. The letter indicates that [NAME_36] also sent a detailed explanation about its decision to [NAME_1]. [ 138 ] In response, on January 16, 2019, [NAME_1] wrote to [NAME_26], inquiring again about the status of his employment, and stating that [NAME_2] had not communicated directly with him since February 2018. He also stated that he had tried to fill a prescription, but that his pharmacy informed him that his benefits had been terminated. [ 139 ] [NAME_1]’ situation came to [NAME_44]’s attention at this time, and they began exchanging emails. [ 140 ] I found [NAME_44]’s testimony about her involvement in this matter to be highly credible. Her memory of events was also more reliable than all other witnesses. She was forthright and clear about what she knew and did not know. [ 141 ] On January 17, 2019, [NAME_44] wrote back to [NAME_1]. She confirmed that his benefits were not cancelled, and that [NAME_2] was switching to a new disability insurer. [NAME_44] said she would review [NAME_1]’ file and be in contact in the next few days. [ 142 ] On January 23, 2019, [NAME_44] asked [NAME_1] to confirm whether he was planning to return to [NAME_2] and, if so, when. She also requested information about the tasks that he was medically cleared to perform and if he had any work-related restrictions. [ 143 ] [NAME_1] responded that he and his doctors had provided both [NAME_36] and [NAME_2] with information about his restrictions over the past two years. However, I find that [NAME_1]’ understanding that he and his doctors had provided information to [NAME_2] about his restrictions was not correct. As explained above, [NAME_1] had provided medical information only to [NAME_36]. [NAME_2] only received the information that [NAME_36] provided in July 2017 and in January and February 2018. Unfortunately, [NAME_1]’ mistaken understanding contributed to his concern that [NAME_2] had not been responding to him or appropriately considering his request to return to work. [ 144 ] [NAME_1]’ follow-up email on January 30, 2019, to [NAME_44] stated that she was acting dishonestly. [NAME_44] responded tactfully and again asked for the information for her return-to-work assessment, but [NAME_1] continued not to provide it. [ 145 ] [NAME_2]’s closing submissions argue that [NAME_1]’ responses were based on his loss of trust in [NAME_2] over the course of their communications in 2017 and early 2018. I agree. [NAME_1]’ interactions and communications with [NAME_26] and [NAME_44] satisfy me that he no longer trusted his employer. However, [NAME_44]’s requests were the appropriate approach to [NAME_1]’ continued desire to return to work with accommodations. [NAME_1]’ distrust did not justify his replies to the requests for information. [ 146 ] [NAME_1] asked for the records that [NAME_4] had on file. On February 20, 2019, [NAME_44] sent them to [NAME_1], informed him that [NAME_2] could not complete an accommodation assessment unless he provided an update on his medical restrictions, and that his employment contract would end unless he did so. In reply, [NAME_1] stated: “my restrictions have not changed at any point since they were last sent to [NAME_4]” and that he was waiting for a letter from his doctor about a return-to-work date. [ 147 ] On March 1, 2019, [NAME_1] sent [NAME_35]’s February 27, 2019, medical report to [NAME_44] which states: “[NAME_1] was diagnosed with epilepsy back in October 2016. Since that time, he has been seen by two different neurologists and has had MRI and EEG. We have had difficulty controlling his seizures. He ended up needing a dose of 800 mg daily of Dilantin which still is not effective. He was still having seizures about every five months and he was switched to Keppra 500 mg twice daily in November of 2018, and then up to 1000 mg twice daily in January of 2019. His most recent seizure was January 7, 2019. Due to his ongoing seizures, [NAME_1] is unable to do any duties that he would be at risk of falling or having an injury. He is also unable to operate any machinery and he is not able to drive. Side effects of medications also play a role for which he gets a lot of anxiety and fogginess from the medication.” [ 148 ] I accept and give significant weight to [NAME_35]’s report about [NAME_1]’ medical situation. [ 149 ] [NAME_1]’ March 1, 2019, email to [NAME_44] states that his last seizures occurred on January 15, 2019, and not, as [NAME_35] reported, on January 7, 2019. In either event, the evidence satisfies me that [NAME_1]’ doctors were not satisfied that the epileptic seizures were controlled, despite daily doses of medications, even as [NAME_1] was asking about the status of his employment in January 2019. [ 150 ] In my view, [NAME_35]’s February 27, 2019, medical report did not indicate any change in medical restrictions that would allow [NAME_2] to make reasonable accommodations. This is also consistent with [NAME_1]’ statement in his February 20, 2019, email that his restrictions had not changed since they were last sent to [NAME_4]. It confirmed that [NAME_1] could still not do the essential duties of his job. [ 151 ] [NAME_44] testified that [NAME_26] contacted [NAME_36] to ensure that [NAME_44] had a complete list of [NAME_1]’ restrictions for her return-to-work