Employment Tribunal Rejects Claim Due to Lack of Medical Evidence

OUTCOME: Dismissed

Case Number: 6006043/2024

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EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Claimant: [redacted]

Respondent: [redacted] East London Hearing Centre

On: 17, 18 and 20 March 2026

Before: Employment Judge M Brewer

Representation

For the Claimant: [redacted] For the Respondent: [redacted]

JUDGMENT

The judgment of the Tribunal is as follows:

1. the claimant’s claim for harassment related to race fails and is dismissed, 2. the claimant’s claim for harassment related to disability fails and is dismissed, 3. the claimant’s claim for unfavourable treatment under s.15, Equality Act 2010, fails and is dismissed, 4. the claimant’s claim for unfair dismissal fails and is dismissed.

REASONS

Introduction

1. This case was listed for a 6-day hearing commencing on 17 March 2026. The case was presented on 17 July 2024. The claimant is disabled by reason of Sickle Cell Anaemia and PTSD.

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2. The claimant represented herself and was assisted by her daughter.

3. The hearing started as scheduled, and we took regular breaks. At the claimant’s request we stopped early for lunch on day 1. On resumption at 2.00 pm the claimant said she was in pain but wanted to continue. I mentioned that if at any point the claimant wished to adjourn for medical reasons, she would need to provide relevant evidence. There was a further short break, but the claimant wanted to and did continue. The claimant was tired as the hearing progressed and so we ended the first day at around 2.50 pm.

4. Day 2 started at the scheduled time, 10.00 am. We had received an email from the claimant’s daughter, timed at 7.22 am, to say that the claimant had been admitted to hospital. No further details were given, and the email contained no application to adjourn.

5. I caused an email to be sent to the claimant asking for further details, including documentary confirmation of the hospital admission. That email was sent at 9.50am. It confirmed that in the absence of further information the hearing would continue.

6. Nothing further was heard from the claimant before 10.00am. Having heard submissions from Mr [RESPONDENT] and considering the amount of time left for the hearing, I determined to adjourn until 10.00am on Friday 20 March. I caused an email to be sent to the parties in the following terms:

“As the parties are aware, the claimant said that she could not attend today because she had been admitted to hospital. No further details of that have been provided despite being asked twice today for official confirmation of the admission.

Having heard submissions from Mr [RESPONDENT] the following has been decided. The case is adjourned until 10.00 am on Friday 20 March 2026. The claimant is ordered to provide to the respondent and to the Tribunal, by no later than 9.30 am on Friday 20 March, the following information:

1. Which hospital the claimant was admitted to, 2. When exactly the admission took place, 3. Why the claimant was admitted.

If the claimant is able to attend the hearing on Friday, then the case will proceed. If not she will also need to say

1. Why she is unable to attend further, 2. When she may be able to attend a hearing.

In the light of whatever information is available on Friday a decision will be taken on how to proceed but the claimant ought to be aware that a decision

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may be made to strikeout the claim under Rule 38 of the 2024 Tribunal Rules”

7. In the event further correspondence was received from the claimant’s daughter on the afternoon of 19 March. The salient points are as follows:

“[APPELLANT] confirms that she was taken to [NAME] and subsequently admitted to the hospital following a medical emergency which arose on the day of the hearing.

At the time of the hearing, she was already wearing a heart monitor due to ongoing cardiac concerns. During proceedings, she experienced a significant escalation in symptoms, including a rapid heart rate of 120 bpm and distress, and requested that the hearing be paused.

Her condition deteriorated later that evening, resulting in hospital admission. She remains under medical care and is currently medically unfit to attend or participate in proceedings.

This follows a recent sickle cell crisis and ongoing treatment, and her condition is recognised as a disability…

The Tribunal has requested formal confirmation of:

• Hospital of admission • Time of admission • Reason for admission

Whilst this request is understood, it is not reasonably practicable for [APPELLANT] to obtain such documentation within the timeframe imposed.

The hospital is operating under significant clinical pressure, and such documentation must be issued by treating [NAME]. Those [NAME] are prioritising [NAME] care and are not immediately available to produce administrative confirmation.

Requesting such documentation at this stage places additional, unnecessary strain on already limited clinical resources and may affect the care of other patients.

This is entirely outside of [APPELLANT]’s control.

The requested evidence will be provided as soon as it becomes reasonably available, most likely upon discharge or when [NAME] can issue confirmation.

