Immigration & Protection Tribunal Allows Humanitarian Appeal Against Deportation

OUTCOME: Allowed

IMMIGRATION AND PROTECTION TRIBUNAL NEW ZEALAND [2026] NZIPT 507083 RŌPŪ TAKE MANENE, TAKE WHAKAMARU AOTEAROA

Appellant: [redacted]

Respondent: [redacted] Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment

Before: [NAME_1] (Member)

Representative for the Appellant: [redacted]

Counsel for the Respondent: [redacted]

Date of Decision: 21 April 2026

__________________________________________________________________ DEPORTATION (NON-RESIDENT)

DECISION __________________________________________________________________ [1] This is a humanitarian appeal by the appellant, a 59-year-old citizen of India, against his liability for deportation which arose when he became unlawfully in New Zealand. THE ISSUE [2] The primary issue on appeal is whether there are exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature, arising from the appellant’s receipt of, and referrals, for [NAME_3] ([NAME_3]) funded treatment and assessment for injuries experienced in New Zealand, such that it would be unjust or unduly harsh for him to be deported. [3] For the reasons that follow, the Tribunal finds that there are exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature that would make it unjust or unduly harsh for the appellant to be deported. It also finds that it would not, in all the circumstances, be contrary to the public interest for the appellant to remain in

2 New Zealand on a temporary basis. The Tribunal allows the appeal and orders the grant of a multiple entry seven-month work visa to the appellant.

BACKGROUND [4] The appellant holds a Bachelor of Science and a Master of Science from a university in India. He arrived in New Zealand in January 2018 to undertake studies towards a Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) in chemistry at [COMPANY_4]. He held two student visas for this purpose. [5] In 2018 and 2020, while studying at [COMPANY_4], the appellant alleges he experienced two sexual assaults by university staff. [6] In August 2020, the appellant reported to [COMPANY_4] that his PhD research had been plagiarised by a student from another university in New Zealand. In turn, [COMPANY_4] commenced disciplinary proceedings against the appellant for plagiarism and, subsequently, litigation in the District Court. [7] In June 2021, [COMPANY_4] terminated the appellant’s PhD enrolment on the grounds that his PhD thesis supervisor had withdrawn due to irreconcilable differences between himself and the appellant, and the [NAME_5] had been unable to identify an alternative chief supervisor for his thesis research. [8] Since August 2021, the appellant has initiated various complaints and proceedings related to the termination of his PhD and allegations that he plagiarised his PhD research and his allegations of sexual assault, including with the Office of the [NAME_6] (the [NAME_6]), the [NAME_7], the Human Rights Commission and the Human Rights Review Tribunal ([NAME_8]). A number of these matters remain extant. [9] In September 2021, the appellant commenced working for a company that offered horticultural services. He was granted a two-year essential skills work visa, permitting him to work as a workforce supervisor at the horticultural company, in April 2022. [10] In July 2022, the appellant unsuccessfully applied for a resident visa under the 2021 Resident Visa category.

3 [11] In May 2023, the appellant injured his Achilles tendon in a workplace accident. He has, as recently as March 2026, received [NAME_3] funded treatment for this injury and continues to receive [NAME_3]-funded treatment in relation to his sexual assaults. [12] In April 2024, the appellant applied for a post-study open work visa. However, he did not meet the criteria for such, and Immigration New Zealand replaced his application with a visitor visa application to allow him to work through his personal matters (being his ongoing legal matters with [COMPANY_4]). He was granted a six-month visitor visa in August 2024. [13] In February 2025, the appellant applied for a medical treatment visitor visa. Immigration New Zealand declined his application in March 2025. [14] In April 2025, the appellant became unlawfully in New Zealand following the expiry of his interim visa which has been granted while the appellant’s visitor visa application was processed. [15] Also in April 2025, the appellant requested a visa under section 61 of the Immigration Act 2009. The Minister of Immigration refused to grant him a visa in May 2025. [16] On 2 May 2025, the appellant lodged the present appeal against his deportation liability. STATUTORY GROUNDS [17] The grounds for determining a humanitarian appeal are set out in section 207 of the Immigration Act 2009 (the Act): (1) The Tribunal must allow an appeal against liability for deportation on humanitarian grounds only where it is satisfied that— (a) there are exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature that would make it unjust or unduly harsh for the appellant to be deported from New Zealand; and (b) it would not in all the circumstances be contrary to the public interest to allow the appellant to remain in New Zealand. [18] The Supreme Court stated that three ingredients had to be established in the first limb of section 47(3) of the former Immigration Act 1987, the almost identical predecessor to section 207(1): (i) exceptional circumstances; (ii) of a

