Employment Tribunal Decides Contractor’s Agency Status in Supervision Case

OUTCOME: Allowed

Case Number: 1301389/2025

1 of 5 [NAME]

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Claimant: [redacted] Respondent 1: [APPELLANT] Respondent 2: [RESPONDENT] at: Birmingham Employment Tribunal

On:

2 March 2026

Before: Employment Judge Wright

Appearances: [NAME] (Counsel for the Claimant)

Miss [COUNSEL] (Counsel for the Respondent)

Witness evidence: [COUNSEL]

1. This is the Tribunal’s reserved judgment following the Preliminary Hearing (“PH”) held on 2 March 2026 to determine:

(ii) whether the [NAME] Respondent (“[NAME]”) was an employee or worker of the First Respondent (“[NAME]”) within the meaning of s.83 Equality Act 2010 (“EqA”); and

(ii) if not, whether [NAME] was acting as an agent of [NAME]

The PH also concerned discrete case‑management matters which have been addressed separately in a case management order already sent to the parties. 2. The Tribunal received oral evidence from Mr [APPELLANT], [NAME] Manager of [NAME]. Neither the Claimant nor [NAME] gave evidence. The Tribunal also received written submissions from [NAME] and [NAME] received by the Judge on 16 March 2026.

Case Number: 1301389/2025

2 of 5 [NAME]

3. [NAME] maintained throughout that [NAME] was a self‑employed contractor and the issue of whether [NAME] was an employee or worker of [NAME] was not contested by the Claimant. The Tribunal nevertheless determines this issue formally below.

4. The central question in dispute was whether [NAME] delegated the supervision of the Claimant to [NAME] and, if so, whether [NAME] was thereby acting as an agent of [NAME] for the purposes of s.109(2) EqA.

The Evidence 5. The Tribunal relies principally on:

(a) the oral evidence of Mr [NAME]; and (b) the documents identified within the bundle as referenced during the PH

6. It was clear from the oral evidence and the Tribunal found that:

7. The Claimant was employed by [NAME] under an apprenticeship contract. Clause 5 of that contract imposed an express and mandatory obligation on [NAME] to ensure that the Claimant received on‑the‑job training during normal working hours, for the purpose of enabling her to perform her duties. That obligation rested with [NAME] and was not transferred by contract to any third party.

8. The evidence establishes that [NAME] fulfilled that obligation, in practice, by placing the Claimant on site with [NAME], a contractor. The Tribunal is satisfied that this was not an informal or incidental arrangement, but one contemplated within [NAME]’s established working model. Contemporary documentation records that [NAME]’s employed apprentices were placed with contractors on site, with the expectation that they would work alongside and be supervised by those contractors as part of their training.

9. Although the Claimant remained contractually accountable to [NAME], the Tribunal finds as fact that, on site, [NAME] exercised sole day‑to‑day supervisory responsibility for the Claimant. No other individual provided routine instruction, oversight, or direction in relation to her work. The supervision was continuous and integral to the performance of the Claimant’s role as an apprentice.

10. Mr [APPELLANT] accepted that [NAME] expected [NAME] to supervise the Claimant, and the Tribunal finds as fact that [NAME] delegated operational and supervisory responsibility to [NAME]. The Claimant thereby relied on [NAME] for instruction, guidance, and allocation of tasks in the course of her daily work.

Case Number: 1301389/2025

3 of 5 [NAME]

Was [NAME] an Employee or Worker of [NAME]? 11. The Tribunal accepts the uncontested position that [NAME] was a self‑employed contractor engaged by [NAME]. There was no mutuality of obligation and no contract of employment, apprenticeship, or personal service between [NAME] and [NAME].

12. Applying the extended concept of “employment” in s.83(2)(a) EqA, the Tribunal finds that [NAME] was not subject to an obligation of personal service and operated as an independent contractor who could delegate work, including supervision, within his own team. This is inconsistent with employee or worker status.

13. The Tribunal therefore concludes, as a matter of law and fact, that [NAME] was not an employee or worker of [NAME].

Was [NAME] as an Agent of [NAME]? The statutory framework

14. Section 109(2) EqA provides that anything done by an agent for the [NAME], with the authority of the [NAME], must be treated as also done by the [NAME].

[NAME]’s submissions

15. [NAME] argued that [NAME] was not its agent, contending that he merely performed services that benefited [NAME] and lacked authority to act “on behalf” of [NAME] in any relevant sense.

