Unjust Dismissal Case Involving Discrimination Against Female Employee Returning from Maternity Leave

OUTCOME: Allowed

Reasons for decision [NAME_1], complainant, and [COMPANY_2]., respondent. Board File: 036544-C Neutral Citation: 2026 [NAME_3] 1236 March 31, 2026 The panel of the Canada Industrial Relations Board (the Board) was composed of [NAME_3], Vice-Chairperson, sitting alone pursuant to section 14(3.1) of the Canada [NAME_3] (the [NAME_3] ). Parties’ Representatives of [NAME_4], for [NAME_1]; [NAME_2] and [NAME_53], for [COMPANY_2].

I. Nature of the Complaint and Procedural Background [ 1 ] On October 21, 2022, [NAME_1] (the complainant) filed a complaint of unjust dismissal pursuant to section 240(1) of Part III of the [NAME_3] (Standard Hours, Wages, Vacations and Holidays) with [NAME_6] ([NAME_6]) against her former employer, [COMPANY_2]. (the respondent). [ 2 ] On March 17, 2023, the [NAME_6] referred the complaint to the Board, after the complainant requested adjudication. [ 3 ] Having carefully considered the parties’ evidence and submissions, the Board finds that the complainant’s dismissal was unjust. As remedies for the unjust dismissal, the Board orders the respondent to pay the complainant $39,878.28 for lost earnings, $142.69 for interest on this amount, $60,000.00 in aggravated damages and $15,000.00 in punitive damages. [ 4 ] These are the reasons for the Board’s decision.

II. Procedural Background [ 5 ] The Board requested submissions from the parties after the [NAME_6] referred the complaint for adjudication. After the Board reviewed the parties’ submissions, it identified that the complainant was raising human rights allegations, and it asked her to confirm whether she had filed a complaint with the Canadian Human Rights Commission (CHRC) alleging discrimination in employment. [ 6 ] On July 6, 2023, the complainant filed a copy of her CHRC complaint with the Board. In that complaint, she alleged that the respondent discriminated against her based on sex and family status contrary to the Canadian Human Rights Act (the Act) regarding her return to work from maternity leave and the termination of her employment on September 2, 2022. [ 7 ] The Board’s jurisdiction to hear and consider unjust dismissal complaints is restricted pursuant to section 242(3.1)(b) of the [NAME_3] , such that it cannot consider a complaint if “a procedure for redress has been provided under Part I or Part II of this Act or under any other Act of Parliament.” A complaint under the Act is another procedure for redress within the meaning of section 242(3.1)(b) of the [NAME_3] (see [NAME_7] , 2020 [NAME_3] 948). Consequently, the Board sought further submissions from the parties about its jurisdiction, given the complainant’s filing of the human rights complaint and the human rights allegations in her unjust dismissal complaint. [ 8 ] On January 13, 2025, the Board issued its decision in [NAME_1] , 2025 [NAME_3] LD 5555, finding that it could not consider the unjust dismissal complaint because there was another procedure for redress under the Act. The Board also noted that it could consider the unjust dismissal complaint if the CHRC decided not to deal with the human rights complaint and to instead refer it to the Board under section 41(1)(b) of the Act. [ 9 ] On March 24, 2025, the CHRC decided not to deal with the human rights complaint at that time and to refer it to the Board, pursuant to section 41(1)(b) of the Act. [ 10 ] On April 21, 2025, the complainant filed the CHRC’s decision with the Board, and the Board reopened its file. [ 11 ] On June 17, 2025, the Board held a case management conference (CMC) with the parties to provide information about the hearing process and to schedule hearing dates. At the CMC, the Board noted that the respondent’s reasons for dismissing the complainant related to the content of her on-air broadcasts, which were delivered in Hindi. The Board directed that, if the respondent intended to rely on audio recordings of the broadcast, it was required to include a written transcript of the recordings as well as an English-language translation in its hearing documents. The Board also set hearing dates of October 20 and 21, 2025, and requested particulars from the complainant about the remedies she was seeking. [ 12 ] On June 27, 2025, the Board sent a notice of hearing to the parties with details about the hearing process and the deadlines for filing their documents in advance of the hearing. In this notice, the Board explained that hearing documents included documents that parties intended to introduce at the hearing, witness identification forms and the authorities that parties intended to rely on in their argument. The Board provided additional information about authorities, as follows: Sometimes, although this is not required, parties refer to decisions in their arguments. Decisions can also be called “authorities”. These are often decisions made by the Board. You can find Board decisions on its website under the “Decisions” tab. If a party wants to make reference to a particular decision in their arguments, the Board asks that they identify the decision to the Board in advance of the hearing. A party may also choose to file a book of authorities or decisions with the Board in accordance with the deadlines for hearing documents, set out above; if a party does this, the book of authorities must be provided to the other party at the same time it is filed. [ 13 ] On August 18, 2025, the complainant filed particulars about the remedies she was asking the Board to order. [ 14 ] On October 14, 2025, the Board wrote to the parties because no hearing documents had been filed prior to the respondent’s deadline of October 10, 2025, and the complainant’s deadline of October 13, 2025. The Board provided the parties with a final opportunity to file their hearing documents by October 16, 2025. [ 15 ] The respondent contacted the Board’s Industrial Relations Officer by email after receiving the Board’s October 14, 2025, letter. In this email, the respondent requested that the hearing dates scheduled for October 20 and 21, 2025, be adjourned. [ 16 ] In response to the respondent’s request, the Board scheduled a CMC for October 16, 2025. At the CMC, the Board received submissions about the adjournment request. The complainant advised the Board that she would consent to the request, provided that the hearing could be rescheduled before December 2025. The parties agreed to reschedule the hearing for October 30 and 31, 2025, and the Board granted the adjournment request. The Board set a deadline of October 20, 2025, for the respondent to provide its hearing documents and a deadline of October 23, 2025, for the complainant to provide hers. The Board also confirmed its direction to the respondent that, as part of its hearing documents, it needed to provide a written transcript of the audio recordings of the complainant’s broadcasts, as well as an English-language translation of the transcripts. [ 17 ] The parties provided their hearing documents in accordance with the deadlines set at the CMC. The respondent’s hearing documents did not include audio recordings of the complainant’s broadcasts or transcripts of the recordings. Instead, the respondent provided notes of the complainant’s broadcast of August 31, 2022, made by [NAME_8], [NAME_8] Manager.

