Employment Tribunal Denies Strike-Out but Awards Costs for Vexatious Conduct

OUTCOME: Refused

Case No: 3303311/2023 10.5 Reserved judgment with reasons – rule 62

March 2017

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Claimant: [redacted]

Respondent: [redacted]

On: 9 April 2024

Before: [ADDRESS] Claimant: [redacted]

Respondent: [redacted]

RESERVED JUDGMENT

1. The application to strike out the claims is refused.

2. The respondent’s application for costs is allowed.

REASONS

1. This is a lengthy judgment. To assist the parties, I have created embedded links to each of the sections of the judgment.

Introduction Procedural history The hearing

The agenda The documents, witness statements and reading time

Findings of fact

Respondent personnel The claimant’s correspondence with employees, officers and agents of the respondent including the respondent’s potential witnesses Allegations that [NAME_9] threatened the Claimant with physical violence online and the suggestion that [NAME_9] may be incited to violence against the claimant Allegations of faking and modifying evidence Derogatory, misleading and/or defamatory comments to third parties

March 2017 Allegations that the Respondent, [NAME_11] and [NAME_13] are defying Department for Education Regulations Rude, aggressive and threatening communications to and/or about staff Abuse of process - claims not within jurisdiction of the Employment Tribunal Abuse of process - Claimant's application for an unless order Unreasonable conduct of proceedings - Claimant's disclosure Unreasonable conduct of proceedings - Respondent's disclosure Unreasonable conduct of proceedings - deadlines - ET3 Unreasonable conduct of proceedings - preliminary hearing of 1 September 2023 Retention and sharing of confidential personal data Unreasonable and vexatious conduct towards [NAME_15] The witness testimony

[NAME_16] [NAME_10] [NAME_18]

The submissions

The respondent’s application for an unless order, for strike out and for a costs order Strike-Out or Unless Order Costs Order

The applicable law

Discussion and conclusions

The overriding objective The claimant’s correspondence with employees, officers and agents of the respondent including the respondent’s potential witnesses Allegations of insurance fraud, conspiracy to defraud and misappropriation of public funds; allegations of fraud against [NAME_9] of fraud against [NAME_9] that [NAME_9] threatened the Claimant with physical violence online and the suggestion that [NAME_9] may be incited to violence against the claimant Allegations of faking and modifying evidence Derogatory, misleading and/or defamatory comments to third parties Allegations that the Respondent, [NAME_11] and [NAME_13] are defying Department for Education Regulations Rude, aggressive and threatening communications to and/or about staff Abuse of process

Claims not within jurisdiction of the Employment Tribunal Claimant's application for an unless order

Unreasonable conduct of proceedings - Claimant's disclosure Unreasonable conduct of proceedings - Respondent's disclosure Unreasonable conduct of proceedings - deadlines - ET3 Unreasonable conduct of proceedings - preliminary hearing of 1 September 2023 Retention and sharing of confidential personal data Unreasonable and vexatious conduct towards [NAME_15] and further steps

Introduction

Procedural history

2. The claimant presented a claim form to the Tribunal on 4 April 2023. This was after early conciliation that started on 2 March 2024 and ended on 4 April 2023. She was employed by the respondent, a [COMPANY_6], as a [NAME_20] of

March 2017 Computing from 1 September 2022 to 19 February 2023. The claimant claims race and sex discrimination. In particular, she claims the following:

a. Harassment related to race.

b. Direct race discrimination.

c. Harassment related to sex.

d. Direct sex discrimination.

3. There was a private preliminary hearing before Employment Judge Warren on 1 September 2023. At that hearing, Employment Judge Warren identified the issues between the parties and explained the process involved in preparing for the final hearing. A final hearing has been listed for 7 to 11 October 2024. The hearing was listed to be in person at the Cambridge County Court.

4. On 5 September 2023 the claimant applied to amend her claim [27] [191], to join another claim and to add further respondents to her claim.

5. On 24 January 2024, the respondent applied for an unless order or strike out and/or costs order and a request for a preliminary hearing [114]. The grounds for the application were as follows:

a. An Unless Order (applied for on 20 November 2023): This request stems from the claimant's continued direct communication with the respondent's potential witnesses and other associated individuals, despite being advised to direct all correspondence to the respondent's legal representatives. The respondent argues that such communications are causing undue stress and anxiety, thereby threatening the Tribunal's capacity to conduct a fair hearing.

b. A Strike Out Order: The respondent seeks to have all or part of the claimant's claims struck out on the grounds that they are scandalous or vexatious. This request is based on several grounds, including the claimant's behaviour causing stress and anxiety for recipients of their emails, the claimant's intent to cause inconvenience and distress, and the claimant's conduct in proceedings being unreasonable and potentially an abuse of process.

c. A Costs Order: Additionally, the respondent is seeking a costs order under rule 76(1) (a) of the Schedule 1 to the Employment Tribunal Rules of Procedure 2013. This is to recover significant legal costs incurred as a result of having to address the claimant's vexatious, abusive, and disruptive communications. The respondent argues that the claimant's actions have necessitated additional legal work, compounding the legal expenses incurred by the respondent.

March 2017 d. A Preliminary Hearing: The respondent also requested a further Case Management Preliminary Hearing. This hearing would not only consider the applications for an unless order, strike out, and costs order but also provide a forum for an Employment Judge to consider the respondent's arguments related to jurisdiction and other pertinent matters as laid out in their amended [NAME_27].

The underlying reasons for these applications include the claimant's direct and unsolicited contact with the respondent's employees and potential witnesses, making allegations of fraud, defying Department for Education regulations, and insurance fraud, among others. These actions, according to the respondent, are causing undue stress and could potentially undermine the fairness and integrity of the Tribunal's proceedings.

6. On 16 February 2024, the claimant applied to the Tribunal for an unless order [89-92] [197]. The application was in the following terms:

Unless Respondents allow [NAME_21] to directly send to me her entire report, with the full knowledge of allegation of insurance fraud or misappropriation of public funds in whatever non- threatening wording [NAME_24] should deem appropriate by Nov 24th, one week in defiance of the existing order, I ask that the court order Respondents to reinstate my salary by Dec 1st as an urgent interim order an emergency injuction

1. to remove all unsubstantiated and disparaging mentions of [NAME_25], or unprofessional communication from all training documents, 2. to sign off training as complete, 3. to remove unsubstantiated disparaging remarks “TS1-TS8 for Part One of” and “In order to complete her final assessment, she now needs to provide consistent evidence to support Part Two (Personal and Professional Conduct) with a focus on regard for the ethos, policies and practices of [COMPANY_26], particularly with a view to effective and appropriate communication. I would recommend that this takes place across the period of half a term” from the written references, 4. to not refer to the written reference as an agreed reference, and to take all necessary steps to rectify documents offered to the Tribunal, steps which may include [COMPANY_5] obtaining independent counsel, separate from [NAME_16]’s.

…

I therefore request an order from the Tribunal under rules 29, 30, 38, and 44 of the ET Rules providing that unless Respondents

March 2017 allow [NAME_21] to send me her entire report, with the full knowledge of allegation of insurance fraud or misappropriation of public funds in whatever nonthreatening wording [NAME_24] should deem appropriate, I ask that the court order Respondents to reinstate my salary as an urgent interim order rectify all training documents and written references.

7. This hearing was listed to determine the following:

a. The claimant’s application for an unless order.

b. The respondent’s application for an unless order, for strike out and for a costs order.

c. Any outstanding issues as to disclosure and assembly of the bundle.

The hearing was listed for 3 hours.

8. On 29 February 2024 and 3 March 2024, the claimant emailed the Tribunal to state that her proposed amendments to her form ET1 were not on the agenda for the preliminary hearing [504]. The claimant modified her application for an Unless Order acknowledging that she could not obtain interim relief.

9. On 18 March 2024 the claimant emailed the Tribunal alleging solicitor misconduct and stated that the matter should be referred to the Solicitor’s Regulation Authority on the grounds of tampering with documents [507]. The Tribunal was invited to strike out the [NAME_27] which were described as “incoherent”. [NAME_28] were accused of not acting in good faith.

10. On 2 April 2024, [NAME_28] applied to the Tribunal to have the hearing extended to 1 day given the scope of the matters that required to be determined [518]. The Tribunal did not extend the allocated time and the hearing continued to be listed for 3 hours.

The hearing

The agenda

11. The Tribunal has not extended the allocated time for this hearing. I explained to the parties that the hearing would have to remain as listed for three hours. I would not be able to sit beyond that time as I had another case to hear in the afternoon. Given the number of matters that required to be dealt with at this hearing, it was simply not practicable to deal with all of them within the allocated time of three hours. After some discussion with the parties we agreed that I would deal with the following applications at this hearing:

a. The respondent’s application for an unless order, for strike out and for a costs order.

March 2017 b. The claimant’s application for an unless order.

c. The claimant’s application for joinder - this was subsequently withdrawn by the claimant when she was making her submissions.

d. The claimant’s application to add further respondents.

12. I explained to the claimant that if the respondent’s application to strike out the claims was unsuccessful, a further preliminary hearing would need to be listed to hear the claimant’s outstanding applications at a later date.

The documents, witness statements and reading time

13. The respondent filed and served a 529-page digital bundle on 5 April 2024. The claimant initially informed me that as the bundle had only been served on her the previous Friday, she objected to its being referred to at this hearing. She said had not had an opportunity to review the documents contained in the bundle. However, she then told me that she had read the witness statements that had been served on her and had read some of the documents in the bundle that were referred to in those statements. The claimant told me that she had also written many of the documents that were in the bundle. The claimant also told me that she was familiar with the respondent’s application for the unless order, strike out order and costs order. However, she had not read the summary of documents prepared by [NAME_29] or the skeleton argument prepared by [NAME_29].

14. [NAME_29] acknowledged that it was a very large bundle for a preliminary hearing. She said that most of the documents contained therein consisted of the claimant’s communications with the respondent, witnesses of the respondent and third parties. She submitted that nothing in the bundle should come as a surprise to the claimant and she should, therefore, be familiar with the documents.

15. I noted that there was no case management order regarding the timetable for filing and serving the bundle and the witness statements. I also noted that the bundle was large.

16. I was concerned to ensure that the claimant had prepared for, and would be able, effectively to participate at this hearing particularly given the fact that she is a litigant in person. As she was familiar with the documents in the bundle, I decided that it would be consistent with the overriding objective to give the claimant extra time to read the document summary and the skeleton argument, and I came off the bench for that purpose. I returned to the bench 40 minutes later to resume the hearing.

17. On 9 April 2024, the respondent tendered a supplementary bundle comprising a witness statement prepared by [NAME_30] 7219 [NAME_31] of the Thames Valley Police in relation to the claimant’s complaint of harassment against [NAME_9]. I admitted this document into evidence as it is relevant to the

March 2017 respondent’s application. It is a short document comprising three pages. I allowed the claimant some time to read this document.

18. In addition to the bundle, the respondent has filed and served three witness statements from the following people:

a. [NAME_32]

b. [NAME_9]

c. [NAME_34]

These witnesses were not present at the hearing to adopt their statements and to make themselves available for cross-examination. As noted above, the claimant confirmed that she had read these witness statements.

19. The claimant quite correctly pointed out to the Tribunal that none of the statements had been signed by the witnesses. I directed [NAME_28] to obtain signed copies of the witness statements which should be filed and served.

20. I heard oral submissions from both sides on their applications.

Findings of fact

Respondent personnel

21. In my findings of fact, I refer to various personnel employed by or otherwise associated with the respondent. Three of these people have provided witness statements, which I discuss below. They are:

a. [NAME_32], the respondent’s [NAME_20].

b. [NAME_9], the respondent’s Head of Computing and line manager of the claimant.

c. [NAME_34], the respondent’s [NAME_35].

In addition, reference is also made to [NAME_37], the respondent’s [NAME_20].

The claimant’s correspondence with employees, officers and agents of the respondent including the respondent’s potential witnesses

22. On 11 May 2023, [NAME_28] [NAME_15] wrote to the claimant notifying her that they were instructed by the respondent, and they asked her to note that all and any future correspondence should be sent to that firm only marked for the attention of [NAME_41], a partner of that firm. Furthermore, the email stated “no correspondence should be sent to our client, directly or otherwise” [211]. Having been a solicitor myself for over 30

March 2017 years, this is standard practice in the profession when a client retains a solicitor to act on their behalf. There is nothing unusual about this type of letter.

23. Notwithstanding this request by [NAME_15], the claimant contacted employees, officers and agents of the respondent on multiple occasions on the following dates:

a. 15 May 2023: an email to [NAME_45] copied to [NAME_13] [211]

b. 23 May 2023: an email to the Watford Employment Tribunal copied to [NAME_46], [NAME_45], [NAME_11] and [NAME_13] [214]

c. 30 June 2023: an email to [NAME_49], [NAME_45] and [NAME_50] [220]

d. 4 July 2023: an email to the Watford Employment Tribunal copied to [NAME_53], [NAME_49], [NAME_11] and [NAME_13] [224]

e. 14 July 2023: an email to the Watford Employment Tribunal copied to [NAME_11], [NAME_13] and someone only identified as “C” [227]

f. 14 August 2023: an email to the Watford Employment Tribunal copied to [NAME_49], [NAME_45], [NAME_13] and [NAME_11] [233]

g. 15 August 2023: an email (10:20 hours) to [NAME_54] and [NAME_49] copied to [NAME_11], [NAME_57], [NAME_13] and [NAME_45]. An email (11:07 hours) to [NAME_49], [NAME_45], [NAME_11] and [NAME_13] [242 & 243]

h. 17 August 2023: an email to the Watford Employment Tribunal copied to [NAME_49], [NAME_11], [NAME_45] and [NAME_13] [131]

i. 19 August 2023: an email to [NAME_49], [NAME_45], [NAME_11] and [NAME_13] [132]

j. 28 August 2023: an email to [NAME_49], [NAME_45], [NAME_11] and [NAME_13] [134]

k. 30 August 2023: an email to the Watford Employment Tribunal copied to [NAME_61] (a Senior Associate at [NAME_15]) , [NAME_49], [NAME_45], [NAME_11] and [NAME_13] [136]

l. 4 September 2023: an email to [NAME_65] copied to [NAME_45], [NAME_13] and [NAME_11] [137]

March 2017 m. 5 September 2023: an email to the Watford Employment Tribunal copied to [NAME_65], [NAME_45], [NAME_29], [NAME_11] and [NAME_13] [138]

n. 7 September 2023: an email to [NAME_65], copied to [NAME_11], [NAME_13] and [NAME_66] [139]

o. 11 September 2023: an email (12:30 hours to [NAME_11], [NAME_65] and copied to [NAME_9]; an email (12:58 hours) to [NAME_65] copied to [NAME_45], [NAME_11], [NAME_13] and [NAME_66]; an email (15:51 hours) to a person only identified as “C” and copied to [NAME_45]; an email sent to [NAME_65] (16:09 hours) copied to [NAME_45], [NAME_11], [NAME_13] and [NAME_66] [140-145]

p. 13 September 2023: an email to [NAME_13], [NAME_11] and [NAME_65] [149]

q. 21 September 2023: an email to [NAME_67], [NAME_9] copied to [NAME_11] and [NAME_45] [151 & 152]

r. 28 September 2023: an email to [NAME_66], copied to [NAME_45], [NAME_65], [NAME_29] and [NAME_68] [153]

s. 2 October 2023: an email (11:07 hours) to Ms [NAME_23] and [NAME_323] copied to [NAME_45]; an email (19:41 hours) to the Watford Employment Tribunal copied to [NAME_65], [NAME_29], [NAME_45], [NAME_11] and [NAME_13] [158 & 159]

t. 3 October 2023: an email to the Watford Employment Tribunal copied to [NAME_65], [NAME_29], [NAME_45], [NAME_11] and [NAME_13] [160]

u. 16 October 2023: an email to the Watford Employment Tribunal copied to [NAME_65], [NAME_45], [NAME_11] and [NAME_13] [161].

v. 13 November 2023: a message from the claimant to [NAME_9] via the [NAME_72] [163]

w. 16 January 2024: a message from the claimant to [NAME_9] via the [NAME_72] [164 & 165]

24. The claimant did not comply with [NAME_15]’s request that she should direct all correspondence to [NAME_45] at that firm and not communicate with their client directly or indirectly. She simply ignored that request on multiple occasions.

25. [NAME_11], [NAME_9] and [NAME_13] have described in detail the negative and distressing impact that this correspondence had upon them in their witness statements which I discuss below.

March 2017

Allegations of insurance fraud, conspiracy to defraud and misappropriation of public funds; allegations of fraud against [NAME_9]

26. On 16 October 2023, the claimant sent an email to the Watford Employment Tribunal [161] which she copied to [NAME_65], [NAME_45], [NAME_11] and [NAME_13], she stated amongst other things:

I have copied partner, [NAME_73], who is the Head of Risk Assessment at [COMPANY_76], as one of the outstanding issues is possible insurance fraud or misappropriation of public funds in how they are getting paid.

27. On 13 November 2023, the claimant sent a message to [NAME_9] via the [NAME_72] [163]. In that message, she stated, amongst other things:

[NAME_11] is either misapproriating public funds or committing insurance fraud to pay the solicitors because defying industry standards like denying me my assessment review that [NAME_21] wrote, or denying me their own grievance procedures, is not indemnifiable. His solicitors, [NAME_85], and [NAME_79] are party to that fraud and, if you don't report this to the [NAME_80] and local council, you are too now. You can check this yourself, it's true. Even the possibility is reportable and should be investigated.

Do you know what they did to [NAME_81]? I do. This can only get uglier is someone doesn't following the law.

I do not want this to blow up as a problem fo [COMPANY_26], or any of these people that are currently letting [NAME_11] just do whatever he wants. I think everyone else is being lied to.

Please will you choose to care? I know you've must be instructed not to respond to me but [NAME_11] is just on the wrong side. Are you?

28. On 20 November 2023, the claimant wrote to the Watford Employment Tribunal [90 & 91]. She stated, amongst other things:

Claimant is representing herself in the above matter and all actions against [COMPANY_5].

In accordance with rules 6, 31 of the Employment Tribunal Rules of Procedure 2013 (ET Rules), Respondents were asked at the preliminary hearing Sept 1st to make all relevant disclosures as requested by the Claimant by Nov 17th.

The Respondents have not complied with this order and continued to resist the disinfecting light of disclosure. But many thanks to [NAME_115] for signposting me to the full numbered rules of the Employment Tribunal. I only had presidential guidance and forms to this point, and no idea I could make written applications like this.

March 2017 In accordance with rules 29, 30, 38, and 44 of ET Rules, and application that:

Unless Respondents allow [NAME_21] to directly send to me her entire report, with the full knowledge of allegation of insurance fraud or misappropriation of public funds in whatever non-threatening wording [NAME_24] should deem appropriate by Nov 24th, one week in defiance of the existing order, I ask that the court order Respondents to reinstate my salary by Dec 1st as an urgent interim order.

I don’t feel inspection of witness statements by members of the public is productive at this stage, but inspection of the emails alleging insurance fraud and misappropriation of funds by parties with an ethical obligation to disclose makes sense, as per the Statutory documents submitted by the Claimant Nov 17, and pursuant to this the blocking of email contact with the [NAME_84] domain should be lifted. I am happy to avoid contact with the Clerk, [NAME_58], as it has been a non-productive exchange regardless, but I specifically have business with the Vice-Chair to report the actions of the [NAME_35], [NAME_85], that defy industry regulation and [COMPANY_6] protocols.

…

[NAME_15] are not representing [COMPANY_5] in the matter of possible insurance fraud and possible misappropriation of public funds. They are in fact the beneficiaries of the actions that need investigating, and therefore have a conflict of interest in extending their representation to include this.

Therefore I ask not only that Watford Employment Tribunal by rule 44 dismiss the attempt to block further communication, but that they lift the email ban instituted by the Respondents. They really don’t want me confusing anyone with facts.

All the parties in receipt of allegations of insurance fraud and misappropriation of public funds should be uncomfortable, but the reason for their discomfort is that they are required to report their employer. They are not in the habit of restraining their employer, as evidenced by his entitled statement in my Nov 17th disclosures, “I do what I want to do”.

29. On 9 January 2024, [NAME_65], [NAME_45] and Ms [NAME_73] (a partner at [NAME_15]) [406] stating, amongst other things:

[NAME_73] is again copied as you have not dealt with possible insurance fraud with your legal fees.

30. On 9 January 2024, the claimant wrote to [NAME_65] and [NAME_86] [407 – 411] referring to her allegation of possible insurance fraud on the part of the respondent in retaining [NAME_15].

31. On 11 January 2024, the claimant emailed [NAME_65] and copied [NAME_88] [414]. She stated, amongst other things:

March 2017 I have further copied you and [NAME_42] on requests to the [NAME_87] for confirmation of [NAME_9] arrangements with STEM Learning to ascertain whether he was defrauding me for money or whether he was merely abusing his authority when denying me the chance to be a lead practitioner, which I trained for and was not paid for my time, and for which training [COMPANY_26] collected a government subsidy. Do you want the emails substantiating this?

32. On 12 January 2024, the claimant emailed [NAME_86] and copied in [NAME_98] [416]. She stated, amongst other things:

Seems this was not just abuse of authority but straight up fraud by an [NAME_84] employee.

I need to contact the [NAME_35] since you don't find it necessary to acknowledge crimes by your clients. My code of ethics demands it.

I will expect contact details within 5 business days

33. On 15 January 2024, the claimant sent an email to the Watford Employment Tribunal, copied to [NAME_65], [NAME_88] [424]. She stated, amongst other things:

Please find also attached evidence from the [NAME_87] uncovered Jan 2024 of fraud by [NAME_84]. Please note that Respondent's solicitors [NAME_62] and [NAME_42] are copied in all correspondences in this matter.

It is also a concern that [NAME_15] have behaved thus far in the personal interests of [NAME_16], who I have applied to be a named respondent separate from [COMPANY_5], and have thus not acted in the interests of [COMPANY_26], particularly as [COMPANY_26] cannot be made to indemnify actions against [NAME_87] regulation, and cannot choose to indemnify actions against [NAME_87] regulation. [NAME_15] have blocked my contact with [NAME_9] and then fed me evidence that led me to uncover this fraud. The separate entities named in this action should have full knowledge and should probably be separately represented.

34. On 16 January, the claimant sent a message to [NAME_9] via [NAME_72] [164 & 165]. The subject matter of the message was “Fraud”. The claimant stated, amongst other things:

Hello [ ],

[NAME_15] have provided me with emails showing that [NAME_38] tried to stop you stopping me from running STEM Learning training, and this led me to a [NAME_87] query where [NAME_89] confirmed that this was not just abuse of authority but fraud, since you were engaged to do the exact same course that students wouldn't benefit from.

March 2017

Can you confirm that you reported to [NAME_36] that [NAME_16] should not be indemnified for defying [NAME_87] regulation and should not have legal costs covered?

Feel free to pas this along to [NAME_15]; I copied them on every query to the [NAME_87] and they should provide you with those emails since this is a separate crime than what they are already litigating.

The suggestion in this message is that somebody from the Department for Education had characterised [NAME_9]’ behaviour as both abuse of authority and fraud. Having read the email correspondence between [NAME_92] and the claimant dated [416- 421] this characterisation by the claimant is incorrect. Indeed, it is misleading for the following reasons. The claimant forwarded an email from [NAME_92] to [NAME_86] on 11 January 2024 [416] which she characterised as “not just abuse of authority but straight up fraud by [NAME_84] employee”. In [NAME_92]’s email to the claimant dated 11 January 2024 (17:28 hours) [416] there is nothing to support the conclusion that [NAME_9] had committed fraud. Indeed, [NAME_92] does not refer to [NAME_9]’ conduct anywhere in the email. In my opinion, this was clearly misleading behaviour on the part of the claimant, and it is understandable why [NAME_9] considered the allegation to be intimidating. The tone of the claimant’s message sent via the [NAME_72] is threatening. [NAME_92] had not confirmed that [NAME_9] was guilty of abuse of authority and fraud. Using words such as “Can you give me a reason to not report you for fraud?” is threatening.

35. On 22 January 2024, the claimant emailed the Watford Employment Tribunal and copied in [NAME_93], [NAME_65], [NAME_88] [434]. She stated, amongst other things:

The fraud by [NAME_9] through STEM Learning has been reported to ActionFraud, crime reference #NFRC240106424282.

This may constitute conspiracy to defraud, since other employees of [COMPANY_5] were aware of it.

It is my concern that [NAME_9] is not being updated on the proceedings. I have contacted him through STEM to explain that [COMPANY_26] solicitors were copied on every message chasing down this fraud, and I would have copied him too. [NAME_72] is a messaging board for sharing best practices; following the [NAME_20] code of ethical conduct is a best practice. [NAME_9] has greeted this information with an unfounded report of harassment and I have been suspended from the site and am unable to keep current with reading and research through them. Someone is confused and has also threatened to cancel my designation as a Professional Development Lead, but it's my understanding that expired already due to [NAME_9] actions.

36. On 25 January 2024, the claimant emailed the Watford Employment Tribunal and copied in [NAME_93], [NAME_65], [NAME_88] [174]. The claimant, stated, amongst other things:

March 2017 Prior to this application to the Tribunal, on Jan 19th, within two days of the message quoted, [NAME_9] made it his priority to try to get me barred and banned from the Stem Learning Community. This is following already having caused the expiry of my PDL status with them, and defrauding me of money that he expected to receive instead.

37. On 29 January 2024, the claimant emailed [NAME_95] (a solicitor at [NAME_15]) and copied in [NAME_98] [455]. She stated, amongst other things:

Can I please have the schedule, contract and financial information for [NAME_38] as well please. I need her birthdate as well just as key ID for ActionFraud.

Feel free to tell her I have grounds to add her to a conspiracy to defraud that you've provided to me, but I'm really interested in compelling her witness testimony since there are several contradictory second hand accounts of her in all three disclosures.

38. [NAME_11] and [NAME_9] have described in detail the negative and distressing impact that this correspondence and these allegations had upon them in their witness statements which I discuss below.

Allegations that [NAME_9] threatened the Claimant with physical violence online and the suggestion that [NAME_9] may be incited to violence against the claimant

39. On 2 February 2024, the claimant emailed the Watford Employment Tribunal and copied in [NAME_93], [NAME_65], [NAME_88] [476]. She stated, amongst other things:

Since collecting evidence of fraud by Respondent's [NAME_9] I have experienced an uptick in rude and insolent questions from incel types (involuntary celibates) that I mostly don't respond to. Today I was on a short list asked to answer this:

TEXT READS "Have you ever thought of hitting your [NAME_20] with a bat?"

I take this as credible threat. I have already requested IP information from [NAME_99] where [NAME_9] first pursued me romantically. [NAME_9] knows where I live. I don't know where he lives, and I only knew he drives a white car as per my report to ActionFraud, if that is even still the case

The email also included a screenshot of [NAME_100] webpage she was referring to. There is no evidence to link [NAME_9] to this question or interaction on the [NAME_99] website.

40. On 9 February 2024, the claimant emailed [NAME_86] and copied [NAME_45] in to that message [477]. She stated, amongst other things:

March 2017 I have had a physical threat of violence leveled against me, and this is a credible threat since [NAME_9] knows what I look like and where I live. As a comparator, [NAME_58] is unknown to me and I don't know where she lives or works and [NAME_65] has accused me of threatening her with legal action, and blocked me from accessing [COMPANY_26] portal.

Can you ensure that only your solicitors that have not already proven themselves lacking in good faith contact me directly? I can provide you with information, but I can't make you read. I will not respond to or copy [NAME_62] or [NAME_96] without some formal apology from them. As a [NAME_20] I have a lot of patience, but less with full grown people, most of whom are larger than me.

Is [NAME_65] just grinding because you charge by the email? Why is he posing threats that I've already responded to? Isn't this what you call vexatious?

41. On 20 February 2024, the claimant emailed [NAME_86] and [NAME_45] [500]. She stated, amongst other things:

I urgently require a full Subject Access Data Request to provide a pattern of behaviour for [NAME_9] who has made a threat to physical violence against me.

This is a criminal investigation and time sensitive.

42. On 29 February 2024, the claimant wrote to the Watford Employment Tribunal [180]. She stated the following [188]:

Since Claimant asserts that [NAME_9] has made a threat of violence against the Claimant on Feb 1st, received Feb 2nd, I have Feb 20th asked again for a full SADR for the purpose of substantiating a pattern of behaviour for a criminal investigation. It is notable that if I have faked this threat, police would also obtain IP address information that would connect me to the sock puppet accounts that have been harassing me. To date, [NAME_15] and [NAME_84] have not acknowledged this request (29/02/2024).

If I am killed, [NAME_9] may be a guilty, murderous patsy or a non- murderous but not innocent patsy. I remind the Tribunal that he knows where I live, and he’s given one day off per week, I believe Mondays this year but [NAME_15] have failed to confirmed this. I don’t believe he would come kill me because [NAME_11] told him to, but he may be incited to violence. If he’s been told I’ve alleged sexual harassment ut not told that I’ve stated explicitly to the court there was no groping, etc., if he knows I’ve lodged the fraud complaint, and if he knows I’ve lodged the threat to violence complaint with police which may be traced to him by IP information, and if he feels like all incels that his “life is over anyway”, he’s never going to have a partner and never going to have kids, I believe he could decide on his own or be incited to kill me.

March 2017 43. On 8 April 2024, [NAME_30] 7219 [NAME_31] settled a witness statement which was produced to the Tribunal. I have reproduced the statement in full as follows:

I am [NAME_30] 7219 [NAME_31] and have been a Police Officer with Thames Valley Police since May 2011. My current role is with the Assessment and Investigation Unit (AIU) based at Milton Keynes Police Station.

I have been asked to provide written testimony about our (Thames Valley Police) interaction with [NAME_101]. This is pertaining to a complaint of harassment against a man she named as [NAME_9].

[NAME_104] first contacted Thames Valley Police on the evening of Friday 9th February 2024 using the Police on-line portal. A call-centre operator from our Enquiry Centre telephoned [NAME_104] back with the following questions later that same day:

A) Please tell us what happened and the events leading up to it, to help is identify if an offence has been committed?

The notes from our operator say “The suspect posted a message from a puppet account asking having you thought about hitting your [NAME_20] with a bat? This was posed to only a short list of people. About four. And I was the only woman. The suspect has a history of staking and harassing me on this platform. I hadn’t reported previously because nothing was directly threatening but now I can’t sleep”./

B) Do you feel race, ethnicity, sex, gender, sexuality, disability or religion were a factor in this crime? The notes from our operator say “Yes”

C) Please tell us why you feel race, ethnicity, sex, gender, disability or religion were a factor in this crime?

The notes from our operator say “The suspect works in an environment where racism and misogyny are prevalent, and has data that indicate he’s part of the problem. The suspect claims not to have any friends, like a profile of an incel. The suspect has a history of not taking racism and misogyny by others seriously. There’s a possibility he has hit a [NAME_105] with his car, and a possibility he’s been investigated for sexual harassment before. The suspect failed to complete sexual harassment training as required by our mutual employer”.

This call was then allocated to [NAME_106] 6176 [NAME_107] also of the AIU Department at Milton Keynes Police Station. They were tasked with ascertaining more information pertaining to this allegation from [NAME_104].

Following a telephone dialogue on Sunday 11th February 2024; they establish the name of the person [NAME_104] is citing as harassing her was [NAME_9]. They further learn he was [NAME_104]’s line manager from when she was previously employed at the “[NAME_4] No: 3303311/2023 10.5 Reserved judgment with reasons – rule 62

March 2017 [COMPANY_6]” in Buckingham. We understand [NAME_104] left this employment that same month.

[NAME_104] was specifically asked what Police outcome she would like to see? [NAME_106] [NAME_107] noted this as “the person sending the messages to be spoken to”. At this point the investigation was allocated to myself (PS7519 [NAME_31]) to take forward.

I asked [NAME_104] to upload the harassing messages/material which she had been receiving via social media. This was invited to be added onto a Police cloud-storage system called “NICE Dems”. To date [NAME_104] has only uploaded a single screen shot and no other evidence to support her claim of harassment. That screenshot was lifted from a social media platform called “[NAME_100]”. The screenshot shows a message thread entitled “Have you ever thought about hitting your [NAME_20] with a bat?” To which [NAME_104] has interacted. Neither has [NAME_104] provided an MG11 (written witness statement) or participated in a Video Recorded Interview to further set out her allegations.

The Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) sets out the threshold under which a crime of harassment is verified. This is drawn from the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. In this report from [NAME_104] that threshold has not achieved. A crime of harassment has not been confirmed. No case file has been raised nor has a CPS lawyer’s advice been sought.

For [NAME_25] the [NAME_20] at [COMPANY_3] was contacted. A separate dialogue was held with them pertaining to this allegation. As a criminal investigation the decision was taken to close it on Tuesday 27th February 2024. The Home Office Closure Code applied being Code 16 (Victim not Supporting). This being on the grounds that [NAME_104] was unable to share with Thames Valley Police any substantive material scoping out the harassment she is claiming against her [NAME_108] line manager.

I wrote to [NAME_104] scoping this decision out on Tuesday 5th March 2024. To date [NAME_104] has not offered up any further corroborating material to support her allegation. This report remains closed.

44. Having read the statement, the inevitable conclusion to be drawn is that the claimant made an unsubstantiated allegation of the threat of physical violence against [NAME_9]. She not only made that allegation to the police but also to other parties. It is telling that she did not provide a witness statement or participate in a Video Recorded Interview to further set out her allegations. The only evidence that she provided to the police was the screenshot from the [NAME_99] website which, in itself, does not link [NAME_9] to the alleged threat of violence. It is reasonable to infer from [NAME_109]’s statement that notwithstanding the absence of any corroboration to support her allegation and her not providing a witness statement or attending a Video Recorded Interview, the outcome that the claimant sought was for the police to speak to [NAME_9]. On that premise, she would be using the police to intimidate [NAME_9]. In the absence of corroboration, or a witness statement or a Video Recorded Interview it would have been wholly inappropriate for the police to speak to [NAME_9]. It is reasonable to infer malicious intent on the part

March 2017 of the claimant in behaving in this way.

45. In his witness statement, [NAME_9] speaks to the distress and sense of intimidation that he felt as a consequence of this allegation of physical violence. I discuss this below.

Allegations of faking and modifying evidence

46. On 21 November 2023, the claimant emailed the Watford Employment Tribunal and copied in [NAME_98] [335] she stated, amongst other things, in respect of the respondent’s disclosure:

This entire disclosures bundle is suspect, but the urgent things is this report.

47. On 7 December 2023, the claimant wrote to [NAME_15] [393] in relation to the bundle in which she inferred that they were tampering with the documentation when she stated:

Are you actually not going to offer me proper disclosures at all? I realise it's going to take some time for you to remove [NAME_11] little flourishes to the truth. Can you provide me with an estimated time?

The [NAME_110] report in the documents proffered is materially different. There's the invention of the notoin that only [NAME_21] was present for the [NAME_105] DM attending the nursing station, and that she had the impression that the child was seeking contraception. This is a convenient way of cutting out [NAME_111]'s testimony, but it's not true.

I will not currently offer you the email that refutes this. Since you have offered an affirmative defence, I want to see what else [NAME_11] will attempt to lie about. Do you think he's done changing the events?

48. On 21 December 2023, the claimant emailed [NAME_98] [396]. In relation to the respondent’s disclosure [396]. She stated, amongst other things:

There are serious falsehoods in these documents. We will not be able to agree on a bundle if everything is creatively coloured through [NAME_16] who has proven repeatedly he is an unreliable witness.

49. On 23 January 2024, the claimant emailed [NAME_93] [438] she stated, amongst other things:

You have had two clear example of your client lying to you and falsifying documents, about confirmation of employment and faking the assessment review by [NAME_21]. You have another, larger lie when the assessment review was ordered, since it wasn't independent. What measures are you taking to ensure that documents which get submitted to the court are accurate?

March 2017 50. On 24 January 2024, the claimant emailed [NAME_93] [441] in relation to the respondent’s disclosure and stated, amongst other things:

I note there are at least two corrections of false information in the disclosure you have provided, but there are still several issues

51. On 25 January 2024, the claimant emailed [NAME_93] [453] in relation to the respondent’s disclosure and stated amongst other things:

You, [NAME_96], seem to have a problem with evidence being altered. [NAME_15] has been copied on my report to the SRA about that.

52. On 8 February 2024, the claimant emailed [NAME_65] and copied in [NAME_93] and [NAME_45] alleging that documents in the disclosure bundle had been altered [482] she referred to going through the respondent’s disclosure bundle with a “fine toothed comb, that’s how I found altered evidence”.

53. On 10 February 2024, the claimant forwarded information that she had submitted to the [NAME_114] to [NAME_45] [490]. In that message, she stated, amongst other things:

[COMPANY_5] has denied my SADR and is compiling lies to justify ending my career.

This is not an exaggeration. In Sept 2023 I've gathered evidence that the headteacher was defaming me in references, and [NAME_15] advised that he stop and provide only a confirmation of employment. Then I gathered information that he was refusing to complete a confirmation of employment form in all probability to defame me over [NAME_25], which was on the form.

Now in January I have had to report [NAME_115], a second time, for falsifying data the wish to use in an Employment Tribunal hearing.

They are very much failing to apply the legitimate interest criteria when denying my SADR, but in doing so, covering over an additional fraud, and insurance fraud by both [COMPANY_6] and [NAME_15].

54. The claimant reported [NAME_15] to the Solicitors Regulation Authority. A copy of her report is included in the bundle [491]. In the report, the claimant alleged:

1) [NAME_96] on Jan 19th 2024 has sent me a third disclosure bundle for the Employment Tribunal that has evidence that has been altered.

This is no longer a case of communication problems with the client since [NAME_15] have three versions in their possession, and the third version disclosed by [NAME_96] has altered evidence previously shared to omit a witness guessing and being mistaken.

2) [NAME_15] now have evidence of fraud by an [NAME_84] employee and have blocked appropriate communication channel for reporting this.

March 2017

3) [NAME_15] has had evidence delivered to all solicitors that an assessment review, as mandatory right regulated by the Department for Education, was denied to me by their clients, [NAME_16], headteacher at [COMPANY_5], and [NAME_85], Chair of the [NAME_80] at [COMPANY_5], and so should understand that is insurance fraud. They have assured the court that both men are fully indemnified in their job roles. This is not the case.

…

1) For two weeks now the firm has had evidence delivered to all current solicitors that an assessment review, as mandatory right regulated by the Department for Education, was denied to me by their clients, [NAME_16], headteacher at [COMPANY_5], and [NAME_85], Chair of the [NAME_80] at [COMPANY_5]. Not only are the firm acting against these regulations by failing to hol their clients to account, attempting to lie that this report was made as a [NAME_25] report, but they have assured the court that both men are fully indemnified in their job roles. This is not the case. Illegal acts and wilful acts against industry regulation are not insurable.

2) So the firm is also committing insurance fraud. There is a total of four solicitors within the firm that have had contact with me and are acting for the client, [COMPANY_5], as well as employing outside counsel, [NAME_116] of [NAME_119], so this is already a fair sum that should be borne by the individuals, [NAME_16] and [NAME_85].

55. On 29 February 2024, the claimant wrote to the Watford Employment Tribunal [180]. In referring to the exclusions in the respondent’s [NAME_326], the claimant alleged:

[COMPANY_26]’s insurance RPA Sections 6 Professional Indemnity Exclusions also include:

“4. for any fine or Penalty, punitive, exemplary or non-compensatory damages (other than exemplary damages in respect of libel, slander or defamation).”

This will include court fines for excluding an application to amend, missing deadlines, attempting to move deadlines by pretending to be on holiday; those should be put squarely on the shoulders of the perpetrators, but particularly attempting to pervert the course of justice by submission of a changed assessment review (a.k.a. [NAME_110], [NAME_110]), and attempting to pervert the course of justice to submit a changed application forms, and a changed witness statement from [NAME_120]. [185].

The claimant further alleged that [NAME_28] had tampered with the bundle:

March 2017 Respondents have attempted to include “evidence” constructed in Nov 2023 to inform an assessment made in Jan 2023. And I say constructed because even to look at it it’s been modified.

Respondents consistently deny a SADR for all email communications, whilst trying to defend that the Claimant’s communications are unprofessional. In comparing the first, second and third disclosure bundles it is clear that:

a) [NAME_121], PA to [NAME_16] has lied and tried to pervert the course of Justice, probably as directed by [NAME_16], and this could not have been done without [NAME_16]’s full knowledge

b) Solicitors [NAME_62] and [NAME_96] have altered evidence and tried to pervert the course of justice.

c) Assistant headteacher [NAME_21] has offered faked evidence to pervert the course of justice, and inappropriately involved [NAME_16] in her assessment review that should have been independent

c) [NAME_10] has faked assessments that were not given to me, and altered assignments set for students by me in order to pervert the course of justice; only he could have accessed these and known what to try to claim.

I have been through the disclosure bundle offered up by the Respondents line by line and I have sent through several other queries which if they can’t substantiate today, their witnesses will have to answer later. Pease see the letter [NAME_15] letter Jan 09. This was written before the third disclosure bundle was made available. See also the [NAME_15] 24 Disclosures Letter asking questions about the irregularities in the disclosure bundle.

Most worryingly, even Respondents solicitors have show a propensity to alter “evidence”. It may be the only course of action that the Tribunal direct Respondents to permit direct access to the Claimant of a SADR from the internet service provider, Google, who will not compromise veracity for the sake of their jobs, whatever fair wording Respondents will agree to.

56. On 15 March 2024, the claimant emailed the Teaching Regulation Agency, the Local Authority Designated Officer and the [NAME_185] [513]. She stated, amongst other things:

I have received now three different hearing bundles from [NAME_130], solicitors for [COMPANY_3], clearly full of modified evidence and fabricated evidence that indicates multiple members of the teaching staff at [COMPANY_3] intend to lie to the Employment Tribunal. This comprises a broad based cover-up of institutional problems at [COMPANY_3].

For the [NAME_124], these bundles include 'evidence' from children that was incorrectly solicited and indicates an institutional protection, straightforward [NAME_25] procedures that weren't followed, and all

March 2017 individual acts are known to at least three [NAME_84] employees. There are several teaching staff at [NAME_84] that are not upholding their code of conduct aside from faking records for the purpose of subverting the course of justice. If they'll lie to the courts, what will they tell you?

I note that [NAME_125] had redirected me to [COMPANY_26] funding bodies, though I made no mention of the insurance fraud by [COMPANY_26]. I believe it is a completely reneging on [NAME_125]'s responsibilities to allow [COMPANY_26] to make it's own investigations and not act on information, particularly when you can be assured that institutional protection is operating. [ADDRESS] has accepted and has listed a criminal prosecution of head [NAME_20]

[NAME_16] and deputy head [NAME_126]. Actionfraud has a second report of fraud, and now local police have a report of a threat of violence against me, and the solicitors at [NAME_15] have refused to cooperate with a criminal investigation. [NAME_15] can only decide this if they are refusing to implicate themselves.

I feel an immediate review by independent, perhaps Ofsted trained, inspectors is in order as a starting step. Or if [NAME_124] and [NAME_125] want to redeem yourselves, you could assign someone legally trained to look at the inconsistencies in these three bundles. They are about 100 pages each.

Also urgently required, [COMPANY_26] does not have representation separate from the representation for the headteacher. Their interests are not the same and it is almost certain those empowered to take steps in that regard are unaware that they should do so.

I understand that no [ADDRESS] has accepted or has listed a criminal prosecution of [NAME_11]. For the claimant to have stated this in this email was clearly false and a serious misrepresentation. Furthermore, I understand that [NAME_129] were not contacted by the police in relation to any criminal investigation relating to the claimant, the respondent or anybody who works for the respondent.

57. On 18 March 2024, the claimant wrote to the Watford Employment Tribunal and copied in [NAME_88] [507]. In that email, she accused [NAME_15] of tampering with documents in the bundle:

Please find linked below the three proposed hearing bundle materials submitted by [NAME_130]. If compared closely, 80% of these documents have been tampered with in a way to obfuscate and materially change, and unfairly disadvantage me as the Claimant, the third specifically denying most of the evidence submitted to the Tribunal by me. This is particularly absurd when Respondents are completely refusing a SADR with no [NAME_134] grounds provided, no redacted SADR offered, have refused to cooperate in contacting witnesses, and have missed the deadline for witness statements.

…

March 2017

One set of mistakes could just be client miscommunication, but these is clearly solicitor misconduct that should be referred by the Tribunal to the Solicitor's Regulation Authority. I am happy to attend proceedings to see this through.

[NAME_15] have also refused to cooperate in the criminal investigation of the harassment and I have been suffering medical issues and have a referral for physical therapy now, next appointment March 27th.

It's difficult to know how to proceed under the circumstances, but I think the Tribunal should consider striking out the inconsistent, incoherent [NAME_27] and concluding these proceedings if Respondents and [NAME_15] cannot act in good faith. I believe [NAME_11] will not stop defaming me and will not rectify my training documents without re-engagement Orders.

58. [NAME_11], [NAME_9] and [NAME_13] have set out in their witness statement the negative impact of the claimant’s behaviour, which I discuss below.

Derogatory, misleading and/or defamatory comments to third parties

59. On 15 August 2023, the claimant emailed [NAME_54] of [NAME_132] and [NAME_49] copying in [NAME_11], [NAME_66], [NAME_13] and [NAME_45] referring to a “false training assessment” [129]. The [NAME_132] is [COMPANY_26]-and [NAME_20] provider which works with 60 schools and organisations across Buckinghamshire, Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire. It is a Department for Education accredited [COMPANY_6].

60. On 23 October 2023, the claimant emailed [NAME_65] and copied in [NAME_88] [294]. She stated, amongst other things:

you have a credible allegation your clients are defying Department for Education regulation. It is in your interests to investigate this so you know if you are party to insurance fraud, or misappropriation of public funds. All of the regulation information is publicly available and I have provided you with evidence.

As such, I have again copied [NAME_73] herein, and I have copied her on every email sent to the SRA. I wish to provide complete transparency, and it's my hope that this has been a miscommunication that you will actively seek to rectify. I realise [NAME_15] is an LLP, but that's not no liability.

Implicitly, the claimant was not only alleging that the respondent was defying Department for Education regulations but also that it and [NAME_129] were party to insurance fraud and misappropriation of public funds. The tone of this email is intimidating and threatening particularly given the reference to the SRA and also to [NAME_15] not having liability.

61. On 17 November 2023, the claimant wrote to the Teaching Regulation Authority (“[NAME_124]”) [169]. In that correspondence, the claimant alleged that [NAME_11] had been defaming her in a reference that was denied to her and claimed as agreed. The [NAME_124] regulates everyone employed to do teaching

March 2017 work in a [COMPANY_6] in England. If they find that a [NAME_20] has been “convicted of a Relevant Offence”, is “guilty of Unacceptable Professional Conduct” or has “behaved in a manner that may bring the teaching profession into disrepute”, then they can make a recommendation to the Secretary of State for Education as to whether the [NAME_20] is prohibited from teaching. The tone of this message to the [NAME_124] is clearly intended to intimidate [NAME_11], particularly given the fact that the correspondence was addressed to his professional regulator.

62. [NAME_11], [NAME_9] and [NAME_13] describe the impact of this behaviour in their witness statements which I discuss below.

Allegations that the Respondent, [NAME_11] and [NAME_13] are defying Department for Education Regulations

63. On 26 September 2023, the claimant emailed [NAME_65], [NAME_45], [NAME_49] and [NAME_86] [279]. She stated, amongst other things:

You have had evidence that your clients [NAME_16] and [NAME_85] are defying government regulation in denying me the assessment review that was written by [NAME_21].

[NAME_116] of [NAME_119] has told the Employment Tribunal that [NAME_11] and [NAME_13] are fully indemnified for anything in their job roles. This cannot be the case if they are wilfully defying government regulation, so you may also be guilty of insurance fraud.

I urge you to persuade your clients to comply with the Department for Education regulations. Your clients actions are an ongoing detriment to me.

64. On 28 September 2023, the claimant emailed [NAME_66] copying in [NAME_45], [NAME_65], [NAME_29] and [NAME_69] [153]. She stated, amongst other things:

As you've been informed, [NAME_11] and [NAME_13] are defying the Department for Education regulation mandating an assessment review upon request by any [NAME_105] or trainee. You will find [NAME_69] copied above, from the [NAME_132], who can explain this to you.

Wilfully defying industry regulation or any crime of any sort cannot be insured. You, [NAME_13], and the solicitor team may be considered party to insurance fraud.

You may not think this is your job, but I am suffering ongoing detriment because of the actions of [NAME_11] and [NAME_13]. If that's not your concern, be concerned for yourself.

