Appeal Allowed: Humanitarian Grounds Against Deportation

OUTCOME: Allowed

IMMIGRATION AND PROTECTION TRIBUNAL NEW ZEALAND [2026] NZIPT 507271 [NAME], [NAME]

Appellant: [redacted]

Respondent: [redacted] Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment

Before: [NAME] (Member)

Counsel for the Appellant: [redacted]

Counsel for the Respondent: [redacted] 30 April 2026

__________________________________________________________________ DEPORTATION (NON-RESIDENT)

DECISION __________________________________________________________________ [1] This is a humanitarian appeal by the appellant, a 35-year-old citizen of [APPELLANT], against her liability for deportation which arose when she became unlawfully in New Zealand. The appeal includes [NAME], a six-year-old citizen of [APPELLANT]. THE ISSUE [2] The primary issue on appeal is whether [NAME]’s connection to New Zealand through his father and three younger siblings, the limited support and situation that the appellant and her son would be returning to in [APPELLANT], and the particular vulnerabilities of the appellant, give rise to exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature. [3] For the reasons that follow, the Tribunal allows the appeal and directs that the appellant and her son be granted resident visas.

2

BACKGROUND [4] The appellant was born in [APPELLANT]. Her evidence is that as a young child she was left by her mother with her paternal [NAME] in the [NAME] in Lautoka. When she was six, her grandmother passed away and she remained in the care of her grandfather and [NAME]. [5] When visiting New Zealand to care for an unwell relative in 2016 with [NAME], she developed further a relationship with a [NAME] living in New Zealand she had been communicating with. She returned to [APPELLANT] prior to the expiry of her visa, but later in 2016 returned to New Zealand with a visitor visa based on her partnership. She remained living with her partner in New Zealand who held an essential skills work visa. In August 2019 their son was born and the couple married in September 2019. [6] Difficulties arose in the couple’s relationship, and they separated in 2021. The appellant had intended for the relationship to resume and so made an application for a work visa supported by her husband in 2022. It was declined in August 2022 because she had developed type 2 diabetes which, at the time, was poorly managed. Immigration New Zealand therefore considered she was not of an acceptable standard of health. [7] In the meantime, the appellant’s husband was maintaining another relationship. Since then, he has had three children with his new partner. [8] The appellant remained in New Zealand unlawfully, and in June and October 2024 sought ministerial intervention pursuant to section 61 of the Immigration Act 2009 (the Act). These applications were both declined, however upon a further section 61 request in June 2025, the Minister of Immigration’s approved delegate deemed it appropriate to intervene, and she was issued a one-day visitor visa to trigger her appeal rights. [9] [NAME] has held visitor visas between August 2020 and January 2021, and August 2021 and January 2024, and was granted a one-day visitor visa with the appellant for the purpose of lodging this appeal. [10] The appeal was lodged on 7 August 2025.

3 [APPELLANT] [11] The [APPELLANT] for determining a humanitarian appeal are set out in section 207 of the Act: (1) The Tribunal must allow an appeal against liability for deportation on humanitarian [APPELLANT] only where it is satisfied that— (a) there are exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature that would make it unjust or unduly harsh for the appellant to be deported from New Zealand; and (b) it would not in all the circumstances be contrary to the public interest to allow the appellant to remain in New Zealand. [12] The Supreme Court stated that three ingredients had to be established in the first limb of section 47(3) of the [NAME] Immigration Act 1987, the almost identical predecessor to section 207(1): (i) exceptional circumstances; (ii) of a humanitarian nature; (iii) that would make it unjust or unduly harsh for the person to be removed from New Zealand: [NAME] v Minister of Immigration [2009] NZSC 76, [2010] 1 NZLR 104 at [34]. [13] To determine whether it would be unjust or unduly harsh for an appellant to be deported from New Zealand, the Supreme Court stated, in [NAME], at [35], that an appellant must show a level of harshness more than a “generic concern” and “beyond the level of harshness that must be regarded as acceptable in order to preserve the integrity of New Zealand’s [NAME]”. [APPELLANT] [14] [APPELLANT] is set out in her counsel’s submissions lodged with the Tribunal on 24 September 2025, and the appellant’s statement dated 28 August 2025, and can be summarised as follows: (a) [NAME] has a close and enduring relationship with his father whom he sees regularly. If he is deported, his relationship will be severed, as his father, who is a New Zealand resident (although also of [NAME] heritage), must remain in New Zealand where he has employment and three other children. The appellant fully supports her son’s relationship with his father, particularly given her experience growing up without involved parents.

