Tribunal Grants Respondent Permission to Call Additional Witness

Canadian Human Rights Tribunal Tribunal canadien des droits de la personne Citation: 2026 CHRT 38 Date: April 17, 2026 File No. : T2664/4021 Between: [NAME]. Complainant - and - Canadian Human Rights Commission Commission - and - [NAME] Respondent - and - [NAME] person Ruling Member: [NAME] \o "1-4" \h \z \u I. INTRODUCTION PAGEREF _Toc227316393 \h 1 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320037003300310036003300390033000000 II.

DECISION PAGEREF _Toc227316394 \h 1 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320037003300310036003300390034000000 III. [NAME]’S APPLICATION FOR LEAVE PAGEREF _Toc227316395 \h 1 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320037003300310036003300390035000000 IV. POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES PAGEREF _Toc227316396 \h 4 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320037003300310036003300390036000000 A. The witness should have been identified by [NAME] earlier in the proceeding PAGEREF _Toc227316397 \h 5 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320037003300310036003300390037000000 B. Prejudice and Unfairness to the Parties PAGEREF _Toc227316398 \h 8 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320037003300310036003300390038000000 V. ANALYSIS PAGEREF _Toc227316399 \h 13 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320037003300310036003300390039000000 A. Is the proposed evidence relevant? PAGEREF _Toc227316400 \h 14 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320037003300310036003400300030000000 B. [NAME] have been identified as a witness earlier in the proceeding? PAGEREF _Toc227316401 \h 15 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320037003300310036003400300031000000 C. Does any prejudice to the parties outweigh the probative value of the proposed evidence? PAGEREF _Toc227316402 \h 16 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320037003300310036003400300032000000 VI.

ORDER PAGEREF _Toc227316403 \h 20 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320037003300310036003400300033000000 I. INTRODUCTION [ 1 ] [NAME] (Respondent) seeks leave from the Tribunal to call an additional witness at the hearing of this complaint, which is already underway. [NAME] asks to call its employee, [NAME], to testify about its current policies, procedures and training regarding domestic and intimate partner violence (DIPV). [ 2 ] [NAME]. (Complainant), the Canadian Human Rights Commission (Commission), and the [NAME] ([NAME]) all oppose the Respondent’s application.

II.

DECISION [ 3 ] I agree that [NAME] may call [NAME] to testify about the current policies, procedures and training regarding DIPV at [NAME]. [NAME] is to provide her evidence on May 12, 2026, and may be cross-examined by the Commission, the Complainant and [NAME]. [ 4 ] I advised the parties of this decision on March 16, 2026 so that they and the remaining witnesses could be prepared well in advance of the resumption of the hearing on May 12, 2026, and stated that my full reasons would follow. This Ruling sets out the full reasons for my decision. III. [NAME]’S APPLICATION FOR LEAVE [ 5 ] The Tribunal’s hearing into this complaint commenced November 24 to 28, 2025, and continued over nine more days in January and February of 2026. It is scheduled to conclude following two more hearing days on May 12 and 20, 2026. The Tribunal has heard evidence from the Complainant and several witnesses called by the Complainant and Commission, as well as expert witnesses called by the Commission and [NAME]. The Respondent has also called several witnesses and has one witness left to call, in addition to [NAME]. [ 6 ] During the hearing on February 4, 2026, [NAME] advised the parties and the Tribunal that it was considering applying for leave to call an additional witness to provide evidence about its policies and training materials in relation to DIPV. Later the same day, the Commission sent an email setting out a “pre-emptive objection” to the possibility of the Respondent calling a new witness at this late stage of the proceeding. The Complainant agreed with the Commission’s pre-emptive objection. [NAME] briefly replied on February 5 to indicate that, if it decided to request leave to call an additional witness it would do so in writing as soon as possible. [ 7 ] At the end of the hearing day on February 13, 2026, [NAME] filed its written application for leave to call [NAME]. In its application for leave, it sets out [NAME]’s anticipated testimony and the basis for its request. [ 8 ] [NAME] says that [NAME] is currently the Manager, Industrial Relations (field). She formerly held the role of Manager, Health and Safety with the portfolio of Workplace Harassment, Violence and Discrimination Prevention Policy, a role to which she is returning shortly. She has been involved in the development of [NAME]’s current policies and training on harassment, violence and discrimination in the workplace and has been involved in training courses related to domestic violence, which informed her work and role in developing