Employment Tribunal: Claimant Wins on Sick Pay and Unfair Dismissal

OUTCOME: Allowed

Case Number: 6000227/2025

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EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Claimant: [redacted]

Respondent: [redacted] London South (by CVP)

On: 12 & 13 February 2026

Before: Employment Judge D [NAME] (sitting alone)

Appearances For the claimant: [redacted] For the respondents: [redacted]

JUDGMENT

1. The respondent’s name is amended by consent from “[NAME] [RESPONDENT] [NAME]” to “[RESPONDENT]”.

2. The claimant’s application to strike out the response for non-compliance with directions is refused.

3. The claimant’s claim for breach of contract relating to non-payment of sick pay is well founded and succeeds.

4. The claimant’s claim of unfair dismissal is well founded and succeeds.

5. The respondent is to pay the claimant the sum of £8,366.86. The award being made up of the following elements:

5.1 Sick pay:

£391.05 5.2 Basic award:

£2,851.20 5.3 Loss of statutory rights:

£211.20 5.4 Loss of earnings:

£4,481.70 5.5 Pension:

£231.71 5.6 ACAS uplift:

£200.00

WRITTEN REASONS 1. Following the judgment, which was given orally, the respondent has requested written reasons. This request was made in time and the reasons are set out below.

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2. This is a claim brought by the claimant against [NAME]. The claimant was, lastly, a dental [NAME]. [NAME], the respondent, is a dentist who is being claimed against in his own name. He has a trading name, but the claim is against him personally.

3. The claimant's employment with the respondent, for the purposes of these proceedings at least, was from 21 January 2015 to 6 of December 2024 albeit the respondent only personally, took over the [NAME] some, quite some time into that, and the claimant’s employment transferred over by way of TUPE.

4. Early Conciliation commenced on 15 November 2024 and ended on 19 December 2024. The ET1 was issued on 3 January 2025. I am satisfied that there are no time limits issues for me to deal with, and certainly none were brought to me during the hearing.

5. This is a claim for constructive unfair dismissal. It is also clear, looking at the claim form, although the box was not ticked, that there is a claim for breach of contract in that the claimant says the respondent did not pay them their contractual sick pay.

6. The allegation of not paying contractual sick pay also forms part of the constructive unfair dismissal claim as one of the breaches the claimant relies upon.

7. I have been provided with an indicative list of issues by the respondent, for which I am grateful. I remind myself that even a list of issues prepared at the preliminary hearing is only indicative, and the claim form is the definitive representation of what the claim is. But that being said, the list of issues does appear to me to set out the constructive unfair dismissal allegations correctly and fairly.

8. The claimant represented herself and did a very good job. The respondent was represented by Miss [RESPONDENT], a [NAME] consultant, who is very experienced and did the best she possibly could for her client. Both cases were presented well and professionally.

9. In terms of witness evidence, I heard from the claimant and then on her behalf, from Miss [APPELLANT]. Dr [RESPONDENT], the former employer prior to the TUPE to the Respondent, did attend the hearing on the first day. He provided a witness statement, but we were not able to hear his evidence and cross examine him due to the fact that he was in France and there was no diplomatic consent to him giving evidence.

10. There were also other witness statements provided by the claimant. I have read those, but those individuals did not attend the Tribunal to give evidence, and where an individual was not presented for cross examination, I have to give little weight to those statements. In any event, I think most of those statements would not take us much further than the evidence that we heard from the live witnesses.

11. I also heard from the respondent on his own behalf and from Ms [RESPONDENT] on his behalf.

12. I have to remind myself that disagreeing with your employer or being unhappy with their management style is not by itself sufficient to succeed in a constructive unfair dismissal claim. It is a high bar to show that the implied term is breached.

13. I begin by looking at the question of sick pay. There is a clash of contracts here. In particular I'm asked to determine which Appendix One I should rely upon. Appendix One is the part of contract which relates to sick pay.

14. The claimant has provided me a copy which she says is the one she was originally given. The respondent has given a copy which he says was on file when he took over the business, and that is what was provided to him by the [NAME] manager.

15. Having heard the evidence of the parties, I accept the claimant’s evidence and I find that the copy the claimant relies upon is the copy that she was originally given.

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16. I also accept the respondent’s evidence that copy he relies upon is the one that he was given by the [NAME] manager. But that does not take me much further as to what contract was in place.

