Tribunal Rejects Motion for Recusal Due to Alleged Bias

OUTCOME: Dismissed

Canadian Human Rights Tribunal Tribunal canadien des droits de la personne Citation: 2026 CHRT 30 Date: March 25, 2026 File No. : HR-DP-3090-25 Between: [NAME_1] Complainant - and - Canadian Human Rights Commission Commission - and - [COMPANY_2] Respondent Ruling Member: [NAME_5] of Contents TOC \o "1-3" \h \z \u I. OVERVIEW PAGEREF _Toc225321130 \h 1 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320035003300320031003100330030000000 II.

DECISION PAGEREF _Toc225321131 \h 1 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320035003300320031003100330031000000 III. ISSUES PAGEREF _Toc225321132 \h 2 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320035003300320031003100330032000000 IV. CONTEXT PAGEREF _Toc225321133 \h 2 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320035003300320031003100330033000000 A. Background to the motion PAGEREF _Toc225321134 \h 2 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320035003300320031003100330034000000 B. The Tribunal’s alleged contradictory rulings and directions PAGEREF _Toc225321135 \h 4 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320035003300320031003100330035000000 1. The Tribunal’s ruling that permits [NAME_2] to include in its SOP a reference to prior judicial decisions that declared [NAME_1] a vexatious litigant PAGEREF _Toc225321136 \h 4 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320035003300320031003100330036000000 2. The denial of [NAME_1]’ claim of privilege over the identity of his expert witnesses, and the decision not to issue a subpoena for witnesses from [NAME_6] and [NAME_7] _Toc225321137 \h 5 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320035003300320031003100330037000000 V. ANALYSIS PAGEREF _Toc225321138 \h 9 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320035003300320031003100330038000000 A. Issue 1. Do my decisions in case managing this Complaint give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias? PAGEREF _Toc225321139 \h 11 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320035003300320031003100330039000000 B. Issue 2. Do my alleged familial ties with employees of the Respondent give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias? PAGEREF _Toc225321140 \h 12 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320035003300320031003100340030000000 C. Issue 3. Does my alleged membership in a racist university alumni group aimed at maintaining “White racial supremacy” give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias? PAGEREF _Toc225321141 \h 13 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320035003300320031003100340031000000 D. Issue 4. Does my enforcement of existing timelines in these proceedings give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias? PAGEREF _Toc225321142 \h 13 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320035003300320031003100340032000000 E. Issue 5. Does my lack of personal experience of racism or lack of professional qualifications in racial profiling give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias or otherwise render me unqualified to hear the Complaint? PAGEREF _Toc225321143 \h 14 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320035003300320031003100340033000000 F. Issue 6. Do my recent case management decisions give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias? PAGEREF _Toc225321144 \h 16 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320035003300320031003100340034000000 VI.

ORDER PAGEREF _Toc225321145 \h 19 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320035003300320031003100340035000000 I. OVERVIEW [ 1 ] This is a ruling on the motion of [NAME_1] (the “Complainant”) asking that I recuse myself because I have shown that I am biased when I issued a series of preliminary rulings and directions, which he says are inconsistent and demonstrate my racial biases. He argues that I have familial ties with one or more employees working for the [COMPANY_2] ([NAME_2] or the “Respondent”), rendering me incapable of the impartiality required of my position. He also alleges that, along with the Superior Court of Justice that previously declared him a vexatious litigant and the lawyer who represented his father against him in a family proceeding, I am a member of a “whites-only University of Ottawa Faculty of Law alumni group that extra-judicially coordinates breaches of civil rights and racist outcomes under a “Chateau Clique” so clandestine that judges and members of the broader legal community alike are only very selectively aware of its existence.” Finally, he maintains that my enforcement of the existing timelines and my refusal to stay the proceedings, despite his judicial review application of some of my rulings, exemplifies this bias. [ 2 ] [NAME_1] argues that I ought to be replaced by a Tribunal member who is a member of a visible minority and has training in anti-Black racism. My background in this regard violates, he argues, his right to a fair trial. Replacing me with a member who has these traits and experience is necessary in his view to remedy the well-established pattern of white adjudicators repressing and impairing the advancement of civil rights. [ 3 ] The Respondent opposes the motion and argues that the Complainant has failed to meet the stringent legal test for establishing a reasonable apprehension of bias.

II.

DECISION [ 4 ] The motion is dismissed. [NAME_1] has not met the high burden of proving that my management of this case, my race or professional experience, or my enforcement of timelines, raise a reasonable apprehension of bias. A reasonable, informed person, having thought the matter through, would not conclude that I am unable to decide this case fairly.