4 (b) [NAME] was born in New Zealand and has never left the country. He attends school and is actively involved in sports and community activities in their local [NAME] and [NAME]. (c) [APPELLANT] appellant has work experience and qualifications in New Zealand working in [NAME] in the [NAME]. She is therefore highly employable in a sector that is difficult to recruit in. She has already made a contribution to New Zealand through her work, and is able to continue to do so if granted residence. Conversely in [APPELLANT] she would not have employment opportunities as such services are not required because the elderly are typically cared for by family. (d) The appellant cannot live with her mother as they are estranged due to her abandonment of the appellant as a toddler and an unsuccessful interaction in her teenage years. (e) The appellant’s father lives in a settlement in Suva with his wife and two of their five children. He works part-time and is an ill health. Their living conditions are crowded, and they are financially constrained. The appellant and her son are therefore unable to live with them should they return to [APPELLANT]. (f) The appellant has a brother and sister who live in [APPELLANT] in communities she is not familiar with. Her grandfather passed away in 2025 and the [NAME] she was additionally raised by now lives in American Samoa. (g) Therefore, the only place the appellant would be able to return to in [APPELLANT] is [NAME]’ [NAME] residence in the [NAME]. The home is however only two rooms and currently three of her adult cousins and their two children live there. The area is also unsuitable due to the lack of modern services and a prominent criminal and drug scene. Further, the [NAME] is well known for its toxic and dangerous environmental conditions and frequent flooding. (h) Because of her likely inability to work in [APPELLANT], if she is required to return, the appellant and her son would have to live in the unsuitable and undesirable environment that is the [NAME]. Given the lack of internet connection, her son would not be able to keep in

5 touch easily with his father and half siblings which would be detrimental to their relationship. (i) The appellant developed type 2 diabetes in 2021. It took her a considerable period after her diagnosis, primarily due to the difficulties she was having in her marriage, to obtain the medical care and support she required. Her diabetes is now well managed through diet and medication. (j) The appellant is of good character and well respected in her community, it is not therefore contrary to the public interest to allow her to remain in New Zealand. It is also in the public interest to allow her son to maintain his relationship with his paternal side of the family. Materials and Documents [15] In support of her appeal, the appellant provides the following documents: (a) Identity documents of the appellant and her son. (b) An undated statement from [NAME] stating that he sees his father and siblings and loves them. (c) Statements (20 February 2026 and 4 June 2025) from the son’s father expressing that his son is a central and irreplaceable part of his life, and he is a committed father as he has his son in his care regularly. The father also explains that his other children, as siblings, are close with his son. (d) A statement (28 March 2025) from the son’s [NAME] confirming his strong relationship with his father, his siblings and her. (e) Medical documents (3 July 2025) confirming that the appellant has type 2 diabetes, hypertension and raised cholesterol for which she is receiving treatment, and is “achieving good results”. (f) Support letters from the pastor of the appellant and her son’s [NAME] (19 March 2026, 4 September 2025 and 12 June 2024) stating that the appellant is a member of their women’s ministry and the son of

6 the [COMPANY], and they are committed members of the congregation. (g) Support letters (19 March 2026 and 2 August 2025) from a [COMPANY] of which the appellant and her son are members, stating that the appellant volunteers with the Trust and has begun participating in governance training. They are positive contributors to their community. Further, the writer has observed the son’s relationship with his father to be strong. (h) Support letters (12 August 2025 and 6 June 2024) from the president of a [NAME] confirming the appellant and her son have been members of the community for years and assist with fundraisers and community events. (i) A support letter (14 June 2025) from the family friend whom the appellant and her son currently live with confirming her financial support of them since September 2023. Also stating that the appellant assists in the home and volunteers in the community. (j) Support letters (5 August 2025, 6, 7, 11 and 13 June 2024) for the appellant and her son from members of the community attesting to their good characters, and supporting their continued presence in New Zealand. Also describing the appellant’s volunteer work. (k) Confirmation of the appellant’s [NAME] ([NAME]) unit standards in dementia and aged care. (l) A statement (18 August 2022) from the appellant’s previous employer recording that the appellant is an “excellent and skilled team member” and that it is difficult to source local employees for such roles. (m) Confirmation documents of the son’s attendance at school. (n) Photographs of the appellant and her son, and of the son with his father and siblings. (o) Photographs of the family home in the [NAME].

