Employment Tribunal Dismisses Claims for Being Out of Time

OUTCOME: Dismissed

Case No: (1) 2407757/2023 (2) 2400787/2024 (3) 2404330/2025 (4) 2404331/2025

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EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Claimant: [redacted]

The Commissioners for His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs

HELD AT:

Liverpool (remote, by CVP) ON: 8 October 2025 (with chambers deliberation on 19 December 2025) BEFORE: Employment Judge Johnson

REPRESENTATION:

Claimant: [redacted] Miss [COUNSEL] (counsel)

JUDGMENT (reserved from preliminary hearing on 8 October 2025)

The judgment of the Tribunal is that:

Case 1 (case number: 2407757/2023)

(1) Case 1 claims 1, 2, 3 & 4 which all involved allegations of detriments arising from protected disclosure under Part IVA of the Employment Rights Act 1996 were not presented within the applicable time limit. It was reasonably practicable to do so.

(2) In respect of Case 1 therefore, claims 1, 2, 3 & 4 are dismissed.

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(3) Case 1 claims 5 & 6 (Case number: 2407757/2023) which involved allegations of detriments arising from protected acts under section 27 of the Equality Act 2010 were not presented within the applicable time limit. It is not just and equitable to extend the time limit.

(4) In respect Case 1 therefore, claims 5 & 6 are therefore dismissed.

Case 2 (case number: 2400787/2024)

(5) The claims brought under Case 2 are struck out in accordance with Rule 38(1)(a) because they have no reasonable prospects of success contrary to Rule 38(1)(a). This is because Case 2 does not raise any claims that the Tribunal has jurisdiction to consider.

Case 3 (case number: 2404330/2025)

(6) Case 3 claim 7 which involved a complaint of unfair dismissal under Part X of the Employment Rights Act 1996 was not presented within the applicable time limit. It was reasonably practicable to do so.

(7) In respect of Case 3 therefore, claim 7 is therefore dismissed.

(8) Case 3 claims 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 & 17, which all involved allegations of discrimination, harassment and/or victimisation under sections 13, 15, 20 & 21, 26 and 27 of the Equality Act 2010 were not presented within the applicable time limit. It is not just and equitable to extend the time limit.

(9) In Case 3, claims 9, 11 and 14 also offended the principle in [NAME] v [NAME] (1843) 3 Hare 100, 67 ER 313[1], which means that their being presented as part of Case 3, amounted to an abuse of process and no special circumstances apply to excuse this abuse. This was because claims 9, 11 and 14 could and should have been brought as part of Case 1 and/or Case 2 as appropriate.

(10) In respect of Case 3, claims 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16 & 17 are therefore dismissed.

Case 4 (case number: 2404331/2025)

(11) Case 4, claim 18 which involved an allegation of detriment relating to victimisation under section 27 [NAME] was not presented within the applicable time limit. It is not just and equitable to extend the time limit.

(12) I respect of Case 4, claim 18 is therefore dismissed.

3 (13) In Case 4, claim 18, this complaint did not offend the principle in [NAME] v [NAME]. Consequently, it was not an abuse of process for the claimant to include claim 18 as part of Case 4. However, this claim remains out of time and dismissed as described in paragraphs (12 & 13) above.

The final hearing date

(14) Consequently, because none of the claimants Cases and claims remain to be determined by the Tribunal, the final hearing listed to take place on 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26 and 29 March 2027 is cancelled.

REASONS

Introduction

1. This public preliminary hearing ([NAME]) arose from a preliminary hearing case management (PHCM) heard by Judge Cookson on 19 and 20 June 2025. It was the fifth PHCM in relation to these joined claims of which there are 4 in number. Their case numbers are identified at the top right corner of each page in order of the dates that they were presented to the Tribunal. At the time Judge Cookson heard the PHCM on 19 and 20 June 2025, it was the first time that claims three and four had been considered by the Tribunal.

2. Judge Cookson decided that the next hearing would be this public preliminary hearing. It was listed for 1 day and its purpose was to consider the following matters, (unless I determined that it was contrary to the overriding objective not to proceed on this basis):

a) Whether the claimant’s first and third claims were presented in time, and if not, whether it was reasonably practicable for it to be presented in time, and if not whether an extension of time should be granted such that the complaints under the Employment Rights Act 1996 ([NAME]), can proceed.

b) Whether the claimant’s first and third claims were presented in time, and if not, whether it would be just and equitable to extend time to allow the claimant’s complaints of discrimination under the Equality Act 2010 ([NAME]), to proceed; and,

c) Whether any of the complaints in the third claim offend the principle in [NAME] v [NAME] (1843) 3 Hare 100, 67 ER 313[1] that a party may not raise any claim in subsequent litigation which they ought properly to have raised in a previous action (that is because some of the complaints in the third claim seem to relate to events which happened before the first

4 claim was lodged) or offend the principle of “res judicata” which is the principle which prevents claims being relitigated.

3. The Tribunal was also asked to consider case management upon the conclusion of the [NAME] and if time is available.

4. Judge Cookson had noted that the [APPELLANT] may need to present amended responses to claims one and three but acknowledged that this matter should only be considered once the preliminary issues above relating to them have been resolved.

5. Judge Cookson also asked the [APPELLANT] to identify any of the complaints identified in the list of issues made by Judge Leach and Judge Buzzard following their PHCMs which they believe require amendment applications to be made by the claimant, (and whether they object to any such amendment). However, Judge Cookson observed how anxious the claimant was feeling and the difficulties she had processing information and decided that any amendment issues would not be dealt with during the [NAME] before me. Given that the claimant can become easily overwhelmed, it was necessary to focus upon single specific matters at each hearing.

6. The case was also listed for an 11 day final hearing on 15 to 29 March 2027, but on a provisional basis because of concerns regarding the inevitable delay in listing a long multi day final hearing. It was listed with the knowledge that the [APPELLANT] was likely to call 12 witnesses (albeit each providing a short statement) and the likelihood that reasonable adjustments will be required for the claimant that may result in more breaks than normal or shorter hearing days.

7. Judge Cookson had listed this case as a preliminary hearing under Rule 53(1)(b) of the ET Rules of Procedure 2024. This requires me to determine a preliminary issue fundamental to the onward progress of these proceedings in relation to Cases 1, 3 & 4. It involves the hearing of evidence, hearing of submissions from parties, the making of findings of fact in relation to the preliminary issue in question and a determination once and for all of those issues without the need for them being considered at the final hearing.

8. I was aware that in relation to issues involving time limits where it is argued that ‘continuing acts’ exist, (i.e. conduct extending over a period in discrimination cases under section 123 Equality Act 2010 and a series of similar detriments in protected disclosure cases under section 48 Employment Rights Act 1996), there may be consideration of relevant evidence that might overlap with evidence that might be relevant to substantive issues at the final hearing. I noted that these proceedings involved four Cases presented from 2023 until 2025.

5 9. In terms of the allegations within the list of issues the claimant’s argument was that they all involved continuing acts. However, from my initial consideration of the papers, these allegations appeared to be no more than single acts where it would be difficult for the claimant to realistically and successfully argue this principle. Nonetheless, documentary evidence was available dealing with the allegations made and the claimant was able to give witness evidence in support of her arguments that the claim was in time. I was therefore able to proceed with the consideration of this matter in the way that it had been listed by Judge Cookson.

10. I also noted that although potentially, my decisions could result in the dismissal of cases 1, 3 and 4, Judge Cookson’s Note of Preliminary Hearing did not make specific provision for Case 2. However, paragraph (16) of her Note recorded that the claimant accepted that Case 2 raised no new claims. Consequently, Case 2 was affected by any decision made in relation to Case 1, given that at its highest level, it provides further particulars made in relation to the existing Case 1 claims.

11. Turning to the claimant’s impairments and the impact that they have upon her ability to participate in hearings I did spend some time discussing these with her and referred to the relevant sections of the [NAME]. This included chapter 1 (‘[NAME]’), and chapter 4 (‘Mental Disability’). In particular, I discussed the claimant’s recent medical treatment, her present health issues and the need for adjustments with her, including allowing breaks and additional time to respond to questions. She was able to participate effectively both in giving her evidence and making submissions as the day progressed.

12. I also took account of the Reasonable Adjustments and Ground Rules section of Judge Cookson’s Note of Preliminary Hearing at paragraphs (37) to (44). In particular, this involved the way in which the [APPELLANT] communicates with the claimant and the need for them to give her warnings of correspondence that they are sending to her. I was conscious during the preliminary hearing of the need to allow the claimant time and to ensure that she could have time to reflect.

13. The claimant did provide an additional letter which was not received by the Tribunal until after the preliminary hearing took place, (sent 8 October 2025 at 19:16). It was a letter from [NAME] who appeared to be a [NAME] with [NAME] dated 11 June 2025. The letter head suggested they related to the NHS Crisis Team and specialised in matters of depression and anxiety. Under the circumstances, I concluded that it was in the interests of justice to accept this document that was submitted late, but I first asked the [APPELLANT] for comments before evaluating its contents. This was a proportionate step to take even though it would delay my delivery of this judgment.

6 14. Ms [APPELLANT] recorded meeting the claimant on 8 occasions following ‘difficult experiences in her workplace’. She records a description being given by the claimant of intrusive memories, feeling overwhelmed, a significant decline in her functioning and attending to personal self care. Hypervigilance was also discussed. A great deal of 1 ½ page letter records the claimant’s perception rather than diagnosis and does not record dates of appointments or their duration. However, a single sentence records that:

‘[NAME] has completed the standardised measures for both anxiety (GAD-7) and low mood (PHQ-9) and she scores 19 and 19 on both indicating severe anxiety and low mood’

No prognosis is given or record of how historically severe these conditions were. The letter simply concludes with work beginning on ‘memories and affect’ [sic] with EMDR being ‘felt to be the best approach at this time’. I assumed that this described ‘Eye Movement Desensitisation and Reprocessing’ therapy. No indication is given of how long this is taking or the subsequent progress made. There was no description of impairments that prevented the claimant from proceeding at the hearing.

Available papers and evidence

15. The [APPELLANT] produced a 465-page [NAME] bundle which contained the following relevant papers:

a) Pleadings for all 4 claims brought in these proceedings; b) Records of the 5 PHCM hearings; c) Documents and correspondence relating to each of the ‘claims’ brought by the claimant (to be distinguished from the 4 separate claim forms); d) The Claimant’s documents including the statement regarding time limits; and, e) Other documents relating to correspondence between the parties and from the Tribunal.