III. ISSUES [ 5 ] The issue that I must decide is whether I have shown a reasonable apprehension of bias that requires that I recuse myself from hearing this matter. More specifically:

1. Do my decisions in case managing this Complaint give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias? 2. Do my alleged familial ties with employees of the Respondent give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias? 3. Does my alleged membership in a racist university alumni group aimed at maintaining “White racial supremacy” give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias? 4. Does my enforcement of existing timelines in these proceedings give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias? [ 6 ] [NAME_1] also demands my recusal based on alleged lack of competence. To this end, the issue I must decide is:

5. Does my absence of personal experience of racism or professional qualifications in racial profiling give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias or otherwise render me unqualified to hear the Complaint? [ 7 ] Finally, after making his submissions on this motion, [NAME_1] has continued to allege that I am biased in subsequent case management decisions. Therefore, I must also decide:

6. Do my recent case management decisions give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias? IV. CONTEXT A. Background to the motion [ 8 ] The Complainant filed a human rights complaint alleging discrimination by the Respondent under section 5 of the Canadian Human Rights Act (CHRA), based on his race, colour, and national or ethnic origin (the “Complaint”). He alleges that, as a Black Canadian of Caribbean background, he was treated differently than other [COMPANY_4] customers in a variety of ways. Namely, he claims that [NAME_2] failed to redress fraudulent activity on his account; required him to verify his identity despite his entering his personal identification number correctly when making deposits and withdrawals; and verified and put holds on cheques that he sought to deposit and that in his view, were evidently legitimate. [NAME_1] also alleges that, after he filed his Complaint in June 2023, [NAME_2] retaliated against him by refusing to provide services to him. [ 9 ] The Canadian Human Rights Commission (the “Commission”) referred the Complaint to the Tribunal on March 6, 2025. Over the course of two lengthy case management conference calls (CMCCs) in October and November 2025, the Tribunal and the parties worked towards getting the case ready for hearing. The Tribunal addressed numerous preliminary issues, including motions to strike portions of the Statement of Particulars (SOP), disclosure issues, expert witnesses, requests to keep information confidential, and subpoenas of witnesses, to name a few. The Tribunal, in consultation with both parties, also set hearing dates and filing deadlines. [NAME_1] expressed frustration with the Tribunal’s decisions and directions on some of these issues. [ 10 ] During a CMCC on January 8, 2026, [NAME_1] indicated that he would be filing a motion for recusal, on the basis that my previous directions and rulings were contradictory and demonstrated that I am biased. He also indicated that he would be bringing a motion to stay these proceedings, pending the outcome of his judicial review of the Tribunal’s previous directions and rulings regarding his motion to strike, his request to subpoena [NAME_7] and [NAME_6] as witnesses, and his request to maintain privilege and/or confidentiality over the identity of his expert witnesses. I advised [NAME_1] that, given that parties had set aside 12 days for the hearing, which was scheduled to start on April 27, 2026, existing filing deadlines would continue to run, as I heard and ruled on the motions that he was filing. [ 11 ] [NAME_1] filed his application for judicial review with the Federal Court on January 16, 2026. [ 12 ] He filed his motion for recusal with the Tribunal on January 27, 2026, asserting that I am biased, and asked that a new member be assigned to his case. He filed his stay motion three days later. [NAME_1] also requested the opportunity to make oral submissions for both motions, a request that the Respondent did not oppose and that I granted. I heard the parties’ oral submissions on the stay motion on February 25, 2026, which I subsequently dismissed on March 13, 2026 (see [NAME_1] v. [COMPANY_2] , 2026 CHRT 21). In a subsequent email, [NAME_1] again requested a stay of proceedings on the basis that the Respondent was “now under an official police investigation based upon reasonable and probable grounds of evidence tampering pursuant to the Canadian Criminal Code” . [ 13 ] The Tribunal heard the parties’ oral submissions on the motion for recusal on March 3, 2026. This motion for recusal is the subject of the present ruling. B. The Tribunal’s alleged contradictory rulings and directions [ 14 ] [NAME_1]’ alleges that my previous directions and rulings on his motion to strike and on his request to subpoena specific witnesses are contradictory and exemplify my bias. These directions and rulings are found in various direction letters and in the summaries of CMCCs. I summarize them below.