III. Factual Background [ 18 ] The Board held a hearing of this complaint by videoconference on October 30 and 31 and November 4 and 5, 2025. The parties provided their evidence about the issues through documents and witness testimony. The respondent’s witnesses were [NAME_2], General Manager, and [NAME_8]. The complainant testified on her own behalf. [ 19 ] The Board has prepared the following summary of relevant events from the documents and witness testimony. [ 20 ] The respondent operates a radio station based in Edmonton, Alberta. The station broadcasts content in more than 30 languages and serves a diverse multicultural audience. [ 21 ] The complainant stated working for the respondent as an on-air host on September 28, 2020. Prior to this, she had worked for over five years as a television news anchor and program host in India. The complainant and the respondent signed an employment contract. According to the contract, the complainant was scheduled to work 14 hours per week, with occasional evening and/or weekend work being required to accommodate on-location events or other station activities. Her rate of pay was identified in the contract as $20.00 per hour, and her vacation entitlement was 10 days after the completion of her first year. [ 22 ] [NAME_2] was the complainant’s immediate supervisor. He testified that he increased the complainant’s work hours to 27 or 28 hours per week during her employment. According to the complainant, her weekly schedule consisted of 16 hours on air and 12 hours of preparation time. Her on-air schedule was two hours every day from Monday to Thursday, four hours on Saturday and four hours on Sunday. [ 23 ] The content of the complainant’s broadcast was focused on [NAME_9] music. The complainant described the content of her weekend broadcast in an email to [NAME_2] on January 26, 2021, as follows: Weekend morning shows start with one Hindi spiritual song and followed by a good morning greeting and welcome message to the [NAME_9]. For the first hour, I briefly talk about selected topics related to daily life and try to engage listeners. Also, I take calls and song requests during this hour. The 2nd and 3rd hours of the show continue talk of selected topics along with playing listeners song requests and engaging listeners by asking some questions related to the show topic, listening to their opinion and sharing selected opinions on air shows with other MyRadio 580 AM listeners. Also, I used to include some funny jokes and Shayari related to show topics. In the last hours of the show, I generally give updates on New release Hindi Movies, TV Shows, and [NAME_9] gossip. During this four hours of show I play all types of Hindi Song from old and New movies based on listeners request and interest. [ 24 ] The complainant was absent from work starting on June 1, 2021, to take maternity and parental leave related to the birth of her son. Prior to the start of her leave, the parties had agreed that it would end on May 30, 2022. During the complainant’s absence, the respondent hired an on-air host to replace her. [NAME_2] confirmed in testimony that he had made the replacement host a permanent employee during the complainant’s maternity leave. [ 25 ] On May 3, 2022, the complainant emailed the respondent to advise it that her maternity leave would end on May 30, 2022, and that she wanted “to start work in the first week of June on mutually agreed date.” She asked the respondent to contact her if it needed more information. [ 26 ] On May 12, 2022, [NAME_8] sent a [NAME_8] message to the complainant, stating that [NAME_2] wanted to know when she would start working at the radio station. The complainant responded that she would be returning to Edmonton from India on June 2, 2022, and that “it would be great if [she could] start from Monday June 6, 2022.” [ 27 ] On May 25, 2022, [NAME_53], the respondent’s Human Resources Manager, advised the complainant by email that [NAME_2] would contact her regarding her work schedule as of the first week of June. [NAME_2] copied the email to [NAME_2]. [ 28 ] On June 2, 2022, [NAME_8] asked the complainant to come to work at 11:00 a.m. on June 6, 2022. [ 29 ] The complainant attended a meeting with [NAME_2] on June 6, 2022, at 10:30 a.m. In the meeting, [NAME_2] requested that the complainant send an email to him and the human resources department with her availability from June 13, 2022, forward. The complainant testified that she questioned the request for availability because she expected to return to the work schedule and duties assigned to her prior to her maternity leave. She also expected to start work on June 6, 2022, and not be required to wait until June 13, 2022. [ 30 ] On June 7, 2022, the complainant sent an email with her availability to [NAME_2] and [NAME_2], with the following message: I would like to confirm you my schedule availability from Monday to Friday 3 PM to closing (11 PM) night. I am willing to start work from next Monday June, 13, 2022 as we discussed yesterday. I will be available in day time office hour from Monday to Friday and occasional weekend from July 2022. I need few week time to arrange my baby daycare. Thank you for your cooperation and understanding. [ 31 ] The complainant testified that, prior to her maternity leave, her weekday schedule was from 4:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m., Monday to Thursday. She believed that, in the June 7, 2022, email, she provided additional availability for weekdays plus expanded availability starting in July 2022 after she arranged her daycare. The respondent did not respond to the complainant’s email. [ 32 ] The complainant called [NAME_8] on June 13, 2022, about her schedule. She called [NAME_8] again on June 16, 2022, and [NAME_8] directed her to contact [NAME_2]. The complainant spoke with [NAME_2] by telephone on June 16, 2022. In this conversation, [NAME_2] told her to wait and that he would arrange a work schedule for her to start on July 1, 2022. [ 33 ] The respondent did not advise the complainant of a work schedule or otherwise contact her prior to July 1, 2022. [ 34 ] [NAME_2] testified that he did not establish a work schedule for the complainant because he was waiting for confirmation that she had arranged daycare for her child. In her testimony, the complainant explained that it was her intention in the June 7, 2022, email to confirm that she was available Monday to Friday from 3:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. and that, starting in July 2022, she would have expanded availability to include weekends and daytime from Monday to Friday. [ 35 ] On July 5, 2022, the complainant telephoned [NAME_8] about her work schedule. That same day, she sent a [NAME_8] message to [NAME_8] asking for an update on her work schedule. [NAME_8] responded on July 6, 2022, that [NAME_2] was not well and was working from home but that she had forwarded the complainant’s message to him for a response. [ 36 ] On July 11, 2022, the complainant exchanged [NAME_8] messages with [NAME_8] about her schedule. [NAME_8] confirmed that [NAME_2] would meet with the complainant on July 14, 2022. [ 37 ] On July 13, 2022, [NAME_8] advised the complainant that the meeting of July 14, 2022, was cancelled because [NAME_2] had to travel to Calgary. [ 38 ] On July 16, 2022, the complainant telephoned [NAME_2]. In this call, [NAME_2] told her that she would receive her work schedule soon. On July 19 and 26, 2022, she wrote to [NAME_8] by [NAME_8] to request her work schedule. [ 39 ] On July 27, 2022, the respondent called the complainant to work to cover the absence of an on-air host. During the complainant’s broadcast, a listener arrived at the station with a gift that he wanted to give to the complainant’s son. According to [NAME_2] and [NAME_8], the listener had been stalking the complainant. [NAME_2] met with the listener and accepted the gift on the complainant’s behalf. He also testified that he took additional steps to ensure the complainant was safe from the listener. [ 40 ] The complainant testified that [NAME_2] told her to start work on August 1, 2022, with her regularly scheduled broadcast from 9:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. The complainant understood that her shift would start at 7:00 p.m. to give her time to prepare before the broadcast. During her drive to the radio station, the complainant was listening to the broadcast and heard the host advise listeners that she would continue as the host until 11:00 p.m. The complainant telephoned [NAME_8] to access the building because she did not have a key or fob to enter. [NAME_8] advised her that her schedule had been postponed and that she would start work on August 8, 2022. [ 41 ] On August 8, 2022, [NAME_8] asked the complainant at 1:33 p.m. to provide her work schedule as it existed before her maternity leave. The complainant provided the following details about her schedule to [NAME_8] at 3:24 p.m.: Monday – 9-11 pm 2 hr Tuesday 9-11 pm 2 hr Wednesday 4-11pm 7 hr Thursday 4-11pm 7hr Friday day off Saturday 10-3 pm 5 hr Sunday 10-3 pm 5 hr [ 42 ] At 6:06 p.m. on August 8, 2022, the complainant asked [NAME_8] to confirm that she would be working that day, noting that she understood that she was to go to work at 7:00 p.m. and do her show from 9:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. [NAME_8] responded that, as per [NAME_2], the complainant should start her program as of the next day and follow her old schedule. [ 43 ] The complainant replied to [NAME_8]’s message at 6:19 p.m., as follows: Thank you. But I don’t understand if you got message from [NAME_2] that I should start my program from tomorrow why I didn’t get any updates about it. The same thing is happening from last two month. Every time I used to get update that start from next week and I am totally clueless what is happening and why. I [think] two month is enough time to arrange fix schedule. [ 44 ] On August 9, 2022, [NAME_8] advised the complainant that she would not be going on air until and unless she met with [NAME_2]. The meeting was scheduled for 10:30 a.m. on August 9, 2022. [NAME_2], [NAME_8] and the complainant attended the meeting. [ 45 ] The complainant testified that [NAME_2] was angry at her in the meeting and told her that he would not tolerate the kind of text message she had sent. According to the complainant, he also told her that he could “fire” her for sending the text message and that she should be thankful that he was bringing her back to work after maternity leave. After he delivered these messages, he told the complainant that she could start her show and left the meeting. [ 46 ] [NAME_2] and [NAME_8] disputed the complainant’s description of the meeting. [NAME_8] testified that [NAME_2] was respectful towards the complainant and explained that he needed time to figure out her schedule when she was returning from maternity leave. [NAME_2] explained that he discussed the text message with the complainant because he was concerned about the tone she had used in the message. [ 47 ] On August 9, 2022, the complainant returned to work, doing her broadcast on weekday evenings and weekends during the daytime. [ 48 ] [NAME_2] testified that he received a phone call from a listener complaining about the content of the complainant’s broadcast on August 15, 2022, while her show was on the air. The next morning, when he arrived at the station, he asked [NAME_8] to schedule a meeting with the complainant for 10:30 a.m. and to listen to the audio recording of the complainant’s August 15, 2022, show. [NAME_8] wrote to the complainant at 7:06 a.m. on August 16, 2022, to tell her that [NAME_2] wanted to meet with her at the station at 10:30 a.m. After she listened to the recording, [NAME_8] told [NAME_2] that the broadcast included comments about Indian independence and that, after a caller said that he was a married man and wanted freedom from his wife, the complainant made a comment that some men want freedom from women. [ 49 ] The complainant attended the meeting with [NAME_2] and [NAME_8] on August 16, 2022. The complainant testified that, in the meeting, [NAME_2] raised concerns about the content of her broadcast on August 15, 2022, without specifying the nature of his concerns. She stated that he told her that her content should only be about [NAME_9] and not other subjects. She agreed that the content of her show was [NAME_9]. [ 50 ] [NAME_8] recalled in her testimony that [NAME_2] told the complainant in the August 16, 2022, meeting that she had used “defaming” language toward women. The complainant disputed that [NAME_2] identified this specific allegation in the meeting. She testified that she did not know about [NAME_2]’s claim that she had made demeaning comments about women in her August 15, 2022, broadcast until the respondent filed submissions with the Board in August 2023, particularizing this allegation. She denied making the alleged comment. [ 51 ] On August 17, 2022, [NAME_8] emailed a warning letter to the complainant related to her August 15, 2022, broadcast. The letter was dated August 16, 2022, and included the following details about the reasons for the warning: This notice is being served as your 1st written warning, due to your programming content. This warning will be placed in your employment file but will be disregarded for disciplinary purpose after a period of 12 months, provided your conduct reaches a satisfactory level. Following your meeting with [NAME_2] on August 16, 2022 it was communicated to you that the subject of your radio programming and content is for entertainment purposes only. Furthermore, the content shared by yourself during your 9-11 PM programming on September 15, 2022 included defaming language. Please take this as your first written notice, in the future if you are uncertain of a topic you wish you discuss during your programming, please seek clarity from management and receive advanced approval from management The likely consequence of further misconduct or insufficient improvement is a Final written warning followed by dismissal. [ 52 ] The respondent had not disciplined the complainant prior to the August 16, 2022, written warning. [ 53 ] [NAME_2] testified that he thought the complainant would reach out to him after receiving the warning letter to request guidance. He was disappointed that she did not do so. He also explained that he lost confidence that she would follow the assigned format and that he started listening to her broadcasts to monitor the content. [ 54 ] On August 31, 2022, the respondent held an all-staff meeting to announce the hiring of [NAME_10] as an on-air host. The respondent also advised the staff that [NAME_10]’s time slot would be Monday to Friday from 8:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m., starting on September 1, 2022. This time slot conflicted with the schedule of the complainant’s weekday broadcasts. [ 55 ] [NAME_2] asked the complainant to meet with him after the all-staff meeting. In their one-on-one meeting, [NAME_2] advised the complainant that, effective September 1, 2022, her time slot would change from 9:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m. to 12:00 a.m. to accommodate the new time slot for [NAME_10]. The complainant asked [NAME_2] for a day to explore options and to discuss the change with her family. She understood from the meeting with him that there was no alternative and that her shift would require her to work until midnight. [ 56 ] On August 31, 2022, at 8:52 p.m., just before starting her evening broadcast, the complainant emailed [NAME_2] to advise him that it would be very difficult to work until midnight and to ask to keep her weekday schedule from 7:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. The complainant telephoned [NAME_8] on September 1, 2022, to ask about her hours. The complainant understood that the respondent would provide an update later that same day. [ 57 ] [NAME_2] testified that, when he listened to the complainant’s broadcast on August 31, 2022, he had concerns about the content. When he arrived at the station on September 1, 2022, he asked [NAME_8] to listen to the audio recording of the complainant’s broadcast and take notes. [ 58 ] [NAME_8] testified about the content of the broadcasts based on her notes, which, according to her, described snippets of the broadcast and was not a transcript of every word. She explained that, during the broadcast, the complainant played many different songs and talked about a festival in India, her childhood memories and a popular Indian singer who had died by suicide. [NAME_8] also noted that the complainant discussed the American singer [NAME_11] and made comments about his family, his plastic surgery and the circumstances of his death. [ 59 ] [NAME_2] decided to dismiss the complainant based on the content of her August 31, 2022, broadcast. He testified that, given the warning letter about similar concerns and the lack of any improvement, he believed that dismissal was appropriate. He stated that he was concerned that the complainant had voiced opinions about [NAME_11] that included false statements. [NAME_2] testified that broadcasting false statements was contrary to broadcasting regulations and the respondent’s policies. [ 60 ] On September 2, 2022, [NAME_8] sent a termination letter to the complainant, with the following content: You are hereby informed that your employment with [COMPANY_2]. Is terminated with effect from September 2, 2022. This termination is with cause, due to the content of your programming. You are entitled to your salary up until September 2, 2022 and we will also compensate for any remaining vacation days + any outstanding commission(s). Following our previous disciplinary warning issued August 16, 2022, your live radio program on August 31, 2022 had unverified and false content stated, as you are aware we are a CRTC licensed radio station, therefore there is no tolerance for broadcasting false information, without verification. Please keep in mind that as per clause #14 of your Employment Agreement you are committed to a 6 month Non-Compete provision for any other company within a 300- Kilometre radius of the Company. Please let us know if we can assist during your transition. [ 61 ] When she received the termination letter, the complainant did not understand the reason for termination or the concerns with the content of her broadcast. She believed that she had been dismissed because she did not agree to the change in her schedule that [NAME_2] had communicated to her on August 31, 2022. [ 62 ] The complainant testified that she first learned the particulars of the alleged content of her August 31, 2022, broadcast when the respondent submitted [NAME_8]’s notes as part of its hearing documents on October 20, 2025. Prior to receiving these notes, the complainant understood that the respondent’s allegation was that she had broadcast unverified and false content, but she did not know the particulars of the allegation. She testified that she did not discuss [NAME_11] in any way during her broadcast. She agreed that she talked about a particular singer who had died by suicide, but she noted that this was a very well-known situation. In reviewing [NAME_8]’s notes, the complainant noted that they were not an accurate reflection of her broadcast. However, she stated that she could not provide full details of the broadcast, given that more than three years had passed. [ 63 ] On October 21, 2022, the complainant filed the unjust dismissal complaint. On the same date, she filed a monetary complaint for amounts owing to her by the respondent. The [NAME_6] has suspended the monetary complaint pending the resolution of the unjust dismissal complaint. [ 64 ] The complainant sought medical treatment for depression and acute stress following the dismissal. She attended regular medical appointments for support. She testified that, although the doctor prescribed medication for depression, she did not take the medication because she was breastfeeding her son. [ 65 ] The complainant did not seek work for the first six months after her dismissal based on her understanding that the non-compete provision in her employment contract prevented her from working for any other company within a 300-kilometre radius of Edmonton. She testified that she could not move from Edmonton for work because her husband was attending university as a PhD student. [ 66 ] The complainant started working as a part-time cashier for [NAME_12] on April 1, 2023. Her rate of pay was $15.55 per hour. She gave birth to her second child in October 2023, and she was absent from work after the birth for 10 months. She returned to her position at [NAME_12] after her maternity leave. [ 67 ] The complainant started full-time employment with [COMPANY_13] in Edmonton on August 26, 2025.