16. The claimant gave witness evidence based upon her statement under oath.

17. The [APPELLANT]’s counsel, [NAME], also provided a detailed skeleton argument which was of assistance in summarising the chronology of the case, provided case law, submissions and concluding with the summary submission that all of the claims identified, had been brought out of time, no extensions of time should be granted, and/or claims should be struck out on [NAME] principles. Using the List of Issues included within the Annex to Judge Cookson’s Note of Preliminary Hearing of 19 and 20 June 2025, Miss [NAME], made submissions in her skeleton argument relating to each of the four Cases in turn breaking down her arguments in relation to each claim within each Case. This was helpful given the complicated history of these proceedings and the numerous complaints raised.

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18. Once the claimant had given her evidence, Miss [APPELLANT] provided her submissions regarding the preliminary issues and in turn, the claimant was allowed time to make her own submissions and reply.

Findings of fact in relation to the progress of the proceedings

19. The parties should note that the Tribunal’s findings of fact do not seek to deal with every point where the parties disagree, simply what is relevant to the issues which the Tribunal is being asked to consider. If the discussion of an incident or point is not referred to within these findings, it does not mean that it has not been considered by the Tribunal, simply that it is not relevant to the issues and the findings that we are required to make.

20. In terms of the findings that we make, the Tribunal has reached its decision on what it considers to be on balance of probabilities the most likely way/reason in which an incident arose.

The claimant’s employment background

21. The claimant began her employment with the [APPELLANT] on 1 April 2016 and at the time when these proceedings arose, she was a [NAME] [NAME] manager.

The claims

22. The relevant dates to which these proceedings relate were as follows:

Case 1 – 2407757/2023

23. The claimant notified ACAS of early conciliation on 18 May 2023, and a certificate was issued on 29 June 2023. A claim form was then presented to the Tribunal on 30 July 2023.

24. The claim form identified disability discrimination and provided a separate grounds of complaint in table form, with relevant dates and acts complained about. She referred to allegations of bullying and her mental health deteriorating in late 2020, with several periods of sick leave being required. it concluded with a summary of events that had arisen since November 2022 and which concluded with the presentation of the claim form in July 2023, including the alleged failure by the [APPELLANT] to progress her grievance regarding treatment at work.

25. A grounds of resistance was presented on 15 November 2023, which confirmed that the claimant remained employed by the [APPELLANT] and resisting the claimant’s subsequent application to amend her claim dated 20 October 2023.

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26. Time limits points were raised and noting that given the date when the claim form was presented, many older allegations would be out of time. It was accepted that an [NAME]) report dated 17 November 2022 described the claimant as being likely to be disabled by reason of stress related illnesses. However, the disclosure of medical evidence was required before any formal acceptance of disability was confirmed.

27. The claim was denied and further particulars requested, including any suggestion that the claimant had raised a protected disclosure and brought a whistleblowing complaint.

Case 2 – 2400787/2024

28. The claimant notified ACAS and began early conciliation on 23 November 2023, with an early conciliation certificate being issued on 4 January 2024. A claim form was presented to the Tribunal on 5 February 2024.

29. The claim form identified complaints of disability discrimination, whistleblowing and holiday pay. [COMPANY] background information was provided regarding the claim. The claimant brought her claim against both [NAME], but the proceedings have only continued against HMRC.

30. The [APPELLANT]’s solicitors presented a response on 13 March 2024 and on behalf of both respondents and the claim was resisted. Given the absence of allegations being made by the claimant in relation to claim 2, it was not surprising that the [APPELLANT] provided a short response resisting the claim. As described above, the claimant has since confirmed that the second claim raises no new claims.

Case 3 – 2404330/2025 (though originally given the ‘Reform’ case number of 6017164/2024)

31. The claimant notified ACAS and began early conciliation on 22 August 2024, with an early conciliation certificate being issues on 3 October 2024. A claim form was presented on 18 November 2024.

32. The claimant in addition to HMRC, referred to the mysterious ‘[NAME]’ at [NAME] as a [APPELLANT]. The claimant also sought the addition of [APPELLANT] and [APPELLANT] who were both at HMRC, as additional respondents. Others were identified as potential respondents in the attached grounds of complaint document. They were [NAME] ([APPELLANT] 2), [NAME] ([APPELLANT] 3), [NAME] ([APPELLANT] 4) and [NAME] ([APPELLANT] 4). They were initially treated as potential respondents in Case 3.

9 33. She identified in section 8.1 of the claim form that unfair dismissal, disability discrimination, holiday pay and post employment harassment and victimisation. She identified her date of termination as being 24 May 2024. The actual decision was sent by email to the claimant on 23 May 2024 and this was provided on page 272 to 275 of the [NAME] bundle. The claimant did not dispute that 23 May 2024 was the effective date of termination, and I concluded that this was the relevant date for the purposes of calculating time limits. However, for the purposes of this judgment, the difference of one day in relation to those claims arising from the date of termination turned out to be not relevant to the determination of this matter.

34. In section 8.2 of the claim form, the claimant referred to being wrongfully arrested on 31 October 2024 and linked this event to the Tribunal claims that she had brought. She alleged that her laptop and mobile phone had been taken from her when she was arrested (presumably by the Police), but she provided no documentary evidence confirming this act of confiscation.

35. At this point, she clearly identified in her claim form that she had PTSD, which meant that she struggled to read or listen and to recall information accurately.

36. Her grounds of complaint identified detriments arising from whistleblowing as well as disability discrimination, victimisation and harassment post- employment, as a well as breach of [NAME]. She also suggested that [NAME] would also be the subject of a further claim relating to post employment discrimination, victimisation and harassment.

37. This case was originally rejected by the Tribunal on 6 November 2024, in accordance with Rule 12 of the Employment Tribunals Rules of Procedure 2013 (2013 Rules and since replaced from the beginning of this year by the 2024 Rules). The claim was rejected because none of the 5 respondents had an early conciliation certificate number provided. The claimant ticking the boxes stating one of exemptions applied, but these were complaints where they were required.

38. The claimant replied on 8 November 2024 and in a short email provided a few paragraphs which made allegations against some of the individual respondents in relation to the perceived harassment complaints. The Tribunal responded on 11 November 2024 and reminded her that the claim was rejected for the reasons given in the letter of 6 November 2024 and her email did not address the issues identified.

39. The claimant produced numerous early conciliation certificates (7 in number), which included the 5 respondents in this case which were presented on 18 November 2024. However, on 6 December 2024, she formally confirmed in an email to the Tribunal and the [APPELLANT]’s representative that all named parties except HMRC be removed from Case 3 and that the case be accepted as ‘…[APPELLANT] v HMRC only’.

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40. Judge Buzzard considered this matter further at the PHCM on 6 December 2024 when he was asked to consider cases 1 and 2. The Tribunal file reveals that he had seen that another Judge had reviewed this matter beforehand and having seen that the claimant had provided relevant early conciliation certificates on 18 November 2024, had directed that the rejection be reconsidered and Claim 3 accepted from that date. Judge Buzzard varied that decision considering the claimant’s email of 6 December 2024 and comments at the PHCM before him, directing that the claim only be accepted against HMRC, [APPELLANT]

1. This case was not to be combined until this matter had been considered by another Judge at the next PHCM.

41. On 9 December 2024, the claimant was informed by the Tribunal that Judge Buzzard had directed that if she wishes to propose an amendment to the particulars of claim to Case 3, she must do so by 20 December 2024. A Notice of Claim was sent to the [APPELLANT] the same day, restricted to the claim against HMRC as [APPELLANT] 1.

42. The [APPELLANT]’s solicitor presented a response on 6 January 2025 on behalf of all the respondents to the claim identified in the Case 3 claim form. They asserted preliminary issues relating to time and [NAME] principles (see discussion of the rule relating to [NAME] v [NAME] below), and abuse of process including vexatious allegations against [NAME]. Disability remained in issue pending further evidence.

Case 4 – 2404331/2025 (originally given Reform number 6012634/2025)

43. The claimant notified ACAS of early conciliation on 28 January 2025, and an early conciliation certificate was issued on 11 March 2025. A claim form was presented on 11 April 2025.

44. Again, the claimant referred to being dismissed, but in this claim stated her date of termination was 30 October 2023 and strangely, described her job as being ‘whatever I wanted it to be’. The claim identified post employment victimisation. Reference was made to a refusal by the [APPELLANT] to process her injury at work benefits claim despite having requested that they do so on 3 occasions.

45. The claimant referred to having PTSD as a disability with the same impairments identified as those in claim form 3.

46. The [APPELLANT] presented a response on 20 June 2025 and referred to the 3 existing claims already brought in these proceedings. Time limits were again raised as an issue. The [APPELLANT] resisted the allegations and argued that the relevant personnel had tried to process the claimant’s claim, but she had failed to complete the new form that she had been asked to complete when her original application became time expired.

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Subsequent case management (throughout the course of the proceedings)

47. Judge Leach heard the first PHCM on 3 January 2024 (in relation to claim 1 only) and had to spend some time explaining to the claimant that some matters such as personal injury, could not be considered by the Tribunal as specific claims. He was concerned that she fully understands the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to hear complaints primarily relating to the [NAME] and [NAME] and allowed time for her to research the law and principles, (providing details of Tribunal guidance and that produced by the Equalities and Human Rights Commission (HMRC) Code of Practice.

48. Reference was made in the Note of PHCM to strike out and deposit orders because the [APPELLANT] had raised them as potential applications to pursue. It was recorded that the claimant was looking to bring claim 2. Additional information was ordered to be provided by the claimant in relation to the table of potential claims that could be brought based upon those identified from the claim form. These were all disability discrimination, harassment and victimisation complaints.

49. Judge Leach heard the second PHCM on 21 March 2024. The claimant’s PTSD was discussed as well as the potential claims of disability discrimination and whistleblowing. It was noted that the claimant had described difficulty in processing information. It was recorded that the claimant had stated her disciplinary hearing at work would take place on 26 March 2024. An overall concern was raised by Judge Leach that the claimant was referring to complaints that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to hear.

50. Judge Leach clearly spent a great deal of time dealing with the claimant and expressed real concerns that the claimant had produced documents suggesting a significant number of claims which was complicating the case, and this might affect the claimant’s ability to pursue her claim if the complaints were not [COMPANY] in number. A further PHCM was listed for 28 June 2024 and the 3 day final hearing which was then listed for September 2024, was cancelled because of the lack of progress in these proceedings.

51. The claimant was encouraged to seek legal advice and ordered to provide the further information required by case management order 2 at the first PHCM. Information was again provided regarding strike out and deposit order applications as they remained a possible course of action for the [APPELLANT] to take.

52. Judge Leach then heard the next PHCM on 28 June 2024 and in relation to the first two claims. He reminded everyone that extensive discussions had taken place with the claimant to assist her in understanding what claims that the Tribunal could deal with and the need for claimants to identify their claims so that they could become understandable. Unfortunately, Judge Leach was

12 dismayed to find that although [COMPANY] documentation had been provided by the claimant since the previous PHCM, it did not reflect the format shown within the template list of issues provided in previous Notes of [NAME].