It is also noted that the Respondent is itself a healthcare organisation and will be fully aware of the operational realities within NHS settings, including the prioritisation of [NAME] care over administrative requests…”

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8. This email did not even attempt to provide the information requested. The claimant must have known what time she was admitted to hospital, which hospital and, broadly, why. The claimant was aware of the requirements for a postponement/adjournment application based on medical grounds. I do not accept that it was not possible to get a short email from the hospital with at least the basic information required by my order. As it was, no attempt appears to have been made to assist the Tribunal to determine how to proceed.

9. I started the hearing at 10.00 am. Mr [RESPONDENT], assuming the claimant was admitted to one of the two hospitals operated by the respondent confirmed, having taken instructions, that neither hospital was experiencing excessive demand and that in the circumstances either a ward manager or a [NAME] would be able to, and would be expected to assist by providing a [NAME] with a short letter setting out the type of information we required.

10. Mr [RESPONDENT] submitted that in the circumstances the application to postpone be refused and the case continue.

11. I took into account all of the information I had available, the claimant’s accepted disabilities, the Tribunal Rules/Guidance and the case law. I have had particular regard to [NAME] v London Borough of Wandsworth 2002 ICR 1471, CA, [NAME] v Metropolitan Police Service [NAME] 0186/12, [NAME] v London Borough of Islington 2024 EAT 118 and [NAME] v [COMPANY] 2024 EAT 195.

12. In brief, the onus is on a party seeking a postponement on grounds of ill health to demonstrate that they are not well enough to attend. Particularly, where the party says that this is due to mental health, that will usually require medical evidence.

13. The claimant had sufficient time to provide some basic information and, in my view, made no effort to do so.

14. In the circumstances I refused the application. Rather than consider striking out the claim I proceeded to hear the respondent’s evidence and submissions from Mr [RESPONDENT].

Issues

15. The issues in the case were agreed, and I have set these out in the Appendix.

Law

16. I set out here a brief description of the relevant law.

Constructive unfair dismissal

17. Section 95(1)(c) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (ERA) states that there is a dismissal when the employee terminates the contract, with or without notice, in

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circumstances such that he or she is entitled to terminate it without notice by reason of the employer’s conduct.

18. The claimant says that the respondent breached the implied term of trust and confidence.

19. In the leading case in this area, [COMPANY] v Sharp [1978] ICR 221, CA, the Court of Appeal ruled that, for an employer’s conduct to give rise to a constructive dismissal, it must involve a repudiatory breach of contract. As Lord [NAME] MR put it:

‘If the employer is guilty of conduct which is a significant breach going to the root of the contract of employment, or which shows that the employer no longer intends to be bound by one or more of the essential terms of the contract, then the employee is entitled to treat himself as discharged from any further performance. If he does so, then he terminates the contract by reason of the employer’s conduct. He is constructively dismissed.’

20. In order to claim constructive dismissal, the employee must establish that:

20.1. there was a fundamental breach of contract on the part of the employer,

20.2. the employer’s breach caused the employee to resign,

20.3. the employee did not delay too long before resigning, thus affirming the contract and losing the right to claim constructive dismissal.

21. The guidance given for deciding if there has been a breach of the implied term of trust and confidence is set out in [NAME] v [NAME]; [NAME] v [NAME] 1997 1 IRLR 462 where Lord [NAME] said that an employer shall not:

"…without reasonable and proper cause, conduct itself in a manner calculated [or] likely to destroy or seriously damage the relationship of confidence and trust between employer and employee."

22. The burden of proving the absence of reasonable and proper cause lies on the party seeking to rely on such absence — [COMPANY] [NAME] v [NAME] 2008 IRLR 207, QBD. As in that case, this will usually be the employee.

23. In Hilton v [COMPANY] 2001 IRLR 727, EAT, for example, Mr [NAME] QC stated in connection with a submission by counsel as to the proper legal test for establishing a breach of the implied term in the context of a case where the employer was alleging that the employee’s misconduct had destroyed trust and confidence:

“When Mr [NAME] identified the formulation of the trust and confidence term upon which he relied, he described it as being an obligation to avoid conduct which was likely seriously to damage or destroy a mutual trust and confidence between employer and employee. So to formulate it, however, omits the vital words with which Lord [NAME] in his speech in [NAME] v Bank

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of [COMPANY] (in compulsory liquidation) (above) qualified the test. The employer must not act without reasonable and proper cause… To take an example, any employer who proposes to suspend or discipline an employee for lack of capability or misconduct is doing an act which is capable of seriously damaging or destroying the relationship of trust and confidence between employer and employee, whatever the result of the disciplinary process. Yet it could never be argued that an employer was in breach of the term of trust and confidence if he had reasonable and proper cause for the suspension, or for taking the disciplinary action.”

Harassment

24. There are three essential elements of a harassment claim under S.26(1),

24.1. unwanted conduct,

24.2. that has the proscribed purpose or effect, and

24.3. which relates to a relevant protected characteristic.