4 humanitarian nature; (iii) that would make it unjust or unduly harsh for the person to be removed from New Zealand: Ye v Minister of Immigration [2009] NZSC 76, [2010] 1 NZLR 104 at [34]. [19] To determine whether it would be unjust or unduly harsh for an appellant to be deported from New Zealand, the Supreme Court stated, in Ye, at [35], that an appellant must show a level of harshness more than a “generic concern” and “beyond the level of harshness that must be regarded as acceptable in order to preserve the integrity of [NAME_9]”. THE APPELLANT’S CASE [20] The appellant’s case is set out the representative’s submissions (dated 2 May 2025, 5 October 2025 and 12 January 2026) and can be summarised as follows: (a) The appellant has suffered physical and psychological injuries while in New Zealand, for which he continues to receive [NAME_3]-funded, multi-disciplinary treatment, including “Rongoā Māori”. As the survivor of sexual assault, he faces stigma, legal exclusion and no support in India. (b) The appellant’s PhD studies were terminated without due process, and he is seeking redress through [NAME_10]. He has active legal proceedings with the [NAME_8], the [NAME_6], the Human Rights Commission, the [NAME_7] and will undertake legal proceedings with higher courts. His presence in New Zealand is required to provide direct and oral evidence, engage with various investigations and legal processes and “mitigate the severe disadvantage posed by lack of legal representation”. He is currently effectively barred from academic or professional re-engagement and the plagiarism accusations and termination of his PhD studies have created permanent reputational damage. (c) The appellant has exhausted his immigration pathways, including multiple ministerial requests. He has also incurred costs and lost income of NZD 404,850 while in New Zealand.

5 (d) Deportation would disproportionately harm the appellant by disrupting his healthcare, preventing him from participating in his ongoing proceedings, causing him to lose seven years of academic effort (and the associated costs), opening him up to cultural and social stigma and undermining systemic accountability for the university in which he was enrolled in a PhD program. (e) The appellant does not pose a burden on [NAME_18]. Between 2018 and 2022, he covered his medical expenses through insurance and personal funds. From May 2023, he has received [NAME_3]-funded injury-related treatment but has also contributed levies to this scheme. He has no criminal history, is of good moral character, financially stable and intends to depart New Zealand after the resolution of his legal matters. He has contributed to New Zealand through his academic work, community service and employment as an essential worker during the March to June 2020 COVID-19 lockdown. (f) The appellant’s deportation would breach sections 19 and 27 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA); sections 21 and 44 of the Human Rights Act 1993; Articles 2, 7, 13, 14 and 26 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); and Article 12 of the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). [21] The representative requests that the appellant be granted an oral hearing and seeks various forms of relief (see [28]–[30] below). Materials and Documents [22] In support of the appeal, the representative provided comprehensive bundles of evidence on 2 May 2025, 5 October 2025, 12 January 2026 and 8 February 2026. He also provided a bundle of authorities on 12 January 2026. Further Correspondence with the Tribunal [23] On 19 May 2025, the representative sought: an interim order under section 210 of the Act staying two deportation liability notices issued to the appellant on 16 and 18 May 2025; a direction that Immigration New Zealand refrain from enforcing the appellant’s deportation pending finalisation of his appeal;

6 the grant of an interim visa to the appellant for the duration of his appeal; and any other relief the Tribunal considered appropriate. [24] On 21 May 2025, the Tribunal advised that: Immigration New Zealand cannot take deportation or removal action against the appellant prior to the determination of his appeal under section 175A of the Act; and the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to order the grant of an interim visa prior to the determination of the appeal. ASSESSMENT [25] The Tribunal has considered the submissions and documents provided by the appellant. It has also considered the appellant’s Immigration New Zealand file in relation to his temporary visa applications and its relevant electronic records. No Oral Hearing Directed [26] With respect to the representative’s invitation to the Tribunal to hear from the appellant in person, the Tribunal acknowledges that it “may, in its absolute discretion, provide an oral hearing” in relation to an appeal against deportation liability which is not brought by a New Zealand resident or permanent resident (section 233(2) of the Act). The representative requests the hearing to allow the appellant to directly address complex factual and legal issues, clarify disputed facts and provide direct evidence of his medical, legal and personal circumstances and to ensure a fair and transparent process in accordance with section 27 of NZBORA. [27] In the present appeal, the Tribunal finds that the appellant has had a fair opportunity to provide documentary evidence and has, with the assistance of his representative, provided comprehensive and updated documentary evidence in support of his case. The Tribunal therefore declines to exercise its absolute discretion to direct a hearing in this case. The Tribunal’s Jurisdiction [28] The representative requests that the Tribunal grant the appellant various forms of relief, some of which are outside the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. These are: delaying the appellant’s deportation for at least three years; granting a 12- to 24-month work visa; waiving the appellant’s prohibition on re-entry to