53. It was noted that the claimant had recently been dismissed and a new claim would be presented to the Tribunal. The claimant was given a further opportunity to clarify her claims and went through the claims.

54. For the first claim, he was able to identify complaints of victimisation under section 27 [NAME] and a detriment under section 47B [NAME].

55. For the second claim, he was able to identify a complaint a holiday pay, but which appeared to be related to her secondment to [NAME] from HMRC in addition to complaints of disability discrimination and detriments for whistleblowing. A further PHCM was listed for 6 December 2024. Concerns remained that the claimant might not progress her claim, but she assured everyone that she would have legal representation by then. Orders were made for the claimant to make any applications to amend, comment upon the draft list of issues and for the [APPELLANT] to make any applications including strike out/deposit and the [APPELLANT] was to do so by 15 November 2024.

56. Judge Buzzard heard the third PHCM on 6 December 2024. A single allegation was added to the list of issues. The claimant confirmed that she did not want to continue with her claim against the second [APPELLANT], [NAME]. The list of issues was included within the Annex to the Note of [NAME]. Time limits were recorded, 2 protected disclosures, 4 detriments from July 2022, victimisation with 1 protected act and 2 detriments.

57. Judge Cookson joined all 4 claims together at the PHCM on 19 and 20 June 2025. It is not necessary to repeat what has already been said about this PHCM. However, an application for anonymity under Rule 49 of two employees and made by the [APPELLANT] was refused. An extension of time was allowed for the [APPELLANT] to present an amended response for claim 4. Reasonable adjustments and ground rules were considered in detail and in particular how best to manage that the claimant’s tendency to become overwhelmed. Judge Cookson provided a great deal of explanation to the claimant and the [APPELLANT] agreed to give the claimant 24 hours warning of correspondence and allow her time to respond. Case management orders were made for the next [NAME]. A detailed list of issues dealing with Cases 1, 2, 3 & 4 and including the claims brought within each case was included within the Annex to the Note of Preliminary Hearing.

58. In advance of this [NAME], the [APPELLANT] had consolidated the issues from claims 1 to 4 on 18 June 2025. Claim 1 and 2 consisted of 2 protected disclosures and 4 detriments, 1 protected act and 2 alleged detriments. Claim 3 was recorded as having an unfair dismissal claim, 3 allegations of unfavourable treatment and 1 PCP plus an alleged reasonable adjustment

13 and auxiliary aid. Harassment was alleged with 3 incidents; direct discrimination was alleged on the same basis. Victimisation was alleged in the same way as before and with a single alleged detriment. Claim 4 was victimisation alleging the 3 previous claims being protected acts, with a failure to process the claimant’s injury at work benefit application.

59. The claimant said in her statement that on 28 October 2024, she contacted the solicitors for HMRC and argued that the actions of certain members of staff were illegal. On 31 October 2024, she then says that she was arrested for harassment of the Assistant Director of HMRC which resulted in her mobile phone and her laptop being taken from her shortly before the PHCM before Judge Buzzard. All her documents were held on her devices which had been confiscated, and she could not access her email account either, because of password restrictions over which devices she could use to access it. She was struggling to access money and while she believed she had a lot of supporting evidence, she had struggled to access it because of severe trauma.

60. During cross examination, the claimant confirmed that she had received documents from the Police but had not provided them. The confiscated items were not returned to her, she said, until April 2024.

61. In terms of when she presented her third claim form, the claimant said she was traumatised and could not say when she engaged with ACAS to obtain the relevant early conciliation numbers. There were documents within the bundle which suggested that the claimant was seeking to engage with ACAS

62. She then argued during her evidence that she tried to obtain replacement devices but was unable to access her ACAS conciliator. She referred to emails with ACAS and several emails from October 2024 onwards show that she was seeking to obtain early conciliation certificates from ACAS but the available emails within the bundle were confused and did not appear to relate to the correct early conciliation certificates.

63. The claimant confirmed that she had contemplated bringing claim 3 from May 2024 but got mixed up because of her mental health issues. However, she confirmed that no medical evidence had been produced today in support of her arguments concerning her capacity to bring proceedings during the history of this case. The claimant did, however, confirm that she received the Tribunal letter dated 6 November 2024 in relation to claim 3, rejecting her claim because she failed to provide early conciliation details.

64. The claimant did provide an additional letter which was not received by the Tribunal until after the preliminary hearing took place, (sent 8 October 2025 at 19:16). It was a letter from [NAME] who appeared to be a [NAME] with [NAME] dated 11 June 2025. The letter head

14 suggested they related to the NHS Crisis Team and specialised in matters of depression and anxiety. I asked the [APPELLANT] for comments.

65. Ms [APPELLANT] recorded meeting the claimant on 8 occasions following ‘difficult experiences in her workplace’. She records a description being given by the claimant of intrusive memories, feeling overwhelmed, a significant decline in her functioning and attending to personal self care. Hypervigilance was also discussed. A great deal of 1 ½ page letter records the claimant’s perception rather than diagnosis and does not record dates of appointments or their duration. However, a single sentence records that:

No prognosis is given or record of how historically severe these conditions were. The letter simply concludes with work beginning on ‘memories and affect’ [sic] with EMDR being ‘felt to be the best approach at this time’. I assumed that this described ‘Eye Movement Desensitisation and Reprocessing’ therapy. No indication is given of how long this is taking or the subsequent progress made.

66. While the claimant has been experiencing ongoing mental health issues, Ms [APPELLANT] letter does not persuade me that the claimant has demonstrated her ability to litigate this case has been significantly impaired. If anything, she has demonstrated an ability to present claims when she feels is appropriate and to make lengthy submissions during this hearing, including the provision of numerous case law authorities.

Law

Time Limits for detriments arising from protected disclosures under Part IV and unfair dismissal under Part X of the Employment Rights Act 1996 67. Section 48(3) provides that a Tribunal shall not consider such a complaint unless it is presented to the Tribunal: (a) before the end of the period of three months beginning with the date of the act of failure to act to which the claim relates or; where the act or failure or, (b) within such further period as the Tribunal considers reasonable in a case where it is satisfied that it was not reasonably practicable for the complaint to be presented before the end of that period of three months.

68. The burden of proof in showing that it was not reasonably practicable to present the claim in time rests upon the Claimant; see [NAME] v [COMPANY] [1978] ICR 943 CA. If the Claimant does succeed in doing so, then the Tribunal must also be satisfied that the time in which the claim was in fact presented was in itself reasonable. One of the leading cases is [NAME] and [NAME] v Southend-on-Sea Borough Council [1984] IRLR 119 CA in which May LJ

15 referred to the test as being in effect one of “reasonable feasibility” (in other words somewhere between the physical possibility and pure reasonableness).

69. In [COMPANY] v [NAME] 0165/07 [NAME] [NAME] described the reasonably practicable test as follows: “the relevant test is not simply looking at what was possible but to ask whether, on the facts of the case as found, it was reasonable to expect that which was possible to have been done”.

70. Several factors may need to be considered. The list of factors is non-exhaustive but may include:

a. The manner and reason for the detriment;

b. The extent to which the internal grievance process was in use;

c. Physical or mental impairment;

d. Whether the Claimant knew of his rights. Ignorance of the right to make a claim may make it not reasonably practicable to present a claim in time, but the claimant’s ignorance must itself be reasonable. In such cases the Tribunal must ask: what were the claimant’s opportunities for finding out that he had rights? Did he take them? If not, why not? Was he misled or deceived? [NAME] v [APPELLANT] 1974 ICR 54 CA. In other words, ought the claimant to have known of his rights? Ignorance of time limits will rarely be acceptable as a reason for delay and a claimant who is aware if his rights will generally be taken to have been put on enquiry as to the time limits.

e. Any misrepresentation on the part of the [APPELLANT];

f. Reasonable ignorance of fact;

g. Any advice given by professional and other advisors (such as the CAB). Aa claimant’s remedy for incorrect advice will usually lead to a remedy against the advisors and the incorrect advice unlikely to have made it not reasonably practicable to have presented the claim within the statutory time limit. See for example: [NAME] (cited above); [COMPANY] v [NAME] 1979 ICR 52 CA.

h. Postal delays/losses

i. The substantive cause of the Claimant’s failure to comply.

Time Limits under the Equality Act 2010

16 71. Section 123(1) of the Equality Act 2010 provides that a complaint may not be brought after the end of:

(a) the period of 3 months starting with the date of the act to which the complaint relates, or

(b) such other period as the Tribunal thinks just and equitable.

Under section 123(3) conduct extending over a period is to be treated as done at the end of the period; and failure to do something is to be treated as occurring when the person in question decided on it. Under section 123(4) in the absence of evidence to the contrary, a person (P) is to be taken to decide on failure to do something:

(a) when [NAME] does an act inconsistent with doing it; or

(b) If [NAME] does no inconsistent act, on the expiry of the period in which [NAME] might reasonably have been expected to do it.

72. In [NAME] v [NAME] Community Centre [2003] IRLR 434 the Court of Appeal stated that when Employment Tribunals consider exercising the discretion under section 123(1)(b) there is no presumption that they should do so unless they consider it just and equitable in the circumstances to do so. A Tribunal cannot hear a complaint unless the Claimant convinces it that it is just and equitable to extend time, so the exercise of the discretion is the exception rather than the rule.

73. In accordance with British Coal Corporation v Keeble [1997] IRLR 336 a Tribunal may have regard to the following factors: the overall circumstances of the case; the prejudice that each party would suffer as a result of the decision reached; the particular length of and the reasons for the delay, the extent to which the cogency of evidence is likely to be affected by the delay; the extent to which the [APPELLANT] has cooperated with any requests for information; the promptness with which the Claimant acted once he knew of facts giving rise to the cause of action; the steps taken by the Claimant to obtain appropriate advice once he knew of the possibility of taking action.

74. Miss [NAME] referred to these cases as part of her skeleton argument and submissions.

The role of the section 207B [NAME] early conciliation period and extension of time limits

75. Provision is made for extending the statutory limitation periods for instituting tribunal claims to allow for early conciliation in section 207B [NAME] as representative of all such provisions. This provision ensures that claimants will not be disadvantaged by engaging with the early conciliation period. There

17 are two separate but related mechanisms within section 207B, which are section 207B (3) and section 207B (4).

76. Section 207B (3) adds on to the ordinary 3 month limitation period the specific amount of time that has been devoted to early conciliation in a particular case (which could be from a couple of days or the maximum of a month and half). Section 207B (4) on the other hand ensures that all claimants that engage in early conciliation towards the end of the ordinary 3 month limitation period benefit from a 'flat rate' extension so that all claimants have at least one month to submit their ET1 from the day on which the early conciliation period ends.

