Employment Tribunal Dismisses Discrimination Claims Against SRA

OUTCOME: Struck Out

RESERVED JUDGMENT WITH REASONS

Case Numbers: 2410964/2023 2401896/2024 2403431/2024 2400031/2025

1

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Claimant: [redacted] Respondents: [redacted] 2. [NAME] 3. [NAME] 4. [NAME] 5. [NAME] [NAME] AT:

Manchester ON: 29 September 2025 BEFORE: Regional Employment Judge Franey (sitting alone)

REPRESENTATION:

Claimant: [redacted] Respondent: [redacted] respondents: [redacted] Mr [COUNSEL], Counsel Mr [COUNSEL], Counsel

RESERVED JUDGMENT

1. All claims in case number 2403431/2024 are dismissed upon withdrawal by the claimant.

2. All complaints of a breach of the Equality Act 2010 in relation to the issue or revocation of a practising certificate by the first respondent, or in relation to whether the claimant’s name appeared on the [NAME] maintained by the first respondent, are dismissed upon withdrawal by the claimant.

3. All claims against the [APPELLANT] respondent Mr [APPELLANT] are struck out because the claimant has no reasonable prospect of establishing that Mr [APPELLANT] can be liable to him under the Equality Act 2010.

RESERVED JUDGMENT WITH REASONS

2 4. The complaints regarding investigations undertaken by the first respondent or its officers during 2019, 2020 and 2021 are not struck out as an abuse of process by reason of the doctrine of “res judicata”.

5. However, those complaints, and all remaining complaints against the first, [NAME], fourth and fifth respondents are struck out as they have no reasonable prospect of success.

6. The applications to amend the claim made by the claimant on 25 February 2025, 14 March 2025 and 15 August 2025 are dismissed.

7. This means that all proceedings in these cases are at an end.

REASONS Introduction 1. In these reasons I will refer to the first respondent as “the SRA”, to the other respondents by name, and to the first, [NAME], fourth and fifth respondents collectively as “the SRA respondents”.

2. This judgment was reserved at the conclusion of a preliminary hearing on 29 September 2025. The case had been listed for two days to deal with a number of applications to strike out the claim or parts of it made by the respondents, and some other matters of case management, but I granted an application by the claimant to vacate the [NAME] day. Details are set out in a case management order which was issued following that hearing. Instead I heard the oral applications by the respondents, supported by the written material mentioned below, but the claimant was not required to respond to those applications during the hearing. It was agreed that his responses to the various applications were to be supplied in writing.

3. His written submission was due by 27 November 2025, but he was granted an extension of time. With a letter dated 23 December 2025 he supplied that material in the form of a witness statement with accompanying documents.

4. Two replies to his submission were made on 21 January 2026: one on behalf of the SRA respondents and one on behalf of Mr [NAME].

5. The production of this judgment has been delayed as the claimant wrote to the Tribunal on three further occasions providing additional submissions and documents: 23 January, 4 and 16 March 2026. The respondents replied on 4 February and 5 March 2026.

6. My decisions in this case have therefore been based on the following information:

RESERVED JUDGMENT WITH REASONS

3 • Consideration of the Tribunal’s file in relation to all four claims • A bundle of documents running to over 900 pages which was prepared by the respondents for this hearing. Any reference to page numbers in these reasons is a reference to that bundle unless otherwise indicated. • Supplementary documents supplied by the claimant, including a further bundle of 58 pages. Any reference to page numbers in that bundle will be preceded by the letter C. • A witness statement from the claimant prepared for this hearing dated 29 September 2025 which ran to ten pages. • A skeleton argument prepared by Mr [NAME] for the respondents he represented which ran to 18 pages (including the appendix) and which was accompanied by copies of some of the decided cases. • Outline submissions on behalf of the [APPELLANT] respondent which had been prepared earlier in the case by Ms [COUNSEL] of counsel, and which were adopted by Mr [COUNSEL] on behalf of his client. • The oral submissions made during this hearing by Mr [NAME] and Mr [APPELLANT]. • Some of the oral comments made by the claimant during this hearing even though he was not being required to respond to these applications. • The written submissions in response to the applications which were supplied by the claimant dated 23 December 2025. • Two replies on behalf of the respondents of 21 January 2026. • Further letters from the claimant of 23 January, and 4 and 16 March 2026. • The attachments to those three letters from the claimant, including the witness statement of Mr [APPELLANT] to the SRA made on 15 June 2025, and the SRA outcome letter dated 6 March 2026 in relation to the claimant’s complaint about Ms [APPELLANT]. • Replies from the respondents of 4 February and 5 March 2026. Summary of the Background 7. To put my decisions into context it is appropriate to summarise the background to this case. I set out here facts which were a matter of record. I did not hear any evidence in this hearing and I made no findings of fact on any disputed issue. For the purposes of an application to strike out a claim it is appropriate to assume that any

RESERVED JUDGMENT WITH REASONS

4 disputed primary facts will be found in favour of the claimant if the matter proceeds to a final hearing.