65. On 16 October 2023, the claimant wrote to [NAME_65] [289]. She stated, amongst other things:

March 2017 As you've been informed, [NAME_11] and [NAME_13] are defying the Department for Education regulation mandating an assessment review upon request by any [NAME_105] or trainee. You will find [NAME_69] copied above, from the [NAME_132], who can explain this to you. Wilfully defying industry regulation or any crime of any sort cannot be insured. You, [NAME_13], and the solicitor team may be considered party to insurance fraud. You may not think this is your job, but I am suffering ongoing detriment because of the actions of [NAME_11] and [NAME_13]. If that's not your concern, be concerned for yourself.

…

Sept 4th, July 31st, Feb 9th 7) You have not acknowledged that you have received evidence that [NAME_16] and [NAME_18] are in violation of Department for Education regulation that guarantees me the right to an assessment review.

66. On 23 October 2023, the claimant emailed [NAME_65] and copied in [NAME_88] [294]. She stated, amongst other things:

But I stress that you have a credible allegation your clients are defying Department for Education regulation. It is in your interests to investigate this so you know if you are party to insurance fraud, or misappropriation of public funds. All of the regulation information is publicly available and I have provided you with evidence.

67. On 7 December 2023, the claimant wrote to [NAME_129] [393]. She stated, amongst other things:

Perhaps most essentially, [COMPANY_5] is still in violation of Statutory Induction Guidance 2019 sections 2.45, 2.50, 2.56, 2.62, 4.1, 4.2, 5.3, 5.6, Teaching Excellent Framework 2016 question 10, both of these files were subtitled “for [NAME_124] right to appeal” and “for right to appeal” when I sent them to both you and the Tribunal, and TEF year 2 Section 8.22 if they can be expected to be current, Statutory Teachers Pay and Condition 2022 most of part 5, part 7.44, 7,46, 7.49, 7.52, [NAME_20] 393Amendment Order 2023 section 3.60, [COMPANY_5]’s UK [NAME_133] [NAME_134] ([NAME_134]) Summary Document point 4, 7, 9, which notably lacks summaries on rectification, as a Schedule 1 entity and data controller, in violation of UK [NAME_134] section 35.2.b, 35.3, 36.3, 38.1.a, 38.1.b, 38.2 (your anonymising is irregular), 38.5.c, 44.1.d.ii, 44.4.a, 44.4.b, 44.4.c, 44.4.e, most of section 45, all of section 46.

68. On 21 December 2023 the claimant emailed [NAME_98] [396]. She stated, amongst other things:

I will need contact with the [NAME_35] to report irregularities with [NAME_16] and his refusal to follow government regulation and [COMPANY_6] procedures, irregularities with [NAME_85] and his refusal to follow [COMPANY_6] procedures, to report my continued

March 2017 victimisation with a false and defamatory reference, and now to report more irregularities, failures in [NAME_25] and failures in [NAME_134] as evidenced by the information you've provided to me. Teachers are mandatory reporters without boundary of [COMPANY_6] or contract term.

69. On 9 January 2024, (incorrectly stated as 2023 in the letter) the claimant wrote to [NAME_65] [407]. The claimant stated, amongst other things:

Sept 4th, July 31st, Feb 9th

5) You have not acknowledged that you have received evidence that [NAME_16] and [NAME_18] are in violation of Department for Education regulation that guarantees me the right to an assessment review.

70. It is unclear in what ways the respondent defied Department for Education regulations. The tone of this correspondence is threatening and intimidating. [NAME_11], [NAME_9] and [NAME_13] speak of the negative impact that this had upon them in their witness statements which I discuss below.

Rude, aggressive and threatening communications to and/or about staff

71. In an email dated 19 August 2023 addressed to [NAME_49] and copied to [NAME_45], [NAME_11] and [NAME_13] the claimant accused [NAME_13] of “Hermeneutical ignorance”[132].

72. In an email dated 13 September 2023 [149] addressed to [NAME_66] and copied to [NAME_11] and [NAME_13], the claimant said:

I need everything you have about the procedure for removing a board member that defies government regulation and [COMPANY_6] protocols please. And when is the next board meeting?

I feel attached to [COMPANY_26] and feel I need to act in its interests. I'm already in it now and I have nothing better to do since I'm kept unemployed by [NAME_11].

There are steps you could take to mitigate all of this at any time. Work with me and there will be less fallout.

73. [NAME_66] forwarded that email to [NAME_13], [NAME_11] and [NAME_65] later on the same day stating:

I must admit it made me feel very uncomfortable and there seems to be an undercurrent of a threat.

74. In an email dated 28 September 2023 addressed to [NAME_135] and copied to [NAME_45], [NAME_29] and [NAME_136] [153] the claimant said, amongst other things:

March 2017 Wilfully defying industry regulation or any crime of any sort cannot be insured. You, [NAME_13], and the solicitor team may be considered party to insurance fraud.

75. In a message dated 13 November 2023, from the claimant to [NAME_9] sent via the [NAME_72] [163], the claimant stated, amongst other things:

This can only get uglier is someone doesn't following the law. I do not want this to blow up as a problem fo [COMPANY_26], or any of these people that are currently letting [NAME_11] just do whatever he wants. I think everyone else is being lied to.

76. The claimant emailed the Watford Employment Tribunal on 2 February 2024 [476]. She stated, amongst other things:

Since collecting evidence of fraud by Respondent's [NAME_9] I have experienced an uptick in rude and insolent questions from incel types (involuntary celibates) that I mostly don't respond to.

77. I have already referred to the claimant’s email to the Tribunal dated 29 February 2024 [188] and discuss below the impact of labelling [NAME_9] as an incel had on him.

Abuse of process - claims not within jurisdiction of the Employment Tribunal

78. The respondent asserts that the claimant has abused process by seeking to use the Tribunal to address claims of libel, defamation, misuse of private information, negligent misstatement, fraud and conspiracy to commit fraud. In this regard, the respondent refers to the following documents:

a. The claimant’s application to amend her claim on 29 February 2024 [192, 194 & 195].

b. The claimant emailed the Watford Employment Tribunal on 23 May 2023 [214] copying in [NAME_49], [NAME_45], [NAME_11] and [NAME_13] indicating that she would not be providing detailed particulars of claim and indicated that a preliminary hearing would not be productive pending the outcome of a Data Subject Access Request. The Employment Tribunal has no jurisdiction to address Data Subject Access Requests as this falls within the jurisdiction of the [NAME_114].

c. This was further evidence in the claimant’s email dated 15 January 2024 to the Watford Employment Tribunal and copied to [NAME_65], [NAME_88] where the claimant states [424]:

March 2017 Please find attached evidence of four Freedom of Information requests made online at whatdotheyknow.com by the Claimant.

Respondents are in blatant and persistent violation of the Tribunal's orders of Sept 1st, for disclosure by Nov 17th "of the documents in their possession or control relevant to the issues in this case whether they assist their case or not".

d. The claimant’s Review of Publically Available Documents which accompanied her applications to the Watford Employment Tribunal on 15 January 2024 [182-190]. In particular:

i. Requiring the Tribunal to take action to inform the relevant bodies and if it does not, to explain why it is sanctioning the use of public funds to deny rights under the law. The Tribunal has no power to do this. ii. Requiring the Tribunal to order [NAME_11] to bear his own costs rather than being indemnified under the applicable insurance policy. The Tribunal has no power to do this.

Abuse of process - Claimant's application for an unless order

79. On November 2023, the claimant applied to the Tribunal for an Unless Order in the following terms[ 89-92]:

80. The claimant resubmitted her application on 29 February 2024 [197-202]. The application was made in the following terms:

Unless Respondents allow [NAME_21] to directly send to me her entire report, with the full knowledge of allegation of insurance fraud or misappropriation of public funds in whatever non-threatening wording [NAME_24] should deem appropriate by Nov 24th, one week in defiance of the existing order, I ask that the court order Respondents an emergency injuction [sic]

1. to remove all unsubstantiated and disparaging mentions of [NAME_25], or unprofessional communication from all training documents,

2. to sign off training as complete,

3. to remove unsubstantiated disparaging remarks “TS1-TS8 for Part One of” and “In order to complete her final assessment, she now needs toprovide consistent evidence to support Part Two (Personal and Professional Conduct) with a focus on regard for the ethos, policies and practices of [COMPANY_26], particularly with a view to effective and

March 2017 appropriate communication. I would recommend that this takes place across the period of half a term” from the written references, 4. to not refer to the written reference as an agreed reference, and 5. to take all necessary steps to rectify documents offered to the Tribunal, steps which may include [COMPANY_5] obtaining independent counsel, separate from [NAME_16]’s.

81. [NAME_15] objected to the original application setting out its reasons for doing so in an email to the claimant dated 21 November 2023 [104]. The respondent had complied with the original order to disclose documents on 17 November 2023. Consequently, there was no basis for the claimant to make your application. [NAME_21] also sent the claimant a copy of the report on 27 November 2023 [387].

82. I agree with the respondent that there was no reason for the claimant to make a further application for and Unless Order for the reasons given by the respondent.

Unreasonable conduct of proceedings - Claimant's disclosure

83. The respondent alleges that the claimant has deliberately failed to disclose relevant documents that she has confirmed that she has in her possession. They rely upon the following documents:

a. An email from the claimant to the Watford Employment Tribunal dated 17 November 2023 and copied to [NAME_98] [299]. The claimant attached “some new evidence” to the email and then stated “This isn't all the evidence since I will have to know what Respondents are admitting and what they are denying”.

b. A letter from the claimant to [NAME_15] dated 7 December 2023 where she states, amongst other things [393]:

The [NAME_110] report in the documents proffered is materially different. There's the invention of the notoin that only [NAME_21] was present for the [NAME_105] DM attending the nursing station, and that she had the impression that the child was seeking contraception. This is a convenient way of cutting out [NAME_111]'s testimony, but it's not true. I will not currently offer you the email that refutes this. Since you have offered an affirmative defence, I want to see what else [NAME_11] will attempt to lie about. Do you think he's done changing the events?

I will not and cannot offer which parts of the publicly available documents I will cite since Idon't know how [NAME_11] will continue to change his narrative, or indeed how much of it is fact. I need full documents of the publicly available in the bundle. Again, this should have been addressed with ACAS.

The claimant has not disclosed the email.

March 2017 c. An email from [NAME_65] to the claimant dated 18 December 2023 [397]. [NAME_65] listed documents which had been partially disclosed by the claimant. The claimant has not provided those documents.

d. An email from the claimant to [NAME_93] copied to [NAME_98] dated 20 January 2024 [436]. The claimant stated amongst other things:

And I have not yet offered evidence that [NAME_9] was pursuing me romantically because I'm not certain if you're denying this. He has certainly tried to hide his tracks but he's not as technically adept as he thinks.

The claimant does not disclose this evidence notwithstanding numerous requests from [NAME_15] [447 & 449].

e. In the claimant’s review of the draft bundle she states the following [445]:

P 363, why are there no dates for the text messages?? Why are only some messages printed? I will get you the rest as soon as possible. I don’t have very nice phone.

The claimant did not disclose this evidence despite frequent requests do so [477 & 482].

84. What this evidence indicates is that the claimant has made selective disclosure. She is obliged to disclose all documents that are relevant to the claims and issues (unless those documents are privileged-i.e. subject to solicitor client privilege or litigation privilege (e.g. a document prepared in contemplation of litigation)) and has a continuing obligation to do so. The claimant cannot “cherry pick” the documents that she wishes to disclose and nor can she withhold a disclosure pending disclosure by the respondent.

Unreasonable conduct of proceedings - Respondent's disclosure

85. The respondent alleges that the claimant has repeatedly accused it of failing to comply with its disclosure obligations. Evidence is provided in several documents as follows:

a. The claimant’s email to the Watford Employment tribunal copying in [NAME_49], [NAME_11], [NAME_13] and [NAME_45] dated 14 July 2023 [126]. In this email, the claimant states:

I feel the Tribunal can make a judgement about the balance of probabilities based on the complete and persistent lack of disclosure from Respondents. The [NAME_20] does not only disadvantage staff, but also students.

b. The claimant’s email to the Watford Employment Tribunal copying in [NAME_98] dated 20 November 2023 [89]. In the email, the claimant states:

March 2017 Respondent has defied the Tribunal's order for disclosure by Nov 17th. Please find attached Respondent's disclosure index. The index has no page numbers, but you will find item 160, the email they are calling [NAME_21]'s report, on page 477.

c. The claimant’s email to the Watford Employment Tribunal [NAME_98] dated 1 December 2023 [388]. In the email, the claimant states:

Respondents have made no attempt to send the disclosures due Nov 17th by court order, or even to re-submit the cleaned up 'disclosures' provided and have offered no reason that the 'disclosures' offered contain obscured, unsigned, undated witness statements, in a [COMPANY_6] that is a paperless environment. At least they have not offered these suspect documents to the court as of yet. Both parties were asked to agree a disclosure bundle by Dec 1st and Respondents have made this impossible.

d. The claimant’s email to the Watford Employment Tribunal copying in [NAME_98] dated 5 December 2023 [389]. The claimant states:

Respondent's solicitors can't have failed to notice that the [NAME_21] report disclosed in the bundle provided Nov 17th is different from the one sent by [NAME_21] 27th. This is further evidence that [NAME_11] is an unreliable witness.

Respondents are still in breach of the Employment Tribunal order requiring disclosures for Nov 17th as they have made no attempt to clean up and resubmit the disclosure bundle with legible documents, in order to meet the further order of the court to agree a disclosure bundle for Dec 1st.

e. The claimant’s email to the Watford Employment Tribunal copying in [NAME_65], [NAME_45] and [NAME_49] dated 13 December 2023 [395]. The claimant states:

Please also note that Respondents are in violation of Order 6 by Judge Warren, to provide all disclosures. They have not provided me with all the disclosures I requested, and the bundle they sent me was poor photocopies with dates obscured, link shared Nov 17th with the court, and most prominently, the included [NAME_21] report was different than that disclosed by [NAME_21] herself to me Nov 27th.

I don't think a £1000.00 fine will be a hardship to them, and when the Tribunal is reviewing this they should take up my best attempt at a draft Claimant's Unless Order as previously submitted.

March 2017 f. The claimant’s email to the Watford Employment Tribunal [NAME_65], [NAME_88] dated 1 January 2024 [400]. In the email, the claimant states:

[NAME_65] pretends to be on holiday and fails to provide disclosures, neglects and possibly defrauds his client [NAME_84], and buys headteacher [NAME_32] more time to defame me to potential employers, we are objectively living in economic precarity.

I need interim relief on an emergency basis now. Please attend to this as soon as is practicable, but consider also that at this stage the only source of funds available to me is credit card debt at some 19.8% interest.

g. The claimant’s email to the Watford Employment Tribunal [NAME_65], [NAME_88] dated 15 January 2024 [424]. In the email, the claimant states:

h. The claimant’s email to the Watford Employment Tribunal [NAME_65], [NAME_45], [NAME_86] and [NAME_93] dated 25 January 2024 [174]. In the email, the claimant states:

Respondents are refusing disclosure

i. The claimant’s email to the Watford Employment dated 20 February 2024 [178]. In the email, the claimant states:

Respondents have previously failed to provide all documents to the Tribunal for the Sept 1st preliminary hearing, so I plan to submit all documents to the Tribunal directly with Respondents copied to safeguard against any confusion.

86. The claimant has failed to identify any specific document relevant to her claim that has not been disclosed by the respondent.

Unreasonable conduct of proceedings - deadlines - ET3

87. The respondent alleges that the claimant has repeatedly accused it of failing to submit its ET3 response in time as evidenced by the following documents:

a. The claimant’s email to [NAME_45] and [NAME_11] copying in [NAME_13] dated 15 May 2023 [211] from which the claimant states:

I cannot endeavour to not email your client. I have an ongoing legal dispute with ongoing detriment to me. Your client has actually already failed to respond 'in due course' as the response was due May 2nd.

March 2017

b. The claimant’s chronology of events [261] “Respondents missed deadline to respond to Employment Tribunal”.

c. The claimant’s email to the Watford Employment Tribunal copying in [NAME_65], [NAME_45], [NAME_11], [NAME_13], [NAME_29] and [NAME_86] dated 16 October 2023 [288].

88. There is no evidence to substantiate the claimant’s allegation that the respondent failed to submit its response in time.

Unreasonable conduct of proceedings - preliminary hearing of 1 September 2023

89. The respondent alleges that the claimant abused the Tribunal process by repeatedly accusing [NAME_15] of not providing the claimant’s documents to the Tribunal ahead of the preliminary hearing on 1 September 2023[290].

90. On 24 August 2023, [NAME_49] emailed the claimant [250] in which she attached the proposed bundle for the preliminary hearing for the claimant to review. The claimant was invited to make any comments about the bundle and was to do so prior to 4 PM on 25 August 2023 which was where [NAME_49] was going to upload the bundle to the Tribunal. [NAME_49] acknowledged that the claimant had submitted additional documents and these had been included in so far as they were relevant to the matters to be determined at the preliminary hearing. She also recognized that there may be other documents which the claimant wish to bring to the Tribunal’s attention and these were contained within a supplementary bundle.

91. On 25 August 2023, [NAME_49] emailed the claimant [253]. She indicated that the documents that the claimant had provided to her (cover note and amended ET 1) had been included in the main bundle for the preliminary hearing. [NAME_49] was replying to an earlier email sent on 25 August 2023 [253] which was addressed to the Watford Employment Tribunal indicating that the bundle did not include the amended claim and cover.

92. On 28 August 2023, the claimant emailed the Watford Employment Tribunal thanking [NAME_28] are sending an up-to-date bundle with the amended ET 1 and cover [265].

93. The summary of the preliminary hearing held on 1 September 2023 [80] records that a copy of the second ET 1 submitted by the claimant was in the bundle before the employment judge.

94. Notwithstanding this, the claimant continued to allege that [NAME_15] had failed to provide the Tribunal with her amended ET 1 ahead of the preliminary hearing [290].

95. [NAME_15] confirmed again to the claimant that the amended ET 1 and cover were included in the bundle in an email from [NAME_65] to the claimant dated 20 October 2023 [293].

March 2017

96. On 23 October 2023, the claimant confirmed in an email to [NAME_65] [295] the claimant acknowledged that the amended ET 1 and cover were in the bundle sent to the Tribunal for the preliminary hearing.

97. The claimant continued to allege that the amended ET 1 and cover were not in the bundle that was sent to the Tribunal for the preliminary hearing in an email dated 9 January 2024 [410].

98. On 20 February 2024, the claimant emailed the Watford Employment Tribunal further claiming that the respondent had previously failed to provide all documents to the Tribunal for the preliminary hearing on 1 September 2023 [506].

99. In the claimant’s “Review of Publicly Available Documents” submitted to the Watford Employment Tribunal on 29 February 2024, the claimant alleged that the respondent had failed to include her application to amend [184].

100. The claimant had no basis for making this allegation about omitting the amended ET 1 and the cover from the bundle for the preliminary hearing 1 September 2023. As a matter of fact, those documents had been included in the claimant had acknowledge that fact. Yet she continued to make the allegations thereafter without any justification whatsoever for doing so.

Retention and sharing of confidential personal data

101. The respondent alleges that the claimant has, on several occasions, retained and shared confidential personal data with third parties without consent. It relies upon the following documents:

a. An email the claimant sent to [NAME_49], [NAME_45] and [NAME_50] copying in [NAME_11], [NAME_13], “[NAME_134]”, [NAME_66] and [NAME_137] [124] She stated, amongst other things:

This morning I was contacted by a [COMPANY_6] that made a conditional offer of employment to me who had [NAME_134] concerns about the report I shared with them. I find that this concern may be well-founded and, in order to err on the side of caution, I have edited my report to anonymise all parties.

b. An email the claimant sent to the Watford Employment Tribunal copying in [NAME_49], [NAME_11], [NAME_45] and [NAME_13] on 17 August 2023 [131]. The email had the claimant’s disclosure for the bundle for the preliminary hearing on 1 September 2023 and a document entitled "Bebras 2022 [NAME_84].xlsx". This document was of no relevance to the claim and contain the personal details of children at the respondent.

c. An email from [NAME_15] to the claimant dated 3 October 2023. It stated, amongst other things:

March 2017 On 17 August 2023 you emailed the Tribunal attaching various documents that you stated you may rely on as evidence at the preliminary hearing on 1 September 2023. One of these documents was a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet entitled "Bebras 2022 [NAME_84]" and contained the personal data of 374 pupils and [NAME_108] pupils of [COMPANY_26].

Your employment with [COMPANY_26] terminated on 19 February 2023.

It is extremely concerning that you have retained a copy of the "Bebras 2022 [NAME_84]" document and the personal data of children that it contains.

For the purposes of this email I use the terms "confidential information" and "[COMPANY_6] property". These terms have the meanings set out in your contract of employment with [COMPANY_26] dated 29 September 2022 and which are as follows:

[COMPANY_26] requires the following of you by return and by no later than 4pm on 6 October 2023:

1. Confirmation of all and any confidential information and/or [COMPANY_6] property that is currently in your possession or control;

2. That you return back to [COMPANY_26] all confidential information and/or [COMPANY_6] property that is in your possession or control;

3. That you irretrievably delete all and any electronic record of all and any confidential information and/or [COMPANY_6] property that is in your possession or control and that is not directly relevant to your race and sex discrimination and harassment claims;

4. To the extent that you retain possession or control of any confidential information and/or [COMPANY_6] property after 4pm on 6 October 2023 on the basis that it is relevant to your race and sex discrimination and harassment claims, that you identify what confidential information and/or [COMPANY_6] property you have retained and why you state that it is relevant to your claims.

Just so that you are aware, your retention of the "Bebras 2022 [NAME_84]" document is a data breach and has been reported to the [NAME_114]'s Office together with confirmation of the steps that have been taken to rectify this breach.

Given the nature of the data contained in the "Bebras 2022 [NAME_84]" document [COMPANY_26] has also referred this to the Local Authority Designated Officer together with confirmation of the steps that have been taken to rectify the matter.

You will appreciate that this is an extremely serious and concerning matter. For the avoidance of any doubt, identification of this issue is the reason why [COMPANY_26] is now only willing to provide a factual reference confirming your role at

March 2017 [COMPANY_26] and the dates of your employment on receipt of any reference requests relating to you.

I look forward to receiving your responses to points 1 to 4 above at the very soonest opportunity and by no later than 4pm on 6 October 2023.

d. [NAME_15] have never received a response from the claimant despite chasing her for one [292].

Unreasonable and vexatious conduct towards [NAME_15]

102. The respondent alleges that the claimant has repeatedly accused [NAME_15] of acting in bad faith and relies on the following documents:

a. An email sent by the claimant to the Watford Employment Tribunal copying in [NAME_98] [303]. The claimant alleged that:

I daresay even the solicitors [NAME_15] are acting in bad faith having persisted in withholding the report by [NAME_21] whilst I, a single parent, struggled to feed my household. They have cooperated with Respondents in the pretense that this was a [NAME_25] review, which they could not reasonably believe after Sept 7th disclosures by me., and they repeatedly asked me to provide legislation citations when their clients know the documents that confirm my right to an assessment review. If I'm wrong, they are welcome to talk to me about positive steps forward.

b. An email sent by the claimant to [NAME_86] copying in [NAME_45] [477]. The claimant stated:

Can you ensure that only your solicitors that have not already proven themselves lacking in good faith contact me directly?

c. An email sent by the claimant to the Watford Employment Tribunal copying in [NAME_88] [507]. The claimant stated:

March 2017 [NAME_15] have also refused to cooperate in the criminal investigation of the harassment and I have been suffering medical issues and have a referral for physical therapy now, next appointment March 27th.

103. The claimant has repeatedly accused [NAME_15] of pretending to be on holiday [400, 442, 473 and 185].

104. The claimant has repeatedly threatened and has reported solicitors at [NAME_15] with reports to the SRA [279, 287, 294, 174, 453, 490-498 & 507].

105. On 18 March 2024, the claimant accused a [NAME_15] of misconduct [507] (see comments above).

106. The claimant has reported [NAME_15] to the Information Commissioners Office without any basis [279 & 490].

107. The respondent accuses the claimant of being persistently rude, aggressive, threatening and obstructive to solicitors at [NAME_15] and relies upon the following:

a. An email from the claimant to [NAME_49] and [NAME_45] dated 31 July 2023 [228]. She stated, amongst other things:

I will say this again explicitly because it seems you are trying to miss the point.

The tone of this email is aggressive.

b. An email to [NAME_49] copying in [NAME_45], [NAME_11] and [NAME_13] dated 15 August 2023 [243]. The claimant states:

I will endeavour to complete this form, although compensation depends on when your client decides to stop indulging his bias, or when you decide that your client is [COMPANY_26] and not [NAME_11].

I do not accept this email is rude because it is started with the words “[NAME_47]” and it ends with “thank you, [NAME_103]”. However, it does appear to be aggressive towards [NAME_11] rather than [NAME_15].

c. An email from the claimant to [NAME_65] copying in [NAME_45], [NAME_11], [NAME_13] and [NAME_66] dated 11 September 2023 [145]. The claimant states, amongst other things:

March 2017

I note that you are still avoiding the statutory required report. Your clients have known about this for some time even if you are new to the case, and you have been made aware of it for 10 days now, and your predecessor longer than that. This is already unreasonable. What is your time frame for compliance? Do you need an [NAME_53] report, too? What does that do to a law firm, cumulatively?

I can't promise not to contact the board, the headteacher and the [NAME_35]. I have business with them separate from the Tribunal claim. I can promise to copy [NAME_42] and he can continue to watch me for "harassment".

Unless you want to tell me that reporting to the [NAME_80] is part of your job?

I don't want the clerk to the board, the headteacher or the [NAME_35] to claim they didn't know their role and/or forgot, and/or didn't see the evidence, or weren't contacted by you. I can't afford to leave it to you and this loose timetable.

The tone of this email is aggressive and threatening (i.e. a threat to report the [NAME_15] to the [NAME_114]).

d. An email from the claimant to [NAME_98], dated 7 December 2023 [391]. The claimant states “Glad to see you are more often getting the name of [COMPANY_26] correct now.” The tone of this email is sarcastic. It was in response to an email sent by [NAME_15] to the claimant on 7 December 2023 [391]. [NAME_15] stated, amongst other things:

We are becoming increasingly concerned by the nature of your communication and unfounded allegations including:

o abuse of process; o suggesting our client is defying Department for Education regulation (albeit without naming such regulation); o suggesting we and/or our client are/is party to insurance fraud, or misappropriation of public funds; o making defamatory statements of our client.

We consider your communication is becoming increasingly vexatious, abusive and disruptive. In accordance with rule 76 of the Employment Tribunal Rules of procedure, we could apply for a costs order where it is considered that a party has acted vexatiously, abusively, disruptively or otherwise unreasonably in the way that the proceedings (or part) have been conducted. Your communication, as we have described, is, we consider, vexatious abusive and disruptive. Please note, should this continue we will made an application to the Tribunal in accordance with rule 76, seeking costs.

March 2017 e. An email to the Watford Employment Tribunal copying in [NAME_65], [NAME_88] dated 1 January 2024 [400] in which the claimant stated, amongst other things:

By any measure, this email is gratuitously offensive to [NAME_65] and makes a serious allegation that he may be defrauding his client as well as enabling [NAME_11] to defame the claimant.

f. An email to the Watford Employment Tribunal copying in [NAME_65], [NAME_88] dated 11 January 2024 [414]. She states:

The [NAME_84] reply will not be in due course as these disclosures are all overdue, except the one made yesterday. Let's not sacrifice accuracy for niceties you wish to include. You are in violation of the Sept 1st Tribunal order for disclosure "of the documents in their possession or control relevant to the issues in this case whether they assist their case or not".

…

When do you expect to have cleaned away the prevarications added by [NAME_16] to the disclosure bundle you have provided?

The tone of this email is sarcastic and suggests that [NAME_15] are guilty of tampering with documentary evidence. It is offensive.

The witness testimony

108. I am mindful of the fact that none of the witnesses who provided statements to the Tribunal for the purposes of this hearing were present to give oral evidence and to be cross examined. In the absence of their evidence being available for challenge under cross examination I must decide what weight to give these witnesses’ statements. I have decided to give these statements weight on the basis that they refer to a substantial volume of contemporaneous documentary evidence that corroborates their testimony. Whilst there is no requirement for corroboration in these proceedings, the fact that there is a significant volume of supporting documentary evidence adds significant cogency to the witness statements.

[NAME_16]

109. [NAME_11] has been employed as the [NAME_20] at the respondent since 1 January 2010. [COMPANY_26] is a state grammar [COMPANY_6] providing secondary and [NAME_140] education for pupils aged 11 to 18.

March 2017 110. [NAME_11] has outlined the specific claims made by the claimant against the respondent that relate to his alleged conduct. These include accusations of harassment related to race, direct race discrimination, and sex discrimination, stemming from various incidents including his response (or lack thereof) to emails, accusations of poor communication skills, jeopardizing the claimant’s [NAME_20] training, and informing prospective employers that her communications were unprofessional.

111. [NAME_11] describes the claimant’s conduct during the proceedings as unreasonable and vexatious, including direct contact with him despite instructions to communicate through [NAME_28], making unfounded allegations against him and the respondent, and making derogatory and defamatory comments about him and his colleagues to third parties.

112. [NAME_141] has detailed the personal and professional impact of the claimant’s conduct, including stress, anxiety, disruption, and a sense of being personally targeted and harassed. This has affected his work and personal life, including concerns for his family’s safety.

113. [NAME_11] has identified instances of direct contact by the claimant and the allegations she has made, including accusations of insurance fraud, conspiracy to defraud, and defamatory statements to third parties.

114. [NAME_141] describes the strain the claimant’s actions have placed on his colleagues and the overall [COMPANY_6] environment, highlighting the emotional toll on individuals like [NAME_10] and others, and the broad impact on [COMPANY_26]’s operation.

115. [NAME_11] is concerned that the continuous stress and harassment might impact his ability to assist the respondent in its defence at the final hearing scheduled for October 2024, especially given his upcoming retirement.

116. The key dates and events in [NAME_141]’s statement are as follows:

a. 11 May 2023: The first instance where [NAME_15] ([NAME_28]) requested the claimant to cease direct contact with [COMPANY_6] staff and communicate through them instead.

b. 15 May 2023: The claimant directly contacted [NAME_141], disregarding [NAME_15]'s request to cease direct communications.

c. 14 August 2023: The claimant emailed the Tribunal, making defamatory statements about [NAME_141], claiming he was racist and sexist.

d. 15 August 2023: The claimant made allegations in an email to [NAME_69] of [NAME_132], questioning the fairness of her reference and training assessment provided by [NAME_141].

March 2017 e. 7 September 2023: The claimant emailed [NAME_15], including [NAME_141] in the communication, claiming that [NAME_141] was responsible for ending her teaching career and causing her financial and personal distress.

f. 13 September 2023: the claimant emailed [NAME_58], claiming she was being kept unemployed by [NAME_141].

g. 14 August to 16 October 2023: A series of emails sent directly by the claimant to [NAME_141] and other [COMPANY_6] staff on various dates, despite repeated requests not to do so.

h. 16 October 2023: The claimant wrote to the Tribunal, accusing [NAME_141] of defamation and obstructing her employment opportunities.

i. 13 November 2023: The claimant made allegations against [NAME_141] and [NAME_10] on a third-party website, accusing them of insurance fraud and conspiracy to defraud.

j. 17 November 2023: The claimant emailed the Teaching Regulation Agency, claiming [NAME_141] defamed her in a reference.

k. 15 January 2024: The claimant emailed the Tribunal, making further allegations of fraud and misconduct against [NAME_141] and others.

l. 16 January 2024: The claimant sent an email accusing [NAME_10] of fraud and threatening to report him.

m. 2 February 2024: The claimant accused [NAME_10] of making a threat of physical violence against her in an email to the Tribunal.

n. 15 March 2024: The claimant emailed the Teaching Regulation Agency and other bodies, making false claims about a criminal prosecution against [NAME_141] and [NAME_126].

[NAME_10]

117. [NAME_142] has been employed by respondent as the Head of Computing since 1 September 2016. In his statement he details a series of interactions and allegations related to the claimant as follows:

a. 1 September 2022 to 19 February 2023: The period during which [NAME_142] was the line manager to the claimant, during her employment at the respondent.

b. 11 May 2023: [NAME_28], [NAME_15], first requested the claimant to cease direct contact with [COMPANY_26]'s staff.

March 2017 c. 11 September 2023: The claimant included [NAME_142] in an email to [NAME_141], despite previous requests to cease direct contacts.

d. 21 September 2023: [NAME_142] received a direct email from the claimant, indicating her monitoring of his activities.

e. 13 November 2023: The claimant sent an email via the [NAME_72] website, making allegations against the respondent and [NAME_142].

f. 14 – 17 November 2023: Correspondence with STEM learning regarding the claimant's message, leading to an investigation by STEM.

g. 16 January 2024: Another email from the claimant to [NAME_142] via the [NAME_72] website, alleging fraud.

h. Late January 2024: [NAME_142] was informed that the claimant had reported him to the police via [NAME_143].

i. 2 February 2024: The claimant accused [NAME_142] of threatening her with physical violence online. It is noteworthy and merits reproducing just how offended [NAME_142] felt when he was referred to as an “incel”. In paragraph 45 of his statement he says:

In her email of 2 February 2024, the Claimant appeared to liken me to or imply that I am an "incel type." I understand that to be a derogatory phrase used to describe embittered misogynistic men often with extremist views. This felt personally insulting and rude. It is very offensive to me to be mentioned in the same sentence as "incel types". I also felt a sense of irony, given the Claimant's unreasonable and vexatious conduct to date.

j. 9 February 2024, 20 February 2024, and 29 February 2024: The claimant repeated allegations against [NAME_142]. In relation to the statement by the claimant starting with the words “if I am killed, [NAME_142] may be guilty…” [188]. [NAME_142]’ response to this as set out in paragraph 48 of his witness statement is:

March 2017 I am completely astounded by this paragraph. I am upset and shocked to the core to be painted as an incel, violent person and a potential murderer. It makes me feel sick having to defend myself against baseless allegations.

118. Throughout these interactions, the claimant's actions are described as unreasonable, vexatious, and including baseless accusations of fraud and physical violence. These interactions have caused significant stress and anxiety for [NAME_142], impacting his ability to participate in the proceedings and affecting his well-being.

[NAME_18]

119. [NAME_13] is the [NAME_35] at the respondent. Appointed to that position on 24 February 2020 having been a governor since September 2014 He has described the following key dates and incidents as follows:

a. 2 February 2023: The claimant raised a grievance, which [NAME_13] investigated and concluded was without merit by 16 February 2023.

b. 11 May 2023: [COMPANY_26]'s solicitors, [NAME_15], first requested the claimant to cease contacting [COMPANY_6] staff directly.

c. 23 May 2023 - 16 October 2023: [NAME_13] received multiple direct emails from the claimant, despite instructions to cease such contacts.

d. 19 August 2023: The claimant emailed criticisms of [NAME_13]'s handling of her grievance review process.

e. 21 September 2023, 28 September 2023, 23 October 2023, and 17 November 2023: The claimant made allegations against [NAME_13], accusing him of defying Department for Education regulations and committing insurance fraud.

f. 25 August 2023, 28 August 2023: The claimant requested through Tribunal submissions for [NAME_13] to step down as [NAME_35].

g. 2 October 2023, 23 October 2023, 24 November 2023, 21 December 2023, 1 January 2024, 12 January 2024, and 25 January 2024: The claimant pursued actions to remove [NAME_13] from his position and sought the contact details of the [NAME_144].

h. 22January 2024: The claimant reported [NAME_10], a colleague of [NAME_13], to the police for fraud.

i. February 2024: The claimant accused [NAME_10] of making threats of physical violence.

March 2017

120. [NAME_13] describes the claimant's conduct as a campaign to destabilize the respondent and personally target him and other staff members, including [NAME_10] and [NAME_16]. The ongoing situation has led to a significant additional workload, necessitated risk assessments, and caused considerable stress among the staff. [NAME_13] expresses concern about the impact of the claimant's actions on the respondent’s reputation and the wellbeing of its employees, fearing that the claimant's behaviour could escalate further as the final hearing approaches in October 2024.

The submissions

The respondent’s application for an unless order, for strike out and for a costs order.

121. [NAME_29] prepared a skeleton argument which she expanded upon in oral submissions. In summary, in her skeleton argument she submits the following:

Strike-Out or Unless Order

122. Scandalous, Unreasonable, or Vexatious Conduct: The respondent argues that the claimant’s conduct in the proceedings has been scandalous, unreasonable, or vexatious. This is based on Rule 37(1) (b), which allows for a claim to be struck out if the proceedings have been conducted in a manner that is scandalous, unreasonable, or vexatious.

123. Impact on Fair Trial: The respondent contends that the claimant’s actions have jeopardized the possibility of a fair trial. It is argued that her conduct has been oppressive, dishonest, vexatious, and unreasonable, adversely affecting the respondent’s witnesses to the extent that their ability to give evidence at the final hearing may be compromised.

124. Behavior Increasing in Severity: Despite warnings and the lodging of applications by the respondent for orders against her, the claimant allegedly escalated her behavior. She reportedly sought alternative methods to harass and distress the respondent's witnesses after being blocked from direct contact, including unfounded complaints to third-party organizations and the police.

125. Risk to Witness Participation: There is a concern that key witnesses may withdraw from participating in the final hearing due to the stress and distress caused by the claimant’s conduct, potentially leaving the respondent unable to fully present its case.

Costs Order

126. Conduct Falling within Rule 76(1) (a): The respondent submits that the claimant’s conduct meets the criteria for a costs order under Rule 76(1) (a), which pertains to parties acting vexatiously, abusively, disruptively, or otherwise unreasonably in the bringing or conducting of proceedings.

March 2017 127. Escalating Legal Costs and Complexity: The respondent highlights that what should have been a relatively straightforward case has become overly complicated and costly due to the claimant's conduct, evidenced by a disproportionately large preliminary hearing bundle.

128. Disproportionate Inconvenience and Expense: It is argued that the claimant's actions have caused significant inconvenience, harassment, and expense to the respondent, out of proportion to any potential gain for the claimant, indicating an abuse of the tribunal process.

129. The respondent suggests that the severity and continuation of the claimant’s conduct, even after previous Tribunal interventions, indicate that less drastic measures than a strike-out may not be sufficient to curtail her behavior, thus justifying the extreme step of striking out her claim. They also contend that the claimant’s actions have clearly crossed the threshold for awarding costs against her, advocating for the tribunal to use its discretion to impose such an order to address the undue burden placed on the respondent by the claimant's conduct.

130. In her oral submissions, [NAME_29] emphasised the application was predicated on the claimant’s conduct in these proceedings and not the merits of the underlying claims. She repeated that the submission was being made under rule 37 (1) (b) and rule 76 (1) (a). She referred me to her skeleton argument and the summary of documents. She submitted that the claimant had displayed a pattern of behaviour that was both continuous and extraordinary and impossible for her to justify. Her behaviour related to the conduct of the proceedings and was aimed at witnesses with the sole purpose to cause them distress and to upset them. The claimant was continuing to behave in this way even when she had been warned that she should not do so.

131. [NAME_29] said that the evidence demonstrated that once the claimant was asked to desist from taking a particular course of action she would find another way to get at [NAME_11], [NAME_9] and [NAME_13]. The claimant had been asked to stop corresponding with witnesses and yet continued to do so. Her email accounted been blocked. On that occurrence, she used an alternative platform to contact [NAME_9]. That platform was also blocked. When that happened, she made unfounded complaints to the police with regard to [NAME_9] and her allegations became increasingly extreme causing alarm and distress to [NAME_9] and others at the sharp end of her invective.

132. [NAME_29] submitted that anything other than a strike out order would be inadequate. However, if the Tribunal was not with her on this point, then an unless order would have to do. However, she was concerned that even when faced with such an order, the claimant would find a way around to threaten and worry the respondent’s witnesses. The history of her behaviour in this claim clearly demonstrated that this would be a likely course of action that she would pursue.

March 2017 133. [NAME_29] submitted that the respondent had a very real concern that its key witnesses would not give evidence at the final hearing. These witnesses deserve protection at the very least.

134. [NAME_29] accepted and acknowledge that a strike out order as a Draconian measure to take. It is the heaviest weapon in the Tribunal’s armory. The Tribunal had to consider carefully whether this would be an appropriate course of action to take. The Tribunal had to consider whether the high threshold for making a strikeout order had been met. The volume of documents contained in the bundle provided very clear evidence that the threshold had been met. If I agreed with [NAME_29], I then had to consider what the prospects were for there being a fair trial. In this regard, I was referred to the witness evidence provided in the statements. I would also have to consider whether a strike out order would be a proportionate response or whether something less would be appropriate.

135. The claimant had been told time and again about the impact of her behaviour. Nothing had changed in her behaviour. Indeed, it had got worse. I was invited also to consider the claimant’s response to the summary of documents at the beginning of this hearing which she simply characterised and dismissed as being “rubbish”.

136. On the question of costs, I was invited to consider all of the same points that were made regarding making a strike out order or an unless order. In any event, costs should be awarded. The application proceeded under rule 76 (a). This should have been a straightforward case given the fact that the claimant had only worked for the respondent for some five months. The bundle was already very large with more than 500 pages. The documents in that bundle largely dealt with how the claimant had been conducting this case. The costs of defending this claim were likely to be excessive. [NAME_29] acknowledged that if the Tribunal was minded to make a costs order, given constraints on time, it would not be possible to quantify costs at this stage. If an order was made, quantification could be made at a later date.

137. The claimant submitted that she is unemployed. Regarding the police report that she said that they had decided not to investigate. She accused [NAME_29] with lying with regard to her characterisation of that report. She accused the respondent are not cooperating. She then started to make representations about the underlying merits of her case and accused the respondent of making allegations about her conduct and having strayed away from the substance of the case. She said that the respondent knew full well that they were not complying with Department for Education regulations. She accused [NAME_129] of filtering information that have been provided to them by the respondent. She said that she was trying to pursue a criminal investigation. Had the police decided that her complaint was unmerited, they could have taken steps against her and investigated and fined her. The claimant said that she had legitimate interest in pursuing this matter. She accused the respondent of having a misogynistic and racist culture. This was why the three key witnesses had refused to deal with the Subject Access Request. They were the harassers rather than the claimant. She said that they could make it go away tomorrow if there were to cooperate with the investigation.

March 2017 She said there was evidence that would support a police investigation. Only the police could track down information about the IP address of the person who had sent her the message. The agencies that she had reported to conduct their own investigations. That is their job. They had not been misled.

The applicable law

138. It is the overriding objective of the rules to enable the Tribunal to deal with cases fairly and justly (rule 2). Dealing with a case fairly and justly includes, so far as is practicable: (a) ensuring that the parties are on an equal footing; (b) dealing with cases in ways which are proportionate to the complexity and importance of the issues; and (c) avoiding unnecessary formality and seeking flexibility in the proceedings; (d) avoiding delay, so far as is compatible with proper consideration of the issues; and (e) saving expense. Not only must the Tribunal seek to give effect to the overriding objective in interpreting, or exercising any power given to it by, the Rules, but there is an obligation on the parties and their representatives to assist the tribunal to further the overriding objective and to co-operate generally with each other and with the tribunal. The overriding objective is to be given effect through other rules, not instead of other rules.

139. A claim or response (or part) can be struck out on the following grounds:

a. That it is scandalous or vexatious or has no reasonable prospect of success — rule 37(1) (a).

b. That the manner in which the proceedings have been conducted by or on behalf of the claimant or the respondent (as the case may be) has been scandalous, unreasonable, or vexatious — rule 37(1) (b).

c. For non-compliance with any of the tribunal rules or with an order of the tribunal — rule 37(1) (c).

d. That it has not been actively pursued — rule 37(1) (d).

e. That the tribunal considers that it is no longer possible to have a fair hearing in respect of the claim or response (or the part to be struck out) — rule 37(1) (e).

The respondent relies on rules 37(1) (b).

140. The word “scandalous” in the context of rule 37 (1) (b) means irrelevant and abusive of the other side. It is not to be given its colloquial meaning of signifying something that is “shocking” ([NAME_145] v Sub London Borough Council 2002 ICR 881, CA). In the case of [NAME_146] v [NAME_147] 17182/81 J claimed that he had been unfairly selected for redundancy and, to back up his claim, alleged fraud, mismanagement, misrepresentation, criminal conspiracy, intimidation and “other torts” against the employer. The Tribunal found that J was “hellbent on causing the respondent company and a number of individuals as much inconvenience, distress, embarrassment and expense

March 2017 as possible” and ordered that the whole claim should be struck out as being largely scandalous or vexatious.

141. A “vexatious” claim has been described as one that is not pursued with the expectation of success but to harass the other side or out of some improper motive.

142. In considering whether a claim should be struck out on the grounds of scandalous, unreasonable, or vexatious conduct, the Tribunal must consider whether a fair trial as possible. In De Keyser Ltd v Wilson IRLR 324, EAT I am reminded that the EAT made it clear that certain conduct, such as the deliberate flouting of a Tribunal order, can lead directly to the question of striking out order. However, in ordinary circumstances, neither a claim nor defence can be struck out on the basis of a party’s conduct unless the conclusion is reached that a fair trial is no longer possible. In [NAME_148] v [NAME_149] 2004 IRLR 140, EAT, the EAT set out the steps that a Tribunal must ordinarily take when determining whether to make a strike out order as follows: g. Before making a strike out order under rule 37 (b) the Employment Judge must find that a party or their representative has behaved scandalously, unreasonably, or vexatiously when conducting the proceedings.

h. One such a finding has been made, they must consider in accordance with De Keyser whether a fair trial is still possible, as, save in exceptional circumstances, a strike out order is not regarded simply as a punishment. If a fair trial is still possible, the case should be permitted to proceed.

i. Even if a fair trial is unachievable, the Tribunal will need to consider the appropriate remedy in the circumstances. It may be appropriate to impose a lesser penalty, for example, by making a costs or preparation order against the party concerned rather than striking out their claim or response.

143. In [NAME_150] v [COMPANY_151] 2022 ICR 327, the EAT rejected the proposition that the question of whether a fair trial is possible must be determined in absolute terms; that is to say, by considering whether a fair trial is possible at all, not just by considering, where an application is made at the outset of a trial, whether a fair trial is possible within the allocated trial window. [COMPANY_153] had failed to comply with any of the tribunal’s case management orders that had been made in preparation for the hearing. E had made an application for the response to be struck out for that reason, but it had not been practicable to deal with that application in advance of the hearing. The strike-out application was renewed on the first morning of what was scheduled to be a five-day hearing. The strike-out order was granted by the tribunal, which found that it was no longer possible for a fair trial to proceed. It was not feasible to remedy the deficiencies in the time available, and an adjournment, which would have been for many months due to the tribunal’s backlog of cases, would have caused E prejudice owing to

March 2017 the two-year delay since dismissal and the fact that E’s considerable losses continued to grow substantially from week to week. [COMPANY_153] appealed against the strike-out decision to the EAT, which rejected the appeal. It held that there was nothing in any of the authorities to indicate that the question of whether a fair trial is possible must be determined in absolute terms. The EAT considered that, where a party’s unreasonable conduct has resulted in a fair trial not being possible within that the allocated window, the power to strike- out is triggered. Whether the power ought to be exercised depends on whether it is proportionate to do so. The EAT found no error in the tribunal’s approach to proportionality. Striking out was considered to be the least drastic course to take in this case. It was a highly relevant factor that the strike-out application was being considered on the first day of the hearing. The parties were agreed that a fair trial was not possible in that hearing window. There was no other option other than an adjournment, which would have resulted in unacceptable prejudice to E (a conclusion that was not challenged by [NAME_154] therefore concluded that the tribunal had not erred in striking out the response.

144. [COMPANY_155] v [NAME_157] and anor 2016 EWCA Civ 382, CA the Tribunal struck out the respondent’s response and debarred it from taking any further part in the proceedings in circumstances where two of its members had verbally and physically intimidated claimant who was also acting as a witness in another claimant’s case. [COMPANY_158], a family company, was managed by [NAME_159], his wife, [NAME_160], and their son, [NAME_161]. T and R, both [NAME_108] employees, brought claims against [COMPANY_158] for unfair dismissal and discrimination. Are supported T’s case and was due to act as a witness. At the Tribunal premises [NAME_159] verbally threatened R to induce her to withdraw her support for T. She was also subjected to physical intimidation by [NAME_161] who intentionally drove his car at speed close to her as she was using a zebra crossing in the car park outside the Tribunal building.

145. The Tribunal decided that [COMPANY_158] should be barred from taking any further part in the proceedings, whether in relation to liability or remedies, in both claims. Both acts of intimidation were so closely associated with the proceedings that they formed part of the manner in which they had been conducted by or on behalf of [COMPANY_162], the second act, set in the context of the first, amounted to scandalous and unreasonable conduct. The Tribunal recognised that it was an extreme and draconian step to strike out [COMPANY_158].’s response but it was a consequence brought upon by [COMPANY_158] itself. The Tribunal also carefully considered whether there was some alternative response short of barring [COMPANY_158], in particular [COMPANY_158].’s suggestion that it could invite the two individuals responsible for the acts not to attend or give evidence. However, it did not think that this would address the ability to have a fair trial in all the circumstances, nor that it was proportionate to deal with the prejudice to the wronged party. Permission to appeal against the substance of the tribunal’s decision was subsequently refused by the EAT. The question of whether the tribunal had given sufficient reasons for its decision to debar [COMPANY_158] was pursued to the Court of Appeal, which concluded that it had.