1. The Tribunal’s ruling that permits [NAME_2] to include in its SOP a reference to prior judicial decisions that declared [NAME_1] a vexatious litigant [ 15 ] In the Respondent’s initial SOP, [NAME_2] challenged [NAME_1]’ credibility by highlighting that he had been declared a vexatious litigant by the Ontario courts and alleging that he has, in the past, exhibited a pattern of accusing individuals of racism and bias when they make decisions with which he does not agree, including by bringing motions asking judges to recuse themselves. The Respondent also brought up the Complainant’s decision to self-publish two books regarding his family and a local lawyer and, at paragraph 119 of the SOP, alleged that [NAME_1] had falsely represented that he was a lawyer. The Complainant sought to strike these sections of the SOP, a motion that the Tribunal granted in part. [ 16 ] On October 23, 2025, I directed that the Respondent file an amended SOP striking paragraphs 115, 116, 117 and 118, which I deemed not relevant to the Complaint before me. I directed that he paragraphs regarding past judicial findings and comments made regarding the Complainant, as well as paragraph 119, were relevant and would remain. I noted that [NAME_1] would have an opportunity to challenge this evidence during cross-examination of the Respondent’s witnesses and to make his submissions regarding the relevance and weight to be afforded to this evidence in his final submissions. [ 17 ] [NAME_1] subsequently reiterated his request for these latter portions of the Respondent’s SOP to be struck, a request that I denied, noting that I had already ruled on the issue. [ 18 ] In his application for judicial review, [NAME_1] argues that the vexatious litigant decision is outside the purview of the CHRA, and that the Ontario Superior Court of Justice’s decision declaring him a vexatious litigant was made in breach of natural justice.

2. The denial of [NAME_1]’ claim of privilege over the identity of his expert witnesses, and the decision not to issue a subpoena for witnesses from [NAME_6] and [NAME_7] [ 19 ] On or around September 12, 2025, the Respondent disclosed to [NAME_1] a copy of an audio-recording of a call, said to have taken place between [NAME_1] and one of [NAME_2]’s call centre employees as part of the Respondent’s disclosure obligations. [NAME_1] claims that the Respondent tampered with this recording, which he says omits an important portion of the conversation, a claim that the Respondent denies. In support of this claim, [NAME_1] commissioned an expert report by [NAME_8]. He shared the report with the Respondent but did not include the resume of [NAME_8]. [ 20 ] On October 31, 2025, the Respondent wrote to the Tribunal, arguing that [NAME_8]’s report should be excluded because it did not comply with the Tribunal’s rules. They alleged that [NAME_8] lacked the necessary expertise, and that the report pertained to a collateral issue that would therefore be of no assistance to the Tribunal in adjudicating the Complaint. The Respondent included with its submission a copy of a [NAME_6] profile that appeared to match [NAME_8], who is described as an audio-engineer based out of Cairo, Egypt. [ 21 ] On November 2 and 3, 2025, [NAME_1] wrote to the Tribunal, stating that he had “reasonable and probable grounds to believe that [NAME_2] and its operatives subjected [NAME_8] to illegal threats of intimidation in these proceedings.” He alleged that, shortly after the Respondent indicated that it found [NAME_8]’s profile online, [NAME_8] blocked [NAME_1]. [ 22 ] The Respondent denied any witness intimidation. [ 23 ] [NAME_1] indicated that he subsequently asked three different certified audio forensic technicians to review the audio file. However, in light of [NAME_2]’s interference with [NAME_8], he would only share the anticipated testimony of these technicians once he was assured that “their identities will be considered sealed from Defence Counsel and the Defendant along with their operatives and regarded as privileged information under the review by the Tribunal.” He reiterated this request during the November 3, 2025, CMCC, asking that the identity of his experts be kept confidential. As reflected in the summary of this call, the Tribunal invited [NAME_1] to provide the evidence that he had to support his allegations of evidence tampering and witness interference. [ 24 ] The Tribunal also directed as follows:

2. Allegations of witness interference […] In response to [NAME_1] concerns that the Respondent interfered with his expert, Member [NAME_5]-[NAME_5] is issuing the following order: Parties are ordered not to contact each other’s witnesses for the purpose of interfering with their testimony. […]

4. Disclosure a. Expert Reports, Witness Lists and Anticipated Exhibits · Parties must disclose the names of their respective witnesses and expert witnesses and a will-say statement as soon as they are identified. This information may not be kept confidential. · Parties are reminded to review Rule 22 of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure and ensure that their expert evidence complies with its requirements. · [NAME_1] is to file his final expert report (including their Curriculum Vitae and a statement indicating how their training, education and experience qualify them to produce the report), no later than January 30, 2026. [ 25 ] Despite what was directed, [NAME_1] did not provide any evidence in support of his claims of witness intimidation. Instead, in an email dated November 5, 2025, he requested that the Tribunal issue a subpoena so that he could call [NAME_7] and [NAME_6] as witnesses to determine whether someone from [NAME_2] had contacted them to intimidate or coerce them, in violation of the CHRA and the Criminal Code . He also asked that the Tribunal recommend that the Attorney General of Canada and/or the Royal Canadian Mounted Police question lead counsel for the Commission to determine possible criminal interference by [NAME_2] against Commission lawyers, presumably regarding the Commission’s decision to withdraw from participating in the proceedings. He subsequently added that the Tribunal needed to declare his other experts’ identities as privileged information. [ 26 ] The Tribunal denied the Complainant’s requests. In a direction issued on November 26, 2025, the Tribunal directed as follows: [NAME_1]’ allegations appear to be raising sections 59 and 60 of the Canadian Human Rights Act, which protect the Tribunal’s process against intimidation. These sections provide a Court with criminal or penal jurisdiction with the ability to impose sanctions based on these provisions. The Tribunal is no such Court and has no authority to enforce these sections. The Tribunal also has no authority to make recommendations to the Attorney General of Canada or to the RCMP. Therefore, all evidence relating to these allegations falls outside of the current proceedings.