7 (p) [NAME] “[NAME]: Ticking Time Bomb Threatening Health and Environment” [COMPANY] ([APPELLANT], 4 July 2024). (q) [APPELLANT] “Health Ministry Urges Relocation of Rubbish Dump: Health and Environment at Stake” [NAME] (10 May 2024). (r) [NAME] “The Silent Threat: Scientist Tells of Hazardous Toxic Gas from Dump Fires” [NAME] (31 May 2024). (s) [APPELLANT] and [APPELLANT] [NAME] ([APPELLANT]) Community-Based Vulnerability Assessment and Climate Action Plan (Abridged Version) ([NAME], 12 August 2022). (t) [NAME] and others “Morbidity and mortality of people who live close to municipal waste landfills: a multisite cohort study” (2016) 45(3) [NAME] 806. (u) Medical documents confirming the appellant’s serious medical event (7 September 2025). ASSESSMENT [16] The Tribunal has considered the submissions and documents provided by the appellant. It has also considered the appellant’s Immigration New Zealand files in relation to her temporary visa applications and its relevant electronic records including her previous partner’s residence application. Whether there are Exceptional Circumstances of a Humanitarian Nature [17] Exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature “must be well outside the normal run of circumstances” and, while they do not need to be unique or very rare, they do have to be “truly an exception rather than the rule”: [NAME] v Minister of Immigration, at [34]. Circumstances in New Zealand [18] The appellant has lived in New Zealand for 10 years. For at least the first six years of that time she was in a relationship with [NAME]. The

8 Tribunal accepts her evidence that their relationship was uncertain and impacted on her psychological wellbeing due to the husband’s infidelity. She had understood that they would work to reconcile and that she (and their son) would continue to reside here. The protracted ending of the relationship was a difficult time for the appellant and coincided with her diabetes diagnosis. [19] In recent years, the appellant has been single and forced to rely on [NAME] and her community. She has been unable to work to support herself and her son, and in September 2025, she suffered a personal tragedy. [20] [NAME] in contrast had a new relationship to which three children were born, and ongoing employment. He also obtained a resident visa in December 2022. Immigration New Zealand’s electronic records indicate that he did not declare nor include his son within his application. [21] On the evidence provided, the Tribunal accepts that the appellant has been in an untenable position because of the impact on her of the end of her marriage and simultaneous events; for her it has been an extremely challenging period of her life. [22] The appellant and her son currently live with [NAME]. They are well supported and have established a strong community around them. They are a part of their local [NAME] and active members of their [NAME]. There is considerable evidence of the appellant volunteering in her community which, as noted in her many letters of support, is testament to her character. [23] The appellant previously worked as a caregiver in a [NAME] to which she wishes to return. She obtained [NAME] unit standards in dementia/aged care whilst doing so, and sees her future career in this area. The evidence from her employer establishes that she was a skilled and valued employee, and that such care work is an area of skills shortage. The Tribunal accepts that the appellant could support herself and her son if lawfully able to work in New Zealand, a position she has not been in since the end of her marriage. [24] The Tribunal accepts that the appellant has made a life for her and her son in New Zealand, to the best of her ability. Until 2022, she had understood her future to be in this country with her husband. Her change in circumstances has been difficult, however she has managed to cultivate a strong community around her small family, and with their help, re-established herself to a contributing member of society.