March 2017 146. Intimidation of witnesses does not automatically mean that a fair trial is no longer possible. [NAME_163] 0042/19 the claimant, a litigant in person, had sent strongly worded and abusive correspondence to the respondent’s representative and witnesses. One of the witnesses, C, was a senior married colleague with whom the claimant had had an affair during her employment with the respondent. Initially the Tribunal sought to address the claimant’s conduct through ‘robust case management’ and made orders that she should immediately desist from repeating allegations previously made in correspondence, should correspond professionally and politely with the respondent’s representative, and should not contact or attempt to contact any witnesses until a witness list had been agreed. The claimant subsequently sent two further emails to C, informing him (among other things) that she had decided to add C’s wife as a witness and was contemplating adding his sister and mother. The Tribunal subsequently struck out her claims on the grounds that the emails were intimidatory, and thus constituted ‘scandalous, unreasonable or vexatious’ conduct under rule 37(1)(b), and were sent in breach of Tribunal orders, falling foul of rule 37(1)(c).

147. The EAT observed that witness intimidation is an obvious example of ‘scandalous, unreasonable or vexatious’ conduct in that it tends to subvert the process of justice and has the potential to impair the fairness of the trial. However, even if the claimant’s emails to C could be said to be intimidatory, in the sense that they were intended to prevent him from giving evidence, the EAT considered that the tribunal had erred in law in failing to address the question of whether strike-out under rule 37(1) (b) was necessary because a fair trial was no longer possible. In the instant case, the Tribunal was in a position to prevent the claimant misusing its procedures by refusing to allow her to lead irrelevant witnesses and by preventing her from asking C questions that were not relevant to the case. There was therefore no imminent risk to the fairness of the hearing. Nevertheless, the tribunal had been entitled to strike out the claims under rule 37(1) (c) for non-compliance with tribunal orders. That non-compliance was sufficiently serious to justify strike-out since the tribunal could have no confidence that the claimant would act with appropriate restraint in her future correspondence or at the hearing itself.

148. The question of proportionality is determined according to the same principles as adumbrated in Blockbuster Entertainment.

149. In [NAME_164] v [NAME_165] and anor 2023 EAT 154 an employment tribunal considering whether to strike out H’s claims found that his objective was to use the proceedings to create a damning public narrative that would (a) destroy the business of the first respondent and (b) harm the political career of the second respondent. In correspondence in which H had made an offer for settlement, he threatened the respondents with a ‘relentless’ campaign ‘through protracted legal actions’ continuing ‘for years’ and ‘high profile media political campaigning in forthcoming local and national elections’ to change the ‘narrative’ to what H wanted it to be. The tribunal considered that H’s conduct was a clear example of abuse of the tribunal process and therefore scandalous, vexatious and unreasonable. H’s goal was

March 2017 ‘to subject the [respondents] to inconvenience, harassment and expense out of all proportion’. His settlement demands went well beyond what he could reasonably expect to achieve even if he won his claims. In light of H’s openly declared intentions to use the proceedings to pursue his campaign against the respondents and their witnesses, and considering the extent to which he was prepared to go to inflict damage on anyone he considers has done wrong to him, and irrespective of how the matter is viewed by the tribunal, the tribunal concluded that a fair trial was not possible.

150. On appeal, the EAT held that it was not clear why a fair trial was no longer possible. The tribunal had not received evidence from any of the respondents’ prospective witnesses to the effect that they were fearful of giving evidence, or of involvement in the claim, or intimidated by H. Rather, the tribunal’s reasoning was based upon its assumed effect of H’s conduct. While the EAT acknowledged the tribunal’s concerns at what it termed H’s weaponisation of proceedings and the high hurdle that H’s appeal had to reach, it nevertheless decided that the tribunal’s conclusion that a fair trial was not possible was an error of principle, or perverse on the material with which it had been provided. That being so, the tribunal also erred in proceeding to strike out the claim. Among other things, the fact that no alternative order was merited or appropriate could not itself serve to establish that the draconian sanction of strike-out was warranted. Such an approach would lead to the sanction being simply a punitive measure. Furthermore, however justified the criticism that the employment tribunal attached to H’s conduct, the respondents’ remedy for any repetition of it lay elsewhere (such as in an application for costs). The tribunal had the applicable legal test well in mind, but it erred in the application of that test. The EAT ordered that H’s claims be reinstated and remitted for an open preliminary hearing at which all necessary directions enabling the matter to proceed to a substantive hearing would be considered.

151. The Tribunal has a discretionary power to make a costs order or Preparation Time Order (“PTO”) under rule 76(1) (a) of the Tribunal Rules where it considers that a party (or that party’s representative) has acted ‘vexatiously, abusively, disruptively or otherwise unreasonably’ in either the bringing of the proceedings (or part) or the way that the proceedings (or part) have been conducted. The fact that a claimant or respondent may ultimately be successful does not necessarily prevent the tribunal from making an order of costs against him or her based on unreasonable conduct.

152. Where the conduct of a party (or of his or her representative) is ‘vexatious, abusive, disruptive or otherwise unreasonable’, rule 76(1) provides that the Tribunal shall consider whether to make a costs order or PTO. Therefore, it has a duty to consider making an order but has discretion as to whether or not to actually make the award. In other words, rule 76(1) imposes a three-stage test: first, the Tribunal must ask itself whether a party’s conduct falls within rule 76(1)(a) — in other words, is its costs jurisdiction engaged?; if so, secondly, it must go on to ask itself whether it is appropriate to exercise its discretion in favour of awarding costs against that party; the third stage is the determination of the amount of any award

March 2017

153. It is appropriate for a litigant in person to be judged less harshly in terms of his or her conduct than a litigant who is professionally represented. According to the EAT in [COMPANY_167] v [NAME_168] 2012 IRLR 648, EAT, an employment tribunal cannot, and should not, judge a litigant in person by the standards of a professional representative. Justice requires that tribunals do not apply professional standards to lay people, who may well be embroiled in legal proceedings for the only time in their life. Lay people are likely to lack the objectivity and knowledge of law and practice brought to bear by a professional legal adviser. The EAT stressed that tribunals must bear this in mind when assessing the threshold tests in the then equivalent to rule 76(1) of the Tribunal Rules 2013. It went on to state that, even if the threshold tests for an order for costs are met, the tribunal still has discretion whether to make an order. That discretion should be exercised having regard to all the circumstances. In this respect, it was not irrelevant that a lay person may have brought proceedings with little or no access to specialist help and advice. This was not to say that lay people are immune from orders for costs: far from it, as the cases make clear. Some litigants in person are found to have behaved vexatiously or unreasonably even when proper allowance is made for their inexperience and lack of objectivity. However, the EAT concluded that, in the instant case, the employment tribunal had been entitled to take into account the fact that H represented himself when refusing the employer its costs.

154. The term ‘vexatious’ was defined by the National Industrial Relations Court in [COMPANY_169] v [NAME_170] 1974 ICR 72, [NAME_171]. [ADDRESS] stated that: ‘If an employee brings a hopeless claim not with any expectation of recovering compensation but out of spite to harass his employers or for some other improper motive, he acts vexatiously.’ Of course, what applies to an employee bringing a claim applies equally to an employer or other respondent resisting a claim. So, it would appear that for conduct to be vexatious, there must be evidence of some spite or desire to harass the other side, or the existence of some other improper motive. Simply being ‘misguided’ is not sufficient to establish vexatious conduct — [COMPANY_167] v [NAME_168] 2012 IRLR 648, EAT.

155. However, the Court of Appeal in [NAME_172] v [NAME_173] 2013 EWCA Civ 1432, CA (a case concerning costs awarded by an employment tribunal), cited with approval the definition of ‘vexatious’ given by Lord Bingham in [NAME_133] v [NAME_174] 2000 1 FLR 759, QBD (Div Ct). According to His Lordship, ‘the hallmark of a vexatious proceeding is… that it has little or no basis in law (or at least no discernible basis); that whatever the intention of the proceedings may be, its effect is to subject the defendant to inconvenience, harassment and expense out of all proportion to any gain likely to accrue to the claimant, and that it involves an abuse of the process of the court, meaning by that a use of the court process for a purpose or in a way which is significantly different from the ordinary and proper use of the court process’. This suggests that where the effect of the conduct falls within Lord Bingham’s stringent definition, this can amount to vexatious conduct, irrespective of the motive behind it.

March 2017

156. A tribunal may also make a costs order or PTO against a party who has acted abusively or disruptively in bringing or conducting proceedings (or his or her representative has done so). For example, in [NAME_175] v London Borough of Lambeth and anor EAT 1237/97 — a case which concerned a complaint of race discrimination — the tribunal office had made four attempts to fix a hearing but had adjourned on the first three occasions at G’s request. In addition, G had failed to attend two interlocutory hearings as he objected to their being held. At the fourth hearing, which was fixed for 15 days, G again said he could not proceed. The tribunal offered to adjourn for five days but G said he would not attend at any time during the 15-day period. The tribunal then adjourned for an hour to allow G to consider his position. The tribunal warned G that if he did not attend after the hour the case might be struck out and costs awarded against him. When G did not attend, the tribunal struck out the case and awarded the respondent the costs of attending the tribunal hearing. The tribunal held that G had conducted the proceedings ‘unreasonably, vexatiously and disruptively’ and this was upheld by the EAT on appeal.

157. A costs order or PTO may also be awarded against a party under rule 76(1) (a) where the party (or his or her representative) has acted unreasonably in bringing or conducting proceedings. ‘Unreasonable’ has its ordinary English meaning and is not to be interpreted as if it means something similar to ‘vexatious’ — [NAME_176] v Secretary of State for Employment EAT 183/83. It will often be the case, however, that a tribunal will find a party’s conduct to be both vexatious and unreasonable.

158. In determining whether to make an order under this ground, a tribunal should take into account the ‘nature, gravity and effect’ of a party’s unreasonable conduct — [NAME_177] v [NAME_178] (London Branch) 2004 ICR 1398, CA . However, the tribunal should not misunderstand this to mean that the circumstances of a case have to be separated into sections such as ‘nature’, ‘gravity’ and ‘effect’, with each section being analysed separately — [NAME_179] v Barnsley Metropolitan Borough Council and anor 2012 ICR 420, CA. [ADDRESS] of Appeal in [NAME_179] commented that it was important not to lose sight of the totality of the circumstances. The vital point in exercising the discretion to order costs (or a PTO) is to look at the whole picture. The tribunal has to ask whether there has been unreasonable conduct by the paying party in bringing, defending or conducting the case and, in doing so, identify the conduct, what was unreasonable about it, and what effect it had.

159. Reasonableness is a matter of fact for the employment tribunal, and it will be difficult to argue that it has made an error of law unless it can be shown that it has neglected relevant considerations or taken into account irrelevant ones. In [NAME_180] v [NAME_181] Trust 2006 ICR 543, EAT, for example, the Appeal Tribunal stated that whether conduct could be characterised as unreasonable required an exercise of judgment about which there could be reasonable scope for disagreement among tribunals, properly directing themselves. It went on to uphold an

March 2017 employment tribunal’s decision to award costs against K. While accepting that not all employment tribunals would characterise K’s conduct as unreasonable, the EAT noted that there had been nothing wrong with the way in which the tribunal had exercised its discretion to order costs.

160. It may be that a party’s conduct, taken as a whole, amounts to unreasonable conduct (Sahota v Dudley Metropolitan Borough Council EAT 0821/03)

Discussion and conclusions

The overriding objective

161. I remind the claimant that in employment tribunal litigation, the overriding objective is a central principle designed to ensure that cases are dealt with justly and fairly. This objective, defined under the Rules of Procedure, requires that cases are handled in a way that is proportionate to the complexity and importance of the issues, ensures expediency and fairness, and seeks to limit costs and delay. This objective applies to all parties involved, including solicitors, represented parties, and litigants in person (those who represent themselves).

162. The overriding objective dictates conduct in several ways and I remind the claimant that she should ensure that her conduct must not waste time or resources, including the Tribunal's time. This includes complying with case management orders and timelines, avoiding unnecessary adjournments, and keeping evidence and submissions concise and relevant.

163. An unrepresented party, often referred to as a "litigant in person," is not bound by the same professional and ethical standards that govern solicitors. This means that while solicitors are expected to adhere to certain rules, these do not apply to individuals who are not legal professionals.

164. It is generally permissible for solicitors representing one party to communicate directly with an unrepresented opposing party. Therefore, an unrepresented party may continue to communicate directly with the other side’s client or witnesses unless there is a specific court order prohibiting such communication.

165. Even though direct communication is allowed, it is advisable for solicitors to clarify any legal implications and boundaries to the unrepresented party. This is to ensure that the unrepresented party is aware of the potential consequences of their actions, such as the risks of inadvertently harassing or intimidating witnesses.

March 2017 166. I am very concerned that the tone and frequency of the claimant’s communications with the respondent’s employees, officers and agents including the respondent’s potential witnesses amounted to harassment and intimidation. Consequently, I consider it necessary to provide instructions to the claimant on how to conduct herself in this litigation. She must address all communications to [NAME_15]. She must not contact any of the respondent’s employees, officers or agents or witnesses or potential witnesses either directly or indirectly which includes but is not limited to:

a. Copying and blind copying said persons in emails

b. Sending messages via online communities or groups

c. Delivering hard copies of messages to said persons

d. Sending text messages or using social media to send messages to said persons.

e. Calling said persons via mobile or landline and/or leaving voicemail messages.

I have made a case management order to that effect which is set out in a separate document. The claimant is required to comply with that order. If she does not, she faces the very real risk of her claim being struck out for non-compliance.

167. My findings of fact inexorably point to the conclusion that the claimant has made several unfounded allegations of insurance fraud, conspiracy to defraud and misappropriation of public funds against [NAME_11], [NAME_9] and [NAME_182]. These allegations have also been repeated to the Tribunal and to [NAME_15]. I agree with [NAME_29] that these allegations are scandalous and unreasonable and were designed to cause as much anxiety and stress as possible for the respondent’s witnesses. This is borne out by what each of those witnesses state in their statements.

Allegations of fraud against [NAME_9]

168. My findings of fact clearly point to the conclusion that the claimant made numerous unfounded allegations of fraud against [NAME_9] and reported him to the police. She has also communicated those allegations to [NAME_15] and to the Tribunal. I am particularly concerned by the claimant’s behaviour in respect of her dealings with [NAME_183] of the Department for Education when she told [NAME_9] that [NAME_92] had confirmed that [NAME_9] was not only guilty of abuse of authority but also fraud. This was misleading. There was no evidence that [NAME_92] held those opinions. There is no evidence that [NAME_92] made those comments. [NAME_9] found this intimidating. It is an allegation that has serious consequences for [NAME_9]’ reputation.

March 2017 169. The claimant also threatened [NAME_9] when she said, “can you give me a reason not to report you for fraud”. She was attempting to coerce [NAME_9] to assist her by threatening to report him to the police.

170. I agree with [NAME_29] that this allegation is scandalous and unreasonable. It was calculated to cause as much stress and anxiety for [NAME_9] as possible. It had that effect on him as set out in his witness statement. It was threatening, bullying and intimidating behaviour.

171. I am particularly concerned about the claimant’s behaviour in respect of these allegations. The police investigated the allegation and found no evidence to support it and took no further action. I am troubled by the fact that the claimant did not attend an interview or make a statement and yet she wanted, and thought it appropriate for, the police to speak to [NAME_9]. The reasonable inference to be drawn from this is that the claimant wished to use the police as a weapon to intimidate [NAME_9]. How could she think that was acceptable in circumstances where she did not provide supporting evidence and did not give a statement or attend an interview?

172. To make such an allegation is scandalous and unreasonable. It shows an intention by the claimant to threaten and intimidate [NAME_9] and to cause him stress, all of which she achieved as per [NAME_9]’ witness statement.

173. I am also concerned about the claimant’s allegations that [NAME_9] threatened her with physical violence that she made on [NAME_99]. She also communicated the allegation to the Tribunal. The claimant has not provided any evidence that [NAME_9] was connected to the post “Have you ever thought of hitting your [NAME_20] with a bat?” The allegation was also communicated to the Tribunal and to [NAME_15].

174. The claimant’s letter to the Tribunal of 29 February 2024 suggesting that [NAME_9] may be incited to violence is both offensive and without justification. The reference to [NAME_9] being an “incel” is also offensive and scandalous to which [NAME_9] took particular exception, as per his statement.

175. The claimant’s behaviour in respect of that allegation was scandalous and unreasonable. It was intended to cause [NAME_9] distress and anxiety. The claimant achieved that outcome as per [NAME_9]’ witness statement. The claimant’s behaviour was bullying and intimidating.

Allegations of faking and modifying evidence

176. The claimant has made several allegations that the respondent and [NAME_15] faked or modified evidence. These allegations were communicated to the Tribunal and to the [NAME_184], the Teaching

March 2017 Regulation Agency, the Local Authority [NAME_185].

177. This is an extraordinary and very serious allegation to make for several reasons:

a. It damages the reputation of the respondent in the eyes of regulators and other important stakeholders with potentially catastrophic consequences for the respondent.

b. Solicitors are bound by strict ethical guidelines set by regulatory bodies such as the Solicitors Regulation Authority (“SRA”). These guidelines demand integrity, honesty, and upholding the law. Faking or modifying evidence directly contravenes these principles and can severely undermine the trust in the legal profession.

c. Fabricating or altering evidence is a criminal offence. If a solicitor is found to have engaged in such activities, they could face criminal charges, including perverting the course of justice, which is a serious crime that can lead to imprisonment.

d. The integrity of the judicial process relies on the accuracy and authenticity of evidence presented in court. Manipulating evidence can mislead the court, resulting in wrongful decisions, miscarriages of justice, and an erosion of public confidence in the legal system.

e. If a solicitor is suspected of such misconduct, they would likely face investigations by their firm and the SRA. This could lead to severe sanctions including suspension, being struck off, and other penalties, effectively ending their legal career.

f. Accusations of faking or modifying evidence can irreparably damage the reputation of the solicitor and their firm. This can lead to a loss of client trust, diminished business prospects, and a tarnished professional image that might extend beyond the individual to affect the firm as a whole.

g. Apart from criminal consequences, there might also be civil liabilities. Affected parties may seek compensation for damages caused by the actions of the solicitor if such manipulation of evidence leads to financial loss, emotional distress, or other harm.

178. The severe and negative impact of these allegations on [NAME_11], [NAME_9] and [NAME_13] could not be clearer as per their statements.

179. Given the gravity of such an accusation, it is imperative that any claim of evidence manipulation is supported by substantial proof before being raised. False accusations can themselves have serious implications, potentially exposing the accuser to legal action for defamation or malicious falsehood if the claims are proven baseless. Therefore, thorough investigation

March 2017 and careful consideration should precede any formal allegations against a solicitor or law firm. The claimant has made unfounded allegations which is very serious and clearly scandalous and unreasonable behaviour.

180. I have identified numerous instances where the claimant has made unfounded allegations which are misleading and defamatory. I am particularly concerned about the following:

a. The claimant’s email of 15 March 2023 to the Teaching Regulation Agency, the Local Authority [NAME_185]. She made multiple allegations including that the respondent faked and modified evidence, was dishonest, had engaged in a cover-up, and had failed to follow [NAME_25] procedures and had failed to follow the respondent’s Code of Conduct, subverting the course of justice and insurance fraud. In so doing, the claimant falsely alleged that a criminal court had accepted this and that a criminal prosecution had been listed against [NAME_11] and [NAME_186]. That was untrue and misleading.

b. The claimant had also alleged, in the same email, that [NAME_15] had failed to cooperate with a criminal investigation relating to the claimant, the respondent and anyone who worked for the respondent. That was misleading.

181. In my opinion, it is reasonable to infer that the claimant’s motivation in making these allegations was to intimidate and threaten the respondent, its witnesses and [NAME_15] into disrepute. This is amplified by the fact that the allegations were made to the Teaching Regulation Authority, the official body responsible for taking action in relation to serious [NAME_20] misconduct. The consequences for the respondent and its staff for these unfounded allegations were potentially very serious.

182. The claimant has made this allegation several times to different people. She has not provided any detail as to how the respondent defied these regulations and how they relate to her claims.

183. Given the lack of substance and the people to whom they were addressed, the reasonable inference to be drawn is that the claimant was motivated with the intention to cause distress and anxiety to [NAME_11], [NAME_9] and [NAME_13]. She achieved that outcome as per their witness statements. Her behaviour was harassing, hostile, intimidating and bullying.

184. The claimant has sent several emails to different members of staff at the respondent. I have already expressed my opinion on the claimant’s email

March 2017 to the Tribunal dated 29 February 2024 and, in particular, the offensive nature of referring to [NAME_9] as an “incel”.

Abuse of process

185. In the context of employment tribunal litigation, abuse of process refers to the misuse of tribunal procedures in a manner that deviates from their intended purpose, specifically to harass, oppress, or gain an unfair advantage over the opposing party. This abuse can manifest in various ways, impacting the fairness and efficiency of the tribunal proceedings. These include:

a. Filing claims that have no legal basis or are not intended to be taken to a conclusion, but are instead used to pressure an employer into a settlement or to tarnish the employer’s reputation.

b. Repeatedly bringing claims against the same party with similar or identical issues that have been previously resolved, often indicative of a desire to harass or burden the opponent rather than seek a genuine legal remedy.

c. Engaging in behaviors that unnecessarily delay the tribunal process, such as failing to comply with tribunal directions, missing deadlines without reasonable cause, or continually requesting adjournments without justifiable reasons.

d. Altering, fabricating, or destroying evidence that is relevant to the case, or encouraging witnesses to give false testimony.

e. Utilizing the tribunal for purposes other than to resolve a genuine employment dispute, such as attempting to gain a negotiating advantage in unrelated matters or using the litigation process to inflict financial or reputational damage on the employer.

Claims not within jurisdiction of the Employment Tribunal

186. The evidence shows that the claimant used employment tribunal proceedings to address allegations of libel, defamation, misuse of private information, negligent misstatement, fraud and conspiracy to defraud, data subject access and Freedom of Information requests and injunction.

187. The Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to hear these types of claim. The correct fora are various including the County Court/High Court, the Crown Court and the [NAME_184].

188. In this regard, I am prepared to give the claimant the benefit of doubt in that I believe that she was simply ignorant of the correct forum in which to make such claims. For example, she recognised that she could apply for an injunction from the Tribunal and withdrew that request. I do not find that there was an abuse of process.

March 2017

Claimant's application for an unless order

189. There was no legal basis for the claimant to make this application. The document requested was the “[NAME_21]” had already been disclosed to the claimant. I regard her application to be an abuse of process.

Unreasonable conduct of proceedings - Claimant's disclosure

190. The evidence shows that the claimant engaged in a process that can best be described as selective disclosure. The parties are required to disclose documents to the other party as follows:

a. On which they rely

b. Which adversely affect their own case (i.e. support the other party’s case).

191. Documents that are privileged (i.e. lawyer/client communications and documents prepared in contemplation of litigation) do not require to be disclosed.

192. The duty to disclose documents is a continuing obligation.

193. By engaging in selective disclosure, I find that there was an abuse of process by the claimant. She did not comply with the Tribunal’s order for disclosure.

194. The claimant repeatedly accused the respondent of failing to make disclosure of documents. She has not identified any specific document relevant to her claims that she asserts were not disclosed.

195. From the evidence it can be inferred that repeatedly making these allegations without providing any detail was done for purposed of harassing the respondent. I hold that this was an abuse of process.

Unreasonable conduct of proceedings - deadlines - ET3

196. The evidence is equivocal and I am prepared to give the claimant the benefit of the doubt. I believe she may have been confusing an ET3 and [NAME_27] for a response for further information. I do not regard this as an abuse of process.

197. The claimant had no basis for making this allegation about omitting the amended ET 1 and the cover from the bundle for the preliminary hearing 1 September 2023. As a matter of fact, those documents had been included in the bundle and the claimant had acknowledge that fact. Yet she continued to

March 2017 make the allegations thereafter without any justification whatsoever for doing so.

198. From the evidence, it is reasonable to infer that there was an abuse of process the intention of which was to harass the respondent.

Retention and sharing of confidential personal data

199. This matter should, in my opinion, be pursued elsewhere and not in the Tribunal.

Unreasonable and vexatious conduct towards [NAME_15]

200. I am very concerned by the contumelious, threatening and hostile tone taken by the claimant that amounts to a sustained, unreasonable and vexatious campaign by the claimant against [NAME_15]. I agree with [NAME_29] that the claimant has been persistently rude, aggressive, threatening and obstructive to [NAME_129] and individual solicitors in that firm. The correspondence amply demonstrates this. This has included reporting named solicitors to the SRA for professional misconduct and threatening to report the firm to the [NAME_53]. The purpose of such behaviour was motivated and intended to ensure that [NAME_15] behaved according to her agenda rather than being based on any arguable grounds for alleging misconduct.

Conclusions and further steps

201. Employment litigation, especially for claimants who represent themselves (a.k.a. litigants in person) is an emotional roller coaster. Losing a job triggers a sense of grievance and, frequently, feelings of grief and bereavement. To many people a job is more than “just a job”. It is a career or a vocation in which people invest a lot of themselves and derive a strong sense of their self-worth and validation from what they do. When the employment relationship breaks down, a claimant may feel angry and upset and may want to punish the respondent. Those feelings are amplified when allegations of unlawful discrimination are involved as these go to protected characteristics that are fundamental to a person’s identity. That said, there are certain standards of behaviour expected by the Tribunal of claimant litigants in person to ensure that there is a fair trial. These are as follows:

a. It is crucial for unrepresented claimants to educate themselves about the legal and procedural aspects of employment tribunals. Understanding deadlines, required forms, evidence submission processes, and hearing protocols is essential. Resources are available from the Tribunal's public offices, and online guidance is often provided by governmental websites.

b. Always interact with opponents, Tribunal staff, and judges with respect and professionalism. This includes using appropriate language, maintaining a calm demeanour, even during stressful or adversarial interactions.

March 2017 c. Follow the Tribunal’s rules and orders strictly. This includes meeting deadlines for submitting documents, adhering to directions regarding evidence and witness statements, and respecting the formats required for any submissions.

d. When communicating with the opposing party, whether orally or in writing, be clear, factual, and devoid of any emotional or inflammatory language. Ensure all communications are relevant to the case and seek to clarify or resolve issues.

e. Organize all case materials, including correspondence, documents, evidence, and legal research. Preparation is key, particularly when presenting the case in hearings, where understanding the key facts and legal points, and having ready access to supporting documents, is crucial.

f. Do not exaggerate or misrepresent facts. Credibility is critical in legal proceedings, and misleading the Tribunal can have serious consequences, including adverse judgments or sanctions.

g. While representing oneself, it is important to seek advice or assistance when necessary. This can include consulting legal advice clinics, seeking guidance from charities specializing in employment law, or occasionally hiring a solicitor or barrister for specific issues or representation at the hearing.

h. Handle any personal or sensitive information with the confidentiality it requires, both in relation a claimant’s own documents and those disclosed by the other party.

i. Concentrate on the legal issues relevant to the case rather than personal grievances. Focus discussions and arguments on how the facts apply to the law as it pertains to the claim.

j. Consider the strengths and weaknesses of the case realistically. Be open to negotiation and settlement if it can provide a suitable resolution without the need for a full tribunal hearing.

202. The claimant has not displayed these standards of expected behaviour. Having reviewed the evidence, which is voluminous, I have no doubt in finding that the claimant’s conduct, taken as a whole, was scandalous and unreasonable. Her behaviour was clearly motivated by the desire to cause the respondent and a number of individuals, including key witnesses, as much inconvenience, distress, embarrassment and expense as possible. She has embarked on a multi-faceted campaign of harassment, threatening and intimidating behaviour including making unsubstantiated allegations to the police concerning [NAME_9]’ behaviour. The claimant has attempted to have [NAME_13] removed from his position of Chair of the [NAME_80] and she has accused [NAME_11] of threats of violence and fraud and has made very

March 2017 serious allegations to third parties including professional regulators. Her behaviour towards [NAME_15] has also been hostile and intimidating including reporting named individuals in that firm to the SRA in circumstances that have been motivated by her anger that [NAME_15] were not prepared to stop acting for the respondent’s key witnesses rather than having any underlying merit as to the substance of an allegation of professional misconduct.

203. The claimant does not or will not understand that professional indemnity, employers’ liability and [NAME_187] will indemnify the insured in these types of claim in respect of legal expenses incurred in defending the claim. For the avoidance of doubt, what insurance policies do not do, for example, is to pay the fine imposed on an employee or director or officer who has been convicted of an offence.

204. The first stage for making a strike out order has been met. That is not the end of the matter as I have to consider whether a fair trial is still possible given the claimant’s behaviour to date. I remind myself that a fair trial in employment litigation, as in any legal setting, is one where all parties are given an equal opportunity to present their case, without undue advantage or disadvantage. This concept is deeply rooted in principles of natural justice and procedural fairness, and it is crucial for maintaining the integrity of the judicial process. This includes professional conduct; the parties should behave professionally in all interactions with the Tribunal, the opposing party, and witnesses. This includes using respectful language, honesty and integrity and being truthful and upfront in all aspects of the case, including evidence and interactions with the Tribunal and other parties. A party should not be aggressive or disrespectful towards the other party, their representatives and their witnesses. The purpose of questioning witnesses should be either to clarify the their testimony or to challenge the evidence, not to intimidate or harass.

205. Given the claimant’s scandalous and unreasonable behaviour, the prospects of a fair trial are hanging by a thread. However, I believe that with robust case management, including case management orders which clearly spell out how the claimant will be required to behave, a fair trial can still be conducted. I am also mindful of the distress that the claimant has caused to [NAME_11], [NAME_9] and [NAME_13]. Her behaviour has been hostile, bullying, aggressive and threatening and it is reasonable to infer that the claimant seeks to deter those individuals from giving evidence at the final hearing. Should she succeed in that objective, there cannot be a fair trial as the respondent would be denied the opportunity of presenting its oral evidence in defending the claims. Having said this, I believe that this behaviour can be curtailed and stopped by robust case management orders. Furthermore, those witnesses should be given the opportunity to give their evidence remotely so that they do not have to attend the hearing centre in person and be physically present in the hearing room at the same time as the claimant. This is often the case in criminal trials to ensure that best evidence can be obtained from a witness so that they can be confident that when they give their testimony, they can do so without fear and intimidation. The Tribunal frequently conducts hybrid hearings of this nature and it would be appropriate in this case should the respondent’s witnesses wish to do.

206. I am acutely conscious that that striking out a claim is a draconian step and one that I am not prepared to make at this juncture. However, the

March 2017 claimant must be under no illusion or misapprehension that if she fails to conduct herself as ordered by this Tribunal, she faces a very real risk of her claim being struck out.

207. I have refused the application for an unless order and have set out my reasons for doing so in a separate document addressing the parties’ applications for case management orders.

208. I now turn to the respondent’s costs application. In so doing, I am mindful of the fact that the claimant is a litigant in person. Notwithstanding this, the overwhelming body of evidence concerning the claimant’s behaviour justifies its characterisation as being abusive, disruptive and unreasonable in the manner in which the claimant has conducted these proceedings. Consequently, the costs jurisdiction is engaged. I find that given the egregious, multifaceted and sustained nature of the claimant’s behaviour, it would be appropriate for the Tribunal to exercise its discretion in awarding costs against the claimant. In her closing submissions, [NAME_29] acknowledged that it would not be practicable for the Tribunal, at this hearing to determine the amount of any award. There was simply no time to do so. I agree. This is something that will have to be dealt with by the Tribunal at a later date, either at a separate costs hearing before the final hearing, at the final hearing or after the final hearing.

__________________________________________

[ADDRESS]

_________________________________________

Date 16 April 2024

RESERVED JUDGMENT & REASONS SENT TO THE PARTIES ON

1 May 2024

FOR EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

1 Case Number: 3303311/2023

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Claimant:

[redacted]

Respondent: [redacted]

Bury St Edmunds

On:

7, 8, 9, 10 October 2024 (in person)

11 October 2024 (hybrid)

8 January 2025 (by video)

9 and 10 January 2025 (in chambers)

Before:

Employment Judge Graham

Members:

Mrs Allen, [NAME_306] Claimant:

[redacted] Respondent: [redacted]

CORRECTED JUDGMENT

1. The complaints of direct race and direct sex discrimination fail and are dismissed.

2. The complaints of harassment related to race and harassment related to sex fail and are dismissed.

3. The Respondent’s previous application for costs before [ADDRESS] succeeded and will proceed to a costs hearing.

CORRECTED REASONS

Introduction and procedural history

1. The Claimant issued her ET1 on 4 April 2023 in which she complained of race and sex discrimination. ACAS Early Conciliation took place between 2 March 2023 and 4 April 2023. The Claimant’s ET1 contained little in the way of details and she was previously directed by Employment Judge

2 Tynan to provide additional information concerning her claim however she did not comply.

2. The Respondent filed an ET3 Response on 23 May 2023 and an updated Response on 3 November 2023 in which it denied the allegations.

Private preliminary hearing for case management – 1 November 2023

3. A preliminary hearing for case management took place on 1 November 2023 before Employment Judge Warren where the List of Issues was finalised, although the Claimant now tells us that she did not agree them, however she did not challenge them at that time.

4. Employment Judge Warren made case management orders for this claim to proceed to trial, and he also recorded that the Claimant had emailed a further ET1 on 8 May 2023 which had not been referred to a judge but in which she sought to add [NAME_18] as a Respondent and she indicated she was claiming constructive dismissal, although Employment Judge Warren recorded that she did not have qualifying service to bring a claim of constructive unfair dismissal. It was also recorded that the Claimant had produced a document entitled “Statement of Claimant” which Employment Judge Warren found to be unhelpful as it did not not set out in clear and unambiguous terms the required further and better particulars of the allegations that she has made in her original claim form, despite what was required was clearly spelt out for her by Employment Judge Tynan.

5. Employment Judge Warren recorded in careful detail what the Claimant would need to do if she wished to apply for permission to amend her claim.

6. In this hearing we have been referred to a document dated 5 September 2023 in which the Claimant appears to apply for permission to amend her claim. We have also been provided with a letter of objection from the Respondent dated 20 October 2023. We have also been referred to a second document dated 29 February 2024 which appears to be an edited version of the 5 September 2023 document, some of the text is struck through, other parts have been added in different colours. Both documents are rather confusing and do not make it clear what the specific amendments being sought are or on what legal basis they are brought. The Claimant appeared to be seeking to bring complaints of defamation, negligent misstatement and fraud, none of which the Employment Tribunal has jurisdiction to consider.

List of Issues

The numbering below has been adopted from the Case Management Summary of Employment Judge Warren dated 1 November 2023.

Harassment Related to Race

6. [NAME_104] identifies her race as Indo / Canadian.

7. Did the Respondent engage in conduct as follows:-

3 7.1 The entire Drama Department, including individuals known as [NAME_190], not responding to her offers to help with the Drama Department at the outset of her employment;

7.2 Failure of [NAME_190] of the Drama Department, the [NAME_20] [NAME_191], the Head of Department [NAME_10], the Head of [NAME_140] [NAME_192], the [NAME_195] and [NAME_25] [NAME_197] on multiple occasions not replying to her emails;

7.3 Persistent mistakes in the spelling of her name by the Examination Department in the first half term of her period of employment with the Respondent;

7.4 [NAME_20] [NAME_16] accusing her of poor communication skills and violating [NAME_25] procedures arising out of a mistake made by [NAME_192] in misreading her word, “assessment” as, “assignment”;

7.5 [NAME_20] [NAME_16] suggesting that the foregoing amounted to poor communication skills and was a [NAME_25] issue, thereby putting in jeopardy [NAME_104]’s completion of her [NAME_20];

7.6 [NAME_20] [NAME_16] wrongly informing prospective employers during her period of notice that her communications were unprofessional, in particular informing [COMPANY_199] and [COMPANY_301] [spelling supplied by Claimant];

7.7 [NAME_20] [NAME_16] requiring [NAME_104] to provide written Reports through the Wellbeing Manager, arising out of the miscommunication allegation; and

7.8 [NAME_200] organiser of [NAME_204] for Period 5 on Wednesdays, declining to allocate [NAME_204] to [NAME_104] throughout her period of employment.

8. If so, was that conduct unwanted?

9. If so, did it relate to the protected characteristic of race?

10. If so, did the conduct have the purpose or, (taking into account [NAME_104]’s perception, the other circumstances of the case and whether it is reasonable for the conduct to have that effect) the effect of violating [NAME_104]’s dignity or creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for her?

Direct Race Discrimination

11. [NAME_104] relies upon the same allegations as appearing as allegations of harassment as in the alternative, insofar as they are not found to amount to harassment, as allegations of direct discrimination.

4 12. Insofar as these allegations are upheld by the Tribunal, the question will be whether those events amounted to, “less favourable treatment”? In other words, did the Respondent treat [NAME_104] less favourably than it treated or would have treated others, (“comparators”) in not materially different circumstances? In respect of the allegation regarding [NAME_201] and [NAME_204], [NAME_104] relies upon actual comparators [NAME_205] and [NAME_208]. In the alternative and in respect of the other allegations, she relies upon hypothetical persons in such circumstances.

13. If [NAME_104] was treated less favourably, the Tribunal will then ask whether the reason for that difference in treatment was race.

Harassment Related to Sex

14. Did the Respondent engage in conduct as follows:-

14.1 [NAME_10] flirting with [NAME_104], (it is very clear that she is not alleging sexual harassment), for example suggesting that she should teach him the Salsa and on her sending a text message making clear that she rejected his advances, [NAME_10] thereafter avoiding her;

14.2 [NAME_20] [NAME_16] wrongly informing prospective employers during her period of notice that her communications were unprofessional, in particular informing [COMPANY_199] and [COMPANY_301], and

14.3 [NAME_20] [NAME_16] requiring [NAME_104] to provide written Reports through the Wellbeing Manager, arising out of the miscommunication allegation.

15. If so, was that conduct unwanted?

16. If so, did it relate to the protected characteristic of sex?

17. If so, did the conduct have the purpose or, (taking into account [NAME_104]’s perception, the other circumstances of the case and whether it is reasonable for the conduct to have that effect) the effect of violating [NAME_104]’s dignity or creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for her?

Direct Sex Discrimination

18. [NAME_104] relies upon the above mentioned allegations of harassment related to sex, insofar as they are not upheld as harassment, as alternatively amounting to direct sex discrimination.

19. Insofar as these allegations are upheld by the Tribunal, the question will be whether those events amounted to, “less favourable treatment”? In other words, did the Respondent treat [NAME_104] less favourably than it treated or would have treated others, (“comparators”) in not materially different circumstances? In respect of the allegation regarding [NAME_201] and [NAME_204], [NAME_104] relies upon actual comparators [NAME_205] and [NAME_208]. In the alternative and

5 in respect of the other allegations, she relies upon a hypothetical comparator in such circumstances.

20. If [NAME_104] was treated less favourably, the Tribunal will then ask whether the reason for that difference in treatment was that she was a woman?

Public preliminary hearing - 9 April 2024

7. A further preliminary hearing took place on 9 April 2024 before [ADDRESS] to consider various applications from the parties. The Respondent applied for an Unless Order for the Claimant to cease contacting the Respondent’s witnesses direct as she was causing them stress and anxiety. The Respondent applied for a strike out of the claim on the basis of unreasonable conduct of proceedings by the Claimant, and it also applied for an order for costs in response to what was described as the Claimant’s vexatious, abusive, and disruptive communications.

8. The preliminary hearing judgment (“the April 2024 judgment”) is publicly available, it is 64 pages long and its contents are therefore not repeated here save to note a number of key findings by [ADDRESS] about the Claimant’s conduct up to that point. It is necessary to do so as much of that conduct was unfortunately repeated before us in this hearing despite a warning from [ADDRESS] and repeated unheeded warnings I had given to the Claimant.

9. [ADDRESS] recorded that the Claimant’s conduct had met the threshold for a strike out on the basis of her scandalous and unreasonable conduct, but declined to strike out the claim on the basis that a fair hearing was still possible although the prospects of that were hanging by a thread. The Respondent’s application for a costs order was granted on the basis of the Claimant’s scandalous, vexatious and unreasonable conduct of proceedings. The amount of that costs order has been left to this Tribunal to decide on another date. The Unless Order was not granted but the Claimant was issued with what can be described as robust case management with explicit guidance on how she should behave for the remainder of the claim.

10. [ADDRESS] referred to the Claimant’s correspondence (including direct contact) with the Respondent’s employees, officers and agents, including their witnesses and their solicitors ([NAME_15]), as well as correspondence she sent to the Tribunal, professional bodies, and regulators about those individuals. Some of the correspondence included allegations of fraud, conspiracy to defraud, and misappropriation of public funds. These allegations were directed at [NAME_141], [NAME_211] and [NAME_10]. It was recorded that the Claimant had provided a misleading account of her correspondence with the Department for Education about her line manager (hereafter referred to as “[NAME_10]”), and that she had made defamatory remarks.

11. It was specifically recorded by [ADDRESS] that the Claimant had used the police as a weapon to intimidate [NAME_10] by making an unsubstantiated allegation of an online threat of physical violence by him to the police. It was recorded that the Claimant failed to make a statement to the police or attend an interview. [ADDRESS] found that this was scandalous and

6 unreasonable and was done to threaten and intimidate [NAME_10] and to cause him stress. [ADDRESS] found that the Claimant had made unfounded allegations of fraud against [NAME_10] designed to cause as much stress and anxiety as possible, and that it was threatening, bullying and intimidating behaviour.

12. It was also recorded that the Claimant did not or would not understand the Respondent’s professional indemnity, employer’s liability and [NAME_187] cover legal expenses but not fines imposed on them.

13. The judgment and separate case management summary set out clear expectations for the Claimant’s conduct of proceedings going forward and this included (but was not limited to) ensuring that communications are relevant to the case, do not exaggerate or misrepresent facts, and to concentrate on the legal issues. The Claimant was advised that all parties are expected to behave professionally in all interactions with the Tribunal, the opposing parties and witnesses, and should use respectful language, honesty, integrity and being truthful, and that the purpose of questioning witnesses should be to clarify their testimony or to challenge evidence not to intimidate or to harass. The Claimant was warned that she must be under no illusion or misapprehension that if she failed to conduct herself as ordered by the Tribunal, she faced a very real risk of her claim being struck out in future.

14. Having found that the Claimant’s behaviour had caused distress to [NAME_141], [NAME_211] and [NAME_10] with a view to deterring them from giving evidence, [ADDRESS] decided that those witnesses should be given the opportunity to give their evidence remotely so they are not physically present with the Claimant.

15. The Claimant’s application for an Unless Order and her application to amend her claim to add further Respondents was refused. Much of the Claimant’s application was recorded as an abuse of process. The Claimant was also informed that the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to consider her complaints of defamation, misuse of private information, negligent misstatement, fraud and conspiracy fraud, data subject access and freedom of information requests and an injunction.

16. It was also recorded that the Claimant’s disclosure of evidence had been selective and she had not complied with the Tribunal’s order, and this was also found to be an abuse of process. It was recorded that the Claimant had continued to argue, without justification, that the Respondent had not included documents in the hearing bundle even though she acknowledged that the documents were in there.

17. Having read the contents of the April 2024 judgment, the warning to the Claimant by [ADDRESS] about her conduct could not have been more clear. The Claimant could not have been in any doubt about how she should conduct herself going forward. As indicated above, the Claimant repeated that behaviour throughout this hearing. Accordingly we find it necessary to provide a summary of the conduct of the hearing not least because we have observed for ourselves the Claimant’s clear propensity to provide a

7 misleading account of matters. This inevitably increased the length of this judgment and the amount of time taken to produce it.

Hearing day one – 7 October 2023 2024

18. At the start of the final hearing we were provided with an unagreed bundle of documents of 1137 pages from the Respondent, together with 16 witness statements, 14 of which were for the Respondent, and 2 for the Claimant. We were also provided with an electronic copy of a bundle of documents of 245 pages from the Claimant which she had sent to the Tribunal via [NAME_212] which is not a link which we use. The Respondent assisted us by downloading the bundle and then forwarding it on to us. I then printed that myself for the Claimant to use at public expense.

19. I asked the parties to confirm that the List of Issues remained as it had been identified by Employment Judge Warren. The Respondent confirmed that it was, the Claimant said that it was not. When asked in what way the list was inaccurate, the Claimant appeared to suggest that she wished to amend her claim at the start of the hearing. I attempted to explore with the Claimant what the amendment was, however after spending some time discussing this with her the Claimant appeared to be saying that there were amendment applications which had not been dealt with and she told me that [ADDRESS] had not given her the opportunity to speak at the previous hearing. Having checked the summary of that hearing that did not appear to be the case. I therefore gave the Claimant the opportunity to send the Tribunal her outstanding application(s) by 12:30pm that day and the Respondent would have until 1pm to provide a response. The hearing was adjourned before midday for the Tribunal to commence reading in.

20. We were provided with witness statements from the Claimant and [NAME_331]. [NAME_214] did not attend as a witness to give evidence and the Claimant told us that they were not in contact. We explained that we may place little or no weight on a statement if the author does not attend the hearing to be questioned which the Claimant noted. Having read the statement it was of very little relevance to the issues in this case dealing only with alleged possible flirtation but not in the context of Issue 14.1 where flirtation by [NAME_10] is alleged, and the Claimant made no reference at all to the statement in evidence or her cross examination of the Respondent’s witnesses. We have therefore decided to place no weight on the statement.

21. At the start of the hearing the Claimant sought permission to amend her statement to include an addendum which already appeared in the hearing bundle. The Respondent objected to this amendment pointing out that the addendum related to the matters which [ADDRESS] had dealt with in his judgment and Case Management Summary of 9 April 2024. The contents appeared to be part of the reason why the Claimant had been issued with a costs order (yet to be quantified). In short the addendum had no relevance to the claim which were dealing with and we therefore rejected the Claimant’s application.

22. We were provided with witness statements for the Respondent from [NAME_240] (Head of Drama and PSHE), [NAME_215] ([NAME_20] of Drama), [NAME_217] (Deputy Head of [NAME_140] [NAME_25]

8 [NAME_20] of Modern Languages), [NAME_16] (Headteacher – retired), [NAME_201] ([NAME_108] of Year, and also [NAME_20]), [NAME_220] (Head of [NAME_140], Associate Headteacher and Designated Safe Guarding Lead), [NAME_222] ([COMPANY_6] Administrator and Payroll Officer), [NAME_10] (Head of Computing and Claimant’s [NAME_108] line manager), [NAME_223] ([NAME_25]), [NAME_197] (Associate [NAME_25]), [NAME_224] (Exams Manager), [NAME_21] (Assistant Headteacher), [NAME_18] ([NAME_35]), and [NAME_38] (Assistant Headteacher).

23. During this hearing the Respondent made an application to permanently anonymise the name of the Claimant’s [NAME_108] line manager. The basis of the application was that public disclosure of unfounded allegations made by the Claimant against him has caused, and continues to risk serious harm to his reputation, career, and well-being. The Respondent argues that this harm engaged his right to privacy under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”) and that this risk outweighs the public interest in disclosure.

24. The application related to the April 2024 judgment which had already appeared on the Tribunal website for a short period of time. I notified the parties that I would need to pass it to [ADDRESS] to deal with and I indicated that if the Claimant wished to object she should write to the Tribunal. The Claimant did not object and [ADDRESS] considered the application and granted it on 16 October 2024 and provided the parties with written reasons why he had done so. These are not duplicated here.

Hearing day two – 8 October 2023 2024

25. The Claimant failed to send us her outstanding applications to amend. The Claimant simply forwarded on the Respondent’s letter of objections of 20 October 2023. This is not what the Claimant was asked to do. At the start of day two I asked the Claimant why she had not complied and she implied that the Tribunal waiting room was too noisy. In order to assist, the Respondent sent us the Claimant’s applications of 5 September 2023 and 29 February 2024 which the panel reviewed.

26. At the start of the hearing on Tuesday 8 October 2024 we dealt with the Claimant’s applications to amend. It was not clear if these were in reality outstanding as [ADDRESS] had dealt with an application to amend (to add two Respondents) on 9 April 2024 which he refused.

27. Nevertheless, and in order to satisfy ourselves that the Claimant’s applications had been considered, we checked that these were the applications which the Claimant wished to make, and we confirmed that the Respondent’s objections of 20 October 2023 still stood. We then considered the Claimant’s applications and provided her with full oral reasons at the start of the hearing, setting out why the applications had been refused.