17. We have signed evidence in which the respondent highlighted changes to the claimant's contract. It is clear that the exact contract that the claimant signed back in 2015 was not the contract which was enforced at the time as changes have been made over time.

18. However, those changes make no mention whatsoever about the sick pay policy being changed. We have evidence that changes were made to the contract, these were written down and signed by the parties. As such, I find it very hard to accept that the Appendix One which was relied upon by the respondent, was actually ever communicated to the claimant or incorporated into her contract.

19. Therefore, I find that the contract that was in force at the time included the Appendix One which the claimant relies upon.

20. It may be that there is a potential claim by the respondent against Dr [RESPONDENT] in relation to incorrect information being given during the TUPE transition, but that is not for this tribunal to determine today.

21. In case I am wrong and the correct contract is the respondent’s version, I also find that the respondent did not act reasonably when coming to the decision that sick pay was discretionary. The version he relies upon was woefully drafted (and at this point I highlight that the respondent did not draft that version of the contract, and so there is no personal criticism of him in the way it was drafted). In his own words it was confusing.

22. I agree that in many ways it was confusing, but I find that it is clear that the default position within the respondent’s Appendix One, is that sick pay is payment in full. It says it may be subject to change depending upon the reason for absence and length of service, but if it says that it may change based upon those, then the default position is clearly the payment is in full within that version of the contract.

23. There is no indication as to how the change would actually be considered, and I find that such a clause would largely be unenforceable. But in any event, the respondent did not carry out any exercise where he considered his discretion before reverting to statutory sick pay. He just went straight to saying “I have the right to apply statutory sick pay, so I'm going to do that.” So even if he was right on this being the correct contract, I find that he breached it.

24. There were other factors in favour of him knowing that the claimant was entitled to contractual sick pay in that although the accountant said it might be discretionary, the accountant also told him that there was no evidence of anyone being paid only SSP after reviewing their pay slips. This tends towards a [NAME] of payment being in full when off sick.

25. The respondent claimed that he was unaware of anyone having had sickness in the years in the run up to him taking over the business, but at the same time, he told me that he was aware of somebody who had been on long term sick leave, and that he was told by the accountant that this person had exhausted her right to company sick pay. This scenario aligns much more closely with the claimant’s Appendix One and I find that the respondent should have been aware that she was contractually entitled to full sick pay.

26. In light of those findings, I find that there was a breach of contract in terms of the respondent not paying the claimant’s sick pay in full. I also find that the decision to place her on statutory sick pay was at least in part because he was not happy with the claimant at this point in time and wanted to punish her for the perceived slights,

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which I will come on to later. I find that these actions did damage trust and confidence, albeit this breach is not, by itself, sufficient for the claimant to succeed in her claim for constructive unfair dismissal. One instance of not paying contractual sick pay would not be enough for somebody to determine that their contract has come to an end by the actions of the respondents.

27. I then move on to the disciplinary process allegations. The claimant says that the respondent withheld and provided misleading evidence in terms of the CCTV evidence.

28. Clearly, there were problems early on with the disclosure of the CCTV evidence to the claimant, but I find that those problems were with the respondent’s lawyers.

29. The respondent himself did try and provide the evidence, although there is some dispute about whether he provided it in full before the first disciplinary hearing or not. But ultimately, [NAME] were his agents, and legally he bears a degree of responsibility for their failings.

30. I am also not satisfied from reading the report of the initial hearing that the eyewitness evidence was taken fully into account. In particular, I find that insufficient weight was given to Dr [NAME] evidence regarding the communication between the reception and [NAME].

31. However, in relation to both of those errors, the failings were, I find, remedied in the appeal hearing. Whilst the claimant did not agree with all of the findings in the appeal hearing, I find that they were findings open to a [NAME]. It is not for this tribunal to substitute their judgment on any disciplinary hearings. I have to ask whether the findings were open to a [NAME], and in this instance, they were.

32. Therefore, in relation to the investigation, disciplinary hearing and appeal hearing, whilst there were some failings along the way, there was no ultimate breach of the implied term. That being said I hope that lessons will be learned by the respondent in terms of engaging with employees better, particularly when the employee is emailing requesting more information.