77. Where multiple early conciliation certificates are issued by ACAS in relation to the same matter, it is only the first in time which will be relevant for the purposes of section 207B, (see Commissioners for HM Revenue & Customs v Garau UKEAT/0348/16). Any subsequent early conciliation certificates will not extend time further.

78. Under section 207B(3), the amount of time spent on early conciliation will not count in calculating the date of expiry of the time limit; the clock will simply stop during the early conciliation period. The precise method of calculation is as follows. The starting point is to ascertain:

(i) the date when the claimant complied with the duty to contact ACAS under section 18A Employment Tribunal Act 1996, (known as Day A); and, (ii) the date on which the complainant received or is deemed to have received the EC certificate (known as Day B) (section 207B(2)(a)&(b)).

When calculating the expiry date of the relevant limitation period, the period beginning with the day after Day A and ending with Day B is not to be counted, (section 207B (3)). Thus if, for example, a 3 month limitation period would ordinarily have expired on 31 March, and Day A was 16 January and Day B was 6 February, the period that would not be counted would be 21 days (i.e. 17 January to 6 February inclusive), so that the revised expiry date would be 21 April.

79. In the above example, the whole of the conciliation period occurred within the ordinary 3 month limitation period for the claim.

80. If, however, Day A of the conciliation period occurs before, and Day B occurs after, the start of the limitation period, the question arises as to whether the days that are not to be counted under section 207B(3) consist only of those days spent conciliating within the 3 month ordinary limitation period or whether it includes all days between the day after Day A and Day B, even those which are after the three-month time limit. The EAT in [NAME] v [NAME] [COMPANY] [2025] EAT 86 held that early conciliation which takes

18 place prior to the limitation period has no effect on time limits: no extension is to be granted in respect of time spent in conciliation before the limitation period begins.

81. Section 207B (4) is relevant where a [NAME] leaves it until late in the ordinary limitation period before complying with the early conciliation requirement. If the ordinary 3 month time limit plus the s 207B(3) extension would result in the time limit expiring during the period beginning with Day A and ending one month after Day B, time is extended to the end of that period i.e. 1 month after the already extended 3 month time limit, (see Luton Borough Council v Haque UKEAT/0180/17).

82. In [NAME] v [NAME] Company UKEAT/0022/16, the EAT held that, in calculating the period ending 'one month after Day B', the correct approach is to adopt the 'corresponding date' rule, as approved by the [NAME] in Dodds v Walker [1981] 1 WLR 10927 at 1029, per Lord [NAME]. This means that if Day B is 6 June, the corresponding date one month later to which the limitation period is extended is 6 July. In the unusual case where the start date is the 31st day of a 31-day month, and the following month is a 30-day month, the expiry date will be the 30th of that month. And where the start date is 31 January, the expiry date is 28 or 29 February, depending on whether it is a leap year. Applying this rule in [NAME], Judge Eady QC held that where Day B was 30 June, the extended expiry date was 30 July, and, therefore, as the claimant had presented his unfair dismissal claim on 31 July, it was out of time.

83. For the avoidance of doubt, the [NAME] has a similar provision which can be found at section 140B, (‘Extension of time limits to facilitate conciliation before institution of proceedings’).

[NAME] principle

84. The principle established in the case of [NAME] v [NAME] (1843) 3 Hare 100, 67 ER 313, Sir [NAME] V-C stated: ''… where a given matter becomes the subject of litigation in, and of adjudication by, a court of competent jurisdiction, the court requires the parties to that litigation to bring forward the whole case, and will not (except under special circumstances) permit the same parties to open the same subject of litigation in respect of matter which might have been brought forward as part of the subject in contest, but which was not brought forward, only because they have, from negligence, inadvertence, or even accident, omitted part of the case. A plea of res judicata applies, except in special cases, not only to points upon which the court was actually required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce a judgment, but to every point which properly belonged to the subject of the litigation, and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at the time.”

19 85. As [NAME] on Industrial Relations and Employment Law’ (at Division PI Practice and Procedure) explains, although originally treated as part of the doctrine of res judicata, this form of estoppel, commonly known as 'the rule in [NAME] v [NAME]’, is now recognised as separate and distinct from both cause of action estoppel and issue estoppel.

86. While the latter types of estoppel, which relate to 'those points which were actually decided by the court', the rule in [NAME] v [NAME] relates to those allegations which could have been brought at the time of the original claim but were not.

87. The rule in [NAME] v [NAME] is a form of estoppel based on abuse of process, and involves the court striking a balance between a claimant's right to bring before the court 'genuine and legitimate claims with a defendant's right to be protected from being harassed by multiple proceedings where one should have sufficed' (Manson v Vooght [1999] BPIR 376 at 389, per May LJ, CA).

88. In Johnson v Gore Wood [2002] 2 AC 1 at 31, [NAME] set out of the principles to be applied when determining whether a claim (or defence) should be struck out as an abuse of process under the rule in [NAME] v [NAME]: ''The bringing of a claim or the raising of a defence in later proceedings may, without more, amount to abuse if the court is satisfied (the onus being on the party alleging abuse) that the claim or defence should have been raised in the earlier proceedings if it was to be raised at all. I would not accept that it is necessary, before abuse may be found, to identify any additional element such as a collateral attack on a previous decision or some dishonesty, but where those elements are present the later proceedings will be much more obviously abusive, and there will rarely be a finding of abuse unless the later proceeding involves what the court regards as unjust harassment of a party. It is, however, wrong to hold that because a matter could have been raised in earlier proceedings it should have been, so as to render the raising of it in later proceedings necessarily abusive. That is to adopt too dogmatic an approach to what should in my opinion be a broad, merits-based judgment which takes account of the public and private interests involved and also takes account of all the facts of the case, focusing attention on the crucial question whether, in all the circumstances, a party is misusing or abusing the process of the court by seeking to raise before it the issue which could have been raised before. As one cannot comprehensively list all possible forms of abuse, so one cannot formulate any hard and fast rule to determine whether, on given facts, abuse is to be found or not. … While the result may often be the same, it is in my view preferable to ask whether in all the circumstances a party's conduct is an abuse than to ask whether the conduct is an abuse and then, if it is, to ask whether the abuse is excused or justified by special circumstances. Properly applied, and whatever the legitimacy of its descent,

20 the rule has in my view a valuable part to play in protecting the interests of justice.'' 89. It should also be understood that when applying this rule, the parties do not have to be the same in the two actions: the claimants may be different, as may the defendants. There must, however, be a sufficient connection between the two actions so as to bind the party in question.

90. The rule also applies in circumstances where the earlier proceedings resulted in a settlement agreement between the parties and were not concluded by a judgment or order made by the court (see [NAME] v [NAME] at 32).

91. The rule in [NAME] v [NAME] has been held to apply in the Employment Tribunal, ([NAME] v Brent London Borough Council [1998] IRLR 525, CA).

92. In [NAME], the main issue was whether there were special circumstances justifying the claimant bringing a race discrimination claim following the dismissal by a tribunal of his unfair dismissal claim. His case was that the grounds for making the subsequent claim only emerged from comments made by a witness for the respondents during the hearing of the unfair dismissal claim. Although the EAT had found that there were special circumstances, the Court of Appeal held there were none. Factors which the Court held were not special circumstances were: (a) that the claimant was not legally represented and was unfamiliar with the law and procedure; (b) that race discrimination was not part of the subject-matter of the unfair dismissal complaint; (c) that the comments of the witness came without warning; (d) that the presence of other claimants inhibited a request for an adjournment, and (e) that neither the respondents' lawyers nor the tribunal itself said or did anything to alert the claimant as to the necessity to make a formal complaint of race discrimination, if that was being alleged. According to the Court of Appeal, what the claimant could and should have done, following the comments of the witness, was to have sought leave to amend his unfair dismissal claim to include a claim of race discrimination, seeking an adjournment if necessary. The [APPELLANT] v [NAME] rule was applied and the claimant was debarred from proceeding with his complaint.

93. Miss [NAME] also referred to the following cases in her skeleton argument:

a) [NAME] v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis & Anor [2007] IRLR 24. An EAT case considering the date when discrimination occurs. b) [NAME] v [COMPANY] [1993] IRLR 317. An EAT case providing guidance relating to time limits including where there are a number of different days in the months concerned. c) [NAME] v [NAME]’s College [2004] UKEAT/0485/04. An EAT case considering time limits and the different tests of reasonable practicability and just and equitable reasons.

21 d) Cohen v Mahmood [2023] EAT 144. An EAT case considering a Tribunal’s decision to allow the claimant to present her case late despite an error in the ACAS Early Conciliation number provided. e) [NAME] v [NAME] [COMPANY] [1996] 1 All ER 981, where Sir [NAME] considered the rule of in [APPELLANT] in a relation to modern litigation.

94. Miss [APPELLANT] referred to the following cases in her submissions in reply:

a) First [COMPANY] v Moussa [2024] EAT 82. An EAT case where the Tribunal found whistleblowing detriments in 2018 had taken place even though the protected disclosure had been made in 2013. The EAT supported the decision made because the ET judgment was properly reasoned. b) [NAME] v Clark [2023] EWCA Civ 386. An EAT case considering equal pay claims and (amongst other things), that a single early conciliation number was acceptable. c) [NAME] v [NAME] [NAME] [2025] EAT 6. Applied Clark (above). d) [NAME] v Nottingham City Council 2601136/15. A first instance decision made by an ET relating to early conciliation and determining that time limits where early conciliation takes place will be 3 months plus the early conciliation period. e) [COMPANY] and ors v [COMPANY] [2016] UKEAT 0282/15/2701. Another EAT case involving early conciliation and the requirement of an early conciliation certificate when the [APPELLANT]’s name is amended. f) [COMPANY] v Mills [2016] IRLR 96. Another EAT case where a claim may be amended without having to go through early conciliation again. g) Orji v Nagra [2023] EWCA Civ 1289. This involves consideration of the rule in [NAME] but in relation to a trespass claim where strike out is considered and which focuses on the costs implications arising from these procedural matters.

Submissions and Decision

95. Miss [NAME] went through each of the allegations from the list of issues, supported by documents within the bundle as possible. This was a lengthy hearing and both parties referred to a surprising number of case authorities. I acknowledged the claimant’s unrepresented status and identified health issues. I decided to record each allegation and its submission as set out in the skeleton argument (supported by oral submissions) and repeating the submissions made in reply by the claimant.

22 Case 1 Claim 1: Protected Disclosure (PD) detriment (List of Issues (LOI) 3.1 Detriment (D) 1)

96. This complaint was that ‘In or about July 2022, while taking part in an [COMPANY], by which the claimant was being assessed for possible promotion. [APPELLANT] refused to ask the claimant questions that should have been asked of her, thereby reducing the claimant’s prospects of receiving a grade A assessment.’

