Tribunal dismisses discrimination complaint against organization

Canadian Human Rights Tribunal Tribunal canadien des droits de la personne Citation: 2026 CHRT 33 Date: April 7, 2026 File No. : HR-DP-3100-25 Between: [NAME] Complainant - and - Canadian Human Rights Commission Commission - and - [NAME] Respondent Decision Member: [NAME] \o "1-3" \h \z \u I. OVERVIEW PAGEREF _Toc226023907 \h 1 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320036003000320033003900300037000000 II.

DECISION PAGEREF _Toc226023908 \h 2 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320036003000320033003900300038000000 III. ISSUE PAGEREF _Toc226023909 \h 2 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320036003000320033003900300039000000 IV. ANALYSIS PAGEREF _Toc226023910 \h 2 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320036003000320033003900310030000000 A. Process for hearing motion PAGEREF _Toc226023911 \h 2 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320036003000320033003900310031000000 B. Can the [NAME] be held legally responsible for the discrimination and racial profiling alleged in the complaint? PAGEREF _Toc226023912 \h 3 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320036003000320033003900310032000000 (i) The police [NAME] who made the impugned report were not [NAME] members PAGEREF _Toc226023913 \h 4 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320036003000320033003900310033000000 (ii) Relationship between the [NAME] and the [NAME] _Toc226023914 \h 6 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320036003000320033003900310034000000 (iii) Allegations against PSSG PAGEREF _Toc226023915 \h 7 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320036003000320033003900310035000000 V.

ORDER PAGEREF _Toc226023916 \h 8 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320036003000320033003900310036000000 I. OVERVIEW [ 1 ] I dismiss this complaint for the reasons set out below. [ 2 ] [NAME] (the “Complainant”) alleged that he was brutally assaulted and detained by members of the Vancouver Police Department (the VPD) in 2021. [NAME] filed a discrimination complaint against the VPD with the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal (the BCHRT). [ 3 ] [NAME] also filed a complaint with the Canadian Human Rights Commission (the “Commission”) against the [NAME] (the [NAME] or the “Respondent”), and the Combined Forces Special Enforcement Unit of British Columbia (the [NAME]). In that complaint, he alleged that officers of the [NAME] and [NAME] discriminated against him and racially profiled him due to his race, colour, and disability in the provision of services contrary to section 5 of the Canadian Human Rights Act , R.S.C., 1985, c. H-6 (the CHRA). Specifically, he alleged that it was [NAME] and [NAME] officers who initiated the incident in which he was assaulted by VPD officers. According to [NAME], members of the [NAME] and [NAME] saw him driving his vehicle in Surrey, British Columbia, and mistakenly believed that he was violating his bail conditions by being there. He alleged that the [NAME] and [NAME] reported the matter to their counterparts in the VPD, who then ended up assaulting and detaining him. [ 4 ] The Commission only referred the complaint against the [NAME] to the Tribunal for an inquiry. It did so based on its understanding that the police officers who had reported the matter to the VPD were members of the [NAME]. In its referral decision, the Commission wrote that, since the [NAME] officers who had initiated the incident and their provincial counterparts were all working as part of one integrated anti-gang police agency (the [NAME]), it did not make sense to separate their role in the incident from the role of provincial police officers. [ 5 ] The [NAME] made a motion to have the complaint dismissed on the following grounds:

1. That the police officers who made the report that led to [NAME]’s alleged assault and detention by the VPD were not [NAME] members;

2. That, in any event, the report in question was not a “service” within the meaning of section 5 of the CHRA; and 3. That the allegations in this complaint regarding the VPD’s actions amount to an abuse of process because [NAME] had already filed a complaint to the BCHRT about those actions.

II.

DECISION [ 6 ] I dismiss this complaint.

III. ISSUE [ 7 ] The issue I must decide is whether the [NAME] can be held legally responsible for the discrimination and racial profiling alleged in this complaint.