28. For the sake of completeness, we have set out the reasons for refusing those applications at Annex 1 to this judgment. We make it clear that there

9 were grounds to conclude that the Claimant had not actively pursued those amendment applications as she could have raised all of them with [ADDRESS] on 9 April 2024. Nevertheless, we gave the Claimant the opportunity for those amendment applications to be considered fully by this Tribunal.

29. Throughout the hearing the Claimant made repeated complaints that the Respondent had failed to deal with her subject access request. The Claimant had already been made aware by Employment Judge Warren the difference between a subject access request and disclosure in the Employment Tribunal and the Judge recorded how the Claimant should go about obtaining missing documents, with the ultimate option of making an application for specific disclosure. The Claimant did not do so and we were satisfied that the Respondent had complied with its disclosure obligations. We note that [ADDRESS] also made the Claimant aware that we do not have jurisdiction over subject access requests, it is clearly set out in his judgment of 9 April 2024.

30. The Claimant made repeated allegations that the bundle had not been agreed, although having heard from both parties it was clear to us that the Respondent had tried repeatedly to agree it with the Claimant and ultimately had to finalise it without her agreement. We accepted the Claimant’s 245 page bundle which she referred to as the “missing items” bundle but it transpired throughout the course of the hearing that many of the documents already appeared in the hearing bundle prepared by the Respondent and the Claimant had simply not looked for them. None of the other documents in the Claimant’s “missing items” bundle had any relevance to the issues in the claim and it appeared that it had been appropriate for the Respondent not to have included them.

31. Throughout the hearing the Claimant appeared averse to using the hearing bundle (referring to it on one occasion as “[NAME_227]’s bible”) and instead relied upon her own “missing items” bundle, and the Claimant routinely failed or refused to give witnesses page numbers of documents she was questioning them on if they appeared in the bundle prepared by the Respondent. This meant that I or the Respondent (or the witnesses themselves) would have to find the page references so that witnesses could see what they were being questioned about. The Claimant also made a totally unsubstantiated allegation that the Respondent had interfered with or doctored her missing items bundle in some way – it was not explained why the Claimant believed that to be the case and in any event it was untrue.

32. The Claimant informed us that she had an additional bundle of documents for the hearing amounting to 1,000 pages. The Respondent objected to the provision of 1,000 pages more of documents. I explained to the Claimant that I would not have time in the hearing to read 1,000 pages but if she wished to review the bundle and to give us the documents she needed us to see which are not already in the hearing bundle we would consider them and their relevance. The Claimant complained in the hearing, and subsequently in writing, that I had told her to read a 1,000 page bundle of documents over lunch. That is not what I advised the Claimant to do and it is misleading to suggest that I did. I advised the Claimant that if she wanted us to see something then it would be for her to source it and to provide it to us and that it falls to her to do so.

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33. The Claimant also complained that the Respondent had provided its witness statements to her late, on or around 20 September 2024 whereas they were due on 19 January 2024. The Respondent says that the delay was the fault of the Claimant as she refused to agree a bundle with them, and then she did not engage on the exchange of statements, it therefore unilaterally sent the Claimant the Respondent’s statements.

34. Having listened to the parties and having read the judgment of [ADDRESS], we were satisfied that the Respondent had complied with Tribunal directions as regards the exchange of witness statements and that it was the Claimant who had failed to engage and who had caused delays.

35. The Respondent had already obtained permission for one of its witnesses to give evidence remotely. The parties were not made aware until late on Friday 4 October 2024 that the hearing venue had been changed from Cambridge to Bury St Edmunds which was a considerable distance from where [COMPANY_26] is based in Buckingham. The Respondent applied for ten of its witnesses to give evidence remotely due to the distance and the impact upon [COMPANY_26]. The Claimant consented to the application and we therefore granted it.

36. We asked the Claimant if she wished to give evidence remotely due to the distance. The Claimant indicated that she wished to come in to the venue in person so we proceeded on that basis with the Claimant in person together with some of the Respondent’s witnesses and lawyers.

37. The Claimant told us at the start of the hearing that she has shoulder pain, and suffers from stress and nervousness. We therefore agreed that we would make adjustments for the Claimant. We provided the Claimant with breaks throughout the hearing, and as the Claimant said her hearing bundles were too heavy to bring to the hearing she wished to use the E- bundle on her laptop, we also arranged for an extra table to be placed next to the Claimant where the hard copy bundles could be spread out if that made it easier for the Claimant. We also provided the Claimant with a spare set of the hearing bundles which the Respondent had produced at its own expense.

38. The Claimant then appeared to suggest that the bundles were too hard to open, and [NAME_29] agreed to go over and open the bundles for the Claimant. We also allowed the Claimant to use her laptop whilst giving evidence so that she could type notes and also use the E-bundle. It was brought to our attention that the Claimant had gone beyond this permission and was looking up extra documents on her laptop during her oral evidence and she was politely asked not to do so. The Claimant was able to type on her laptop very proficiently during her evidence and throughout the hearing, and we noted that she produced a long typed statement which she read on Friday 11 October for 90 minutes, and again she was able to produce written submissions of 29 pages on 9 January 2025.

39. The Claimant offered to provide us with medical evidence which we said was unnecessary as we would accept what she told us about her shoulder pain, her stress and her nervousness as we had no reason to doubt her. Nevertheless, the Claimant insisted that she provide them to us, therefore

11 we accepted them. The Claimant subsequently applied for a written transcript of the hearing paid for at public expense and I refused that application on 10 December 2024. The reasons for refusing that application were provided to the Claimant in writing and are not repeated here save to note that I determined that a transcript at the public expense was not necessary in the interests of justice to ensure the effective participation of a vulnerable party or witness or by way of reasonable adjustments for a person with a disability. I was not satisfied that the Claimant is a vulnerable party, nor that she would likely meet the legal definition of disabled based upon the material before me, and I did not consider that a transcript at the public expenses is required to ensure her effective participation in proceedings.

40. The Tribunal was very troubled with some of the statements made by the Claimant. On one occasion the Claimant informed us that she had further documents which she had chosen not to disclose because they would impact a police investigation. These were apparently messages she claimed to have received on social media from “sock puppet” accounts which we asked the Claimant to confirm meant accounts with fake names.

41. When it was put to the Claimant by [NAME_29] that the bundle contained a letter from the police which said that there was no investigation as the Claimant had not engaged, the Claimant sought to tell us that there was an ongoing investigation. When pressed why the Claimant had not provided disclosure of these relevant documents, the Claimant told us that they were not relevant. The Tribunal was left baffled as to why the Claimant had mentioned them in the first place.

42. The Claimant also told us that she was worried whether the Respondent would still survive after all the defamation there would be of [COMPANY_26] coming out of the issues in this case and in her appeal. It appeared to the Tribunal that this was some form of threat towards the Respondent, and it suggested to us a possibility that these proceedings were being used as a means to attack the Respondent for reasons beyond the subject matter of her claim. This also fitted in with much of the Claimant’s answers in her oral evidence where she said that the Respondent’s witnesses were kind or beyond reproach and that she was not accusing them of racism or sexism – notwithstanding that she had accused these individuals of direct race and sex discrimination, and also harassment.

43. We had sought to clarify with the Claimant at the start of the hearing what was the status of her appeal against the judgment of [ADDRESS] of 9 April 2024. The Respondent told us that it was concluded, the Claimant disagreed and said that it was active. Having reviewed the permission decision of His Honour Judge Barklem of 9 August 2024, it was clear that permission to appeal had been refused. The Claimant then told us that she was awaiting written reasons, however we noted that the permission refusal decision already included reasons. We further noted that the Claimant’s appeal had been marked as totally without merit and as such she was not entitled to a Rule 3(10) oral hearing. We therefore satisfied ourselves that this hearing could and should proceed before us.

44. The Claimant started to give her evidence at 11:27am on day two of the hearing.

12

45. During her evidence the Claimant gave exceptionally long narrative answers which seemed to avoid answering many of the questions and often entering into a dialogue about the Respondent generally. Much of the Claimant’s oral evidence did not relate to the legal issues to be decided, and did not relate to the matters which the Claimant had unsuccessfully sought to include as an amendment of her claim. The Claimant was repeatedly asked by [NAME_29], and by me, to confine her answers to the questions which had been asked so that valuable time was not wasted. Eventually it became necessary for me to warn the Claimant that her long answers (many of which did not answer the questions) would impact the amount of time she might have to spend with the Respondent’s 14 witnesses and that it was being said solely to help her so that she would have sufficient time available for her cross examination. The Claimant’s response was that she was content as she would be concise with her questions and did not have many for the witnesses.

Hearing day three – 8 October 2023 9 October 2024

46. At the start of day three we considered the Claimant’s further application to amend her claim to include the following allegations which were alleged to be victimisation and harassment:

46.1 Failure to rectify NQT training documents;

46.2 Failure to provide a statutory right to an assessment review within 20 days;

46.3 Failure to provide an accurate reference informed by NQT assessment;

46.4 Ongoing victimisation comprising rejection from 342 job applications, having attended 63 interviews, the Claimant says the Respondent must be providing some kind of verbal or written word that none of the prospective employers are willing to share with the Claimant; the Respondent refused to provide an assessment review commissioned by [NAME_21] completed on 19 April 2023, but when provided it contained irregularities; and other matters contained within the Claimant’s long narrative which could not be understood;

46.5 Failure to prevent sexual misconduct; and

46.6 Failure to address sexual misconduct

47. After hearing submissions from both parties we determined that the Respondent would suffer the greater hardship and injustice if the application were granted, and accordingly we refused the Claimant’s application. The reasons for doing so are set out at Annex 2 to this judgment.

48. Following the refusal of the Claimant’s amendment application at 12:10pm the Claimant became annoyed and accused [NAME_29] of having “stared daggers” at her the day before. This was untrue and the Claimant was warned by me that this was an outrageous allegation to make.

13

49. The Claimant then alleged that [NAME_29] had made a vexatious complaint about her to [NAME_125]. We understand that this may have something to do with the Claimant allegedly having retained some data from [COMPANY_26]. [NAME_29] denied making any referral to the Local Authority Designated Officer (“[NAME_125]”) about the Claimant. The Claimant was again warned by me about her conduct. It transpired later in the hearing that the Claimant accepted that [NAME_29] had not made any referrals to anyone about the Claimant but that it had been someone else who had done so.

50. The Claimant then complained that she only had the Respondent’s witness statements since 20 September 2024. The Claimant was asked if she had applied to postpone this hearing, the Claimant replied that she had not and I directed her to continue with her oral evidence.

51. The Claimant then complained that her amendments had been refused and asked what remedies I would give her. I explained that we were here to hear the claim she had brought comprising of the issues she had agreed before Employment Judge Warren previously. The Claimant indicated that she would not be able to obtain the remedy she was seeking and asked what was the point of carrying on. It transpired that what the Claimant was seeking was the amendment of her training records. The Claimant made reference to whistleblowing and it was explained to her that she did not have a whistleblowing complaint and I also explained the difference between the Employment Rights Act 1996 and the Equality Act 2010. The Claimant told me that she did not understand the difference between them.

52. It became clear that the Claimant was under the impression that the Tribunal had the power to order to rectification of her training records. This was an error on the part of the Claimant as we have no such power. The most which the Tribunal could have done if a relevant discrimination complaint succeeded (beyond an award of compensation and making a finding of discrimination), would be to issue a recommendation to the Respondent, we do not have the power to issue an Order rectifying the records. Moreover, we have no power to make recommendations in connection with whistleblowing complaints in any event. The Claimant had more than ample time and numerous opportunities to bring a claim for whistleblowing detriment or to amend her claim to included one but she had not done so.

53. The Claimant was repeatedly asked what she wished to do and she instead insisted that I tell her what her options were. As the Claimant refused to tell me if she intended to proceed with her claim I informed her that if she did not proceed with her claim then it would be dismissed with consideration of an application for costs. I then asked the Claimant if she wished to proceed to which she replied “I guess so.” I asked the Claimant again and received the same response. The Claimant then informed me that she needed more time to prepare and I asked her to confirm if she was seeking an adjournment, to which the Claimant indicated she was and the Respondent indicated that it would oppose the application as we were on day three, the case was brought eighteen months earlier and it needed resolution especially for [NAME_10] given the stress he was under caused by the Claimant’s conduct of proceedings as recorded by [ADDRESS].

14 54. The panel then adjourned briefly to consider the adjournment request and upon our return informed the parties that it had been refused. This was on the basis that the claim had been listed for some time, it was ready for hearing, and we needed to get on and hear it. I then warned the Claimant about her behaviour which we had found to be disruptive.

55. The Respondent then raised its own concerns. [NAME_29] referred to the Claimant’s amendment application which included the reference to alleged sexual misconduct by [NAME_10], and she reminded us of [ADDRESS]’s judgment where he had found the Claimant’s purpose in making that allegation had been to harass [NAME_10]. [NAME_29] asked me to warn the Claimant to stick to the list of issues and that she must not do anything to intimidate witnesses and that if she does so [NAME_227] would apply for a strike out of the claim.

56. I issued the Claimant with that warning as it was clearly set out within [ADDRESS]’s judgment that the purpose of the allegations about criminal acts by [NAME_10] had been to intimidate him, and [ADDRESS] had issued the Claimant with a clear warning about her future behaviour. I directed the Claimant to comply with the previous order from [ADDRESS] about her future behaviour.

57. I also told the Claimant that her comments the day before that [COMPANY_26] would be defamed in these proceedings, had been a threat on her part and that she must not make any further threats to the Respondent or its witnesses for the remainder of the hearing, failing which the Tribunal would consider a strike out of its own volition.

58. I informed the Claimant that I was placing on record that her behaviour this week had already met the threshold for consideration of a second costs order for unreasonable conduct of proceedings and I asked the Respondent to send to the Claimant the extract from [ADDRESS]’s judgment which [NAME_29] relied upon.

59. After lunch the Claimant said that she had not received the extract therefore did not know what criminal complaints were being referred to. I asked her to look at the judgment which was on [NAME_29]’s screen which showed the extracts which I have summarised below which she should avoid raising again:

59.1 Allegations that [NAME_10] used a sock puppet account to contact her or made threats of physical violence or that there was or is any police report/investigation into the same; or

59.2 Any reference to [NAME_10] having engaged in “sexual misconduct” when she has been very clear that she is not alleging sexual harassment.

60. We could not start the Claimant’s oral evidence until 2:14pm as we had spent the first part of the day dealing with the Claimant’s applications and addressing her behaviour.

Hearing day four – 10 October 2024

15 61. Overnight the Claimant sent correspondence to the Regional Employment Judge and the Employment Appeal Tribunal about this matter. In one of her emails the Claimant alleged:

“Also, Barrister for the Respondents sent correspondence to Judge Graham without copying Claimant, and Barrister for the Respondents was offered the direct email for the Bury St Edmunds Employment Tribunal whilst both Respondents and Judge Graham complained of the delay in getting Complainants emails.”

62. The Claimant’s email was discussed with her at the start of the hearing. [NAME_29] pointed out that the Claimant had been copied in on correspondence and that the Claimant had replied to it. The Claimant said that she had been mistaken. The Respondent and its counsel were not offered an email address which was not shared with the Claimant. This was another misrepresentation by the Claimant and I again warned her about making allegations which she knows to be untrue.

63. The Claimant’s oral evidence then continued at 10:42am. We then heard the oral evidence of [NAME_10] by video whom we allowed to be accompanied by [NAME_21] to sit with him during his evidence as a support due to the distress he was under. Ms [NAME_23] took no part in [NAME_10]’s evidence which was completed that day. The Claimant repeatedly asked questions which did not relate to the legal issues to be decided in the case and I had to remind her on numerous occasions to focus on the issues we were here to decide, to keep her questions relevant, and to make good use of her time. The Claimant did not follow that guidance and the questions asked of [NAME_10] had very little relevance.

Hearing day five – 11 October 2024

64. We were due to continue with the Respondent’s witness evidence on the start of 11 October 2024 however the Claimant asked to have a private preliminary hearing for case management. The purpose of the Claimant’s request was unclear and the Claimant then read out a personal statement for up to an hour and a quarter which she had typed the night before. This personal statement of the Claimant had no relevance at all to the issues we were here to decide, and in any event the Claimant’s witness evidence had already completed and we were due to continue with the Respondent’s evidence. Within her personal statement the Claimant suggested she had started to suffer from early symptoms of a migraine the day before but she said it had not developed into a migraine. The Claimant said she was not long term disabled, but she wanted a closed judgment or a private judgment, that could be used elsewhere in other court proceedings, which found her either to be disabled or vulnerable. The Claimant asked for a transcript from the 9 April 2024 hearing at the public expense, although this had already been refused by [ADDRESS].

65. I encouraged the Claimant on numerous occasions to resume the questioning of the Respondent however she maintained that she wished to complete her statement. During the remainder of this the Claimant conceded she had been wrong to accuse [NAME_29] of referring her to [NAME_125] and she also accepted that it was possible that [NAME_222] did answer emails and she was someone who could be relied upon.

16

66. We resumed the Respondent’s evidence shortly after 10:53am where we heard from [NAME_211], followed by [NAME_224], [NAME_38], [NAME_220], [NAME_222], and [NAME_215]. The Respondent had attempted to call [NAME_16] and [NAME_217] however the Claimant objected to hearing them in that order, and whereas it was a matter for the Respondent who it calls and when, the Respondent was able to move witnesses around at short notice in order to help progress the witness evidence.

67. As we ran out of time to complete the Respondent’s witness evidence we listed this for one further hearing date to take place on 8 January 2025 at 9:30am by video in order to give the Claimant sufficient time to question the Respondent and to minimise disruption to the Respondent [COMPANY_6] having so many staff have to travel the 86 miles to the hearing venue which would take in the region of two hours each way. The Claimant agreed this in the hearing on 11 October 2024.

Hearing day six – 8 January 2025

68. On 20 December 2024 the Claimant wrote to the Tribunal and changed her position as she had been refused a transcript at public expense and would need to make her own notes or have a note taker, she complained of delays with the Respondent’s witnesses and suggested there was some connection issue with the video. The Claimant asked for the hearing to take place in person again, to which the Respondent objected as the arrangements had already been made at [COMPANY_26] and it would be disruptive to the students’ education to change it now, this had been agreed previously with the Claimant, and there was no reason why this would not be effective, and the Claimant had raised her objections very late for no good reason.

69. We refused the Claimant’s application but offered to make the hearing hybrid so that the Claimant and her note taker could attend the hearing in person if she was concerned about their connection issues. The Claimant did not respond to that offer, and the hearing took place by video on 8 January 2025 as previously agreed. The Claimant arrived over 20 minutes late for the hearing and said she did not know it was due to start at 9:30am even though this had been done for her benefit and previously agreed with her. After the hearing the Claimant wrote to complain that the hearing had been by video, however we had made the offer of a hybrid hearing which she had not accepted. The Claimant no reference to that offer in her correspondence. The Claimant has also written to allege that her observers or notetakers were not allowed to join the hearing however that is untrue and she did not raise that during the hearing.

70. At the start of the hearing at 9:53am the Claimant sought to rely on additional documents which she had not sent to the Respondent or the Tribunal. When asked why these had not been disclosed before the Claimant blamed the Employment Tribunal for not sending her a DUC upload link. The Claimant was repeatedly asked why these had not been disclosed during the entire life of the claim to which she again blamed the Tribunal for not sending her an upload link before changing her position to say that she was unable to do so as they related to a criminal investigation by the Police which she did not wish to prejudice.

17

71. The documents were eventually sent to us and comprised of two attachments of 47 pages each. I asked the Claimant which specific legal issue they related to. The Claimant could not tell me other than harassment generally, and she referred to the alleged threat to her on social media and her explanation for the late disclosure was that she did not wish to prejudice a criminal trial and she did not know until after the October hearing that the Police did not intend to investigate further.

72. The Respondent objected to their admission on the basis that they were incredibly late for no good explanation for their late disclosure, some of the documents appeared innocuous and they were all documents in the Claimant’s possession, many of which were already in the hearing bundle, and the remainder were not relevant and some of which were messages sent to [NAME_228] termination of the Claimant’s employment and the Respondent did not propose to seek to recall [NAME_10] to give evidence again. The Respondent said it was not understood why the Claimant continued to press these matters as they were not relevant to the issues and that time continued to be wasted and inconvenience was being caused to the Respondent [COMPANY_6].

73. The Tribunal considered the documents and noted that many of them were already in the hearing bundle, there was no legal issue to determine about an alleged threat to the Claimant on social media and therefore the remaining documents were not relevant, and moreover they had been disclosed far too late with no good reason as these documents were already in the Claimant’s possession and she did not say she had been advised by the Police to withhold them. We also noted that [ADDRESS] had already found the allegation about an online threat of violence was unsubstantiated, and had been raised in order to use the police as a weapon against [NAME_10] and to threaten, harass, intimidate and bully him. We therefore refused to allow the documents to be admitted.

74. The oral evidence then recommenced at 11 am by which time one hour and a half hours of Tribunal time had been spent waiting for the Claimant to join the hearing and in dealing with her application. I then had to impose a timetable for the rest of the Respondent’s witnesses as I had twice directed the parties to agree a timetable between themselves in advance of the hearing. The Respondent had complied with that direction and sought to engage with the Claimant who had failed to engage with the Respondent.

75. I allocated 75 minutes for [NAME_141] as his evidence was larger (and more central to the case) and then thirty minutes each for [NAME_197], [NAME_240], [NAME_223], [NAME_217], and [NAME_201] on the basis that their evidence was much shorter. I allocated one hour with [NAME_21] from 4pm until 5pm as her evidence was slightly longer. The parties agreed with this timetable. The Claimant had full use of this time as the Respondent did not ask any re-examination. I suggested we have a half hour lunch rather than an hour in order to give the Claimant more time with the witnesses to which she agreed, and I allocated two breaks of up to fifteen minutes. The video connection worked well with no interruptions although we briefly logged out due to a minor delay on the feed.

18 76. The Claimant’s questioning of the Respondent’s witnesses remained unsatisfactory as she continually asked irrelevant questions of them (including how many male and female staff members have PhDs at [COMPANY_26]), and repeatedly asking about [NAME_10]’s working pattern and when his hours of work changed. This was clearly an attempt to reopen earlier unsubstantiated allegations of fraud against [NAME_10] which [ADDRESS] had already been found to have been raised to bully, threaten and intimidate him, and I disallowed the questions. The Claimant also avoided using the hearing bundle and failed to provide witnesses with the page numbers of documents, and when asked to do so the Claimant declined and said that they could look it up later if they wished. The Tribunal found this to be unreasonable and obstructive and I issued the Claimant with a warning that I would disallow any questions about documents if she failed to give witnesses page numbers in the bundle as it was unfair on them to be questioned on historic documents without seeing them.

77. The Claimant also sought to mislead witnesses during her questioning by informing one witness ([NAME_229]) that [NAME_230] had admitted that he had applied an illegal policy at [COMPANY_26], and informing another witness that the Tribunal had already found the Respondent’s other witnesses to be unreliable. Both of these statements were untrue, and I reminded the Claimant not to mislead witnesses in future. The Claimant’s frequent misrepresentation of matters we had observed for ourselves did damage her credibility for us as we had seen first hand the Claimant’s propensity to argue things which she knew were not true. This also did cause us to question how the Claimant may have presented at the material times during the course of her employment. Nevertheless we were mindful that the Claimant is a litigant in person, a tribunal hearing can be stressful and daunting, and it was not the Claimant’s normal environment therefore her stress might be heightened.

78. The hearing ended shortly after 5pm and the Respondent was directed to provide written submissions by 12pm the following day, and we gave the Claimant until 2pm to provide hers. The Claimant complained that this was too short and that she would be saving some of her submissions for her appeal.

Findings of Fact

79. From the information and evidence before the Tribunal it made the following findings of fact. We made our findings of fact on the balance of probabilities taking into account all of the evidence, both documentary and oral, which was admitted at the hearing. We do not set out in this judgment all the evidence which we heard but only our principal findings of fact, those necessary to enable us to reach conclusions on the issues to be decided.

80. Where it was necessary to resolve conflicting factual accounts, we have done so by making a judgment about the credibility or otherwise of the witnesses we have heard based upon their overall consistency and the consistency of accounts given on different occasions when set against any contemporaneous documents. We have not referred to every document we read or were directed or taken to in the findings below, but that does not mean they were not considered.

19 81. The Respondent is a [COMPANY_6] which provides secondary and [NAME_140] education to pupils aged between 11 and 18. The Claimant identifies as being of Indo-Canadian origins. The Headteacher at that time was [NAME_16] who has since retired. The [NAME_35] was [NAME_18].

82. At the material time the Claimant was a newly qualified [NAME_20] (“NQT”) and she applied for the role of [NAME_20] of computing with the Respondent in January 2022 but was unsuccessful. On 28 March 2022 the Respondent identified that there were concerns with the Claimants’ pre-employment [NAME_25] checks. The Claimant’s [NAME_231] recorded incidents in September 2016, April 2018 and May 2018 and whereas she was interviewed by the Police no police action was taken. The [NAME_231] also recorded that the Claimant had been dismissed for gross misconduct in January 2017, and she had been investigated by the [NAME_20] who had closed their investigation with no action taken against her.

83. The Claimant made a second application on 30 March 2022 for which she was successful and she commenced her employment as [NAME_20] of computing on 1 September 2022. We heard that the Respondent, particularly the [NAME_141] [NAME_259], were keen to give the Claimant a chance.

84. The Claimant attended INSET days on 2 and 5 September 2022 where she undertook [NAME_25] training.

85. As an NQT the Claimant was required to complete an induction assessment confirming that she was meeting the required standards set by the Department for Education which covers both teaching and also personal and professional conduct. Both elements are accredited by what is known as an appropriate body which we understand to be an organisation that quality assures statutory [NAME_20] induction. The Respondent in this case works with [COMPANY_232] as the appropriate body.

86. The expectation once an NQT starts their role and is within the [NAME_20] (“ECT”) period, is that they will focus on gaining teaching experience. It was clear from the evidence of the Respondent’s witnesses, and the contemporaneous documents in the hearing bundle, that the Respondent considered the Claimant’s knowledge of her subject matter to be excellent and that her teaching was very good, however as she had limited teaching experience she was encouraged to focus on her teaching first. It was the Respondent and [NAME_141]’s practice that [NAME_233] needed to focus on their teaching skills and experience upon joining [COMPANY_26].

Spelling of the Claimant’s surname

87. On 5 September 2023 [NAME_10] (the Claimant’s line manager) emailed the [NAME_234] to ask them to set the Claimant up on the OCR System so that she could access the [NAME_236] software. [NAME_224] (Exams Manager) actioned this promptly and notified [NAME_10] that it had been done on 7 September.

88. The Claimant found she was unable to log in and engaged with [NAME_237] who replied to advise on 7 September that her username was cpunshan. This was an incorrect spelling of the Claimant’s surname but the Claimant

20 appeared not to have noticed it as she continued to try and access the system.

89. The Claimant emailed [NAME_237] on 3 October who then asked for a new activation email for the Claimant on 4 October however the Claimant did not receive the notification. The Claimant still could not gain access so she emailed [NAME_237] on 10 October. [NAME_237] was initially unable to identify the problem so she passed the Claimant the number to call OCR direct, however five minutes later she realised that there was a spelling mistake which she then corrected and apologised to the Claimant. [NAME_238] explained to us that the previous time she had completed the task was a year before, she had been busy at the time, and it was a typing error rather than a deliberate misspelling of the Claimant’s name.

90. On 4 November 2023 the Claimant emailed [NAME_238] to say that her line manager keeps asking about her login for [NAME_236] but she still has not received an email from them and asked for it to be reset. [NAME_238] replied that she could not understand why the Claimant had not received it and offered to look at it with the Claimant to which the Claimant replied:

“Thank you [NAME_225], I see you’ve caught a spelling mistake and sorted this out for me :)”

91. It therefore appeared that the Claimant had not noticed until then that [NAME_238] had fixed the issue the month before.

92. [NAME_238] had not met the Claimant before and did not have direct knowledge of her race. During her oral evidence the Respondent questioned the Claimant about her surname and it was established that this was her married name and the origins are English not Indian. The Claimant had not volunteered this information to us until she was asked about it however she added that the letter “a” had been added which was an over generalisation of Hindi words such as Himalayas.

93. We noted that the Claimant did not deal with this allegation in her witness statement and in her oral evidence she informed us that she did not accuse anyone in [COMPANY_26] personally of being sexist or racist, rather it was [COMPANY_26] as a whole. The Claimant’s cross examination of [NAME_238], like her closing submissions, concerned why [COMPANY_26] did not have a policy of copying and pasting names when setting up accounts so that names, particularly those from minorities, are not misspelled. This was a different complaint than the one the Claimant had brought. The Claimant appeared to accept in her closing submissions that this was simply a typing error.

94. Whereas the Claimant alleges that there was persistent misspelling of her name only one incident was brought to our attention which was the misspelling on 7 September which was corrected on 10 October 2023.

95. Having listened to the account of [NAME_238] we are satisfied that this was simply a typing error which she identified and corrected. We find that the error was an unintentional mistake rather than a conscious decision.

96. Similarly the Claimant made repeated misspellings of other people’s names. In an email dated 20 February 2023 the Claimant repeatedly misspelled the

21 surname of [NAME_220] even though she had met him and knew who he was. In her oral evidence the Claimant told us that she wrote KF instead of [NAME_217] in one document as she didn’t know how to spell her name.

Interest in [NAME_239] performance

97. On 6 September 2022 the Claimant emailed [NAME_240], Head of Drama and Personal, Social and Health Education (“PSHE”) and said the following:

“[NAME_188],

I wanted to get in touch to let you know I am interested if you need staff in teaching or developing sex education.

I know many teachers don't like to teach this. I am qualified in terms of having a degree in Human Physiology, and it's not easy to embarass me.

Additionally, I know the big production is [NAME_239] this year and I'm really looking forward to seeing that. I may like to find time to help with this as I love dancing; all kinds of partner dancing, jazz funk, etc. I literally have about 10 different pairs of dance shoes.

Thank you,”

98. The email had been sent at the start of term by which time [NAME_241] informed us that all schemes of working lessons had already been written for the year ahead and PSHE teachers had already been assigned their timetable lessons. [NAME_241] said this is something she assumed the Claimant would have known that she would not need to teach PSHE at that time.

99. [NAME_241] said in her evidence, and we accept that unchallenged evidence, that she read the Claimant’s email and registered her interest in undertaking this type of work in the future which could be discussed when the next [COMPANY_6] timetable was being coordinated in the summer of 2023.

100. As regards the Claimant’s comment that she may like to find time to help with [NAME_239], [NAME_241] said she made the assumption that the Claimant would be in touch with her again to discuss how she might be able to help. Neither contacted each other again and we noted that the Claimant’s email did not ask for any type of response.

101. On or around 20 or 21 October 2022 the Claimant spoke to [NAME_215], [NAME_20], and the director of the production of [NAME_239], and she expressed her interest in helping with the choreography for the production. [NAME_242] informed the Claimant that there were only a few weeks to go before the opening night on 24 November 2022 and that the choreography had been completed by a [NAME_140] (or Year 13) choreographer with [NAME_242], other students, and [NAME_241], but he would welcome support with polishing the show’s numbers and she was free to attend rehearsals which were twice a week after [COMPANY_6]. The Claimant did not attend these.

22 102. [NAME_242] explained how busy things had been and the Claimant said that she knew how busy he was and would drop him and email to remind him of the conversation. [NAME_242] relayed his conversation to [NAME_241] on 21 October so she was aware that the Claimant might be in touch. The Claimant did so on 21 October 2022 and said the following in her email:

“[NAME_189]

I thought it might be easier for me to find you.

As we discussed, please let me know if the [NAME_105] that’s doing the choreo for [NAME_239] needs assistance with anything.

Thank you,”

103. This was the last day before half term. [NAME_242] did not reply. [NAME_242]’s evidence was that he did not consider that the Claimant was expecting a response unless the students needed help, and that her email had been sent as a reminder of their conversation. [NAME_242] also told us that the production team consisted of individuals from diverse backgrounds and that the [NAME_105] who led the choreography is black.

Electives / [NAME_204]

104. The Claimant was interviewed on 8 April 2022 by [NAME_141] and [NAME_259]. The evidence of [NAME_141], which we accept, is that when interviewing candidates there will often be some discussion about their interest beyond their subject area and when that occurs he may mention it to [NAME_201] (an Assistant Headteacher) who lead on [COMPANY_26]’s electives programme.

105. [NAME_141] said that nothing came up during the Claimant’s interview and rather the discussion was about her teaching, her subject area, and also the issues with her [NAME_231]. [NAME_141] says that even if the Claimant had indicated other areas of interest he would unlikely have raised it with [NAME_243] as the Claimant was an NQT and his approach, as we have found, is that [NAME_233] need to focus their team on developing their teaching. We also accepted that evidence, it was entirely plausible and was not challenged to any degree by the Claimant.

106. On or before 5 October 2022 the Claimant spoke to [NAME_243] and indicated that she was interested in running an elective and asked how she could get involved. [NAME_243] informed the Claimant that she could email him with any suggestions. On 5 October 2022 the Claimant emailed [NAME_243] and said that she would be interested in running karate and self defence electives for Year 7 or Year 11 students.

107. The unchallenged evidence of [NAME_243] was that the electives programme provides an opportunity for students to undertake learning experiences beyond the core curriculum with each activity delivered over one term. These electives are rotated through a carousel of fixed activities with more flexibility for those in years 8 to 10 which are delivered in mixed age groups. The electives are run by a mixture of teaching and support staff and also [NAME_36] and external providers. Electives are introduced where

23 a staff member has capacity on their timetable and if there is sufficient interest from students in such a case the elective is then run at the start of the next rotation.

108. On 10 October 2022 [NAME_243] informed the Claimant that the elective cycle for years 7 and 11 had been fixed but they could start considering changes for the next academic year and that they could introduce new electives for years 8 and 10 midyear and he could see whether there was sufficient interest in karate and self-defence for [COMPANY_26] to offer this. On 10 October the Claimant provided further details and raised queries about insurance, resources and timing. [NAME_243] replied the following day on 11 October indicating the proposed elective could start just before Christmas and could run for 13 weeks but there would have to be consideration of an appropriate venue due to [COMPANY_26]’s large spaces already being in use, and he advised the Claimant to speak to [NAME_244] about the insurance. The Claimant did not reply.

109. On 21 [NAME_243] contacted the Claimant again to advise that a local sensei had contacted [COMPANY_26] about the prospect of running karate. [NAME_243] asked the Claimant if she had found out about the insurance requirements as per his previous email.

110. On 21 October the Claimant replied in relation to her own insurance and providing more detail about what she could offer but she did not address whether she had discussed insurance with [NAME_247] but instead she copied her into the exchange. The Claimant asked about offering karate to year 11 students even though [NAME_243] had already told her it could not be introduced for year 11 midway through the academic year. The Claimant did not pursue this further and we find that [NAME_243] had responded positively to the Claimant’s suggestion.

111. On 9 November 2022 the Claimant emailed [NAME_243] regarding a potential STEM computing elective for year 11 students even though he had already advised the Claimant that any new elective could not be introduced for them partway through the academic year

112. [NAME_243] confirmed that the proposed elective could be potentially offered to Year 9 and 10 students and that it could be potentially started in rotation two before Christmas. There were further exchanges of emails between [NAME_243] and the Claimant during November. [NAME_243] indicated that he would email all Year 9 and 10 students if [NAME_10] was content, on 28 [NAME_10] asked [NAME_243] to hold off and to obtain further details about the proposed course from the Claimant. The Claimant provided this the same day and on 1 [NAME_243] thanked the Claimant and acknowledged receipt. No further steps were taken in connection with the course due to the Claimant’s resignation on 24 November 2022. The Claimant complains that it should have been run even after she left on the basis of the work she had already done, however we note that she would not have been there to teach it and moreover the students had not even been asked by this stage if they were interested in the course.

113. The Claimant has identified two comparators for this complaint. The first is [NAME_248] who joined the same time as the Claimant. [NAME_251] was not an NQT therefore she was not in a directly comparable situation to

24 that of the Claimant. In June 2022 prior to [NAME_251]’s arrival, [NAME_141] informed [NAME_243] that [NAME_251] speaks Japanese and suggested contacting her to see if she would be interested in running this as an elective. There was an exchange of emails on this issue in June 2022. The situation is different to that of the Claimant in that this was raised and discussed months before term had started. [NAME_251] had also offered to run an elective on anthropology or archaeology for year 12 [NAME_105] students to which [NAME_243] replied it was more likely something they could look at offering in 2023/2024.

114. We did not find that [NAME_251] was a true comparator given that she was not an NQT and moreover her circumstances were different in that she had been approached before the start of term to discuss an elective whereas it was the Claimant who raised hers after the term had commenced.

115. The second comparator relied upon by the Claimant was [NAME_252] who was a new [NAME_20] in the History department. In May 2022 the Head of [NAME_254] decided not to reintroduce the [NAME_254] taster elective and this left a gap as the Respondent had already allocated a number of hours for this elective. The head of History, [NAME_255], was asked to speak to [NAME_258] to see if he wished to reintroduce the elective or if there was something else he could offer. There was a discussion between [NAME_258] and [NAME_243] in mid June 2022 where it was agreed that he would undertake an elective in Muay-Thai boxing and this was offered as an elective from the start of the new academic year from September 2022. The Claimant spent part of her cross examination time talking about why karate / self defence would have been preferable to Muay-Thai however that was not one of the issues we needed to decide, and in any event we noted that [NAME_258] was asked about this in June 2022 before the academic year started and this was due to a gap which had been created. We also understand that [NAME_258], unlike the Claimant, was not an NQT.

116. We do not find that [NAME_258] could have been a true comparator given that he was not an NQT and because the discussions between him and the Respondent took place before the start of the academic year. We understand both [NAME_258] and [NAME_251] to both be white.

117. On 1 November the Claimant volunteered to take part in the Driver Awareness course for [NAME_140] pupils which [NAME_243] agreed and the Claimant took part on 16 November 2022.

Flirtation

118. The Claimant has accused [NAME_10] of direct sex discrimination and harassment related to sex. The alleged treatment is said to be flirtation and asking her to teach him salsa. The Claimant has failed to tell us what else this flirtation was alleged to be. It does not appear in the ET1 claim form, the list of issues, the Claimant’s witness statement, nor in her closing submissions. It was not put to [NAME_10] in the Claimant’s cross examination of him either.

119. When asked about this by [NAME_29] the Claimant made vague reference to having observed a lesson with [NAME_10] on 29 March 2022 prior to starting her role, and some point (on an unspecified date) he said that she

25 would be welcome to attend a [COMPANY_6] trip which the Claimant said would have involved staying away overnight which she said was inappropriate as she said she did not yet have her [NAME_231] and he would have seen her bed hair. This was not something which the Claimant advanced or put to [NAME_10] in his evidence and it was clearly therefore not the alleged flirtation relied upon by the Claimant. It was never established before us what this alleged flirtation was.

120. Before commencing her role the Claimant started to send [NAME_10] a succession of unsolicited messages to his personal mobile phone which he says were inappropriate and caused him to feel uncomfortable. These included a message on 13 May 2022 where the Claimant asked him “Couldn’t it be that your mum had a myopic mailman?” followed by “Was that ill-considered? I’m so sorry.”

121. In a further message dated 12 July 2022 the Claimant messaged “I know you’ve just had 20 days straight work. How about some fun and easy team building over drinks Friday?” [NAME_10] sent a polite reply the following day declining the invite.

122. On Sunday 17 July 2022 the Claimant messaged “I could arrange for you to join the incumbent pub quiz team defending the title Wednesday night if that’s the kind of thing you’d enjoy.” [NAME_10] replied on 19 July 2022 and stated “Sorry I am unavailable. No exciting plans at present. I hope you enjoy the quiz.”

123. On 12 August 2022 the Claimant message saying “Please [[NAME_10]], I’m looking for busy work that doesn’t need thought. My grandmother’s passed away.”

124. All of the above messages were sent before the Claimant had even started work for the Respondent.

125. Upon joining the Respondent the Claimant sought to spend a great deal of time with [NAME_10]. Whereas they were due to have fortnightly diarised meetings, [NAME_10] gave evidence (which we accept) that the Claimant sought to meet much more regularly and for longer periods of time, both in and out of [COMPANY_6] hours, and that these meetings did not reduce as they normally would when an NQT settles in. As this started to impact on [NAME_10]’s personal time he advised the Claimant that he would be happier to meet before [COMPANY_6] (rather than after [COMPANY_6]) and that [NAME_259], Assistant Headteacher, was also available to speak to her.

126. The Claimant continued to message [NAME_10] in his own time once she started her role. At 5:12pm on Friday 16 September 2022 the Claimant messaged “is it a good time to talk. This is a negative option question. I’m calling if you don’t say not to.”

127. Later that evening the Claimant messaged to [NAME_10] “Okay, can you please call me in the next few hours? I will be unavailable from about 9.”

128. On 19 September 2022 the claimant messaged [NAME_10] and asked about the spelling of his name when he was a child.

26

129. The Claimant also sent [NAME_10] a message on the same date asking if he liked sushi. The Claimant asked the same question of [NAME_10] during his oral evidence before us even though it had absolutely no relevance to the claim whatsoever.

130. The evidence of [NAME_10] was that he became increasingly concerned about the amount of time the Claimant required and the volume of her email correspondence including copying him in unnecessarily, as well as the things she spoke to him about including talking about other members of staff. [NAME_10] raised this with [NAME_259], Assistant Headteacher, who advised him to tell the Claimant only to message him during [COMPANY_26] day, and only to message his personal phone in the case of emergency and where possible only meet her in the presence of another member of staff.

131. Despite at some point in mid September advising the Claimant only to message his personal number in an emergency, the Claimant continued to message [NAME_10]. On 27 September 2022 the Claimant messaged “Okay I class this as an emergency. I’m missing the tanzanite ring I worse this morning, probably left in the ladies staff toilets near N16. It was my mother’s birthstone.”

132. On 29 September the Claimant messaged “Also an emergency to me; I’m driving to work with my window down because its stuck. I will need to sort it today.”

133. On 21 October 2022 the Claimant emailed [NAME_10] at the start of the half term break and said “Can we talk later today about some things I don’t want to put in writing?” [NAME_10] forwarded the email to [NAME_259] and it transpired this concerned an issue the Claimant had with the room being locked over lunchtime.

134. On 21 October 2022 the Claimant text messaged [NAME_10] “So about your dance lesson.” [NAME_10] did not reply.

135. Again on 21 October 2022 the Claimant messaged “are we not going to be friends then? You can say so. Many people find me delightful - you don’t have to be one of them.” [NAME_10] did not reply. The Claimant says that this message was her rejecting the advances of [NAME_10]. Clearly this is nothing of the sort. The Claimant was not rejecting anything at all and was continuing to try and engage with [NAME_10] who clearly did not wish to do so. [NAME_10] also forwarded these messages on to [NAME_259] and told her he was not entirely sure what to make of them.

136. Whereas the Claimant has alleged that [NAME_10] flirted with her by suggesting that she should teach him salsa, [NAME_10] has denied this and says that the Claimant was passionate about dance and was hoping to set up a staff dance club, and whereas he was positive and encouraging about it as he wanted the Claimant to settle in at [COMPANY_26], he did not show any specific interest in being taught by the Claimant. We accept that evidence from [NAME_10]. We do not find the [NAME_10] ever asked the Claimant to teach him to dance salsa as he denies it and we have found [NAME_10] to have been honest and candid throughout his evidence. We have found and have observed ourselves that the Claimant has a clear propensity for misrepresenting things said and

27 done, and we prefer the evidence of [NAME_10] over the Claimant and we note the content, the tone, and the volume of the messages going from the Claimant to [NAME_10], very few of which were responded to by [NAME_10] and he did not ask to be taught salsa in any of those messages.

137. Whereas the Claimant has argued that [NAME_10] sought to avoid her after her message of 21 October 2022 which she says was her rejection of him, we do not find as a fact that is what happened. As we have already indicated, [NAME_10] sought to minimise unnecessary contact with the Claimant from early on in her employment and asked her to cease messaging him on his personal number unless it was an emergency. The Claimant continued to message [NAME_10] after the event portraying irrelevant and unnecessary communications as emergencies to her when they were not.

138. On 23 November 2022 [NAME_10] informed [NAME_259] by email that the Claimant had criticised him for not giving her compliments, she brought up old topics that he thought had been resolved, and that when he made a point during a lesson observation that she had used junk or fill words, she had said that she uses colloquial language on purpose and had been awarded many trophies for her speaking. [NAME_10] advised [NAME_259] that he did not think that he could work with the Claimant much longer, and the evidence of [NAME_259] was that this caused her to worry about his wellbeing.

139. On 2 February 2023 the Claimant informed [NAME_141] that [NAME_10] had been cross with her and had told her that he could not get any work done as she had been staring at him whereas the Claimant’s explanation was that she had been patiently waiting for a chance to speak to him.

140. Having considered those messages, having read the witness statements of [NAME_10] and of the Claimant and also having heard their oral evidence, and having noted that the Claimant did not even put this allegation to [NAME_10] in his oral evidence, we find that at no point did [NAME_10] ever flirt with the Claimant as alleged. We further record that the allegation was untrue and that the Claimant has deliberately pursued this allegation knowing that it was untrue.

[NAME_25] issues

141. At the material time the Respondent had five designated [NAME_25] leads (“DSL”) at [COMPANY_26]. These are teaching staff with special responsibility for dealing with [NAME_25] issues.

142. The Respondent operates a system whereby [NAME_25] concerns must be entered onto [COMPANY_26]’s database known as Wellbeing Manager. Once an entry is made it is assessed by one of the DSLs. The logging of [NAME_25] concerns is mandatory not optional, and it is essential that entries are recorded as soon as possible so that there can be an assessment of the risk and so that support can be channeled or action taken in order to minimise risk to the [NAME_105]. The Respondent’s approach to [NAME_25] at the relevant time was based upon the principles of the 2022 version of [NAME_260] (“KCSIE”) which is a Government publication which sets out the legal duties to be followed to safeguard and to promote the welfare of children and young people under the age of 18 in schools and colleges.

28

143. The Claimant attended induction training on 12 July 2022 where the attendees were advised “If you notice something that concerns you: Put the information into Wellbeing Manager.” This was contained in the slides distributed to attendees. The Claimant also attended INSET training on 2 and 5 September 2022 at the commencement of the academic year where this requirement was explained to her.

144. As part of the training the [NAME_20] is required to complete a [NAME_260] (“KCSIE”) quiz. On 28 September 2022 [NAME_223], Deputy Headteacher and DSL, emailed the Claimant to inform her that the quiz organiser had sent her records of the training but the Claimant was not recorded as having completed it and [NAME_229] asked her to do so as soon as possible if she had not already. The Claimant responded to say she had already done it but had just redone it and scored 16 out of a possible 25 which she said she was not very pleased about but was happy to do it again.

145. On 24 October 2022 [NAME_229] was formally notified by the quiz company that the Claimant’s score was 64% which [NAME_229] says was the lowest at [COMPANY_26] and that the average score was 88%. [NAME_229] was in receipt of the Claimant’s answers and her evidence to us that she was concerned by some of the Claimant’s wrong answers, in particular her answer with respect to information sharing.

146. One of the questions asked was “When a child makes a disclosure, which of the following is NOT true?” The Claimant had replied “Only involve those who need to be involved, for example [NAME_25].” The suggested or expected answer was “Promise a child that you will not tell anyone.” [NAME_229]’s evidence was that staff must never promise a child that they will not tell anyone about a [NAME_25] disclosure they have received, and that this indicated to her that the Claimant may not properly understand the requirements under [COMPANY_26]’s policies about information sharing.

147. [NAME_229] provided the Claimant with a copy of the [NAME_25] quiz report on 23 November 2022 and asked her to review the areas where her answers were not in line with the suggested answers and for her to note the explanations provided. The Claimant was asked to undertake an [NAME_261] course on [NAME_25] under KCSIE 2022.

148. A few days earlier [COMPANY_26] was contacted by the mother of a pupil (“[NAME_262]”) to advise that they may be upset or struggle with timekeeping or miss something as a result of personal circumstances. On 8 November 2022 it was noted that [NAME_262]’s behaviour had been uncharacteristic and they were spoken to by [NAME_220] the [NAME_327]. On 21 November 2022 [NAME_262] informed [NAME_230] that the Claimant had given them a sanction by asking them to write 500 words on why they were doing computing and the Claimant had asked their parent to sign it. [NAME_230] said that [NAME_262] was distressed as they felt that it was unfair. [NAME_230] felt that this was ill judged given [NAME_262]’s personal circumstances and emailed the Claimant to

29 inform her of [NAME_262]’s personal issues and he asked her to consider rescinding the sanction. The Claimant was asked to let [NAME_230] know her thoughts.