these policies. From June 2019 to May 2022, she held the position of Specialist, Human Rights and Employment Equity on the National Human Rights and Employment Equity team, which was responsible for the development of [NAME]’s accommodation policy and training. [ 9 ] [NAME] anticipates that [NAME] will speak to [NAME]’s current policies and training programs, including how they were developed, to whom they apply, and how they are currently being implemented, as well as the process involved in reviewing or revising them. [ 10 ] [NAME] is not proposing to call [NAME] to testify about [NAME]. or her employment with [NAME]. [ 11 ] [NAME] says it is necessary to call [NAME] at this stage of the proceeding because of additional, unanticipated evidence that was provided by [NAME]’s expert witness, [NAME], when she testified between January 27 and 29, 2026. [NAME] produced [NAME]’s report in September of 2025, prior to the commencement of the hearing, and [NAME] indicated it would be objecting to [NAME]’s evidence. The Tribunal agreed to determine the issue of the admissibility of [NAME]’s evidence in writing prior to her being called to testify, in order to save time at the hearing. On January 12, 2026, the Tribunal advised the parties that [NAME] may be called to give expert evidence in the area of violence  against women in Canada, including the shelter sector and the domestic and international instruments that inform Canadian governments’ and employers’ obligations to implement measures in respect of gender-based violence , and that her report may be admitted as evidence (full reasons issued January 20, 2026 in [NAME]. v [NAME] , 2026 CHRT 5). [NAME] was permitted to testify about the topics included in her report, with the exception of one section that was to be redacted. [NAME]’s report covers several topics including [NAME]’s policy framework in 2019, which is when the alleged discrimination occurred, as well as its current policies. She also addresses the public interest remedies sought by the Complainant and Commission that relate to [NAME]’s policies and training. [ 12 ] [NAME] says that, as part of her evidence at the hearing, [NAME] testified about aspects of [NAME]’s current policies, procedures and training that were not included in her report. Specifically, it argues that she opined on imagery in [NAME]’s recent self-study guide, how its training programs should be delivered, and that new policies should have some form of outcomes. [ 13 ] [NAME] says that, as these aspects of [NAME]’s testimony were not included in her report, it had no advance notice of these specific criticisms of its current policies, procedures and training. It notes that [NAME] also acknowledged that, despite opining on [NAME]’s policies and training and a lack of an integrated or trauma informed “strategy”, she had no knowledge of how these policies and training are implemented, nor what [NAME]’s strategy may be on various issues related to DIPV in the workplace. [ 14 ] [NAME] argues that, in light of this additional expert evidence, it is necessary as a matter of procedural fairness to allow it to call a witness to speak to current policy, procedure and training infrastructure at [NAME], including with respect to the development, review, and application of the impugned policies and programs. [NAME] says its remaining witnesses are primarily retired and/or do not have involvement and knowledge of the current policies, procedures, and training that [NAME] testified about. [ 15 ] [NAME] further argues that the Commission and Complainant are seeking public interest remedies, namely revisions to its policies, procedures and training in relation to DIPV and human rights, with the assistance of consultants. It argues that the Tribunal should not order public interest remedies based on policies and procedures from seven years ago (when the alleged discrimination against [NAME]. took place) that are no longer in place, without having regard to evidence from [NAME] about its current policies and procedures, which [NAME] can provide. [NAME] submits that ordering public interest remedies in the absence of a complete evidentiary basis on these points risks creating unduly onerous and unworkable conflicts with its current policies and procedures that address the issues of discrimination, accommodation, workplace violence and DIPV. [ 16 ] [NAME] says it is seeking to rely on the Tribunal’s ability, pursuant to sections 48.9(1) and 50(3) of the Canadian Human Rights Act , R.S.C. 1985, c.H-6 [CHRA] as well as Rules 5,7, and 8 of the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal Rules of Procedure,2021 (SOR/2021-137) [Rules] to control its process by granting a party leave to call an additional witness. It notes that the Tribunal has previously exercised its discretion in this regard (in [NAME] v [NAME] Canada Ltd. and [NAME] , 2022 CHRT 25). It also notes that both the Commission and Complainant relied on the Tribunal’s exercise of its own discretion to seek to add witnesses during the course of the hearing, and to seek to admit evidence that was disclosed well into the hearing.