25. Mr Justice Underhill, then President of the EAT, expressed the view that it would be a ‘healthy discipline’ for a tribunal in any claim alleging unlawful harassment specifically to address in its reasons each of these three elements — [NAME] v [NAME] 2009 ICR 724, EAT (a case relating to a claim for racial harassment brought under the Race Relations Act 1976 (RRA)). Nevertheless, he acknowledged that in some cases there will be considerable overlap between the components of the definition — for example, the question whether the conduct complained of was unwanted may overlap with the question whether it created an adverse environment for the employee. An employment tribunal that does not deal with each element separately will not make an error of law for that reason alone — [NAME] v Ministry of Defence EAT 0225/14.

26. A claim brought on the basis that the unwanted conduct had the purpose of violating the employee’s dignity or creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment obviously involves an examination of the [NAME]’s intentions. As the [NAME] is unlikely to admit to having had the necessary purpose, the tribunal hearing the claim is likely to need to draw inferences from the surrounding circumstances.

27. In deciding whether the conduct has the effect referred to in S.26(1)(b) (i.e. of violating a person’s (B) dignity or creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for B), each of the following must be taken into account:

27.1. the perception of B,

27.2. the other circumstances of the case, and

27.3. whether it is reasonable for the conduct to have that effect — S.26(4).

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28. The test therefore has both subjective and objective elements to it. The subjective part involves the tribunal looking at the effect that the conduct of the alleged harasser (A) has on the complainant (B). The objective part requires the tribunal to ask itself whether it was reasonable for B to claim that A’s conduct had that effect.

29. In order to constitute unlawful harassment under S.26(1) EqA, the unwanted and offensive conduct must be ‘related to a relevant protected characteristic’. However offensive the conduct, it will not constitute harassment unless it is so related, and a tribunal that fails to engage with this point will err — London Borough of Haringey v O’[NAME] 0004/16.

30. Whether or not the conduct is related to the characteristic in question is a matter for the appreciation of the tribunal, making a finding of fact drawing on all the evidence before it – Tees Esk and Wear Valleys NHS Foundation Trust v [NAME] [NAME] 0039/19.

Section 15 EqA

31. In Secretary of State for [NAME] v Dunn EAT 0234/16 the EAT (presided over by Mrs Justice Simler, President) identified the following four elements that must be made out in order for the claimant to succeed in a S.15 claim:

31.1. there must be unfavourable treatment,

31.2. there must be something that arises in consequence of the claimant’s disability,

31.3. the unfavourable treatment must be because of (i.e. caused by) the something that arises in consequence of the disability, and

31.4. the alleged discriminator cannot show that the unfavourable treatment is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.

32. In [NAME] v NHS England [NAME] 2016 IRLR 170, EAT, Mrs Justice Simler considered the authorities, and summarised the proper approach to establishing causation under S.15. First, the tribunal has to identify whether the claimant was treated unfavourably and by whom. It then has to determine what caused that treatment — focusing on the reason in the mind of the alleged discriminator, possibly requiring examination of the conscious or unconscious thought processes of that person but keeping in mind that the actual motive of the alleged discriminator in acting as he or she did is irrelevant. The tribunal must then determine whether the reason was ‘something arising in consequence of the claimant’s disability’, which could describe a range of causal links. This stage of the causation test involves an objective question and does not depend on the thought processes of the alleged discriminator.

33. Further case law may be referred to below where relevant.

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Findings of fact

34. I make the following findings of fact. References are to pages in the hearing bundle unless otherwise stated.

35. The claimant is disabled by reason of Sickle Cell Anaemia and PTSD.

36. The claimant started working for the respondent on 17 January 2022 in [NAME]. She is familiar with the respondent’s employment related policies.

Harassment and s.15 allegations

The annual leave issue

37. The respondent operates a detailed annual leave policy for non-medical staff [129]. The salient parts of the policy are as follows:

“4.8 CARRY-OVER OF ANNUAL LEAVE ENTITLEMENTS

The carry-over of annual leave from one year to the next should be avoided. It is important staff and managers take responsibility for ensuring annual leave entitlements are taken effectively throughout the year.

In exceptional circumstances, managers may approve carry over of up to the equivalent of one weeks’ leave from any current leave year to an immediately subsequent leave year this should be taken within the first 3 months of the new leave year. Public holidays cannot be carried over into the next leave year.

Applications to carry over leave in excess of the equivalent of one weeks leave will be supported only where it can be demonstrated staff were prevented due to service needs from taking their normal full entitlement or where managers support carry over for another reason.