9 Best interests of the children [25] The Tribunal has an obligation to have regard to the best interests of any children affected by the outcome of an appeal, under Article 3(1) of the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child. Such children are [NAME], his two young half-brothers and half-sister. The best interests of children are a primary consideration and must be afforded substantial weight; [NAME] v Minister of Immigration [2008] NZCA 377, [2009] 2 NZLR 700 (CA) at [49]. [26] [NAME] has grown up in New Zealand having never left the country. He attends school, is involved with his [NAME] and [NAME], and plays various sports. He has regular contact with his father, [NAME], two half-brothers and half-sister. In his letter he says he loves his dad and siblings and has fun with them. [27] Should the son leave New Zealand, it appears unlikely he would be able to maintain any form of meaningful relationship with his father. His mother would not have the funds nor ability to continue to support their relationship. His father, who has lived in New Zealand since 2014, has three younger children who are New Zealand citizens and employment that would impede his ability to travel and the prospect of ongoing interactions. That the father did not declare the son in his application for residence would likely bar him from applying for a resident visa himself as a dependent child of his father (see instruction F5.1.b.i). Although there is an exception (at F5.1.e), the outcome of any application is highly uncertain which creates a lack of stability for the son. [28] The Tribunal is satisfied that it is in the son’s best interests to remain close to his father and siblings and not to be separated from them. He has grown up with them, albeit in separate households, and has strong bonds with them. His father is attentive and loving, and to continue their relationship is, the Tribunal finds, fundamental to the son’s favourable development. As the son has always lived in the primary care of the appellant, remaining here without her would be detrimental for him (even if the husband and [NAME] agreed) because he would be apart from his mother who is (most likely) his primary attachment figure. [29] Relocation to [APPELLANT] would involve significant adjustments for the son who has never visited there and so is unfamiliar with the country. His prospects there would be further adversely influenced by the fact that he and his mother would be joining an already overcrowded, and rudimentary home in an area with environmental hazards. His mother would be without a meaningful income until

10 she obtained employment, which would likely [NAME] some time. The Tribunal therefore finds that he would return to a situation where his mother would struggle to meet his nutritional and sanitary needs and where he would be exposed to the harsher realities of life.

For these reasons, it is in the son’s best interests to remain permanently in New Zealand. [30] With regard to the son’s half-siblings, they are all younger than him and therefore have grown up with him as a presence in their lives. The information is that they have a close relationship. The Tribunal finds that it is in their best interests if the son remains in New Zealand. This enables the continuity of their family unit as they know it. They will continue to grow up with their half-brother and will not have a father who is attempting to maintain a relationship with his son in [APPELLANT]. Circumstances in [APPELLANT] [31] When the appellant was very young, her mother left her in the care of her paternal [NAME]. Her mother visited her once and facilitated the appellant to visit her, however their relationship was strained, and they no longer have any contact.

For these reasons, although her mother lives in [APPELLANT], the appellant states that she is not able to live with her. Relying on this evidence, the Tribunal accepts that there is no relationship between the appellant and her mother and that that the appellant could not expect to receive social, emotional or housing support from her mother. [32] The appellant’s father and [NAME] live in [APPELLANT] with two of their five children. The appellant explains that they live in a small home, her father is not well, and the family has a precarious financial situation. On this evidence, the Tribunal accepts that the appellant and her son cannot live with them. The appellant also has a brother, his wife and four children in [APPELLANT]. However, she has no connection with them or the place they live and, fairly, does not consider she could live there. Likewise her sister, husband and three children live in another small village leading a subsistence lifestyle which the appellant also does not feel able to join. The appellant has two other brothers in [APPELLANT] about whom no evidence has been provided. [33] The Tribunal accepts the appellant’s evidence that should she be required to return to [APPELLANT], the only place she would realistically have to go to, would be the home she was raised in by [NAME] in the [NAME]. [NAME] are now deceased, and [NAME] (who helped raise her) lives