IV. Positions of the Parties A. The Respondent [ 68 ] The respondent argues that it had just cause to dismiss the complainant and that, therefore, her dismissal was not unjust. The respondent submits that the content of the complainant’s August 31, 2022, broadcast included false information about [NAME_11] and that broadcasting this information violated the standards and requirements of the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission. The respondent also states that the complainant’s conduct on August 31, 2022, was similar to her conduct in broadcasting “defaming” comments on August 15, 2022, for which she had received a warning letter. The respondent argues that the complainant did not show improvement after the warning letter and that, therefore, dismissal was the appropriate response to her August 31, 2022, broadcast. [ 69 ] To support its decision to terminate the complainant’s employment, the respondent relies on media reports about the dismissal of two on-air hosts for their comments. It notes that Don Cherry was dismissed in 2019 from his position as on-air host for Hockey Night in Canada for his remarks about immigrants to Canada and that a Radio-Canada journalist was relieved of her duties for comments she had made on television that demonstrated prejudicial attitudes toward Jewish communities. The respondent argues that these media reports demonstrate that the dismissal of on-air hosts is justified for demeaning comments. [ 70 ] The respondent submits that the decision to dismiss the complainant was independent of any scheduling requests and not tainted by discrimination related to her maternity leave. [ 71 ] The respondent also denies that it discriminated against the complainant regarding her return from maternity leave. It submits that the delays in returning her to work were caused by her failure to confirm her daycare arrangements after her June 7, 2022, email. The respondent states that it supported the complainant in taking her maternity leave by organizing a baby shower and providing a gift basket, and it argues that it had every intention to have her return after her leave. The respondent further notes that its workplace includes many women who have taken and returned from maternity leave without issue. [ 72 ] The respondent asks the Board to dismiss the complaint. B. The Complainant [ 73 ] The complainant argues that the termination of her employment was an unjust dismissal and discrimination based on sex and family status. [ 74 ] The complainant submits that she had a right under the [NAME_3] to return to her position after her maternity leave and that the respondent’s delay in returning her was contrary to the [NAME_3] and the Act. The complainant argues that the respondent was unwilling to re-employ her after her leave and that it returned her to work only after weeks of her persistent requests. She submits that her dismissal was part of the continuum of discriminatory treatment related to her maternity leave given that the respondent had no intention to return her to work. The complainant believes that she would not have been dismissed if she had not taken maternity leave. [ 75 ] The complainant argues that the respondent has not proven the content of her broadcasts on August 15 and 30, 2022. She denies making the remarks that the respondent identifies as “defaming” and false, and she states that she followed the guidelines for her show’s content by focusing on [NAME_9] music. The complainant notes that, although the respondent initially stated that it had audio recordings of the broadcasts, it did not provide them in evidence. Instead, the respondent relied on the vague and generalized recollection of its witnesses, and [NAME_8]’s notes. The complainant argues that [NAME_8]’s notes are not reliable proof of the allegations regarding the content of her broadcasts and that the respondent should have preserved the audio recordings. [ 76 ] The complainant further argues that the respondent failed to follow a fair discipline process. She submits that it did not engage in meaningful and progressive discipline prior to the dismissal and that it acted to dismiss her very quickly without providing coaching and training related to its expectations after issuing the August 16, 2022, warning letter. [ 77 ] The complainant asks the Board to allow her complaint and to order remedies for unjust dismissal.

V. Analysis and Decision [ 78 ] The issues to be considered in this complaint may be summarized as follows: Was the complainant’s dismissal unjust? Did the respondent act contrary to the complainant’s rights set out in the Act in terminating her employment? If the Board finds that there has been an unjust dismissal, what remedies should it order? [ 79 ] Before analyzing the issues, the Board notes that the parties’ evidence conflicted in several key areas. In particular, the complainant’s evidence about her interactions with [NAME_2] and the content of her radio broadcasts contradicts the evidence of [NAME_2] and [NAME_8]. [ 80 ] Given the contradictions, the Board must assess the credibility and reliability of the parties’ evidence to determine which evidence to accept. In assessing credibility, the Board applies the principles set out in [NAME_14] v. [NAME_14] , 1951 CanLII 252 (BC CA). In that decision, the [ADDRESS] of Appeal stated the following: ... Opportunities for knowledge, powers of observation, judgment and memory, ability to describe clearly what he has seen and heard, as well as other factors, combine to produce what is called credibility, ... The credibility of interested witnesses, particularly in cases of conflict of evidence, cannot be gauged solely by the test of whether the personal demeanour of the particular witness carried conviction of the truth. The test must reasonably subject his story to an examination of its consistency with the probabilities that surround the currently existing conditions. In short, the real test of the truth of the story of a witness in such a case must be its harmony with the preponderance of the probabilities which a practical and informed person would readily recognize as reasonable in that place and in those conditions. … Again a witness may testify what he sincerely believes to be true, but he may be quite honestly mistaken. ... (pages 356–357) [ 81 ] There are other factors that are relevant in assessing credibility. These include the witness’s motives, their relationship to the parties, the internal consistency of their evidence and inconsistencies and contradictions in relation to other testimony or documentary evidence. [ 82 ] The Board finds the complainant’s testimony more credible overall than the testimony of the respondent’s witnesses. [ 83 ] The complainant’s oral testimony aligns with her written records of her communications with the respondent by email and [NAME_8]. In addition, her description of the relevant events has been consistent from the initial filing of the unjust dismissal complaint and the CHRC complaint. The complainant’s description of events was fully set out in both complaints with supporting documents. Her written and oral evidence involved a straightforward account of the relevant events with supporting emails, [NAME_8] messages and a call log for her cellphone. [ 84 ] In contrast, the respondent’s witnesses testified with vague and generalized evidence about the circumstances leading to the complainant’s dismissal. Neither witness was able to provide specifics about their interactions with the complainant, unless they refreshed their memory by referring to the documents she had filed in support of her claim. In particular, [NAME_8] testified that [NAME_2]’s meetings with the complainant on August 9 and 15, 2022, were generally respectful but was unable to recall or testify to the details of the meetings. [ 85 ] The respondent did not disclose relevant documents until its submissions to the Board on August 22, 2023. In these submissions, it first particularized its allegation that the complainant had made a sexist and demeaning remark in her broadcast of August 15, 2022. The Board accepts the complainant’s evidence that she did not know about the respondent’s allegation that she had made a demeaning remark until she reviewed the August 22, 2023, submissions. [ 86 ] The respondent also described the allegations about the complainant’s August 31, 2022, broadcast in its August 22, 2023, submissions, but it described them in the same manner as in the termination letter, by claiming that she had broadcast false and unverified content. The respondent did not disclose the particulars of these allegations until it filed its hearing documents on October 20, 2025. Again, the Board accepts the complainant’s evidence that she did not know the particulars of these allegations until she received [NAME_8]’s notes as part of the respondent’s hearing documents on October 20, 2025. [ 87 ] [NAME_2] and [NAME_8] referenced certain documents during their testimony, including notes, emails and policies. However, the respondent did not disclose these documents in support of the oral testimony. In particular, [NAME_8] testified that she had notes of the meetings between [NAME_2] and the complainant as well as notes of the complainant’s broadcasts of August 15 and 31, 2022. [NAME_8]’s testimony about these notes, the respondent only disclosed the notes related to the August 31, 2022, broadcast. [ 88 ] Moreover, [NAME_8] continues to be employed by the respondent, as the [NAME_8] manager and an on-air broadcaster. She maintains a close relationship with [NAME_2], and she is the employee who attends his meetings with other employees and communicates on his behalf with employees.