7 New Zealand; and granting the appellant leave to appeal its decision to the High Court. [29] Under the Act, the maximum period the Tribunal may delay deportation for is 12 months (see section 216(1)(a)). Similarly, the maximum period for which it may order the grant of a temporary visa is 12 months (see section 210(1)(b) and section 216(1)(b)). Because the appellant is unlawfully in New Zealand under section 154 and is not subject to a deportation order, he is not presently subject to a prohibition on re-entry to New Zealand (see section 179(1)). Finally, the question of leave to appeal the Tribunal’s decision is a matter for the High Court or, in certain circumstances, the Court of Appeal (see section 245). [30] It is open to the appellant to seek legal advice as to the extent of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction and its application to his circumstances. Whether there are Exceptional Circumstances of a Humanitarian Nature [31] Exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature “must be well outside the normal run of circumstances” and, while they do not need to be unique or very rare, they do have to be “truly an exception rather than the rule”: Ye v Minister of Immigration, at [34]. Settlement in New Zealand [32] The appellant has been in New Zealand for over eight years. He held a student visa for his first four years here, then an essential skills work visa. Most recently, he has held a visitor visa. [33] Initially, the appellant studied towards a PhD in chemistry. He also worked, between March and June 2020, as a grader at an orchard. From 2022, he has worked in a supervisor role at a horticultural company. He has not had the right to work in New Zealand since mid-2024, when he was granted a visitor visa, and appears to be supporting himself using savings. [34] The appellant provides two affidavit (25 March 2025 and 12 January 2026) in which he affirms that he has no intention to remain in New Zealand on a permanent basis.

8 The appellant’s medical treatment [35] The appellant is undergoing medical treatment for injuries suffered in New Zealand, being post-traumatic stress disorder and comorbid major depressive disorder with moderate anxious distress and an ankle injury. [36] The appellant alleges he experienced two sexual assaults, in 2018 and 2020, while at [COMPANY_4]. In 2023, he began to receive [NAME_3]-funded treatment for post-traumatic stress disorder and major depressive disorder connected to the sexual assaults, which remains ongoing. Prior to 2023, the appellant had personally funded treatment. He has now applied for permanent injury compensation from [NAME_3]. [37] In January and February 2026, the appellant attended therapy sessions with a [NAME_11]. He currently has active [NAME_3]-funded referrals for trauma-informed psychological therapy and an impairment assessment for post-traumatic stress disorder and depression as part of his application for permanent injury compensation. [38] In May 2023, the appellant suffered a workplace injury. He was carrying a 20 to 40kg bag when his foot became stuck in a rabbit hole, and he has experienced pain in his ankle and lower leg since then. He was diagnosed with insertional Achilles tendinopathy with large calcific chunk embedded within the Achilles insertion and has undergone both physiotherapy, hydrotherapy and specialist review since his injury. He has also engaged with other [NAME_3]-funded services, as part of his rehabilitation, including beginning a vocational independence process. An [NAME_3] medical certificate states that the appellant remains unfit to work until 6 May 2026. He has a recovery goal, with [NAME_3], of returning to alternative type of work by the end of May 2026. [39] A referral document (19 January 2026) from the appellant’s general practitioner to a consultant orthopaedic surgeon records that the appellant continues to wear a moonboot for his injury, has an antalgic gait (limp) and likely he has chronic regional pain syndrome given his ongoing weightbearing limitations and restricted range of movement in the ankle and subtalar joint. He is prescribed painkillers and uses walking aids. The appellant requested re-referral to the orthopaedic specialist for consideration of surgical intervention as exercise and physiotherapy has not been “that effective”. His referral was accepted, with an appointment scheduled for 6 March 2026. He was also scheduled to attend an