IV. POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES [ 17 ] [NAME]., the Commission, and [NAME] all oppose [NAME]’s application for leave to call [NAME]. Their main arguments are that: (i) [NAME] should have identified [NAME] as a witness earlier in the proceeding (either in its Statement of Particulars (SOP) or after [NAME] filed [NAME]’s report in September of 2025) but chose not to, and (ii) [NAME] should not be allowed to do so now because calling a new witness at this stage is prejudicial to them as it is procedurally and substantively unfair. A. The witness should have been identified by [NAME] earlier in the proceeding [ 18 ] [NAME] argues that [NAME] has long been aware that the adequacy of its current policies, processes and training related to DIPV were in issue in this case. It notes that the SOPs of the Complainant, Commission and [NAME], all of which were filed in 2021 and 2022, mention [NAME]’s current policies and training, that were developed after the alleged discrimination against [NAME]. in 2019. [NAME].’s SOP says that she is asking the Tribunal to order [NAME] to develop and implement a “new, rigorous training program for all levels of management, that addresses the warning signs and identifies the needs of women suffering from the long-term mental health effects of intimate partner violence.” The Commission in its SOP seeks public interest remedies, including asking the Tribunal to order [NAME] to engage consultants to develop training about DIPV for all [NAME] employees and to review and revise its human rights training program and create and revise policies related to performance objectives and evaluations for survivors of DIPV seeking human rights accommodations. In its [NAME] denies that a public interest remedy is necessary or appropriate and claims it has adequate policies and procedures for addressing mental health accommodations and protections for employees who experience DIPV. [ 19 ] [NAME], the Commission argues that [NAME] knew or should have known that its current policies are a key issue for the Tribunal when considering public interest remedies like those sought by [NAME]. and the Commission. The Commission argues that the Tribunal must look at [NAME]’s policies that were in place in 2019 to consider the context in which the alleged discrimination took place, and assess its current practices, policies and measures to determine whether remedies are warranted. The Commission says this must be done in accordance with the constraints set out in the Tribunal’s Rules which require the Respondent to identify its witnesses and provide a summary of their anticipated evidence in its SOP (Rule 20(1)(d)). Rule 37 further states that the Respondent may only call a witness at hearing if that witness was identified in its SOP (as required by Rule 20). The Commission concedes that the Tribunal may vary or dispense with compliance with a Rule, so long as doing so does not interfere with the fair and expeditious determination of the inquiry (Rules 8 and 5). [ 20 ] [NAME] says that, while [NAME] did not list [NAME] as a witness in its SOP, the summary of [NAME]’s anticipated testimony in the Respondent’s leave application confirms that she has been involved in harassment, violence and discrimination prevention and human rights promotion at [NAME] since at least 2019. [NAME] says this made her an obvious and available witness to call who should have been identified earlier in the Tribunal’s proceeding. [NAME] says [NAME] clearly made a deliberate choice not to list any witnesses who could speak to its [NAME]-2019 policies, procedures and training. [ 21 ] The Commission states that the testimony of [NAME] is unnecessary and improper because the existence of [NAME]’s current policies is not disputed and it is not necessary to call another witness to introduce or address them. The Commission notes that [NAME]’s current policies are included in both the joint book of documents of the Commission, Complainant and [NAME], and in the Respondent’s book of documents. They are also referred to by [NAME] in her report. The Commission therefore suggests that the policies should be entered as uncontested exhibits or as an amendment to the agreed statement of facts. The Commission says the Tribunal can assess these current policies by looking at the uncontested documents which speak for themselves. [ 22 ] [NAME]’s position is that the need to call [NAME] to testify about its current policies and training did not arise until [NAME] testified. It remained of the view until hearing her testimony that, if necessary, one of its planned witnesses could confirm the current training in place and identify the relevant existing policies or that, in any event, it would ask that the relevant documents be put into evidence given they were provided to [NAME]’s expert and referenced directly in her report. [ 23 ] [NAME] argues that [NAME]’s testimony is not a justification for calling a witness this late in the proceeding. In its Motion for Interested Person Status, it outlined the subject matters it would address if granted such status, including the public interest remedies sought by [NAME]. and the Commission. After being granted interested person status, [NAME] filed [NAME]’s report in September of 2025. The report has a section titled “[NAME]’s Current Policies”, in which [NAME] addresses policies, training materials and processes for workplace violence, harassment and discrimination implemented since 2019. [NAME] says [NAME] raised various concerns in her report about how in practice [NAME]’s current policies, procedures and training materials function, given variables like management style and discretion, organizational culture and local capability, as well as concerns that the materials are not entirely trauma informed. [NAME] and Commission submit that, as [NAME] was made aware of [NAME]’s reservations about its policies and training in September of 2025, it could have selected a witness like [NAME] to address the potential gaps and deficiencies [NAME] identified, but it did not. [ 24 ] [NAME] notes that it objected to the admissibility of [NAME]’s evidence before she testified. It says that, had it known the extent of what [NAME] would seek to opine on, it likely would have earlier considered an additional witness to respond. [NAME] says that it does see its policy and training documents as largely speaking for themselves. However, since [NAME] testified about what she perceives as items that should be revised or form part of a broader approach at [NAME], including based on critiques that were not addressed in her report when discussing the current policies and training, it believes it is necessary to present evidence in response, and that it would assist the Tribunal and parties to hear it. [ 25 ] Even though [NAME] objected to the admissibility