16. [NAME] further submitted that supervision of the Claimant, if performed at all, was incidental to [NAME]’s own work and did not amount to the type of authorised representative function contemplated by the law of agency. It relied on Ministry of [NAME] v Kemeh [2014] ICR 625 and, in particular, paras [47]–[48].

Findings of fact

17. The Tribunal rejects [NAME]’s characterisation of the evidence. It is not correct, as asserted at paragraph 44 of [NAME]’s written submissions, that [NAME] played only “some” role in supervision. The Tribunal finds as fact that [NAME] played, in practice, the only role in supervising the Claimant. Mr [APPELLANT] was quite clear that those involved in the supervision of the Claimant on paper, would not have been involved or had any interaction at all with her on site and whilst there would have been occasional on site visits to review the overall project, the Claimant would not have seen or had any interaction or involvement with those individuals.

Case Number: 1301389/2025

4 of 5 [NAME]

18. This supervision was not sporadic, incidental, or peripheral. It was integral to the Claimant’s on‑site training, which her contract expressly required [NAME] to provide. [NAME] complied with this obligation by delegating day‑to‑day supervisory authority to [NAME], a conclusion reinforced by Mr [NAME] answers to the Tribunal’s own questions.

19. The Tribunal further finds that [NAME] knew and intended that:

(a) [NAME] would exercise supervisory control over the Claimant’s daily work;

(b) [NAME] would instruct the Claimant, direct task allocation, and monitor her

training progress; and

(c) [NAME]’s supervisory role formed part of the mechanism through which [NAME]

discharged its obligation to provide on‑site apprenticeship training.

20. The question is whether [NAME], in supervising the Claimant, was acting “on behalf of” [NAME] pursuant to authority vested in him by [NAME].

21. The Tribunal finds that [NAME] deliberately and knowingly delegated the practical discharge of its supervisory function, in respect of the Claimant’s on‑site training, to [NAME]. That delegation was implicit in the placement arrangement and in the expectation that the Claimant would be instructed and overseen by [NAME] in the course of her daily work.

22. In supervising the Claimant, [NAME] was not merely performing work that happened to benefit [NAME]. He was carrying out a function which [NAME] itself was obliged to perform, and which it chose to effect through him. The supervision of the Claimant was therefore undertaken on behalf of [NAME] and pursuant to its authority, albeit informal and implied rather than express.

23. The Tribunal accordingly concludes that, for the purposes of section 109(2) Equality Act 2010, [NAME] was acting as the agent of [NAME] in relation to the supervision of the Claimant.

24. The Tribunal has considered the decision of the Court of Appeal in Ministry of [NAME] v Kemeh [2014] ICR 625, in particular paragraphs [47]–[48]. The Tribunal accepts the principle articulated therein that agency is not established merely because an individual performs work which benefits another, nor because the putative [NAME] exercises some measure of operational control.

25. This case is materially distinguishable. In Kemeh, the [NAME] was employed by a contractor and performed his own functions pursuant to that employment. He was not authorised to discharge, on behalf of the Ministry of

Case Number: 1301389/2025

5 of 5 [NAME], a responsibility which the Ministry itself owed to the Claimant. By contrast, in the present case, [NAME] was entrusted with, and in fact carried out, the supervision of the Claimant’s on‑site training, a responsibility which remained that of [NAME] under the apprenticeship contract.

26. Accordingly, this is not a case of a contractor simply carrying out work for the benefit of a [NAME], but one in which a defined function of the [NAME] was delegated and exercised by another on its behalf. The reasoning in [NAME] therefore does not preclude a finding of agency on the facts of the present case.

27. Taking these factors together, the Tribunal concludes that, in supervising the Claimant, [NAME] was acting as [NAME]’s agent within the meaning of s.109(2) EqA.

Conclusion

28. The Tribunal determines that:

(1) [NAME] was not an employee or worker of [NAME] within the meaning of s.83 EqA;

but (2) [NAME] was acting as an agent of [NAME] for the purposes of s.109(2) EqA when

supervising the Claimant.

Employment Judge Wright 6 April 2026 Note Public access to employment tribunal decisions Judgments (apart from judgments under rule 52) and reasons for the judgments are published, in full, online at www.gov.uk/employment-tribunal-decisions shortly after a copy has been sent to the claimant(s) and respondent(s) in a case.