9 MRI appointment in February 2026 and in February 2026 attended a physiotherapy session with a [NAME_11]. [40] The Tribunal accepts that the appellant is currently unfit to work until May 2026 due to an Achilles tendon injury. It also accepts that he has applied for permanent injury compensation, in relation to his 2018 sexual assault, and that he has been referred for ongoing psychological treatment and an impairment assessment. Ongoing disputes and legal proceedings [41] The Tribunal’s humanitarian jurisdiction focuses its exceptional circumstances assessment on the consequences of an appellant’s deportation, rather than the merits of any ongoing legal disputes or other complaints. As such, the Tribunal does not intend to set out the details of the appellant’s previous and ongoing disputes, although it accepts that he engaged in complaints and legal processes regarding the termination of his PhD studies, his plagiarism case and his allegations of experiencing sexual assault. [42] It suffices to record that the appellant first filed a complaint against [COMPANY_4] in 2020 and his disputes have been ongoing since then, traversing several topics and organisations. [COMPANY_4] has similarly engaged with its disciplinary processes and brought litigation against the appellant in the District Court. [43] Currently, the appellant’s proceedings against [COMPANY_4] in the [NAME_8] are subject to a stay order (7 July 2025) while the High Court judicially reviews a decision of an [NAME_8] not to recuse himself from determining the appellant’s [NAME_8] proceedings. [44] Additionally, the [NAME_6] is investigating complaints by the appellant in relation to requests for information under the Official Information Act 1980 from [COMPANY_4] (regarding his plagiarism case) and the New Zealand Police (regarding his sexual assault complaint). The [NAME_7] is reviewing complaints by the appellant against both [COMPANY_4] and the New Zealand Police under the Privacy Act 2020. [45] Finally, in December 2025, the Independent Police Conduct Authority’s [NAME_12] commenced an assessment of the police’s investigation of the appellant’s complaint of experiencing sexual assaults in 2018 and 2020.

10 The appellant has not provided any indication of when he expects his active complaints and proceedings to be finalised. [46] The representative submits that the appellant’s deportation would breach the appellant’s right to natural justice and due process and his right to a fair trial (see Article 14 of the ICCPR and section 27 of NZBORA). He submits that deportation would “render [the appellant’s] proceedings ineffective or futile, particularly given the need for physical presence, local evidence, and participation in investigative processes”. Similarly, the appellant writes, in his May 2025 affidavit, that “remote participation is not feasible, and my absence would jeopardize my case”. He considers, as per his January 2026 affidavit, that his presence in New Zealand is required to mitigate the fact that he is self-represented. Neither the appellant nor the representative has explained the basis of these statements nor provided any supporting evidence. [47] It is evident that the appellant feels highly aggrieved by his experiences in New Zealand and that these experiences have unfolded in a way he would not have anticipated when he first travelled here to commence his studies. He has pursued several avenues to address his grievances, as he is entitled to do, and it is evident that he is actively engaged in his ongoing legal disputes and complaints, with the assistance of the representative. The Tribunal accepts that it is the appellant’s clear preference to remain in New Zealand until his ongoing proceedings are finalised. [48] However, the fact of the appellant’s ongoing disputes and legal proceedings does not, of itself, amount to an exceptional humanitarian circumstance. While entitled to bring his various complaints and lodge legal proceedings, the appellant has done so without the right to remain here on a permanent basis. [49] Further, the appellant's complaints before the [NAME_6], the [NAME_7] and the [NAME_12] are on the papers, and he has not demonstrated that he will be unable to engage with these processes from India. His deportation therefore would not interfere with his rights to natural justice and due process, under both NZBORA and the ICCPR. Similarly, the appellant has not demonstrated that he will be unable to attend and provide evidence in his proceedings before the High Court or the [NAME_8], through remote participation mechanisms, or that his proceedings will be prejudiced through his remote participation. It is open to the appellant to instruct counsel if he feels unable to manage his proceedings from India without legal representation.