33. There was also a dispute as to whether there were previous discussions with the claimant prior to the allegations which led to her suspension. Having heard from everyone, I prefer the evidence of the claimant on this point. I find that there was no real warning given to her that her behaviour was considered to be unacceptable. The respondent may well have asked the [NAME] manager to speak to the claimant, but I accept the claimant's evidence that this conversation did not take place.

34. However, it is not always necessary to have those discussions prior to a suspension, sometimes behaviour can be so significant that you just need to jump straight to the formal process.

35. As to the suspension itself, the allegations were, I find, suitable to warrant a suspension on full pay pending investigation and disciplinary hearing. A suspension, whilst seen by many people as a disciplinary action, is not actually a disciplinary action.

36. I find that the respondent was worried about the claimant continuing to act in what he says was a disruptive manner, and notwithstanding the malicious nature of some of the allegations, suspension for the other allegations was still within the range of reasonable actions, even without prior discussion.

37. Whilst the decision to suspend was reasonable, the manner of the suspension was, I find, calculated to embarrass and upset the claimant. I accept the respondent’s evidence that he was not at work on this day, so he could not personally hand her

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the letter, but throughout these proceedings, and the incidents which led to these proceedings being issued, the respondent has constantly indicated that any issues should go through the [NAME] manager. He said that if the claimant wanted to speak to him, she should go through the [NAME] manager first.

38. Therefore, proper [NAME] for communicating the suspension would have been to ask the [NAME] manager to speak to the claimant in private and provide her with the letter of suspension. Leaving a letter in a public area on her desk, is not acceptable way to communicate this. Although the envelope was marked private and confidential anybody could have opened that letter. This also meant that the claimant came into work and was left to read a letter and go home. There is no telling when she would have actually opened that letter during her shift and she could have worked the whole shift before discovering she had been suspended. If the respondent was truly concerned about her conduct at work and whether she was a risk to patients that is something which should have been managed in person, rather than just dumping it on the claimant in an unsupervised manner.

39. The fact that the [NAME] manager was not even aware of the situation is also a factor I take into account when I find that this was calculated to embarrass and upset the claimant.

40. As to the allegations themselves, some were arguable and justified. There was clearly a disagreement on 26 July between the claimant and the respondent. The discussions that I see on CCTV after that disagreement between the claimant and her colleagues could be considered to be unprofessional, although I find that the respondent has clearly exaggerated the alleged aggressiveness of the claimant.

41. In the CCTV that I have seen, she was largely polite and the respondent was dismissive and rude. He was telling her she was wrong when she said that she had not received the minutes from the meeting she was unable to attend.

42. I also find that the respondent has exaggerated the claimant's attempts to manipulate the situation and get her colleagues on side. She was merely seeking support from her colleagues after a difficult encounter with [NAME].

43. The issue of the claimant questioning clinical judgment could also legitimately be seen to be a problem which needed investigating, albeit there was clearly a difference in culture of the company at the time of the respondent running it compared to his predecessor (both in terms of paperwork being kept and the manner in which [NAME] could speak with clinicians).

44. That being said, other allegations, such as making personal phone calls, leaving work early, and not devoting her whole time to [NAME] [NAME] were, I find, completely unfounded and were thrown into the letter in order to further humiliate and punish the claimant for standing up to the respondent when she was reasonably of the view that she was being deprived of minutes of meetings.

45. So, whilst the institution of the investigation was reasonable, there were elements of the allegations and the manner in which it was instituted, which were unreasonable and breached the implied term of mutual trust.

46. As to the claimed lack of support being offered to the claimant during her suspension and sickness, I find that the claimant was not in possession of the handbook. She accepts that she had seen a copy of the handbook when a colleague had it, and she had glanced through it, but this is not the same as being in possession of a handbook.

47. The claimant had refused to sign or take a copy of the handbook because of concerns over proposed contractual changes, hence her wanting the minutes of

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the meeting. The respondent knew, or should have known, that she did not have this handbook.

48. In any event, it was clear that discussions were ongoing about the adoption of the handbook, and it was not yet incorporated into anyone's contract. Therefore, there was no real need for the claimant to know the details of the contents of it. Without the handbook, there was no other way that the claimant could have known about access to the [NAME]. I have not seen any evidence where it was referred to in any other correspondence from either the respondent or the [NAME] manager to the claimant. Nor was there any mention of it in the suspension letter, which one would normally expect to be included as normal [NAME].