8. The claimant was admitted as a solicitor some years ago. The SRA regulates that profession and is responsible, amongst other things, for maintaining the [NAME] and for issuing practising certificates. It is in that sense a qualifications body under Section 53 of the Equality Act 2010. The First SRA Investigation 9. On 31 October 2019 the SRA wrote to the claimant inviting him to provide an explanation of his conduct in relation to an allegation that he had failed to disclose a bankruptcy issue when applying to renew a practising certificate. That letter appeared at pages 606-610. The claimant provided a detailed response on 1 November 2019 at pages 611-616. No further action was taken by the SRA. On 17 December 2019 the claimant wrote to the SRA making an allegation of race discrimination in the way they had dealt with the matter. Case Number 2406159/2019 10. In 2019 the claimant had instituted Employment Tribunal proceedings in an unrelated matter against [NAME] and [NAME]. They had case number 2406159/2019. The hearing began in February 2020. Judgment and reasons for dismissing some applications by the claimant were issued in April 2020, before the final judgment of that Tribunal was sent to the parties on 16 July 2020. Mr [COUNSEL] articles 11. Mr [COUNSEL] is also a solicitor who works as a legal journalist and is the founder and editor of “[NAME]”, a news-driven website providing market intelligence for law firms. On 23 June 2020 he published on that website a story based on the Tribunal decision in April 2020 in case number 2406159/2019 (page 479-480). The website referred to the claimant having made and then retracted a request for the female judge chairing that tribunal to be replaced by a [NAME] judge. That was mentioned in the Tribunal decision issued in April 2020. A further article on 5 August 2020 (pages 481- 482) repeated some criticisms made of the claimant by the Tribunal in their final written decision. The [NAME]

12. On 11 November 2020 (pages 617-619) the SRA notified the claimant that it was going to investigate his conduct in those proceedings, in relation to his application for the case to be heard by a [NAME] employment judge. He was asked to explain his reasons for making that application. The claimant responded the same day by e-mail at page 620-623. He made clear how angry he was that this allegation was being investigated and asked the details of who had reported it to the SRA. He said that the actions of the SRA amounted to discrimination because of race and sex, harassment related to those protected characteristics, and victimisation.

RESERVED JUDGMENT WITH REASONS

5 13. Further correspondence between the claimant and the SRA ensued, including a letter from the claimant of 27 January 2021 in which he again alleged that there had been a breach of the Equality Act.

14. No action was taken in relation to the allegation but the claimant’s practising certificate was subsequently revoked in April 2021. Case Number 1304231/2021 15. On 18 September 2021 the claimant issued proceedings against the SRA and others in the Birmingham Employment Tribunal under case number 1304231/2021. For the purpose of his claims of discrimination and harassment he relied on the fact he was a [NAME]. His complaints were later described by Employment Judge Jones as covering four broad areas: (a) The first SRA investigation between October 2019 and December 2019. (b) How his complaints about that first investigation were dealt with. (c) The [NAME] investigation between November 2020 and January 2021, and (d) How the respondent dealt with his complaints about that [NAME] investigation.

16. It was also recorded that the claimant pursued a complaint of discrimination about the revocation of his practising certificate.

17. The Birmingham proceedings came to an end through two judicial decisions.

18. The first was a judgment of Employment Judge Connolly issued in July 2022 (pages 417-427) dismissing the complaint about the revocation of the practising certificate in April 2021 because Section 120(7) of the Equality Act 2010 meant the Tribunal had no jurisdiction over that complaint; a statutory right of appeal to the High Court was available.

19. The [NAME] was a decision of Employment Judge Jones issued in January 2024 (pages 428-440) dismissing his complaints as out of time. Article June 2022 20. In the meantime the claimant pursued an appeal against the decision of the Tribunal in case number 2406159/2019. In an article published on 6 June 2022 (pages 483-484) Mr [APPELLANT] reported on the claimant’s success in the Employment Appeal Tribunal. The article also reported references made by the ET and the EAT to the claimant’s behaviour, and reported that part of the case in which the appeal succeeded had been remitted to a different tribunal for consideration.

RESERVED JUDGMENT WITH REASONS

6 21. The claimant made a formal complaint to Mr [APPELLANT] on the same day (pages 485- 489). He said that earlier articles had resulted in him being investigated by the SRA in November 2020, and that although the investigation had not resulted in any finding of a breach of SRA codes of conduct, it had resulted in the revocation of his practising certificate in April 2021. He threatened legal action against Mr [APPELLANT].

22. There ensued a series of e-mails between the claimant and Mr [APPELLANT] during June 2022 beginning at page 490. The outcome was that Mr [NAME] removed the articles in July 2022, although confirming he did so with no admission of liability or that the articles were incorrect. He refused to publish an apology (page 504). SRA Complaint by Mr [NAME]

23. On 27 February 2023 Mr [APPELLANT] made a complaint about the claimant to the SRA (page 472). His report form appeared at pages 473-478. Attached were copies of the articles and the correspondence with the claimant. He said that in the e-mails the claimant had taken “an extremely aggressive approach” to the publication of the articles, and that he had been accused by the claimant of having acted in bad faith and defaming him. He said the claimant had demanded erasure of the articles, and an apology and compensation, and had threatened legal action if he did not comply. Mr [NAME] said that the articles were a fair, accurate and contemporaneous report of tribunal rulings which would be covered by qualified privilege. [NAME]

24. In May 2023 the regulatory position changed and solicitors had to make a renewed application to stay on the Roll and pay an administration fee. The claimant was not aware of this and made no such application. He formed the view later on that he had been taken off the Roll at this stage. [APPELLANT]

25. The February complaint from Mr [NAME] was actioned by the SRA on 8 September 2023 by a letter to the claimant informing him he was under investigation. The letter appeared at pages 628-630. Further information was provided in a letter of 27 September 2023 at pages 631-633. The claimant was asked to clarify something he had written to Mr [NAME] about the reason for the revocation of his practising certificate. Case Number 2410964/2023 26. The claimant complained about this to the SRA and also presented his claim form in case number 2410964/2023. It was validly presented with effect from 3 November 2023.