11 abroad. Three adult cousins and their two children currently live in the two bedroomed basic home. The Tribunal accepts it would be a primitive and overcrowded existence for the appellant, and particularly her son who has enjoyed the comforts of New Zealand his entire life. There is additionally no internet access at the home which would make it difficult for the son to retain meaningful contact with his father and half siblings. [34] The evidence is that the [NAME] is known for the [NAME], a 50-acre landfill dominating the area. The toxic fumes from the annual fires there and the general odour permeate the settlement. The site now encompasses a mangrove area, therefore the toxic waste is seeping into the sea. The health risks, particularly to local residents, are accepted; [NAME] [NAME] “The Silent Threat: Scientist Tells of Hazardous Toxic Gas from Dump Fires” [NAME] (31 May 2024). [35] Recurrent floods in the area, along with the proximity to the dump site, additionally have detrimental impacts on locals’ health and often children’s access to school, and as such women’s access to work. [NAME] and [APPELLANT] [NAME] ([APPELLANT]) Community-Based Vulnerability Assessment and Climate Action Plan (Abridged Version) ([NAME], 12 August 2022) at p14. [36] The Tribunal accepts the evidence of the undesirable circumstances in [NAME] and how that would impact the appellant and her son. The Tribunal is additionally satisfied that the appellant would find it challenging to obtain employment. She would likely not be able to find work in the aged/[NAME] sector that she is now experienced and qualified in, given the lack of such services in [APPELLANT]. Her previous work experience in [APPELLANT] was limited to casual work and as such would likely not assist her. [37] It is accepted that difficulties in re-establishing oneself in a home country, including disparities in economic opportunities and standards of living do not, of themselves, amount to exceptional humanitarian circumstances; [NAME] v Minister of Immigration (HC Wellington, AP56/99, 26 September 2000); and [NAME] v Chief Executive of the Department of Labour [1995] NZAR 509 (HC). However, the Tribunal considers the appellant’s situation is intensified by the fact that she would be bringing her young son, who is unfamiliar with [APPELLANT] and wholly used to New Zealand culture, into such an environment.

12 [38] The appellant has not lived in [APPELLANT] for 10 years and her son has never lived there. A return would require a significant adjustment for them both and, the Tribunal is satisfied, detrimentally affect their immediate and long-term prospects. Conclusion on exceptional humanitarian circumstances [39] After full consideration, the Tribunal finds that the removal of the appellant and her son from their established lives, and in particular the son from his relationship with his paternal family, amounts to exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature. The appellant herself has been in New Zealand for 10 years and has a level of vulnerability due to her family and personal circumstances. A return to [APPELLANT] for her would be traumatic and difficult, and for her son would be detrimental to his development. Furthermore, the Tribunal has found that it is in the son’s best interests to remain in the appellant’s primary care and to continue contact with his father and three siblings who reside in New Zealand. Whether it would be Unjust or Unduly Harsh for the Appellant to be Deported [40] Whether deportation would be unjust or unduly harsh must be assessed in light of the reasons why the appellant is liable for deportation and involves a balancing of those considerations against the consequences of deportation – [NAME] v Minister of Immigration [2015] NZSC 132, [2016] 1 NZLR 248, at [9]. [41] The appellant is liable for deportation because she became unlawfully in New Zealand following the expiry of her temporary visa. She did however lodge this appeal in an attempt to regularise her and her son’s immigration status within time, together with a large volume of supporting information. [42] The Tribunal accepts the evidence that the appellant’s first period of unlawful presence occurred primarily because she was in a difficult period of her life. She subsequently made several attempts to regularise her status, her third resulting in the Minister of Immigration’s delegate seeing fit to grant her a one-day visitor visa for the sole purpose of allowing her to lodge this appeal in order that the Tribunal could assess her and her son’s humanitarian circumstances. [43] The Tribunal is cognisant that [NAME] bears no responsibility for the fact that he is unlawfully in New Zealand where he has lived all his life.