Applications to carry over annual leave from any current leave year to an immediately subsequent leave year must be made in writing to the designated manager prior to the end of the leave year from which the paid contractual annual leave is to be carried over. Actual approval can only be granted by Divisional triumvirate or Corporate Director (Covid-19 carry over exceptions apply – see section 4.8.2).

Designated managers must ensure staff carrying over amounts of paid contractual annual leave agree a date by which the total amount of carried over paid contractual annual leave will be taken, prior to the request to carry over being approved (should be taken within the first 3 months of the new leave year).

4.8.1 Carry-over of annual leave during or after long term sickness absence

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Managers should encourage staff on long term sick to take their annual leave during the period of sickness absence, where appropriate to do so (advice can be sought from [NAME]).

If an employee on long term sick leave has not taken all of their annual leave in the current leave year prior to the sickness absence, they must take any untaken annual leave when they return to work. If they choose not to do this, the remaining annual leave will be lost and cannot be carried over. However exceptional circumstances will be considered (such as service needs inhibiting taking of annual leave).

If there is insufficient time left in the annual leave year or the member of staff has not returned to work within the leave year, they should be allowed to carry annual leave forward into the new leave year. However, this is limited to the four weeks' annual leave (under reg.13 of the Working Time Regulations 1998).”

38. The respondent’s holiday year is from 1 April to 31 March.

39. The claimant’s line manager was originally [APPELLANT], but she left the respondent in August 2023 at which point the claimant’s line manager was an agency worker, [APPELLANT] ([NAME]). The head of the [NAME] was [NAME] ([NAME]). There was also an Associate Director of People, [APPELLANT] ([NAME]).

40. The claimant was responsible for the [NAME] Department as this was the department with the lightest case load.

41. The claimant had a period of sick leave between 5 June 2023 and 19 September 2023 [449].

42. On 31 January 2024 the claimant emailed [NAME] as follows:

“I would like to arrange to take the balance of my annual, for the leave year April 23 - March 24, from the 29 March 2024. The policy requires that all annual leave be taken by 31 March each year; but I am making a special request that I take all of my leave from 29 March 2024, to accommodate travel for rejuvenation, health management and connecting with family in the Caribbean. I have not been able to take the majority of my leave due to severe ill health. I believe that I have 3.5 weeks of annual leave left for the leave year of April 23 to March 24. Thank you in anticipation of your kind understanding and agreement of my request.”

[319/320]

43. [NAME] escalated this request to [NAME] as she did not have authority to approve holiday requests in excess of two weeks duration. Furthermore, although the claimant’s email is not express on the point, given that only two of the proposed holiday dates fell within the then current leave year, the claimant was in fact also

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requesting to carry over into the next holiday year almost all her remaining current leave year allowance, around 3.5 weeks.

44. The view of [NAME] was that as the claimant had been in work since October 2023 she had, at the date of the request, had several months to take her annual leave. Over the course of two emails on 7 February 2024, [NAME] said to [NAME]:

“[NAME], what impact does that have in terms of any particular case management?

l suppose my question is also why has she left the request so long given l raised this with the team both before and after Christmas? And is she flexible on dates --ie. is she able to take 2 weeks in March and then only carry over 5 days as per policy rather than expecting to carry over 3 weeks which is far in excess of what the policy permits.

It looks like she is planning to go at the beginning of Easter (Good Friday is 29 March) and so I am also mindful that some of her colleagues will also want some leave and so I am thinking of the wider team also…

To carry over this amount of leave of course then has a knock-on effect in terms of what she accrues for next year, and so everyone is being encouraged NOT to carry any over. I would be happier to allow some but not 3.5 weeks as that feels excessive and unnecessary…”

[321/322]

45. After further discussion, [NAME] emailed [NAME] on 19 February 2024 as follows:

“I know that she was very ill and that she accrued annual leave before she came back at the end of October, but even taking that into account we still have to follow policy - I would have hoped as an [NAME] Partner she would have understood this and I've highlighted the relevant section of the Trust's Annual Leave policy… [APPELLANT] along with the rest of the team, were advised both pre and post Christmas about ensuring that untaken leave was taken.

This is what I would approve:

• That she can carry over 5 days of leave in total - and this would be Friday 22 March, and Monday 25 March - Thursday 28 March (as Friday 29 March is a bank holiday).

• That the request for 2-22 April is taken from her new leave year 2024/5 entitlement.

I can't say I am happy about approving the leave at the end of March as we already have 2 [NAME] Partners on the same leave, and I have to think about what this will mean for the service but I will agree it for the sake of resolving the matter…”

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[324]

46. The claimant was unhappy about the decision and for reasons which remain unclear argued that the proposal,

“leaves me with less leave to manage my wellbeing during the coming year, which has become even more crucial since the decline in my general health following my last hospital admission”

[328].