Accordingly, she has a motivation to support the respondent in its decision to dismiss the complainant and in presenting the evidence to counter the complainant’s claim of unjust dismissal. [ 89 ] For all these reasons, in this complaint, where the parties’ evidence conflicts, the Board prefers the complainant’s written account and oral testimony. A. Was the complainant’s dismissal unjust? 1. Legal Principles in Unjust Dismissal Complaints Under the [NAME_3] [ 90 ] In an unjust dismissal complaint, the employer has the burden to prove that the dismissal was for just cause. To meet this burden, the employer must demonstrate that the employee engaged in the alleged misconduct through objective and reliable evidence and that the misconduct was of a severe enough nature to justify dismissal (see Murray v. West Arm Truck Lines , [2009] C.L.A.D. No. 389, at paragraph 75). [ 91 ] The Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) analyzed the approach to unjust dismissal complaints in [NAME_15] v. [COMPANY_17]. , 2016 SCC 29 ( [NAME_15] ). In that decision, the SCC affirmed that the concept of progressive discipline applies in unjust dismissal complaints under the [NAME_3] . It explained the concept of progressive discipline as follows: [ 54 ] … This concept generally requires employers seeking to justify the dismissal to demonstrate that they have made the employee aware of performance problems, worked with the employee to rectify them, and imposed “a graduated repertoire of sanctions before resorting to the ultimate sanction of dismissal”: ... [ 92 ] In [NAME_18] v. [NAME_18] , 2017 [NAME_18] 477, the Federal Court ([NAME_18]) considered the SCC’s decision in [NAME_15] , in a judicial review of an adjudicator’s decision in an unjust dismissal complaint. The [NAME_18] noted that progressive discipline was a relevant consideration in determining whether a dismissal was justified for the purpose of section 240 of the [NAME_3] . The Board summarized the concept of progressive discipline in [NAME_20] , 2020 [NAME_3] 943: [ 38 ] The principle underlying progressive discipline is that the purpose of discipline is not to punish, but rather to correct and improve employee behaviour. In a progressive discipline approach, an employer would impose disciplinary consequences of increasing severity for repeated misconduct. The range of disciplinary consequences often starts with verbal or written warnings and moves through suspensions of different lengths prior to termination. The progressive discipline steps are intended to warn the employee that, if the conduct does not change, further discipline will be imposed and his or her ongoing employment will be in jeopardy (see [NAME_21] v. [COMPANY_22] ., [2019] C.L.A.D. No. 11, at paragraph 22; and [NAME_23]  v.  [NAME_19] ,   [2003] C.L.A.D. No. 205, at paragraph 37). In Payne ,  supra , the Federal Court of Appeal stressed the importance of progressive discipline in unjust dismissal cases. At paragraph 48 of the decision, it wrote that “[d]ismissal for cause is rarely found to be just in the absence of prior warnings and the imposition of lesser penalties for similar misconduct.” [ 93 ] Progressive discipline also requires well-documented, clear and effective communications (see [NAME_20] , at paragraph 55). [ 94 ] Although progressive discipline applies in the unjust dismissal context, not all dismissals need to be justified based on an employee’s record of prior misconduct and discipline. An employee may be dismissed for cause in the absence of a record of progressive discipline where the termination is a proportionate response to an egregious act of misconduct by the employee. [ 95 ] The Board has applied the approach in Re Wm. Scott & Co. , [1976] B.C.L.R.B.D. No. 98 (QL) ( Re Wm. Scott & Co .), finding it to be a helpful guideline in assessing whether there was just cause for dismissal. The Board generally addresses the following questions adapted from Re Wm. Scott & Co. when assessing just cause: Has the employee given just and reasonable cause for some form of discipline by the employer? If so, was the employer’s decision to dismiss the employee an excessive response in the circumstances? If so, what alternative measures should be substituted as just and equitable? B. Application of the Principles to the Facts of This Complaint [ 96 ] According to the respondent, it dismissed the complainant due to the content of her August 31, 2022, broadcast, and following a written warning about the content of her August 15, 2022, broadcast. The complainant denies the respondent’s allegations about the content of these broadcasts. [ 97 ] The Board finds that the respondent did not prove the content of the complainant’s broadcasts with clear and convincing evidence. The Board notes that the respondent had an opportunity to preserve the audio recordings of the broadcasts and did not do so. The respondent also had an opportunity to engage an independent person to transcribe the recordings, and it chose instead to ask [NAME_8] to prepare notes of the broadcasts. [ 98 ] The respondent did not disclose [NAME_8]’s notes of the August 15, 2022, broadcast. The respondent’s evidence about the content of that broadcast is limited to the recollection of [NAME_2] and [NAME_8] that the complainant made a reference about men wanting freedom from women. The complainant states that she was not aware of the nature of this allegation until the respondent’s August 2023 submissions and was not aware of the specific allegation until the hearing of this complaint. [ 99 ] The Board finds that the respondent has not proven the misconduct alleged in the August 16, 2022, warning letter. Moreover, the warning was not a clear and effective step in progressive discipline because it made a general reference to “defaming” language without providing specific details of the misconduct. In the absence of the specific allegation, the complainant was denied an opportunity to respond to the alleged misconduct and to correct her behaviour. [ 100 ] The respondent indicated in case management meetings with the Board that it intended to rely on audio recordings to demonstrate the complainant’s misconduct. It did not advise the Board or the complainant that it no longer intended to rely on the audio recordings until it filed its hearing documents on October 20, 2025. [NAME_2] testified that the respondent did not have the audio recordings because its recording system was set up to automatically delete recordings after 30 days. [ 101 ] The respondent’s evidence of the complainant’s alleged misconduct on August 31, 2022, was the testimony of [NAME_2] and [NAME_8], as well as [NAME_8]’s notes. Again, the Board notes that the respondent did not disclose [NAME_8]’s notes until it filed them as part of its hearing documents on October 20, 2025, and that the complainant only became aware of the specific allegations through the filing of these notes. [ 102 ] The respondent communicated its decision to dismiss the complainant through a letter sent by email. In the letter, the reason for termination was identified as the complainant’s broadcasting of unverified and false content in her August 31, 2022, broadcast. It is the Board’s view that it is procedurally unfair to the complainant for the respondent to rely on this general allegation without providing specific details until 10 days before the hearing. When the specific details were disclosed through [NAME_8]’s notes, it remained unclear how the content of the notes related to the allegation of broadcasting unverified and false content until [NAME_2] testified that his concern related to the comments about [NAME_11]. [ 103 ] [NAME_2] also testified that he was concerned that the complainant’s comments about a singer who had died by suicide would glorify or romanticize suicide. Again, the first time that the complainant heard this concern was during [NAME_2]’s testimony on October 30, 2025. In the letter of termination, the respondent identified that the complainant was being dismissed for broadcasting false and unverified content. [NAME_2]’s concern about romanticizing suicide is not aligned with the allegations of broadcasting false and unverified content.

