Company Fails to Respond, Licence Revocation Upheld by Upper Tribunal

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UKUT 23 (AAC) Appeal No. UA-2025-000794-T

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS CHAMBER

[COMPANY] Appellant

Before: Upper Tribunal Judge Citron and Upper Tribunal Members [NAME]

Hearing date: 1 December 2025 Hearing mode: Cloud Video Platform

Representation: Appellant:

[redacted]

On appeal from: Decision maker: Traffic Commissioner Ref:

OD2053253 Date of decision: 13 May 2025

SUMMARY OF DECISION

100 Transport – Traffic Commissioner Appeals 100.12 Revocation

The appellant, a company, did not respond to communications from the [NAME] stating that the Traffic Commissioner was minded to revoke its good vehicles operator’s licence under the provisions of both section 26 and section 27 of the Goods Vehicles (Licensing of Operators) Act 1995. The Upper Tribunal decided that the Traffic Commissioner could not be said to be plainly wrong in deciding, following expiry of reasonable deadlines set for the appellant to respond, to direct revocation, given that the case for revocation under one or both of those sections, as set out in the communications from the Traffic Commissioner, was adequately coherent and rational. The appeal against the revocation of the appellant’s licence was therefore dismissed.

Please note the Summary of Decision is included for the convenience of readers. It does not form part of the decision. The Decision and Reasons of the judge follow.

[COMPANY])

Appeal no. UA-2025-000794-T NCN [2026] UKUT 23 (AAC)

2 DECISION

The decision of the Upper Tribunal is to dismiss the appeal.

Subject matter

Revocation of goods vehicles operator’s licence Failure to respond to Office of Traffic Commissioner

Cases referred to

[COMPANY] & anor v Secretary of State for Transport [2010] EWCA Civ 695 [NAME] Appeal 2005/472 [NAME] t/a [NAME] 2001/12

REASONS FOR DECISION

The decision appealed against 1. The appellant, a company, appealed to the Upper Tribunal against a decision of a Traffic Commissioner (the “[NAME]”) in a letter (the “decision letter”) from the office of the [NAME] (“[NAME]”) dated 13 May 2025 revoking (from 16 May 2025 at 23:59) the appellant’s goods vehicles operator’s licence under the Goods Vehicles (Licensing of Operators) Act 1995. (In what follows (unless the context otherwise indicates), references to “sections” or “s” are to sections of that Act, and references to “Schedules” are to its schedules.)

2. According to the decision letter, the grounds for the [NAME] deciding to direct revocation, under s26(1)(h), were that since the licence had been issued (or varied) there had been a material change in any of the circumstances of the licence-holder that were relevant to the issue (or variation) of the licence – namely, changes to financial standing and repute. The decision letter also said that the [NAME]’s direction to revoke was required under s27(1), as it appeared to the [NAME] that the appellant no longer satisfied the first requirement in s13A (including that the appellant was of good repute and had appropriate financial standing) or the second requirement there (that the appellant had designated a suitable number of individuals who satisfied the transport manager requirements in paragraph 14A of Schedule 3).

3. The decision letter also set out context, including:

[COMPANY])

Appeal no. UA-2025-000794-T NCN [2026] UKUT 23 (AAC)

3 a. [NAME]’s letter to the appellant of 26 March 2025 notifying the appellant that the [NAME] was considering revoking its licence b. [NAME]’s letter to the appellant of 16 January 2025 requesting evidence that the appellant continued to meet the requirement of financial standing; no response had been received c. the sole director of the appellant, [NAME], had recently been appointed sole director of another company with an operator’s licence, [COMPANY]; and that that company had been found to lack financial standing and been allowed a period of grace to correct the situation. Further background 4. We note that: a. the decision letter was marked as sent via recorded delivery and email to the same email address as ‘[COMPANY]’ (see sub- paragraph d. below); b. [NAME]’s 26 March 2025 letter i. was marked as sent via recorded delivery and email to the same email address as ‘[COMPANY]’ (see sub-paragraph d. below); ii. cited the fact at paragraph 3c above as meaning that the [NAME] could not be satisfied that the appellant continued to meet the requirement for financial standing; iii. cited the appellant’s failure to respond to [NAME] correspondence as meaning that the [NAME] was no longer satisfied that the requirement of good repute was met; and iv. gave the appellant until 16 April 2025 to make written representations for the [NAME]’s consideration and/or to request a public inquiry (this was in compliance with s27(2) and (3) and s29(1)); c. [NAME]’s 16 January 2025 letter, citing changes in directorship, required the appellant to provide financial evidence in the name of [NAME] showing it had ready access to sufficient resources to support its licence; various documents were required to be submitted by 30 January 2025

[COMPANY])

Appeal no. UA-2025-000794-T NCN [2026] UKUT 23 (AAC)

4 d. In an email to [NAME] of 14 May 2025 from ‘[COMPANY]’, the sender states (amongst other things) that, as regards the appellant, “I sold this company on April 14th, and the new owner is relatively new to this industry. He depends heavily on this business and may be struggling with the complexities surrounding it”.