47. The claimant emailed [NAME] on 23 February about her annual leave issue [334] and her email included this:

“When I was released from hospital, I was not well enough to travel to Margate, let alone the Caribbean. It is only recently that I am now in a position to travel…

If the decision remains unchanged, then I can cancel the request to carry leave into April 24, and take all the balance of my leave by 31.03.24, if this is the preferred way forward…”

48. So, in short, when the claimant returned from sick leave in September 2023, she had 3.5 weeks accrued untaken leave and some 6 months left of the leave year in which to take it. On her own case the claimant was fit to travel by February 2024, at which point she still had two months of the leave year left. She could have taken her holiday in the then current leave year. There is no evidence that there was ever any medical reason why she could not travel before February 2024, but even if there were it is plain that the particular travel proposals were the claimant’s preference and had nothing to do with any obstacle or need caused by her disability.

49. The respondent acted reasonably in following the annual leave policy, allowing 5 days to be carried over but determining that there was sufficient time left in the annual leave year for the claimant to use her annual leave and thus section 4.8.1 of the policy did not apply.

The spreadsheet

50. On 6 March 2024 the claimant met with [NAME] and [NAME] summarised that meeting in an email to [NAME] on the same date. The relevant part of that in relation to the spreadsheet issues is as follows:

“During our meeting she went through all of her outstanding cases that she had produced in a spreadsheet. There were some gaps, so I have asked her to redo and send me a final version before she logs of from work today, together with a list of all of her open sickness cases on [NAME].”

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51. There is also a contemporaneous note of the meeting at [340] which says as follows:

“I also asked [NAME] to send me a spreadsheet with all her sickness cases on, in case any managers called or emailed me in her absence. This would make it easier to respond and chase up on any cases. [NAME] had agreed to do this. I asked her to get these completed and sent over to be by the end of the day (6" March 24)”

52. The significance of this is that as an agency worker [NAME] did not have access to the respondent’s [NAME] system on which [NAME] cases are logged and updated. She therefore needed a different document to work from. The claimant was aware that [NAME] did not have access to [NAME], nevertheless she failed to provide the up-to-date spreadsheet that she had promised.

53. The allegation here is that requiring the claimant to provide the spreadsheet put the claimant under undue pressure.

54. There was no evidence of any particular pressure, let alone undue pressure put on the claimant and the reason for [NAME] requiring the spreadsheet was known to the claimant, who had agreed to provide it. Given that she was updating [NAME] in any event it is difficult to see how this small extra task created undue pressure, and I find that it did not. [NAME]’s request was reasonable in all the circumstances not the least of which was the claimant’s agreement to provide the spreadsheet.

The laptop

55. At the 6 March 2024 meeting the issue of the claimant’s laptop was discussed. The salient part of [NAME]’s email to [NAME] summarising the meeting is as follows:

“I met with [APPELLANT] this morning as she had put an urgent meeting request in my diary for 12 midday, she informed me that she has an appointment with her GP this evening after work and will be signed off from work due to [NAME] in relation with her on going treatment for Sickle Cell…

I asked her to forward me a copy of the fit note as soon as she gets it from her GP, I also asked her to send me an email with authorisation for me to refer her to [NAME] in her absence, but she was reluctant to do this, stating she would rather I wait until she is back from leave before referring her to [NAME].

I have also emailed her asking her to bring her laptop into [ADDRESS] either tomorrow or Friday..”

56. The laptop belongs to the respondent. The [NAME] team only use laptops, and they have no spares. As the claimant was now going to be away on a combination of sick leave and annual leave for in excess of 5 weeks, the respondent had arranged for her role to be covered by an agency worker who therefore needed

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the laptop. This was the view of [NAME] as she expressed it in her email of 6 March 2024 to [NAME] [342]:

“I am thinking that I will need to get in some temporary agency cover given the period of her absence, and so I need to have her laptop for them to use Can you tell her that she must bring it in asap please. I will get onto the agency next week…”

57. At the meeting with [NAME], the claimant refused to bring the laptop back. The contemporaneous note of the meeting at [341] confirms this. The claimant said of the laptop:

“if they want it, they wiII have to send someone to collect it…”

58. On 11 March 2024 [NAME] exchanged text messages with the claimant arranging for the laptop to be collected. The claimant seems to have been content with the arrangements [352].

59. I find as a fact that the respondent acted reasonably in requiring the return of the laptop for the period of the claimant’s booked absence.