Accordingly, the Board rejects this ground as one of the reasons for the dismissal. [ 104 ] [NAME_8]’s notes of the August 31, 2022, broadcast are undated and describe her impression of snippets of the broadcast, and not the entirety of the content. The testimony of [NAME_2] and [NAME_8] about the content of the complainant’s August 31, 2022, broadcast relied extensively on these notes. [ 105 ] It is the Board’s view that [NAME_8]’s notes are not objective and reliable evidence of the complainant’s alleged misconduct. If the Board accepts [NAME_8]’s testimony, she prepared the notes on September 1, 2022, at [NAME_2]’s direction, to support his decision to dismiss the complainant. However, it is not clear when or how she prepared the notes. In addition, the respondent communicated to the Board and the complainant at the pre-hearing CMCs that it intended to rely on the audio recordings to prove misconduct, but it changed course before the hearing and indicated that it would rely on [NAME_8]’s testimony and notes to prove the misconduct. [ 106 ] The respondent had an opportunity to preserve the audio recordings of the two broadcasts that it relied on as just cause for dismissal, and it did not do so. The Board accepts that the respondent did not intentionally destroy the audio recordings. However, by not retaining them, the respondent has failed to provide objective and convincing evidence to establish that the complainant engaged in misconduct. [ 107 ] The respondent argued that the complainant had a duty to advise it of her complaint and to direct it to save the recordings for the purpose of litigation. The Board disagrees, and it notes that the complainant does not have an obligation to ask the respondent to preserve evidence. The burden of proof in an unjust dismissal complaint requires the respondent to prove cause with objective and reliable evidence, and it has the responsibility to preserve the relevant evidence it relied on in deciding to dismiss the complainant. [ 108 ] The respondent has not established that the complainant broadcast “defaming” comments on August 15, 2022, or false and unverified content on August 31, 2022. Moreover, by relying on vague and general allegations and failing to disclose the specifics of its allegations in a timely manner, the respondent denied the complainant a fair and reasonable opportunity to respond to the allegations. The Board also finds that the respondent’s failure to disclose the specific allegations until October 20, 2025, undermined the credibility and reliability of its evidence. [ 109 ] The Board concludes that the respondent has not proven misconduct by the complainant that is cause for discipline. Therefore, the Board finds that the respondent unjustly dismissed the complainant. C. Did the respondent act contrary to the Act regarding the dismissal? [ 110 ] The complainant argues that the respondent’s actions with respect to her return to work from maternity leave and her dismissal amount to discrimination in employment based on sex and family status, in violation of her rights under the Act. [ 111 ] In [NAME_24] v. Day & [COMPANY_24] ., 2010 [NAME_18] 556 ( [NAME_24] ), the [NAME_18] considered the jurisdiction of an adjudicator to consider human rights allegations in an unjust dismissal complaint. The Board notes that the [NAME_18]’s decision in [NAME_24] focused on an adjudicator’s jurisdiction because it was made prior to 2019 amendments to the [NAME_3] that transferred the responsibility for the adjudication of unjust dismissal complaints to the Board from ad hoc adjudicators. The Board has found that the pre-2019 interpretation and analysis apply to its jurisdiction to consider unjust dismissal complaints (see Kommepalli , 2020 [NAME_3] 938; and [NAME_7] ). [ 112 ] In [NAME_24] , the [NAME_18] found that section 242(3.1)(b) of the [NAME_3] deprived the adjudicator of jurisdiction to consider the unjust dismissal complaint where a substantially similar complaint could be made on the same facts under the Act because the Act provided another procedure for redress. The [NAME_18] further explained that the adjudicator would have jurisdiction if the CHRC or the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal (CHRT) exercised their statutory discretion to refer the human rights complaint to the adjudicator. [ 113 ] The [NAME_18] described the adjudicator’s residual jurisdiction, as follows: [ 74 ] However, unlike what was stated by the adjudicator in this case, an adjudicator appointed under subsection 242(1) of the Canada [NAME_3] is not wholly without jurisdiction. His jurisdiction is simply ancillary to that of the Canadian Human Rights Commission and of the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal. Consequently, the Canadian Human Rights Commission could, in the exercise of its statutory discretion under either paragraph 41(1)(b) or paragraph 44(2)(b) of the Canadian Human Rights Act , refer the complaint to the adjudicator if it is satisfied that it could be more appropriately dealt with in the context of a hearing held pursuant to section 242 of the Canada [NAME_3] . I add that in such an event, the adjudicator appointed under the Canada [NAME_3] would have the authority to hear and decide the human rights allegations to the extent that they relate to the unjust dismissal which he is appointed to adjudicate. This flows logically from the reasoning in Boutilier . [ 75 ] The adjudicator’s interpretation of his jurisdiction in this case was too restrictive. I am of the view that the adjudicator erred when he decided that the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Canada in Parry Sound (District) Social Services Administration Board v. [NAME_25]., Local 324 , 2003 SCC 42, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 157 ( Parry Sound ) did not extend to an adjudicator appointed under subsection 242(1) of the Canada [NAME_3] . I see no reason why such an adjudicator would be precluded from considering human rights issues which arise in the context of an unjust dismissal complaint in the event the Canadian Human Rights Commission refers the complaint back to the adjudicator under its authority pursuant to paragraph 41(1)(b) or paragraph 44(2)(b) of the Canadian Human Rights Act . [ 76 ] Under paragraph 242(3)(a) of the Canada [NAME_3] , an adjudicator must “consider whether the dismissal of the person who made the complaint was unjust and render a decision thereon”. Surely a dismissal made in violation of an employee’s human rights is “unjust” within the meaning of that provision of the [NAME_3] , and I fail to understand why an adjudicator could not so find. Obviously, the decision of the adjudicator in such a case is made under the relevant provisions of the Canada [NAME_3] , and the remedial measures which the adjudicator can order are those set out in that [NAME_3] and not those provided for in other legislation such as the Canadian Human Rights Act . However, the concept of “unjust dismissal” is not such as to foreclose any consideration of motives for dismissal based on violations of human rights where an adjudicator is properly referred a matter pursuant to paragraph 41(1)(b) or paragraph 44(2)(b) of the Canadian Human Rights Act . [ 114 ] In [NAME_7] , the Board found that it did not have jurisdiction to consider [NAME_7]’s complaint of unjust dismissal due to the application of section 242(3.1)(b) of the [NAME_3] because he had filed a complaint to the CHRC based on the same facts. The CHRC subsequently decided to not deal with the human rights complaint and referred it to the Board because the human rights issues could be dealt with through the unjust dismissal process. [ 115 ] After the Board received the referral, it considered the merits of the unjust dismissal complaint in [NAME_7] , 2022 [NAME_3] 1034 ( [NAME_7] 2022 ). The Board reviewed the [NAME_18]’s analysis from [NAME_24] about the nature of its jurisdiction to consider human rights allegations after a referral. It then explained that, in [NAME_26] v. [COMPANY_26] of Canada , 2019 [NAME_18] 994 ( [NAME_26] ), the [NAME_18] had provided additional clarification on the limits of the jurisdiction to consider human rights allegations after a referral from the CHRC: [ 49 ] The [NAME_18] further clarified the jurisdiction of an unjust dismissal adjudicator to consider human rights allegations in [NAME_26] v. [COMPANY_26] of Canada , 2019 [NAME_18] 994. This decision concerned an application for judicial review of the CHRC’s decision not to deal with [NAME_26]’ human rights complaint because she had previously filed and withdrawn an unjust dismissal complaint. The [NAME_18] allowed the application for judicial review. Among other things, the [NAME_18] stated that it was unreasonable for the CHRC to conclude that an adjudicator determining an unjust dismissal complaint had the jurisdiction to address all of the human rights issues raised in the human rights complaint (at paragraph 45). The [NAME_18] explained that the problem with the CHRC’s reasoning was that, as set out in [NAME_24] , the unjust dismissal adjudicator “has the jurisdiction to address human rights complaints, to the extent that they relate to the circumstances of a dismissal” ( [NAME_26] , paragraph 42). According to the [NAME_18], it was not possible for [NAME_26] to have all of the human rights issues dealt with in the unjust dismissal proceeding because the unjust dismissal adjudicator would only have jurisdiction to consider the circumstances of her dismissal and the human rights issues related to the dismissal (at paragraph 47). [ 116 ] As stated in [NAME_7] 2022 , based on the analysis in [NAME_24] and [NAME_26] , it is clear that, after a referral from the CHRC, the Board’s jurisdiction to deal with human rights allegations in an unjust dismissal complaint is limited to a consideration of the human rights allegations to the extent that they relate to the circumstances of the dismissal. [ 117 ] As noted earlier in this decision, the complainant filed a complaint with the CHRC setting out her human rights claim, and the CHRC decided in March 2025 not to deal with her complaint because it could more appropriately be addressed according to the unjust dismissal process under the [NAME_3] . Given the CHRC’s decision, the Board has the authority to hear and decide the complainant’s human rights allegations to the extent that they relate to the termination of her employment. [ 118 ] The complainant’s human rights allegations involve a claim that the respondent discriminated against her based on sex and family status in its response to her return from maternity leave, in changing her work hours on August 31, 2022, in issuing the written warning and in dismissing her. The Board finds that all the complainant’s human rights allegations relate to her dismissal. [ 119 ] The sequence of relevant events starts with the respondent’s action and inaction regarding the complainant’s return from maternity leave and concludes with her dismissal. These events occurred over a few months, between May 2 and September 2, 2022. The complainant’s repeated attempts to return to work and her requests for a work schedule set the context for the August 16, 2022, warning, the change in work hours communicated on August 31, 2022, and the dismissal on September 2, 2022. All these events involve the respondent’s conduct related to the complainant’s maternity leave and her status as a mother over a short period. Therefore, the Board will consider the human rights allegations regarding this series of events to assess whether the respondent has acted in violation of the Act. [ 120 ] In its decisions, the CHRT has explained that the complainant has the burden to prove allegations of discrimination. There are three elements that a complainant must demonstrate to meet this burden of proof (see, for example, [NAME_27] v. [NAME_27] , 2019 CHRT 22, at paragraph 60 ( [NAME_27] )). In the circumstances of the complainant’s claim of discrimination based on sex and family status, these three requirements may be described as follows: The complainant must establish that she has a characteristic protected by a prohibited ground of discrimination under the Act (in this case, sex and family status); The complainant must establish that she was subjected to adverse differential treatment in the course of employment (under section 7(b) of the Act); and The complainant must establish that the prohibited ground of discrimination (sex and family status) was a factor in the adverse differential treatment she suffered in the course of her employment. [ 121 ] In [NAME_27] , the CHRT explained the applicable principles in assessing discrimination claims, as follows: [ 61 ] … the applicable standard is that of proof on a balance of probabilities, and it is not necessary to demonstrate that the prohibited ground of discrimination under the CHRA was the sole factor in the manifestation of the adverse impacts suffered by the complainant. [ 62 ] Discrimination is not usually direct or intentional. As indicated in [NAME_28] v. [NAME_28] Company , 1988 CanLII 108 (CHRT) [ [NAME_28] ], direct proof of discrimination is not necessary, nor is it necessary to demonstrate an intention to discriminate (see also [NAME_28] , supra , at paras. 40   and 41). It is the Tribunal’s role to analyze the circumstances of the complaint to determine whether there is any subtle scent of discrimination. [ 63 ] When the Tribunal analyzes circumstantial evidence, discrimination may be inferred when the evidence presented in support of the allegations of discrimination make such an inference more probable than other possible inferences or hypotheses (see [NAME_28] , supra ; [NAME_29] v. Canada (Department of National Health and Welfare ), 2001 CanLII 8492 (CHRT) ). Evidence of discrimination, even if circumstantial, must nevertheless be tangibly linked to the respondent’s impugned decision or conduct (see [NAME_28] , at para. 88). [ 122 ] Section 3(1) of the Act identifies the prohibited grounds of discrimination as follows: 3 (1) … race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, age, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, marital status, family status, genetic characteristics, disability and conviction for an offence for which a pardon has been granted or in respect of which a record suspension has been ordered. [ 123 ] Section 3(2) of the Act confirms that “[w]here the ground of discrimination is pregnancy or child-birth, the discrimination shall be deemed to be on the ground of sex.” A person’s childcare obligations are within the scope of the definition of family status in the Act (see [NAME_30] v. [COMPANY_30] , 2014 CHRT 28 ( [NAME_30] ); and Canada (Attorney General) v. [NAME_30] , 2014 FCA 110). Therefore, the Board finds that the complainant has the protected characteristics of sex and family status. [ 124 ] The complainant also experienced adverse and differential treatment in employment. The respondent did not reinstate her at the end of her maternity leave. Instead, it returned her to employment more than two months later. The respondent disciplined the complainant by issuing her a warning letter and terminating her employment. In addition, it had advised her on August 31, 2022, that her hours of work were being changed effective the following day, such that she was required to work until midnight, rather than until 11:00 p.m. All these actions involve adverse and differential treatment in employment. [ 125 ] Therefore, the Board finds that the complainant has established the first two requirements to prove discrimination in employment contrary to the Act, and it will consider whether she has met the third requirement by demonstrating that the prohibited grounds of discrimination of sex and family status were factors in the adverse differential treatment she experienced. [ 126 ] The complainant contacted the respondent in early May 2022 to confirm that her maternity leave would end on May 30, 2022, and that she would be returning to work on a mutually agreed date in the first week of June 2022. She asked the respondent for her work schedule and to return to work multiple times between May 12 and August 8, 2022. The respondent was non-responsive and did not return her to her regular work schedule until August 9, 2022. Moreover, the respondent only permitted the complainant to return to work after requiring her to meet with [NAME_2] and [NAME_8] to discuss the tone of her text message on August 8, 2022. [ 127 ] The complainant had taken a leave of absence from work for maternity and parental leave, starting on June 1, 2021. These are protected types of leave under sections 206 and 206.1 of the [NAME_3] . Section 209.1(1) of the [NAME_3] protects an employee’s right to return to their position after taking a leave of absence under the [NAME_3] , including maternity and parental leave. This section provides the following: 209.1 (1) Every employee who takes or is required to take a leave of absence from employment under this Division is entitled to be reinstated in the position that the employee occupied when the leave of absence from employment commenced, and every employer of such an employee shall, on the expiration of any such leave, reinstate the employee in that position. [ 128 ] Section 209.1(2) requires an employer to reinstate an employee in a comparable position in certain circumstances: 209.1 (2) Where for any valid reason an employer cannot reinstate an employee in the position referred to in subsection (1), the employer shall reinstate the employee in a comparable position with the same wages and benefits in the same location. [ 129 ] The respondent argued that it could not return the complainant to her position for operational reasons. It stated that it needed to adjust its broadcast schedule to return her to her schedule. The respondent also submitted that the complainant failed to confirm that she had arranged for daycare and that, until she did so, it could not reinstate her. [ 130 ] The Board finds that the respondent did not have a valid reason for failing to reinstate the complainant in her position or an equivalent position at the end of her maternity leave. When the complainant started her leave in June 2021, the respondent knew that the leave would end on May 30, 2022. The complainant reminded the respondent on May 2, 2022, that her leave would be ending and that she intended to return to work during the first week of June 2022. The respondent did not reinstate her until August 9, 2022, despite her regular communication with it and her repeated requests for reinstatement. The failure to reinstate the complainant is contrary to the employer’s obligation under section 209.1(1) of the [NAME_3] and is discrimination in employment based on her pregnancy, which is contrary to the Act. [ 131 ] [NAME_2] testified that he was doing the complainant a favour when he re-employed her after the birth of her son and that she should have been thankful that she was returning to the station. He also stated that he saw her as a totally different person after her maternity leave. The complainant had the right to be reinstated in her position after her maternity leave, and when the respondent eventually reinstated her after her persistent efforts over two months, this was not a favour but an exercise of the complainant’s protected rights under the [NAME_3] and the Act. [ 132 ] The Board finds that [NAME_2]’s attitude, as described in his testimony, affected his decision-making about the complainant’s reinstatement after her maternity leave. He also explained that he was upset about the tone of the complainant’s text message on August 8, 2022, and that he needed to meet with her to discuss this message before she could return to her on-air duties on August 9, 2022. His need to meet with her about the tone of her text message is consistent with his attitude that he was doing the complainant a favour by reinstating her. He testified that she should not have expressed being upset in the text message about her return to work but should instead have been grateful. [ 133 ] The complainant finally returned to work as an on-air host on August 9, 2022, more than two months after the end of her maternity leave. [NAME_2] required her to meet with him the morning of her return to work to discuss her text message. The complainant explained in her testimony and written [NAME_8] that [NAME_2] expressed anger towards her in this meeting, telling her that he would not tolerate that type of message. She stated that he reminded her that the respondent was allowing her to return to work after a year of leave and that she should be thankful that she was returning. According to the complainant, [NAME_2] told her that he could “fire” her for the message she had sent on August 8, 2022. [ 134 ] [NAME_2] and [NAME_8] challenged the complainant’s description of the meeting of August 9, 2022, the Board finds that the complainant’s description is aligned with the other comments [NAME_2] made in his testimony that she should have been grateful to return to work and should have recognized that he was doing her a favour in putting her back on the air. [ 135 ] The complainant felt intimidated and threatened by [NAME_2] in the meeting of August 9, 2022. She testified that, after this meeting, she expected to be dismissed. [ 136 ] [NAME_2] also testified that he was upset that the complainant did not respond to the August 16, 2022, warning letter or seek guidance from him. He felt that he gave her a full opportunity to improve and that she had been deliberate in broadcasting false content on August 31, 2022. [ 137 ] Taken in its entirety, [NAME_2]’s testimony showed an attitude towards the complainant in which he expected her to be grateful and obedient towards him. He was disturbed by any challenge she made, whether it was related to asking to be reinstated or for her work schedule or involved her failure to reach out to him after the warning letter and dismissal to ask questions and make amends. [NAME_2]’s attitude, he treated the complainant in a discriminatory manner. He refused to return her to work, expected her to defer to him and monitored her performance after her return from leave. In all these ways, the complainant was treated in a discriminatory way based on sex and family status. [ 138 ] The complainant’s last day of work was August 31, 2022. On this day, [NAME_2] told her that her hours of work would be changed, effective the following day, because her on-air time slot would be 10:00 p.m. to 12:00 a.m. rather than 9:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. to accommodate the time slot of [NAME_10], a newly hired on-air host. The complainant considered the change in work hours and advised [NAME_2] later that same day that, due to her family responsibilities, she could not accept the change in hours. [NAME_2] did not respond to her email about the change in hours. Instead, he decided on September 1, 2022, to dismiss the complainant, due to the alleged content of her program on August 31, 2022. [ 139 ] The respondent’s action in changing the complainant’s work hours with one day’s notice is a form of discrimination based on family status, given the complainant’s responsibilities as the parent of a young child. The protection against discrimination based on family status in the Act includes protection from discrimination due to childcare obligations ( [NAME_30] ). [ 140 ] [NAME_2]’s decision to dismiss the complainant was made in the context of his refusal to reinstate her after her maternity leave and his concerns about her lack of gratitude for her eventual return to work. [ 141 ] The respondent argues that it has not engaged in discriminatory conduct because it treated the complainant like a “princess” and was generous in hosting a baby shower for her and giving her a gift basket before the birth of her son. The respondent also submits that it employs many women and that some of them have returned from maternity leave with no issues. None of these actions toward the complainant or the events regarding different employees affect the question of whether the respondent discriminated against the complainant in May to September 2022 in connection with her return from maternity leave. [ 142 ] The respondent claims that the reason for dismissal was the content of the complainant’s programming. The Board has found that the respondent has not proven the content of the programming or that the complainant engaged in misconduct regarding the content. Even if the Board had accepted that the respondent had proven misconduct in the content of the complainant’s broadcasts, the Board would find that one of the reasons for the dismissal was the respondent’s response to the complainant’s maternity leave and its frustration with her lack of gratitude and deference. The Board finds on a balance of probabilities that the respondent’s decision to discipline the complainant by issuing the warning letter and dismissing her was influenced by discrimination based on sex and family status, even though the discrimination may not have been the sole reason for the discipline. D. Remedies [ 143 ] The Board has found that the respondent’s dismissal of the complainant was unjust. Section 242(4) of the [NAME_3] sets out the Board’s remedial authority with respect to a finding of unjust dismissal: 242 (4) If the Board decides under subsection (3) that a person has been unjustly dismissed, the Board may, by order, require the employer who dismissed the person to (a) pay the person compensation not exceeding the amount of money that is equivalent to the remuneration that would, but for the dismissal, have been paid by the employer to the person; (b) reinstate the person in his employ; and (c) do any other like thing that is equitable to require the employer to do in order to remedy or counteract any consequence of the dismissal. [ 144 ] The Board has broad authority to grant an appropriate remedy, in accordance with section 242(4) of the [NAME_3] , and it has full discretion to choose among the remedies listed in section 242(4) to order the remedies it finds appropriate for the unjust dismissal (see [NAME_15] ; and [NAME_31] v. [COMPANY_31] of Commerce , 2019 [NAME_18] 1226, at paragraphs 39 and 44–45). The principle underlying the remedial powers set out in section 242(4) of the [NAME_3] is that the employee who has been unjustly dismissed should be made whole. [ 145 ] The complainant seeks the following remedies from the Board: Compensation for lost remuneration from June 2022 to October 2025, in the amount of $46,633.26; Interest on the wage loss; A payment for the tax liability related to receiving the wages as a lump sum; Damages in lieu of reinstatement equivalent to up to 12 months of earnings; General damages for discrimination based on sex and family status of $20,000.00; Aggravated damages of $40,000.00; and Punitive damages of $30,000.00. [ 146 ] The respondent does not agree with the remedies requested, but it did not make any specific submissions on the appropriate remedies. E. Compensation for Lost Remuneration [ 147 ] Section 242(4)(a) of the [NAME_3] empowers the Board to order an employer to pay compensation “not exceeding the amount of money that is equivalent to the remuneration that would, but for the dismissal, have been paid by the employer.” The principle underlying this remedy is that the complainant should be put in the position she would have been in but for the unjust dismissal. [ 148 ] The complainant claims compensation for lost wages, for the following periods: Full compensation for June and July 2022 for the respondent’s failure to reinstate her following the end of her maternity leave; Full compensation from September 2, 2022, the date of dismissal, to March 2023, because she had no income during these months; and Partial compensation from April 2023 to August 26, 2025, with deductions for her employment income and her ten-month maternity leave from October 2023 to July 2024 related to the birth of her second child. [ 149 ] The Board does not have authority, pursuant to section 242(4)(a) of the [NAME_3] , to award compensation for the wages the complainant lost because the respondent took until August 9, 2022, to reinstate her following her maternity leave. Section 242(4)(a) allows the Board to order compensation no greater than the earnings the complainant would have had but for the dismissal. Given that the complainant’s lost wages for June and July 2022 relate to events before her dismissal, the Board cannot order compensation for these lost wages under section 242(4)(a) of the [NAME_3] . [ 150 ] The Board will assess compensation for the complainant’s lost wages from the date of dismissal forward, based on her assigned work schedule prior to her maternity leave. The complainant testified that her regular schedule involved 28 hours per week, and she provided the details of her schedule to the respondent when she was returning from maternity leave. Her schedule consisted of two hours on each of Monday and Tuesday, seven hours on each of Wednesday and Thursday and five hours on each of Saturday and Sunday. She was paid $20.00 per hour. Therefore, her regular weekly earnings were $560.00. [ 151 ] In the employment contract, the parties indicated that the respondent might assign additional duties to the complainant. The Board has limited evidence about the frequency and regularity of the additional duties.