97. The claimant [APPELLANT] says, attended an [COMPANY] ([NAME]) on 10 August 2022, (p209). This was followed by an interview on or around 18 August 2022 with Mr [APPELLANT] on the interview panel, (p230). The claimant then appealed the outcome on 15 September 2022. She argued that this allegation was not presented to ACAS until 18 May 2023 and the claim form not until 30 July 2023 and was therefore 255 days late.

98. The claimant argued in relation to all of the allegations, they were continuing acts and this claim continued until she presented her later claims. She described this detriment as being ‘all part of a process that continued until I was dismissed’. If the claimant was correct in this assertion, then as her date of dismissal was 24 May 2024, this allegation would have been presented in time.

99. In relation to case 1, claim 1, I accepted that the claimant knew about the alleged failure by Mr [APPELLANT] on 18 August 2022. As a single allegation, this meant she had until 17 November 2022 to present a claim or at least begin early conciliation.

100. The claim was of course not presented until 30 July 2023. Early conciliation does not help the claimant here because this began on 18 May 2023 and was therefore commenced long after 17 November 2022. In principle, if a single act, this detriment was presented long out of time under section 48 [NAME].

101. In terms of whether this amounts to a continuing act under section 48(4) [NAME], if the claimant was correct, this complaint would be in time. However, in relation to this allegation I concluded that it does not make sense as a continuing act for the purposes of section 48. It is an act which may have continuing consequence in that a single act may have affected the outcome of the [COMPANY]. But this was not an act which continued each day thereafter because it related to an assessment taking place in July 2022.

102. The claimant did not argue that she was unaware of this matter at the time of the interview and therefore the claim is out of time. Time in this allegation ran from when the [APPELLANT] did or did not act and that must be July 2022.

23

103. For the purposes of an extension of time, the claimant had not relied upon this argument as part of her submissions. Nonetheless, based upon what she told me during the preliminary hearing, the claimant was unable to persuade me that she was unable to present her claim until almost a year had elapsed. As I considered above, the claimant’s medical evidence did not describe health issues that prevented her from presenting her claim within the normal permitted time period. Consequently, this claim is out of time

Case 1 Claim 2: PD Detriment (LOI 3.1 D2)

104. This complaint was ‘claims of bullying made by [NAME] and [NAME] against her in or around November 2022’.

105. The claimant raised concerns against Mr [APPELLANT] on 21 October 2022 (p245), Ms [NAME] on 24 October 2022 (pp250-1) and Ms [NAME] on 21 November 2022 (pp256-7). Miss [NAME] said that time began to run from each of these dates. However, even if we rely upon the last of these dates (which should assist the claimant in terms of time limits), the claim should have been brought by 20 February 2023. Claim 2 was presented on 30 July 2023, which was therefore 160 days out of time.

106. The claimant failed to provide evidence in support of why it was not reasonably practicable to present reasons why the claim could not be brought sooner but maintained that it amounted to a continuing act.

107. It is noted that the claimant was aware of the claims being made against her by these people by 30 November 2022 when an Assistant Director sent details of these claims have been made against her. I did note that the actual claim forms were sent to the claimant on 7 December 2022. But even if I rely upon this later date, a claim should have been presented by no later than 6 March 2023, (allowing for any early conciliation). As explained above, this means that more than 4 months elapsed after this date before the claim was presented out of time. Early conciliation did not of course begin until after 6 March 2023, (beginning on 18 May 2023).

108. These detriments amounted to single complaints which gave rise to single detriments and while the subsequent investigation may have had continuing consequences, it did not amount to continuing acts under section 48(3)(a).

109. The claimant did not argue reasonable practicability on this allegation and without any convincing explanation being provided concerning why the claimant delayed presenting this complaint until 30 July 2023, this allegation remains out of time.

24

Case 1 Claim 3: PD detriment (LOI 3.1 D3)

110. This complaint was ‘the [APPELLANT]’s decision to investigate the claims of bullying received against the claimant and proceeding with that investigation.’

111. The [APPELLANT] according to Miss [APPELLANT] decided to investigate the complaints on 30 November 2022 and referred to emails within the bundle, (pp231-9). On this basis, the claimant should have begun proceedings relating to this allegation by 28 February 2023. Given the dates provided above, she failed to do so until 30 July 2023 and was therefore 152 days out of time.

112. The claimant in reply argued the claim was in time because it was a continuing act.

113. This allegation relates to the discussion above regarding Case 1 Claim 2 as the [APPELLANT] proceeded to investigate on 30 November 2022. Consequently, for those same reasons given above, I must conclude that this allegation does not form part of a continuing act and it is also out of time.

Case 1 Claim 4: PD detriment (LOI 3.1 D4)

114. This complaint was ‘…the [APPELLANT]’s decision to “streamline” their investigation of the claims of bullying and subsequent failure to properly follow the investigation procedure.’

115. Miss [NAME] argued that this allegation relates to the decision letter from the manager concerned identifying the steps being taken in relation to the investigation of the three claims, dated 20 February 2023, (pp268-271). The latest date in that investigation was the review of an email sent by the Claimant on 8 February 2023.

116. Miss [APPELLANT] therefore contends that 8 February 2023 is the latest date on which time for claim 4 can be said to have begun to run. Consequently, the claimant therefore had until 7 May 2023 to present claim. As the claim fell with the first claim form which was presented on 30 July 2023, it was 84 days out of time.

117. Once again, the claimant in reply argued the claim was in time because it was a continuing act.

118. From the [APPELLANT]’s perspective, relying upon 8 February 2023 date is attractive. This is because the claimant failed to begin early conciliation until 18 May 2023, which would have been 11 days after the expiry of the 3 month limitation period.

25

119. But having considered the allegation and the available documents, I concluded that this allegation related to the [APPELLANT]’s letter dated 20 February 2023 where the Assistant Director was investigating the complaints made against the claimant. This letter was sent by email, and the claimant did not argue that there was any delay in her reading it. Therefore, the claimant had until 19 May 2023 to present the claim. On this occasion, the claimant was just in time because she first notified ACAS of her potential claim on 18 May 2023.

120. The early conciliation certificate was issued on 29 July 2023 and section 207B(4) of the [NAME] is relevant in this particular situation. As explained above, this is because limitation would have expired between date A and date B.

121. This is a case where the ordinary 3 month time limit plus the s 207B(3) extension results in the time limit expiring on 19 May 2023, which is during the period beginning with Day A (18 May 2023), and ending one month after Day B (i.e. Date B being 29 June 2023 and one month after ending on 29 July 2023). Consequently, the operation of section 207B(4) means that the time limit is extended to 29 July 2023.

122. As [NAME] (above) confirms, by presenting the claim form in Case 1 on 30 July 2023 one day after the extended 29 July 2023 date, unfortunately for the claimant, she presented this claim 4 out of time. In the absence of any arguments to the contrary, I cannot accept that it was not reasonably practicable for the claimant to present this claim by this date. Moreover, as described above, I am not persuaded that the disclosed medical evidence identifies health issues which would have satisfied the reasonable practicability test. Consequently, case 1 claim 4 remains presented out of time.

Case 1 Claim 5: victimisation (LOI 4.2 V1)

123. This allegation involved ‘claims of bullying made by certain colleagues of the claimant, against her in or around November 2022.’

124. Miss [NAME] argued that her submissions for claim 2 could be repeated here, save that the test for an extension of time under section 123 [NAME] was just and equitable grounds. This is because victimisation complaints arise from section 27 [NAME].

125. The claimant maintained her argument that this was a continuing act until she was dismissed and therefore not out of time.

126. I agreed with [NAME] that this allegation was capable of being dealt with in the same way as Case 1 Claim 2 (above) because it dealt with

26 the same subject matter. This was subject of course to the application of section 123 [NAME], (rather than section 48 [NAME]).

127. In terms of the claimant’s submission that the claims were continuing acts, applying the wording section 123(3)(a) [NAME], I am unable to accept that these complaints amounted to conduct extending over a period. They were each single acts and time runs from the date when they were made, or in this case when the claimant undoubtedly knew about them as explained in within the discussion of allegations Case 1 Claim 2.

128. The claimant should have presented her claim by 27 February 2023. This date was calculated by applying the later date of 30 November 2022 when the claimant was made aware of the claims being brought against her. However, as previously described in relation to Case 1 Claim 2 (above), even using the date of the claim forms being sent to the claimant on 7 December 2022, the claimant only had until 6 March 2023 in which to commence proceedings. By presenting case 1 on 30 July 2023, this claim was significantly out of time.

129. The claimant provided no arguments asserting an extension of time. In any event no circumstances were available which would support an extension of time on just and equitable grounds under section 123(1)(b) [NAME]. Claim 5 therefore remains presented out of time.

Case 1 Claim 6: victimisation (LOI 4.2 V2)

130. This allegation was ‘…the [APPELLANT]’s decision to investigate the claims of bullying received against the claimant and proceeding with that investigation.’

131. [APPELLANT] repeated her submissions relating to claim 3 above.

132. The claimant maintained her argument that this was a continuing act and therefore not out of time.

133. I agree that applying section 123 [NAME] instead of section 48 [NAME], Claim 6 can be treated in the same way as Claim 3. In the same way that Claim 5 was considered (above), this claim must also be determined as out of time.

Case 1 – summary

134. The claimant had confirmed her awareness of ACAS from November 2022 during emails with [NAME] [NAME] of HMRC and referred to ‘currently working with ACAS’, (22 November 2022, p400). Therefore, as submitted by [APPELLANT], I agree that the claimant knew she could bring a claim to the Tribunal long before the first claim was first issued. The claimant simply

27 argued that none of the complaints were out of time in her oral reply at the [NAME] and did not provide submissions regarding the merits of an extension of time on grounds of reasonably practicability under Part IV [NAME], or just and equitable grounds under section 123 [NAME]. However, even by allowing some general enquiry into the circumstances surrounding the claimant’s health and knowledge at this time, I concluded that she was in a position where she would have been aware of the Employment Tribunal process or could have easily discovered this process and time limits and could have presented a claim within the time limits available.

Case 2

135. Miss [NAME] submitted that Case 2 did not actually contain any claims and the claimant accepted as much during the PHCM on 19 and 20 June 2025 before Judge Cookson. In paragraph (16) of Judge Cookson’s Note of [NAME], the claimant was recorded as saying that:

‘…she had misunderstood Employment Judge Leach’s instructions to clarify her complaints which is why she put in her second claim, but she accepts that the second claim raises no new claims. Since the first claim the claimant says she continued to be discriminated against and has been dismissed on grounds of gross misconduct. That is the focus of the third claim. The fourth claim relates to what the claimant says are delays in processing an application for benefits under the [NAME]. An application for benefit had already been made at the time the claimant was dismissed but is still outstanding to date.’ (p181).

136. I did not hear any meaningful reply from the claimant concerning Case 2 during the [NAME] and she simply agreed that this case did not introduce any new claims. I must therefore conclude that she is content that Judge Cookson’s comments in paragraph (16) are a correct record of the claimant’s belief that Case 2 raises new claims and at its highest amounts to nothing more than further information in relation to Case 1.