The fit note

60. The claimant’s allegation is that on 11 March 2024, [NAME] requested the claimant provide a Fit Note for her sickness absence before the 7-day self-certification period. I should add at this point, not least because it is highly relevant to my judgment, that the reason for the claimant’s planned sickness absence was neither of her disabilities, it was because she had injured the thumb on her right hand [360].

61. [NAME]’s notes of the meeting of 6 March record the following:

“[NAME] said that she, was due to see her consultant that evening and would be signed off sick due to [NAME] in relation to her sickle cell crisis that put her in hospital. I told [NAME] that I would have to let [NAME] know that she wasn't going to be in from tomorrow (7" March 24). I asked [NAME] if she was cancelling her leave due to being signed off with PTSD, she replied that she was going to be signed off sick until 18" March, then she was taking her annual leave from 19" April. I said ok, and reiterated again that as she was seeing her consultant that evening (6" March 24) it would be good if she could forward me her Fit Note the next day to which she agreed.”

62. In other words, all [NAME] was doing was asking the claimant for the fit note which it seemed the claimant would have either on 6 or 7 March as the claimant was telling [NAME] that she “would be” signed off sick; the presumption being that she was being signed off from that day or the next. The claimant at no point said, either at the meeting or in the hearing when being cross-examined on the point, that she was signing herself off sick for 7 days and would then get a fit note.

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63. As no fit note was provided it was chased for by email on 11 March 2024 [349].

64. I find as a fact that in the circumstances the request was not premature or as the claimant now says, unnecessary. The request was simply based on what the claimant told the respondent, or at least what the respondent reasonable understood the position to be.

[NAME] referral

65. The allegation here is that on or around 11 March 2024, [NAME] referred the claimant to [NAME] due to PTSD associated with the Sickle Cell health condition.

66. It was clearly established at the hearing that no such referral was ever made and therefore I need say no more about this here.

Undermining email

67. On 11 and 13 March 2024, [APPELLANT] emailed to the [NAME] team. The claimant alleges these emails publicly undermined her and portrayed her as "reckless” and "irresponsible" for being off sick and allegedly accused the claimant of leaving her work in disarray.

68. It is necessary to look at the relevant parts of these emails.

69. At 10.22 am on 11 March 2024, [NAME] wrote this email to her team:

“Dear all,

I spoke to [APPELLANT] this morning and she has advised me that [APPELLANT] is currently off sick. I understand she was off sick at the end of last week and this is continuing into this week.

She has annual leave booked through to 18 April and so will not be returning until after then.

I appreciate that this was unexpected and so there has not been any opportunity to plan this, [NAME] is trying to establish a handover of cases so that we understand what work has been left outstanding and of these cases, which are a priority to pick up.

I also know that this will put an even greater pressure on our team and our services as I know some of you have your own leave booked and so we already have other absence in the team, and so I wanted to assure you that I will be doing all that I can to cover [APPELLANT]'s absence, given that it will mean [NAME] will have no support for 5 weeks.

I will be seeing if we can get some extra agency cover, and we are also trying to get [APPELLANT] to arrange for her laptop to be returned whilst she is

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away, so that we have one that can be used by whoever comes in to cover. If you have any questions, then please let me know.

Equally if this impacts on any of your cases in which [APPELLANT] has some involvement, and we need to change plans, then let me know.”

[345]

70. On 13 March at 13.40, [NAME] sent this email to her team:

“Dear all, I’m really pleased to advise you that [NAME] is going to be joining the team wef Tuesday 2 April as an interim [NAME] Manager for a 3 month period.

We continue to be extremely busy, and I am conscious that with [APPELLANT] on extended leave until mid-April, and a number of you also taking some leave over the coming weeks, that we need some additional capacity to support you and our workload.

[NAME] is currently working at [NAME] as an [NAME] Manager and has worked at a number of other NHS Trusts in [NAME] or HR Partner roles and so brings some experience with him”

[363]

71. [NAME]’s evidence was that these emails were merely updating her team. I find that the emails in question do update the [NAME] team, they are supportive, recognising how bust the team was at the time and the references to the claimant are the context in which the need for extra support arose.

72. I find as a fact that there is nothing, either express or implied, in either of these emails which comes remotely close to characterising the claimant as either reckless or irresponsible and it is impossible to understand how the claimant reached this conclusion.

12 March 2024 email

73. The claimant alleges that on 12 March 2024 [NAME] sent an email to the claimant referring to a "further period of absence" suggesting a pattern of unreliability.

74. The email referred to is at [353] and was in the following terms:

“Hi [APPELLANT], a quick email to let you know that [APPELLANT] has confirmed with me that she picked up the laptop from you this morning, and so we now have it thank you.