of [NAME]’s evidence in advance of her testimony, [NAME] argues that it should have known its objection could fail and planned for that possibility by identifying a witness who would be able to respond meaningfully to [NAME]’s report and anticipated testimony. [ 26 ] [NAME] notes that, rather than objecting to [NAME]’s evidence elicited through examination in chief and cross-examination by the other parties, [NAME] instead chose, in its cross-examination, to further explore issues relevant to [NAME]’s current policies and training measures. [NAME] says its re-examination appropriately touched on the issue of imagery used in the current training guide, since [NAME] had raised this issue by referring [NAME] to specific pages in one such training guide during cross-examination. [ 27 ] [NAME] argues that [NAME]’s testimony did not open up any new field or subject area not mentioned in her report. [NAME] submits that [NAME]’s testimony-in-chief addressing [NAME]’s current policies and training materials was comparatively brief, and the parts identifying what [NAME] claims were “new” and that justify calling [NAME] must be read in the context of her report and testimony as a whole. It argues that [NAME]’s testimony on imagery in [NAME]’s recent self-study guide, how its training programs should be delivered, and that new policies should have some form of outcomes could be reasonably foreseen based on the content of her report. It suggests that her testimony on these subjects was simply “amplifying” on subject matters addressed in her report [ 28 ] [NAME] says there was nothing in [NAME]’s testimony that could not be reasonably foreseen or that would justify calling a new witness to respond. B. Prejudice and Unfairness to the Parties [ 29 ] The Commission’s position is that permitting [NAME] to call a new witness more than halfway through the hearing and after [NAME] already opened its case and called some of its witnesses would be prejudicial to the other parties and contrary to procedural fairness, natural justice, the CHRA, and the Tribunal’s Rules. The Commission argues that the Tribunal should only vary or dispense with Rule 37, which requires parties to name all of their witnesses in their SOPs, if persuaded that the party had valid reasons for not complying with the Rule ( [NAME]. v [NAME] , 2026 CHRT 4 at paras 21-23). [ 30 ] The Commission argues that the Respondent’s request to call [NAME] should be denied because the addition of this witness would cause significant procedural and substantive prejudice to the other parties which cannot be cured without compromising the efficiency, fairness, and integrity of the process. The Commission submits that calling [NAME] also distracts from the essence of the dispute because the Respondent is proposing to introduce new factual assertions through this witness that the parties have had no notice of. It says this changes the evidentiary landscape after disclosure has already happened and invites the kind of trial by ambush that the Tribunal’s timelines are designed to prevent, given that the parties have already crafted their case theory, witness lists, and cross-examination based on the witness lists and records of appearance. The Commission submits that allowing a late witness would fundamentally alter the case that the other parties must meet. [ 31 ] The Commission also says allowing a new witness at this stage would materially compromise the parties’ ability to advance their cases because their litigation strategies would require revision, time and resources, including funding which may not be available. [ 32 ] With respect to funding, the Commission suggests it would need at least a month to draft a new contract for a responding expert witness but would not know until after April 1, 2026 if any funding will be available to retain such a witness. This concern is based on the Commission’s view that [NAME] is seeking to call [NAME] to introduce a “counter-expert opinion” to [NAME]’s evidence, which it says is improper. The Commission says that [NAME] is neither qualified nor impartial, objective or independent from [NAME]. [ 33 ] The Commission submits that the three points [NAME] is being proposed to speak to can be addressed in the Respondent’s closing submissions instead of through a new witness. [ 34 ] With respect to the Commission’s suggestion that [NAME] would be providing opinion evidence which may necessitate the need to call further expert evidence, [NAME] says [NAME] is an employee who will provide evidence about her own direct involvement in and knowledge of [NAME]’s current policies and training programs and how [NAME] addresses the issue of DIPV through these policies and programs. It says she is not being called as an expert witness. Rather, it says that, as [NAME] conceded that she had not spoken to anyone at [NAME] about its current policies and training programs, as well as its more general approach - including “strategy” - on these issues before offering her opinion on them, it considers it necessary for the Tribunal’s benefit to provide evidence directly from [NAME] on these broader points. It says this is fact evidence, not opinion evidence. [ 35 ] The Commission also points out that the Tribunal disfavours late, marginal, or tactically-timed evidence that impairs an opposing party’s ability to know and meet the case. It says the addition of a late witness will require extending hearing time and so impose delays and uncertainty on the other parties who have diligently complied with the Tribunal’s deadlines. The Commission argues this may require reopening earlier evidence, which could disrupt the Tribunal’s schedule and prejudice the administration of justice. It says such possible impacts materially undermine the parties’ right to a fair and orderly hearing. [ 36 ] The Commission argues that, to preserve procedural integrity, the Respondent’s request should be denied. It argues that granting [NAME]’s request despite the absence of a reasonable explanation risks incentivising late tactical disclosure and eroding the Tribunal’s ability to manage proceedings efficiently. [ 37 ] [NAME] disagrees with the suggestion that its request to add a witness at this stage is a tactical choice which should be refused for various reasons advanced by the other parties. It further notes it is not making this request in a short timeframe, given that the parties have months to prepare for [NAME]’s testimony, as the hearing is not scheduled to resume until May. [ 38 ] The Commission says that the Tribunal must consider whether the prejudice to the responding parties outweighs any probative value of the proposed witness (relying on Woodgate et al v RCMP , 2024 CHRT 5; [NAME] v [NAME] , 2023 CHRT 22; [NAME] v [NAME] , 2021 CHRT 13). The Commission says any attempt to “cure” the prejudice, through