27. During the rest of 2023 there was significant further correspondence between the claimant and the SRA, some of it relating to a data protection Subject Access Request. On 20 December 2023 Ms [APPELLANT] wrote to the claimant as an investigation officer of

RESERVED JUDGMENT WITH REASONS

7 the SRA saying that three matters would be investigated arising out of his dealings with Mr [NAME], only one of which had been mentioned in the September letter. In the course of the investigation Mr [NAME] made a witness statement for the SRA in July 2024 and a [NAME] statement in June 2025. Paragraph 2 of the [NAME] statement said it had been made at the request of the SRA. In that witness statement he sought to give an explanation for why it was in February 2023 that he came to complain about the claimant’s conduct in the middle of 2022. Case Number 2401896/2024 28. On 25 March 2024 the claimant presented his claim in case number 2401896/2024. It was combined with 2410964/2023.

29. The combined cases came before Employment Judge Tobin for a case management hearing on 23 May 2024. His written case management order was issued on 6 June 2024 and appeared at pages 152-163. He listed the matter for a two-day preliminary hearing in December 2024 to consider a number of matters including applications by the respondents to strike out the claim. That hearing was subsequently postponed to April 2025 and then to 29 September 2025. Case Number 2403431/2024 30. On 1 June the claimant presented a [APPELLANT] claim form in case number 2403431/2024 against the SRA and its lawyer Mr [NAME]. That claim was withdrawn on 25 February 2025 and the claimant agreed in this hearing that it could be dismissed. Case Number 2400031/2025 31. Correspondence between the claimant and the SRA continued during 2024, as did the ET proceedings.

32. The claimant lodged a further claim on 30 December 2024 under case number 2400031/2025.

33. In correspondence during the ET proceedings it was confirmed that an application to strike out case number 2400031/2025 would be heard at this hearing as well as the points being made overlapped with those being made in relation to the other two cases. It was agreed at this hearing that the three cases could be formally combined. Comparators for SRA Treatment 34. In his first claim form in these proceedings the claimant sought to rely on [APPELLANT] (presumably a [NAME]) as a comparator, being a solicitor about whom the claimant made a number of complaints from 2012 onwards. They included a complaint of dishonesty. He asserts in his claim form that no action was taken against her until her own practice made a complaint in 2020, which resulted in her being struck

RESERVED JUDGMENT WITH REASONS

8 off. The first SRA investigation mentioned above arose out of a bankruptcy order sought by Ms [APPELLANT] against the claimant.

35. In the alternative he relied upon a hypothetical comparator.

36. In his letters to the Tribunal of 23 December 2025 and 16 March 2026 the claimant provided some information about another person he identified as a comparator for the purposes of his race and sex discrimination complaints. [COUNSEL] is a solicitor who represented the SRA in the proceedings before the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal in late 2025. On 12 November 2025 the claimant made a complaint to the SRA about her conduct, alleging that she had misled that Tribunal by asserting that “unused material” was protected by privilege, by failing to disclose her letter to that effect to the Tribunal, and by misrepresenting the claimant’s medical conditions and the reason for him not attending. On 6 March 2026 the SRA notified the claimant that his report had been assessed and the decision had been taken not to investigate the concerns he raised. The letter was accompanied by a statement of the reasons for the decision which ran to four pages. The claimant says that Ms [APPELLANT] is a [NAME], and that because he is a [NAME] he has been treated less favourably than she was treated by the SRA when they chose to pursue the investigation into the concerns raised about him. Agreed Matters 37. It was agreed in the course of this hearing that the withdrawn case 2403431/2025 could be dismissed.

38. In the course of oral submissions about the effect of Section 120(7) Equality Act 2010 on the complaints in relation to the practising certificate and the Roll, the claimant sensibly accepted that those claims were indeed prohibited by that provision, as Employment Judge Connolly had decided in the Birmingham proceedings, and he withdrew the aspects of his claims which relate to those two matters. Those matters are also dismissed on withdrawal in the judgment above. Amendment Applications 39. The claimant had made an application to amend his claim in the agenda form for the case management hearing before Employment Judge Tobin in May 2024, and three further applications to amend in correspondence between February and August 2025. Those applications concerned the SRA respondents, not Mr [NAME].

40. Mr [NAME] had explained in his skeleton argument why those applications were opposed, and expanded briefly on those points in oral submissions. As the claimant was a litigant in person I allowed him the facility to reply in relation to his applications and to do so in writing.