Accordingly, the Board will calculate the complainant’s wage loss based on her regular work schedule. [ 152 ] There are 155 weeks between September 2, 2022, the date of the complainant’s dismissal, and August 26, 2025, the date she started full-time employment. [ 153 ] The complainant states that she was absent from work for 10 months for maternity leave between October 2023 and July 2024. She submits that 10 months of earnings should be deducted from her compensation because she was not able to work. The Board calculates that the complainant was absent from work for 42 weeks of maternity leave. Therefore, it will determine her lost earnings based on 113 weeks of earnings, which represents 155 weeks less 42 weeks of maternity leave. [ 154 ] The Board calculates that the complainant would have earned $63,280.00 in wages from the respondent for 113 weeks of work, based on $560.00 per week. [ 155 ] The complainant earned $23,401.72 from all sources, excluding Employment Insurance benefits, between April 1, 2023, when she started working as a part-time cashier for [NAME_12], and August 26, 2025, when she began her full-time position with [COMPANY_13]. The Board deducts the complainant’s earnings of $23,401.72 from its calculation of the earnings that she would have received from the respondent, for a total award of compensation for wage loss of $39,878.28. F. Interest [ 156 ] The complainant claims interest on her lost wages at the rate of five percent for three years. [ 157 ] As part of a make-whole order under section 242(4) of the [NAME_3] , the Board has the authority to award interest (see Mak , 2022 [NAME_3] 1036, at paragraph 222). It is the Board’s view that, without an interest award on the compensation amount, the complainant will not be made whole for the loss of remuneration she experienced because of the unjust dismissal. [ 158 ] In Service Employees’ International Union, Local 183 v. [COMPANY_32] , 1980 CanLII 959 ( [NAME_32] ), the Ontario Labour Relations Board (OLRB) considered how to calculate the interest on compensation for lost wages, noting that an employee’s total wage loss does not occur all at once but instead accumulates with each pay period following the dismissal. Given that the total wage loss does not occur all at once, the OLRB found that it would be inappropriate to simply apply the relevant annual interest rate to the total amount of the loss. [ 159 ] The OLRB reviewed the method suggested by the [ADDRESS] of Appeal and outlined the approach it would take to calculating interest on compensation for lost wages, as follows: 30. [ADDRESS] of Appeal in [NAME_33] v. [NAME_33] , supra, recognized this principle. Lord Denning expressed it in the following way at page 1207: “Loss of wages. This occurred week by week. In principle, the interest should be calculated on each week's loss from that week to the date of trial. But that would mean too much detail. Alternatively, it would be possible to add up the loss every six months and allow interest on the total every six months until trial.... More rough and ready, the total loss could be taken from accident to trial: and interest allowed only on half of it, or half the time, or at half the rate.” Focusing on the “rough and ready” methods suggested by Lord Denning, we note that the granting of interest on one half the amount of loss effectively takes into account the fact that the loss does not occur all at once, as discussed above, but rather rises steadily over the period away from work from zero to 100 per cent. The average amount of loss suffered by the complainant over the entire period, therefore, may be represented by half the amount found owing by the end of the period in question. … 33. Considering all needs, the Board concludes that one of the rough and ready approaches highlighted in [NAME_33] v. [NAME_33]  is most suitable. For its ease of calculation, flexibility and basic accuracy, therefore, the Board has concluded that a calculation of interest on the Board’s monetary awards should be carried out as follows: firstly, taking into account all factors, including the duty to mitigate, assess the wage portion of the compensation award; secondly, divide it in half; lastly, apply the appropriate annual interest rate pro-rated to reflect the proportion of the year represented by the compensation award. [ 160 ] The Board has followed the approach outlined in [NAME_32] in calculating interest on compensation for wage loss in unjust dismissal complaints (see [NAME_34] , 2022 [NAME_3] 1049, at paragraphs 223–224; and [NAME_35] , 2023 [NAME_3] 1057, at paragraph 165). [ 161 ] Section 36(1) of the Federal Courts Act provides that the provincial laws relating to prejudgment interest apply in respect of federal court proceedings related to a cause of action arising in that province. The complainant’s claim arose in the province of Alberta, and, therefore, the Board will use the interest rate prescribed by regulation under the Alberta Judgment Interest Act , RSA 2000, c J-1. The complainant’s complaint was filed in 2022. For 2022, the prescribed rate of interest in Alberta is 0.2 percent. [ 162 ] The Board has calculated the compensation for the complainant’s lost wages as $39,878.28. Applying the [NAME_32] approach to the compensation award, the Board calculates the amount by applying an interest rate of 0.2 percent to one half of $39,878.28 for the period of September 2, 2022 to March 31, 2026, the date of issuing this decision. The total amount of interest, using this calculation, is $142.69. The Board awards this amount of interest to the complainant. G. Payment for Tax Liability [ 163 ] The complainant asks the Board to award an additional 25 percent on the award of compensation for lost wages and interest to compensate her for the income tax consequences of receiving a lump-sum payment of wages. To support this claim, she relies on the decision of the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal (BCHRT) in [NAME_36] v. [NAME_36] dba Prince George Ford (No. 2) , 2022 BCHRT 88 ( [NAME_36] ). [ 164 ] In [NAME_36] , the BCHRT ordered compensation for lost wages and benefits, as well as compensation for the tax liability related to receiving wages as a lump sum. The BCHRT noted that it made the award related to income tax consequences, pursuant to section 37(2)(d)(ii) of the British [NAME_3] , RSBC 1996, c 210, which provides the following: 37 … (2) If the member or panel determines that the complaint is justified, the member or panel … (d) if the person discriminated against is a party to the complaint, or is an identifiable member of a group or class on behalf of which a complaint is filed, may order the person that contravened this [NAME_3] to do one or more of the following: … (ii) compensate the person discriminated against for all, or a part the member or panel determines, of any wages or salary lost, or expenses incurred, by the contravention. [ 165 ] The Board’s authority to order remedies for unjust dismissal is found in section 242(4) of the [NAME_3] , which empowers the Board to make a complainant whole for the consequences of the dismissal. It may happen that the complainant will be required to pay higher taxes after she receives the compensation for lost wages ordered in this decision. However, the complainant has not proven that she will be required to pay higher taxes or established the amount of this loss. [ 166 ] Therefore, the Board rejects the complainant’s claim for compensation for tax liability on the basis that she has not established a loss. H. Damages in Lieu of Reinstatement [ 167 ] The complainant did not request reinstatement as a remedy. She had found alternate full-time employment at the time of the hearing, and she stated that she was not confident that she would be treated fairly by the respondent if she were reinstated. She asked for compensation in lieu of reinstatement in an amount up to the equivalent of 12 months’ earnings. [ 168 ] In [NAME_34] , the Board considered the approach to assessing whether reinstatement is an appropriate remedy for unjust dismissal. It described the approach to this assessment, as follows: [ 178 ] … In assessing whether reinstatement is an appropriate remedy, adjudicators have considered a number of factors, including the wishes of the discharged employee. In Bank of [NAME_6] v. [NAME_6] , 2012 [NAME_18] 1513, the [NAME_18] set out a non-exhaustive list of factors relevant to this assessment in the context of an unjust dismissal (at paragraph 11). These factors include:

1. The deterioration of personal relations between the complainant and management or other employees. … 2. The disappearance of the relationship of trust which must exist in particular when the complainant is high up in the company hierarchy. … 3. Contributory fault on the part of the complainant justifying the reduction of her dismissal to a lesser sanction. … 4. An attitude on the part of the complainant leading to the belief that reinstatement would bring no improvement. … 5. The complainant’s physical inability to start work again immediately. … 6. The abolition of the post held by the complainant at the time of [their] dismissal. … 7. Other events subsequent to the dismissal making reinstatement impossible, such as bankruptcy or lay-offs. … [ 169 ] Considering these factors involves assessing whether the employment relationship is still viable and can be re-established despite the employer’s decision to terminate. [ 170 ] The Board acknowledges that the complainant does not wish to return to employment with the respondent, given the series of events related to her return from maternity leave and how the respondent dismissed her. [ 171 ] The Board accepts the complainant’s view that the employment relationship is no longer viable given the significant deterioration in her relationship with [NAME_2], the General Manager. The complainant states that she can no longer trust [NAME_2] after the events between her request to return to work in May 2022 and her dismissal in September 2022. The Board agrees that [NAME_2]’s actions have broken the trust in the employment relationship and that it is not reasonable to reinstate the complainant. [ 172 ] However, the Board finds that it is not appropriate to award damages in lieu of reinstatement and that an award of compensation for lost earnings is the appropriate remedy to compensate for the unjust dismissal.