150. The Claimant replied the same day to advise “you may see this as a sanction, but I’m not at all cross with [[NAME_262]]. I want [[NAME_262]] to refocus on [[NAME_262]’s] goals and the reason [[NAME_262]] chose computing. I want [[NAME_262]] to remember why [[NAME_262]] likes it and what [[NAME_262]] wants to deal with it.” The Claimant took issue at the time and in these proceedings with [NAME_230]’s interpretation of the reason for the 500 words as she says that he misread her use of the word “assessment” as “assignment”. The Claimant has become preoccupied with this issue however we noted that at no point did [NAME_230] use the word assignment, and that his expressed concern was that the allocation of this task (irrespective of how it was labeled or described) was inappropriate given [NAME_262]’s circumstances at the time.

151. At 12:24pm the Claimant emailed [NAME_230] to say she had tried to find him at break time to discuss [NAME_262] further and she asked if he was available after [COMPANY_6] and that it was a bit urgent. Not unreasonably in our view, [NAME_230] assumed that it related to the 500 word matter. [NAME_230] replied at 1:40pm to say that he had been in pre-arranged meetings and would be at a Senior Leadership Team (“[NAME_263]”) meeting after [COMPANY_6] but would be available the following morning. The Claimant’s reply at 2:59pm was a little terse and she said “I’m sorry that you don’t see this as urgent and are unable to spare 10 minutes today; it is a [NAME_25] concern.” In her evidence to us [NAME_259] has described this email as rude and antagonistic and not what she would expect from an [NAME_264]/qualified [NAME_20].

152. [NAME_230] attempted to find the Claimant after his meeting but she had already left for the day. [NAME_265] emailed the Claimant at 3:19pm and advised her that if she had a [NAME_25] concern she should immediately upload it to Wellbeing Manager so that one of the DSLs could pick it up and deal with it.

153. The Claimant replied to [NAME_265] and stated she was in a quandary about what KCSIE would have to say about her email exchange with [NAME_230] and that she wanted to meet him in person. [NAME_265] emailed the Claimant to advise that Wellbeing Manager was the place to log any concern she might have and if in doubt the concern should be reported. The Claimant was advised that the [NAME_266] read all reports and decide on the appropriate action. The Claimant replied to say she had been warned about putting things in emails as parents could ask to see anything that mentions their child and that KCSIE had a specific exclusion about not disclosing information that would put a child in an adverse position with a parent.

154. At 4:41pm [NAME_230] emailed the Claimant again and asked to meet the following morning in person and reminded her that all [NAME_25] concerns should be recorded on Wellbeing Manager and that it was secure and that if she was unhappy doing this she should contact one of the [NAME_266] or [NAME_197] the DSL directly for a telephone conversation.

30 155. As the Claimant had not immediately uploaded the concern about [NAME_267] did this instead. We have been provided with a copy of the entry which records the detail and what the Claimant said she had heard from another [NAME_105]. It was recorded that the Claimant said she did not wish to add this to Wellbeing Manager due to the [NAME_105]’s age and what the Claimant said that KCSIE says about not informing parents. The rest of the entry summaries further discussions with [NAME_262] including the 500 word task and that the Claimant felt undermined over that issue and had been told by [NAME_259] to respect [NAME_230]’s decision.

156. [NAME_230] and [NAME_265] met with the Claimant the following morning where she was asked why she had not updated Wellbeing Manager to which she advised that she had been within her rights to withhold the information if she felt that the [NAME_105] would come to harm by the disclosure and that she lacked confidence in [COMPANY_26]’s ability to deal with concerns in line with KCSIE procedures. The Claimant was reminded that it was her responsibility to upload her concerns relating to pupils on WellBeing Manager however she continued to dispute this and said she was not required to report or [NAME_25] information.

157. The evidence of [NAME_230] was that a delay in reporting information like this could impact a [NAME_105] receiving the help that they need which was time limited and the failure to do so could put a [NAME_105] at risk, and this caused him deep concern with the Claimant’s reticence to do so.

158. The evidence of [NAME_265] was that the Claimant regularly referred to her ethical obligations towards pupils which she said superseded [COMPANY_26]’s processes, and she became defensive and sought to make things personal by saying that [NAME_230] did not trust her professional judgement. The evidence of [NAME_265] was that the Claimant sought a debate, that she interrupted and was argumentative.

159. [NAME_230]’s evidence was that the Claimant displayed a maverick approach to [NAME_105] welfare and displayed an “I know best” attitude. Having read all of the relevant documents and having heard the oral evidence of the Claimant, [NAME_230] and [NAME_265], we are satisfied that is how the Claimant presented at the time and that she was argumentative, would not accept what she was being asked to do, and that her expressed opinion about what she could withhold was contrary to the Respondent’s policy and caused the Respondent concerns about her approach.

160. There was then a discussion about the Respondent’s policy on providing painkillers on site. The Claimant repeatedly referred to this issue in the hearing however it was not one of the issues for us to decide. The Claimant continually argued that the Respondent had an illegal policy whereby she said that [NAME_230] had contacted local pharmacies and told them not to supply painkillers to the students, whereas it was the Respondent’s evidence that [NAME_230] had asked the local pharmacies to keep an eye on how much was being purchased. During the Claimant’s questions to the Respondents’ witnesses on 8 January 2025 she told that [NAME_230] had admitted to having an illegal policy. This was untrue and misleading as he gave

31 no such evidence to us. This was not one of the matters for us to decide, notwithstanding that the Claimant kept persistently returning to the issue, and we make no findings of fact about it.

161. Given the concerns about the Claimant’s approach to this matter [NAME_230] emailed [NAME_268] and [NAME_229] on 23 November to provide a summary of the discussion and he considered that the Claimant required some retraining. In his email [NAME_230] said that the Claimant had not uploaded her [NAME_25] concerns to Wellbeing Manager, she said that she was within her rights to withhold her concerns and lacked confidence in the Schools’ ability to deal with [NAME_25] concerns in line with KCSIE, the information would have helped the [NAME_105] receive support, withholding the information may have put the [NAME_105] at risk, the Claimant only disclosed the information once she disagreed with his decision, the Claimant was still not listening to the instruction to report all [NAME_25] issues, and she appeared frustrated and cross at [NAME_10] for reporting the concerns on Wellbeing Manager.

162. A similar email was sent by [NAME_265] raising concerns about the Claimant’s approach to the matter including that the Claimant believed that her ethical obligation superseded [COMPANY_26]’s processes and recording of [NAME_25] concerns.

163. [NAME_141] and [NAME_229] met the Claimant the following day on 24 November to discuss the matter and her KCSIE quiz score, and she was informed that these had raised concerns and that she must in future log her concerns on the Wellbeing Manager which the Claimant agreed she would do but that she had been told to show compassion to [NAME_262]. The Claimant expressed concern about the parents being informed of the matter and she appeared angry with [NAME_230]. [NAME_229] told the Claimant that she needed to use a polite tone in correspondence and to pause and think before sending an email when irate. The Claimant was asked to undertake an [NAME_261] training module on [NAME_25] which she later completed and scored 90%.

164. During the meeting the Claimant explained that relations with her line manager [NAME_10] were not good and it was agreed that there would be a meeting with [NAME_259] to review and clarify expectations.

165. The Claimant’s NQT accreditation was discussed and Dr [NAME_12] raised his concerns that further evidence would be needed to accredit her with respect to her [NAME_25] and her relations with colleagues and that she would need to supply further evidence.

166. Later that day on 24 November the Claimant uploaded an entry to Wellbeing Manager however it was very [NAME_133] and lacked any detail about the matters which the Claimant said she had witnessed and heard. The most which the Claimant said was that she overheard part of a conversation and that she had constructed a lot of meaning from the exchange that was not explicit Claimant did not say what it was that she had heard. The Claimant’s entry was of no value as it provided no detail.

167. [NAME_230]’s evidence was that he remains of the view that the Claimant had misunderstood KCSIE and he provided us with a detailed summary of

32 the provisions which are not repeated here however we noted that KCSIE provides that DPA and UK [NAME_134] do not prevent the sharing of information for the purposes of keeping children safe and promoting their welfare; and when in doubt staff should speak to the DSL; and fears about sharing information must not be allowed to stand in the way of the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of children.

168. KCSIE also provides that all concerns, discussions and decisions made, and the reasons for those decisions, should be recorded in writing, and that information sharing is vital in identifying and tackling all forms of abuse and neglect, and in promoting children’s welfare. KCSIE also provides a relevant summary of the [NAME_134] principles which allow for data to be shared and withheld where the serious harm test under the legislation is met. It appeared to the Tribunal that the Claimant may have misunderstood this [NAME_83] provision as entitling her to withhold making an entry on Wellbeing Manager, however we find that belief was incorrect. The clear message from KCSIE is that concerns must be recorded and that personal data may be withheld from subsequent disclosure where the serious harm test is met. This does not entitle a [NAME_20] to refrain from recording the concern in the first place These are two different things and it appeared to us that the Claimant misunderstood the relevant provision under KCSIE.

Claimant’s resignation and grievance

169. Following the Claimant’s meeting with [NAME_141] and [NAME_229] on 24 November she sent an email in which she said she was giving the Respondent tentative two months’ notice. [NAME_141] accepted that notice by email the following day and arranged to meet with the Claimant to discuss it.

170. On 26 November 2023 a [NAME_20] at [COMPANY_26], [NAME_270], emailed [NAME_141] and [NAME_229] to raise concerns about comments the Claimant had made to students about an alleged lack of diversity in [COMPANY_26]’s workforce.

171. On 30 November 2022 [NAME_141] met with the Claimant to discuss her resignation. When asked why she had resigned the Claimant said she felt that [COMPANY_26] and she were pulling in different directions, she disagreed with the KCSIE 2022 and information sharing with parents, and she felt undermined by [NAME_230]. The Claimant nevertheless asked to extend her notice as she wanted to complete some work with Year 7. It was agreed to extend the Claimant’s notice until the end of the February 2023 half term. [NAME_141] discussed the Claimant’s NQT status with her and said that whereas there was solid evidence of her teaching further evidence would be needed with respect to her wider professional abilities.

172. A draft NQT Induction Assessment was produced by [NAME_10] as the Claimant’s line manager on or around 8 December 2022. The Assessment recorded that the Claimant was meeting expectations in respect to her teaching, and it was further recorded that she had superb subject knowledge however it also recorded that there were occasions where her behaviour towards other members of staff could have been more appropriate and further there had been [NAME_25] concerns where the Claimant had not followed [NAME_25] procedures.

33

173. The evidence of [NAME_141] is that he agreed with the assessment and he relied upon the Claimant’s handling of the [NAME_262] [NAME_25] issues and also the concern raised by [NAME_270] on 26 November 2022. The Claimant provided her comments on the assessment and recorded that certain of her communications may look unprofessional and that she recognised that [COMPANY_26] required further evidence of professionalism from her. [NAME_141] did not sign off the assessment due to the outstanding concerns identified.

174. In these proceedings the Claimant alleges that [NAME_141] accused her of poor communication skills and violating [NAME_25] procedures arising out of a mistake made by [NAME_230] misreading the word assessment as assignment. This issue kept being raised by the Claimant throughout the hearing, however it was not one of the issues for us to decide, and moreover it was not established before us that [NAME_230] ever formed a view on whether the 500 word task was an assessment or an assignment. This is something which continues to preoccupy the Claimant but it was of no relevance whatsoever to the claim.

175. The evidence of [NAME_141] is that he never accused the Claimant of having poor communication skills, and his evidence was that he had concerns over her professional communications and he points out in his evidence that he had recorded within the assessment that there were occasions when the Claimant’s behaviour towards other members of staff could have been more appropriate. [NAME_141] says he asked the Claimant to be aware of the tone of her communications and to focus on positive response to constructive criticism.

176. On 9 December 2022 the Claimant sent an e-mail to [NAME_141] indicating she was interested in withdrawing her notice of termination of employment. [NAME_141] replied on 6 January 2023 declining to accept that withdrawal and he noted that he had made steps towards finding a replacement and he also highlighted that the Claimant continued to reflect her concerns about the schools ethos and policies. The expressed intention of [NAME_141] was that he hoped to be able to support the Claimant’s successful completion of her NQT assessment before she left.

177. We have been referred to a long list of issues which the Respondent says caused it concern for the remainder of the Claimant’s employment. These concerns include the Claimant using her personal email to discuss [COMPANY_6] matters on one occasion, the Claimant discussing [COMPANY_6] recruitment with the students and giving her opinion on the suitability of an applicant, inappropriate communication to and about [NAME_10], including making a comment to the students on 18 January that “I’m not sure why they let him be a grown-up.” One [NAME_105] reported to [COMPANY_26] that the Claimant been discussing inappropriate matters with them including her resignation and request to withdraw her notice, a recent Ofsted inspection and that she commented that [NAME_141] was angry with her and his reaction to the OFSTED inspection, and comments that [NAME_10] was a yes man.

178. The Claimant was also alleged to have conducted a remote court hearing in the [COMPANY_271] despite being permitted to do so from home and a private space available at [COMPANY_26] for her to have used.

34 Within the hearing the Claimant did not deny these matters and she confirmed that she had some of these discussions with students.

179. On 18 January 2023 the Claimant sent [NAME_10] an email in which set out a large number of complaints and stated “This follows on the heels of saying no to birthday cake. And you can say no, but you don’t have to tell me what I can do with my cake, thanks.”

180. The Claimant and her union representative attended a meeting with [NAME_141] and [NAME_259] on 19 January 2023 to discuss the remainder of her employment and concerns about her professional communications. The Claimant was told that some of her emails to [NAME_10] had not been professional and that further evidence was still required for [COMPANY_26] to sign off her NQT induction assessment in respect of professional behaviours.

181. During a further such meeting on 31 [NAME_141] informed the Claimant that [NAME_131] (the accreditation body for [NAME_233]) required her to work a further term and therefore Respondent could not sign off her NQT Induction Assessment, and that whilst he remained happy with her teaching he still had concerns about her professional standards and he discussed the concerns to which we have already referred above. [NAME_259] raised the issue of the Claimant discussing [NAME_10] with students, in particular the comment about “I’m not sure why they let him be a grown up” to which the Claimant said was a joke, and [NAME_141] told her that was ill advised.

182. In January 2023 [NAME_259] started to log relevant communications from the Claimant given that the Respondent needed to consider the Claimant’s [NAME_264] induction assessment and whether she could be signed off as satisfying the standards in relation to professional conduct, including professional communication. The mere fact of keeping a log like this was indicative to the Tribunal that the Respondent had concerns at that time about the way in which the Claimant was conducting herself in communications and her dealings with her colleagues and students. This log contains a number of the matters to which we have already referred above where the Claimant made comments to students or her colleagues.

183. On 31 January the Claimant contacted [NAME_211] the [NAME_35] following her meeting with [NAME_141] and she asked to speak to him about professionalism at [COMPANY_26] and about [NAME_141] specifically. The Claimant mentioned a [NAME_25] issue which she said may amount to a whistleblowing situation. Upon receipt of the Claimant’s email the clerk to the [NAME_36], [NAME_66], wrote to the Claimant providing guidance on the steps to follow if she wished to report a [NAME_25] issue or to make a complaint.

184. The Claimant continued to send correspondence to [NAME_10] which the Respondent deemed to be inappropriate, including an email of 1 February 2023 in which she said “And this is how it ends up being emails: you either talk and won’t let me talk, or you leave or hide. I’m not happy to be scapegoated for other peoples unprofessional behaviour and I’ve contacted [NAME_35] about this.” In a further email on 7 February the Claimant emailed [NAME_10] and asked “will I see you before I go or are you trying to not even see me??”

35 185. On 2 February the Claimant emailed [NAME_141] about [NAME_10] and said:

“Yesterday period 5 [[NAME_10]] was again cross and left the room saying "I can't get work done with you staring at me" I thought I was patiently waiting for a chance to talk about agreeing to some reference points. I guess this discussion will have to be with you?”

186. The Claimant filed a formal grievance against [NAME_141] on 2 February which related to the completion of her [NAME_20] training, the [NAME_25] issue and questions relating to professionalism of her communication. The Claimant said she had not received responses to emails and had a delayed response from [NAME_141] and she made reference to problematic [COMPANY_6] policies. The Claimant did not mention discrimination or harassment anywhere within her grievance.

187. A formal grievance meeting with [NAME_211] took place on 7 February during which the Claimant confirmed her complaints were that her [NAME_20] training had not been signed off because the standards for communication and [NAME_25] has not been met, and that [NAME_141] presided over a culture that did not encourage constructive challenge in a dialogue of [COMPANY_6] policies and approaches. The Claimant said the outcomes she was seeking was the signing off of her [NAME_20] training and an agreed reference.

188. It was agreed that the Claimant would meet [NAME_141] with [NAME_211] as mediator. As the Claimant disputed that she had not complied with [COMPANY_26] [NAME_25] procedures [NAME_211] suggested that [NAME_229] be asked to review the [NAME_25] incident. The Claimant subsequently aske that [NAME_272] undertake this instead as [NAME_229] had already been involved. The Claimant widened the outcomes she was seeking to include reinstatement to her role and also a number of other matters.

189. The mediation meeting took place on 10 February which was also the Claimant’s last day of working at [COMPANY_26]. [NAME_141] informed the Claimant that he had signed off part one of the teaching standards including the standards relating to safe-guarding, that further evidence of progress with her professional communications was still required, and therefore he could not sign off part two of the teaching standards yet. [NAME_141] said that he would seek confirmation from [NAME_131] whether the Claimant would need to be signed off on part one of the teaching standards again, and he said he would agree a suitable reference wording with the Claimant making clear the progress she had made on part one of the teaching standards, but that she needed to work further on professional communication.

190. It was agreed that [NAME_229] would review the relevant email correspondence between the Claimant and [NAME_230] so that the Respondent could better understand and learn from examples provided by the Claimant. It was also agreed that [NAME_21], Assistant Headteacher, would review the handling of the [NAME_25] incident in November 2022 so that [COMPANY_26] could also learn from the particular circumstances of that case.

191. On 12 February the Claimant emailed [NAME_211] and [NAME_141] and sought to widen her desired outcomes including sign off of her [NAME_20] training, reinstatement of her as a [NAME_20], an award of an additional job

36 title as key stage co-ordinator, an apology from [NAME_230], enactment of a whole [COMPANY_6] policy on responsiveness to parents, students and staff, financial compensation, and implementation of other matters she said that she had previously raised. This was a significant widening of her earlier desired outcomes before the mediation meeting.

192. On 13 [NAME_141] emailed the Claimant draft wording for her reference which he sought to agree with her, and she was notified that [NAME_131] had confirmed that her next [COMPANY_6] would need to report on all of the teaching standards in the NQT induction assessment.

193. A copy of the reference prepared by [NAME_141] appeared in the hearing bundle. We have found it to be a detailed and a positive reference which confirms that she had completed all [NAME_25] training, not been the subject of any allegations or concerns or disciplinary procedures relating to the welfare of young people. The reference confirms the Claimant had made good progress towards her final assessment, she sets high expectations, her students are clear about what they are learning, she promotes good outcomes, lessons are appropriately sequenced, she has worked to make lessons accessible and provides good support to help their motivation. As we have indicated earlier, the reference states that the Claimant has excellent subject knowledge, as well as other positive comments about her handling of [NAME_105] behaviour and that she had developed good a relationship with the students. There is also reference to the Claimant’s contribution beyond the curriculum.

194. The reference also includes the following:

“We have been very happy to confirm that [NAME_103] has ample evidence to meet TS1-TS8 for Part One of the Teaching Standards. In order to complete her final assessment, she now needs to provide consistent evidence to support Part Two (Personal and Professional Conduct) with a focus on regard for the ethos, policies and practices of [COMPANY_26], particularly with a view to effective and appropriate communication. I would recommend that this takes place across the period of half a term.”

195. The Claimant did not reply to [NAME_141]’s email.

196. On 20 [NAME_141] advised the Claimant that he had received a reference request from [COMPANY_273] and that he wanted to respond to the request promptly and he asked the Claimant if she had any comments on the draft reference he had previously provided to her. The Claimant replied the same day and confirmed she had no comments on the draft reference. [NAME_141] therefore, reasonably in our view, understood that the reference was agreed and sent a copy to [COMPANY_273] on 21 February. The reference was also sent to [COMPANY_274] upon their request on 27 February 2023. The Claimant now complains about the contents of that reference with respect to her professional communications. The specific section in the reference is as follows:

“In order to complete her final assessment, she now needs to provide consistent evidence to support Part Two (Personal and Professional Conduct) with a focus on regard for the ethos, policies and practices of [COMPANY_26], particularly with a view to effective and appropriate communication.”

37

197. [NAME_141] says it was a true, fair and accurate account based on his assessment of the Claimant and having taken into account those concerns about her communications which we have already referenced in this judgment.

198. The Claimant has complained that the reference is the reason why she has not been able to obtain new employment since leaving the Respondent, however [NAME_141] disagrees and says that the reference is on balance positive and that it had been agreed in advance with her and that she had the opportunity to comment on it and confirm that she did not have any comments.

199. [NAME_141] tells us he received 12 requests for references for the Claimant, of which two request were subsequently retracted, and he therefore provided 10 references for her and [NAME_141] says that in his view references are not generally used as part of shortlisting but are only requested once a decision has been made to invite to candidate to interview.

200. [NAME_141] says that as well as obtaining references, schools are required to undertake an enhanced [NAME_231] and in the Claimant’s case it would reveal information to which we have already referred. [NAME_141] also tells us that schools are required to undertake online checks prior to appointment and Google and [NAME_275] searches of the Claimant record that she had previously brought Employment Tribunal proceedings against the [NAME_276] and the published judgment includes a paragraph which states:

“it has to be said, the claimant displayed a largely hostile tone, accusing respondent of amongst other things, unprofessionalism and dishonesty.”

201. We understand that to be a finding by Employment Judge Connolly in the judgment dated 3 March 2023. [NAME_141] says in his opinion these matters were more likely to have impacted on the Claimant’s chances of gaining new employment rather than the positive reference, he says he provided. This is not a matter which we need to make a finding on as it is not one of the Issues which we need to resolve in this case.

202. On 13 February 2023, after already having undertaken her last day of work at the Respondent, the Claimant sent further correspondence to [NAME_211] and referred to a tragedy in the news at that time about a 16 year old transgender pupil who had been stabbed to death, and the Claimant wrote “Can we respect the zeitgeist and prioritise pupil outcomes?”

Grievance outcome

203. On 16 [NAME_211] issued the Claimant with the grievance outcome and findings. The complaint about the Claimant’s [NAME_20] training not being signed off with respect to her communications was not upheld, and the Claimant was informed that there was ample evidence the Claimant was meeting part one of the teaching standards (essentially this was the Claimant’s teaching), however consistent evidence would still be needed to demonstrate that she was meeting part two of the standards which relates

38 to personal and professional conduct. In particular [NAME_211] informs us that this related to effective and appropriate communication.

204. It appeared that by this time the Claimant’s approach to [NAME_25] was no longer of concern to the Respondent, and we of course note that the Claimant had achieved 90% in her [NAME_261] quiz a few weeks earlier.

205. Whereas the Claimant disputed in her grievance that she had not complied with procedures with respect to the November 2022 [NAME_25] incident, this was rejected by [NAME_211] who recommended a review should be undertaken by [NAME_272] to allow the Respondent to learn from the incident.

206. [NAME_211] did not uphold the Claimant’s complaint that she had not received responses from staff, that her views had been dismissed out of hand, and that [NAME_141] provided over a culture that does not encourage constructive challenge. [NAME_211] recorded that the Claimant had said in the grievance process that no allegation was made against any other member of staff other than [NAME_141], therefore reasonably in our view [NAME_211] confined his consideration accordingly. Given that the Claimant had not provided evidence of [NAME_141] not responding to her, nor evidence of her views being dismissed, nor evidence that constructive challenge or dialogue was not encouraged, these allegations were also rejected.

207. We noted that [NAME_211] was keen to learn from the issues the Claimant had raised as he also advised that he would arrange for the emails between the Claimant and [NAME_230] to be reviewed so that the Respondent could better understand the situation and learn from them.

208. Given that the Claimant’s grievance was not upheld [NAME_211] also rejected the Claimant’s desired outcomes of signing off the [NAME_20] training as complete, reinstatement, financial compensation, and an apology from [NAME_230]. We noted that [NAME_211] indicated that the Respondent would look into whether it would be helpful to formally set expectations on responsiveness to communications received. [NAME_211] also agreed to consider the Claimant’s views on [NAME_277] in his additional role as link governor for that area. The Claimant had already sent [NAME_211] her views on 8 February which he had acknowledged already.

209. The Claimant continued to correspond with [NAME_211] on various issues following the outcome of her grievance. On 24 [NAME_211] reiterated to the Claimant that his decision was as set out in his letter of 16 February and advised her to discuss any outstanding issues about signing her induction Assessment Form with [NAME_272]. The Claimant continued to remonstrate and on 24 February she emailed to say it was not fair or reasonable to require her to do another term of NQT training to which [NAME_211] informed her on 26 February that he had provided her with the grievance response and that he considered the formal process to be closed.

210. On 27 February the Claimant wrote to say that the Respondent should consider an earlier email from her of 20 February as her appeal against the grievance outcome. On 1 March 2023 [NAME_66] wrote to the Claimant to advise that the issues the Claimant had raised had been examined during the grievance process, a way forward had been agreed with her, and that

39 the process was now closed. The Claimant’s employment had already terminated on 19 February and the Claimant had not appealed the grievance outcome within five working days as set out in the Respondent’s grievance policy.

211. The Claimant continued to email the Respondent after this time and we note that she continued to argue that [NAME_230] had made a mistake about the 500 word task and confused an assignment with an assessment, and she said “to be fair, one page might seem like an essay to a geography [NAME_20].” In her correspondence the Claimant described [NAME_230] as bellicose and [NAME_141] as petty.

212. We understand that [NAME_272] conducted the review into the handling of the [NAME_25] incident of November 2022 relating to [NAME_262]. After clarifying the Claimant’s account of the matter [NAME_272] spoke to [NAME_230], [NAME_268], [NAME_259] and [NAME_141] as well as reviewing the email messages and the Respondent’s Child Protection and [NAME_25]. It was recorded that the Claimant had not logged the [NAME_25] concern on Wellbeing Manager as she should have done and as she had been asked to do. [NAME_272] said she could understand why [NAME_230] had instructed [NAME_262] not to complete the 500 word task however she considered that he could have had a face to face conversation with the Claimant about the matter. There was also consideration of the Claimant’s view that it was not appropriate for staff at nearby supermarkets to limit the amount of painkillers they sell to the Respondent’s students, however it was recorded that [NAME_230] had simply asked them to keep an eye on the amount as a precautionary measure for their safety. In conclusion the report found that the Claimant had not followed the correct [NAME_25] procedure whereas [NAME_230] had dealt with it in the correct manner. [NAME_211] requested some clarification of the report in April 2023 which was duly provided by [NAME_272].

213. The Claimant was provided with a copy of the report on 27 November 2023 during these proceedings. The Claimant previously argued that the report she was sent was not that of [NAME_272], she has been provided with a copy from [NAME_272] and the only difference between the two relates to the redaction of personal information.

Replies to the Claimant’s emails

214. The Claimant provided a list of emails she says were not responded to during her employment by the Respondent’s staff. The Claimant alleges that this was direct race discrimination and also harassment related to race. During the hearing the Claimant did not advance her pleaded claim and instead told us that she was not accusing anyone individual of being racist or sexist, and she also told us that [NAME_222], Senior Finance Administrator / Payroll Officer was above reproach and that she did reply to emails. The Claimant’s complaint appeared to develop into one about the failure of the Respondent to have a communications policy which mandates a reply within a set period of time, such as 24 hours which the Claimant now appears to advance.

215. Nevertheless, we are able to make findings on the emails the Claimant says were not responded to. The Claimant has said that she sent

40 correspondence to a [NAME_278] which was not responded to however the Respondent says that it has no member of staff with that name. The Claimant did not pursue this in the hearing.

216. On 7 December 2022 the Claimant emailed [NAME_141] and he sent a reply on 12 December. On 9 December the Claimant sent an email about withdrawing her notice and [NAME_141] replied on 6 January 2023. On 5 January 2023 the Claimant emailed [NAME_141] about [COMPANY_6] matters form her home email address to which he responded and asked her to send it via her work address. The Claimant emailed [NAME_141] on 7 January and he replied on 9 January 2023. On 9 May 2023 the Claimant emailed [NAME_141] about her role at [COMPANY_26] and her job search, and [NAME_141] instructed [NAME_28] to reply.

217. The Claimant alleges that she sent an email to [NAME_280] on 29 April 2023 however having carried out a search it has not been able to locate a copy, and the Claimant has not provided us with one either. We have found [NAME_141] to be an honest and truthful witness throughout his evidence, whereas we have found the Claimant to be unreliable and prone to misleading in her questions to witnesses. We therefore prefer the evidence of [NAME_141], we find that the Respondent did not receive an email from the Claimant of 29 April 2023 as alleged. We also find that [NAME_141] replied to the Claimant’s emails.

218. The Claimant emailed [NAME_211] on 8 February and he responded the same day. The Claimant emailed [NAME_211] again on 20 February and he replied on 24 February. The Claimant emailed [NAME_211] on 24 February and he replied on 26 February. The Claimant copied [NAME_211] in to an email she sent to [NAME_58] at 6:13pm on 1 March 2023, and [NAME_141] sent a reply from [NAME_280] on 16 March 2023. The Claimant sent an email to [NAME_281] on 28 April 2023 and [NAME_211] replied to her on the same date. We have also found [NAME_211] to be an honest and truthful witness in his evidence, and we prefer his evidence over that of the Claimant. In any event we have already found that the Respondent did not receive an email from the Claimant on 29 April 2023. We find that [NAME_211] replied to the Claimant’s emails.

219. There was a considerable amount of correspondence from the Claimant to [NAME_10] particularly towards the start of her employment, including on 16, 19, 27 and 29 September, and 21 October which did not relate to work, which was unsolicited and unnecessary and did not require a response from [NAME_10]. This included questions about what he was called as a child, whether he liked sushi, her missing ring, her car window, a dance lesson, and whether they should be friends. [NAME_10] did not respond to these emails.

220. The Claimant says she emailed [NAME_10] on 1 January 2023 however he denies receipt and having conducted a search has been unable to find the email. We have not been provided with a copy. We have found [NAME_10] to have been an honest and truthful witness, and he has spoken candidly throughout his evidence, notwithstanding that much of it was uncomfortable for him and clearly had caused him and continued to cause him much distress. We prefer [NAME_10]’s evidence to that of the Claimant, and we find that he did not receive an email from her on 1 January 2023.

41 221. The Claimant sent [NAME_272] an email on 18 January 2023 in which she said that [NAME_10] was cross again and she did not really want to be there and asked about an appointment with someone called [NAME_55]. [NAME_272] replied the same date. [NAME_10] says in his witness statement that he was copied in on this exchange but did not reply as there was nothing in there which indicated that a response from [NAME_10] would be needed as well. Having reviewed that exchange we do not see that [NAME_10] was copied in on the emails, although it is possible that he was blind copied in and it does not appear on the version we have been provided with. In any event we find that there was nothing within the Claimant’s email which indicated or necessitated a response from [NAME_10].

222. The Claimant sent an email to [NAME_259] and [NAME_10] on 23 January to which [NAME_259] responded on 25 January. The Claimant emailed [NAME_10] twice more on 23 January 12:08pm and 12:29pm. The first email concerned two students who had problems with their tests and she asked [NAME_10] not to consider their results as representative. There was no indication that a response was desired or required.

223. As regards the email of 12:29pm, the Claimant asked if [NAME_10] had created a [NAME_282] account for a pupil. This related to an earlier email sent to her on 20 January from the Lead Cover Supervisor. [NAME_10]’s evidence was that he had already actioned this on 22 January and so he did not reply. We accept that evidence from [NAME_10] as it was not challenged by the Claimant.

224. On 30 January 2023 an email was sent to staff from an Assistant Headteacher about the entry of grades data. The Claimant emailed [NAME_10] on 31 January 2023 at 10:05am to state she had completed hers. This was not a reply to anything [NAME_10] had sent, it appeared to be for information only, there was no indication within the email of a response was needed, and [NAME_10] did not reply.

225. The Claimant sent a second email to [NAME_10] on 31 January in which she said “Hello [[NAME_10]] Can you find 10 minutes today to catch up at 3:30 please. You’ve had 40 minutes of our mentor time to yourself today so I would appreciate a quiet word. Thank you.” The evidence of [NAME_10] was that there had been a brief mentor meeting however the Claimant had not been in a receptive mood and that he chose not to respond to her email as he needed time to process the views she had shared about the staff (including himself) with the students and that this had created a sense of discomfort and made him reluctant to engage with her on email, and moreover he could not meet at 3.30pm and felt it more appropriate to address the matter in person once she had reflected on her meeting with [NAME_141] and [NAME_259] that day.

226. The Claimant emailed [NAME_10] and [NAME_259] on 1 February 2023 at 3:16pm. The email subject is “Reference questions” and within the email the Claimant said:

“Hello [[NAME_10]]

And this is how it ends up being emails: you either talk and won’t let me talk, or you leave and hide.

42 I’m not happy to be scapegoated for other people’s unprofessional behaviour and I’ve contacted the chair of governor’s about this…”

227. The Claimant went on to refer to other staff not responding to her offers of help. The Claimant’s email did not contain any questions or indication that a response was required. [NAME_10]’s evidence was that in his view the content and tone of the Claimant’s email was unprofessional, aggressive and not conducive to a productive response, therefore he says he chose not to reply.

228. The Claimant emailed [NAME_10] three times on 2 February at 8:49am, 9:53am, and 11:59am. The emails concerned parents’ evening, [NAME_236], and a list of other matters. [NAME_10] sent a response on email at 1:24pm and his evidence was that he also spoke to the Claimant in person.

229. The Claimant emailed [NAME_10] on 7 February 2023 at 3:38pm and stated “Will I see you before I go or are you trying to not even see me?” followed by a list of her contributions in which she said “My contributions, whether you keep them or not.” [NAME_10] did not respond to the Claimant’s email on the basis that he interpreted the first part of the email as a personal question and he did not wish to provide an answer to it. As regards the list of contributions, the evidence of [NAME_10] was that he did not consider that a response was required as the email did not include any questions in relation to her work but included a number of curriculum suggestions.

230. On 10 February 2023 the Claimant emailed [NAME_10] and said “I know how you hate emails so thank you for everything. Please don’t give up on [NAME_282] its clever and only needs a bit of attention. Feel free to ask me for my overbearing opinion.” The Claimant listed four other matters including that her headphones were missing and she asked [NAME_10] for the name of his game on [NAME_282] and if he could forward on an app someone had written. [NAME_10] did not reply to the email and told us that he generally does not like communicating by email and prefers communicating in person, and that he spoke to her about the email later that same day. We accept that evidence as it was not challenged by the Claimant.

231. The Claimant says that she sent a second email on 10 February to [NAME_10]. We have not been provided with a copy of it, [NAME_10] does not agree that one was sent and says he has searched for it but not found a second email. We have already indicated that we prefer the evidence of [NAME_10] over that of the Claimant. The Claimant did not put this matter to [NAME_10] during his oral evidence. We find that a second email was not received by [NAME_10] on 10 February.

232. The Claimant sent two emails on 12 February 2023 to [NAME_10], the first at 12:23 pm and the second one at 12:26 pm and these were sent on a Sunday at the start of [COMPANY_26] half term break. In the first email the Claimant said she did not expect him to pick this up on term break but someone was going to send her the brand of the henna they use and she asked [NAME_10] to send it to her personal address. In the second email the Claimant told [NAME_10] that this person had taken photos of her hands but she had left these on the Respondent’s laptop she had returned, and she asked [NAME_10] to obtain the photos from this person again. These emails were not work related, they were of a personal nature. [NAME_10] did not reply to either of them. By the time

43 [NAME_10] returned to work it was 20 February by which time the Claimant’s employment had ended the day before on 19 February and she had lost access to her work email then. [NAME_10] told us that he did not consider that it would have been appropriate to respond to these emails anyway.

233. We make a finding of fact that [NAME_10] replied to the Claimant’s emails that were work related and which necessitated a response from him, however where they were personal in nature, or where they were work related but did not require a response from [NAME_10], he did not do so.

234. On Monday 16 January 2023 the Claimant emailed [NAME_222], Senior Finance Administrator/Payroll Officer. This was a reply to an email [NAME_241] had sent her on 23 November 2022. [NAME_241] does not work on Mondays therefore she could not reply to the email straight away however she did so on Thursday 19 January. The Claimant has informed us during the hearing that [NAME_241] was beyond reproach and did reply to her emails. We therefore make a finding that [NAME_241] did not fail to reply to emails from the Claimant.

235. The Claimant alleges she sent [NAME_268] an email on 1 January 2023. [NAME_268] has searched but not found a copy. The Claimant has not provided us with a copy. We have found [NAME_268] to be honest and reliable witness and we prefer his evidence over that of the Claimant for the reasons we have already given.

Accordingly, we find that the email of 1 January 2023 was not received by the Respondent.

236. The Claimant emailed [NAME_268] on Saturday 7 January and the subject was “Cultural aspects of transgender” and the contents related to wellbeing and KCSIE. The email did not request a response. Within the email the Claimant said “I very much appreciate that you asked me to do this even if it doesn't go anywhere. This is very much the way to handle me, just that little bit of voice” and “Thank you for listening and thank you for asking.” It was clear to the Tribunal that the Claimant did not expect a reply from [NAME_268], and that the most she expected was that he would read her email. In any event [NAME_268] says in his witness statement that he acknowledged the email in person the following week commencing 9 February 2023 and we accept that evidence. We make a finding with [NAME_268] did not fail to reply to emails from the Claimant.

237. On 16 November 2022 the Claimant emailed [NAME_230] with feedback the “[NAME_283]” trip to which he provided a response on 18 November 2022. We make a finding with [NAME_230] did not fail to reply to emails from the Claimant.

238. The Claimant says that she sent [NAME_237] an email on 5 September 2022. As part of her role [NAME_237] monitors the [NAME_284] and she says she has conducted a search to establish if the Claimant sent her or the [NAME_235] an email on that date but none has been identified although she says they exchanged a number of emails between 7 September and 4 November 2022 and these appeared in the hearing bundle which we have seen. We do not find that the Respondent received an email from the Claimant on 5 September. We make a finding that [NAME_237] did not fail to reply to emails from the Claimant.

44 Law

Direct discrimination

239. Section 13(1) Equality Act 2010, together with sections 9 and 11 of that Act, provide that direct discrimination takes place where an employer treats an employee less favourably because of race or sex than it treats (or would treat) others. Race includes national and ethnic origins. Under s. 23(1), when a comparison is made there must be no material difference between the circumstances relating to each case. A comparison may be made with an actual comparator, or with how a hypothetical comparator would have been treated.

240. Given that a tribunal may take into account a wide range of factors including circumstantial evidence, there may be cases where there is someone who, whilst materially different to a claimant, may be of assistance as an evidential comparator. They may, depending upon the circumstances and in conjunction with other material, justify a tribunal drawing an inference that a claimant was treated less favourably than he or she would have been treated.

241. Section 39 of that Act provides that an employer must not discriminate against its employee by dismissing them or subjecting them to any other detriment.

242. It is often appropriate to first consider whether a claimant has in fact received less favourable treatment than an appropriate comparator, and then consider whether this less favourable treatment was because of the protected characteristic, in this case that is race. In some cases, particularly if there is only a hypothetical comparator relied upon, it may be appropriate to first consider the reason why the claimant was treated as they were – [NAME_285] v [NAME_286] of the [NAME_4] [2003] IRLR 285 (paragraph 8).

243. The reason for decisions or treatment can often be for more than one reason. Provided that the protected characteristic (here race and sex), had a significant influence on the outcome, then discrimination will be made out – per Lord Nicholls in Nagarajan v London Regional Transport [1999] IRLR 572. The Tribunal may need to consider the mental processes of the alleged discriminator, and whereas this is often referred to as motivation, it is not to be confused with motive as this is not a relevant consideration. It is possible for an employer to discriminate unlawfully even with a benign motive – Amnesty International v Ahmed UKEAT/0447/08.

244. Very little discrimination today is overt or deliberate, and those accused of discrimination are usually unlikely to accept that they have done so, and possibly will be unlikely to recognise it in themselves. In cases of direct discrimination (or victimisation), an examination of the “reason why” someone was treated as they were should not be reduced to a simple “but for” question. It is therefore not appropriate to ask but for the protected characteristic (here it is race and sex) would the Claimant have been treated better? Rather we must conduct a more rigorous inquiry into the mental processes of the Respondent to establish the underlying core reason for the treatment. This might be easier in cases where there is an overt or obvious

45 reason for the treatment, however in other cases are more detailed analysis of the facts will be necessary. As per [NAME_287] LJ in [NAME_288] v University of Oxford and another [2001] ICR 847:

“Very little direct discrimination is today overt or even deliberate. [NAME_330] tell tribunals and courts to look for, in order to give effect to the legislation, are indicators from a time before or after the particular decision which may demonstrate that an ostensibly fair−minded decision was, or equally was not, affected by racial bias.” (paragraph 11).

245. In Earl Shilton Town Council v Miller [2023] IRLR 532 the court provided guidance on the approach to the reason why analysis in discrimination claims. Here HHJ Tayler noted that when considering whether treatment was due to a protected characteristic the tribunal spends much of its time considering the mental processes of the alleged discriminator in order to ascertain the reason why someone was treated as they were. However, the court held that there are at least two types of cases where it is unnecessary to consider the mental processes of the alleged discriminator, the first is where the reason was obvious, and the second is where a criterion is used which corresponds exactly with the protected characteristic. The court also concluded that a “good” motive will not prevent discrimination from having occurred, and this is of course consistent in [NAME_291] to which we have already referred.

246. In [NAME_292] v [NAME_293] of [COMPANY_6] [1981] IRLR 487 the court noted the special nature of discrimination proceedings and that the person complaining of discrimination may face great difficulties when it comes to proof. The court held that where it may be appropriate to take into account evidence of hostility before and after the event (or act complained of) where it is logically probative of a relevant fact.

247. The term “detriment” should be given its broad ordinary meaning, and a detriment will exist if a ‘a detriment exists if a reasonable worker would or might take the view that the [treatment] was in all the circumstances to his detriment – per [NAME_294] LJ in Ministry of Defence v Jeremiah [1980] QB 87.

Harassment

248. Section 40 provides that an employer must not harass an employee. Section 26 provides that a person (A) harasses another (B) if it engages in unwanted conduct related to a relevant protected characteristic, and the conduct has the purpose or effect of (i) violating B's dignity, or (ii) creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for B. In deciding whether conduct has the effect referred to into account must be taken of the perception of B; the other circumstances of the case; and whether it is reasonable for the conduct to have that effect. This analysis is not required where the conduct had the purpose of violating B’s dignity or creating the proscribed environment.

249. In Weeks v [COMPANY_295] of Further Education UKEAT/0630/11 it was held that a tribunal must be sensitive to all the circumstances; the fact that unwanted conduct was not itself directed at the Claimant is a relevant consideration but it does not prevent that conduct being harassment.

46

250. As to whether the conduct had the requisite effect, there are both subjective considerations – the Claimant’s perception of the impact on him – but also objective considerations including whether it was reasonable for it to have the effect on the particular claimant, the purpose of the remark, and all the surrounding context - Richmond Pharmacology Ltd v Dhaliwal [2009] ICR 724. Conduct which is trivial or transitory is unlikely to be sufficient.

251. In HM Land Registry v Grant [2011] EWCA Civ 769 it was held:

“Tribunals must not cheapen the significance of these words. They are an important control to prevent trivial acts causing minor upsets being caught by the concept of harassment.” (paragraph 47)

252. Section 212 of the Act provides that a detriment does not include harassment. Accordingly it is not possible for impugned treatment to amount to both direct discrimination (or victimisation) and harassment at the same time.

Liability for discrimination

253. Section 109 of the Act provides that anything done by a person (A) in the course of A's employment must be treated as also done by the employer. In proceedings against A's employer (B) in respect of anything alleged to have been done by A in the course of A's employment, it is a defence for B to show that B took all reasonable steps to prevent A from doing that thing, or from doing anything of that description.

Burden of proof

254. Section 136 of the Equality Act 2010 provides that if there are facts from which the court could decide, in the absence of any other explanation, that a person (A) contravened the provision concerned, the court must hold that the contravention occurred. However this does not apply if A shows that A did not contravene the provision.

255. The burden of proof provisions require careful attention where there is room for doubt as to the facts necessary to establish discrimination, but have nothing to offer where the tribunal is in a position to make positive findings on the evidence one way or another - Hewage v Grampian Health Board [2012] IRLR 870.

256. Guidance on the application of the burden of proof in discrimination complaints was provided in Igen Ltd v Wong [2005] IRLR 258:

“(11) To discharge that burden it is necessary for the respondent to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that the treatment was in no sense whatsoever on the grounds of [the protected characteristic], since no discrimination whatsoever is compatible with the Burden of Proof Directive.

(12) That requires a tribunal to assess not merely whether the respondent has proved an explanation for the facts from which such inferences can be drawn, but further that it is adequate to discharge the burden of proof on the

47 balance of probabilities that [the protected characteristic] was not a ground for the treatment in question.

(13) Since the facts necessary to prove an explanation would normally be in the possession of the respondent, a tribunal would normally expect cogent evidence to discharge that burden of proof....”

257. This judgment refers to the law under the previous Sex Discrimination Act 1975 prior to the Equality Act 2010, however the decision of the Court of Appeal in Efobi v Royal Mail Group Ltd [2019] ICR 750 confirms this guidance also applies under the Equality Act 2010.

258. It is not sufficient for a claimant to merely to prove facts from which the tribunal could conclude that the Respondent “could have” committed an unlawful act of discrimination. Rather a claimant must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. As was held in Madarassy v Nomura International Plc [2007] ICR 867:

259. “The bare facts of a difference in status and a difference in treatment only indicate a possibility of discrimination. They are not, without more, sufficient material from which a tribunal “could conclude” that, on the balance of probabilities, the respondent had committed an unlawful act of discrimination.” (paragraph 56)

260. The court in Madarassy indicated that at the first stage the tribunal would need to consider all the evidence relevant to the discrimination complaint such as evidence as to whether the act complained of occurred at all; evidence as to the actual comparators relied on by the complainant to prove less favourable treatment; evidence as to whether the comparisons being made by the complainant were of like with like; and available evidence of the reasons for the differential treatment. The absence of an adequate explanation for differential treatment of the complainant is not relevant to whether there is a prima facie case of discrimination by the Respondent. The absence of an adequate explanation only becomes relevant if a prima facie case is proved by the complainant.

261. At the first stage the tribunal should take into account all of the relevant evidence from both sides and usually disregard any explanation provided the Respondent. The consideration of the tribunal then moves to the second stage whereby the burden is on the Respondent to prove that it has not committed an act of unlawful discrimination. The Respondent may prove this by an adequate non-discriminatory explanation of the treatment of the complainant. If it does not, the tribunal must uphold the discrimination claim.

262. As regards the “something more” needed to shift the burden of proof onto a Respondent, this will depend upon the facts of each case but it may include evidence of stereotyping, statistical evidence, lack of transparency or inadequate disclosure, or inconsistent explanations. However, mere unreasonable treatment by an employer “casts no light whatsoever” as to the question of whether an employee has been treated unfavourably - Strathclyde Regional Council v Zafar [1998] IRLR 36. This has also been followed by the Employment Appeal Tribunal in [COMPANY_296] and others v Bahl [2003] IRLR 640 where it was held that mere unreasonableness is not enough as it tells us nothing about the grounds for acting in that way.

48

263. In [NAME_297] v [NAME_298] and others [2006] IRLR 748 the EAT provided helpful guidance on the application of the burden of proof, and in particular the potential for a tribunal to move direct to the second stage where the evidence suggests that the employer had discriminated against the claimant:

[redacted] whether or not they can properly and fairly infer race discrimination. If they are satisfied that the reason given by the employer is a genuine one and does not disclose either conscious or unconscious racial discrimination, then that is the end of the matter. It is not improper for a tribunal to say, in effect, “there is a nice question as to whether or not the burden has shifted, but we are satisfied here that, even if it has, the employer has given a fully adequate explanation as to why he behaved as he did and it has nothing to do with race”.

76. Whilst, as we have emphasised, it will usually be desirable for a tribunal to go through the two stages suggested in Igen, it is not necessarily an error of law to fail to do so. There is no purpose in compelling tribunals in every case to go through each stage. They are not answering an examination question, and nor should the purpose of the law be to set hurdles designed to trip them up. The reason for the two-stage approach is that there may be circumstances where it would be to the detriment of the employee if there were a prima facie case and no burden was placed on the employer, because they may be imposing a burden on the employee which he cannot fairly be expected to have discharged and which should evidentially have shifted to the employer. But where the tribunal has effectively acted at least on the assumption that the burden may have shifted, and has considered the explanation put forward by the employer, then there is no prejudice to the employee whatsoever.