For these reasons, the Tribunal will not accept evidence relating to [NAME_2]’s alleged witness tampering, nor will it issue subpoenas to obtain such evidence. [ 27 ] The Tribunal also reiterated its direction from the November 3, 2025, CMCC: Parties must disclose the names of their respective witnesses and expert witnesses and will-say statements as soon as they are identified. This information may not be kept confidential. [ 28 ] The Tribunal added the following: For the hearing to be fair, the Respondent must know the case that it has to meet. [NAME_2] cannot prepare to test either the qualifications or the evidence of an expert without knowing their identity. [ 29 ] The Tribunal ordered that [NAME_1] file his expert report with the Tribunal by January 30, 2026, and reminded the parties to review Rule 22 of the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal Rules of Procedure, 2021 (SOR/2021-137) (the “Rules of Procedure”) to ensure that their expert evidence complies with its requirements. [ 30 ] During a CMCC on January 8, 2026, [NAME_1] reiterated his request that the names and contact information of all his experts be held privileged and hidden from [NAME_2], to prevent [NAME_2] and its operatives from being able to contact them to perpetrate intimidation. The Tribunal advised [NAME_1] that this had been addressed in the Tribunal’s direction of November 26, 2025, but added the following direction, which is reflected in the CMCC summary: To be clear, insofar as the claim is now for privilege and not simply confidentiality, the Tribunal sees no basis for a claim for any kind of privilege over this information. Again, For the hearing to be fair, the Respondent must know the case that it has to meet. [NAME_2] cannot prepare to test either the qualifications or the evidence of an expert without knowing their identity. Regarding the consequences for intimidation of witnesses, this was addressed in response to the request for a subpoena for [NAME_7]. [ 31 ] [NAME_1] did not file his expert reports by this deadline. During a CMCC on February 25, 2026, he asked the Tribunal to grant him a further extension, due to his self-represented status. I granted an extension to both parties and gave [NAME_1] until March 6, 2026, to disclose his expert reports. I warned that, if he failed to comply, he would not be permitted to rely on his expert reports or call his experts. As a derogation from Rule 22(1)(a) of the Rules of Procedure, which normally requires parties’ expert reports to set out the experts’ name, I subsequently directed that, given [NAME_1]’ ongoing fears of witness intimidation, the name of [NAME_1]’ expert could only be disclosed to specific individuals working for the Respondent, to the extent necessary for the Respondent to be able to defend its case. [ 32 ] [NAME_1] disclosed the name of one of his experts on March 7, 2026, although it is not clear whether he did so intentionally. At the time of writing, [NAME_1] continued to refuse to disclose the name of his other expert.