137. Miss [NAME] submission was that Case 2 should therefore be dismissed. Despite having had an opportunity to make representations to the contrary, the claimant did not disagree. However, while Miss [APPELLANT] did not seek the strike out of the claim under Rule 38, I decided that of my own initiative, Rule 38(1)(a) was relevant here. This is because Case 2 is dependent upon Case 1 given that it raises no new claims itself. It is therefore impossible to measure time limits under the relevant provisions of the [NAME] or [NAME] as no specific allegations and dates were identified in the claim form for Case 2 from which time could run.

138. In Case 2, the claimant’s claim form presented on 5 February 2024 simply refers in section 8.1 to disability discrimination, holiday pay and in the free text box ‘whistleblowing’. Section 8.2 identifies Case 1 and says ‘Current

28 claim 2407757/2023. Agreed to add details by 29 February 2024 from current case management. Both claims are relative to each other and ongoing. Victimisation, discrimination and harassment.’ In section 9.2 dealing with remedy, the claimant responded when what she was seeking, she replied ‘I am not sure – justice’. In their response dated 13 March 2024, the [APPELLANT] provided a short grounds of resistance and argued that the claimant had provided ‘bare allegations’. The claimant has made no attempt to dispute this, despite having several opportunities to do so. Now I have determined that Case 1 was presented out of time, Case 2 amounts to little more than further information arising from a case that will no longer be permitted to continue in these proceedings.

139. The claimant has had an opportunity to make representations concerning the shortcomings of Case 2 and has agreed that it raises no new claims. She has never attempted to argue that this was a viable case. Consequently, having had that opportunity and having not sought to persuade me that this case has any reasonable prospects of success, I must conclude that the provisions of Rule 38(1)(a) are met. Case 2 is therefore struck out under this rule.

Case 3 – overview

140. This case involved a claim form presented on 2 November 2024. Miss [NAME] said that because it was initially submitted without an early conciliation number, it was rejected on 6 November 2024 under Rule 10(c)(i) of the 2013 Rules, (now Rule 12(c)(i) of the 2024 Rules).

141. The [APPELLANT] does not believe that the claimant had actually applied for a reconsideration of the rejection but notes that an early conciliation certificate was submitted on 18 November 2024. Because the response was required by the Tribunal’s Notice of Claim letter dated 9 December 2024 to be presented by 6 January 2025, the necessary 28 day period meant that the claim form was presented on 9 December 2024.

142. As described above, Judge Slater had instructed that the case be treated as reconsidered and accepted from 18 November 2024 as this was when the date when the various respondents (including [APPELLANT] 1 – HMRC) were received by the Tribunal. Judge Buzzard simply varied this direction on 6 December 2024 following the claimant’s confirmation that she only wished to proceed against [APPELLANT] 1 and did not seek to vary the date when the claim was deemed to be accepted by the Tribunal on 18 November 2024.

143. Consequently, for the purposes of Case 3, the following dates are relevant:

a) Asserted date employment began – 16 April 2016.

29 b) Effective date of termination – 23 May 2024. c) Date A (ACAS) – 22 August 2024. d) Date B (ACAS ECC) – 3 October 2024. e) ET1 treated as presented to Tribunal – 18 November 2024. f) ET3 presented by [APPELLANT] 1 (HMRC) – 6 January 2025.

144. If the date of termination was correct, the claimant would have 3 months from that date to present a claim or notify ACAS, which would be 22 August 2024. The claimant notified ACAS on 22 August 2024 and was therefore just in time to benefit from early conciliation.

145. However, the claimant would be subject to the provisions of section 207B(4) [NAME] and section 140B [NAME], meaning that the claim form would need to be presented at the end of the period of one month after Date B. As Date B was 3 October 2024, the claimant needed to present a valid claim form by 3 November 2024. While she attempted to present her claim for Case 3 on 2 November 2024, its rejection because of the failure to provide early conciliation numbers (and wrongly asserting an exemption from this requirement within the claim form), meant that the later date of 18 November 2024 was used. This was when the claimant presented Claim 3 again and this time correctly.

146. Consequently, as the claimant failed to present her claim within the usual 3 month time limits, Case 3 was presented out of time using the date of termination as the start date of the time limit calculation. However, I heard submissions in relation to each allegation within the list of issues arising from Case 3 (including reference to the rule in [NAME] v [NAME] for some of them), and I did need to briefly record what was said and any decision as relevant.

Case 3 Claim 7 unfair dismissal (LOI 7)

147. Miss [APPELLANT] submitted that the claimant’s effective date of termination of employment was 23 May 2024, which means that a claim must have been presented or notified to ACAS by 22 August 2024. The claimant notified ACAS by this date, and the early conciliation certificate was issued on 3 October 2024, meaning the claimant had until 3 November 2024 in which to present a Tribunal claim form.

148. However, she argued that the claim form was correctly presented on 18 November 2024 and is therefore out of time.

149. The claimant asserted that her arrest on 31 October 2024 resulted in her mobile and tablet devices being seized by Police and at that point she was prepared to present her claim. When asked why she had not provided evidence from the Police of the seizure of IT equipment during cross examination, the claimant replied; ‘I did receive something but…I haven’t

30 provided them.’ She went on to say that; ‘they were seized on the day [of her arrest] and only returned mid April 2025’.

150. Miss [APPELLANT] however, argued that the claimant was still able to present a defective claim form on 2 November 2024 and as this was her third claim, was well aware of the expectations regarding time limits. She noted the absence of evidence in support of the arrest by Police and the seizure and while providing correspondence with ACAS during November 2024, she referred to ACAS early conciliation numbers which were not consistent with those relating to this claim.

151. The claimant responded by emphasising that she knew that she had to get the early conciliation certificate sorted and thought she should enter that she enters ‘no’ on the claim form when she presented it on 2 November 2024. She said that she did not have evidence of the Police arrest, what was taken and medical evidence in support of any relevant impairments.

152. The claimant had been given an opportunity to provide witness evidence and documentary evidence in support of the time limits preliminary issue by Judge Cookson at the PHCM. She was also cross examined during the [NAME] before me. She accepted that she had not provided any documentation despite having received ‘something’. from the Police and said that ‘I did receive something…but I haven’t provided them’. Despite the apparent delay in the equipment being returned until April 2025, the claimant was able to present the defective claim on 2 November 2024.

153. The claimant said it was difficult to manage what was going on at the time. She accepted that she had been contemplating bringing her claim since her dismissal in May 2024, but while making some reference to problems with her mental health and ‘looking at documents makes me severely ill…’ and she was putting things off, I was not provided with sufficient medical evidence that persuaded me it was not possible for the claimant to present her claim within the normal time limits. While it is understandable that some delay could take place, the arrest came at the end of the 3 month period and the extension of time allowed through early conciliation, which would end on 3 November 2024.

154. On balance therefore, I do accept that it was reasonably practicable to present the claim in time. The claimant has had ample opportunity to provide evidence that might persuade me to the contrary, despite Judge Cookson’s detailed discussions with her. The claimant was well aware of the need to comply with time limits by the time that she was in a position to present case 3, having already not only engaged with the Tribunal process in relation to Cases 1 and 2, but also having seen the [APPELLANT]’s grounds of resistance relating to time limits.

31 155. The danger of leaving the presentation of a claim until the end of the time limit period is that events can arise which get in the way of complying with remaining days. The claimant did refer to having difficulties to motivate herself to take action, but she has not provided evidence that persuaded me it was not reasonably practicable for her to present her claim before her arrest on 31 October 2024. She was able to begin early conciliation just in time on 22 August 2024 and then had a month to present her claim once the early conciliation certificate was issued on 3 October 2024. When she presented the claim without an early conciliation number on 2 November 2024, the claimant while acknowledging the defect with her claim in the attached grounds of complaint, stated:

‘I will require a couple of weeks to re-compile my full complaints with details and I will send through my ACAS certificate numbers for everyone listed on Monday when I can contact ACAS.’

As 2 November 2024 was a Monday and the date when the claim form was received by the Tribunal, it is reasonable to conclude that the claimant aimed to rectify this defect within a day or so. Instead, they were not provided until Monday 18 November 2024, three weeks later.

156. Considering all the circumstances and the evidence before me, I was unable to conclude that it was not reasonably practicable for the claimant to present her claim for unfair dismissal until 18 November 2024. She simply let three weeks pass by in the knowledge that she needed to rectify the defect that she knowingly had in place when she presented her claim on 2 November 2024 and without any convincing evidence that she was incapacitated during this period.

157. My conclusion must be therefore, that case 3 claim 7 (unfair dismissal) was not presented in time and it was reasonably practicable to do so with the applicable time limits.

Case 3 Claim 8 – discrimination arising from disability (LOI 9)

158. The alleged unfavourable treatment under section 15 [NAME] is, ‘did the [APPELLANT] treat the claimant unfavourably by dismissing her?’

159. Miss [APPELLANT] repeated her submissions relating to unfair dismissal in that the unfavourable treatment arises from her dismissal on 23 May 2024, meaning she had until 22 August 2024 in which to notify ACAS or begin her claim.

160. The claimant’s reply is effectively repeated from the unfair dismissal complaint as well.

32 161. I agreed that in terms of time limits, the calculation of time follows the discussion within the unfair dismissal complaint of Case 3 claim 7 above. However, the question of an extension of time is subject to just and equitable grounds under section 123 [NAME]. I reminded myself that it is entirely possible for a complaint subject to the [NAME] to be permitted an extension of time arising out of the same facts as a complaint arising out of the [NAME]. This is because the reasonably practicability test under section 111 [NAME] for unfair dismissal (and ERA complaints more generally), is a more onerous ‘hurdle’ than the just and equitable test under section 123 [NAME].

162. However, I also reminded myself of the Court of Appeal decision in [NAME] v [NAME] and that it should not automatically be assumed that an extension should be granted. Time limits after all, are something that all parties should normally be expected to comply with.

163. I do not need to repeat the claimant’s submissions concerning this allegation as her focus throughout this case was that in the case of [NAME] complaints, the allegations were conduct extending over a period consistent with section 123(3). I cannot accept that this applies to this claim because the allegation is an act of dismissal and whatever the continuing effect of a dismissal remaining in place, it cannot reasonably be considered conduct extending beyond the actual date when the claimant was dismissed. I did not hear evidence which persuaded me that the claimant did not become aware of her dismissal until a much later date thereby making the correctly presented claim on 18 November 2024 in time.

164. As to the question of just and equitable extensions, I have considered all of the circumstances described above and repeated in relation to Case 3 claim 7, (above). My conclusion is that the time that had elapsed since dismissal, the additional time allowed by late early conciliation and the claimant’s delay in rectifying her defective presentation of claim of 3 weeks does not support a finding that it was just and equitable to extend time.