77. Indeed, it is important to emphasise that it is not the employee who will be disadvantaged if the tribunal focuses only on the second stage. Rather the risk is to an employer who may be found not to have discharged a burden which the tribunal ought not to have placed on him in the first place. That is something which tribunals will have to bear in mind if they miss out the first stage. Moreover, if the employer’s evidence strongly suggests that he was in fact discriminating on grounds of race, that evidence could surely be relied on by the tribunal to reach a finding of discrimination even if the prima facie case had not been established. The tribunal cannot ignore damning evidence from the employer as to the explanation for his conduct simply because the employee has not raised a sufficiently strong case at the first stage. That would be to let form rule over substance.”

Time limits

264. Section 123 Equality Act 2010 provides that proceedings on a complaint may not be brought after the end of (a) the period of 3 months starting with the date of the act to which the complaint relates, or (b) such other period as the employment tribunal thinks just and equitable. Section 123(3) provides that conduct extending over a period is to be treated as done at the end of the period.

49 265. The normal time limit must be adjusted to take into account the early conciliation process and any extensions provided for in section 140B.

266. In Hendricks v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [2002] EWCA Civ 1686, the Court of Appeal stated that the test to determine whether a complaint was part of an act extending over a period was whether there was an ongoing situation or a continuing state of affairs in which the claimant was treated less favourably. In Hale v Brighton and Sussex University Hospitals NHS Trust UKEAT/0342/17 it was found that the respondent’s decision to instigate disciplinary proceedings against the claimant created a state of affairs that continued until the conclusion of the disciplinary process.

267. When determining if there was a continuing state of affairs the tribunal will consider what the acts were, the context and who was involved. A tribunal may decide that some acts form part of a continuing act, while others remain unconnected - Lyfar v Brighton and Sussex University Hospitals Trust [2006] EWCA Civ 1548.

268. It is for the claimant to show that it would be just and equitable to extend time - [COMPANY_299] (t/a Leisure Link) v Robertson [2003] EWCA Civ 576.

269. The court in British Coal Corporation v Keeble [1997] IRLR 36 provided guidance to tribunals when considering whether to exercise its discretion to extend time on this just and equitable basis. This will include consideration of the length of and reasons for the delay, but might include the extent to which the cogency of the evidence is likely to be affected by the delay; the extent to which the party sued had co-operated with any requests for information; the promptness with which the claimant acted once they knew of the possibility of taking action; and the steps taken by the claimant to obtain appropriate professional advice once they knew of the possibility of taking action.

270. The court in Adedeji v University Hospitals Birmingham NHS Foundation Trust [2021] EWCA Civ 23 has confirmed that the correct approach is for the tribunal to assess all the factors in the particular case which it considers relevant to whether it is just and equitable to extend time. The court advised against using a mechanistic approach and using the examples in Keeble as some sort of checklist.

271. In [NAME_146] v The Secretary of State for Health and Social Care [2024] IRLR 275 the Employment Appeal Tribunal reiterated the long established principle that time limits in an employment law context are relatively short and should be complied with, however the tribunal has a wide discretion to extend time on just and equitable grounds.

Submissions

272. The Respondent provided written submissions of 17 pages which in summary urge us to treat the Claimant’s evidence with caution, it says that the Claimant has a propensity to make serious and potentially damaging allegations against individuals without any credible evidence, and despite my repeated guidance she failed to put her allegations to the Respondent’s

50 witnesses, and she was unable or unwilling to provide any rational basis for her assertions that the alleged treatment was in any way linked to her race or sex.

273. The Respondent says that its witnesses gave evidence in a fair, reasonable and moderate manner with high levels of professionalism and it asks us to contrast this with the manner in which the Claimant conducted herself during these proceedings which it says is stark and the Respondent invites us to reflect upon how these differences in approach and attitude were likely to have shown themselves within the workplace.

274. The Respondent describes the Claimant’s evidence as unreliable and self-serving and on occasions wholly incredible, by way of example the interpretation of the text messages between herself and [NAME_10]. The Respondent reminds us that within the Claimant’s evidence she said she had never experienced any person associated with [COMPANY_26] making any overtly racist or even questionable comment regarding her or anyone else’s race and that she had not experienced any of her colleagues been treated in a way that caused her concern. The Respondent argues that there is no background evidence from which any adverse inferences might conceivably be drawn and that the Claimant made it clear at the outset of her cross examination that she was not alleging that her [NAME_108] colleagues individually held views or acted in a way that was racist or sexist despite the fact that her allegations relate directly to their actions.

275. As regards Issue 7.1 the Respondent says that [NAME_242] did respond to the Claimant’s offers of help when they had a discussion, there was no need to reply to her email, and likewise there was no need for [NAME_240] to reply either. The Respondent says the Claimant knew what she had to do if she wished to become involved and as such the allegation fails at the first hurdle, and there is no evidence that her race was a material influence for the direct discrimination claim, nor was the conduct related to race for the harassment claim. The Respondent says that the burden of proof has not shifted.

276. As regards Issue 7.2, the Respondent says that the Claimant’s emails were in fact responded to either by email or followed up with a verbal discussion and an other occasions it can be seen that no response was requested or required and that the number of emails not responded to was in fact very small. The Respondent says for those non replies a good and rational and non-discriminatory reason has been put forward. The Respondent says that the Claimant had a good relationship with [NAME_237] who was a colleague in a non-teaching role and who tried to assist and support the Claimant. Likewise the Respondent says [NAME_222] who worked in payroll was described by the Claimant as beyond reproach therefore it is extraordinary that the Claimant should choose to accuse them of discrimination. The Respondent says there is zero evidence that there was any link between the alleged treatment and the Claimant’s race, noting that the Claimant never put to any of the witnesses that it was her race which was a causal factor, and further [NAME_237] had never met the Claimant and did not know her Indo-Canadian background. The Respondent says that the burden of proof has not shifted.

51 277. As regards Issue 7.3, the Respondent says there was one misspelling of the Claimant’s name, it was not persistent, and the misspelling was of an English name the Claimant adopted by marriage. The Respondent points out the change in the Claimant’s approach to this issue where she said the Respondent should have a policy of cutting and pasting names rather than typing them, and it says it does not give rise to a claim for direct discrimination or harassment, and the complaint is fatally flawed. The Respondent reminds us that it was the Claimant who had consistently misspelled [NAME_230]’s surname.

278. As regards Issues 7.4 and 7.5, the Respondent says that there was a [NAME_25] concern which arose out of the Claimant not inputting a concern onto Wellbeing Manager, it was a key [NAME_25] issue that troubled [NAME_141] and was wholly supported by contemporaneous evidence. As regards the communication concerns, the Respondent says that [NAME_141]’s evidence on this was clear, it was unchallenged, and that it was clear that the Claimant’s communications were on any analysis concerning and the Claimant even recorded in the ECT form that she recognised that from the outside her communications with certain staff looked unprofessional. The Respondent says that the assessments of the Claimant were otherwise positive and these were learning and development points for her.

279. The Respondent says that whereas the [NAME_25] concern was resolved, the concern about some of the Claimant’s communications remained and it asks us to consider the Claimant’s communication style demonstrated during the tribunal process. The Respondent reminds us that the Claimant never put to the witnesses that this was due to her race, the true position was absolutely clear from the documents and witness evidence and the claim is doomed to fail.

280. As regards Issues 7.6 and 14.2 the Respondent says that the Claimant had requested an agreed reference, one was produced, it was sent to the Claimant but she did not reply, when a request came in and she was again asked for comment to which she said she did not have any comments and the only interpretation is that she agreed it and as such there was no less favourable treatment and the wording was accurate, it was positive overall with just one development point.

281. As regards Issues 7.7 and 14.3 the Respondent says that all staff were required to log [NAME_25] concerns, and there was nothing particular to the Claimant and it is difficult to see how this could possibly amount to an allegation of discrimination where she is asked to comply with [COMPANY_6] procedures based upon KCSIE principles for the safety and welfare of children and it had nothing to do with the Claimant’s race.

282. As regards Issue 7.8 the Respondent says that [NAME_243] did not decline to offer the Claimant lessons but simply had not been signposted to speak to her prior to her employment and as such the complaint ought to have been withdrawn. The Respondent refers to [NAME_141]’s evidence that the Claimant was recruited with an unenviable DBS certificate, he wished her to be focused on her teaching and did not which her to be distracted by other responsibilities and this is his approach to all new [NAME_233], and further the circumstances of the two comparators relied upon were very different.

52 The Respondent says that [NAME_141]’s evidence on this was unchallenged by the Claimant, she did not suggest his action in not highlighting for [NAME_204] was tainted by discrimination, his account is entirely rational, and the Respondent was liaising with her about delivering such activities in the second term which did not take place due to her resignation.

283. With respect to Issue 14.1 the Respondent says that the allegation of flirtation is wholly unsubstantiated and without merit, it says it is clear from the documents that it was the Claimant who was making all the advances with respect to meeting and socialising with [NAME_10] who politely declined or did not respond, and asked her not to use his personal number save in emergencies but she continued to do so. The Respondent says that the content and tone of the Claimant’s communications were troubling and caused [NAME_10] to become increasingly anxious in turn causing [NAME_259] to be concerned for his mental state. The Respondent says that the Claimant could not point to any communication alleged to be flirtation, and that her alleged rejection of the advances was nothing of the sort and as such there can be no question of [NAME_10] having taken avoidance action against her.

284. We received written submissions from the Claimant of 29 pages. Much of the Claimant’s submissions either contain new evidence from the Claimant or relate to issues which were not part of the claim we heard. Moreover, the Claimant continued to refer to some matters which [ADDRESS] had found to be threats, harassment and intimidation by the Claimant towards the Respondent, its witnesses and also its lawyers. We are not going to deal with those matters. Our focus will be on the claims which the Claimant has brought. It is regrettable that the Claimant has, despite the clarity of [ADDRESS]’s judgment and the reminders from me, continued to repeat such matters one further time in her closing submissions.

285. The Claimant also alleges throughout her submissions that the Respondent’s witnesses have lied under oath and perverted the course of justice, and that documents have been withheld, altered and fabricated. We also noted that the Claimant said that “[NAME_85] was only one of two witnesses that didn’t lie to the Tribunal, but has admitted law breaking.” We make it clear that there was no such admission by [NAME_211] about breaking the law during his evidence and this was another misrepresentation on the part of the Claimant.

286. In her closing submissions the Claimant tells us that with respect to Issue 7.1 [NAME_240] confirmed that she did not find it necessary to respond to the Claimant, she disputes ever having attended a rehearsal or that she agreed to email [NAME_242], rather she suggests he was to email her.

287. With respect to Issue 7.2 the Claimant disputes that she received in person replies to her emails and she accuses the Respondent’s witnesses of giving unreliable testimony and having reasons to be loyal to [NAME_141]. The Claimant continued to assert that the Respondent should have a communications policy which mandates a reply to correspondence within 24 hours.

288. With respect to issue 7.3 the Claimant stated “I don’t have a problem with people making mistakes spelling my name, this isn’t about superficial

53 “problems” that should have been better managed. I have a problem when that misspelling affects how I do my job, particularly for 6 weeks. I didn’t even have the name of the person that examinations email, and struggled to find a mistake.” The Claimant said that her Anglicised Norman French surname does not follow the phonetics of modern English, and the spelling of her surname with an ”A” was an over generalisation of Hindi words such as Himalayas.

289. The Claimant said this was still a management issue as [NAME_141] “hired a woman that genuinely doesn’t understand copy and paste, but rather fail to set a communication policy that mandates copying and pasting email specifically, updating names such as Interchange which has changed to [NAME_236], and using precise words such as email login rather than username. This is particularly necessary for a [COMPANY_6] that has 50% ethnic minorities.”

290. As to Issue 7.4 the Claimant said that [NAME_230] didn’t just make a reading comprehension mistake, he took her to task for his mistake enough to make her quit her job and “We have no evidence that [NAME_220] is racist, just a mistake, but [NAME_16] attributing the failure in communication to Claimant is unfair and probably racist.” The Claimant continued to make reference to why she had not updated Wellbeing Manager at the time, and she said it was unfair to regard this as a [NAME_25] issue. The majority of the Claimant’s submissions on this did not address the legal issue to be decided and instead sought to again go over her narrative of the events but without reference to the legal issue for us to decide. The thrust of the Claimant’s submission was that the treatment of her was unfair or unreasonable, rather than discriminatory.

291. Regarding Issue 7.5 the Claimant said she had made 337 applications, attended 65 interviews, travelled 2557.4 miles and only had “two confirmations of dates back” indicates that [NAME_141] is either sharing some of a “false record, or just providing an otherwise bad reference verbally or written.”

292. With respect to Issue 7.8 the Claimant said that she believed [NAME_243]’s testimony and that the exclusion of her from [NAME_204] was by the hand of [NAME_141], and/or [NAME_10], and/or [NAME_259]. The Claimant provided us with submissions on the differences between karate and Thai boxing and argued that karate should have been offered due to what she said were the benefits of it and that the decision had been to support [NAME_258] who was white and male. The Claimant said “I remind the Tribunal that I’m not stating everyone that excluded me was racist and sexist; I am claiming that one racist person failing to regulate or correct his own bias, other’s bias, is enough to create an atmosphere of racist oppression.”

293. With respect to Issue 14.1 and the allegation of flirtation, the Claimant alleged that [NAME_10] had been non-responsive and failed to train the Claimant, and other such matters. The Claimant still did not direct us to how this alleged flirtation manifested itself. We noted that in her submissions rather than summarising what the alleged flirtation from [NAME_10] is said to be, the Claimant instead sought to justify her own actions as “attempting to share my friends group with him and diffuse his attentions among other people.”

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294. The Claimant then went on to suggest that [NAME_259] had put the Claimant alongside [NAME_10] and sought to justify “her decision to facilitate (initiate? Agree to?) the meet cute between Claimant and my line manager by initiating or agreeing to us sharing classrooms, unlike the rest of [COMPANY_26], and sharing a form group. It was like living together and having 30 children, and desperately needing a divorce.”

295. As to Issue 14.2 the Claimant suggested that allegations she had been unprofessional were out of time, weak and non-compliant with [NAME_328] within KCSIE and was not evidenced so should not be shared with prospective employers and not on her training forms.

296. As to Issue 14.3 the Claimant said she had been following instructions from [NAME_259] and that not putting concerns about [NAME_230] in writing was correct and that there was not a way of registering concern for multiple students on Wellbeing Manager. The Claimant referred us to KCSIE and said that her actions even as described by the Respondent’s witnesses did not meet the harm threshold.

297. The Claimant also told us that the burden of proof had shifted as she said that the Respondent had submitted an affirmative defence and had attempted to provide alternative explanations of mostly in person responses. The Claimant says that the Respondent had fully refused a Subject Access Data Request and had refused equalities monitoring data under Freedom of Information requests, and whereas it is not expressed explicitly she appears to suggest that we ought to draw some form of negative inference from this.

Conclusions and analysis

298. We will deal with each of the Issues in turn.

Issue 7.1 The entire Drama Department, including individuals known as [NAME_190], not responding to her offers to help with the Drama Department at the outset of her employment;

299. [NAME_241] did not send a reply to the Claimant’s email of 6 September 2022. We accepted [NAME_241]’ evidence that she did not consider that a response was required with respect to sex education given that it was the start of term, the lessons had already been assigned some time earlier, and she assumed that the Claimant was talking about the future. This was an entirely plausible assumption from [NAME_241] and we believed her evidence.

300. As regards the offer of helping with the production of [NAME_239], again this was written in such [NAME_133] terms with the Claimant explaining that she was looking forward to seeing the show, she may like to find time to help with it, and that she loves dancing. [NAME_241] explained to us that she assumed that the Claimant would be in touch again with how she might be able to help. We of course took into consideration that [NAME_241] could have sent a reply to acknowledge the Claimant’s email, however we were also mindful that the Claimant’s email did not request a reply nor did it suggest that a reply was expected.

55 301. We also took into consideration that some weeks later on 21 [NAME_242] informed [NAME_241] about his conversation with the Claimant so she was under the impression that the Claimant would be in touch or attend a rehearsal. We accepted [NAME_241]’ evidence which we found to be honest and reliable and consistent.

302. With respect to the allegations against [NAME_241], the Claimant has not established facts from which we could conclude that discrimination had taken place. A prima facie case of discrimination has not been established and following the guidance in Hewage and in [NAME_297], we are able to make a positive finding that the reason for the treated complained of was not discriminatory. We have therefore not found it necessary to apply the burden of proof. However if we are wrong on that, and even if the burden of proof has shifted, we were satisfied with the non-discriminatory explanation from [NAME_241] for reasons in not responding to the Claimant on those occasions.

303. With respect to [NAME_242], the Claimant had already engaged with him in person and he had already explained to her how she could get involved and he assumed that the email was sent as a summary of the conversation and that she would be in touch in future. This was also sent on the last day before half term at 4:15pm which was outside of [COMPANY_6] hours and with only three weeks left before the production of [NAME_239].

304. With respect to the allegations against [NAME_242], the Claimant has again not established facts from which we could conclude that discrimination had taken place, and a prima facie case of discrimination has not been established. We have therefore not found it necessary to apply the burden of proof to this Issue. However if we are wrong on that, and the burden has shifted to the Respondent to provide a non-discriminatory explanation, we find that it has done so. [NAME_242] reasonably assumed that the Claimant would be in touch with him and she had been invited to attend the rehearsals. We found that this was an entirely plausible explanation for not responding to the Claimant.

305. We make it clear for the avoidance of any doubt that we find that the Claimant’s race played no part whatsoever in the way in which [NAME_241] and [NAME_242] behaved and there was no less favourable treatment of the Claimant. For these reasons the complaint of direct discrimination fails and is dismissed.

306. With respect to harassment related to race, we did not find that there was any unwanted conduct on the part of [NAME_241] or [NAME_242]. The Claimant’s email to [NAME_300] simply expressed an interest and a desire to be kept in mind if she could help in future. The failure to reply to that [NAME_133] email by [NAME_241] was not in our view unwanted conduct. Similarly with respect to [NAME_242], the Claimant had a discussion with him in person, there was no need to respond to her email of 21 October, and the Claimant knew she was welcome to attend rehearsals and to take part in the limited time before the production. This was also not unwanted conduct, therefore the harassment complaint fails as [NAME_29] argues “at the first hurdle.”

56 307. However, if we are wrong on that, and this failure to respond to the emails of 6 September and 21 October did amount to unwanted conduct, we have gone on to consider whether this was related to race. We find that it was not. There was no evidence presented to us which gave any indication whatsoever that not replying to those two emails was in some way related to the Claimant’s race, not least because the Claimant had a very positive and receptive discussion with [NAME_242] on 20 or 21 October 2022.

308. We do not need to go on and to look at whether the conduct had the proscribed purpose or effect because we did not find any connection whatsoever to the Claimant’s race. It appeared to the Tribunal that the Claimant was nursing a wholly unjustified sense of grievance.

309. In addition we record that the Claimant failed to put this complaint to either [NAME_241] or [NAME_242], she did not accuse them of direct race discrimination or harassment when they gave evidence, and her own witness statement is silent on this matter.

310. The complaints of direct discrimination and harassment related to race were totally without merit and we dismiss them.

Issue 7.2 Failure of [NAME_190] of the Drama Department, the [NAME_20] [NAME_191], the Head of Department [NAME_10], the Head of [NAME_140] [NAME_192], the [NAME_195] and [NAME_25] [NAME_197] on multiple occasions not replying to her emails;

311. We have already addressed the response from [NAME_241] and [NAME_242] with respect to Issue 7.1 which is not repeated here.

312. We have spent a considerable amount of time in this judgment going over each of the emails which the Claimant says were not responded to and we have found that the factual premise of the allegation has not been made out as many of the emails had as a fact been responded to, either by an email which already appeared in the hearing bundle, or she received a response in person, or the Claimant’s alleged email had not been received by the Respondent.

313. There were a very small number of emails which were not responded to by [NAME_10] and our focus will be on those emails.

314. With respect to the Claimant’s email of 18 January 2023 to [NAME_272] in which she said that [NAME_10] was cross, there was nothing contained therein which indicated that a response from [NAME_10] was expected or needed. Likewise the Claimant’s email to [NAME_10] of 23 January 2023 at 12:08pm was an update about [NAME_105] tests, and it did not ask for a reply nor would it appear that one was needed.

315. The Claimant’s email to [NAME_10] of Monday 23 January at 12:29pm asked him if he had created a [NAME_282] account for a pupil. The Claimant’s email was sent following an email she had received on Friday 20 October, and by the time the Claimant had sent her email on the [NAME_10] had already created the account over the weekend. [NAME_10] could have replied to the Claimant confirming he had already created the account, it

57 was clear the underlying request had already been resolved. It was clear to the Tribunal that this lack of response had nothing whatsoever to do with the Claimant’s race.

316. [NAME_10] did not respond to the Claimant’s email of 31 January 2023 at 10:05am where she informed him she had completed her entry of the grades data. Nothing contained therein required a response from [NAME_10].

317. [NAME_10] did not respond to the Claimant’s second email of 31 January 2023 where she asked to meet at 3:30pm for ten minutes. The Claimant’s email to [NAME_10] was terse and in a disrespectful tone, and [NAME_10] was feeling uncomfortable engaging with the Claimant due to the manner in which she was conducting herself, in particular because she had shared with the students her views on [NAME_10] and other teaching colleagues. The Claimant’s behaviour was deteriorating, and we accepted that [NAME_10] would not wish to engage with her at that precise time for that reason and that he intended to engage with her once she had spoken to [NAME_141] and [NAME_259] later that day. It was again clear to the Tribunal that this lack of response had nothing whatsoever to do with the Claimant’s race.

318. [NAME_10] did not respond to the Claimant’s email to him and [NAME_259] of 1 February 2023 and he says that it was because the email was unprofessional, aggressive and not conducive to a productive response. We accept that [NAME_10] found that email to be as he has described and that was the reason he chose not to respond at that time. The Claimant was clearly agitated and angry in her email and we accept that [NAME_10] did not wish to engage with her at that time. We again repeat that it was clear to the Tribunal that this lack of response had nothing whatsoever to do with the Claimant’s race.

319. [NAME_10] did not respond to the Claimant’s email of 7 February asking whether she would see him before she left her role and setting out a list of her contributions. We accept that [NAME_10] interpreted the first part of the email as a personal question and that he did not wish to provide an answer to it not least because of the manner in which the Claimant was conducting herself at that time. As regards the second part, we accept that [NAME_10] interpreted this as a list of curriculum suggestions and did not consider that a response was required. We again record that it was clear to the Tribunal that this lack of response had nothing whatsoever to do with the Claimant’s race.

320. As regards the Claimant’s emails of Sunday 12 February 2023, these were sent during the half term break after the Claimant had finished her last day at work and they were personal in nature relating to henna and photographs of her hands. Within the first email the Claimant herself said she did not expect [NAME_10] to pick up her email. By the time [NAME_10] returned to work on 20 February the Claimant’s employment had ended. We accept that [NAME_10] did not wish to respond to the Claimant about her personal requests and further he considered she would not receive a reply even if he sent it upon his return to work as she would lose access to her work email.

321. The Claimant has not in our view established facts from which we could conclude that discrimination had taken place. Much of that correspondence did not require a response or was not work related. We do not consider that the Claimant has established a prima facie case of discrimination. As a

58 result we have not deemed it necessary to apply the burden of proof to this complaint. That said, if we are wrong on that and if the burden has shifted to the Respondent, we find that the Respondent has discharged that burden and provided a non-discriminatory explanation for the treatment which we believed.

322. [NAME_10] has provided an entirely plausible and non-discriminatory explanation for not responding to the Claimant’s emails and we accept his explanations (identified above) as being the true reasons for not responding to the Claimant on those occasions identified. The Claimant’s race had absolutely nothing whatsoever to do with how [NAME_10] responded (or why he did not respond) to her emails, and further the Claimant did not even put to [NAME_10] in his evidence that the reason for not responding was due to her race. We dismiss the direct discrimination complaint.

323. As regards harassment, we do not find that there was any unwanted conduct. Most of the unanswered emails were either non-work related or did not require a response. [NAME_10] did not respond to all the Claimant’s emails he spoke to her in person at work and sought to minimise his engagement with the Claimant given the manner in which she was behaving at that time, including discussing [NAME_10] with students which was unprofessional of her. Minimising contact with the Claimant in such circumstances does not in our view amount to unwanted conduct.

324. If we are wrong on that, and the failure to respond to the Claimant’s emails did amount to unwanted conduct, the harassment complaint would in any event fail as the failure to respond was not related to the Claimant’s race in any way at all. The Claimant did not put to [NAME_10] or any of the witnesses that her race was the reason for not responding, any in any event there are no grounds from which we could possibly draw an inference of that nature.

325. We therefore dismiss the complaint of harassment related to race.

Issue 7.3 Persistent mistakes in the spelling of her name by the Examination Department in the first half term of her period of employment with the Respondent;

326. The factual premise of this allegation has not been established. There were no persistent mistakes in spelling the Claimant’s surname. There was one incident whereby [NAME_237] made a typing error when creating an account for the Claimant. This took place on 7 September 2023.

327. We have not found it necessary to apply the statutory burden of proof as this was nothing more than a simple typing error, it had nothing whatsoever to do with the Claimant’s race. The Claimant’s surname is in any event an English name and not Indo-Canadian, therefore the misspelling of that name had nothing whatsoever to do with the Claimant’s race.

328. We record that the Claimant did not even advance this as a complaint of direct discrimination or harassment related to race before us, instead seeking to argue that the Respondent ought to have a policy mandating copying and pasting of names. That is a different matter altogether, it is not the complaint which the Claimant brought to the Tribunal, and it was clear

59 to us that even the Claimant did not consider that it was an act of direct discrimination or harassment.

329. The complaint was totally without any merit and we dismiss it.

Issue 7.4 [NAME_20] [NAME_16] accusing her of poor communication skills and violating [NAME_25] procedures arising out of a mistake made by [NAME_220] in misreading her word, “assessment” as, “assignment”;

330. We start by making it clear that it was not established before us that [NAME_230] had made a mistake or had misinterpreted an assessment as an assignment or vice versa. The Claimant had issued [NAME_262] with a 500 word task during a period where [COMPANY_26] was on notice of their personal circumstances, and when this was brought to the attention of [NAME_230] he asked the Claimant to consider withdrawing the task and when she declined [NAME_230] told [NAME_262] that they did not need to complete it. There was nothing to support an assertion that [NAME_230] had made any sort of mistake.

331. The Claimant had raised a [NAME_25] issue about [NAME_262], under [COMPANY_26] policy she was required to record this as a concern on Wellbeing Manager but she failed to do so, and when she was specifically asked to record it the Claimant initially failed to do so, and when the entry was eventually added it was so [NAME_133] as to be of no use at all.

332. The Claimant had failed to do what was asked of her and this caused concern to a number of senior members of staff within [COMPANY_26] (including the [NAME_25] leads) and this was raised with the Claimant by [NAME_141] as part of her NQT assessment as he was bound to do. This had nothing whatsoever to do with the Claimant’s race, it was due solely to the Claimant’s intransigence in not recording a [NAME_25] concern on Wellbeing Manager. The matter was resolved when the Claimant passed the [NAME_261] [NAME_25] quiz and when she accepted that [NAME_25] concerns needed to be recorded. This remained on the Claimant’s first assessment as it was a contemporaneous document but it did not appear on the final assessment as it was resolved by then.

333. As regards the Claimant’s communications, we found that the Respondent had not accused her of having poor communication skills as alleged. The concern was only about some of the Claimant’s professional communications not her communications generally. These two things are not synonymous and the concern was about specific communications from the Claimant, not her overall communication skills.

334. The Respondent has drawn to our attention the communications which it says were of concern and the Claimant has not disputed before us that these things took place. These communications include things she had told students about [COMPANY_26] making a mistake with respect to recruiting a particular candidate, discussing with the students [NAME_141]’s reaction to an OFSTED inspection, telling students about [NAME_10] “I’m not sure why they let him be a grown up”, the comments about cake to [NAME_10], discussing her employment situation with the students as well as the other matters to which we have referred.

60

335. Given the factual premise of the complaint has not been made out, we find that the Claimant has not established facts from which we could conclude that discrimination has taken place. A prima face case of discrimination has therefore not been made out. It appeared clear to us from the contemporaneous documents before us that the concerns about [NAME_25] and specific communications had nothing whatsoever to do with the Claimant’s race. We therefore did not consider it necessary to apply the burden of proof to this complaint.

336. However, if we are wrong on that and if the burden has shifted, we find that the Respondent has discharged that burden. We accepted the explanations from [NAME_141] as to why he raised these concerns with the Claimant. We noted that the Claimant had herself noted on the ECT form that she recognised why from the outside her communications with certain staff members look unprofessional.

337. The Respondent’s explanations gave an entirely plausible and non- discriminatory explanation of why these matters were raised with the Claimant and this was borne out fully by the contemporaneous documents in the hearing bundle before us. We are satisfied that the Claimant’s race played no part whatsoever in the way in which the concerns about [NAME_25] and communications were raised with the Claimant, and we dismiss the direct discrimination complaint.

338. As regards harassment, we do not find that the Claimant was subjected to unwanted conduct by virtue of the Respondent raising what we find to be entirely legitimate concerns about how the Claimant handled the [NAME_25] issue and the contents of some of her communications. However, if we are wrong on that, and by raising these concerns this did amount to unwanted conducted, the harassment complaint would still inevitably fail because this was not related in any way whatsoever to the Claimant’s race. The second assessment produced by [NAME_141] was overall positive about the Claimant’s teaching, the [NAME_25] concerns had been resolved, and the only outstanding issue was the manner in which the Claimant had carried out some of her professional communications. There was no connection at all with the Claimant’s race.

Accordingly, the harassment complaint also fails and is dismissed.

339. We also record for completeness that the Claimant failed to put these allegations to the Respondent’s witnesses as allegations of race discrimination. The Claimant was at pains to tell us why these assessments of her were in her opinion unreasonable and unfair, but she continuously failed to advance the claim which she had brought which was for direct race discrimination and harassment related to race.

Issue 7.5 [NAME_20] [NAME_16] suggesting that the foregoing amounted to poor communication skills and was a [NAME_25] issue, thereby putting in jeopardy [NAME_104]’s completion of her [NAME_20];

340. This complaint is a duplication of Issue 7.4 above and we refer to the conclusions we have already reached about this complaint. [NAME_141] did not accuse the Claimant of having poor communication skills. The concerns raised were about some of the Claimant’s professional communications.

61 We dismiss both the direct race discrimination and the harassment related to race complaints for the reasons we have already given.

Issue 7.6 [NAME_20] [NAME_16] wrongly informing prospective employers during her period of notice that her communications were unprofessional, in particular informing [COMPANY_199] and [COMPANY_301] [spelling supplied by Claimant];

341. The factual premise of this allegation has not been made out. [NAME_141] did not inform those schools that the Claimant’s communications were unprofessional. The reference presented to us in the bundle was generated as it was one of the Claimant’s desired outcomes from her grievance. The reference was shown to the Claimant and she was asked for comment but she provided none. The Claimant was asked a second time once there had been a request for a reference to which the Claimant said she had no comments on the reference. It was reasonable for [NAME_141] to conclude, as he did, that the reference was agreed with the Claimant.

342. The reference was detailed and it was very positive about the Claimant. The reference did not state that the Claimant’s communications were unprofessional, it stated that she needed to “provide consistent evidence to support Part Two (Personal and Professional Conduct) with a focus on regard for the ethos, policies and practices of [COMPANY_26], particularly with a view to effective and appropriate communication.” There was no suggestion that the Claimant’s communications were unprofessional, it simply identified a development area for the Claimant and in our view there was considerable contemporaneous written evidence to support the view held by [NAME_141] about this development need.

343. We accepted [NAME_141]’s evidence that this is the reference he supplied and that he did not stray beyond it.

344. We did not need to apply the burden of proof with respect to this allegation as the factual premise of the allegation had not been made out, and in any event there was no connection whatsoever with the Claimant’s race and the contents of the reference. The Claimant did not even advance this as an argument in her questions to [NAME_141] during his evidence.

345. We dismiss the complaint of direct discrimination for the above reasons. As regards harassment we find that there was no unwanted conduct as this was an agreed reference. In the event that we are wrong on that and the reference was not agreed and therefore amounted to unwanted conduct, we would in any event have dismissed the complaint as this treatment did not relate to the Claimant’s race in any way whatsoever.

Issue 7.7 [NAME_20] [NAME_16] requiring [NAME_104] to provide written Reports through the Wellbeing Manager, arising out of the miscommunication allegation; and

346. We have already found that there was not a miscommunication on the part of [NAME_230]. The Claimant asked to discuss a [NAME_25] issue, the Claimant should have put it on WellBeing Manager but failed to do so, the Claimant was then instructed to do so but failed to do so at the time, and

62 this was then discussed with her and it was explained to her why this was necessary.

347. The requirement to put [NAME_25] concerns onto WellBeing Manager applied to all staff, not specifically the Claimant. There were very good reasons for having such a requirement as it enables those tasked within [COMPANY_26] for leading on [NAME_25] to make an informed decision as to what the actual concern is, what is the risk to the [NAME_105], and what support might be offered, when, how and by whom. This requirement is based upon the KCSIE principles. The Respondent’s witnesses gave very clear and compelling evidence that it takes [NAME_25] incredibly seriously and why it is essential that concerns are logged onto WellBeing Manager, and the potential risk to a [NAME_105] of failing to do so.

348. The requirement for all staff to use WellBeing Manager did not amount to less favourable treatment and this had nothing whatsoever to do with the Claimant’s race, it is a requirement for all staff to use it. The Claimant has failed to establish facts from which we could conclude that discrimination had taken place and a prima facie claim has not been established. It is not necessary for us to apply the burden of proof provisions to this complaint and we therefore dismiss the allegation of direct discrimination.

349. As regards harassment, we do not find that the requirement to log a [NAME_25] concern could amount to unwanted conduct, but even if we are wrong on that it had nothing whatsoever to do with the Claimant’s race and we dismiss the harassment complaint as well.

350. We further record that the Claimant did not put to [NAME_141] during his evidence this requirement was linked to her race. The complaint was not advanced by the Claimant in this way, rather the Claimant’s complaint appeared to be that she disagreed strongly with the Respondent’s policy, however that is a different matter and not the one which she brought to this Tribunal for us to decide.

Issue 7.8 [NAME_200] organiser of [NAME_204] for Period 5 on Wednesdays, declining to allocate [NAME_204] to [NAME_104] throughout her period of employment.

351. During the hearing and in her closing submissions the Claimant said that she believed [NAME_243] and she accepted that he had not made this decision. The Claimant was asked if she was therefore withdrawing this complaint and she said that she was not, and she has since alleged that the decision must have been made by someone else, and she refers to [NAME_141], and/or [NAME_10] and/or [NAME_259].

352. The factual premise of the complaint has not been established as the Respondent did not decline to offer the Claimant the opportunity to deliver [NAME_204]. The Claimant expressed an interest in providing karate lessons and she received a positive response from [NAME_243] which she did not pursue. During November 2022 there was a discussion about the Claimant offering computing lessons in the second rotation and again the Claimant received a positive response from [NAME_243], however the Claimant’s subsequent resignation meant that it did not take place.

63 353. Nevertheless we have looked to see if there was any less favourable treatment of the Claimant by considering the situation as regards the two comparators she has named. We have found that neither of these are true comparators. [NAME_251] and [NAME_258] are both white, they were not in the same position as the Claimant as neither of these two people were [NAME_233], whereas they may have been new to [COMPANY_26] they were not newly qualified. [NAME_251] was asked to provide Japanese lessons, and [NAME_258] was permitted to provide Muay Thai boxing lessons after having been asked to fill a slot left available when the [NAME_254] elective ended.

354. We find that a true comparator would have been an NQT not of the Claimant’s race who had been offered the opportunity to undertake [NAME_204]. We were not provided with one. There was no evidence from which we might infer that a hypothetical comparator would have been treated any differently than the Claimant.

355. The Claimant has not established facts before us from which we could conclude that discrimination had taken place. A prima facie case of less favourable treatment was not established. We did not consider it necessary to apply the burden of proof in these circumstances.

356. Nevertheless, we have considered that if we are wrong on that and the burden has shifted to the Respondent, we have accepted the explanation from [NAME_141] that the Claimant was treated consistently with the Respondent’s custom and practice that [NAME_233] would need to concentrate on their teaching upon their arrival.

357. This was an entirely plausible explanation from [NAME_141] and we believed him, he has been an honest and compelling witness throughout. We were satisfied that there was no detriment to the Claimant and in any event the way in which the Claimant was treated with respect to [NAME_204] had nothing whatsoever to do with her race. We dismiss the complaint of direct discrimination.

358. As regards harassment, we again find that there was no unwanted conduct. The Claimant raised the possibility of [NAME_204], [NAME_243] was receptive to this and arrangements were underway for the Claimant to deliver computing lessons in the second rotation. In such circumstances there was no unwanted conduct. Nevertheless, if we are wrong on that, and this did amount to unwanted conduct the claim would still fail as this treatment did not relate to the Claimant’s race in anyway. We dismiss the complaint of harassment related to race.

Issue 14. 1 [NAME_10] flirting with [NAME_104], (it is very clear that she is not alleging sexual harassment), for example suggesting that she should teach him the Salsa and on her sending a text message making clear that she rejected his advances, [NAME_10] thereafter avoiding her;

359. We have found the Claimant’s presentation of this complaint to be quite extraordinary not least because throughout the hearing the Claimant repeatedly failed to explain to us what the alleged flirtation by [NAME_10] was said to be. The Claimant failed to put this to [NAME_10] during his oral evidence and the Tribunal was left unclear what this alleged flirtation was save for the reference to salsa in the List of Issues which was not even advanced before

64 us. The Claimant’s witness statement and her written closing submissions provided no illumination as to the alleged flirtation, the Claimant instead seeking to tell us that [NAME_10] had not provided her with training, and that she had offered him her friendship group to diffuse his attentions.

360. The allegations of direct sex discrimination and harassment related to sex, like all allegations of discrimination, are very serious allegations to make. There is potential for the allegation to be career ending for a [NAME_20] if proven to be true with all damaging consequences which might flow from that. We would expect if such a complaint is made and pursued then the complainant would tell us what the flirtation was. Unfortunately, the Claimant has failed to point to anything which might form the basis of such a complaint.

361. The List of Issues includes the allegation that [NAME_10] asked the Claimant to teach him to dance salsa. We did not find that [NAME_10] asked the Claimant to teach him to dance salsa. It was the Claimant who was offering to teach dance from the start of her employment. The Claimant had messaged [NAME_10] on one occasion suggesting that she gives him a dance lesson, he did not respond.

362. In her oral evidence the Claimant made reference to [NAME_10] inviting her to a [COMPANY_6] trip prior to starting work which she said was inappropriate as she did not have her [NAME_231] by then and he would have seen her bed hair. This was not something which the Claimant had raised before, it had nothing to do with dance lessons or salsa, it did not appear in her claim form, nor her witness statement, she did not put it to [NAME_10] in his evidence, and it was not mentioned in the Claimant’s closing submissions. It was clear to us that this was not the allegation of flirtation that was being pursued. The allegation of flirtation remained undefined up until the conclusion of the hearing.

363. We have not found there to be any flirtation on the part of [NAME_10] towards the Claimant and therefore both complaints fall at the first hurdle as the factual premise has not been made out. For the sake of completeness, we find that there was no less favourable treatment of the Claimant, and we dismiss the complaint of direct sex discrimination.

364. With respect to the harassment complaint, we have found no unwanted conduct on the part of [NAME_10] as the flirtation was not established before us. We therefore dismiss the complaint of harassment related to sex.

365. We do find that this complaint was an abuse of the process of the Employment Tribunal. There was no evidence to substantiate such a complaint, and all the contemporaneous evidence before us indicated that it was the Claimant who sought to engage with [NAME_10] before she started her role, once she had been appointed, and throughout her employment, even after she was asked to cease contacting [NAME_10] on his private number unless it was an emergency. The Claimant then sought to characterise her communications to [NAME_10] as emergencies even when they were nothing of the sort.

366. The Claimant continued to send personal or non-work related messages to [NAME_10] right up to the conclusion of her employment, asking when she was

65 going to see him, and asking him to find out about the henna someone had used, and to obtain photographs of her hands. Even as late as 10 February 2023 the Claimant wrote to [NAME_10] to thank him. This was hardly the act of someone who felt that they had been subjected to direct sex discrimination and harassment related to sex.

367. The Respondent has described the Claimant’s complaint against [NAME_10] as troubling and we agree given the lack of anything to substantiate such serious complaints. The Claimant’s closing submissions were particularly revealing as she described their relationship as “It was like living together and having 30 children, and desperately needing a divorce.” The Respondent has argued that it was the Claimant who made all the advances with regard to meeting and socialising with [NAME_10] and that he had politely declined or not responded. We agree with that description of what occurred in this case. It appeared to the Tribunal that these two allegations against [NAME_10] were pursued in order to continue to harass him and that there was no other basis for bringing these two specific complaints. This was an abuse of the process of the Employment Tribunal as the complaints were pursued for an improper purpose. The Claimant’s conduct caused a considerable amount of distress to [NAME_10] so much so that he felt only able to appear on video to give evidence, and even then needed to be accompanied as he did so.

368. We dismiss the complaints of direct sex discrimination and harassment related to sex and record that they were totally without merit.

Issue 14. 2 [NAME_20] [NAME_16] wrongly informing prospective employers during her period of notice that her communications were unprofessional, in particular informing [COMPANY_199] and [COMPANY_301],

369. We repeat our earlier conclusion under Issue 7.6. [NAME_141] did not inform either of those two schools that the Claimant’s communications were unprofessional. [NAME_141] had recorded in the reference that the Claimant needed to “provide consistent evidence to support Part Two (Personal and Professional Conduct) with a focus on regard for the ethos, policies and practices of [COMPANY_26], particularly with a view to effective and appropriate communication.” There was no suggestion that the Claimant’s communications were unprofessional, it simply identified a development area for the Claimant and as we have already indicated there was considerable contemporaneous written evidence to support the view held by [NAME_141].

370. We also accepted [NAME_141]’s evidence that this is the reference he supplied and that he did not stray beyond it.

371. We did not need to apply the statutory burden of proof as the Claimant has not established a prima facie case of discrimination as the factual premise of the complaint was not made out, and further we saw no evidence of less favourable treatment of the Claimant on grounds of her sex. Moreover, the Claimant did not even advance this as an argument in her questions to [NAME_141] during his evidence, preferring to argue instead that the reference was unfair and unreasonable. Our task is to consider whether this amounted to less favourable treatment on grounds of the Claimant’s

66 sex and we find that it did not. We dismiss the complaint of direct sex discrimination for these reasons.

372. As regards harassment related to sex, we find that there was no unwanted conduct as this was an agreed reference. In the event that we are wrong on that, and the reference was not agreed, and if the contents of the reference amounted to unwanted conduct, we would in any event have dismissed the complaint as it did not relate to the Claimant’s sex.

Issue 14.3 [NAME_20] [NAME_16] requiring [NAME_104] to provide written Reports through the Wellbeing Manager, arising out of the miscommunication allegation.

373. We repeat our earlier conclusion under Issue 7.7. There was no miscommunication.

374. The requirement to put [NAME_25] concerns onto WellBeing Manager applied to all staff, not specifically the Claimant. There were very good reasons for having such a requirement as it enables those tasked within [COMPANY_26] for leading on [NAME_25] to make an informed decision as to what the actual concern is, what is the risk to the [NAME_105], and what support might be offered, when, how and by whom. This requirement is based upon the KCSIE principles. The Respondent’s witnesses gave very clear and compelling evidence on the approach it takes to [NAME_25] and why it is essential that concerns are logged on WellBeing Manager and the potential risk to a [NAME_105] of failing to do so.

375. The requirement for all staff to use WellBeing Manager did not amount to less favourable treatment and this had nothing whatsoever to do with the Claimant’s sex, it is a requirement for all staff to use it. A prima facie case of discrimination has not been established and the burden of proof did not shift to the Respondent. We therefore dismiss the allegation of direct discrimination.

376. As regards harassment related to sex, it was clear to us that the Claimant disagreed strongly with this requirement, however we do not find that the requirement to log a [NAME_25] concern could amount to unwanted conduct, but even if we are wrong on that it had nothing whatsoever to do with the Claimant’s sex. We again record that the Claimant did not put to [NAME_141] during his evidence this requirement was linked to her sex.

377. We dismiss the complaint of harassment related to sex.

378. All of the Claimant’s complaints fail and are dismissed.

Time

379. Given that none of the complaints have succeeded it was not necessary for us to deal with the time issue and we note that we were not addressed on the matter of time by either party before us.

Costs

67 380. [ADDRESS] has previously made a costs order in favour of the Respondent but has left the amount to be determined by this Tribunal. A costs hearing will be listed in due course.

Approved by:

Employment Judge Graham

3 February 2025

RESERVED JUDGMENT & REASONS SENT TO THE PARTIES ON

27 February 2025

FOR THE TRIBUNAL OFFICE

Notes Reasons for the judgment having been given orally at the hearing, written reasons will not be provided unless a request was made by either party at the hearing or a written request is presented by either party within 14 days of the sending of this written record of the decision. If written reasons are provided they will be placed online. All judgments (apart from judgments under Rule 51) and any written reasons for the judgments are published, in full, online at https://www.gov.uk/employment-tribunal-decisions shortly after a copy has been sent to the claimants and respondents. If a Tribunal hearing has been recorded, you may request a transcript of the recording. Unless there are exceptional circumstances, you will have to pay for it. If a transcript is produced it will not include any oral judgment or reasons given at the hearing. The transcript will not be checked, approved or verified by a judge. There is more information in the joint Presidential Practice Direction on the Recording and Transcription of Hearings and accompanying Guidance, which can be found here:

www.judiciary.uk/guidance-and-resources/employment-rules-and-legislation-practice-directions/

68 ANNEX 1

WRITTEN REASONS FOR REFUSING THE CLAIMANT’S AMENDMENT APPLICATIONS OF 5 SEPTEMBER 2023 AND 29 FEBRUARY 2024

1. The Claimant seeks permission to amend her claim to include the following:

1.1 Failure to grant a statutory assessment review.

1.2 A reference from [NAME_16] was inaccurate.

1.3 Training documents had been delayed by [NAME_16].

1.4 [NAME_141] shared a reference which had not been agreed.

1.5 To add two named Respondents, [NAME_141] and [NAME_302].

2. The Claimant appears to allege that these are allegations of direct discrimination and victimisation. The Claimant also makes reference to defamation, negligence, and fraud.

Law

3. In the case of Chandhok v Tirkey [2015] ICR 527 the Court held that:

“The claim, as set out in the ET1, is not something just to set the ball rolling, as an initial document necessary to comply with time limits but which is otherwise free to be augmented by whatever the parties choose to add or subtract merely on their say so. Instead, it serves not only a useful but a necessary function. It sets out the essential case. It is that to which a respondent is required to respond. A respondent is not required to answer a witness statement, nor a document, but the claims made— meaning, under the Employment Tribunals Rules of Procedure 2013 (SI 2013/1237), the claim as set out in the ET1.” [16]

4. The approach to be adopted when considering applications to amend has been recently considered in the matter of Vaughan v Modality Partnership Limited [2020] UK EAT 0147/20. Here it was noted that the Tribunal has a broad discretion when considering applications to amend.

5. The key test for considering amendments has its origin in the decision of Cocking v Sandhurst (Stationers) Ltd [1974] ICR 650:

“In deciding whether or not to exercise their discretion to allow an amendment, the tribunal should in every case have regard to all the circumstances of the case. In particular they should consider any injustice or hardship which may be caused to any of the parties, including those proposed to be added, if the proposed amendment were allowed or, as the case may be, refused.” [657BC]

6. In Selkent Bus Co Limited v Moore [1996] ICR 836 it was said:

“Whenever the discretion to grant an amendment is invoked, the tribunal should take into account all the circumstances and should balance the

69 injustice and hardship of allowing the amendment against the injustice and hardship of refusing it.” [843D]

And:

“Whenever taking any factors into account, the paramount considerations are the relative injustice and hardship involved in refusing or granting an amendment.” [844B]

7. In Selkent the court identified the relevant circumstances as: i. the nature of the amendment ii. the applicability of time limits iii. the timing and manner of the application.

8. These are merely examples of factors which may be relevant to consider. Each application will be different and will require an assessment of the circumstances of each case. There may be a situation whereby a minor amendment if refused may cause great prejudice to a claimant who would not be able to pursue an important of their claim. Likewise, an amendment if granted may cause a respondent prejudice in having to defend a claim it would not otherwise have to, and one which may have been dismissed as out of time had it been brought as a new claim on a fresh ET1. Clearly some prejudice may be experienced if witnesses have left their roles or documents have been lost in the interim, as well was additional costs.