V. ANALYSIS [ 33 ] Public confidence in our legal system is rooted in the fundamental belief that those who adjudicate in law must always do so without bias or prejudice and must be perceived to do so (see [NAME_10] v. Canada , 2003 SCC 45 at para 57 [ [NAME_10] ]). [ 34 ] The essence of impartiality lies in the requirement of the adjudicator to have the ability to be genuinely open-minded. This is not synonymous with neutrality; impartiality does not require adjudicators to discount the very life experiences that may have qualified them to preside over disputes, or to have no sympathies or opinions. They must, however, be free to entertain and act upon different points of view with an open mind (see R. v. S. (R.D.) , [1997] 3 SCR 484 at paras 29, 35 and 119 [ R. v. S. ([NAME_11].) ] ; and Yukon Francophone School Board, Education Area #23 v. Yukon (Attorney General) , 2015 SCC 25 at para 23 [ Yukon ]). [ 35 ] In contrast, bias denotes a state of mind that is, in some way, predisposed to a particular result or that is closed with regard to particular issues. The words “bias” or “prejudice” connote a favourable or unfavourable disposition or opinion that is somehow wrongful or inappropriate, either because it is undeserved, or because it rests upon knowledge that the subject ought not to possess (see Bell Canada v. [COMPANY_12] , 2003 SCC 36 at para. 38 [ Bell Canada ], citing Scalia J. in Liteky v. U.S. , 114 S.Ct. 1147 (1994) at 1155) . In its application to legal proceedings, it is a condition or state of mind that sways judgment and renders a judicial officer unable to exercise their functions impartially in a particular case (see [NAME_10] at para 58). [ 36 ] The impartiality of adjudicators, including members of a quasi-judicial administrative tribunal such as the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal, is presumed (see Maritime Employers Association v. [NAME_14]’s Union, Local 375 ([NAME_15]) , 2020 FCA 29 at para 5) . It is a high presumption not easily displaced. The apprehension of bias must be reasonable, held by reasonable and right-minded persons, applying themselves to the question and obtaining thereon the required information. To establish its existence, we must ask: What would an informed person, viewing the matter realistically and practically, and having thought the matter through, conclude? Would they think that it is more likely than not that the adjudicator, whether consciously or unconsciously, would not decide fairly? (See Committee for Justice and Liberty et al. v National Energy Board et al., [1978] 1 SCR 369 at pp. 394 and 395 [ Committee for Justice and Liberty ]; Yukon at para. 20). The inquiry into an adjudicator’s conduct is inherently contextual and fact specific. The reasonable apprehension of bias must be assessed in the context of the circumstances and in light of the whole proceeding (See Yukon at para 26). [ 37 ] The onus of establishing a reasonable apprehension of bias rests with the party raising it, who must rebut the presumption with cogent evidence and with grounds that are substantial (see [NAME_16] v. [NAME_17]’s Hospital and Health Centre , 2013 SCC 30 at para 22; [NAME_18] v. Canada (AG) , 2025 FC 1370 at para 55; Yukon at para 26 ; and [NAME_10] at para 76) . They must show that there is a real likelihood or probability of bias. A mere suspicion is not enough (see R. v. S. ([NAME_11].) at para 112; Zündel v. Citron (C.A.) , 2000 CanLII 17137 (FCA) at para 36 ). [ 38 ] Finally, it is important that justice must be seen to be done. However, it is equally important that adjudicators discharge their duty to sit. They should not, by acceding too readily to suggestions of appearance of bias, encourage parties to believe that, by seeking their disqualification, they will have their case tried by someone they believe more likely to decide in their favour (see [NAME_19] v. [COMPANY_20] , 2022 FC 1759 at para 25 [ [NAME_19] ], citing Justice Mason in Re JR. (1986), 161 CLR 342 (HC) at para 5; and [NAME_21] v. Correctional Service Canada , 2026 CHRT 7 at para 18 [ [NAME_21] ]). A. Issue 1. Do my decisions in case managing this Complaint give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias? [ 39 ] No. [NAME_1] has not demonstrated that my actions give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. An informed person, having viewed the matter realistically and practically, and having thought the matter through in its full context, would not find that it is more likely than not that I am unable, consciously or unconsciously, to decide the Complaint fairly. [ 40 ] [NAME_1] argues that my decisions, on the one hand, to allow the Respondent to include in its SOP a reference to previous judicial findings that [NAME_1] is vexatious but, on the other hand, to refuse to issue a subpoena to [NAME_7] for him to obtain evidence of intimidation by [NAME_2] with one of his proposed expert witnesses, are contradictory. In his view, both decisions relate to evidence that is external to the facts of this Complaint and ought to be determined in a consistent fashion. For me to allow the Respondent’s evidence but not that of the Complainant demonstrates, in his view, favouritism to [NAME_2] as a “traditionally white/Caucasian controlled institution whose conduct aligns with [my] apparent prejudices as a Caucasian.” [ 41 ] Contrary to what [NAME_1] argues, the impugned decisions are different in nature. My decision to allow the Respondent to introduce legal findings regarding [NAME_1]’ past conduct before the courts relates to the parties’ rights to challenge a witness’s credibility, which is relevant to the merits of the case. [NAME_1]’ request to subpoena [NAME_7], on the other hand, came as part of a request to initiate criminal proceedings pursuant to sections 59 and 60 of the CHRA. In essence, [NAME_1] was requesting to have a separate hearing to address the Respondent’s alleged infractions over which the Tribunal has no jurisdiction. Moreover, the relief, which includes a fine of up to $50,000 (see section 60(2) of the CHRA), would have been unrelated to the merits of the Complaint, which is what I am charged with determining (see section 49(2) of the CHRA). [ 42 ] [NAME_1] was also partially