41. My decision on those applications is recorded in the judgment above and explained below.

RESERVED JUDGMENT WITH REASONS

9 Issues to be Determined 42. The consequence of this was that after the hearing on 29 September 2025 there were five matters for me to determine in this judgment: (a) Whether there was any legal basis on which Mr [APPELLANT] could be liable to the claimant under the Equality Act 2010 given that he did not employ the claimant and nor was he an employee of the SRA. (b) Whether complaints about the two investigations in between 2019 and 2021 against the SRA respondents should be struck out as an abuse of process because they had already been determined in the Birmingham case. (c) Whether the claims raised by the claimant should be struck out as having no reasonable prospect of success, including the claimant’s prospects of establishing that his complaints were brought within time. (d) If not, whether his complaint should also be struck out on the basis that the claims were scandalous or vexatious. (e) Whether the claimant should be granted permission to amend his claim.

43. The first four applications fell to be determined under what is now Rule 38 of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024 which, so far as material, reads as follows: “(1) The Tribunal may, on its own initiative or on the application of a party, strike out all or part of a claim, response or reply on any of the following grounds – (a) That it is scandalous or vexatious or has no reasonable prospect of success. (b) That the manner in which the proceedings are being conducted by or on behalf of the claimant or the respondent (as the case may be) has been scandalous, unreasonable or vexatious …” 44. I will address each of the applications in turn, summarising the relevant legal framework and the competing position of the parties before confirming my decision. Issue (a): Liability of [NAME]

45. The matter for me to determine was whether the claimant had any reasonable prospect of showing that Mr [APPELLANT] could be legally liable under the Equality Act 2010 if there had been any discrimination, harassment or victimisation in his actions, which of course was denied.

RESERVED JUDGMENT WITH REASONS

10 Relevant Law 46. The SRA is potentially liable in the event of having contravened the Act by virtue of Section 53 in its capacity as a qualifications body. Section 109 also makes it liable for anything done by its employees or agents: “(1) Anything done by a person (A) in the course of [NAME] employment must be treated as also done by the employer. (2) Anything done by an agent for a [NAME], with the authority of the [NAME], must be treated as also done by the [NAME]. (3) It does not matter whether that thing is done with the employer’s or [NAME]’s knowledge or approval.” 47. In relation to the [NAME], fourth and fifth respondents, they are employees of the SRA and therefore it is liable should they contravene the Equality Act in their dealings with the claimant. In those circumstances they would also be personally liable under Section 110: “(1) A person (A) contravenes this section if – (a) A is an employee or agent, (b) A does something which, by virtue of Section 109(1) or (2), is treated as having been done by A’s employer or [NAME] (as the case may be) and (c) The doing of that thing by [NAME] amounts to a contravention of this Act by the employer or [NAME] (as the case may be).” 48. Unlike the other individual respondents, Mr [NAME] was not an employee of the SRA and therefore not potentially personally liable by that route under Section 110. He might be liable if he were an agent of the SRA.

49. The relationship between the common law concept of agency and the provisions now found in Sections 109 and 110 have been considered in a number of cases, including [NAME] v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2004] ICR 1660, and by the Court of Appeal in Ministry of Defence v Kemeh [2014] ICR 625. In the latter case the court said that the concept of agency “must at least reflect the essence of the legal concept” under common law. Part of the essence of that concept is that the agent has authority to act on behalf of the [NAME], and consents so to act. Frequently, although not invariably, the agent has power to affect the [NAME]’s legal relationships with a [APPELLANT] party. Submissions 50. The complaints about breaches of the Equality Act made by the claimant against Mr [APPELLANT] appear in the grounds of complaint in case number 2410964/2023 (pages 16-36).

RESERVED JUDGMENT WITH REASONS

11 51. He alleges in paragraph 55 of that document (page 34) that Mr [NAME] acted as an agent of and under the directions of and in collusion with the SRA. He alleges direct discrimination because of race and sex in the publication of the article in August 2020 and by making his report to the SRA in 2023. At the time he completed the grounds of complaint the claimant believed this report had been made in September 2023 but it was in fact made in February 2023. The making of this complaint is described as “targeting” the claimant. The report to the SRA is also said to amount to victimisation.

52. Mr [NAME] argued that there was no possible basis upon which Mr [NAME] could be considered to be an agent of the SRA in the publication of the article in August 2020 or in making a report to the SRA. There was no agreement in place between him and the SRA which would establish him as their agent, and they had no involvement whatsoever in him deciding either to publish the article or complain to them. They were simply the recipients of information which the SRA and its investigation officers then dealt with in accordance with their processes. Mr [NAME] wrote the article and made the complaint to the SRA on his own behalf, not on behalf of the SRA. Further, Mr [NAME] submitted that the process of getting a witness statement from a complainant was set out in an e-mail from Ms [APPELLANT] at page 722- 723, and that subsequent correspondence showed that Mr [NAME] was acting independently because he insisted on having his witness statement checked by his own lawyers before it was provided to the SRA. The fact that [NAME] wanted to prepare the first draft for him did not make him the agent of the SRA.

53. The claimant argued that there was an agency relationship. He relied upon the way in which the SRA dealt with Mr [NAME] in getting a witness statement from him. That appeared in the section of the bundle starting at page 715. The written submissions of the claimant about the liability of Mr [APPELLANT] appeared in paragraphs 6- 25 of the witness statement attached to his letter of 23 December 2025. He submitted that the question of whether there was an agency relationship was fact-sensitive, and therefore not appropriate for determination in this way. He asserted that Mr [NAME] had written the offending articles in [NAME] because of his relationship with the SRA, and in doing so was influenced by the claimant’s protected characteristics. He also contended that the report in February 2023 to the SRA was made because of his relationship with the SRA. He developed his submissions by reference to the “unused material” which included attendance notes of telephone discussions between Mr [NAME] and the SRA’s officers, and the request for a witness statement made by Ms [NAME] in an e-mail of 20 December 2023. That request for a witness statement was repeated by SRA officers on a number of occasions.