Accordingly, it is clear to see that each application must be viewed in its own particular circumstances.

9. It is clear from the case law that the overriding principle is the balance of justice between the parties rather than any specific factor weighing more heavily than others. It is of course possible to balance the additional expense faced by a party by an award of costs against the applicant, although costs remain relatively rare in the Tribunal, and it would depend upon the paying party’s means and ability to pay. Moreover, costs will not help where witnesses have gone away or documents have been lost.

10. In Transport and General Workers Union v Safeway Stores Ltd UKEAT/0092/07 the court noted that that on a correct reading of Selkent the fact that an amendment would introduce a claim that was out of time was not decisive against allowing the amendment, but was a factor to be taken into account in the balancing exercise.

11. Underhill LJ in Abercrombie v Aga Rangemaster Limited [2014] ICR 209 - the list of factors espoused by Mummery J in Selkent as examples of factors that may be relevant to an application to amend (“the Selkent factors”) should not be taken as a checklist to be ticked off to determine the application (per [47]), but are factors to take into account in conducting the fundamental exercise of balancing the injustice or hardship of allowing or refusing the amendment.

12. Further in Abercrombie Underhill LJ stated:

“Consistently with that way of putting it, the approach of both the Employment Appeal Tribunal and this court in considering applications to

70 amend which arguably raise new causes of action has been to focus not on questions of formal classification but on the extent to which the new pleading is likely to involve substantially different areas of inquiry than the old: the greater the difference between the factual and legal issues raised by the new claim and by the old, the less likely it is that it will be permitted.” [48]

13. As indicated in [NAME_304] it is necessary to focus upon the practical consequences of allowing an amendment when conducting the balancing exercise – what will be the effect if the application is approved or rejected?

Submissions

14. The Claimant told us that the Tribunal should not stick slavishly to the list of issues. The Claimant told us that there was a case on this but she could not remember the name. The Tribunal is familiar with the authorities on the matter and it appeared that the Claimant was likely referring to the judgment of the Court of Appeal in [NAME_305] v The London Borough of Brent [2012], EWCA Civ 1630 where it was held:

“As the ET that conducts the hearing is bound to ensure that the case is clearly and efficiently presented, it is not required to stick slavishly to the list of issues agreed where to do so would impair the discharge of its core duty to hear and determine the case in accordance with the law and the evidence.” [31]

15. The Respondent repeated the objections as set out in its letter of 20 October 2023 in which it argued at the updated contact details were not an amendment, it opposed joining the Claimant’s claim with that of [NAME_81] as there were no common or related issues of fact. As regards the remaining four issues the Respondent argued these were entirely new claims and causes of action lacking in clarity in detail and the Claimant had not provided that detail despite a request from the Respondent. The Respondent raised the issue of the timing of the application, the delay, the prejudice it would suffer if granted given the additional work which would need to be undertaken, and together with the cost.

16. As regards ticking box 10.1 on the ET1 (information to regulators in protected disclosure cases) the Respondent noted the box had already been ticked by the Claimant and in any event the claim form did not include a claim that she had made a protected disclosure under the Employment Rights Act 1996. The Respondent objected to the addition of additional Respondents and argued the Claimant had not notified ACAS during early conciliation that she intended to name either [NAME_141] or [NAME_211]. The Respondent said that both were acting on behalf of the Respondent at all times and there were no issues between them and the Claimant which are not already capable of being determined in these proceedings and there are no pleaded acts of either for which the Respondent would not except vicarious liability.

Decision

71 17. We note that at the private preliminary hearing on 1 September 2023 Employment Judge Warren provided the Claimant with detailed guidance on the steps to follow if she wished to apply for permission to amend her claim. The Claimant did not comply.

18. The Claimant was directed at the start of this hearing on 7 October 2024 to send us the amendment application she wished to make by 12:30pm. The Claimant failed to do so and instead sent us the Respondent’s previous objections as she said the Tribunal waiting room was too noisy. The Claimant made no effort to comply with the Tribunal direction even though it was her own application and in her own interests to comply.

19. The Respondent (helpfully in our view) took it upon themselves to look through all of the material the Claimant sent over the weekend to try and extract what it is the Claimant was seeking to add. They have identified an application from 5 September 2023. That application was particularly hard to understand and the Respondent asked for additional information on 20 October 2023. That information was not forthcoming. Having read that application much of it was not a true amendment application, and we have identified five potential amendments although each of them lacked detail.

20. On 29 February 2024 the Claimant wrote to the Tribunal about her amendments, however the Claimant’s letter is very difficult to follow as it is in different colours which text struck through and contains references to matters for which the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction, such as defamation, fraud and negligence.

21. One request was to change her address which is not an amendment. Another was to join her claim with another person’s claim which is not an amendment. The Claimant asked to the tick the box in the ET1 to inform regulators of her protected disclosures which is also not an amendment and she does not have a whistleblowing claim. The box was already ticked anyway.

22. We refuse the proposed amendments for the following reasons. The first attempt to amend the claim in September 2023 lacked any clarity and it could not be understood what the proposed amendments were intended to be. The Claimant failed to clarify the proposed amendments when asked to do so. The Claimant’s subsequent correspondence to the Tribunal in February 2024 suffered from the same lack of detail as to what the proposed amendments were. Much of the amendments were not matters for which the Tribunal has jurisdiction for in any event. The Claimant has repeatedly failed to pursue her amendment application by setting out clearly what the proposed amendments are (including the factual allegation and cause of action), there was a preliminary hearing in April 2024 where this matter could have been raised and resolved, and whilst the Claimant says she was not given the opportunity to speak that is not borne out by the judgment and case management summary we have read.

23. As of today’s date (8 October 2024), which is the second day of a five day final hearing, the proposed amendments still do not make a great deal of sense, and we lack the jurisdiction to consider complaints of defamation, negligence, and fraud. This was already explained to the Claimant by [ADDRESS]. Whereas it is possible to understand that the

72 Claimant also alleges that some of these were acts of direct sex and race discrimination (although this was not stated by the Claimant), their merits appear to be no more than arguable, and the Claimant fails to identify what protected act she relies upon for her victimisation amendment. The application suffers from a lack of clarity. We have taken into account the applicability of time limits however the Claimant has failed to tell us the dates of the acts complained of despite having had over 13 months in which to do so since her first application to amend in September 2023, and in any event it appeared from what we could understand of these proposed amendments that they would be out of time in any event.

24. We also note that [ADDRESS] had already refused the Claimant’s application to amend to add additional Respondents during the preliminary hearing of 9 April 2024. We have no power to go behind that decision.

25. Were we to grant the application to amend it would involve new lines of enquiry and further evidence would need to be produced and witness statements would need to be amended, all at further cost to the Respondent and it would force this hearing to go part heard with judgment unlikely to be handed down to some point in 2025 based upon the amount of work involved and current listing estimates. We are mindful that at least one witness has since retired.

26. The prejudice to the Respondent would be considerable, whereas the Claimant would suffer less hardship and injustice in the alternative if we refuse it because she already has a comprehensive claim for direct race and sex discrimination and also harassment related to the same, and she will have the opportunity to seek compensation should any or all of those claims succeed. If we reject the application the Claimant will lose the opportunity to complain about some of the new matters, however for many of them we do not even have jurisdiction in any event. One of the issues which we will be considering is at 7.6 and 14.2 about [NAME_141] allegedly informing prospective employers that her communications were unprofessional, therefore the injustice and hardship to the Claimant in refusing the application is limited.

27. The Respondent would suffer the greater injustice and hardship if the application were allowed. The injustice and hardship to the Claimant would be minimal in refusing the application, and for these reasons we refuse the Claimant’s application to amend.

73 ANNEX 2

WRITTEN REASONS FOR REFUSING THE CLAIMANT’S AMENDMENT APPLICATION OF 9 OCTOBER 2024

1. On day three of the final hearing (9 October 2024) the Claimant sought permission to amend her claim to include the matters listed below. This was a repeat or a clarification of her previous amendment applications. The proposed amendments were:

1.1 Failure to rectify NQT training documents;

1.2 Failure to provide a statutory right to an assessment review within 20 days;

1.3 Failure to provide an accurate reference informed by NQT assessment;

1.4 Ongoing victimisation comprising rejection from 342 job applications, having attended 63 interviews, the Claimant says the Respondent must be providing some kind of verbal or written word that none of the prospective employers are willing to share with the Claimant; the Respondent refused to provide an assessment review commissioned by [NAME_21] completed on 19 April 2023, but when provided it contained irregularities; and other matters contained within the Claimant’s long narrative which could not be understood;

1.5 Failure to prevent sexual misconduct; and

1.6 Failure to address sexual misconduct

2. The Claimant explained that the above was alleged to be victimisation and harassment.

Submissions

3. The Claimant was asked what was the protected act that she relies upon to which she said that she brought to the attention of the headteacher a [NAME_25] issue during a meeting with [NAME_220].

4. The Claimant also referred to a text message from her to [NAME_10] in which she said “guess we won’t be friends then” sent at 7:15 pm on 21 October 2023. The Claimant explained she was not complaining of sexual harassment but that she was being punished at work and denied a trip to Berlin that she helped to prepare, and she said that she did not talk about race or sex discrimination or harassment during the course of her employment.

5. The Respondent objected to the Claimant’s application arguing that it had been made too late, it was long out of time, it was now day three of a five day hearing and it would be a substantial amendment if allowed to proceed, and further Claimant’s witness statement does not address these matters therefore it would not be possible to deal with them in the time available.

74 6. The Respondent also said that much of this subject matter was already contained within the existing this issues at 7.4, 7.5, 7.6, and 7.7 and there was no prejudice to the Claimant in refusing the application as the matters are already being considered, moreover the claims are weak in any event and the allegations of victimisation are not supported by protected act.

7. The Claimant told us that there was an inaccuracy in the NQT training documents which requires amendment. When asked what this inaccuracy was the Claimant told us that the first document records that there were [NAME_25] issues and problems with her communications, and that the second document states that the Claimant has problems with professional communications.

8. The Claimant says that she has an entitlement to a statutory assessment review within 20 days. We repeatedly asked the Claimant where this right existed but she could not tell us. The Respondent said that the Claimant is mistaken and has confused matters, and that there is a right to appeal against a decision of [NAME_131] (the training body) but there is no statutory right of appeal against the Respondent, and that the Claimant has confused this with the grievance process where the Respondent offered a review of the process to see if lessons could be learned.

9. With respect to the reference, the Claimant said that it was a refusal by [NAME_141] to complete a confirmation of employment document. The Respondent says that it attempted to agree a reference with the Claimant and one was produced which it shared with the Claimant.

10. As regards alleged sexual misconduct, the Respondent says that the Claimant’s text message was not to reject rejection any advances, and there would be serious hardship to Respondent if the Claimant’s amendment application is granted and it relies upon its previous arguments about the amount of time and costs and the work which would have to be undertaken if granted at this late stage part way through the final hearing.

Decision

11. As referenced yesterday, the key task for us (once the proposed amendment is properly understood) is to balance the injustice and hardship when considering any application to amend, and this is clear from the judgment of his His Honour Judge Tayler in [NAME_304] referenced above.

12. We have taken into account the factors identified in the case of [COMPANY_324] but not so as to operate as a checklist exercise, but these do include the nature of the amendment, the applicability of time limits, and the timing and the manner of the application to amend. We have taken into account all of the circumstances in this case, not merely the Selkent factors.

13. We note that the amendments are said to comprise complaints of victimisation, and following repeated attempts by me to identify a protected act the Claimant relies upon an alleged [NAME_25] issue and also her text message of 7.15pm on 21 October 2023. It appeared to the Tribunal that neither of these things are likely to amount to a protected act within the meaning of s. 27 Equality Act 2010, and in the absence of a protected act (or a belief on the part of the Respondent that the Claimant had done a

75 protected act) that would indicate that the victimisation complaint has little or no reasonable prospects of success. As regards the [NAME_25] issue there was in any event a lack of detail as to what it is the Claimant now says that she had said. As regards the text message, which we did have before us, we did not read that message as rejecting anything at all.

14. These proposed amendments have been made very late in proceedings, we are now on day three of a final hearing of case which was issued eighteen months earlier. We take on board that the Claimant suggests that some of this victimisation is ongoing however the acts themselves that she appears to be complaining about all appear to be already out of time with no good explanation for not having brought them sooner. It was clear that what was being raised was alleged an act or acts with continuing consequences as distinct from conduct extending over a period.

15. Proposed amendments 1 – 4 (victimisation) appear to have little or no reasonable prospects of success, the subject matter of each will already be considered under issues 7.4, 7.5, 7.6 and 7.7, the Claimant would suffer very little prejudice in refusing the amendments which are weak and appear to be out of time, whereas the Respondent would suffer greater prejudice if granted due to the work required to deal with them, time and legal costs and further delay.

16. Proposed amendments 5 – 6 also appear to have little or no reasonable prospects of success as complaints of harassment related to sex or indeed a sexual harassment for the reason the Claimant tells us repeatedly that she is not subjected to sexual harassment by [NAME_10], she made no mention at the material time, and it is a brand new and significantly out of time complaint with no good reason for it not having been raised sooner. The issue of alleged flirting by [NAME_10] will already be considered under Issue 14.1 in any event. Again, the Claimant would suffer very little prejudice in refusing the amendments which are weak and appear to be out of time, whereas the Respondent would suffer greater prejudice if granted due to the work required to deal with them, time and legal costs and further delay.

17. The Respondent would suffer the greater injustice and hardship if the application were allowed. The injustice and hardship to the Claimant would be minimal in refusing the application, and for these reasons we refuse the Claimant’s application to amend.

Case Number: 3303311/2023

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Claimant:

[redacted]

Respondent: [redacted]

Under Rule 67, the judgment sent to the parties on 27 February 2025 is corrected as set out in block type after paragraphs 17, 24 and 45 of the corrected judgment.

Approved by:

Employment Judge Graham

27 February 2025

SENT TO THE PARTIES ON 28 February 2025

FOR THE TRIBUNAL OFFICE

Important note to the Claimant(s) and Respondent(s): Any dates for asking for written reasons, applying for reconsideration or appealing against the judgment are not changed by this certificate of correction and corrected judgment. These time limits still run from the date the original judgment or reasons were sent, as explained in the letter that sent the original judgment.

Case Number: 3303311/2023

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Claimant:

[redacted]

Respondent: [redacted]

Under Rule 67, the judgment sent to the parties on 27 February 2025, is corrected as set out in bold, italics and underlined at paragraphs 142, 148, 149, 150, 155, 157, 160, 290, 330, 331, and paragraph 3 of Annex 2 of the corrected judgment.

Approved by:

Employment Judge Graham

7 April 2025

SENT TO THE PARTIES ON 8 April 2025

FOR THE TRIBUNAL OFFICE

1 Case Number: 3303311/2023

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Claimant:

[redacted]

Respondent: [redacted]

Bury St Edmunds (hybrid)

On:

27 and 28 April 2026

Before:

Employment Judge [NAME_306]

[NAME_307] Claimant:

[redacted] Respondent: [redacted]

RESERVED JUDGMENT

1. With respect to the costs order of [ADDRESS] dated 16 April 2024, the Claimant is ordered to pay the Respondent the whole of its legal costs which are attributable to the vexatious, abusive, disruptive or otherwise unreasonable conduct of proceedings as identified by [ADDRESS] in that judgment. These costs are to be assessed by way of a detailed assessment on the indemnity basis.

2. The Respondent’s second application for costs under Rules 74(2)(a) and 74(2)(b) succeeds. We make an order for costs in favour of the Respondent comprised of (i) 35% of the remainder of its total legal costs of defending the claim (after deducting the amount to be paid to satisfy the costs order of [ADDRESS]); and (ii) 100% of the legal costs attributable to the final hearing going part heard for the period 12 October 2024 until 9 January 2025, including legal work undertaken on those dates. Those costs are to be assessed by way of detailed assessment on the indemnity basis.

REASONS

Introduction

1. This hearing was listed for the following two matters:

2 i. To determine the amount of the costs order made by [ADDRESS] on 16 April 2024; and

ii. To consider the Respondent’s application dated 11 April 2025 for an order of costs against the Claimant. That application is brought under Rules 74(2)(a) and 74(2)(b) of the Employment Tribunal Rules of Procedure 2024.

2. The Respondent’s updated schedule of costs records a total figure of £92,903.40.

3. This hearing had previously been postponed pending the Claimant’s appeals against the liability judgment of this Tribunal of 3 February 2025 which have since been disposed of.

4. On 3 February 2025 I made case management directions with respect to the costs order from [ADDRESS], directing the Respondent to serve a schedule of costs on the Claimant, and directing the Claimant to serve on the Respondent a statement of her means, and I took care to explain what that should involve and I recommended the Claimant to take legal advice.

5. On 10 June 2025 I refused the Claimant’s application to postpone the costs hearing and I extended the hearing length by one day as the Respondent had made a second costs application. I again reminded the Claimant a second time to provide evidence of her means.

6. On 25 July 2025 I then postponed the costs hearing as correspondence suggested there may be a Rule 3(10) hearing before the Employment Appeal Tribunal. I again reminded the Claimant a third time to provide evidence of her means by referring her to my previous directions of 3 February 2025.

7. On 4 November 2025 I directed the two days costs hearing to be relisted as the appeals had been fully disposed of, and I again, for a fourth time directed the Claimant to provide evidence of her means and I took care to explain what this involved.

8. On 26 January 2026 the Tribunal listed today’s hearing in person at Bury St Edmunds Employment Tribunal, and the address and start time were included.

9. Since the liability hearing the Claimant has written in repeatedly asking for a transcript of the liability hearing at public expense even though it had been previously refused, and permission to appeal that case management decision was also refused.

10. The Tribunal had previously refused a transcript paid for at public expense as there was no evidence that the Claimant was disabled (her earlier claim was for race and sex discrimination), and moreover the Claimant was not vulnerable party, therefore it was not necessary in the interests of justice for her to be provided with a transcript paid for at public expense to ensure her effective participation in those proceedings.

11. The Claimant has also written in repeatedly asking Watford Employment

3 Tribunal if it accepted that she was disabled or vulnerable and asking if I had reserved this costs hearing to myself. The Claimant also suggested she did not know if the hearing was proceeding or where, even though it was clear from the notice of hearing, which I note the Respondent re-sent to the Claimant. I had not directed a reply as I had not been made aware of the correspondence.

12. The Claimant failed to attend the hearing in person on 27 April 2026 as I had directed. Just before the hearing was due to start the Claimant emailed and asked for a CVP link to be sent to her even though this was an in person hearing. Whereas we could have proceeded in the absence of the Claimant due to her failure to attend, I directed for a CVP link to be sent so that we could enquire why the Claimant had not attended in person. The hearing started 35 minutes late whilst we waited for the Claimant to join the hearing.

13. When we started the hearing the Claimant was sitting in an office and wearing what appeared to be a work lanyard. Further time was spent as we could not hear the Claimant but she could hear us, the Claimant was asked to remove her headset and then rejoin a couple of times but we still could not hear her. I asked the Claimant to be sent the telephone number which she was initially reluctant to call, but when she called [NAME_308] hearing she held the telephone so far away from her face at full arm’s length we could not hear her. The Claimant was repeatedly asked to hold it closer to her mouth which she did for a while before holding it away again, therefore we could not hear her. The Claimant then placed the telephone on the desk and we couldn’t hear her then either as it was so far from her, and eventually the Claimant picked up the telephone but again the sound was intermittent.

14. I asked the Claimant where she was but she repeatedly refused to tell me, other than she was in another place, and later on she told me she was in a friend’s place of work. The Claimant denied she was at work and she said the lanyard which appeared to have an employer’s name on it, was her lanyard and had her name on it, and then she removed it.

15. The Claimant told us she had not come in person as she is disabled and does not drive this far anymore, and she then told us it would be impossible to get the time off, before subsequently correcting herself to say that it would be impossible for her daughter to get the time off to drive her here.

16. I asked the Claimant why she had not applied to either convert or postpone this hearing, to which she told me she had and which the Respondent denied, and having checked the Respondent’s bundle of documents I noted an email from the Claimant of 26 January 2026 indicating she could not attend in person as she said she was disabled. This was not passed to me by the Tribunal staff, and whereas it did not specifically ask for the hearing to be converted, that appeared to be the purpose behind it.

17. Had I been passed a copy of the correspondence I would have refused to convert the hearing anyway as we have not found the Claimant to be vulnerable or disabled, and the final day of the liability hearing was listed by video which the Claimant then complained about, and then having given the Claimant the option of attending in person for a hybrid hearing the Claimant then did not attend in person and continued to complain.

4 18. Whereas we converted the costs hearing to a hybrid hearing because the Claimant failed to attend in person, we could not proceed as we could barely hear the Claimant. I repeatedly asked the Claimant how she invited us to proceed in this situation, whilst I reminded her of the seriousness of this situation given it was a costs hearing and we must be able to satisfy ourselves that we could hear the Claimant and she could hear us.

19. The Claimant told us she would be content to proceed even if we could not hear her as she would ask for a transcript which she would check and then respond to. I informed the Claimant that was not appropriate, we would ensure that both sides get a fair hearing in this application and to proceed in that way would not be fair to anyone – the Claimant must have the opportunity to be heard during the hearing itself.

20. I asked the Respondent how it invited us to proceed and [NAME_29] suggested that we could read in for the morning and recommence at 2pm on 27 April or even 10am on 28 April with the Claimant appearing in person.

21. After deliberating as a panel I informed the Claimant that the hearing would be adjourned until 10am on 28 April and if she failed to attend the hearing in person we would proceed in her absence. I explained again the importance of the Claimant’s attendance.

22. At 11:22, shortly after the hearing was adjourned the Claimant sent a long email to the Regional Employment Judge in which she appeared to complain about the conduct of the hearing and directing her to attend in person. At the start of the email the Claimant said:

“Judge Graham is refusing me participation on the grounds that he can't hear me, and is ordering me to attend court in person.”

23. That is untrue, and the Claimant knows it to be untrue. The steps taken by the Tribunal were to ensure she could fully participate in the hearing. This is unfortunately a repeat of previous behaviour during the first liability hearing where the Claimant would write to the Regional Employment Judge and the Employment Appeal Tribunal deliberately misrepresenting things said and done by me as the judge during that hearing. The Claimant was warned about this conduct at the time and within the liability judgment. The Claimant continues to conduct herself in the costs hearing in a similar manner.

24. At the end of the email the Claimant said:

“I see no reason why I can't attend remotely tomorrow. He is threatening to proceed without me rather than allow me to hear what happening because he claims to not be able to hear me. Surely allowing me to listen is better than proceeding without me?”

25. For the avoidance of doubt, it would have been incredibly unfair to both parties to proceed in such a way where the Claimant could not be heard. This is the case whether it is a liability hearing or a costs hearing.

26. Having directed the Claimant to attend on 28 April in person, the Claimant telephoned the Watford Employment Tribunal and was advised by a

5 member of the administrative staff that the hearing would be hybrid. This is not what I had directed, and therefore the Claimant did not attend in person but again joined by video. Whereas I was very concerned that my directions had not been complied with by the Claimant, and I was further disappointed they had been effectively varied by the Tribunal administration without authority, I nevertheless allowed the hearing to proceed as a hybrid with the Claimant appearing online as her sound issues had resolved.

27. We started the hearing almost forty minutes late whilst I attempted to understand what had happened with the listing and why the Claimant was again appearing online. We then heard from [NAME_29] for an hour or so where she addressed us on the Respondent’s costs submissions, referring us to pages in the costs bundle and taking us through the Respondent’s written submissions.

28. After a break of an hour and 15 minutes for lunch and for the Claimant to prepare, we then heard the Claimant’s submissions. During the Claimant’s submissions I repeatedly had to ask her to address the Respondent’s costs application and submissions as she sought to bring up other matters including the handling of her Subject Access Request and Freedom of Information Act requests and a referral the Respondent allegedly made about her to the [NAME_53] for allegedly retaining data belonging to the Respondent.

29. Regrettably I had to issue the Claimant with a warning about her conduct as she told us during her oral submissions that [NAME_332] had a fetish for blonde women and that it was clever of the Respondent’s counsel to have dyed her hair grey. The Tribunal found this to be an outrageous thing to say – the comment was provocative and inflammatory, it had nothing whatsoever to do with the original claim nor the issue of costs, and it was clearly said to cause upset to the Respondent’s witness and to its legal team. This comment was gratuitous, and leaving aside the offence it may have caused, it showed an exceptional amount of disrespect to the Tribunal process. We found it incredible that a party who had complained of harassment related to sex, should choose to conduct themselves in such a way before us.

30. This was precisely the sort of behaviour that [ADDRESS] had previously identified and found to be harassment and intimidation and had warned the Claimant about, and which formed part of the reasons for the first costs order. I warned the Claimant we would bar her from her giving oral submissions if she carried on in that way. Following this the Claimant started to laugh and said she did not know why anyone was offended as she had seen counsel’s hair and she thought it looked great. I warned the Claimant a further time not to make personal remarks about people who were simply here to do their job and I advised her to take this hearing more seriously.

31. We were provided with a bundle of documents of 817 pages prepared by the Respondent together with a written skeleton argument. The Claimant provided additional documents by email over lunch, and we read the contents that she took us to. The Claimant took exception to my having informed her that she must refer us to the relevant pages as we would not go away and read every document provided. Nevertheless if the Claimant

6 referred us to a document we looked at it during the hearing.

32. The Claimant did not provide any evidence of her means despite my direction for her to do so sent on 3 February, 10 June, 25 July and 4 November 2025. I note from the Respondent’s bundle the Respondent reminded the Claimant to send this information on 22 April, 7 May, 15 May, 9 June, 24 June and 16 December 2025.

33. On 26 January 2026 the Claimant confirmed she had not submitted any evidence of her means as she said she had not worked for three years. During the hearing however the Claimant told us she had submitted evidence, however it transpired this was simply her earlier EX 107 forms where she applied for a transcript of previous hearings at public expense. That is not the same as providing evidence of means, and I had taken considerable care to put into writing (including on 5 November 2025) what she must do. In the hearing the Claimant told us that she had no savings. No documentary evidence, such as bank statements were ever disclosed.

Transcript

34. The Claimant told us she had applied for a transcript of this hearing to be paid for at public expense. We had not been provided with a copy. I asked the Claimant to re-send it to us at lunch time however she failed to do so. I therefore asked our usher to look for the EX107 form however all that could be found were historic forms relating to earlier hearings, none of them concerned this hearing. The Claimant said she would send a new request, and I explained that we would consider it if it was filed in time.

Law

35. The Overriding Objective of the Employment Tribunal is set out at Rule 3 of the Employment Tribunal Rules of Procedure 2024 and is as follows:

“Overriding objective

3.— (1) The overriding objective of these Rules is to enable the Tribunal to deal with cases fairly and justly.

(2) Dealing with a case fairly and justly includes, so far as practicable—

(a) ensuring that the parties are on an equal footing,

(b) dealing with cases in ways which are proportionate to the complexity and importance of the issues,

(c) avoiding unnecessary formality and seeking flexibility in the proceedings,

(d) avoiding delay, so far as compatible with proper consideration of the issues, and

(e) saving expense.

7 (3) The Tribunal must seek to give effect to the overriding objective when it—

(a) exercises any power under these Rules, or

(b) interprets any rule or practice direction.

(4) The parties and their representatives must—

(a) assist the Tribunal to further the overriding objective, and

(b) co-operate generally with each other and with the Tribunal.”

36. Rule 74 provides:

“(1) The Tribunal may make a costs order or a preparation time order (as appropriate) on its own initiative or on the application of a party or, in respect of a costs order under rule 73(1)(b), a witness who has attended or has been ordered to attend to give oral evidence at a hearing.

(2) The Tribunal must consider making a costs order or a preparation time order where it considers that—

(a) a party (or that party’s representative) has acted vexatiously, abusively, disruptively or otherwise unreasonably in either the bringing of the proceedings, or part of it, or the way that the proceedings, or part of it, have been conducted,

(b) any claim, response or reply had no reasonable prospect of success, or

(c) a hearing has been postponed or adjourned on the application of a party made less than 7 days before the date on which that hearing begins.

(3) The Tribunal may also make a costs order or a preparation time order (as appropriate) on the application of a party where a party has been in breach of any order, rule or practice direction or where a hearing has been postponed or adjourned.”

37. It is clear from the wording of Rule 74 that costs remain discretionary and the word “must” only requires the Tribunal to consider whether to make a such an order in the circumstances identified. It does not follow that we must make that award.

38. Rule 76 provides:

“The amount of a costs order

(1) A costs order may order the paying party to pay—

(a) the receiving party a specified amount, not exceeding £20,000, in respect of the costs of the receiving party;

(b) the receiving party the whole or a specified part of the costs of the receiving party, with the amount to be paid being determined—

8

(i) in England and Wales, by way of detailed assessment carried out either by a county court in accordance with the Civil Procedure Rules 1998, or by the Tribunal applying the same principles...”

39. Rule 82 provides in that in deciding whether to make a costs order (and when determining the value of the order) the Tribunal may have regard to the paying party’s ability to pay.

40. The approach to be followed when dealing with an application for costs was helpfully set out in Millin v Capsticks LLP UKEAT/0093/14/RN at paragraph 52 and also Robinson v Hall Gregory Recruitment Ltd [2014] IRLR 761 at paragraph 15.

41. In summary there are three stages, first the tribunal must be of the opinion that the paying party has behaved in a manner referred to in the Rules, but if of that opinion, it does not have to make a costs order. It has still to decide whether, at a second stage, it is “appropriate” to do so. In reaching that decision it may take account of the ability of the paying party to pay. Having decided that there should be a costs order of some amount, the third stage is to determine what that amount should be.

42. The fact that a party is a litigant in person is a relevant consideration even at the first stage when determining whether any of the grounds for an order are made out. The EAT has cautioned tribunals not to apply professional standards to lay people and reminded tribunals that even where the thresholds are met the Tribunal still has a discretion whether to award costs - AQ Ltd v Holden [2012] IRLR 648 (at paragraph 32). Nevertheless, a cost order can be made against an unrepresented party, including where there is no deposit order in place and even in the absence of a costs warning – [NAME_304] v London Borough of Lewisham IRLR 713. In that case the court held that “the basis on which the costs threshold was crossed was not any conduct which could readily be attributed to the appellant’s lack of experience as a litigant” rather it was “her fundamentally unreasonable appreciation of the behaviour of her employers and colleagues” (paragraph 25).

Conduct – Rule 74(2)(a)

43. As regards vexatious, abusive, disruptive or otherwise unreasonable conduct, the term vexatious has been held to mean the bringing of a hopeless claim not with any expectation of recovering compensation, but brought out of spite to harass the employer or for some other improper motive – ET Marler Ltd v Robertson [1974] ICR 72 (paragraph 76). However, being misguided is not the same as vexatious or unreasonable – [NAME_168] (at paragraph 38).

44. In Scott v Russell [2013] EWCA Civ 143, CA the Court of Appeal endorsed a wider definition of vexatious as espoused by Lord Bingham in Attorney General v Barker [2000] 1 FLR 759, QBD as follows - “the hallmark of a vexatious proceeding is… that it has little or no basis in law (or at least no discernible basis); that whatever the intention of the proceedings may be, its effect is to subject the defendant to inconvenience, harassment and expense out of all proportion to any gain likely to accrue to the claimant, and

9 that it involves an abuse of the process of the court, meaning by that a use of the court process for a purpose or in a way which is significantly different from the ordinary and proper use of the court process.” The implication from that definition is that it is the effect of the conduct which is key rather than the motivation behind it.

45. The term vexatious may apply to both the bringing and the conducting of the proceedings, and such a finding is rare as it is often described as unreasonable conduct even where there is shown to have been an improper motive. In [NAME_309] v [NAME_36] of All Saints Church of England [COMPANY_6] [1991] ICR 493 costs were awarded where the claimant had been “motivated by resentment and spite in bringing the proceedings” and where there was “virtually nothing to support his allegations of race discrimination.”

46. There is no definition of abusive or disruptive conduct within the Rules, however in the case of [NAME_175] v London Borough of Lambeth EAT 1237/97, the EAT upheld a costs order on this basis where it had included conduct that was frivolous and involved failure to comply with orders and delays, oppressive behaviour and seeking to ambush the other party in the hearing. Abusive conduct may include gratuitous insults or unsubstantiated slurs, and disruptive may include excessive prolixity and time wasting, unnecessarily lengthy or aggressive cross examination of witnesses or calling unnecessary witnesses, and failing to respect the Tribunal’’s attempts to manage the claim and maintain an orderly hearing. Such a finding is more likely where a party has been warned about the conduct but nevertheless continues with that conduct.

47. As regards unreasonably bringing or conducting proceedings, the word unreasonable should bear its ordinary English meaning and is not to be interpreted as something similar to vexatious – [NAME_176] v Secretary of State for Employment EAT 183/83. Whereas a tribunal should take into account the nature, gravity and effect of a party’s unreasonable conduct, it does not mean that each should be considered separately – [NAME_179] v Barnsley Metropolitan Council and another [2012] ICR 1398 (at paragraph 41). It will be for the tribunal to look at the full picture of the conduct, identifying the specific conduct, what was unreasonable about it, and what effect that conduct had.

48. In [NAME_179] the court clarified that whereas causation is a relevant factor it is not necessary for a tribunal to determine whether there was a precise causal link between the unreasonable conduct in question and the specific costs being claimed, and as indicated above, it is not a requirement for a tribunal to dissect a case in detail and compartmentalise the relevant conduct under separate headings such as nature, gravity and effect. The tribunal’s task will be to look at the whole picture of what happened and to ask whether there has been unreasonable conduct by the claimant in bringing and conducting the case and in doing so to identify the conduct, what was unreasonable about it, and what affect it had. Subsequent cases have again encouraged tribunals not to go beyond an appropriate broad brush first instance assessment or to adopt an overly-analytical approach.

49. Conduct occurring outside of the bringing or the conducting of the claim may not necessarily give rise to the power to make an order for costs – there must be some relationship to the proceedings. Posting messages on social

10 media may have some connection to the proceedings if they were intended intimidate the witness from giving evidence or to influence what evidence they may give.

50. In [NAME_311] v Scadden and others [1999] IRLR 700 it was observed that a party’s conduct may straddle one or more of descriptions used in what is now Rule 74(2) and it is not necessary to labour the distinctions between those different words.

No reasonable prospects of success – Rule 74(2)(b)

51. The test as to whether a claim had any reasonable prospects of success is an objective one, the fact that the claimant genuinely believed that she was correct is immaterial, the key question is whether the claimant had any reasonable grounds for so thinking – [NAME_304].

52. It may be a relevant factor for a tribunal to consider whether the paying party has received legal advice or is acting as a litigant in person. Costs may be awarded from the point at which it was clear that the claim had no reasonable prospects of success and this requires careful analysis of when that occurred. The Tribunal should consider the overall picture available to a claimant at the outset, for examples as regards the strengths and weaknesses for competing explanations for the conduct complained of – Keighley v Age UK Leeds EAT 0229/19. It might also be appropriate to consider when the documentary evidence became available to the claimant.

53. In [NAME_310] the court held that at paragraph 8:

“A party who, despite having had an apparently conclusive opposition to his case made plain to him, persists with the case down to the hearing in the 'Micawberish' hope that something might turn up and yet who does not even take such steps open to him to see whether anything is likely to turn up, runs a risk, when nothing does turn up, that he will be regarded as having been at least unreasonable in the conduct of his litigation.”

54. When determining reasonable prospects of success the tribunal must consider each cause of action separately – Opalkova v Acquire Care Ltd EAT 0056/21 (at paragraphs 21 and 27). It may be appropriate to consider whether the claim had no reasonable prospects of success when submitted, or did it reach a stage where it had no reasonable prospect? Secondly at the stage when the claim had no reasonable prospect of success, did the claimant know that was the case? Thirdly, if not, should the claimant have known?

55. In Cartiers Superfoods Ltd v Laws [1978] IRLR 315 the court held that in order to determine whether a party had acted friviously, it was necessary “to look and see what that party knew or ought to have known if they had gone about the matter sensibly.” (paragraph 18)

56. The test is whether the claim had no reasonable prospects of success, judged on the basis of the information that was known or reasonably available from the start – we must consider how the prospects of success

11 in a trial that has yet to take place would have looked. We should consider what information was available at that time. The fact of a factual dispute which can only be resolved by hearing evidence and finding facts does not preclude a tribunal from finding that the claim had no reasonable prospects of success from the outset – Radia v Jefferies International Ltd EAT 0007/18. The questions to be asked are:

i. Did the complaints in fact have no reasonable prospects of success? ii. Did the Claimant in fact know or appreciate that? iii. Ought they reasonably to have known or appreciated that?

57. In Saka v Fitzroy Robinson Ltd EAT 0241/00 the EAT referred to the:

“very real difficulties which face a claimant in a discrimination claim”, that there is often a lack of overt evidence and so “it may be and often is very difficult for the claimant to know whether or not he has real prospects of success until the explanation of the employer’s conduct which is the subject of complaint is heard, seen and tested” [10]

58. The court in Madu v Loughborough College [2025] IRLR 497 made similar comments in the context of discrimination claims. Here HHJ Tayler encouraged tribunals to give consideration to the challenge to claimants in taking an objective view of their prospects of success (paragraph 15), although the court made it clear that this does not give any kind of immunity to discrimination claimants as regards costs orders (paragraph 21).

Stage two – exercise of the discretion

59. A tribunal has a discretion whether to make an order for costs if a ground is made out, the tribunal is not obliged to do so. It would be an error to go straight from the first stage to the third stage without considering the question of whether the Tribunal should exercise its discretion – Abaya v Leeds Teaching Hospital NHS Trust UKEAT/0258/16.

60. The burden rests with the party who is applying for costs to establish that the costs jurisdiction is engaged. Cost orders are fact specific and should be dealt with as summarily as possible therefore issue based costs orders are to be avoided. We must take into account all that which appears relevant and disregard that which is not.

61. In [NAME_179] the court reiterated that it remains the case that cost orders in the Tribunal are rare, they are the exception and not the rule and further:

“41. The vital point in exercising the discretion to order costs is to look at the whole picture of what happened in the case and to ask whether there has been unreasonable conduct by the claimant in bringing and conducting the case and, in doing so, to identify the conduct, what was unreasonable about it and what effects it had ...”

62. It was held in Gee v Shell UK Limited [2003] IRLR 82:

“35. It is nevertheless a very important feature of the employment jurisdiction that it is designed to be accessible to people without the need of

12 lawyers, and that — in sharp distinction from ordinary litigation in the United Kingdom — losing does not ordinarily mean paying the other side’s costs…”

63. Moreover as per Lodwick v Southwark London Borough Council [2004] ICR 884 (at paragraph 23) costs are compensatory for the receiving party and are not intended to be punitive on the paying party. Given their compensatory nature that will involve consideration of the loss sustained and these should be limited to those which are reasonably and necessarily incurred.

64. When determining whether to exercise our discretion we may have regard to the paying party’s ability to pay. It is unnecessary for the assessment of means to be limited to the date when the order falls to be made, and the fact that the ability to pay is currently limited does not preclude a costs order being made where there is a realistic prospect that the paying party may be able to afford to pay at some point in the future – [NAME_304].

65. It may again be appropriate at this second stage to consider the position of the paying party or whether they had outside support (for example from a trade union) when considering whether to make an order.

66. The fact that a costs warning has been issued by a party is a relevant factor to take into consideration although it is not a pre-condition for an order to be made. It may be relevant factor to consider whether the party seeking costs applied for a preliminary hearing for a strike out of the claim or a deposit order in the alternative.

67. It may be a relevant factor to consider the extent to which a party has acted under legal advice – Brooks v Nottingham University Hospital NHS Trust EAT 0246/18. It may be appropriate to exercise the discretion in favour of a costs order where a party unreasonably fails to take legal advice and persists with a hopeless claim to a final hearing. The fact that a party is unrepresented may be a relevant factor to consider in the exercise of discretion – [NAME_168], and that a tribunal should not judge a litigant in person by the same standards of a professional representative and it was further held:

“32… lay people are likely to lack the objectivity and knowledge of law and practice brought by a professional legal adviser. Tribunals must bear this in mind when assessing the threshold tests in rule 40(3) . Further, even if the threshold tests for an order for costs are met, the Tribunal has discretion whether to make an order. This discretion will be exercised having regard to all the circumstances. It is not irrelevant that a lay person may have brought proceedings with little or no access to specialist help and advice.

33. This is not to say that lay people are immune from orders for costs: far from it, as the cases make clear. Some litigants in person are found to have behaved vexatiously or unreasonably even when proper allowance is made for their inexperience and lack of objectivity…”

68. The Tribunal Rules do not oblige tribunals to remind parties that they are at risk of costs, and the judicial sift stage under Rule 27 only considers whether there are arguable complaints and defences.

13 69. Again, and as per the decision in [NAME_312], it may also be appropriate to consider the nature of the evidence available to the claimant and also the nature of the claim, and whether it would be reasonable for the claimant to test the evidence at a final hearing. It may only be at a final hearing that a claimant can understand whether they have any prospects of success once the employer’s conduct is explained and tested. In [NAME_304] the claimant had made allegations of discrimination, harassment and whistleblowing which were complicated, however the costs threshold was crossed because of the claimant’s fundamental unreasonable appreciation of the behaviour of her employer and colleagues rather than due to her lack of experience.

Stage three – the amount of the order

70. We remind ourselves that cost orders should be compensatory in nature not punitive. It is necessary to consider what loss has been caused to the receiving party and costs should be limited to those reasonably and necessarily incurred – [NAME_315]. Even where a loss is identified, it is still necessary to take into account other factors such as the conduct of the parties, and the tribunal may take into account the means of the paying party. Means includes income, expenditure and capital or assets including property – Shields Automative Ltd v Grieg UKEAT/0024/10 [47].

71. Where means are taken into account a tribunal should record its findings about the ability to pay a costs order. Where means are not taken into account a tribunal should explain why – Jilley v Birmingham and Solihull Mental Health NHS Trust UKEAT/0584/06 (paragraph 44). There is no absolute duty on a tribunal to take ability to pay into account – [NAME_316]; and “a tribunal has a broad and unfettered discretion whether to have regard to a paying party’s ability to pay” – QR v The GI Group Ltd [2025] EAT 178 (paragraph 61).

72. A tribunal is not required to limit costs to an amount the paying party can afford to pay – Arrowsmith v Nottingham Trent University [2012] ICR 159 as that party’s circumstances may well improve. The likelihood of an improvement in circumstances may be a relevant factor to consider, and in [NAME_304] an order was upheld even though the claimant could not presently meet a substantial payment however there was a realistic prospect that she might be able to do so in the future. Whatever order is made would need to be enforced in the county court which can take into account means from time to time. In [NAME_304] the court stated that questions of what a party could realistically pay over a reasonable period:

“are very open-ended, and we see nothing wrong in principle in the tribunal setting the cap at a level which gives the respondents the benefit of any doubt, eve to a generous extent. It must be recalled that affordability is not, as such, the sole criterion for the exercise of the discretion: accordingly a nice estimate of what can be afforded is not essential” (paragraph 29).

73. In that case the tribunal noted that the claimant was out of work at the time the order was made and had no savings or capital assets, nevertheless the court noted there was no reason to assume the claimant would not return to their chosen career at some point in the future and the question of affordability does not have to be decided “once and for all by reference to

14 the party’s means as at the moment the order falls to be made” so that “if there is a realistic prospect that the [claimant] might at some point in the future be able to pay a substantial amount it was legitimate to make a costs order in that amount so that the respondents would be able to make some recovery when and if that occurred” (paragraph 28). The court nevertheless said that it accepted the force of the argument that it would be pointless (and not a proper exercise of discretion) to require the appellant to pay more, even in the optimistic scenario envisaged, than she could realistically pay over a reasonable period.”

74. In Herry v Dudley Metropolitan Council [2017] ICR 610 the court held that where a tribunal has had regard to the ability to pay, it must show that it has given proper consideration to matters such as future earning capacity and where appropriate, alternatives to making a whole costs order.

75. The tribunal may make an award of unassessed costs which cannot exceed £20,000, or it may make an order for detailed assessments of costs for which there is no limit which must be determined in accordance with the Civil Procedure Rules.

76. The reference to unassessed cost does not mean that the figure should be entirely arbitrary and it should be in respect of costs incurred by the receiving party therefore the tribunal must state on what basis it is awarding any sum of costs; on what basis it arrives at the sum; and why costs are being awarded against the party in question - [COMPANY_317] and another v [NAME_318] 0087/09.

77. As regards the choice between summary and detailed assessment, the court held in Kovacs v Queen Mary and Westfield College [2002] IRLR 414 that the power to make a summary assessment within the capped amount is intended to be exercised where the tribunal both feels able to make it, and is satisfied that that it would properly compensate the other party for the costs attributable to the vexatious, abusive, disruptive or unreasonable conduct which has led to the decision to make an order for costs (paragraphs 35 and 38). The court observed that a tribunal should not use its power to make a summary assessment where this would not properly compensate the other parry for the costs incurred by reason of the culpable conduct in question.

78. The Civil Procedure Rules provide two bases for assessing costs – the standard basis which is the usual method, and also the indemnity basis – CPR 44.3(1).

79. The tribunal has the power to order costs to be assessed on the indemnity basis in an appropriate case however this should not be regarded as penal rather it is intended to be compensatory. The exercise of the discretion to order costs to be assessed on the indemnity basis is not restricted to situations where there had been deception or underhand conduct – [NAME_310].

80. The court in Howman v The Queen Elizabeth Hospital Kings Lynn UKEAT/0509/12 held that “costs incurred in proceedings in employment tribunals should only be assessed on the indemnity rather than the standard basis when the conduct of the paying party has taken the situation away

15 from even that very limited number of cases in the employment tribunal here it is appropriate to make orders” (paragraph 10). Accordingly, it is not enough to meet the threshold for an award of costs – the abusive or unreasonable conduct should be so extreme that it is has taken the situation way from the limited number of cases where costs orders are made, into a separate category.

81. If costs are assessed on the indemnity basis, this does not involve the application of a punishment upon the paying party. Rather it reflects the conclusion that in the circumstances of the case, where there are doubts about the reasonableness of particular costs, these should be resolved in favour of the receiving party. Conversely, where costs are awarded on the standard basis, which is the usual method of assessment, any doubt about the reasonableness of specific costs are resolved in favour of the paying party.

Respondent’s Submissions

82. We received written submissions from the Respondent, and in her oral submissions [NAME_29] first addressed the second costs order that the Respondent invited us to make under Rules 74(2)(a) on the basis that the Claimant had acted vexatiously, abusively, disruptively or otherwise unreasonably in either the bringing of the proceedings, or part of it, or the way that the proceedings, or part of it, have been conducted; and Rule 74(2)(b) that any claim had no reasonable prospect of success.

No reasonable prospects of success – Rule 74(2)(b)

83. With respect the claim’s prospects of success, [NAME_29] referred us to Issue 7.1 where the Claimant alleged that the entire drama department did not respond to her offers of help, and she had said that this amounted to direct race discrimination and harassment. We had found that there was no less favorable treatment, and no unwanted conduct related to race, and we also recorded that the Claimant failed to put the claim to the Respondent’s witnesses, and her statement was silent on the matter, and these complaints were totally without merit (see liability judgment paragraphs 298- 310).

84. [NAME_29] said that whereas the Claimant is a litigant in person and she is not to be held to the same standard of knowledge as a lawyer, nevertheless it should have been immediately obvious to the Claimant that based on contemporaneous documents and emails, that there was nothing amiss, let alone anything discriminatory, and this would have been apparent had the Claimant (or anyone) looked at it sensibly with any ounce of realism. The Respondent says that both [NAME_240] and [NAME_215] had to be called as witnesses as a result.

85. As regards Issue 7.3 which related to alleged persistent mistakes in the spelling of the Claimant’s name, [NAME_29] reminded us of our finding that there was one typo which had nothing whatsoever to do with race, and the Claimant’s own name was not even linked to her race. We are reminded that the allegation was not put to the witness by the Claimant and she did not suggest any link to any protected characteristic in the hearing, and this meant a third unnecessary witness was called for a claim we found to be

16 totally without merit. (see liability judgment paragraphs 326-329).

86. [NAME_29] said the Respondent was again put to expenditure of legal costs preparing witness statements and preparing the witnesses themselves for the hearing, without the Claimant giving any single thought as to the time and cost to the Respondent (and the stress caused to individuals) nor to the resources of the Tribunal.

87. As regards Issue 14.1 which related to alleged flirtation by [NAME_10], [NAME_29] reminds us of our finding that the Claimant’s presentation of the claim had been quite extraordinary, and that this was the clearest unarguable example of the Tribunal process being used to advance a personal agenda irrespective of the damage it caused, and we had found the allegation to be an abuse of process and brought in order to continue to harass [NAME_10].