successful in both requests. While I allowed the Respondent to introduce evidence of [NAME_1]’ past conduct in other judicial proceedings, I struck out the portions of its SOP that related to [NAME_1]’ self-publication of books in which he accuses, among other things, his father’s lawyer of “corruption, systemic racism and evil.” In addition, although I refused [NAME_1]’ request to subpoena witnesses for him to be able to prove the witness intimidation that he accused the Respondent of committing, I limited the individuals within the Respondent who would have access to the names of his other experts, in recognition of [NAME_1]’ fears that these experts would also be intimidated. [ 43 ] In other words, [NAME_1] takes issue with certain negative decisions that I made in his regard. However, when taken in the context of the rest of the case management decisions made on these issues, they do not disclose a pre-disposition to a certain result, a closed mind, or favoritism towards a party. My subsequent decisions to deny [NAME_1]’ repeated requests for a stay of proceedings on the basis of his judicial review of my decisions or on the basis of his efforts to have police investigate the Respondent’s conduct, as discussed further below, do not change this assessment. [ 44 ] Case management inevitably results in some parties’ requests being dismissed, in whole or in part, but this does not mean that the result was prejudged or that the request was not given balanced and fair consideration (see [NAME_22] v. [COMPANY_3] , 2025 CHRT 70 at para 24). Disagreement with a decision-maker’s decision alone does not support an allegation of bias, and [NAME_1] has not shown that my decisions were in any way wrongful or inappropriate (see Bell Canada at para 38; and [NAME_23] v. Canada (Attorney General) , 2023 FC 811 at para 58). B. Issue 2. Do my alleged familial ties with employees of the Respondent give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias? [ 45 ] [NAME_1] provides a list of individuals who are or were employees of [NAME_2] or affiliated with [NAME_2] and who possess one of my last names. He alleges that our familial ties render me biased in favour of the Respondent. Considering that the Complainant has provided no further evidence on this issue beyond a list of names, and given that I have no known connection, familial or otherwise, with any of these individuals, the basis for the allegation is factually false, and I need not to entertain this argument further. C. Issue 3. Does my alleged membership in a racist university alumni group aimed at maintaining “White racial supremacy” give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias? [ 46 ] [NAME_1] alleges that I am a member of a racist university alumni group, along with the Superior Court Judge who declared him a vexatious litigant and the lawyer who represented his father against him in family litigation. Beyond their evidently provocative and offensive nature, these allegations are also groundless. [NAME_1] brought forward no evidence that such a group even exists, and regardless, I am not a member. I also have no connection with either the Judge or the lawyer that [NAME_1] mentions. D. Issue 4. Does my enforcement of existing timelines in these proceedings give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias? [ 47 ] On November 3, 2025, the Tribunal set 11 days for the hearing of the Complaint to begin on April 27, 2026, and continue over the span of three weeks. The hearing dates, which were challenging to find, were selected to accommodate the parties’ availability, commitments, and several religious holidays on which dates the Complainant asked that the Tribunal not sit. Parties have since completed their disclosure, the Complainant has commissioned two expert reports, and the Respondent has nearly finalized its expert report and has confirmed the availability of its 10+ witnesses, one of whom is no longer an [NAME_2] employee. The Respondent expressed that it had been “difficult to organize all these witnesses in such a compressed time period.” In other words, both the Tribunal and the parties have worked hard to ensure that they are ready to proceed. [ 48 ] [NAME_1] has been aware, since the CMCC of November 3, 2026, of the case management decisions which he now argues demonstrate bias, he only first raised the issue of bias during a CMCC on January 8, 2026. He sent in his written submissions on January 27, 2026, and delivered his oral submissions on March 3, 2026. Filing deadlines, initially scheduled for February 27, 2026, had to be pushed to March 6 and 13 and April 7, 2026. As I explained in my ruling on his stay motion (see 2026 CHRT 21), for the Tribunal to suspend the proceedings as the Complainant asks would inevitably have compromised the hearing dates and significantly delayed the proceedings. The basis for both of [NAME_1]’ requests for a stay involves the Tribunal to be waiting for the outcome of other lengthy (the judicial review with the Federal Court) and unproven (the alleged police investigation of the Respondent) proceedings. [ 49 ] [NAME_1] was consulted when the hearing dates were chosen, and he was aware of filing deadlines as of November 3, 2026. In other words, none of these timelines come as a surprise to him. The Tribunal has an obligation to proceed with cases fairly but also expeditiously, in keeping with the objectives of section 48.9(1) of the CHRA and Rule 5 of the Rules of Procedure. An informed person, viewing this matter realistically and practically, would not conclude that my decision to enforce existing timelines shows bias, or that I cannot make a fair decision in [NAME_1]’ case (see [NAME_22] at para 24; [NAME_23] at para 58; Committee for Justice and Liberty at 394). E. Issue 5. Does my lack of personal experience of racism or lack of professional qualifications in racial profiling give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias or otherwise render me unqualified to hear the Complaint? [ 50 ] [NAME_1] argues that, as a Caucasian adjudicator, I am lacking the personal and professional experience necessary to properly adjudicate his Complaint that is based on race. He argues that, unlike him and Respondent counsel, I