165. This claim is therefore out of time.

Case 3 Claim 9 – reasonable adjustments (LOI 10.1)

166. This allegation is ‘allow the claimant to retain her HMRC email or send her queries and documents by post (which the claimant says had previously been recommended by [NAME]).’

167. The background to this complaint is Miss [APPELLANT] submitted, related to the claimant’s secondment to [NAME] from November 2022 until November 2023. The [APPELLANT]’s policy she says, is for a secondment longer than 6 months to involve the change of the employee’s email address to that of the secondee organisation. As this change and deletion of the

33 claimant’s HMRC email address took place on or around 21 January 2023, a claim should have been presented by 20 April 2024. As early conciliation did not begin until 22 August 2024 and the legitimate claim 3 was not presented until 18 November 2024. Miss [NAME] this was 578 days out of time.

168. Moreover, she argued that the principles in [NAME] applied because the claim 9 arose from 21 January 2023 and this was before the presentation of claim 1 and claim 2.

169. Once again, the claimant argued that the allegation involved a continuing act that continued until she was dismissed.

170. There was no doubt that this was an old claim. Old in that it related to a change in the claimant’s HMRC email address on or around 21 January 2023. Miss [NAME] was correct in asserting that the claim in accordance with section 123 [NAME], should have been presented long before the date of 18 November 2024 when Case 3 was presented.

171. The claimant provided no circumstances specifically relating to this case which would support her argument that this allegation involved conduct extending over a period. It did involve a decision which involved a discussion over several days according to pages 294 to 295 of the [NAME] bundle provided at this hearing. [NAME] of HR on 30 January 2023 did describe the deletion of the email account as being ‘…a bit heavy handed to me…’, he also acknowledged the need to manage those employees ‘…on loan and thousands of new starters its better to make space on the network than have loads of accounts suspended in case someone returns.’ He concluded by noting that HR records remain in place and an email address can be reinstated upon return. My understanding was that the decision was to delete the claimant’s email account.

172. The claimant did not argue that she was unaware of this suspension at the time. There was correspondence during the period 15 to 21 August 2023 when the claimant using her personal email was engaging with [APPELLANT] [NAME] and other about gaining access to her email account with the [APPELLANT], (pages 296 to 298 of the [NAME] bundle). On 17 August 2023, Ms [NAME] explained that the email account had been deleted and could no longer be accessed. However, even if I treat the date of knowledge of this action as being 17 August 2023, the claimant must have notified ACAS by 16 November 2023. As early conciliation did not begin until 22 August 2024, the early conciliation period is not relevant, and the presentation of the claim did not happen until later on 18 November 2024.

173. The claimant did not provide me with any circumstances that could demonstrate that this allegation was conduct extending over a period, or at least conduct extending to beginning of July 2024, when it could have been

34 presented in time, (considering the subsequent early conciliation period before the presentation of the claim correctly on 18 November 2024).

174. As the claimant was engaged in this dispute during August 2023, I concluded that it would have been reasonable to have presented this claim much earlier than it actually was. It simply was not just and equitable to allow an extension of time to present the claim more than a year after the exchange of emails during summer of 2023. This claim was presented out of time, and it was not just and equitable to extend time.,

175. However, Miss [NAME] also addressed me on the rule of [NAME] v [NAME] in that the claim could and should have been presented as part of Case 1 presented on 30 July 2023 and Case 2 presented on 5 February 2024.

176.

For the reasons given above regarding the claimant’s email exchange during August 2023, I did not agree that the claimant would certainly have been in a position to include claim 9 as part of Case 1. It is entirely possible that the claimant did not have clear notice of the deletion of her email account until a few weeks following 30 July 2023. However, in principle, the claimant could have brought it as part of Case 2. She commenced early conciliation on 23 November 2023; it was completed on 5 February 2024 and the claim form presented on 13 March 2024.

177. However, in considering this submission, I have exercised caution and heeded the words of Lord [NAME] in [NAME] (above), namely that for the late presentation to amount to abuse, it should be considered unjust harassment. I am expected to take a broad merits based judgment and reflect the public and private interests relating to the facts of the case and consider all of the circumstances. Moreover, I should consider whether abuse if found can be excused by special circumstances.

178. This is a case where the claimant commenced litigation with Case 1 on 30 July 2023 and had reached a position where litigation was something that she felt necessary. She understood the early conciliation period and also the questions asked of her when completing a claim form. She also had knowledge of section 8.1 which asked her to identify complaints within her contemplation and section 8.2 permitted a detailed background narrative to be provided in support. Despite the claimant’s mental health issues, I accept that she understood from this point the need to bring claims within a confined period of time and to clearly identify them within the claim form shortly after they arose.

179. The Tribunal is faced with many claims where claimants can bring them within an original claim form and fail to do so. Later, sometimes much later, they decide to make an application to amend or even present a new

35 claim. As is the case in these proceedings, this often results in preliminary hearings relating to the question of time limits.

180. Respondents rarely rely upon [NAME] but that is perhaps because the time limit argument is so obvious, it is felt unnecessary. However, unless the circumstances are exceptional, it is reasonable to expect a claimant to know what is prompting them to bring a claim and the complaints (at least in broad terms), that they wish to bring against their employer when each claim form is presented.

181. Unfortunately, there is a tendency for many claimants having presented their first claim form, to spend a great deal of time reflecting upon the recent history of their employment. They may search for incidents which in their view and with hindsight, could be treated as detriments of acts of discrimination etc’. While understandable to some extent, this approach can lead to the proceedings becoming effectively an ‘inquiry’ into the claimant’s employment history. This is not what Employment Tribunals are expected to do and instead they should focus upon the essential elements of clearly identified complaints which are alleged to have contravene the [NAME], [NAME] etc’. These claims should of course be brought without delay and within the time limits provided.

182. In this case, I concluded that the claimant in relation to claim 9 had adopted this reflective approach and she would have been in a position had it been considered an act of discrimination long before it was included in Case 3. The claimant was aware of time limits as she had already begun proceedings in 2023. Her failure to include the claim in Case 2 and then seeking to include it in Case 3 without any real explanation of how it could amount to conduct extending over a period rendering it in time, leaves me to conclude that it is an abuse of process.

183. While I have considered the question of special circumstances that might excuse the claimant’s actions, the evidence available is not persuasive. The claimant has been able to continue presenting claims and utilising early conciliation despite her ill health and is able to litigate as an unrepresented party.

I therefore conclude that [NAME] applies in relation to claim 9 and the claim cannot be accepted. However, considering my conclusions in relation to time limits above, this makes no difference to my overall decision regarding dismissal.

Case 3 Claim 10 – reasonable adjustments (LOI 10.5)

184. The allegation is ‘would it have been reasonable for the [APPELLANT] to provide the claimant with a laptop from March 2023 onwards?’

185. Miss [APPELLANT] argued that the claimant was seconded but did not have her laptop taken off her. It relates to the suspension of her IT account

36 on or around 21 January 2023, with the laptop being returned on 19 July 2023 and therefore the allegation is false.

186. In terms of relevant dates, she submitted that the claimant sent an email on 8 January 2024 requesting ‘the immediate supply of my work laptop and restoration of access to HMRC systems’. The [APPELLANT] referred to the claimant not being permitted access to its systems while suspended the same day. The [APPELLANT] asserts that either this allegation is a duplicate of Claim 9 (above), with the same time limit implications, or alternatively if 8 January 2024 is applied as a date, the claim should have been begun from 7 April 2025, meaning that the actual presentation date of 18 November 2024 is 255 days out of time.

187. The claimant in her submissions by way of reply, focused upon this being a continuing act. She did not dispute that claim 10 was closely related to claim 9.

188. It is not necessary to spend much time concerning this allegation because based upon the available evidence, claim 10 relates to the period when the claimant was seconded during 2023 and consequential upon the ‘suspension’ of the email account.

189. Having considered the emails at pages 299 to 300 of the [NAME] bundle on 8 January 2024 between the claimant and Ms [APPELLANT]/HR it does seem that this matter had been running for some time. This email chain appears to be more connected with the claimant’s suspension rather than the events beginning from March 2023 onwards. At best, it appears to be a restatement of an earlier issue. However, even if I allow the 8 January 2024 as the relevant date when time begins to run, the claimant would need to have presented a claim by 7 April 2024. As early conciliation began on 22 August 2024 and appeared to arise from her subsequent dismissal on 23 May 2024, this claim was presented long out of time.

190. The claimant failed to provide any arguments in support of why this allegation could amount to conduct extending over a period of time and in any event, from January 2024, she was suspended from work when access to work IT equipment would have been [COMPANY].

For the reasons given above in relation to claim 9, I do not accept that it is just and equitable to extend time in this allegation. The claim is therefore out of time.

191. [NAME] was not raised by Miss [NAME] in relation to this allegation is therefore not considered.

Case 3 Claim 11 – sex discrimination (LOI 11.1.1)

192. The allegation was ‘[APPELLANT] asked the claimant questions about her personal and sex life in May/June 2023.’

37

193. [APPELLANT] asserted that the claimant was emailed questions by Mr [APPELLANT] on 7 June 2023, and this was supported by documents in the bundle. Accordingly, she says, the claim should have been brought by 6 September 2023. Early conciliation took place long after this date with the claim being presented on 18 November 2024 with Case 3.

194. She observed that Case 2 was presented on 5 February 2024 and therefore [NAME] applies because Claim 11 could have been included within that earlier claim.

195. The claimant’s argument was that this remained a continuing act.

196. On pages 300 to 301 of the [NAME] bundle can be seen an exchange of emails between the claimant and Mr [APPELLANT] on 7 June 2023 and where he says, ‘I appreciate that this is a difficult time, and that the topics I need your assistance with are of a particularly sensitive and personal nature.’ In the absence of anything in the alternative from the claimant, it appears that this incident arose on or around 7 June 2023.

197. For similar reasons given above in relation to claims 9 and 10, this claim was presented long after the three month period expired. The claimant has not explained why this act can be conduct extending over a period and certainly into the period of suspension and up to and including the date of dismissal.

198. Additionally, and for the reasons given above, I cannot accept that it is just and equitable to extend time. Consequently, claim 11 is out of time.

199. Miss [NAME] did raise the alternative submission that [APPELLANT] applies. The claimant did not provide any arguments concerning why it did not apply or convincing special circumstances which would excuse any application of this rule.

200. This was an allegation which the claimant was aware of both in relation to Case 1 presented on 30 July 2023 and Case 2 on 5 February 2024. I have considered all the circumstances and concluded that it was an abuse of process not to have included this claim within the original claim Case 1 or at the very least in Case 2 and instead included it within Case 3. This is for the same reasons described above in relation to claim 9. There was no reason why the claimant could not have presented this claim on these alternative dates. This simply involves a claimant reflecting upon the latter stages of their employment and deciding particular events where upon reconsideration, acts of discrimination. No special circumstances were identified to me to excuse this finding that an abuse of process took place and [NAME] applies.