49. I also find that the tone of the suspension letter certainly gives the impression that the claimant was not to contact her colleagues at all. On this point I also accept Miss [APPELLANT] evidence that the staff were told the claimant could not contact them, and implicitly, that means they cannot contact her.

50. I find that there were valid reasons to block the [NAME] manager's access to her email address. It appears that there were significant data breaches going on, and the respondent, quite rightly, was taking steps to deal with that, but this was never communicated to the claimant so that she was unaware that her messages to the [NAME] manager were not being received.

51. In evidence, the respondent said that other staff were told about this, but that the claimant was not.

52. I accept the claimant could still call the [NAME] manager, and she did on occasion, so there was a degree of support, but the claimant was left in an avoidable position where she thought that emails were being ignored, and this was down to a lack of communication from the respondent to the claimant. The respondent is also, I have to say at this point, liable for any failings of his employees, so if he had directed someone to pass information on to the claimant and they did not, then respondent is ultimately responsible for them in the same way that a company is responsible for their employees actions.

53. I then move on to the allegation that there was a lack of training on new IT systems. I find that training was given to staff on a general basis, and the respondent says it was provided for two days. I also accept that [NAME] in her evidence, said this training was not of good quality. I do not need to make any findings on whether it was suitable or not, because the claimant did not receive this training in any event.

54. It was booked to take place on a date where the claimant had pre-booked annual leave, and I accept her evidence that she told the [NAME] manager about this leave before the training was arranged. The respondent was therefore aware that the claimant was not going to be present at the training.

55. I find that the respondent then took no steps to arrange for claimant to undergo the training. Miss [APPELLANT] confirmed that she did not train the claimant, despite the respondent’s assertions otherwise, although she may have given some guidance with general questions. I prefer Miss [NAME] evidence on this point.

56. Miss [NAME], in her statement, said training was given to all staff, although this plainly not accurate, as the claimant was not present at the training. In her evidence, she said that she would have answered any questions the claimant had on the system, but I find this does not amount to the same as being provided with training.

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57. On balance, I find that this decision to exclude the claimant from training arises from the respondent not being happy with the manner in which the claimant carried out her work.

58. Now there are possibly some valid criticisms of the claimant's work. Perhaps she was a little bit too familiar with [NAME]. In terms of asking questions of the [NAME], she did this in the same manner in which she had been working for the best part of 10 years prior to the respondent taking over. The respondent wanted to change the culture and he was entitled to do that, but the manner in which this is done has to be careful.

59. I find from the evidence before me that the questions the client was asking were generally valid. Questions of the dentist about what care was to be booked in, why certain charges were made are fine. If the [NAME] is being asked questions by patients about why they are being charged a certain amount of money it is entirely right for her to raise that with the respondent.

60. As to the allegation that the claimant was trying to push patients to not have treatment with the respondent and wait for a different dentist, I find this did not happen. I prefer the claimant’s evidence that what she was doing was asking the patient if they wanted to continue that treatment with the respondent, who they had seen on an emergency basis, or if they were happy to wait and see their normal dentist at a later date. I find that that is a perfectly valid question to put to a patient, and there was no evidence of her advising patients not to use the respondent.

61. Where the difficulty comes in this relationship is that I find the respondent does not like being questioned at all by anybody, and when he is questioned, he gets defensive and deflects back on to the individual. That appeared to be the case from the CCTV footage that I watched, and it came across from the claimant’s witness statement that that was the manner in which he acted. It was also the manner in which he gave his evidence to the Tribunal.

62. Now I have to be careful on that point, because the manner in which somebody gives evidence in an unfamiliar situation, such as a Tribunal setting does not always reflect upon their normal demeanour, but in this instance, it is a factor that I take into consideration when making my decision, because it does tie in with the evidence that I've seen from the witnesses as to his communication style.

63. I also find that the respondent refused to take part in a Back to Work meeting after the claimant’s suspension was lifted. This was not really contested by the respondent. I find that the email the claimant sent requesting this meeting was polite and professional and was seeking to have a meeting so that she could find a way to work together with the respondent and to find out his preferred communication style. She was taking on board that there had been problems in the past and she was seeking to fix them. I find that this was entirely reasonable.

64. I do not accept for one moment the respondent’s claim that he refused the meeting because he was scared of her. He clarified that his fear was not a physical one, but that he was scared of the claimant attempting to entrap him and using things he said in the meeting to further her employment claim, which I accept she had already indicated she was considering. But if he was truly scared of her on that point, then he could have brought in a third party to the meeting.