assessment. This explains the email exchanges and notes of a telephone call between [NAME_2] and [NAME_36] in February and March 2019. [ 152 ] In relation to [NAME_44]’s assessment of [NAME_2]’s ability to accommodate [NAME_1]’ needs, [NAME_44] testified as follows: a. Based on her discussions with [NAME_26], [NAME_44] knew that [NAME_26] and [NAME_24] had assessed the options for [NAME_1], but she again reviewed the criteria for the available positions in January 2018 to satisfy herself that [NAME_4]’s previous assessment was accurate. She also conducted the review because [NAME_1] had expressed concern that [NAME_2] had not adequately looked for other roles for him in the company. b. In 2019, when she was communicating with [NAME_1], she reviewed the job descriptions for the positions identified as being available in January 2018—a machine operator position at the Portage la Prairie location, and an accounting clerk and two quality assurance technician positions at the Regina location. c. The requirements for the accounting clerk, as shown in the job description, included a college diploma in accounting or a minimum of five years of work experience in accounting or data entry. The requirements for the quality assurance technician included a Bachelor’s degree in food science or science or a diploma in Science Laboratory Technology, and one to two years of work experience as a laboratory technician. On cross-examination by [NAME_1], [NAME_44] testified that, in 2018, it was [NAME_2]’s understanding that [NAME_1] did not have the qualifications for these positions. [ 153 ] I accept [NAME_44]’s testimony. I also accept the documentary evidence about her assessment and the timing of it. [ 154 ] I am satisfied that, for the machine operator position, [NAME_2] determined that [NAME_1]’ job restrictions prevented him from meeting the requirements of the job, and that he did not have the qualifications or skills for the administrative positions in [NAME_37]. [NAME_1] also testified that he did not want to work at the [NAME_37] facility, and [NAME_42]’s testimony confirmed that it would not have been a feasible option for their family. [ 155 ] In [NAME_1]’ closing submissions, he suggests that [NAME_44] conducted her review in January 2018 but did not communicate with him about it. He argues that this indicated a lack of transparency and the possibility of “just making up documents.” I disagree. [NAME_1] heard [NAME_44]’s testimony, and he cross-examined her. I accept [NAME_44]’s testimony that she prepared the document and conducted her review in 2019 . There is no foundation for the submission that [NAME_2] was “making up documents” or that [NAME_44] acted without transparency. [ 156 ] [NAME_44]’s testimony also satisfies me that she was knowledgeable about an employer’s duty to accommodate the needs of an employee with a disability to the point of undue hardship. On cross-examination by [NAME_1], [NAME_44] also described a situation in which [NAME_2] had accommodated another employee who had been injured by providing training, because the employee had skills that could be used in an administrative role. Overall, [NAME_44]’s evidence satisfies me that [NAME_2] fulfilled its duty to accommodate [NAME_1] to the point of undue hardship. [ 157 ] [NAME_1] did not provide further medical information after [NAME_35]’s February 27, 2019, report. There is no evidence of changes in [NAME_1]’ restrictions. He started working for another employer in 2019, and continued doing so in 2020, 2021, and 2022. [NAME_2] and [NAME_1] did not communicate further about the possibility of him returning to work for it. [ 158 ] The legal framework above confirms that an employer reaches the point of undue hardship when reasonable means of accommodation are exhausted and only unreasonable or impracticable options for accommodation remain (see Council of Canadians with [NAME_33] ). I am satisfied that, in the absence of evidence of further changes in [NAME_1]’ restrictions, further attempts to accommodate him in returning to work for [NAME_2] would be unrealistic, impractical, and beyond the scope of the duty to accommodate required pursuant to section 15 of the CHRA.

3) Conclusion about accommodations [ 159 ] Having considered all the evidence and the parties’ submissions, I am satisfied that [NAME_2] has proven on a balance of probabilities that its refusal to return [NAME_1] to work was based on a bona fide occupational requirement under section 15(1)(a) of the CHRA, and that the accommodation of [NAME_1]’ needs would impose undue hardship under section 15(2) of the CHRA in relation to the factors of cost, health, and safety.

V.

ORDER [ 160 ] [NAME_2]’s request to dismiss the Complaint due to the passage of time or for delay is dismissed. [ 161 ] This Complaint is dismissed. Signed by [NAME_3] Tribunal Member [NAME_22], Ontario March 16, 2026 Canadian Human Rights Tribunal Parties of Record File No. : HR-DP-3002-24 Style of Cause: [NAME_1] v. [COMPANY_2] Decision of the Tribunal Dated: March 16, 2026 Date and Place of Hearing: May 5 to 7, 2025 By Zoom videoconferencing Appearances: [NAME_1] , Self-represented [NAME_46] , for the Canadian Human Rights Commission [NAME_47] and [NAME_48] , for the Respondent