adjournments, additional disclosure or additional preparation time, would only shift the burden and adverse consequences of the Respondent’s lateness to the other parties, which would prolong the proceeding, increase costs, and undermine the parties’ access to timely justice. [ 39 ] Further, the Commission argues that the Respondent’s request to call a new witness at the close of its case is an abuse of process. It suggests that, because counsel for [NAME] did not mention prior to the end of the hearing day on February 13 that it would be filing its application for leave later that day, this “constitutes procedural manipulation and abuse” which is “inconsistent with the integrity of the Tribunal’s adjudicative process.” The Commission suggests the Respondent should have dealt with the issue of an additional witness during the hearing day instead of misusing the Tribunal’s and parties’ time and resources by filing its leave application. [ 40 ] The Commission notes that the Tribunal has no tolerance for abuse of process and conduct that resembles bad faith (relying on [NAME] v Correctional Service Canada , 2025 CHRT 107). It says the Tribunal has a duty to prevent the misuse of its proceeding in a way that would be manifestly unfair to a party or would bring the administration of justice into disrepute ( Saskatchewan (Environment) v Métis Nation – Saskatchewan , 2025 SCC 4 at para 33). [ 41 ] [NAME] takes offence at the accusations of “abuse of process” and what it perceives to be an attack on the integrity of its counsel and asks the Tribunal to confirm that no such misconduct or abuse of process has occurred. It notes that it advised the parties and Tribunal by email on February 5, 2026 that it would file its application for leave to call an additional witness formally in writing once it decided to proceed with the request, which is what it did. [NAME] says that to suggest that its counsel somehow misled the Tribunal or engaged in an abuse of process because it did not verbally remind the parties during the hearing day on February 13 that it would be making a written request prior to doing so, is a serious and baseless allegation and one that should not be made lightly and without proper foundation. [ 42 ] [NAME] notes that, while it opposed requests by the other parties to call additional witnesses during the hearing, it did not level accusations of counsel misconduct or abuse of process for making requests in accordance with the CHRA and the Rules. [ 43 ] The Commission argues that, although both the Complainant and Commission were granted leave to call additional witnesses during the hearing, those requests were distinguishable from [NAME]’s request to call [NAME]. The Commission says the Tribunal’s decision to allow these witnesses to testify was made prior to the Respondent starting its case so the Respondent’s witnesses had the opportunity to address any of the evidence provided. It also says that [NAME] was an anticipated witness as he was on [NAME].’s witness list in her SOP, so the parties had had notice of this witness for many years, even though the Complainant did not include him in her record of appearance filed prior to the hearing. The Commission also says the evidence of [NAME] and the women’s shelter witness called by the Commission was necessary, whereas [NAME]’s unanticipated testimony is not. [ 44 ] [NAME] submits that the public interest remedies sought by [NAME]. and the Commission and supported by [NAME]’s expert [NAME] are not extreme in nature and do not necessitate a new witness. It says that, at their heart, they seek the involvement of an independent third party with expertise in DIPV and trauma informed practices to review [NAME]’s existing policies and training with a view to improving them in the context of [NAME]’s unique circumstances, including its workplaces and workforces, and in consultation with the Commission. It says this is hardly an onerous “ask”. [ 45 ] Finally, the Commission argues that the Tribunal’s process must be trauma informed, meaning it should be conducted in a manner that minimizes re-traumatization of the Complainant and promotes the psychological safety of participants. It argues that allowing a late witness risks compounding stressors on the Complainant, including the need to relive events and confront unanticipated narratives on compressed timelines. The Commission argues that a trauma informed approach supports maintaining clear, predictable procedures and reasonable timelines so that the parties, particularly those alleging discrimination, can participate meaningfully without undue strain. It says declining a late addition witness is the proportional and fair outcome that preserves both the integrity of the record and considers the individual circumstances of [NAME]. [ 46 ] The Complainant opposes [NAME]’s application for leave and agrees with the Commission’s and [NAME]’s submissions. [NAME]. objects to having [NAME] provide evidence at the hearing because she does not know [NAME]. or have any knowledge of the facts or events in this case. She says that training policies are ineffective if employees do not understand or follow them. She also says that she wants the hearing to be over as soon as possible because it has been difficult for her to re-live her trauma. [NAME]. also says that if [NAME] is permitted to call this witness, she would like to call her own additional witness and, if not, suggests that [NAME] should call either the president of her union at the time she worked at [NAME] or the Director of the Mail Processing Plant where she worked, instead of [NAME]. [ 47 ] With regard to the issue of prejudice in the form of trauma associated with this case and the time taken to have it heard, [NAME] says a Respondent must be able to mount a defence to serious claims against it and extensive remedies sought. In addition, it submits that the Complainant does not in fact consider the request to call an additional witness to be prejudicial because she indicates that she would like [NAME] to call a different additional witness. [ 48 ] [NAME] says the claims of delay and prejudice levelled by the other parties in response to its request to call [NAME] are based on unsupported speculations and inaccurate assumptions about the additional evidence [NAME] seeks to introduce. [ 49 ] [NAME] says it is trying to ensure that the Tribunal has all of the information before it that is relevant to the issues and, in particular, the remedies sought. It submits that the evidence of [NAME] will be of significant benefit to both the Tribunal and the other parties, given their purported interest in public interest remedies. It says that hearing directly from [NAME] on this issue, rather than hearing only [NAME]’s speculation about certain details of the policies and training programs, will be of assistance.