88. [NAME_29] said the Claimant continued with this conduct even after [ADDRESS] had found the Claimant’s actions had been designed to threaten and to harass and to intimidate [NAME_10]. We were reminded that we had recorded in the liability judgment that there was no evidence to support the allegation that [NAME_10] had harassed the Claimant, and rather the evidence was all the other way around. [NAME_29] says that this brings the total number of unnecessary witnesses thus far to four.

89. We are further reminded that [NAME_10] was so affected by his treatment by the Claimant that he could not attend the hearing in person, and did so by video, and with support in place, and [NAME_29] says that none of that should have been necessary, it was not a genuine claim and the Claimant was pursuing an alternative agenda and the costs associated with his evidence and defending that claim should not be borne by the Respondent. (see liability judgment paragraphs 359-368).

90. [NAME_29] referred us to other complaints where the Claimant failed to put the complaints to the witnesses which might on occasion be excusable, however I had intervened to assist the Claimant to remind her to do so, but she still failed to ask witnesses about the things they were accused of. We are reminded that the Claimant alleged that [NAME_222] had discriminated against her by not responding to her emails, however in the hearing she did not put that allegation to the witness and told us that she was beyond reproach (see liability judgment paragraph 234). [NAME_29] says that this was a fifth unnecessary witness.

91. [NAME_29] reminds us that the Claimant did not put to any of the other witnesses the separate allegation about not replying to emails at Issue 7.2 (see liability judgment paragraph 324), and similarly she did not put the allegation with respect to poor communication skills and [NAME_25] concerns (Issue 7.4) to the relevant witnesses either (see liability judgment paragraph 339). The same is true of allegation 7.6 which was not put to the witness (see liability judgment paragraphs 341, 344).

92. As regards Issue 7.7 regarding the requirement to put [NAME_25] reports through Wellbeing Manager, we are reminded that we found that the Claimant had not pursued this allegation with the witness nor indicated how this was even linked to her race (see liability judgment paragraph 350).

17 93. As regards Issue 7.8 regarding [NAME_243] declining to allocate the Claimant [NAME_204] to the Claimant, we are reminded that the Claimant had accused [NAME_243] of this conduct and then accepted in the hearing he had not made the decision, therefore the Respondent says that he was a further unnecessary witness bringing the total to six. (see liability judgment paragraphs 351-358). [NAME_29] says that the Claimant knew everything she needed to know about the allegation at the time of the events and she had the responses from day one, and it would have been immediately obvious that the Respondent had not done anything wrong had the Claimant gone about it sensibly. We are told that evidence needed to be prepared for the witness to defend a hopeless claim, and one which, like other complaints, the Claimant failed to put the allegation to the witness.

94. Finally with respect to Issue 14.2 concerning allegations that the Respondent had informed prospective employers that the Claimant’s communications were unprofessional, we are reminded yet again that this was not put to the witness and we are told that significant expense was incurred in preparing witness evidence.

95. [NAME_29] argues that all of the above came at considerable cost to the Respondent but they should not be borne by [COMPANY_26], and the complaints either had no reasonable prospects of success, or were not pursued in anything resembling a reasonable manner, and if a party does not put their case to a witness they cannot expect the complaints to succeed. [NAME_29] says that in addition to relying on all the above for the application under Rule 74(2(b) they are also relied upon under Rule 74(2)(a) as well. [NAME_29] argued that the Claimant had not just met the costs threshold, but she has met it by a mile.

96. [NAME_29] said that the Claimant had been warned about these complaints time and time again but the Respondent ended up having to defend them. In addition [NAME_29] says that it would be open to the Respondent to apply for its entire legal costs however it wished to take a proportionate approach and apply for a limited portion of its costs of defending the complaints, and it asks for the costs of up to 30-35% of defending the entire claim, which is roughly calculated on the basis of the six witnesses which it says were not needed as the complaints were not put to those witnesses.

Vexatious, abusive, disruptive or otherwise unreasonable conduct of proceedings – Rule 74(2)(a)

97. The Respondent relies upon the same matters under Rule 74(2)(b) for its application under Rule 74(2)(a). In addition, the Respondent refers to what it says is disruptive and unreasonable conduct on the part of the Claimant, up to and including the final hearing, including things done by her in order to harass [NAME_10] which was vexatious conduct. The Respondent says that the original hearing did not complete in the original trial window due to the Claimant’s conduct which caused wholly unnecessary delays through the hearing.

98. The Respondent refers to paragraphs 17-78 of the liability judgment where I set out in detail what had happened during the hearing each day, recording the amount of time lost and wasted due to (i) the Claimant’s wholly

18 unnecessary and unmeritorious repetitive applications which took up substantial hearing time; (ii) wholly unsubstantiated allegations made during the course of the final hearing which required adjournments in order to clarify matters; and (iii) repeated failure to comply with my directions on how to conduct herself during the hearing.

99. The Respondent says that there was ample time to deal with the evidence in five days in a case concerning only five months of employment with the Respondent. The Respondent says that going part heard was for the benefit of the Claimant notwithstanding her conduct was the cause of going part heard, and this is not a benefit given routinely to those who delay, and this caused additional costs to the Respondent, comprising counsel fees and solicitor costs, as well as the additional cost of the sixth day, together with the cost of producing purely written submissions.

100. The Respondent says that the Claimant was warned about her conduct and issued with a costs warning from me during the hearing but all of these went unheeded, and every day there were more applications from the Claimant and more delays caused by her, and that the conduct identified in the liability judgment at paragraphs 17-78 easily meets the threshold of unreasonable conduct of litigation under Rule 74(2)(a).

101. As to the costs being sought, the Respondent says that it is seeking the whole of its legal costs incurred due to the fact of the final hearing going part heard after day five of the final hearing on 12 October 2024 and then being relisted for an additional sixth day on 9 January 2025.

Costs order dated 16 April 2024

102. The Respondent draws our attention to paragraph 202 of the preliminary hearing judgment of [ADDRESS] where the judge summarises the Claimant’s behaviour:

“The claimant has not displayed these standards of expected behaviour. Having reviewed the evidence, which is voluminous, I have no doubt in finding that the claimant’s conduct, taken as a whole, was scandalous and unreasonable. Her behaviour was clearly motivated by the desire to cause the respondent and a number of individuals, including key witnesses, as much inconvenience, distress, embarrassment and expense as possible. She has embarked on a multi-faceted campaign of harassment, threatening and intimidating behaviour including making unsubstantiated allegations to the police concerning [NAME_9]’ behaviour. The claimant has attempted to have [NAME_13] removed from his position of Chair of the [NAME_80] and she has accused [NAME_11] of threats of violence and fraud and has made very serious allegations to third parties including professional regulators. Her behaviour towards [NAME_15] has also been hostile and intimidating including reporting named individuals in that firm to the SRA in circumstances that have been motivated by her anger that [NAME_15] were not prepared to stop acting for the respondent’s key witnesses rather than having any underlying merit as to the substance of an allegation of professional misconduct.”

103. We are also referred to paragraph 208 of the judgment where [ADDRESS] sets out the reasons for making a cost order against the Claimant:

[redacted]

“I now turn to the respondent’s costs application. In so doing, I am mindful of the fact that the claimant is a litigant in person. Notwithstanding this, the overwhelming body of evidence concerning the claimant’s behaviour justifies its characterisation as being abusive, disruptive and unreasonable in the manner in which the claimant has conducted these proceedings. Consequently, the costs jurisdiction is engaged. I find that given the egregious, multifaceted and sustained nature of the claimant’s behaviour, it would be appropriate for the Tribunal to exercise its discretion in awarding costs against the claimant. In her closing submissions, [NAME_29] acknowledged that it would not be practicable for the Tribunal, at this hearing to determine the amount of any award. There was simply no time to do so. I agree. This is something that will have to be dealt with by the Tribunal at a later date, either at a separate costs hearing before the final hearing, at the final hearing or after the final hearing.”

104. We are referred to the following sections of the preliminary hearing judgment where [ADDRESS] based his above conclusions on the Claimant having undertaken the conduct listed below.

Conduct Paragraph number of [ADDRESS]’s judgment The Claimant’s correspondence with employees, officers and agents of the Respondent including the Respondent’s potential witnesses, ignoring requests not to contact witnesses direct – 23 incidents identified 22-24, 163 Unfounded allegations of insurance fraud, conspiracy to defraud and misappropriation of public funds; allegations of fraud against [NAME_9] 26-28, 167-170 Unfounded allegations that [NAME_9] threatened the Claimant with physical violence online and the suggestion that [NAME_9] may be incited to violence against the Claimant 39-45, 171-175 Unfounded allegations of faking and modifying evidence, including accusing [NAME_28] of tampering with the evidence 46,-58, 176-179

20 Derogatory, misleading and/or defamatory comments to third parties 59-61, 180-181 Allegations that the Respondent, [NAME_11] and [NAME_13] are defying Department for Education Regulations 63-70, 182-183 Rude, aggressive and threatening communications to and/or about staff 71-77, 184 Abuse of the Tribunal process - claims not within jurisdiction of the Employment Tribunal 78-86, 189, 193, 195, 198 Unreasonable conduct of proceedings - Claimant's disclosure 87-100, 198 Unreasonable and vexatious conduct towards [NAME_15] 102-107, 200 Acting with malicious intent to threaten, harass and intimidate, with actions that were designed to cause stress and anxiety 44-45. 61, 70. 166, 167, 170-175, 181, 183, 202, 205

105. As to the value of the costs, the Respondent invites us to make an award of the whole of the costs incurred by the Respondent as a result of the conduct listed in the table above, subject to a detailed assessment, on the basis that there is no other possible way of adequately compensating the Respondent for the legal costs incurred due to the conduct referenced above.

106. As to the question of the Claimant’s ability to pay, the Respondent says that the Claimant has had numerous opportunities to evidence her means, particularly so by the very detailed letter I directed to be sent on 4 November 2025 where I reminded the Claimant that if she does not provide evidence of her means then it cannot be taken into account. The Respondent says that the only evidence from the Claimant is the EX 107 form (for the transcript) which is two years old and out of date, and no evidence of means has been provided. The Respondent says that if we were minded to consider the Claimant’s means that we should look not just at what we know of the Claimant’s means now, but also look to the Claimant’s future potential means – the Respondent relies upon the judgments in Arrowsmith and also [NAME_304] in this regard.

107. As to the method of calculation of costs, the Respondent invites us to order that they be assessed on the indemnity basis on account that the

21 abusive and unreasonable conduct has been so extreme that it has taken the situation away from the limited number of cases where costs orders are made, into a separate category – reliance is placed on the judgments in [NAME_310].

Claimant’s submissions

108. The Claimant delivered her oral submissions on the afternoon of 28 April 2026.

109. Much of the Claimant’s oral submissions did not address the Respondent’s application for costs and instead consisted of the Claimant rehearsing historic grievances against the Respondent and its lawyers, and also against previous Employment Judges. I repeatedly reminded the Claimant to focus her attention on the cost order of [ADDRESS] and the Respondent’s second cost application, however the Claimant did not heed the guidance.

110. We took into consideration that the Claimant is a litigant in person, and when she was repeating her complaints about the Respondent she was, in effect, trying to tell us that she thought that she had legitimate grounds of complaint in the first place.

111. The Claimant told us she did not have a choice but to bring the claim as she had been out of work for three years which she said was due to the Respondent’s reference. The Claimant said various laws had been broken, and not just employment law but also statutory guidance for schools. I attempted to explain to the Claimant that guidance is not the law, and moreover we do not have jurisdiction over that matter, however the Claimant appeared to reject this and carried on regardless.

112. The Claimant said it was the Respondent’s choice and not hers to bring the number of witnesses that it had. The Claimant then sought to distance herself from the complaints she had brought by suggesting that it was Employment Judge Tynan at an earlier preliminary hearing who had helped to put the claim together and the Claimant told me that she did not consider the conduct of the witnesses as racism but that she was illustrating the culture of the then head [NAME_20]. The Claimant agreed that the people she had accused of not responding to her emails had come to see her in person, and whereas she admitted saying in the liability hearing that [NAME_241] had been above reproach, the Claimant said that she had misrepresented facts to the Tribunal.

113. The Claimant referenced her complaints to the police which she said she had not wanted to trouble them with, however she said they had told her to hold fire with some evidence, and she said that a statement produced by a police [NAME_30] referred to in the proceedings had been riddled with errors. The Claimant complained that she had been prevented from bringing or presenting her evidence about the alleged police investigation.

114. The Claimant said it was true that she was not effective at questioning [NAME_10] in the hearing which she attributed to aphasia, and she then went on to reference other matters concerning him which [ADDRESS] had previously told her could not be pursued.

22

115. As regards the complaint about misspelling her name, the Claimant disagreed with the finding that this happened once as she explained that after the hearing she identified other occasions when it had happened and that it has lasting consequences upon her as it prevented her from doing her job for a month.

116. As regards the complaint about being required to file reports using Wellbeing Manager, the Claimant appeared to misunderstand her own claim as she told us she had reported risks directly to the manager.

117. The Claimant repeated that she did not think that the Respondent’s witnesses were racist, rather she said her complaint was that they did not have policies in place to address unconscious bias – again this was not the claim the Claimant had pursued.

118. The Claimant argued that the Respondent should not be using its funds to pay for legal representation, and she made further criticism of Judge Tynan for removing [NAME_141] as a named Respondent. Criticisms were made of [ADDRESS], the Claimant accused him of over reliance on the issue of insurance as he mentioned it, she said, 33 times in his preliminary hearing judgment. The Claimant accused [ADDRESS] of failing to deal with things she had raised such as missed deadlines and disclosure issues, she said had been prevented at the preliminary hearing from cross examining witnesses, and he did not deal with her allegations that the Respondent had tampered with evidence.

119. Whereas the Claimant criticised the Respondent for calling too many witnesses, she also told us she never agreed to a hearing estimate of five days, rather she said she was not able to say how long the case needed. The Claimant said she was accused of having a malicious intent but her goal was to try and get a job yet she had been accused of sending unprofessional communications.

120. The Claimant then made the outrageous and scandalous comment about the Respondent’s counsel’s hair which I directed to her withdraw, following which the Claimant burst into laughter. I directed the Claimant to take the proceedings more seriously, after which the Claimant complained that she had been named in an article by the [NAME_319] – this had absolutely no relevance either to the Respondent’s cost application.

121. The Claimant accused [NAME_28] of leaving out her evidence, and she alleged I had refused to allow her evidence. The Claimant referred to being asked by [NAME_28] to cease contacting the Respondent’s witnesses direct, and this is something which [ADDRESS] referred to in his judgment. The Claimant denied that she had done so, she told me that when she left the Respondent she was locked out of the domain so did not have access to ways to contact them so she had not done so.

122. The Claimant then referred me to an email of 23 December 2023 which she suggested showed she was not threatening witnesses, and in doing so she drew to my attention that she had written to one of the Respondent’s witnesses direct during the life of the claim. When I put this

23 to the Claimant, the Claimant denied that she had contacted anyone. I reminded the Claimant that this was an email from her home address to the Respondent’s witness after the claim had started, and the Claimant told me that it was not contact as she had put in the email that the witness did not have to reply if she did not want to, and furthermore her emails were blocked so the witness never received it.

123. The Claimant accused Employment Judge Warren of writing up Judge Tynan’s case management orders, and she complained that the Respondent had referred her to the [NAME_53] for retaining its data. The Claimant repeated allegations that [NAME_28] had tampered with evidence and her evidence was disallowed, and she denied that any of her claims had been vexatious.

124. The Claimant criticised the Respondent for what she described as its cleverly orchestrated order of witnesses which prevented her from asking questions she wished to ask, and she criticised me for not recalling one witness. The Claimant repeated a third time that she did not think that the Respondent’s witnesses carried out acts of “direct racism” rather she said that the complaint was that the Respondent did not enforce good communication.

125. I raised with the Claimant that she had in fact pursued allegations of direct race discrimination, the Claimant replied that she only accused [NAME_141] of direct bias and she did not know the mindset of the other 13 witnesses. I asked the Claimant if she was saying that there was a problem with the list of issues which she had previously agreed, to which the Claimant criticised me and previous judges of refusing her amendments to the claim and forcing her to stick to the list of issues.

126. The Claimant started to repeat complaints of delays with witness statements and evidence being left out, and that the Respondent would not agree facts with her.

127. The Claimant concluded that she was just a person trying to understand the process; being able to type does not mean that she is not disabled; it was absurd to apply for costs against her and the sums claimed were also absurd; and this was about a grievance process not being followed.

Conclusions

128. We will start with the Respondent’s second application for costs (dated 11 April 2025) and go through the three stage test.

Stage one – are the grounds made out?

129. We start with whether the claim or parts of it had no reasonable prospects of success under Rule 74(2)(b).

130. Within issue 7.1 the Claimant had alleged that the entire drama department, including [NAME_240] and [NAME_215], had not responded to her offers to help with the drama department at the outset of her employment. This was alleged to have been direct race discrimination as

24 well as harassment related to race. The factual premise of that complaint was not established as those individuals had either replied to emails or spoke to the Claimant in person or the emails did not necessitate a response. We found the complaint to be totally without merit and in the costs hearing the Claimant accepted people had spoken to her in person.

131. This is a claim the Claimant would have known from the start was going to fail as she knew that she had received responses, and the Claimant did not even put the discrimination allegation to the witnesses. It is a claim which should never have been brought in the first place, and it is a claim which has materially increased the Respondent’s legal costs, and whereas two witnesses were called to deal with it, a number of the other witnesses also had to provide disclosure and address the complaint in their statements together with their other evidence to us.

132. Within issue 7.3 the Claimant alleged that there had been persistent mistakes in the spelling of the Claimant’s name by the Examination Department in the first half term of her period of employment with the Respondent. This too was alleged to have been direct race discrimination and harassment related to race. This is another claim where the factual premise had not been made out. There was one typo on one occasion, and it had nothing whatsoever to do with race, and moreover the Claimant’s surname had nothing whatsoever to do with her own race. This is a complaint which was not put to the witness as an act of discrimination or harassment, and it was a wholly unreasonable and disproportionate response to accuse someone in the Employment Tribunal of discrimination and harassment due to one simple typing error. The Respondent was put to legal expenditure of preparing a witness and providing evidence for a complaint which was not even properly pursued before us, and again we marked this complaint as being totally without merit.

133. Within issue 14.1 the Claimant accused [NAME_10] of flirting with her, for example suggesting that she should teach him salsa, and on her sending a text message making clear that she rejected his advances, [NAME_10] thereafter avoided her. This was alleged to have been harassment related to sex and direct sex discrimination. We recorded in the liability judgment that the Claimant’s presentation of the complaint had been quite extraordinary.

134. The Claimant never explained what this alleged flirtation as said to be; it was never even put to [NAME_10] who had to attend the hearing in a very anxious condition due to the Claimant’s behaviour; we found that [NAME_10] had never asked the Claimant to teach him salsa; and the evidence quite clearly showed the Claimant repeatedly pursuing [NAME_10] even when (i) he stopped engaging with her; and (ii) he politely but directly asked her to cease contacting him unless it was an emergency. The Claimant’s response to dress up mundane and irrelevant matters as emergencies when they were nothing of the sort and when they did not concern [NAME_10] in the first place.

135. The Claimant wasted the whole of the cross examination with [NAME_10] asking him totally irrelevant matters, including whether he liked sushi. The Claimant’s behaviour towards [NAME_10] was deeply troubling, and her closing submissions referring to their relationship as a marriage, when in fact they were line manager and subordinate, was very revealing to us. This complaint was totally without merit, and again it materially increased the

25 Respondent’s legal costs by having to address it in [NAME_10]’s witness statement and providing disclosure, as well as taking up tribunal time hearing cross examination on totally irrelevant matters. It was an abuse of process to have brought this claim in the first place as the Claimant pursued the complaint knowing it was untrue from the start.

136. Within issue 7.2 the Claimant alleged staff did not reply her emails, and [NAME_241] was one of those people. This was alleged to have been direct race discrimination and harassment related to race. In the hearing the Claimant failed to put the allegation of discrimination to [NAME_241], and instead she told us that she had replied to emails and was beyond reproach. The Respondent was put to unnecessary legal expenditure in producing her witness evidence. The Claimant failed to put this allegation of discrimination and harassment to the other witnesses who had been named, and again legal costs were incurred to address allegations which were not even pursued at the final hearing. [NAME_241] was a witness who had to be called to give evidence to deal with a complaint which was destined to fail at trial.

137. Within issue 7.4 the Claimant had alleged that [NAME_141] had accused her of having poor communication skills and that she had violated [NAME_25], this was also alleged to have been direct race discrimination and harassment related to race. The factual premise of the complaint was not made out, and moreover the Claimant did not even put this to the witness as an allegation of discrimination – rather it was pursued as being unfair.

138. The Claimant would have known from the start, by reading the documents already in her possession at the material time, that she had not been accused of these things, rather the concern related to specific pieces of the Claimant’s professional correspondence.

139. As regards [NAME_25] concerns, it would have been obvious from the start of the claim that this complaint was also destined to fail as the Claimant knew she should report [NAME_25] concerns on Wellbeing Manager. The Claimant knew she had not done so, and it would have been apparent to any reasonable person prior to filing the ET1 why the Respondent would have raised this an issue, and why it had nothing whatsoever to do with her race. Again, this was not put to witnesses as an allegation of discrimination.

140. With respect to Issue 7.6 where the Claimant alleged that [NAME_141] wrongly informed prospective employers during her period of notice that her communications were unprofessional, the factual premise of the complaint was not made out as it never happened, and the Claimant would or should have known from the start that there was no evidence at all of [NAME_141] having ever done anything of the sort. Again, the Respondent was put to legal expenditure defending a claim the Claimant would have known was destined to fail.

141. As regards Issue 7.7 regarding the requirement to put reports through Wellbeing Manager, the Claimant did not put this to the witness as an allegation of discrimination, rather the Claimant spent the hearing time arguing that she disagreed with the requirement - this was a totally different matter. The Claimant would have known from the start that this requirement

26 to put [NAME_25] concerns on Wellbeing Manager applied to everyone and not just her, and it had absolutely nothing whatsoever to do with her race.

142. Likewise with respect to issue 7.8 regarding [NAME_243] declining to allocate [NAME_204] to the Claimant, the factual premise of the allegation was not made out as we found that [NAME_243] gave the Claimant positive responses to each request. We found that the reason they were not pursued was because the Claimant did not take the matters further due to her resignation, having only been employed for some five months. The Claimant would have known this from the start of the claim that [NAME_243] had not done what he was accused of, and the Claimant should have realised that this complaint was also destined to fail. I even gave the Claimant the opportunity to withdraw the complaint mid-hearing when she accepted that [NAME_243] had not done what he was accused of, however the Claimant declined to do so, and instead now complains about the order of the Respondent’s witnesses. [NAME_243] was yet another witness who had to be called to give evidence to deal with a complaint which was destined to fail at trial.

143. The Claimant is a litigant in person and she is not to be judged as having the same knowledge and experience (or indeed the same resources) as a lawyer, however the Claimant is clearly a highly intelligent professional, and she would have or should have realised before filing her ET1 that these complaints were going to fail as she knew that the factual premise for these complaints did not exist, and moreover there was no relationship to her race, or to her sex.

144. This is not simply a case of someone being misguided, or making a few simple mistakes. The case was the subject of detailed and careful case management where the issues were discussed before a judge; the issues were produced well in advance of the final hearing; and the Claimant had ample opportunity to think about the merits of the complaints however she chose to take them all the way to trial.

145. The Respondent had no choice but to prepare the number of witnesses that it did to deal with each allegation raised by the Claimant. We agree that at least six witnesses were required to attend the hearing to give evidence to address complaints which were destined to fail, and these witnesses are:

[NAME_240] (Issue 7.1) [NAME_215] (Issue 7.1) [NAME_222] (Issue 7.2) [NAME_320] (Issue 7.3) [NAME_201] (Issue 7.8) [NAME_10] (Issue 14.1)

146. We therefore find that at least 35% of the claim had no reasonable prospects of success and that the Claimant should have known from the start, which is at the time of filing her ET1, that those complaints were destined to fail.

27 147. We will now consider whether the Claimant conducted these proceedings vexatiously, abusively, disruptively or otherwise unreasonably under Rule 74(2)(a).

148. We find that in pursuing all the above allegations, which we have found to have had no reasonable prospects of success, also amounts to conduct which was unreasonable as the Claimant pursued them in the knowledge that the factual premise would not be established at a final hearing.

149. With respect to the allegation of flirtation against [NAME_10] which was alleged to be harassment related to sex, this complaint was pursued not only in the knowledge that it was untrue, but also with the purpose of continuing to harass that witness in these proceedings. This is a particularly serious matter, and it amounts to an abuse of process of the Employment Tribunal, and it was vexatious to have brought it and to have persisted with it.

150. It is a complaint which should never have been brought as there was no truth in it, and the Claimant knew that [NAME_10] had never flirted with her – rather she knew that [NAME_10] had asked her to stop contacting him but she persisted in doing so, and then having been asked not to contact him, she complained about him to the police (described by [ADDRESS] as weaponising the police against him) and then pursued him and continued to harass him by way of these Tribunal proceedings in the knowledge that he had not done any of the things he was accused of.

151. The impact upon [NAME_10] of this treatment by the Claimant was severe and it was plain to see – he was unable to attend the hearing in person and had to be accompanied even giving evidence online, and he appeared visibly distressed.

152. Within the liability judgment the Tribunal took the highly unusual step of setting out in careful detail the events of each hearing day because of the manner in which the Claimant chose to conduct herself, and persisted in doing so despite (i) the abundantly clear warning about her conduct from [ADDRESS]; and (ii) the warnings I gave the Claimant throughout the hearing. This conduct was recorded at paragraphs 17 to 78 of the liability judgment which are incorporated below:

17. Having read the contents of the April 2024 judgment, the warning to the Claimant by [ADDRESS] about her conduct could not have been more clear. The Claimant could not have been in any doubt about how she should conduct herself going forward. As indicated above, the Claimant repeated that behaviour throughout this hearing. Accordingly we find it necessary to provide a summary of the conduct of the hearing not least because we have observed for ourselves the Claimant’s clear propensity to provide a misleading account of matters. This inevitably increased the length of this judgment and the amount of time taken to produce it.

Hearing day one – 7 October 2023 2024

28

20. We were provided with witness statements from the Claimant and [NAME_214]. [NAME_214] did not attend as a witness to give evidence and the Claimant told us that they were not in contact. We explained that we may place little or no weight on a statement if the author does not attend the hearing to be questioned which the Claimant noted. Having read the statement it was of very little relevance to the issues in this case dealing only with alleged possible flirtation but not in the context of Issue 14.1 where flirtation by [NAME_10] is alleged, and the Claimant made no reference at all to the statement in evidence or her cross examination of the Respondent’s witnesses. We have therefore decided to place no weight on the statement.

22. We were provided with witness statements for the Respondent from [NAME_240] (Head of Drama and PSHE), [NAME_215] ([NAME_20] of Drama), [NAME_217] (Deputy Head of [NAME_140] [NAME_25] and [NAME_20] of Modern Languages), [NAME_16] (Headteacher – retired), [NAME_201] ([NAME_108] of Year, and also [NAME_20]), [NAME_220] (Head of [NAME_140], Associate Headteacher and Designated Safe Guarding Lead), [NAME_222] ([COMPANY_6] Administrator and Payroll Officer), [NAME_10] (Head of Computing and Claimant’s [NAME_108] line manager), [NAME_223] ([NAME_25]), [NAME_197] (Associate [NAME_25]), [NAME_224] (Exams Manager), [NAME_21] (Assistant Headteacher), [NAME_18] ([NAME_35]), and [NAME_38] (Assistant Headteacher).

Hearing day two – 8 October 2023 2024

25. The Claimant failed to send us her outstanding applications to amend. The Claimant simply forwarded on the Respondent’s letter of objections

29 of 20 October 2023. This is not what the Claimant was asked to do. At the start of day two I asked the Claimant why she had not complied and she implied that the Tribunal waiting room was too noisy. In order to assist, the Respondent sent us the Claimant’s applications of 5 September 2023 and 29 February 2024 which the panel reviewed.

28. For the sake of completeness, we have set out the reasons for refusing those applications at Annex 1 to this judgment. We make it clear that there were grounds to conclude that the Claimant had not actively pursued those amendment applications as she could have raised all of them with [ADDRESS] on 9 April 2024. Nevertheless, we gave the Claimant the opportunity for those amendment applications to be considered fully by this Tribunal.

32. The Claimant informed us that she had an additional bundle of documents for the hearing amounting to 1,000 pages. The Respondent objected to the provision of 1,000 pages more of documents. I explained to the Claimant that I would not have time in the hearing to read 1,000 pages but if she wished to review the bundle and to give us the documents she needed us to see which are not already in the hearing bundle we would consider them and their relevance. The Claimant complained in the hearing, and subsequently in writing, that I had told her to read a 1,000 page bundle of documents over lunch. That is not what I advised the Claimant to do and it is misleading to suggest that I did. I advised

30 the Claimant that if she wanted us to see something then it would be for her to source it and to provide it to us and that it falls to her to do so.

37. The Claimant told us at the start of the hearing that she has shoulder pain, and suffers from stress and nervousness. We therefore agreed that we would make adjustments for the Claimant. We provided the Claimant with breaks throughout the hearing, and as the Claimant said her hearing bundles were too heavy to bring to the hearing she wished to use the E-bundle on her laptop, we also arranged for an extra table to be placed next to the Claimant where the hard copy bundles could be spread out if that made it easier for the Claimant. We also provided the Claimant with a spare set of the hearing bundles which the Respondent had produced at its own expense.

39. The Claimant offered to provide us with medical evidence which we said was unnecessary as we would accept what she told us about her shoulder pain, her stress and her nervousness as we had no reason to doubt her. Nevertheless, the Claimant insisted that she provide them to us, therefore we accepted them. The Claimant subsequently applied for a written transcript of the hearing paid for at public expense and I refused that application on 10 December 2024. The reasons for refusing that application were provided to the Claimant in writing and are not repeated here save to note that I determined that a transcript at the public expense was not necessary in the interests of justice to ensure the effective participation of a vulnerable party or witness or by way of reasonable adjustments for a person with a disability. I was not satisfied that the Claimant is a vulnerable party, nor that she would likely meet the legal definition of disabled based upon the material before me, and I did not consider that a transcript at the public expenses is required to ensure her effective participation in proceedings.

31

Hearing day three – 8 October 2023 9 October 2024

46.1 Failure to rectify NQT training documents;

46.4 Ongoing victimisation comprising rejection from 342 job applications, having attended 63 interviews, the Claimant says the Respondent must be providing some kind of verbal or written word that none of the prospective employers are willing to share with the Claimant; the Respondent refused to provide an assessment review commissioned by [NAME_21] completed on

32 19 April 2023, but when provided it contained irregularities; and other matters contained within the Claimant’s long narrative which could not be understood;

46.5 Failure to prevent sexual misconduct; and

46.6 Failure to address sexual misconduct

54. The panel then adjourned briefly to consider the adjournment request and upon our return informed the parties that it had been refused. This was on

33 the basis that the claim had been listed for some time, it was ready for hearing, and we needed to get on and hear it. I then warned the Claimant about her behaviour which we had found to be disruptive.

Hearing day four – 10 October 2024

61. Overnight the Claimant sent correspondence to the Regional Employment Judge and the Employment Appeal Tribunal about this matter. In one of her emails the Claimant alleged:

63. The Claimant’s oral evidence then continued at 10:42am. We then heard the oral evidence of [NAME_10] by video whom we allowed to be accompanied by

34 [NAME_21] to sit with him during his evidence as a support due to the distress he was under. Ms [NAME_23] took no part in [NAME_10]’s evidence which was completed that day. The Claimant repeatedly asked questions which did not relate to the legal issues to be decided in the case and I had to remind her on numerous occasions to focus on the issues we were here to decide, to keep her questions relevant, and to make good use of her time. The Claimant did not follow that guidance and the questions asked of [NAME_10] had very little relevance.

Hearing day five – 11 October 2024

Hearing day six – 8 January 2025

69. We refused the Claimant’s application but offered to make the hearing hybrid so that the Claimant and her note taker could attend the hearing in person if she was concerned about their connection issues. The Claimant did not respond to that offer, and the hearing took place by video on 8 January 2025 as previously agreed. The Claimant arrived over 20 minutes late for the hearing and said she did not know it was due to start at 9:30am even though this had been done for her benefit and previously agreed with her. After the hearing the Claimant wrote to complain that the hearing had been by video, however we had

35 made the offer of a hybrid hearing which she had not accepted. The Claimant no reference to that offer in her correspondence. The Claimant has also written to allege that her observers or notetakers were not allowed to join the hearing however that is untrue and she did not raise that during the hearing.

76. The Claimant’s questioning of the Respondent’s witnesses remained unsatisfactory as she continually asked irrelevant questions of them (including how many male and female staff members have PhDs at [COMPANY_26]), and repeatedly asking about [NAME_10]’s working pattern and when his hours of work changed. This was clearly an attempt to reopen earlier unsubstantiated allegations of fraud against [NAME_10] which [ADDRESS] had already been found to have been raised to bully, threaten and intimidate him, and I disallowed the

36 questions. The Claimant also avoided using the hearing bundle and failed to provide witnesses with the page numbers of documents, and when asked to do so the Claimant declined and said that they could look it up later if they wished. The Tribunal found this to be unreasonable and obstructive and I issued the Claimant with a warning that I would disallow any questions about documents if she failed to give witnesses page numbers in the bundle as it was unfair on them to be questioned on historic documents without seeing them.

153. As paragraphs 17-78 of the liability judgment demonstrate, the conduct of the final hearing was incredibly challenging to manage given the manner in which the Claimant conducted herself, notwithstanding whatever assistance was provided for her, nor any warnings issued to her.

154. It is clear from the summary of the six hearing days that the Claimant wasted a considerable amount of hearing time with her long narrative answers which didn’t answer the Respondent’s questions and which she refused to curtail, instead informing me that she didn’t need much time with the Respondent’s witnesses as she would be concise.

155. Further time was wasted dealing with the Claimant’s meritless applications to amend and which, in part, didn’t make a great deal of sense as they appeared to relate to things we had no jurisdiction to consider in the first place.

156. The Claimant wasted further time challenging me on case management decisions the Tribunal had taken, specifically the refusal of her amendment applications, and at one stage the Claimant refused to tell me if she intended to continue with her claim, instead arguing with me and attempting to direct me to tell her what her options were.

157. The Claimant wasted further time seeking to introduce irrelevant material into the hearing bundle and referring to matters which [ADDRESS] had told her would not form part of her case and had warned her about raising.

158. Much of the Claimant’s questions to the witnesses were irrelevant, and the entirety of the cross examination of [NAME_10] bore no relationship to the allegations against him, and the Claimant failed to put the allegations of direct discrimination and harassment to the witnesses. Whereas we have some sympathy with litigants in person who are unfamiliar with the process and may forget to put the case, or parts of the case, to an opponent’s

37 witnesses, in this case I went to great lengths to remind the Claimant of the complaints she had brought and that she needed to put these allegations to the witnesses and to challenge those parts of their evidence which related to the issues, if she disagreed with it. The Claimant ignored my advice and instead continued pursuing matters not within the list of issues, usually neglecting to mention anything at all about discrimination or harassment.

159. Time was also spent, unnecessarily, addressing the Claimant’s correspondence sent during the evenings to the Regional Employment Judge and the Employment Appeal Tribunal, where the Claimant made misleading allegations about the conduct of the hearing, including alleging that I had received private communications from the Respondent’s counsel, or I had forced the Claimant to read a 1,000 page bundle over lunch. Further time was wasted having to repeatedly ask the Claimant to use the hearing bundle which she described as “[NAME_29]’s bible” and having to find page numbers for the documents as the Claimant refused to give them to the Respondent’s witnesses when questioning them.

160. In addition, further time was wasted warning the Claimant after she made a threat to defame the Respondent in the liability hearing and in her appeal(s); and also correcting the Claimant’s misleading questions to witnesses where she told them that another witness had admitted breaking the law, or telling the witnesses that certain facts had already found by the Tribunal. This appeared to confuse the witnesses and it was necessary for me to spend time correcting those matters.

161. Further time was wasted listening to a mid-trial statement the Claimant insisted on reading out which, having listened to it, had nothing whatsoever to do with the issues in the claim but was intended to persuade us to produce for the Claimant some sort of judgment confirming that she was temporarily disabled which she appeared to want to use in some other litigation elsewhere.

162. Further time was unnecessarily spent on addressing whether there were any live appeals or a police investigation – in both situations the Claimant insisted that there were, however none of this was true. The appeal against [ADDRESS]’s judgment was refused permission and marked totally without merit, and there was no police investigation.

163. We therefore find that the totality of the matters summarised above, and captured in detail at paragraphs 17-78 of the liability judgment (pasted above) amounted to unreasonable and disruptive conduct of proceedings on the part of the Claimant, part of it was also vexatious, although the precise definition is immaterial – the conduct falls squarely within the meaning of Rule 74(2)(a).

164. We record for the avoidance of any doubt, there was more than sufficient time for the witness evidence to have been completed well within the five days of the hearing time, and the only reason the hearing went part heard to a sixth day (with written submissions having to be produced) was entirely due to the Claimant’s unreasonable and disruptive conduct during the hearing itself.

38 165. We have kept clearly in mind that the Claimant is a litigant in person, but again we recall that she is a highly intelligent professional, and she was given a crystal clear warning from [ADDRESS] before the liability hearing, and she was warned by me repeatedly during the hearing. Any reasonable litigant, notwithstanding their lack of legal training, would have understood and heeded those warnings, the Claimant did not.

166. We are left with the clear conclusion that the Claimant’s conduct was intentional – it was not the sort of inadvertent error which a litigant in person may make on occasion. The Claimant’s conduct within the hearing was unacceptable from the start of the hearing right up until its conclusion.

167. We further observe, as the record of this costs hearing shows, that the Claimant’s conduct has not improved at all. The same pattern of behaviour is repeated now as before. The Claimant twice refused my direction to attend the hearing in person; the Claimant ignored my four directions to provide evidence of her means; the Claimant refused to tell me where she was and instead answered cryptically that she was in a place, although she later said it was an office being built in Milton Keynes; the Claimant was thoroughly rude and offensive to [NAME_29] by making personal remarks about her hair as well as the scandalous comment about the [NAME_108] head [NAME_20]; the Claimant sent misleading correspondence to the Regional Employment Judge during the hearing as she had done in the liability hearing; and finally the Claimant sought to blame everyone else for the present costs application – that includes the Respondent, [NAME_28] (whom she still accuses of evidence tampering); and the four Employment Judges whom she has criticised.

168. We therefore find that the gateway to consideration of exercising our discretion to make a costs order has been met under both Rules 74(2)(a) and Rules 74(2)(b).

Stage two – should we exercise our discretion?

169. We remind ourselves that costs are discretionary, they are the exception and not the rule. We also remind ourselves to look at the whole picture of what happened in this case. We further remind ourselves that costs are intended to compensate – they are not intended to punish, and we have no power to punish people for their conduct – our focus is limited to compensating for wrongdoing and nothing further beyond that.

170. We have already recorded how much time was spent unnecessarily addressing complaints which had no reasonable prospects of success which would have been apparent from the start. We have also already recorded that the matter went part heard due entirely to the Claimant’s conduct. The costs associated with those matters would have been significant.

171. We ask ourselves is it reasonable to expect the Respondent to bare the burden of the costs associated with those things when it was the Respondent which had complied fully with our directions, and which had complied with its duties to the tribunal including furthering the Overriding Objective. It is the Respondent, and its lawyers, which have shown

39 considerable patience and restraint, despite enormous provocation from the Claimant.

172. We compare and contrast the Respondent’s conduct to that of the Claimant who has been unreasonable and disruptive throughout this process, not just in the liability hearing before us, but routinely throughout the entire litigation unabated. It has been near impossible to manage the Claimant’s conduct as she will not comply with directions issued to her, and she ignores the clearest of warnings given to her – warnings which were designed to assist her as well as the Respondent, and to ensure that both sides had the fair hearing they were entitled to.

173. I went to great lengths on four occasions to remind the Claimant that we can take her means into account when dealing with the issue of costs. Means are something which we could take into account at this second stage of the process when deciding whether or not to exercise our discretion to award costs.

174. The Claimant has denied us the opportunity to do so. The contents of the EX 107 form which is in effect a two-year-old application for a transcript of proceedings paid for by the public purse, is not the provision of evidence of means. The Claimant’s email in January 2026 that the position has not changed, is also not evidence of her means. The Claimant’s comments mid hearing that she has not worked in three years and has no savings, is scant evidence of her means. No documents were provided, for instance a bank statement at the very least – this was the bare minimum that the Claimant could have done but she chose not to do so.

175. We also note that the Claimant has a propensity to mislead as we have referred to in the liability judgment. We remind ourselves of the clear and the helpful guidance of HHJ Tayler in [NAME_322] v [NAME_298] of Bradford Metropolitan District Council [2025] EAT 160 about the danger of making an overarching assessment of credibility which is then used globally in all subsequent assessments.

176. However, we have little confidence that what the Claimant tells us is the truth in the absence of corroborating evidence where it could be easily produced but has been withheld (such as a bank statement). This is because we have seen first-hand ourselves during the hearings, the Claimant’s propensity to mislead and to misrepresent. For that reason, and in accordance with [NAME_316], we decide not to take the Claimant’s means into account. We recognise that is an unusual step and one which a Tribunal may be reluctant to take, but this is an unusual case, and it is an extreme one. The Claimant has damaged our trust in the veracity of what she tells us.

177. In any event we note that means can still be taken into account by the county court at the enforcement stage. We further record that even had we taken into account what little we have been told about the Claimant’s means, the outcome would not have differed given the gravity and the extent of the Claimant’s conduct. The Respondent has described this as an extreme case, and we agree with that description. In addition the Claimant

40 is a qualified [NAME_20] and may be able to return to her chosen profession in future.

178. Given the enormity of the unreasonable, disruptive and vexatious conduct of proceedings, combined with the volume of complaints which the Claimant would or should have known from the start had no reasonable prospects of success, we are therefore minded to exercise our discretion and to make an award of costs in favour of the Respondent to compensate it for the legal expenditure it has incurred.

Stage three – what is the value of the award?

179. We now have to determine the appropriate amount of the award. We are mindful that there is already an order for costs against this Claimant in favour of the Respondent, and we are tasked also with determining the value of that award.

180. The total amount of legal costs being pursued by the Respondent, which we understand may not even be the total legal spend on this case, amounts to £92,903.40. That is a considerable amount, but as we have noted, this is an extreme case. The claim is a large one; the number of witnesses was considerable and this was due to the number of allegations the Respondent faced.

181. We found each of the Respondent’s witnesses to have given relevant evidence, we saw no duplication in their evidence; and each witness addressed the allegations concerning them fully but concisely. It is difficult to see how the Respondent could have defended all of the allegations without the witnesses identified.

182. We note that the Respondent does not seek its full legal costs for the hearing, rather it is seeking 35% of the legal costs (after a deduction for the costs to be awarded pursuant to the costs order of [ADDRESS]). This 35% has been calculated based upon six of the Respondent’s witnesses being required to give evidence in connection with complaints which had no reasonable prospects of success or which were not even put to the witnesses as allegations of discrimination.

183. The calculation of 35% is a proportionate and a pragmatic approach towards compensating the Respondent for the loss sustained due to the Claimant’s conduct, and we agree with it. It appears fair in all the circumstances, taking into account everything which happened in the hearing and the work the Respondent was put to including disclosure and producing witness statements and preparing witnesses for trial, as well as the time spent during the hearing on their evidence.

184. We find that 35% is an appropriate figure as we have found that six of the Respondent’s fourteen witnesses were called to give evidence in connection with complaints which had no reasonable prospects of success. Some of that witness evidence was discrete and limited to specific issues, although the evidence of [NAME_10] was necessarily considerable. We have considered awarding a lower percentage, however we consider that a smaller figure would not properly and fairly compensate the Respondent for

41 loss it had suffered. It was particularly significant to us that [NAME_10] had to be called to give evidence yet the Claimant’s purpose in making complaints about him was done in order to continue to harass him and this was vexatious conduct. It was also significant that these witnesses were all accused of direct discrimination and harassment, yet the complaints were never put to them, therefore the preparation was wasted.

185. As regards the costs associated with the hearing going part heard on day five and being re-listed for an additional sixth day, and the costs of producing written as opposed to oral submissions, the Respondent seeks 100% of its costs incurred by that. Going part heard was due entirely to the Claimant and we agree that the Respondent should be fully compensated for the loss it suffered due to the Claimant’s conduct in causing the matter to go part heard and to be listed for a further hearing day which should not have been necessary. This also appears fair in all the circumstances having taken into account everything which occurred during the hearing, including my warnings to the Claimant to use her time wisely.

186. These costs will likely exceed the amount we can assess summarily under the Employment Tribunal Rules of Procedure if the Respondent is to be fully and fairly compensated for the amount of loss suffered. We are therefore minded to order those costs to be assessed by way of a detailed assessment by an Employment Judge trained to undertake detailed assessment. We find that there is no other appropriate or proportionate alternative to this way forward. There is no realistic prospect of the parties ever agreeing the amount of costs to be paid; and we find that a summary assessment would be inadequate to fairly compensate the Respondent for the loss it has sustained.

187. We have considered whether costs should be assessed on the standard or indemnity basis. In this case, the manner in which the proceedings were conducted justifies a departure from the standard basis. The Claimant’s conduct takes the case outside the ordinary category of costs awards in the Employment Tribunal and into the exceptional category contemplated in Howman. We are minded that in order to fully and fairly compensate the Respondent for that loss, that assessment should be conducted on the indemnity basis which means that any doubt as to the reasonableness and necessity of the costs is resolved in favour of the Respondent.

188. We record for completeness that we have not taken into account the Claimant’s means for the same reasons we have explained at stage two, however means can be taken into account at the enforcement stage in the county court.

Value of the costs order dated 16 April 2024

189. We are tasked with determining the level of costs to be awarded to the Respondent pursuant to the costs order of [ADDRESS] dated 16 April 2024 as stages one and two have already been completed by [ADDRESS]. We do not take into account the Claimant’s means for the reasons we have already given above, whilst noting that the Claimant is a qualified [NAME_20] and she may return to her chosen career in future.

42 190. The conduct identified by [ADDRESS] is at the extreme end of the scale, involving findings of the Claimant ignoring instructions not to contact witnesses direct; making unfounded allegations of fraud and serious criminal wrongdoing; making unfounded allegations of physical violence and faking and modifying evidence and accusing solicitors of evidence tampering; making derogatory misleading or defamatory comments to third parties; making unfounded allegations of flouting Department for Education Regulations; sending rude and aggressive and threatening communications; abusing the Tribunal process; engaging in unreasonable conduct of the litigation; engaging in unreasonable and vexatious conduct towards [NAME_28]; and acting with malicious intent to threaten, harass and intimidate with actions designed to cause stress and anxiety.

191. All of the above would have put the Respondent to legal expenditure in dealing with and responding to that conduct. When we look at how the Respondent might be compensated for the loss it has suffered due to the above conduct, we find that the Respondent’s loss would be significant and that the option of summary assessment by this Tribunal (up to a maximum of £20,000), would be insufficient to fairly compensate the Respondent for the loss it has suffered. There is no reasonable prospect of the parties ever reaching agreement on the costs to be paid to the Respondent.

192. In the circumstances we award the Respondent 100% of its legal costs incurred due to the Claimant’s conduct identified by [ADDRESS] in the 16 April 2024 judgment.

Accordingly, we order there to be a detailed assessment of those the costs. In order for the Respondent to be fairly compensated those costs should be assessed on the indemnity basis, with any doubt as to any reasonableness and necessity of the costs to be resolved in favour of the Respondent for the same reasons we have given above.

Summary

193. With respect to the costs order of [ADDRESS] dated 16 April 2024, we award the Respondent 100% of its legal costs which are attributable to the vexatious, abusive, disruptive or otherwise unreasonable conduct of proceedings as identified by [ADDRESS] in that judgment. These costs are to be assessed by way of a detailed assessment on the indemnity basis.

194. With respect to the Respondent’s second application for costs dated 11 April 2025, we have found that the Claimant has conducted the proceedings vexatiously, abusively, disruptively or otherwise unreasonably; and we further find that the complaints identified in this judgment had no reasonable prospects of success.

195. We make an order for costs in favour of the Respondent comprised of (i) 35% of the remainder of its total legal costs of defending the claim (after deducting the amount to be paid to satisfy the costs order of [ADDRESS]); and (ii) 100% of the legal costs attributable to the final hearing going part heard for the period 12 October 2024 until 9 January 2025, including legal work undertaken on those dates. Those costs are also to be assessed by way of detailed assessment on the indemnity basis.

43

196. Case management orders will follow separately as regards the process for detailed assessment of the Respondent’s legal costs.

Approved by: Employment Judge Graham 30 April 2026

JUDGMENT SENT TO THE PARTIES ON 12 May 2026

FOR THE TRIBUNAL OFFICE