IV. ANALYSIS A. Process for hearing motion [ 8 ] The Federal Court has confirmed that this Tribunal may consider and grant preliminary motions to dismiss complaints so long as it does so in a procedurally fair manner, cautiously, and only in the clearest of cases (see Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission) v. Canada (Attorney General) , 2012 FC 445 at paras 119, 132, 140, and 157). [ 9 ] The Tribunal has dismissed complaints in numerous cases through preliminary motions to determine key legal issues, often in the context of motions to strike claims from SOPs (see, for example, Dorey et al. v. Employment and Social Development Canada , 2023 CHRT 23; Cushley et al. v. Veterans Affairs Canada , 2022 CHRT 21 at paras 16–18; [NAME] v. Correctional Service Canada , 2020 CHRT 27 at para 86; and [NAME] v. [NAME] , 2024 CHRT 133). [ 10 ] I discussed the treatment of the Respondent’s motion with the parties in a case management call. I directed the Respondent to file any evidence supporting its motion in affidavit form. I also provided [NAME], who is his representative, with the opportunity to file any evidence that the Complainant might have that was relevant to the issues raised in the motion. In addition, I told her that she could request the opportunity to cross-examine the person(s) who swore the affidavit(s) filed by the Respondent. I advised the parties that, if [NAME] wished to cross-examine the affiant(s), the Tribunal would set up a virtual hearing for her to do so. The Respondent filed an affidavit sworn by an [NAME] with the [NAME] and another sworn by a law clerk. [NAME] made submissions in response to the motion but she did not request the opportunity to cross-examine the persons who swore the affidavits submitted by the Respondent. I have decided this motion based on the evidence filed by the parties as well as their submissions. B. Can the [NAME] be held legally responsible for the discrimination and racial profiling alleged in the complaint? [ 11 ] No. I find that there is no basis on which to hold the [NAME] responsible for the discrimination and racial profiling alleged in the complaint. [ 12 ] Section 65(1) of the CHRA makes organizations responsible for any act or omission committed by “an officer, a director, an employee or an agent” of the organization in the course of their employment for the organization unless they meet the conditions set out in section 65(2) of the CHRA. This means that the [NAME] may be held liable for the acts or omissions of its “officers, directors, employees or agents” in the course of employment. [ 13 ] The Complainant argued that the [NAME] was legally responsible for the actions of the police officers who made the report that led to his allegedly brutal assault and detention by the VPD because they were [NAME] members and due to the close relationship between the [NAME] and the [NAME]. (i) The police [NAME] who made the impugned report were not [NAME] members [ 14 ] [NAME]’s mother believed that the police officers who made the report that led to her son’s assault and detention by the VPD were [NAME] members because of a statement made to her by counsel for the VPD in the BCHRT process. According to her, counsel for the VPD said that the VPD officers who detained [NAME] had acted on a report made by [NAME] officers. [ 15 ] However, the [NAME] filed an affidavit from [NAME], who is currently posted to the [NAME], which included copies of a General Occurrence report and Employee Profile Information as exhibits. The information contained in [NAME]’s affidavit and the exhibits attached to it were not challenged. The General Occurrence report showed that the report that led to [NAME]’s detention by the VPD was made by [NAME] and [NAME]. The Employee Profile Information attached to [NAME]’s affidavit shows that [NAME] and [NAME] were not employed by the [NAME]. According to [NAME] and [NAME] were members of the Delta Police Department and seconded to the [NAME] from that municipal police force. [ 16 ] According to [NAME], employees of municipal police forces who are seconded to the [NAME] remain employees of their municipal police force during their secondment. They do not become [NAME] members or [NAME] employees during their secondment to the [NAME]. Seconded police officers continue to identify themselves to the public as members of their home police department and they remain subject to provincial complaint processes during their secondment to the [NAME]. Municipalities and the Province of British Columbia are jointly and severally liable for any torts committed by police officers seconded from a municipal police department to the [NAME] (see [NAME] v. [NAME] , 2023 BCSC 144 at para 5 [ [NAME] ]). [ 17 ] The evidence before me does show that municipal police officers who are seconded to the [NAME] are appointed as supernumerary special [NAME] by the [NAME] so they have peace officer status outside of British Columbia. However, I agree with the [NAME]’s argument that the appointment of an officer as a supernumerary [NAME] does not make them a “member” or employee of the [NAME]. Under the [NAME] Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. R-10 (the “[NAME] Act”) , a “member” is defined as the Commissioner (section 5), the Deputy Commissioner and officers (section 6(3)-(4)), and individuals appointed as a member (section 7). The [NAME] Act does not provide that supernumerary [NAME] become members or employees of the [NAME]. In fact, it provides that supernumerary [NAME] are not entitled to any pecuniary privileges or benefits at all (section 9.6(3)). [ 18 ] In making findings of fact, I must consider the reliability of evidence to determine whether facts have been established on a balance of probabilities (in other words, that they are more likely than not). In this case, I find the evidence from the [NAME]’s official records to be more reliable than the hearsay statement made by counsel for the VPD. The reason for this is that I have no information to explain the basis for his belief that the police officers who made the report about the Complainant were [NAME] members. Based on the evidence