V. ANALYSIS [ 50 ] The core issue that arises in this application for leave is whether any prejudice from [NAME]’s late request to call [NAME] as a witness is sufficient to justify excluding her proposed testimony. My conclusion is that it is not. I accept that [NAME] identified the possibility of calling an additional witness, and then filed its application for leave, promptly after [NAME]’s testimony raised the relevance of this additional evidence, which significantly minimizes any concerns about prejudice from delay or cost to the parties. The parties’ remaining arguments regarding prejudice are largely speculative and are unsubstantiated. [ 51 ] The CHRA requires the Tribunal to give the parties who appear before it a full and ample opportunity to present their evidence and make representations (s.50(1) of the CHRA). The CHRA allows the Tribunal to receive and accept any evidence and other information, whether on oath or by affidavit or otherwise, that the Tribunal sees fit (s.50(3)(c) of the CHRA). The Tribunal must conduct its proceedings as informally and expeditiously as the requirements of natural justice and the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure allow (s.48.9(1) of the CHRA). One of the requirements of natural justice is a party’s right to be heard, in terms of both presenting evidence and responding to allegations against it. [ 52 ] Rule 37(b) of the Tribunal’s Rules states that a party may call a witness at the hearing only if that witness was identified and a summary of their anticipated testimony was provided in their SOP. However, Rule 8 states that the Tribunal may vary or dispense with compliance with a Rule, if doing so secures the informal, expeditious and fair determination of the inquiry on its merits, as required by Rule 5. [ 53 ] The Tribunal controls its own proceedings and may decide all questions of law or fact necessary to determine any matter under inquiry (s.50(2) of the CHRA). [ 54 ] In the circumstances of this case, given the objections of the parties to [NAME]’s proposed evidence, it is appropriate to consider whether [NAME]’s proposed evidence is relevant, whether [NAME] could have identified her as a witness earlier in the proceeding by the reasonable exercise of diligence , and whether any prejudice in permitting her to testify outweighs the probative value of hearing her evidence. A. Is the proposed evidence relevant? [ 55 ] Yes. [NAME] maintains that [NAME]’s proposed evidence is relevant because it will provide more information about its existing policies and training materials, the interpretation and application of which have become relevant to the assessment of potential remedies in light of [NAME]’s testimony about those policies and training materials. None of the other parties oppose this evidence on the basis that it will not be relevant and, in fact, the Commission has tried to elicit evidence about [NAME]’s current training materials from another of [NAME]’s employee witnesses whose job does not involve creating policies or training materials. As such, I accept that this proposed testimony is relevant in that, “in light of all the other evidence, the at-issue evidence logically tends to make a fact in issue more or less likely” ( R v [NAME] , 2022 SCC 34 (CanLII), [2022] 2 SCR 619 at para 45). B. [NAME] have been identified as a witness earlier in the proceeding? [ 56 ] No. While I accept that, if [NAME] could have identified and included [NAME] in its witness list earlier, its lack of due diligence may be a reason to exclude the late addition of this witness, I do not accept that [NAME] should have been able to identify the need for this evidence earlier. I find that it acted with reasonable diligence once it recognized that the proposed evidence was potentially relevant. [ 57 ] The Commission and [NAME] submit that [NAME] has failed to demonstrate that the late addition of this proposed witness was unavoidable or that it acted with due diligence or that the witness could not have been identified and disclosed within the case management schedule and Tribunal Rules. [ 58 ] [NAME] disputes that it could have identified the need to call [NAME] before hearing [NAME]’s testimony in January 2026. When it filed its SOP and amended SOP in 2021 and 2022, [NAME]’s position in response to the Commission’s and Complainant’s listed public interest remedies was that its current policies and training are adequate to address mental health accommodations and protections for employees who experience DIPV. It was of the view that the current policies could be introduced through another one of its witnesses, as they speak for themselves. [NAME] maintained this position after receiving [NAME]’s report in September 2025. [ 59 ] I accept [NAME]’s position that it was not until [NAME] testified that it decided it needed to call an additional witness to speak to its policies and training materials because [NAME]’s testimony went beyond the information in her report. I do not agree with [NAME] that [NAME] could have reasonably foreseen, based on her report, that [NAME] would provide her opinion about the i magery in [NAME]’s self-study guides or offer specific recommendations about how its training programs should be delivered. I do not agree that the references to a trauma informed approach in her report