13 [44] Whilst the Tribunal has regard for the integrity of immigration instructions and the general policy that individuals without a valid visa should not remain in New Zealand, it must be balanced against the consequences of deportation which have been identified above as amounting to exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature. To separate the son from his father and siblings to a country he has no familiarity with, the living conditions therein being harsh, would detrimentally affect his development. Moreover, the appellant’s experiences have placed her in a vulnerable situation with a young son to care for. To deport her now, would, the Tribunal considers, be unjust. Conclusion on injustice or undue harshness [45] Weighing the reason why the appellant and her son are liable for deportation to [APPELLANT] against the consequences of their deportation as discussed above, the Tribunal is satisfied that it would be unjust or unduly harsh for them to be deported. Public Interest [46] Where the Tribunal has determined that there are exceptional humanitarian circumstances which would make it unjust or unduly harsh for the appellant to be deported, it must also be satisfied that it would not be contrary to the public interest to allow the appellant to remain in New Zealand. This involves the weighing of those factors which would make it in the public interest for the appellant to remain against those which make it in the public interest that he leaves – [NAME] v Chief Executive of Department of Labour ([NAME], CIV-2004-485-102, 30 November 2004) at [41]. [47] The appellant explains that her unlawful status has been primarily created by the difficulties she was facing at the relevant time. The break down in her marriage, diabetes diagnosis and the withdrawal of her husband’s support for her immigration status were overwhelming. She found it difficult to cope with her situation and as such, it went unaddressed. [48] When she was able, the appellant made three attempts to seek ministerial intervention in order that she could regularise her status, and was successful on the third. Therefore, although the Tribunal acknowledges the public interest in maintaining the integrity of the [NAME], the appellant’s breach of her visa conditions is considered mitigated due to her circumstances.

14 [49] The appellant developed type 2 diabetes in 2021. She initially had difficulty adjusting to her diagnosis, particularly as it coincided with the period of disintegration of her marriage. It was for these reasons that she failed to proactively engage with Immigration New Zealand in the processing of her application for a work visa (when her diabetes was poorly controlled) and as such, her application for a work visa was declined. [50] The appellant also has hypertension and raised cholesterol. Her evidence however is that she is now sufficiently supported to manage her conditions, and they are controlled well by medication. Her doctor’s letter (3 July 2025) confirms this. [51] The Tribunal finds that the appellant’s health conditions may present a potential burden on the [NAME] in due course. However, whilst actively managed by diet and medication, as they currently are, they do not impose significant costs or demands on [COMPANY]. [52] The appellant has provided a clear New Zealand conviction check (19 September 2025) and the Tribunal has obtained an updated, likewise clear, check (21 April 2026). The appellant has applied for a new [NAME] passport in order to obtain a police check from [APPELLANT], however it has not to date been issued. She has provided a statutory declaration (28 April 2026) confirming that she does not have any convictions nor pending charges in [APPELLANT]. She had previously provided a clear [NAME] police check (21 July 2021) to Immigration New Zealand. Given the appellant has resided in New Zealand for 10 years, the Tribunal accepts that the appellant presents no character concerns. [53] There is also a public interest in New Zealand upholding its international obligations to preserve the family unit; see Article 23(1) of 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Article 9 of the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child. The son has a strong and ongoing connection with his father and siblings and it is in his best interests for these relationships to continue within the context of the family unit. Conclusion on public interest [54] Having regard to all the above, the Tribunal determines that it would not, in all the circumstances, be contrary to the public interest for the appellant to remain in New Zealand permanently.

15 Certified to be the Research Copy released for publication.

[NAME] [55] For the reasons given, the Tribunal finds that there are exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature which would make it unjust or unduly harsh for the appellant and her son to be deported from New Zealand. [56] The Tribunal also finds that it would not in all the circumstances be contrary to the public interest for them to remain in New Zealand on a permanent basis. Order for Grant of a Visa [57] The Tribunal accepts that the appellant’s vulnerabilities heighten the need for her to have a stable environment in which she can provide fully and effectively for her son in New Zealand. The son’s predicament, in any application relying on his relationship with his father, is highly uncertain. Further, as his relationships with his paternal family are ongoing, any temporary visa would not address what is in his best interests. Therefore, pursuant to section 210(1)(a) of the Act, the Tribunal orders that the appellant and her son be granted resident visas. Order as to Depersonalised Research Copy [58] Pursuant to clause 19 of Schedule 2 of the Immigration Act 2009, the Tribunal orders that, until further order, the research copy of this decision is to be depersonalised by removal of the appellant’s name and any particulars likely to lead to the identification of the appellant or her son and his family members, or information regarding a medical event. This is because the son is a minor and the decision contains health information in respect of which the appellant is entitled to privacy. “[NAME]” [NAME]