You will have to let us know when you are back in the country and what is best in terms of arrangements for it to be returned/ collected. I only have what [NAME] has verbally advised me, that you will be on leave and returning

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back to work on 23 April as it isn't on the planner or your calendar and so you will have to correct me if that is not the case.

Once you are back, we will need to have a return-to-work meeting given that it follows a further period of sickness absence, as [NAME] is in an interim role, it is probably better that I do that and meet with you.

Looking in your calendar it appears that you would have time for us to do that on Wednesday 24 April and so I will send you an MS Teams invite for us to do that. I will suggest 10 am.

In the meantime, take care and enjoy your break and I will see you once you are back.”

75. Most of this email seems at worst uncontroversial. [NAME] discusses the collection from, and future return to the claimant of her laptop. The reference to a further period of absence is, first, a matter of fact; the claimant was taking a further period of absence as it followed her absence at the end of 2023, and second, the reference was necessary context to explain the need for a return-to-work meeting.

76. There seems to me to be nothing in the email expressly or impliedly critical of the claimant. As to the suggestion that the reference to the “further period of sickness absence” amounted to a suggestion of a pattern of unreliability, I cannot see how the claimant could reach such a conclusion given that what was stated was entirely factually correct and I find as a fact that the email does not in any way say, suggest, indicate or imply that the claimant was unreliable.

Laptop collection

77. On 12 March 2024, a member of the respondent’s HR Team, and a colleague of the claimant’s, attended the claimant’s home to collect her laptop which the claimant alleges caused her humiliation and embarrassment.

78. The need for the laptop is discussed above, and I need say no more about that here other than to reiterate that it was the claimant’s position that the respondent would be required to collect the laptop from her home.

79. There is at [352] an exchange of text messages between [NAME] and the claimant arranging the collection as follows:

[NAME]: Hi [APPELLANT], [NAME] has very kindly agreed to drive to yours and pick up the trust laptop. But in view of her diary it will have to be on her way into work tomorrow morning sometime between 8-8.30. She has your address from ESR. If there is a problem with this, then please let me know. [NAME]: [APPELLANT]

[NAME]: Thanks for confirming [APPELLANT], and I'll make sure [APPELLANT] knows.

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80. It seems that the claimant was aware of and content with the arrangements which she initiated the need for. In the circumstances it is impossible to conclude that the claimant acted reasonable in feeling either humiliated or embarrassed.

Performance management meeting

81. This issue, as expressed in the agreed list of issues, seems to me to amount to two allegations.

82. The first is that on 24 April 2024, [NAME] invited the claimant to an unjustified formal performance management meeting, without providing any evidence of poor performance management.

83. The second is that in the meeting, [NAME] expressed severe disappointment with the claimant’s request to carry over annual leave, demonstrating a lack of empathy about the claimant’s condition.

84. I shall deal with these in turn.

85. First, the meeting on 24 April was a return-to-work meeting following the claimant’s sickness absences in late 2023 and March 2024. It was not a performance management meeting, formal or otherwise. This is clear from the evidence of [NAME] (see paragraph 88 of her witness statement).

86. I also accept the evidence of [NAME] that some concerns had been raised about the claimant’s performance as set out at paragraph 89 of her witness statement.

87. [NAME]’s evidence was that these concerns had been discussed with the claimant previously.

88. Notes of the meeting are at [421/422].

89. I find as a fact that this meeting was not a formal performance management meeting.

90. As to the second part of this allegation, [NAME]’s note records the following:

“Towards the end of the meeting, I said that I was glad that she had had a good holiday and that she had felt it was what she had needed, but I did feel that the way in which she had managed it could have been handled better.

She was an [NAME] Partner and so I had been disappointed - from not planning her leave in the first place bearing in mind the times I had raised it with everyone to avoid this happening; and then an expectation that she could carry over 3 weeks leave and at short notice. The communication around it could've been better and I mentioned her email to the team that I thought was inappropriate, as could the planning and handover/ cover of her absence.”

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91. I do find that there is mild criticism, expressed as disappointment by [NAME], for the reasons set out in the note.

92. However, I confess to being perplexed by the part of the allegation which is that this was “severe” or that it demonstrates that there was a lack of empathy about the claimant’s condition. The claimant’s absence in March was not because of her disability; it was because she had injured the thumb on her right hand.

93. The claimants’ wish to carry over a large amount of annual leave, and the reasons why that could not be accommodated are dealt with above.

94. What seems to me to be plain from all of the evidence I have seen is that the claimant wanted to go on an extended trip to the Caribbean. That trip spanned two holiday years and involved more than two weeks leave. The respondent allowed the claimant to take a longer holiday than usual and allowed her to carry over 5 days from the 2023/2024 leave year into the following holiday year, as per their policy. There is no evidence that this trip had anything to do with the claimant’s disability.