65. The ideal person would have been the [NAME] manager, who the respondent wanted to act as a “go between” for the two of them. If he wanted her to have that role, then it would be ideal for her to be present in the meeting as well.

66. It was clear by this point that there were communication issues between the claimant and the respondent, but instead of working with the claimant to resolve

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them, the respondent essentially washed his hands and refused to engage in fixing the problem.

67. I find that this adds weight to the claimant’s assertion that the respondent told the [NAME] manager he would not acknowledge the claimant on her return. This statement is confirmed by [APPELLANT] in her witness statement, although she was not present to give evidence and be cross-examined so I give little weight to her assertion. I also acknowledge, out of fairness to the respondent, within that statement, she says that she did not fully believe that was what the respondent meant, but that he was saying it in the heat of the moment. So, if I give any weight to her assertion that he made this comment, I have to take into account the view that it was a heat of the moment comment. However, on balance, I find that the respondent said that he would not acknowledge the claimant on her return, and this is reflected, I find, in his refusal to engage in a Back to Work meeting with the claimant.

68. I find that she was entitled to see this as a genuine and serious barrier to continued employment, considering that she needed to engage in discussions with the respondent as part of her day-to-day job in order to make sure that she booked appointments correctly and that she could ensure patient safety. Whilst patient safety is generally and immediately the responsibility of the treating dentist, every employee has a responsibility for it, and if a [NAME] books the incorrect treatment or doesn't book an emergency appointment at the right time and leaves it longer, that can cause damage to patient’s dental health and could lead to negligence claims. Therefore, there is a duty on the [NAME] to ask questions if they are not sure why something is being done, although challenging clinical decisions, I accept, would not be appropriate. If the respondent, as I find, was not going to talk to her, then this could not happen.

69. That is a fundamental breach, I find, of the implied term, because it leaves the claimant in an extremely difficult position.

70. It was also raised by the claim that there was a toxic environment, as evidenced by other people leaving. There is a clear difference in the evidence of the parties as to the reason why people left the respondent's employment, and I placed no weight on that allegation because there is just not enough information for me to make any findings on that.

71. Ultimately, I find that there were a number of breaches of the implied term that include the failure to pay the claimant her contractual sick pay, the manner in which the investigation was brought about, how the suspension was communicated to the claimant, the respondent’s attitude towards the claimant and his refusal to engage with her on her return.

72. I find that even where there is an element of the investigation which was reasonable and there was proper cause to consider it, the breaches here were fundamental, as they go to the core of the claimant's job. The final point about the refusal to engage and acknowledge the claimant would, by itself, amount to a fundamental breach, but cumulatively, everything that I raised amounts to a fundamental breach.

73. The respondent says there was no evidence of grievance in relation to the pay. There may not have been a formal grievance, but the claimant clearly was raising it in emails as a complaint with both the [NAME] manager and the respondent as a significant issue.

74. I find that the claimant did resign in response to the breaches, and there was no evidence before me of the claimant affirming the breaches. She left within a few

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weeks at most, of being told she was not going to be paid he sick pay and being told that the respondent was not going to acknowledge her. She tried to resolve the situation first of all, and then resigned within a matter of days of it being perfectly clear that there was not going to be any further resolution.

75. So therefore, I find that the claimant was unfairly dismissed by the respondent and that there was a breach of contract in terms of her not being paid her sick pay.

Remedy 76. In relation to sick pay, the claimant sought £391.05. Having reviewed the claimant’s calculations, and the documents in the bundle I am satisfied that this is the correct figure for the sick pay.

77. In relation to the basic award, the parties are in agreement that this figure is £2851.20.

78. In relation to the loss of statutory rights, the claimant seeks a weeks pay, and that to me, seems eminently reasonable. This comes to £211.20.

79. The main area of dispute is the level of any compensatory award that I should make. In her claim form she sought a year’s pay, although, since putting in her claim she actually managed to find work a little bit sooner than that, in a new role, albeit at a lower rate and with increased travel costs. The respondent suggests that at most, a month would be appropriate to find new work. 80. at the time the claimant left the respondent’s employment, I find that she did have limited access to travel. There was one car in the household, which was being used by her son for his commute, and she was hoping to find an alternative work location where she could walk to as she had previously.