38 201. This claim, however, remains dismissed primarily for the reason of time limit grounds as described above.

Case 3 Claim 12 – sex harassment (LOI 11.1.2)

202. This allegation related to ‘[NAME] investigation involved Ms [NAME] going through personal messages as recorded in her report in February 2024 which the claimant says made her feel that was being negatively presented as sexually promiscuous’.

203. Ms [NAME] report was submitted as being prepared and dated 26 February 2024 and the document was references in the [NAME] bundle. Miss [NAME] therefore submitted that the claim should have been presented by 25 May 2024. Case 3 was not of course presented until 18 November 2024, (with early conciliation beginning out of time on 22 August 2024). She argued that the claim was presented 177 days out of time.

204. The claimant maintained her argument that this was a continuing act and therefore not out of time and as with her other claims, submitted no reason why it was not reasonably practicable to present her claim in time.

205. [NAME] report dated 26 February 2024 considered the concerns raised against the claimant and can be found in the [NAME] bundle at pages 304 to 333 with appendices following the report.

206. I accepted that this decision was available to the claimant from this date and therefore she must present her complaint of harassment by 25 May 2024. As early conciliation began on 22 August 2024, this does not assist the claimant and Case 3 was presented much later on 18 November 2024.

207. The claimant failed to identify how this allegation could amount to conduct extending over a period or why it would be just and equitable to extend time. This claim was presented out of time.

Case 3 Claim 13 – sex harassment (LOI 11.1.3)

208. This allegation was as follows, ‘[APPELLANT] [NAME] asked questions about whether the claimant had spent the night in the hotel room the booking of which was subject to a fraud investigation even though that would not have been a breach of HMRC policy and supported the sexual narrative about the claimant recorded in the investigation report in his decision on dismissal.’

39 209. Miss [APPELLANT] submitted that Mr [APPELLANT] asked questions of the claimant about this matter in the decision meeting of 12 April 2024, with the dismissal decision letter dated 23 May 2024. Accepting that the later date could be used for the calculation of time limits, she said that the primary limitation date would be 22 August 2024.

210. The same arguments were therefore used for claims 7 and 8 and the claimant relied upon her usual argument of continuing act in reply.

211. This allegation does seem to be curious in terms of its relationship with a broader allegation in relation to sex harassment. However, pages 337 to 357 of the [NAME] bundle identify Mr [APPELLANT] asking the claimant about the hotel booking during the decision meeting. This is dated 12 April 2024. But even by accepting that this allegation formed part of a process ending with the decision to dismiss on 23 May 2024, it was out of time. This is for the reasons given above relating to the other claims arising from the decision to dismiss in Case 3.

212. I accepted that the allegation was potentially material until the decision in the process was reached, but it could not amount to conduct extending over a period beyond 23 May 2024 when the claimant was dismissed. For the reasons given in relation to the complaint of discrimination arising from a disability (section 15 [NAME]) which is claim 8, I do not accept that it was just and equitable to extend time. this complaint is out of time.

Case 3 Claim 14-16 – direct discrimination (LOI 12.1)

213. These allegations related to the earlier claims 11, 12 and 13 (above). The same submissions were therefore made and the same reply made by the claimant.

214. I agreed with [APPELLANT] and noted that the claimant did not dispute this, that these allegations of direct discrimination related to claims 11 (claim 14), 12 (claim 15) and 13 (claim 16), being respectively the same factual allegations pleaded against alternative complaints.

215. The claimant did not provide alternative submissions to those already raised and I would therefore repeat my decision in relation to claims 11, 12 and 13, (with claim 14 also being subject to a positive finding in relation to [NAME]).

Case 3 Claim 17 – victimisation (LOI 13.2.1)

216. This allegation involved the following, ‘Treat matter which had previously been treated as safeguarding matters as reason to refer the claimant for possible gross misconduct and leading to gross misconduct charges and dismissal.’

40

217. The alleged detriment involved, as submitted by [APPELLANT], the claimant being informed of her misconduct investigation on 15 August 2023, with her dismissal taking place on 23 May 2024. Accepting that the later date could be used she submitted that 22 August 2024 was the primary limitation date for presenting this claim.

218. Not surprisingly, Miss [NAME] repeated her submissions for claim numbers 7 and 8, and the claimant’s usual reply was argued.

219. There was no dispute that this allegation may have resulted from earlier conduct, but that in terms of conduct extending over a period, it ended on 23 May 2024 when the claimant’s employment ended.

220. For the same reasons given above in relation to claims 7 and 8, claim 17 is presented out of time and for the same reasons relating to claim 8, it is not just and equitable to extend time under section 123 [NAME].

Case 3 – summary

221. Miss [NAME] therefore argued that all of the claims had been presented out of time and the claimant had not argued that any of the claims could not be brought earlier than they were on reasonable practicability grounds.

222. My findings in relation to Case 3 above support this submission and not only are all of these claims out of time but claims 9 11 and 14 are also subject to the application of [NAME].

Case 4 Claim 18 – victimisation (LOI 17.2)

223. This case involved an allegation of victimisation and was as follows: ‘Fail to consider the claimant’s injury at work benefit application “made over 2 years ago” and in particular put the application on hold between January 2024 and July 2024 and fail to ensure that the application was progressed in a timely way by [NAME] [understood to be the personal on line [NAME]] and in accordance with the scheme guidance.’

224. Miss [APPELLANT] submitted that the [APPELLANT]’s [NAME] emailed the [APPELLANT] on 25 January 2024 confirming that the claimant’s injury benefit application could not be processed until there was an outcome to the misconduct process. This was confirmed in documents provided in the [NAME] bundle. Consequently, that process concluded with the dismissal decision letter dated 23 May 2024.

225. The [APPELLANT] then forwarded the application to [NAME] by 17 July 2024 at the latest and although the claimant was informed, she did not qualify

41 for that benefit. Using this last date, Miss [NAME] asserted that the primary limitation date was 16 October 2024. With Case 4 Claim 18 being presented on 11 April 2025, it was made 177 days out of time.

226. Miss [NAME] also noted that Case 3 was presented on 18 November 2024 and as there was no asserted reason why Claim 19 could not be brought with this earlier case, the principle set out in [NAME] must apply and is an abuse of process.

227. The claimant did not provide a reply with any special circumstances being raised in relation to [NAME]. She did not provide any specific arguments disputing that this claim was presented out of time and relied upon her existing general argument of conduct extending over a period.

228. The claimant did not dispute the alleged final date when the detriment could have taken place and from when time began to run. Pages 362 to 364 of the [NAME] bundle cover correspondence between the claimant, Ms [APPELLANT] and others from January 2024 to 4 April 2024 relating to injury benefit. The [APPELLANT] accepts that until the disciplinary process concluded, the application could not be processed. This means that the earliest this could take place would be shortly after the decision to dismiss on 23 May 2024. Page 460 of the [NAME] bundle contained a copy of the HR email to Ms [APPELLANT] and copying in the claimant confirming that the application had been made. The HR email rejecting the application could be found on page 464 and was dated 16 September 2024.

229. I considered that 16 September 2024 was when the claimant could reasonably treat the detriment as taking place. In accordance with section 123 [NAME], the claimant had until 15 December 2024 in which to present a claim. However, early conciliation did not begin until 11 March 2025 and conclude on 11 April 2025. Case 4 was not presented until 11 April 2025, and it was therefore out of time.

230. I was unable to accept that this decision which was a single act could amount to conduct extending over a period beyond 16 September 2024 and the claimant was unable to explain why she could not bring this claim sooner. At this point she had been dismissed, there was no formal appeal procedure allowed by the decision letter and the next logical step was to present a claim. Even allowing for the claimant’s arrest on 31 October 2024, she had until 15 December 2024 to notify ACAS. There was no evidence provided to persuade me that it was not just and equitable to extend time to 11 April 2024.

231. [NAME] did raise [NAME] in relation to this case, it did involve a claim arising after the claimant’s dismissal, where her focus would reasonably be in relation to the complaints directly arising from the decision to dismiss and the arrest on 31 October 2024 did amount to a special circumstance that would have distracted her from a new claim and for her to

42 focus upon her older claims arising from 23 May 2024 or earlier. This argument is rejected but the claim remains out of time.

Conclusion

232. Accordingly, for the reasons given above, all of the complaints arising from Cases 1, 3 and 4 are out of time and the combined claims are dismissed. Additionally, Case 2 is struck out under Rule 38(1) of the [NAME].

233. This also means that the final hearing listed for 15 to 29 March 2027 is cancelled. I noted that Friday 26 and Monday 29 March 2027 appear to be the Easter Bank Holiday, but my decision in this case means that it is not necessary to consider this factor any further.

_____________________________

Employment Judge Johnson

Date____13 January 2026_________

JUDGMENT SENT TO THE PARTIES ON

3 March 2026

FOR THE TRIBUNAL OFFICE

Notes

Public access to employment tribunal decisions

Judgments and reasons for the judgments are published, in full, online at www.gov.uk/employment-tribunal-decisions shortly after a copy has been sent to the claimant(s) and [APPELLANT](s) in a case.

Recording and Transcription

Please note that if a Tribunal hearing has been recorded you may request a transcript of the recording, for which a charge may be payable. If a transcript is produced it will not include any oral judgment or reasons given at the hearing. The transcript will not be checked, approved or verified by a judge. There is more information in the joint Presidential Practice Direction on the Recording and Transcription of Hearings, and accompanying Guidance, which can be found here:

https://www.judiciary.uk/guidance-and-resources/employment-rules-and-legislation-practice- directions/

Case Number: (1) 2407757/2023 (2) 2400787/2024 (3) 2404330/2025 (4) 2404331/2025

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Claimant: [redacted] The Commissioners for His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs

JUDGMENT

(1) The claimant’s application dated 17 March 2026 for reconsideration of the judgment sent to the parties on 3 March 2026 was sent to the Tribunal in time and in accordance with Rule 69 of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024.

(2) The claimant’s application for reconsideration is refused.

REASONS

There is no reasonable prospect of the original decision being varied or revoked in accordance with Rule 68, because:

1. Having considered the claimant’s grounds supporting her application and the [APPELLANT]’s reply dated 23 March 2026, the claimant has failed to identify any or any sufficient grounds that the judgment decision was made contrary to relevant legal principles or that findings were made which could be considered unreasonable based upon the evidence available at the preliminary hearing on 8 October 2025.

Date: 14 April 2026

Approved by:

Employment Judge Johnson

JUDGMENT SENT TO THE PARTIES ON

27 May 2026

FOR THE TRIBUNAL OFFICE