54. In his later correspondence, having seen Mr [APPELLANT] [NAME] statement, the claimant emphasised its contents. The statement says that it was made at the request of the SRA. It says he had had a video conference and e-mail correspondence with the SRA’s solicitor. It explains the timing of Mr [COUNSEL] complaint by reference to a Warning Notice issued by the SRA on 28 November 2022 about Strategic Lawsuits against Public Participation.

RESERVED JUDGMENT WITH REASONS

12 55. The claimant also raised after the hearing a new legal point not expressly pleaded in his ET1: that Mr [NAME] could be liable because he instructed, caused or induced the SRA to contravene the Equality Act contrary to Section 111, and/or knowingly helped the SRA to contravene the Act contrary to Section 112. I assumed in his favour that this was a refinement of his assertion in the ET1 that Mr [NAME] had colluded with the other respondents.

56. The respondents provided a response to the claimant’s letter of 23 December 2025 and attached witness statement. The submission for the SRA respondents observed that the claimant was not entitled to introduce new factual material by way of a witness statement. That was formally correct, but it seemed to me that much of what was included in the witness statement was actually submissions rather than the assertion of facts not already before me in the existing documentation. In so far as the claimant provided further documents or factual material in this witness statement and his subsequent letters, I considered it in accordance with the overriding objective to take it into account given that he is a litigant in person and given that the sanction of striking out a claim as having no reasonable prospect of success is one which should not be imposed if there is a prospect of facts establishing the claim being proven at trial.

57. The SRA respondents submitted that there was no understandable or logical basis for asserting an agency relationship between Mr [NAME] and the SRA.

58. That same point was made in the submissions supplied on behalf of Mr [APPELLANT]. It suggested the claimant had not identified any authority conferred by the first respondent on Mr [APPELLANT] to act on its behalf towards the claimant. Mr [APPELLANT] was getting his own legal advice, showing that he was not under the direction or control of the SRA. The dealings with Mr Mr [NAME] over his witness statement were simply how the investigation officers obtain evidence from a complainant/witness.

59. Both submissions also asserted that any reliance by the claimant on Sections 111 and 112 of the Equality Act was misconceived. My Decision 60. I was satisfied that none of the points made by the claimant about the dealings between Mr [APPELLANT] and the SRA after the complaint was made could help him in establishing that Mr [NAME] was an agent of the SRA in writing the August 2020 article or in making the complaint in February 2023. There is no basis upon which the Tribunal could conclude that he did so on behalf of the SRA as opposed to on his own behalf, even though his [NAME] of June 2025 made it clear that his witness statement was requested by the SRA. I accepted the submission that subsequent dealings were simply the mechanics of obtaining a witness statement to enable the SRA to take the matter forward, and the mere fact that a lawyer or representative of an organisation provides the first draft of a witness statement to a witness or complainant does not make the latter the agent of the former. In all the material supplied by the claimant there is nothing that showed that Mr [APPELLANT] was acting on behalf of the SRA or authorised to do so. A regulatory body can gather evidence

RESERVED JUDGMENT WITH REASONS

13 without making a complainant or witness its agent. There is no reasonable prospect of the Tribunal finding that Mr [COUNSEL] could be liable to the claimant as agent for the SRA.

61. I also considered the suggestion that Mr [NAME] might potentially be liable under Sections 111 and 112. Section 111 was recently the subject of extensive consideration by the Employment Appeal Tribunal in [NAME] [COMPANY] and another [2025] ICR 46 and the Court of Appeal in the same case with [2025] EWCA Civ 1662. I had regard to what was said in those decisions in considering the submission by the claimant.

62. However, in my judgment reliance on both sections was misconceived: (a) Section 111(7) makes clear that the section would not apply unless the relationship between Mr [NAME] and the SRA was such that he was in a position to commit a basic contravention in relation to the SRA. He plainly was not in any such position. (b) The submission that Mr [NAME] could be liable under section 112 for having knowingly helped a contravention by the SRA must fail as – for reasons set out below – the claimant has no reasonable prospect of establishing that there was any such contravention.

63. All claims against Mr [NAME] are therefore dismissed. Issue (b): Effect of the Birmingham Proceedings 64. The issue for me to determine was whether it was an abuse of process for the claimant to pursue in these proceedings complaints about the first two SRA investigations between 2019-2020, and 2020-2021, because those matters had formed the subject of his complaints to the Birmingham Employment Tribunal in case number 1304231/2021, and had been the subject of judicial decisions to dismiss them made by Employment [NAME]. Relevant Law 65. The principles behind the doctrine of “res judicata” were set out by Lord [NAME] in paragraph 17-26 of the decision of the Supreme Court in [COMPANY] v [NAME] UK [COMPANY] [2014] 1AC 160. The doctrine is a substantive matter which has the purpose of limiting duplication in litigation. There is a bar to raising again in later litigation points which have been raised and determined in earlier litigation. Submissions 66. Mr [NAME] argued simply that any complaints about these two investigations had already been raised in the Birmingham proceedings and had been the subject of judicial determinations. He accepted that they were not determinations on the merits

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14 based on any finding of fact, but submitted nevertheless that they were still covered by the doctrine and the claimant could not relitigate those matters in this case.