would reasonably lead one to foresee some of these specifics of her testimony. [ 60 ] [NAME] was permitted to “amplify” the evidence set out in her report with respect to [NAME]’s policies and training when she testified, and [NAME] is fairly asking for the opportunity to respond to this unanticipated evidence, as it relates to significant remedial requests by the Complainant and Commission. [NAME] filed its application for leave to call [NAME] within a reasonable time after [NAME] testified, given the hearing schedule. C. Does any prejudice to the parties outweigh the probative value of the proposed evidence? [ 61 ] No. The Complainant, Commission and [NAME] argue that permitting [NAME] to be called as a witness this late in the proceeding will result in procedural and substantive unfairness and prejudice which cannot be cured without compromising the efficiency, fairness and integrity of the process. However, for the most part, they have failed to substantiate these arguments by presenting anything more than speculation and assumptions that this will be the case. [ 62 ] The Commission suggests that permitting [NAME] to be called to testify about [NAME]’s policies and training in relation to DIPV will change the evidentiary landscape and result in a trial by ambush that will impact the parties’ case theory, witness lists and cross-examination. This is substantially overstating the impact that a witness such as [NAME] could have on the process or the parties’ cases, especially since the parties have been in possession of the documents [NAME] will testify about since the case management stage of the proceeding. The Commission takes the view that the documents are uncontroversial and speak for themselves yet has asked another of [NAME]’s witnesses about some of the documents, which would seem to indicate that the Commission is interested in receiving further information about them from [NAME]. [ 63 ] The arguments about the effect that adding another witness at this stage will have on the timing of the hearing and parties’ resources are largely speculative and unsubstantiated. [NAME] made its application for leave three months before the hearing was set to resume and the Tribunal communicated its decision a month prior to releasing these reasons in order that the parties could prepare for this additional evidence. There has been no resulting adjournment of the hearing or need to schedule additional hearing days in order to accommodate this additional witness. The parties and Tribunal had already agreed on the hearing dates of May 12 and May 20 prior to the application being made by [NAME] and there is only one other witness left to testify for [NAME]. Two days should be sufficient time for both witnesses to testify and be cross-examined, especially since [NAME]’s evidence will be limited to the issue of [NAME]’s policies and training programs and the public interest remedies sought by the parties. [ 64 ] In terms of resources, it is clear that [NAME] is being called as a fact witness, not an expert witness, as she is an employee of [NAME] being called to testify about the policies and training programs she has direct knowledge of through her employment. [ 65 ] Regarding the argument that permitting a new witness to be called at this stage of the hearing would cause further trauma to the Complainant or would not adhere to a trauma informed process, this is an unsubstantiated assertion. [NAME] is not being called to testify about [NAME].’s experience at [NAME] and her evidence will not prolong the hearing. [NAME]. herself says in her submission that she would like [NAME] to call additional witnesses who did have some involvement with her when she was employed there and who were not named in any party’s SOP. [ 66 ] Finally, with regard to the Commission’s suggestion that [NAME]’s request to call an additional witness at this stage of the proceeding is an abuse of process, this is a serious and unfounded allegation. [NAME] advised the parties and Tribunal verbally on February 4 that it was considering calling one additional witness to testify about a limited subject area and, in response to the Commission’s unsolicited pre-emptive objection to this statement, [NAME] advised on February 5 that, if it did decide to make an application for leave it would do so in writing and as expeditiously as possible, which it did. There was no requirement to discuss the application for leave during the busy hearing day on February 13, and filing the application after the hearing ended for the day was entirely reasonable. I reject the Commission’s allegation that [NAME]’s conduct was “procedural manipulation and abuse” or “conduct that resembles bad faith”. [ 67 ] Both the Commission and Complainant requested to call an additional witness after the hearing started and the parties were content to deal with these requests in an informal and expeditious manner. There is a certain irony to the Commission’s contention that, by not complying with the Tribunal’s Rules, the Respondent is undermining the fast, fair and informal mandate of the Tribunal process and its jurisprudence. While the parties were of course entitled to provide submissions with respect to [NAME]’s application for leave to call [NAME], I note that the time and resources it has taken the parties and Tribunal to deal