81. At this point the claimant was also subject to work related stress, and her confidence was knocked by the manner in which she left her previous employment. I do take that into account.

82. She provided evidence of making three job applications. There are no dates on those, but I accept her evidence that they were shortly after her employment ended at the beginning of 2025.

83. Early in the new year, she said, she also trained to be an invigilator and took some ad hoc shifts at the [COMPANY] invigilating exams. The respondent argues that the claimant should have made more applications and that there were plenty of jobs out there.

84. At this point, I have to take note that there is no evidence of what jobs were available in the area. But I do take the view there were likely to be jobs available.

85. I find that it was entirely reasonable, particularly in the initial stages, for an individual, to try and get work similar to the work they were doing before, and in the same sort of area. There then does come a point where the claimant has to take on more responsibility and maybe look at jobs that are less closely linked to the job they were doing before and potentially further afield.

86. The claimant did eventually look further afield and found work. She also tried to ease herself back into the world of work with the invigilation.

87. When I weigh everything up in the balance, I do find that there was a failure to mitigate here. I find that that the claimant should have applied for more jobs and potentially looked at more than just [NAME] type roles. When I look at it all, I find that an appropriate period to award compensation for would be six months to take into account a bit of time for the claimant to get over the stress and knock of confidence and to explore the options in the local area before then applying further afield.

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88. that would be a figure of £5068.80. During that time, the claimant did earn £587.10 which I would be reducing the award by. The compensatory award, therefore is £4481.70. This is a rough and ready approach, trying to balance the limited evidence from both sides.

89. The claimant also then seeks pension contributions at 3%. Unfortunately, there is no hard evidence in the to bundle show what the employer’s contribution rate was. I've been provided with a spreadsheet by the respondent showing the payments made and what their contributions were, and on those figures, from a quick calculation, it appears that the pension contributions on their spreadsheet are in the region of about 1.7 or 1.8%. However, that was a spreadsheet that was produced for these proceedings rather than being contemporaneous evidence. It is not hard evidence of the employer's contribution rate.

90. I do take judicial notice that under statutory schemes, such as auto-enrolment, the minimum contribution is 3%. The claimant gave evidence when she looked on her online account, which unfortunately, is not before us, that it said 3%.

91. On balance, I am satisfied that the employer's contribution rates in this instance would be 3% so if I apply 3% to the sick pay, basic award and the compensation, so not on the loss of statutory rights, that would be an additional figure of £231.71 pence.

92. The element that I have had the most concern over, really is the ACAS uplift. In my initial ruling, I found that there were failings in the disciplinary process in terms of provision of documents and proper consideration of witness evidence in the initial hearing, however, in the appeal hearing, I found that those faults were remedied, and the remaining areas where I found the unfair dismissal came about were not really related to the grievance.

93. I therefore award an additional figure of £200, which is about 5%. That reflects that there were some failings, but it is far from the most egregious failing that I've seen in a disciplinary or grievance process. 94. because I meant to address that point, and I didn't explicitly say that that's fine. Thank you. Okay, so the order that will come out will have a breakdown of the awards, so there'll be another opportunity for people to check the sums. If there are any problems with that, you can write in. And we have ways of amending it, amending slips and judgments like that, I will have that order with my clerks this evening. It may take a couple of weeks for them to send it out. If you've not got anything within two weeks. And by all means, please do chase the tribunal, but please don't chase before then, simply because otherwise it ends up in the black hole of communication backlog that we've got at the moment, just want to say thank you to basically the way that you've presented the case and prepared it, 95. I repeat here what I said at the conclusion of the hearing, the manner in which both parties presented the evidence and the bundle, and in which arguments were raised before me were was professional and I thank both the Claimant and [APPELLANT] for their assistance.

[APPELLANT] J [APPELLANT] 24 April 2026

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EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Claimant: [redacted]

Respondent: [redacted] London South (by CVP)

On: 12 & 13 February 2026

Before: Employment Judge D [NAME] (sitting alone)

JUDGMENT

5.1 Sick pay:

£391.05 5.2 Basic award:

£2,851.20 5.3 Loss of statutory rights:

£211.20 5.4 Loss of earnings:

£4,481.70 5.5 Pension:

£231.71 5.6 ACAS uplift:

£200.00

EJ D [NAME] 15 February 2026