11 [50] Finally, the representative’s submission regarding the appellant’s financial losses following the termination of his PhD is noted. However, his financial losses are not a consequence of his potential deportation and are not relevant to the Tribunal’s exceptional humanitarian circumstances assessment. Circumstances in India [51] The appellant retains a familial and cultural nexus to India. His mother resides there, and he has made several return trips to India since first travelling to New Zealand. Additionally, the appellant has spent most of his life in India and he will be familiar with the lifestyle, language and culture there, and will have both personal and professional relationships which may assist him as he re-establishes himself there. [52] Prior to travelling to New Zealand, the appellant worked in the field of chemistry, including as a senior chemist. Most recently, he held employment as a chemistry lecturer at an institute of technical education in India and freelanced as a chemistry tutor for another organisation in India. [53] The representative submits that the termination of the appellant’s PhD studies, and the allegations of plagiarism have caused him permanent reputational damage and barred him from academic and professional re-engagement. Although the representative has not provided evidence in support of these submissions, the Tribunal acknowledges that he may face difficulties in re-entering academia, particularly due to the plagiarism allegations. However, the appellant has a long professional history in India and has worked both in and out of academia. His previous work experience may assist him to find employment, if required to return to India, although it may take him some time. [54] The representative submits that, in India, the appellant will face stigma, legal exclusion and no support following his experiences of sexual assault in New Zealand. However, submissions are made in general terms without reference to the appellant’s particular circumstances. The supporting evidence does not demonstrate that the appellant, in particular, will experience any of the above or that he will be unable to access any required ongoing medical treatment in India. Nor does the evidence before the Tribunal suggest that a return to India will re-traumatise the appellant, deny him access to essential care or constitute inhuman or degrading treatment, as the representative submits. Indeed, according to the appellant’s affidavits of May 2025 and January 2026, he intends

12 to return to India in the future and seeks a multiple entry work visa that will allow him to return to India to visit his mother. Conclusion on exceptional humanitarian circumstances [55] The High Court has held that the stringent statutory test of “exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature” cannot be equated with “compassionate factors”, circumstances that are more than simply “routine”, or “genuinely concerning circumstances”. The High Court has also noted “the high threshold for a finding of exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature”; see Minister of Immigration v Jooste [2014] NZHC 2882, [2015] 2 NZLR 765 at [45]. [56] The appellant’s length of time in New Zealand and his level of settlement here are not out of the ordinary. It is evident that he feels highly aggrieved by his experiences with [COMPANY_4] in New Zealand and has, as he is entitled to, taken steps to access legal remedies, some of which remain ongoing. However, the appellant has not demonstrated that he will be unable to participate in any of his active complaints or proceedings from offshore or that he will be prejudiced if he is unable to remain in New Zealand until their resolution (the anticipated timeframe for which is not clear). [57] The appellant retains a familial nexus to India, through his mother, and where he will be familiar with the lifestyle. While his PhD termination and plagiarism case may make it difficult for the appellant to re-enter academia in India, he has not demonstrated that he has suffered reputational damage such that he could not re-establish himself there. Nor has he demonstrated that he faces stigma, exclusion or a lack of support there arising from his experiences of being sexually assaulted. [58] However, the appellant is receiving ongoing [NAME_3]-funded medical treatment for injuries experienced in New Zealand. This includes a recovery plan targeting a return to work by the end of May 2026. He has also been referred for trauma-informed psychological therapy. Importantly, the appellant has been referred for an impairment assessment for permanent injury compensation arising from post-traumatic stress disorder and depression originating from an injury in 2018. The Tribunal is satisfied that the appellant’s active referrals for [NAME_3]-funded medical treatment, and his ongoing application for permanent injury compensation, arising from injuries experienced in the workplace in New Zealand give rise to exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature at this time.

13 Whether it would be Unjust or Unduly Harsh for the Appellant to be Deported [59] Whether deportation would be unjust or unduly harsh must be assessed in light of the reasons why the appellant is liable for deportation and involves a balancing of those considerations against the consequences of deportation; [NAME_13] v Minister of Immigration [2015] NZSC 132, [2016] 1 NZLR 248 at [9]. [60] The appellant is liable for deportation because he is unlawfully in New Zealand, following the expiry of his interim visa, granted while his application for a medical treatment visitor visa was processed. [61] The representative’s submissions suggest that the New Zealand State bears some responsible for the appellant’s unlawful status, because Immigration New Zealand refused to grant him a visitor visa despite his efforts to regularise his status. This submission is wholly rejected. It has been the appellant’s responsibility, at all times, to retain lawful status in New Zealand. That he did not meet the criteria in instructions for the grant of a medical treatment visitor visa does not transfer responsibility for his immigration status to either Immigration New Zealand or the State. Nor does his desire to remain in New Zealand, regardless of the reason, absolve him of his responsibility to do so lawfully. It has always been the appellant’s responsibility to comply with the terms of his temporary visas, including by departing prior to their expiry. His actions in failing to do so were not “beyond his control” as submitted and constitute a breach of the integrity of the immigration system. [62] Weighing against the appellant’s deportation liability is the exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature identified above, in particular his active referrals for trauma-informed psychological therapy and an impairment assessment for his permanent injury compensation application, relating to post-traumatic stress and depression. Conclusion on injustice or undue harshness [63] Balancing the reason for the appellant’s deportation liability (his unlawful presence in New Zealand) against his exceptional circumstances (his active referrals for medical treatment), the Tribunal finds that it would be unjust or unduly harsh for him to be deported from New Zealand at this time.