5. As part of the Upper Tribunal proceedings, [NAME] disclosed a five-page internal [NAME] document; this included (in addition to information included in the summaries of [NAME]’s letters, above) that: a. the appellant had “declared a change of ownership” – two directors had been removed and a new one, [NAME], nominated; b. there was no history of non-compliance; c. [NAME]’s 26 March 2025 letter to the appellant, sent by recorded delivery, had been signed for on behalf of the recipient. Jurisdiction of the Upper Tribunal 6. The holder of an operator's licence may appeal to the Upper Tribunal against any direction given under s26(1) or s27(1) in respect of the licence (s37(2)).

7. The Upper Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear and determine all matters whether of fact or law for the purpose of the exercise of its functions under an enactment relating to transport. It has the power to make such order as it thinks fit or, in a case where it considers it appropriate, to remit the matter to a [NAME] for rehearing and determination.

8. The Upper Tribunal may not take into consideration any circumstances which did not exist at the time of the determination which is the subject of the appeal.

9. The task for the Upper Tribunal on an appeal is to conclude whether or not, on objective grounds, a different view from that taken by the [NAME] is the right one or (meaning the same thing) whether reason and the law impel the Upper Tribunal to take a different view ([NAME] and anor v Secretary of State for Transport [2010] EWCA Civ 695 at [40]). The appeal 10. The appellant’s case was essentially that it had not received [NAME]’s letter of 16 January 2025; the appellant asserted that it had met all required financial standards and was willing to provide the necessary bank statements to

[COMPANY])

Appeal no. UA-2025-000794-T NCN [2026] UKUT 23 (AAC)

5 demonstrate this (and certain such statements were enclosed with its appeal form). The Upper Tribunal hearing 11. The Upper Tribunal hearing was directed to be held via video-link, using the Cloud Video Platform. The Upper Tribunal’s case management directions (issued on 14 October 2025) had given the appellant the option to request a face-to-face hearing, but no such request was made. The Upper Tribunal hearing notice, issued on 7 November 2025, explained how to join the hearing. A reminder letter was sent to the appellant by the Upper Tribunal on 25 November 2025. Despite all this, no one representing the appellant joined the hearing at the appointed time. We considered whether it was in the interests of justice to proceed with the hearing in the absence of a representative of the appellant, and concluded that it was: the appellant’s appeal form was adequately clear and intelligible; we had a complete bundle, including the [NAME] case file; the case management directions had given the appellant the opportunity to change its grounds of appeal in the light of the contents of the [NAME] file (it had not chosen to do so); and no good reason had been advanced for the appellant’s failure to attend the hearing. Discussion 12. This seems to us a simple case of an operator failing to respond to important correspondence from [NAME]. The appellant here protests that it did not receive [NAME]’s 16 January 2025 letter – but that does not assist the appellant in explaining why it did not respond to [NAME]’s 26 March 2025 letter, sent by recorded delivery and to an email address that was clearly in use. There is a rich seam of Upper Tribunal (and its predecessors) case law emphasising the difficulty of showing a decision of the [NAME] to be plainly wrong, where it results from an operator failing to respond to important correspondence from [NAME]. One example is [NAME] Appeal 2005/472, where this was said:

9. One aspect of the trust which should exist between the Traffic Commissioner and an operator is that the Traffic Office is entitled to expect to receive replies to correspondence, either within the timescale set down in the letter from the Traffic Office, or with the promptness which the contents of the letter under reply deserves. Sometimes an operator may have good reasons for being unable to reply, in full, at once. In that case he should reply promptly and explain why he cannot reply in full and how long he will need to do so. The alternative of remaining silent will, almost inevitably, lead the [COMPANY] (T)

Appeal no. UA-2025-000794-T NCN [2026] UKUT 23 (AAC)

6 Commissioner to draw adverse conclusions which it may be impossible to overturn on appeal.

10. In the appeal of [NAME] t/a [NAME] no. 12 of 2001 the Tribunal said this:- “This case demonstrates, once again, how important it is for operators to reply to correspondence from Traffic Commissioners. If they fail to do so and if they fail to take advantage of the opportunity of requiring a Public Inquiry, with the result that their operator’s licence is revoked, it is highly unlikely that an appeal to the Tribunal will succeed. ….” 13. This, combined with the fact that, in our view, [NAME]’s letter of 26 March 2025 set out an adequately coherent and rational case for why one or more of the licence- revocation conditions in s26(1) and/or s27 was satisfied, means that it cannot be said that it was plainly wrong of the [NAME], on receiving no response from the appellant on expiry of the (reasonable) time limit set, to direct revocation of the appellant’s operator’s licence.

14. It follows that the appeal falls to be dismissed.

[NAME]

Judge of the Upper Tribunal

[NAME] Members of the Upper Tribunal

Authorised by the Judge for issue on 15 January 2026