before me, I find that the police officers who made the report that initiated the incident between the Complainant and the VPD were not [NAME] members or employees. [ 19 ] I note that the Complainant did not argue that the police officers who made the impugned report were officers, directors, or agents of the [NAME] within the meaning of subsection 65(1) of the CHRA. The terms “officers” and “directors” typically refer to officers and directors of a corporation. As police [NAME] and [NAME] would not fall within the meaning of officers or directors of the [NAME]. In light of the evidence set out above, I also find that these police officers cannot be considered “agents” of the [NAME] given their continued connection to their home departments during their secondment and the terms of the relationship between the [NAME] and the [NAME] described below. In light of this evidence, I cannot find that municipal police officers seconded to the [NAME] are “agents” of the [NAME] in the sense of acting under the express, implied, or apparent authority of the [NAME]. (ii) Relationship between the [NAME] and the [NAME] [ 20 ] I note that [NAME] filed his complaint with the Commission against the [NAME] and the [NAME]. In part, this may have been because the BCHRT referred to the [NAME] as “part of the [NAME]” in one of its letters to [NAME]. In the correspondence, a BCHRT Member wrote that “the [[NAME]] is a part of the [NAME] and therefore under federal jurisdiction.” It is unclear what evidence, if any, the Member was relying upon in making this statement in the letter. The Member advised the Complainant that he had to file a complaint with the Commission if he wished to raise allegations against the [NAME] and the [NAME]. The Member added that, if the Commission disagrees that the federal government regulates the [NAME], the Complainant should send the BCHRT a letter and it could consider reopening that part of his complaint. [ 21 ] In directions I sent to the parties in advance of the motion, I asked them to address the nature of the [NAME] and specifically, whether it is a separate legal entity or a “part of the [NAME]” as the BCHRT had stated in its correspondence. Based on the evidence filed by the [NAME] in support of its motion, I find that the [NAME] is not a part of the [NAME] as suggested by the BCHRT Member in her correspondence. [ 22 ] The [NAME] was established under a Memorandum of Understanding signed by the Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General for the Province of British Columbia, the Organized Crime Agency of British Columbia, the [NAME] E Division, and ten municipal police departments from British Columbia. In his affidavit, [NAME] states that the [NAME] is not a legal entity as such, it is simply the name given to the integrated unit formed under the Memorandum of Understanding. Similarly, the British Columbia Supreme Court has described the [NAME] as “an integrated police unit comprised of municipal and [NAME] officers that is aimed at disruption and suppression of organized crime” (see [NAME] at para 13). [ 23 ] While the [NAME] has operational and administrative oversight of the [NAME], it acts under the strategic direction of a Board of Governance shared with the Organized Crime Agency of British Columbia. The Board of Governance includes civilians as well as [NAME] from various municipal police departments as well as the [NAME]. It also includes the Associate Director of Police Services of the British Columbia Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General. The [NAME] receives at least part of its funding from the Province of British Columbia. [ 24 ] [NAME] argues that the [NAME] is responsible for the actions of the police officers from municipal forces who are seconded to the [NAME] because the Memorandum of Understanding states that the [NAME]’s policies apply to those officers when they are seconded to the [NAME]. In addition, the Memorandum of Understanding states that the [NAME] must pay and assume financial responsibility for the salaries normally accruing to municipal police officers at the rate that they are entitled to under their collective agreement, contract, or term of employment. [ 25 ] In my view, these provisions reflect the fact that, under the Memorandum of Understanding, the [NAME] has operational and administrative oversight of the [NAME]. However, as noted above, that administrative oversight is undertaken under the strategic governance of a Board of Governance that includes representation from various partner agencies who are parties to the Memorandum of Understanding. Due to this governance model, I do not find that the [NAME] is a part of the [NAME] or that the [NAME] is legally responsible for the actions of all non-[NAME] members who are seconded to the [NAME]. (iii) Allegations against PSSG [ 26 ] Although the Complainant’s main allegations in this complaint were against the officers who made the report to the VPD, he also made an allegation against the “PSSG.” Specifically, the Complainant alleged that the “PSSG” failed to accommodate his disability when one of its employees explained his bail conditions to him. “PSSG” appears to be a reference to the British Columbia Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General. Not only is this Ministry a provincial agency, but there is no legal basis on which to find the [NAME] legally responsible for any of that Ministry’s actions or inactions. Therefore, these allegations must also be dismissed as against the [NAME]. [ 27 ] For the above reasons, this complaint against the [NAME] must be dismissed. As a result of this finding, I do not have to address the other grounds on which the [NAME] sought to have the complaint dismissed.

V.

ORDER [ 28 ] The complaint is dismissed for the above reasons. Signed by [NAME] Tribunal Member Ottawa, Ontario April 7, 2026 Canadian Human Rights Tribunal Parties of Record File No. : HR-DP-3100-25 Style of Cause: [NAME] v. [NAME] of the Tribunal Dated: April 7, 2026 Motion dealt with in writing without appearance of parties Written representations by: [NAME] , for the Complainant [NAME] , for the Respondent