with this application – including the uncalled for pre-emptive objection by the Commission – has far exceeded the time it will take for [NAME] to testify and be cross-examined. [ 68 ] The Complainant, Commission and [NAME] have not demonstrated that they will experience actual prejudice by hearing from [NAME] and having the opportunity to ask her questions themselves, aside from the time required to prepare for and to cross-examine one additional witness at the hearing. On the other hand, [NAME], as a matter of procedural fairness, is entitled to know and defend itself against all allegations, including with respect to the remedies sought by the parties. I accept that, for [NAME], the remedial requests in this case are not minor or, as [NAME] describes them, “hardly an onerous ask”. [ 69 ] I also agree with [NAME] that it will be of assistance to the Tribunal, which is being asked to order public interest remedies if discrimination is proven, to hear from [NAME] directly about its current policies and training materials. [ 70 ] The Tribunal must balance the goal of truth-seeking, allowing all parties a full and ample opportunity to present their case, with the need to proceed expeditiously and fairly ( Woodgate et al v RCMP , 2023 CHRT 21 at para 26). Having considered and weighed the arguments before me, I find that, while there may be some limited prejudice to the parties in having to prepare for one additional witness, this is outweighed by the probative value to the Respondent of being permitted to respond to unanticipated evidence given about its policies and training materials by an expert witness in the proceeding. I also agree that there is a benefit to the Tribunal’s decision-making function to be presented with as much useful evidence related to the issues it must decide as possible. I accept that permitting [NAME] to testify will secure the informal, expeditious and fair determination of the inquiry on its merits. [ 71 ] Finally, the Commission submits that, should the Tribunal allow [NAME]’s request, [NAME] should only be allowed to provide affidavit evidence, which would be in lieu of oral testimony in chief, to avoid prolonging the hearing. It submits that the affidavit evidence must exclude any opinion and be limited to responding to the testimony of [NAME] that [NAME] argues is new. I do not agree to make such an order. While I will permit [NAME] to decide how it will call [NAME]’s evidence (by affidavit or viva voce ), I am of the view that allowing her to testify before the Tribunal will be beneficial to the parties and to the Tribunal. Even if the Tribunal were to order [NAME]’s evidence in chief to be provided by affidavit, the other parties would have the right to cross-examine her, which would necessitate her appearing and testifying at the hearing. However, I do agree to require [NAME] to provide a more detailed will-say statement setting out [NAME]’s anticipated testimony prior to her testifying, in order to allow the other parties to be better prepared to cross-examine her on May 12. [ 72 ] In addition, [NAME] requested that, if [NAME] is permitted to call [NAME], it be granted leave to cross-examine her, which it says is warranted since the primary justification for calling her is to respond to and counter [NAME]’s expert’s evidence. In the ruling granting [NAME] interested person status, the Tribunal granted [NAME] limited participatory rights, which did not include the right to cross-examine the party’s witnesses ( [NAME]. v [NAME] , 2025 CHRT 28 at paras 78-87). However, during a case management meeting with the parties on November 6, 2025, I agreed that [NAME] could seek leave to cross-examine the Respondent’s witnesses and I would hear from the other parties and decide whether to grant such leave or not. I accept that, in its leave application, [NAME] conceded [NAME]’s right to cross-examine [NAME], if it sought leave to do so. As [NAME] is being called to respond to evidence given by [NAME]’s expert, I agree that [NAME] may cross-examine [NAME].

VI.

ORDER [ 73 ] [NAME] is granted leave to call [NAME] to testify in respect of the current policies, procedures and training at [NAME] regarding DIPV and that are relevant to this complaint. [NAME] may choose how it will call [NAME]’s evidence (by affidavit of viva voce ). [ 74 ] [NAME] is granted leave to cross-examine [NAME], following the cross-examinations by the Commission and Complainant. [ 75 ] [NAME] is to provide a detailed will-say statement for [NAME] by no later than May 1, 2026 to assist the parties to understand the topics she will be testifying about at the hearing on May 12, 2026. [ 76 ] [NAME] is to be prepared to testify starting at 9:30 a.m. on May 12, 2026. [NAME]’s remaining witness is to be prepared to begin her testimony following [NAME]’s testimony on May 12, 2026 (time permitting) and to complete her testimony on May 20, 2026. Signed by [NAME] Tribunal Member Ottawa, Ontario April 17, 2026 Canadian Human Rights Tribunal Parties of Record File No. : T2664/4021 Style of Cause: [NAME]. v. [NAME] of the Tribunal Dated: April 17, 2026 Motion dealt with in writing Written representations by: [NAME] and [NAME], for the Respondent [NAME]. , Self-represented Complainant [NAME] and [NAME], for the Canadian Human Rights Commission [NAME], for the Interested Party