67. In his written submissions of 23 December 2025 the claimant argued that the effect of the doctrine on his claim was limited to complaints about the revocation of the practising certificate, as per the judgment of Employment Judge Connolly, because the doctrine did not apply where complaints were dismissed as out of time rather than determined on their merits. My Decision 68. I accepted the claimant’s submission that a decision by an Employment Tribunal that it had no jurisdiction over a claim because it was brought out of time could not in itself trigger the doctrine of “res judicata”. The Tribunal was deciding that it had no jurisdiction to determine the claims, not determining them on the merits.

69. That view is supported by a decision of the Privy Council in [NAME] [NAME] [NAME] v Lall AIR 1940 PC 222.

70. In my judgment it is open in principle to the claimant to argue that the Tribunal has subsequently gained jurisdiction over these matters by later events which show that, with hindsight, they were part of a continuing course of discriminatory conduct so time started to run after the date on which his claim form in the Birmingham proceedings was presented. The decision of Employment Judge Jones in January 2024 recorded in paragraph 37 that the claim form was presented on 18 September 2021, and that the last act complained of occurred on 3 March 2021. It was on that basis that the claims were found to be out of time so the Tribunal had no jurisdiction over them. But that does not prevent the claimant bringing those complaints in these proceedings if later events show that there was a continuing act of discriminatory conduct extending over a longer period, so under Section 123(3)(a) Equality Act 2010 time had not in fact started to run. The claimant made that point in case number 2410964/2023, where in paragraphs 9-12 of the claim form he says that there was continuing discrimination by the SRA up to May 2023.

71. The application of the SRA respondents to strike out these claims as they are “res judicata” is therefore rejected.

72. I should also mention that Mr [NAME] made a submission on behalf of Mr [NAME] that any complaint about the August 2020 article could have been raised in the Birmingham proceedings issued in September 2021. He therefore submitted that it would be an abuse of process for the claimant to run this complaint against Mr [APPELLANT] in these proceedings when he could and should have done so in the Birmingham case. It was not necessary for me to decide this issue because there was no basis on which Mr [APPELLANT] could be liable to the claimant under the Equality Act in any event.

RESERVED JUDGMENT WITH REASONS

15 Issue (c): Merits – No Reasonable Prospect? 73. In this section I will deal only with the complaints against the SRA respondents because for reasons set out above there is no legal basis for any liability on the part of Mr [NAME].

74. The issue for me to determine was whether the claimant would have any reasonable prospect of success in establishing at a final hearing, assuming that all the primary facts were as he asserts, that there had been any direct discrimination because of race or sex, any harassment related to either of those protected characteristics, or any detrimental treatment of him materially influenced by one or more of the matters he said were protected acts.

75. For the purposes of this part of the case I assumed in his favour that the matters he relied on as protected acts would indeed qualify. This was essentially a question of causation, with a subsidiary point about time limits.

76. I concentrated on the later allegations, not those which were pursued in the Birmingham proceedings, since if the later events were not discriminatory those already raised in the Birmingham proceedings would remain out of time as determined by Employment Judge Jones. Only if there was a continuing act of discrimination could those earlier matters be revived in this litigation. Relevant Law 77. Discrimination complaints are highly fact-sensitive. There is a strong public interest in such claims proceeding to a final hearing so that the evidence can be properly examined. Striking out such a claim on the ground that it has no reasonable prospect of success is reserved for the clearest of cases. The alleged facts must be taken at their highest unless there is some particularly compelling reason for thinking that the tribunal will reject them. Where there is a central core of disputed fact, it is highly unlikely that it will be appropriate to strike out the claim. [NAME] v. North Glamorgan NHS Trust [2007] EWCA Civ 330 is authority for these propositions.

78. As a result it will only be in a plain and obvious case that it is appropriate to strike out a complaint of discrimination at a preliminary hearing on the ground of its prospects of success: [NAME] v. [COMPANY] Union [2001] UKHL 14.

79. Even so, in [NAME] v. British Airways [2017] EWCA Civ 1392, Underhill LJ said at paragraph 16: “Employment tribunals should not be deterred from striking out claims, including discrimination claims, which involve a dispute of fact if they are satisfied that there is indeed no reasonable prospect of the facts necessary for liability being established, and also provided they are keenly aware of the danger of reaching such conclusion in circumstances where the full evidence has not been heard and explored, perhaps particularly in a discrimination context.”

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16 80. To put it another way, “the need for caution when considering a strike-out application does not prohibit realistic assessment where the circumstances of the case permit”: [NAME] v. Ministry of Justice & others [2023] EAT 41.

81. I had regard to a number of decisions of the President of the EAT, Lord Fairley, in 2025 dealing with the striking out of discrimination complaints, as set out by Mr [NAME] in his skeleton argument. They were examples of applications of the principles summarised above.

82. In assessing the claimant’s prospect of success I took into account the wording of Sections 13, 26, and 27 of the Equality Act 2010. In addition, where a comparator is relied upon, section 23 provides that the material circumstances must not be different. However, evidence of how other cases were treated can still help a Tribunal decide the “reason why” question even if the material circumstances differ, particularly for claims (such as harassment and victimisation) where a comparator (real or hypothetical) is not strictly required.