have no substantive, direct experience of racism. My assignment to this case runs contrary, in his view, to some of the recommendations of the external Steering Group for Canada’s Black Justice Strategy, found in the report “A Roadmap for Transformative Change: Canada’s Black Justice Strategy” (the “Report”). The Report finds, among other things, that Black Canadians are repeatedly subjected to subversions of their rights to a fair trial and disproportionately disadvantaged, resulting in unfair judicial outcomes. It concludes that there is a need for more adjudicators who are members of visible minorities in order to ensure greater fairness and balance in proceedings. [NAME_1] also relies on a blog article by University of Calgary professor [NAME_24], which analyzes the reasons behind two contradictory decisions of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice. The essence of [NAME_24]’s analysis is that the contradictory outcomes of the Court decisions can be explained by the judges’ own identities and judicial philosophies regarding race. He argues as follows: The Dosu case underscores why judges hearing race-based discrimination matters need either lived experience or genuine cultural competence regarding systemic racism. At minimum, any judge handling such a case must understand how racism operates within legal processes – whether through personal experience or through rigorous, purposeful education. [ 51 ] [NAME_1] also attaches to his motion a copy of my biography, as found on the Tribunal’s website, as well as that of my colleague [NAME_25]. The inference appears to be that Member [NAME_26], as a Black man with experience in anti-Black racism, is better qualified than I to adjudicate the Complaint. [ 52 ] [NAME_1] is correct that I do not share the lived experience of racism endured by those who are visible minorities and that there are other members who have greater experience in this particular area of human rights. Having said this, the question that I must answer here is not whether there are other members who have more personal and professional experience in anti-Black racism. To entertain this question would open the door to a form of “judge-shopping” and to abuse of the adjudicative process, where parties challenge the selection of adjudicators based on individual traits and qualifications. These are the same reasons why adjudicators are only to recuse themselves in the clearest of cases. In the words of Justice Mason in Re JR , judicial officers must discharge their duty to sit and should not accede too readily to suggestions of appearance of bias such that they encourage parties to believe that, by seeking disqualification of a judge, they will have their case tried by someone thought to be more likely to decide in their favour (see [NAME_19] at para 25). [ 53 ] [NAME_1]’ arguments, while important, relate to larger questions of policy of judicial appointments that are not for me to determine. Instead, what is for me to determine in the context of this motion for recusal, is whether I can adjudicate the Complaint impartially and with the sensitivity that is specifically required of hearing human rights cases. To be appointed, members of the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal “must have experience, expertise and interest in, and sensitivity to, human rights” (see section 48.1(2) of the CHRA). These are the qualifications that are required of my position, and which guided the Governor in Council’s decision to appoint me. [ 54 ] As the Supreme Court recognized in S. ([NAME_11].) at paragraph 38: ... judges in a bilingual, multiracial and multicultural society will undoubtedly approach the task of judging from their varied perspectives. They will certainly have been shaped by, and have gained insight from, their different experiences, and cannot be expected to divorce themselves from these experiences on the occasion of their appointment to the bench. In fact, such a transformation would deny society the benefit of the valuable knowledge gained by the judiciary while they were members of the Bar. As well, it would preclude the achievement of a diversity of backgrounds in the judiciary. The reasonable person does not expect that judges will function as neutral ciphers; however, the reasonable person does demand that judges achieve impartiality in their judging. [ 55 ] In other words, there is no legal basis for a request for recusal based on the colour of an adjudicator’s skin or their professional background. The question is whether they have achieved impartiality in their judging. [ 56 ] The Complainant has not shown that I have demonstrated bias. A right-minded, reasonable, and informed person, knowledgeable about the facts and context of the case, having thought the matter through, would not conclude that the elements raised by the Complainant, taken collectively or in isolation, demonstrate a reasonable apprehension of bias on my part. F. Issue 6. Do my recent case management decisions give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias? [ 57 ] [NAME_1] voiced his allegations of bias during his oral submissions on the motion on March 3, 2026, the Tribunal has received several pieces of correspondence in which he argues that other recent case management decisions exemplify this bias and support his request for my removal. [ 58 ] [NAME_1] argues that my suggestion to the parties that the Tribunal conduct a hybrid proceeding, with certain witnesses testifying virtually, is unfair and favours the Respondent. He also contends that I promised him a letter supporting his request to obtain the contact information for a prospective witness from a hiring agency, and states that he suspects that my failure to deliver on this promise “is the result of apparent coaching by a cabal which appears to be operating to subvert the integrity of civil and human rights laws which include the CHRA.” Combined with my refusal to stay the proceedings despite his Federal Court judicial review application, he concludes that the Tribunal “is acting as an extension of well-documented racism at the Canadian Human Rights Commission in collusion with racial profiling at [NAME_2].” He intends to circulate a “public petition