14 Public Interest [64] Where the Tribunal has determined that there are exceptional humanitarian circumstances which would make it unjust or unduly harsh for the appellant to be deported, it must also be satisfied that it would not be contrary to the public interest to allow the appellant to remain in New Zealand. This involves the weighing of those factors which would make it in the public interest for the appellant to remain against those which make it in the public interest that he leaves; [NAME_14] v Chief Executive of Department of Labour (HC Auckland, CIV-2004-485-102, 30 November 2004) at [41]. [65] The Tribunal has found that it would be unjust or unduly harsh to deport the appellant, because of his exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature. There is a public interest in avoiding outcomes which are unjust or unduly harsh; [NAME_15] v Immigration and Protection Tribunal and Minister of Immigration [2015] NZSC 28, [2016] 1 NZLR 298 at [169]. [66] There is a public interest in maintaining the integrity of the immigration system. It is concerning that the appellant attributes responsibility for his unlawful status to the New Zealand State when it has been, at all times, his responsibility to maintain lawful status in New Zealand and depart prior to the expiry of his visa. Nevertheless, the Tribunal does not consider the appellant’s actions in remaining in New Zealand to pursue the present appeal constitute a significant breach of the integrity of the immigration system. [67] There are no other adverse public interest factors. Importantly, since 2023, the appellant has been in receipt of [NAME_3]-funded treatment for injuries suffered in New Zealand and he has active referrals for such. Allowing the appellant to access the [NAME_3]-funded care to which he has already been referred and for his permanent injury compensation impairment assessment to be completed would be consistent with the purpose of the Accident Compensation Act 2001 (see sections 3(c) and 3(d)). [68] The appellant provided a police certificate (22 May 2024) from India, which was clear. The Tribunal has obtained a Ministry of Justice criminal history check (16 April 2024) which is also clear. [69] For the sake of completeness, the Tribunal records that there is no public interest factor in the present appeal that requires the appellant to remain in New Zealand for the duration of his legal proceedings. The Tribunal has found

15 that the appellant has not demonstrated that he is required to remain in New Zealand for the duration of these proceedings. Nor has he demonstrated that he cannot engage with these proceedings meaningfully from offshore. Conclusion on public interest [70] Having weighed the above public interest factors, the Tribunal finds that it would not, in all the circumstances, be contrary to the public interest for the appellant to remain in New Zealand on a temporary basis so that he can access the trauma-informed psychological therapy to which he has been referred, complete his recovery plan and attend the impairment assessment for his permanent injury compensation application. DETERMINATION [71] For the reasons given, the Tribunal finds that there are exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature which would make it unjust or unduly harsh for the appellant to be deported from New Zealand at this time. [72] The Tribunal also finds that it would not in all the circumstances be contrary to the public interest for him to remain in New Zealand on a temporary basis to access the medical treatment and impairment assessment to which he has been referred. Order for Grant of a Visa [73] Pursuant to section 210(1)(b) of the Act, the Tribunal orders that the appellant be granted a multiple-entry work visa for a period of seven months. The purpose of this visa is to allow him to complete his recovery plan (targeting fitness to return to work at the end of May 2026) and access referrals to trauma-informed psychological therapy and, importantly, an impairment assessment for permanent injury compensation for post-traumatic stress disorder and depression originating from an injury in 2018. The impairment assessment referral was made in January 2026 and the referral document states that it may take up to approximately six months for an appointment to be scheduled. Noting that it is now April 2025, a seven-month work visa will provide time for the appointment to be scheduled and the assessment to be completed. Although not the purpose for which this visa is ordered, it will also allow for the appellant to seek a period of

16 Certified to be the Research Copy released for publication.

[NAME_1] Member employment before he returns to India, if he wishes to, and to make any arrangements he considers necessary regarding his various legal proceedings. [74] The appeal is allowed in the above terms. Order as to Depersonalised Research Copy [75] Pursuant to clause 19 of Schedule 2 of the Immigration Act 2009, the Tribunal orders that, until further order, the research copy of this decision is to be depersonalised by removal of the appellant’s name and any particulars likely to lead to the identification of the appellant. This is to protect the privacy of the appellant’s health information. “[NAME_1]” [NAME_1] Member