83. I also took account of the case law on the application of the burden of proof provision in Section 136. including the well-known authority of the Court of Appeal in [NAME] v [COMPANY] [2007] ICR 867.

84. The effect of the provisions of the Equality Act 2010 and the case law can be summarised as follows: (a) The burden on the claimant under Section 136 is not to prove that there has been discrimination, but to prove facts from which the Tribunal could, in the absence of any explanation, reasonably conclude that there has been discrimination. Once that is done the burden shifts to the respondent to show that there was a non-discriminatory reason for the treatment of which the claimant complains. In many cases, however, tribunals can make a firm finding about the reason for the treatment which removes the need formally to go through a two-stage process. (b) The burden of proof will not shift simply because the claimant has a protected characteristic and is treated in a way which amounts to a detriment. “Something more” is needed to give rise to the reasonable possibility that the detrimental treatment may be materially influenced by the protected characteristic or a protected act. The material influence in most cases is a question of assessing the mental processes, conscious or subconscious, of the decision maker to see whether the protected characteristic or protected act was a factor in the decision. It does not have to be the sole or even the predominant factor. (c) What amounts to “something more” may itself be a relatively small matter. But as Underhill LJ put it in [NAME] (paragraph 24): “where there is on the face of it a straightforward and well-documented innocent explanation for what occurred, a case cannot be allowed to proceed on the basis of a mere assertion that that explanation is not the true explanation without the

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17 claimant being able to advance some basis, even if not yet provable, for that being so.” Background 85. The claimant protested that the skeleton argument for Mr [APPELLANT] only mentioned discrimination and harassment, not victimisation. That was factually correct, but the applications themselves did mention victimisation (e.g. page 67) or were plainly made in relation to the claim as a whole (e.g. page 146). I was satisfied that the omission of that matter expressly from the skeleton argument did not undermine the application that was being made or placed the claimant at any disadvantage.

86. The complaints made in these proceedings were a combination of direct discrimination because of race and sex, harassment related to race and sex, and victimisation because of one or more protected acts. I will assume in favour of the claimant that he seeks to pursue all his allegations of detrimental treatment under all five possible heads of claim, and that he will prove at the final hearing that the acts on which he relies are indeed protected.

87. The detrimental treatment about which he seeks to complain is clearly set out in the three claim forms. I omit from this broad summary the complaints about the investigations between 2019 and 2021, as their viability depended on the later claims. I also omit those which relate to the practising certificate or the Roll.

88. In summary, therefore, the claimant complains about the following:

(a) the decision in September 2023 to carry out an investigation into his conduct based on the February 2023 complaint from Mr [NAME];

(b) steps subsequently taken in the investigation which then ensued;

(c) a failure to deal properly with complaints made by the claimant about how he was being treated, and

(d) the decision of the respondent notified on 29 November 2024 to refer him to the Solicitors’ Disciplinary Tribunal. Application to Strike Out 89. Mr [NAME] submitted on behalf of the SRA respondents that although the claimant has the protected characteristics and did protected acts, he had provided nothing from which the Tribunal could conclude that those matters were any part of the reason for his treatment by the SRA and its investigation officers about which he complained in this case. He submitted that this was simply a question of the SRA performing its regulatory function once a complaint was received from Mr [APPELLANT] and that the matters about which the claimant complained were just letters communicating the next step and proceeding with the investigation. Everything was well documented

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18 and in accordance with processes. The claimant had no reasonable prospect of showing that this treatment would have been any different had he not been [NAME], or had been a woman, or had not made allegations of discrimination previously. Claimant’s Response to Application 90. The claimant’s submissions as to the merits of these complaints against the SRA respondents were set out in paragraphs 32-42 of the witness statement attached to his letter of 23 December 2025.

91. He emphasised the importance of inferences being drawn from primary facts, and said that the decision to pursue the matter before the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal was based upon a knowingly false statement that the evidential and public interest test requirements were met.

92. He suggested that inferences could be drawn of a discriminatory intent from the knowledge, mental processes and decision-making of the SRA respondents revealed in the unused material, and the fact that that material was concealed from him and his requests for access to it were deliberately ignored.

93. On the question of victimisation he relied upon the fact that the latest notice of investigation given to him in September 2023 arose during the proceedings against the SRA in the Birmingham Employment Tribunal, and indeed days before a preliminary hearing in October 2023. The decision to prosecute him before the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal occurred after he brought proceedings against the first respondent in this case in October 2023.

94. In his later correspondence he relied in particular upon a contrast between the way he was treated and the decision not to investigate Ms [NAME] in relation to his complaint against her. SRA Reply 95. In the written response by the SRA respondents to the claimant’s written submission, it was asserted that there was still no evidence to support a finding of discrimination as opposed to the claimant’s bare assertions. My Conclusions 96. I considered first the claimant’s reliance on comparators. The first comparator identified in his claim form was [NAME]. However, on the limited information supplied it did not seem to me that her material circumstances were the same as those of the claimant. The nature of the complaints which he made against her were quite different from those which Mr [NAME] made against him in February 2023. There was not enough information before me for me to conclude that reliance on this comparison would help the claimant shift the burden of proof to the respondents.