further to free speech guaranteed by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms” across social media and to ask for a parliamentary investigation into the matter. [ 59 ] When the Tribunal set the hearing dates in this matter in November 2025, [NAME_1] requested that the hearing take place virtually, and the Respondent agreed with this proposal. As the Tribunal and the parties discussed the logistics of the hearing, I indicated to [NAME_1] that his practice of joining CMCCs from public computers, without the use of a headset, risked disruptions during the proceedings. I advised [NAME_1] that the Tribunal could allow him to join the hearing remotely from a room within the Tribunal’s offices. If he did not wish to avail himself of that offer, then he should look to find a space that was quiet, and that would be available for the entirety of the hearing days. If he could not be in a room with a door that closed, he would need to use a headset. I indicated that, if none of this was satisfactory or possible for him, the Tribunal could hold the hearing in person in Ottawa, Ontario, and that witnesses that were unable to join in person would be able to do so virtually. [ 60 ] Since this conversation, [NAME_1] appears to have changed his mind about his preferred format for the hearing. He no longer wishes to have a virtual hearing at all. Instead, he wants an in-person hearing and rejects the notion that any of the witnesses be permitted to testify virtually. The Respondent prefers a virtual hearing, but at a minimum, requests that some of their witnesses who face challenges in travelling to Ottawa be allowed to testify virtually. [ 61 ] I determined that the hearing would proceed in person, with the possibility of virtual participation of some witnesses. Given that the Respondent has over 10 witnesses to call in a hearing that starts in one month, it is not surprising that some of them may be unable to shift from virtual to in-person attendance, particularly if they are not based in Ottawa. [ 62 ] The Tribunal’s procedural powers to determine the format of its hearings are broad and discretionary, and the Tribunal routinely holds hearings virtually, in person, or in a hybrid fashion, depending on the circumstances of each case. Rule 33(2) of the Rules of Procedure provides that the Tribunal can hold hearings “in whole or in part by means of a telephone conference call, videoconference or any other form of electronic communication.” Moreover, Rule 33(3) allows the Tribunal to facilitate the conduct of a hearing by the use of “any electronic or digital means of communication or storage or retrieval of information, or any other technology it considers appropriate.” [ 63 ] In these circumstances, my decision to proceed with a hybrid hearing was appropriate and reasonable. [NAME_1] is unable to have the full in-person hearing that he now desires not because I am biased against him, but because there are practical and logistical challenges that must reasonably be accommodated that come with the fact that he changed his preferred hearing format only weeks before the hearing. [ 64 ] As for my failure to issue a letter for obtaining the prospective witnesses’ information, [NAME_1] is incorrect in his understanding. Although I did indicate that I would investigate the options I had at my disposal, aside from a subpoena, to assist [NAME_1]’ efforts to obtain the witnesses’ contact information from a third party in an informal fashion, I was explicit that I could not commit to providing him a letter at this time. Upon reviewing section 50(3)(a) of the CHRA, I concluded that the extent of my powers to compel information from a third party is by way of a subpoena duces tecum . For this reason, I issued a summary of the CMCC, which made clear that [NAME_1] could request a subpoena from the Tribunal should he be unsuccessful in obtaining the contact information for his witness. [NAME_1] is evidently not satisfied with my response; however, this does not show bias. I do not believe that a right-minded, reasonable, and informed person, having reviewed this context and thought the matter through, would conclude that these elements, taken collectively or in isolation, demonstrate a reasonable apprehension of bias on my part. [ 65 ] To allege bias is a serious matter; it is not an allegation that should be made lightly (see [NAME_27] v. Canada (Attorney General) , 2001 FCA 223 at para 8). [NAME_1]’ unfounded allegations that I am part of a white-supremacist group, his repeated allegations that every decision I make shows bias, and his refusal to comply with Tribunal directions and timelines so far, are all markers of vexatious conduct. [ 66 ] While all parties are free to file motions, making unsubstantiated allegations of impropriety against the opposite party, legal counsel or the Court, refusing or failing to abide by rules or orders of the Court, the use of scandalous language in pleadings or before the Court, and disrespectful and disruptive behaviour before the Court are characteristics of vexatiousness (see [NAME_28] v. Canada (Revenue Agency) , 2006 FC 1535 at para 31). These principles have been found to apply to the Tribunal (see [NAME_21] at para 45) and Rule 10 of the Rules of Procedure permits the Tribunal to make any order, including on its own motion, that it considers necessary against vexatious conduct or abuse of process. This can include an order dismissing the Complaint. (see also [NAME_21] v. Correctional Service Canada , 2025 CHRT 61 at paras 15-16). [ 67 ] [NAME_1] is hereby advised that he should refrain from making inflammatory and derogatory allegations about any participant or the Tribunal, as this could result in a finding of abuse of process and in an order made against him.

VI.

ORDER [ 68 ] For these reasons, the Complainant’s motion for recusal is denied. Signed by [NAME_5] Tribunal Member Ottawa, Ontario March 25, 2026 Canadian Human Rights Tribunal Parties of Record File No. : HR-DP-3090-25 Style of Cause: [NAME_1] v. [COMPANY_2] of the Tribunal Dated: March 25, 2026 Date and Place of Hearing: March 3, 2026 Via Zoom videoconferencing - Ottawa, Ontario Appearances: [NAME_1] , Self-represented [NAME_29] , for the Respondent