I. General Damages for Discrimination [ 173 ] The complainant asks the Board to order general damages of $20,000.00 for discrimination based on sex and family status. She argues that the damages are appropriate as compensation for the injury to her dignity, feelings and self-respect caused by the respondent’s breach of its obligations under the Act. [ 174 ] Section 53(2)(e) of the Act empowers a member or panel of the CHRT to order compensation in an amount not exceeding $20,000.00 for any pain and suffering experienced because of a discriminatory practice. [ 175 ] The Board’s remedial authority comes from section 242(4) of the [NAME_3] and not section 53 of the Act. The Board has the authority to award “make whole” remedies in accordance with section 242(4)(c) of the [NAME_3] . Therefore, it will consider the complainant’s claim for damages for injury to her dignity, feelings and self-respect as part of its consideration of her claim for aggravated damages. J. Aggravated Damages [ 176 ] The complainant seeks aggravated damages arising from the manner of dismissal and its impact on her in the amount of $40,000.00. [ 177 ] The complainant argues that the manner of dismissal caused her significant and serious emotional and personal harm. She notes that the termination was abrupt and communicated by a letter without full reasons and that this happened when she was particularly vulnerable, having returned from maternity leave only three weeks prior. She states that her vulnerability was further heightened because she was the only income earner in her family, as her husband was attending school to complete his PhD degree. [ 178 ] The complainant testified that she experienced severe health consequences because of the manner of dismissal. She sought medical treatment shortly after the dismissal for depression and an acute stress response to the dismissal. The complainant provided the reports of her appointments with a social worker from September 2022 to March 2023. In these reports, the treating social worker notes severe symptoms of depression, anxiety, nightmares, low appetite and feelings of isolation. The complainant testified that, although she was prescribed medication to treat depression, she did not start the medication because she was breastfeeding her son. [ 179 ] The complainant also submits that aggravated damages are appropriate because the manner of dismissal has harmed her professional reputation and her personal dignity. She states that the respondent’s accusations that she used “defaming language” and broadcast “unverified and false content” harmed her reputation as a broadcaster. The complainant described that she was unable to work in broadcasting due to the circumstances of her dismissal. She also testified that people in the Hindi community would approach her at social events and at temple and ask her questions about why she was no longer broadcasting. [ 180 ] The complainant further argues that the discriminatory nature of the dismissal as a response to her maternity leave and her childcare responsibilities caused her insecurity and distress. She notes that this distress was compounded by the delay in reinstatement after maternity leave and [NAME_2]’s intimidating communications directed at her. [ 181 ] Aggravated damages, also known as moral damages or mental distress damages, have been awarded by adjudicators in unjust dismissal cases. The Board notes that the [NAME_18] upheld aggravated damages awarded in [NAME_38] v. [NAME_37], 2013 [NAME_18] 767 ( [NAME_37] ) (see paragraphs 30–40) and more recently in [COMPANY_39] . v. [NAME_40] , 2015 [NAME_18] 1182 ( Spruce Hollow ). [ 182 ] The Board recently reviewed the principles related to an award of aggravated damages in Mak , as follows: [ 163 ] Aggravated damages are not punitive but are intended to compensate for damages flowing from the manner in which employment was terminated (see [NAME_41] , at paragraphs 60 and 62; and [NAME_26] v. [COMPANY_26] of Canada , 2019 [NAME_18] 994, at paragraph 43). Therefore, a party claiming such damages must prove actual harm that was in the contemplation of the parties and a linkage between the harm and the manner of dismissal. Aggravated damages can be awarded for conduct that was pre-termination or post-termination as long as the conduct was part of the manner of dismissal. [ 164 ] To award such damages, courts and adjudicators have first considered the manner in which the employment was terminated and the mental distress that resulted. For example, courts have recognized that conduct in dismissal that might result in compensable damages includes attacking the employee’s reputation by declarations made at the time of dismissal and misrepresenting the reason for the decision (see [NAME_41] , at paragraph 59). Normal distress and hurt feelings relating to the end of employment are not generally compensable. The impacts that have been compensable have included “consequential damage to [the employee’s] prospect of future employment, to his mental and physical health and well-being, to his integrity and dignity, and to his personal and professional reputation” ( [NAME_37] ) and mental distress, embarrassment, hardship and a loss of self-esteem and dignity (see Spruce Hollow , at paragraph 109). [ 165 ] In [NAME_42] v. [COMPANY_42] ., [1997] 3 S.C.R. 701 ( [NAME_42] ), the SCC held that employers have an obligation of good faith and fair dealing in the manner of dismissal. In [NAME_41] , it held that there is an expectation of good faith and fair dealing in the manner of dismissal. [ 166 ] The SCC set out the rationale for damages in [NAME_42] as follows: 95 The point at which the employment relationship ruptures is the time when the employee is most vulnerable and hence, most in need of protection. In recognition of this need, the law ought to encourage conduct that minimizes the damage and dislocation (both economic and personal) that result from dismissal. In [NAME_43] , supra , it was noted that the manner in which employment can be terminated is equally important to an individual’s identity as the work itself (at p. 1002). By way of expanding upon this statement, I note that the loss of one’s job is always a traumatic event. However, when termination is accompanied by acts of bad faith in the manner of discharge, the results can be especially devastating. In my opinion, to ensure that employees receive adequate protection, employers ought to be held to an obligation of good faith and fair dealing in the manner of dismissal, … [ 183 ] At outlined in Mak , an employer has a duty to act in good faith in its approach to dismissing an employee. In addition, the Board notes that an employer’s pre-termination and post-termination conduct may be relevant to an assessment of bad faith in the manner of dismissal (see [COMPANY_44]. v. [NAME_44] , 2010 BCSC 1650, at paragraph 18). [ 184 ] In the present complaint, the Board finds that the respondent failed to fulfill its duty to act in good faith at the time of dismissal, and even before and after it. The Board finds that the manner of dismissal was wrongful and that the dismissal was aggravated by several factors, as described below: The respondent refused to reinstate the complainant after the end of her maternity leave, contrary to its obligation under the [NAME_3] and without providing valid reasons for the refusal. The respondent did not disclose the specific allegation related to the complainant’s August 15, 2022, broadcast until its submissions to the Board in August 2023. The respondent hired a permanent host to replace the complainant during her maternity leave. The respondent changed the complainant’s schedule on August 31, 2022, requiring her to work until midnight starting on September 1, 2022. The respondent made no effort to contact the complainant about the content of her broadcast on August 31, 2022, or to ascertain her position about the alleged content. The termination letter identified that the reason for the complainant’s dismissal was that she had broadcast false and unverified content, but the letter also did not provide any particulars. The respondent did not inform the complainant of the details of the allegations against her until October 20, 2025, more than three years after the impugned broadcasts and a week in advance of the first hearing date. By not being informed of the details of the allegations, the complainant was left in ignorance as to what had happened, and this lack of information contributed to her anxiety and depression after the dismissal. Since the respondent did not disclose the details until October 20, 2025, the complainant was denied procedural fairness because she was required to respond to the allegations more than three years after the date of the broadcasts. The respondent failed to retain the recordings of the complainant’s two broadcasts that it relied on as reasons for dismissal, relying instead on [NAME_8]’s notes and the memories of [NAME_8] and [NAME_2], as refreshed by the notes. During the Board’s process, the respondent initially suggested that it had the audio recordings and that it would be relying on them at the hearing, raising the complainant’s expectation that she would have a full and fair opportunity to respond to the allegation of broadcasting false and unverified content. However, it later changed course. The respondent reminded the complainant in the termination letter that, for the next six months, she could not be employed “for any other company within a 300-kilometre radius of the Company.” [ 185 ] The non-compete provision in the complainant’s employment contract was particularly restrictive. It required that she not work for any other company within 300 kilometres of the respondent for six months. When she was dismissed, the complainant lived in Edmonton with her son and her husband, a PhD student. It was not practical for her to relocate given her husband’s university studies. She understood that the non-compete provision meant that she could not work within 300 kilometres of Edmonton for the first six months after the dismissal. [ 186 ] [NAME_2] testified that if the complainant had come to him with concerns about the non-compete provision, he would have explained that it only restricted her from working as an on-air radio or television broadcaster. The complainant did not contact him because of the manner of dismissal. She experienced significant emotional harm after the dismissal and suffered from anxiety and depression. She also understood from the plain language of the non-compete provision that she could not work for six months if she stayed in Edmonton. [ 187 ] The non-compete provision in the contract is wider than reasonably required to protect the respondent’s interests. The respondent had a legitimate business interest in restricting its on-air hosts from working for competing broadcasters. However, by restricting the complainant from employment in any company, the respondent’s non-compete provision prevented her from engaging in a range of employment activities beyond work as a broadcaster. [ 188 ] The respondent reminded the complainant of the specific language of the non-compete provision in its termination letter. This specific direction contributed to the personal distress that the complainant experienced due to the manner of dismissal. [ 189 ] The Board finds that the manner in which the respondent dismissed the complainant, including its conduct before and after the dismissal, inflicted mental distress and reputational harm on the complainant. The respondent acted in bad faith and unfairly toward the complainant starting from its laconic response to her first request to set a date for her reinstatement after maternity leave. The respondent’s actions have caused permanent harm to the complainant’s health and her reputation as a broadcaster. The complainant has left her chosen profession as an on-air radio and television broadcaster. She had been employed in this field for more than five years, and, because of the respondent’s actions, she will not return to broadcasting. [ 190 ] In [NAME_37] , the [NAME_18] upheld an award of $85,000.00 in aggravated damages, noting that the damages were awarded for “consequential damage to [the complainant’s] prospect of future employment, to his mental and physical health and well-being, to his integrity and dignity and to his personal and professional reputation” (paragraph 31). [ 191 ] The Board also notes that, in [NAME_45] v. [NAME_45] (County) , 2005 CanLII 45197 (ON SC), the Ontario Superior Court awarded $70,000.00 in aggravated damages regarding the manner of dismissal. The Ontario Superior Court explained the reasons for this award, as follows: [ 254 ] The intangible damage flowing from wrongful actions of the employer in the case before me resulted in humiliation, embarrassment, loss of self-esteem and loss of enjoyment of social activities. Unlike the routine case, these losses were not temporary. These losses have continued for the better part of 4 years up to the present. I find that the losses will be diminished by this judgment but that there will be a lingering loss. As the plaintiff has already experienced, “clouds” on one’s character are difficult to eradicate. [ 255 ] I assess these losses at $ 50,000. [ 256 ] The plaintiff also suffered damage to his physical and mental health. This loss is recoverable both because of the [NAME_42]  type conduct of his employer and under the tort of wrongful infliction of mental suffering. I assess this damage at $20,000. [ 192 ] Here, the complainant has suffered severe health consequences because of the manner of dismissal. These consequences were beyond the normal frustration, distress and hurt feelings that an employee experiences after dismissal. Moreover, the complainant has experienced damage to her dignity, self-esteem and reputation. This damage has continued over many years since the dismissal. [ 193 ] In assessing the amount of aggravated damages to compensate the complainant, the Board notes the series of aggravating factors in the respondent’s conduct and the severity of the impact on the complainant. In all these circumstances, the Board finds that an award of $60,000.00 in aggravated damages is appropriate. K. Punitive Damages [ 194 ] The complainant also seeks punitive damages of $30,000.00 to denounce and deter the respondent’s conduct. She submits that the respondent made serious and unfounded accusations about the content of her broadcasts, refused to reinstate her after her maternity leave and intimidated her by disciplining her rather than providing her with coaching and guidance. [ 195 ] [COMPANY_41]. v. [NAME_46] , 2008 SCC 39, the SCC described the test for punitive damages as follows: [ 68 ] … this Court has stated that punitive damages should “receive the most careful consideration and the discretion to award them should be most cautiously exercised” ( [NAME_47] , at pp. 1104-5). Courts should only resort to punitive damages in exceptional cases ( [NAME_48] , at para. 69). The independent actionable wrong requirement is but one of many factors that merit careful consideration by the courts in allocating punitive damages. Another important thing to be considered is that conduct meriting punitive damages awards must be “harsh, vindictive, reprehensible and malicious”, as well as “extreme in its nature and such that by any reasonable standard it is deserving of full condemnation and punishment” ( [NAME_47], at p. 1108). … [ 196 ] The Board notes that, in the unjust dismissal context, the [NAME_18] upheld an award of $100,000.00 in punitive damages in [NAME_37] and an award of $25,000.00 in punitive damages in Spruce Hollow . [ 197 ] In Spruce Hollow , the [NAME_18] described that the test for awarding punitive damages in the employment context involved three elements (see paragraphs 119–122). First, the employee must demonstrate that the employer’s conduct is reprehensible, meaning that it is malicious, oppressive and high-handed. Second, the employee must show that an award of punitive damages in addition to compensatory damages is rationally required to punish the employer and meet the objectives of retribution, deterrence and denunciation. Third, the employee must establish that the employer committed an independent actionable wrong. The [NAME_18] described the proof required in the third element, as follows: [ 121 ] … The employee is not required to show that the employer committed a free-standing tort or that they have an independent cause of action, but rather that the employer breached a distinct contractual provision or other duty, including either a fiduciary obligation or the duty of good faith and fair dealing in termination: [NAME_48] , above at paragraphs. 79-82; [NAME_49] , above at paragraph 80. [ 198 ] Here, the Board finds that the complainant has established all three elements of the test for awarding punitive damages. The respondent behaved reprehensibly towards her by refusing to reinstate her following her maternity leave, disciplining and dismissing her without providing particulars and changing her schedule with one day’s notice without regard to her parenting responsibilities. The Board also finds that an award of punitive damages is needed to denounce and deter the respondent’s behaviour, particularly as it relates to its obligations to reinstate workers after [NAME_3] -protected leave and to maintain a discrimination-free workplace. [ 199 ] Finally, the Board is persuaded that the respondent committed an independent actionable wrong by failing to fulfill its duty of good faith and fair dealing in employment. It breached this duty by requiring an overly broad six-month non-compete clause and by dismissing the complainant without disclosing its allegations in a timely way, thereby denying her a fair opportunity to review and respond to the allegations. [ 200 ] In assessing the quantum of punitive damages, proportionality should be considered. In Spruce Hollow , the [NAME_18] identified the following factors as relevant to the principle of proportionality in punitive damages: [ 122 ] … 1. The blameworthiness of the defendant’s conduct;

2. The vulnerability of the plaintiff;

3. The harm or potential harm of the conduct to the plaintiff;

4. The need for deterrence;

5. The amount of any other damage awards; and 6. The amount of any resulting unjust enrichment: … [ 201 ] Having considered the above factors, the Board notes the particular vulnerability of the complainant because, on the date of dismissal, she had just returned to work from maternity leave after a two-month dispute about her return. Moreover, it is the Board’s view that the respondent engaged in conscious and unconscious acts to delay and deter the complainant’s return to work, with the consequence of inflicting significant harm on her and her family. [ 202 ] The Board assesses $15,000.00 in punitive damages as a proportional award in all these circumstances, to denounce and deter the respondent’s conduct.

VI. Confidentiality Order [ 203 ] The complainant filed a series of medical documents related to the diagnosis and treatment of her health conditions after the dismissal. The Board finds that these documents should be treated as confidential, pursuant to section 22 of the Canada Industrial Relations Board Regulations, 2012 , and it has issued a confidentiality order regarding the medical documents. Board order no. 1778-NB is attached.

VII. Conclusion [ 204 ] The Board finds that the complainant was unjustly dismissed by the respondent. As remedies for the unjust dismissal, the Board orders the respondent to pay compensation to the complainant as follows: Compensation of $39,878.28 for lost earnings less deductions for employment earnings; Interest on the compensation awarded in the amount of $142.69; Aggravated damages in the amount of $60,000.00; and Punitive damages in the amount of $15,000.00. [ 205 ] The Board has enclosed order no. 1779-NB, which directs the respondent to immediately pay these amounts to the complainant. [ 206 ] The Board notes that if the complainant has difficulty with the enforcement of the Board’s decision, she can proceed to file a copy of the Board’s order in the [NAME_18] after 14 days from this decision. She can also ask the Head of Compliance and Enforcement, through the inspector at the [NAME_6], to do so on her behalf (see section 244 of the [NAME_3] ). [ 207 ] The Board reminds the parties that the [NAME_6] suspended the complainant’s monetary complaint pending the outcome of the unjust dismissal process and that, in its decision of March 24, 2025, the CHRC retained jurisdiction regarding the complainant’s human rights complaint. The CHRC stated the following: The Complainant can return to the Commission within 60 days of the final decision in the other process to ask the Commission to reactivate their complaint, if they believe that their human rights issues were not adequately addressed. The Commission will then verify whether the other process adequately dealt with the human rights issues in order to decide whether or not to deal with the complaint. [ 208 ] The Board confirms that, for the purpose of the monetary complaint and the above-cited portion of the CHRC’s decision, this decision is the Board’s final decision in the unjust dismissal process. ____________________ [NAME_3]-Chairperson