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19 97. As for [APPELLANT], the nature of the complaint made by the claimant against her was very different from that made against him by Mr [NAME]. The SRA gave detailed reasons for its decision not to investigate as part of its letter of 6 March 2026, which was provided to me with the claimant’s letter of 16 March 2026. I do not consider that the way in which his complaint about Ms [NAME] was dealt with lends any support to his contention that the way in which he has been treated has been influenced by his race, sex or protected acts.

98. Of overwhelming significance, I concluded, was the nature of the complaints against the claimant made by Mr [APPELLANT] in February 2023. They appeared in the bundle for this hearing at pages 473-504. Mr [NAME] provided to the SRA a link to the Employment Tribunal rulings in case number 2406159/2019, copies of three articles about the case, and the correspondence between himself and the claimant. The articles largely consisted of quotations from the decisions of the Employment Tribunal, and subsequently the Employment Appeal Tribunal, or brief summaries of what had been decided. The correspondence from the claimant of 6 June 2022 (page 485), 20 June 2022 (page 492), 23 June 2022 (page 498) and 30 June 2022 (page 500) made accusations of bad faith, defamation and falsehood, demanding compensation and a written apology, in ways which were obviously inappropriate given that the articles were just a fair and accurate report of judicial proceedings and therefore protected by qualified privilege under section 14 of the Defamation Act 1996.

99. Despite the assertions made by the claimant to the contrary, those matters plainly warranted an investigation by the SRA. He provided nothing which suggested, even indirectly, that his race or sex or protected acts had made any difference to the way he was treated. I concluded that the claimant had no reasonable prospect of showing that the SRA was influenced in any material way by his race, sex or earlier protected acts in deciding to institute the investigation and pursue it. Had those complaints been made about a hypothetical comparator (a [NAME] or female solicitor, or a solicitor who had not done any protected acts), the SRA response would have been the same. 100. The claimant has also alleged discrimination, harassment or victimisation in relation to each of the subsequent steps in the investigation. It is of course clear that each step in the investigation is a further detrimental step as far as he is concerned, and one which he says has a detrimental impact upon his health. However, even when the contents of the “unused material” are considered, and the knowledge, mental processes and decision-making of the individual SRA respondents revealed by that material are taken into account, there is still nothing which suggests any link at all between the claimant’s protected characteristics and the treatment in question, or his protected acts and the treatment in question. 101.

I therefore concluded that these claims should be struck out in their entirety. The claimant has no reasonable prospect of showing that his treatment by the SRA respondents from May 2023 onwards amounted to less favourable treatment because of race or sex, or that it was conduct related to his race or sex for the purposes of his harassment complaints, or that any protected acts had a material influence on how he was treated. There is an innocent and well documented reason for the SRA to

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20 investigate him (the [NAME] complaint and associated documents) which has nothing to do with his sex or race, or any protected act, and his case that it is because of or related to those things is mere assertion. 102. Nor, therefore, has he any reasonable prospect of establishing that the complaints determined as out of time in the Birmingham proceedings have been brought within time in these proceedings: there has been no discriminatory act extending over a period. Issue (d): Vexatious Conduct 103. The submission that the claimant was vexatious was made by Mr [APPELLANT], supported by Mr [APPELLANT], based on the history of the litigation and the claimant appealing at every stage and making allegations of dishonesty or inappropriate behaviour by [NAME] each time that something happened with which he did not agree. 104. I did not form a view on whether that was the case given that I was striking out the claim for other reasons. Issue (e): Amendment Applications 105. Applications to amend are a matter of case management, applying the overriding objective and the test of the balance of prejudice or hardship derived from [NAME] v [COMPANY] [1974] ICR 650 and [COMPANY] [COMPANY] v Moore [1996] IRLR 661. 106. In his applications to amend made in February, March and August 2025 the claimant took issue with actions from December 2024 onwards, leading up to a letter on behalf of the SRA of 8 August 2025 giving notice of intended publication of prosecution to the [NAME]. In essence those applications sought to introduce new allegations into the proceedings as they occurred on the basis that they represented further instances of treatment in breach of the Equality Act. Those applications to amend were made within the primary time limit on each occasion. 107. In the [APPELLANT] of the applications the claimant emphasised that there was a difference between the wording of the notice that he was being referred to the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal, and the formal decision to prosecute the case before that tribunal. The former, dated 29 November 2024, said that the allegation was that the claimant had acted in “an aggressive and unprofessional manner”, whereas the latter, dated 13 February 2025, alleged the claimant of acting in an “intimidating manner”. I do not consider that this change in wording can support an allegation that his race, sex or protected acts have influenced his treatment. 108. As the existing claims have no reasonable prospects of success, it follows that the proposed amended claims also have no reasonable prospect of success. They were simply further instances of regulatory processes being pursued because of concerns about the claimant’s conduct. In my judgment the claimant has no

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21 reasonable prospect of success of showing a prima facie case that these further steps were influenced in any material way, consciously or subconsciously by his protected characteristics, or were related to them, or were influenced by the fact that he has previously brought Employment Tribunal proceedings. 109. The balance of prejudice therefore favoured refusing permission to amend: the claimant is not prejudiced by being prevented from introducing new claims which are hopeless. Permission to amend was refused.

Approved by

Regional Employment Judge Franey

8 April 2026

RESERVED JUDGMENT AND REASONS SENT TO THE PARTIES ON

13 May 2026

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FOR THE TRIBUNAL OFFICE

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