95. Even if the clamant had needed to take a holiday to recover (although recover from what is entirely unclear), by her own evidence she was able to take a foreign holiday (that is to fly) from February 2024 and there is no evidence that she was unable to go on a domestic holiday at any point, so it is impossible to understand how the claimant reached the conclusion that the mild criticism at the meeting, translated into an allegation that [NAME] lacked empathy, particularly when balanced against what the respondent, and indeed specifically [NAME] had agreed to regarding the time off taken by the claimant, whether for sickness or holiday.

96. I find that [NAME] did not demonstrate a lack of empathy about the claimant’s condition at any point.

Further s.15 allegation

18 March 2024 email

97. In the list of issues there is an allegation that on 18 March 2024, the claimant received an email from [NAME] criticising her for not sending her the completed spreadsheet as requested and criticising the claimant's out of office message.

98. There is no email of 18 March 2024 in the bundle and the date may be an error. There is an email from [NAME] on 11 March 2024 which appears to cover the points raised in this allegation. That relevant part of that email is as follows:

“l write further to our conversation last Wednesday 6 March…

I had asked during our meeting on 6 March that you complete the missing fields in the spreadsheet we went through as part of your case review, which haven't yet received, nor have l received the list of your open sickness cases which you had also agreed to do and provide me with. It's

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important that we understand what actions an immediate priority and/or are outstanding…

Finally, I have also noted that your out of office message is not what we discussed as I had asked you to put [NAME] name down as contact for any sickness cases, my name for the point of escalation and the [NAME] inbox email address. Your message is very vague and doesn't have a return-to- work date. Can l ask that you address this immediately so that there is an accurate message and forwarding contact details.

Thank you”

[356]

99. Before turning to the claimant’s response, it is relevant to consider the context in which [NAME]’s email was sent.

100. First, as set out above, [NAME] required a spreadsheet because she did not have access to the [NAME] system, a fact of which the claimant was well aware.

101. Second, as the claimant was going to be off work for an extended period an out of office message was needed as she had a number of ongoing cases she was managing for her [NAME].

102. During the meeting on 6 March 2024 (see above), the claimant expressly agreed to provide an up-to-date spreadsheet for [NAME]. [NAME]’s contemporaneous meeting note at [343] says:

“I also asked [NAME] to send me a spreadsheet with all her sickness cases on, in case any managers called or emailed me in her absence. This would make it easier to respond and chase up on any cases. [NAME] had agreed to do this…”

[340]

103. As set out above, at the hearing the claimant confirmed that she was aware that [NAME] did not have access to [NAME] and she also said that, as she was the only [NAME] team member to work “with [NAME]” (that is the Department of [NAME]), it was reasonable of [NAME] to ask for the spreadsheet. However, the claimant also went on to say that [NAME] was not acting reasonably in asking for the spreadsheet even though the claimant had agreed it was needed, had agreed to provide it and had failed to do so.

104. As for the out of office message, the claimant’s evidence on this was difficult to comprehend.

105. [NAME]’s note of the meeting says this:

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“We also had a discussion regarding her out of office message. I had asked [NAME] to put [NAME] name down as the person to contact regarding any sickness cases, my name down as the point of contact for escalation and the [NAME] inbox for any general queries.”

[340]

106. There is no dispute that this conversation took place. The claimant has not suggested that the request was unreasonable.

107. The claimant did in fact activate an out of office message which read as follows:

“Thank you for your email. I am currently away. Please forward your email to [NAME], [NAME] Manager. Email: [EMAIL]”

[344]

108. What was missing was the reference to [NAME] for sickness cases and the direction to the [NAME] inbox for general queries. Under cross-examination the claimant said she was tired after working late and implied that this is why the message was not as [NAME] had wanted, but this excuse does not hold water. If the claimant was well enough and alert enough to draft the above message, why was it too much to draft it as [NAME] wanted?

109. The answer to that is, in my judgment, at least in part to be found in the claimant’s response to [NAME]’s email of 11 March 2024, set out above. I stress that up to this point all of the communications between the protagonists in this case had been polite, respectful and cordial. But in response to [NAME]’s email, the claimant sent this on 12 March 2024:

“All my cases have been updated on [NAME]. You simply need to access them and you will have all the information you need…

It is abundantly clear to me, that since advising that I will be temporarily off work in order to manage my health and wellbeing there has been what feels like a 'witch hunt' after me…”

110. How or why the claimant reached this position is entirely unclear either from anything in the bundle or within her witness evidence, but it seems to me, and I find as a fact, that the claimant deliberately refused to comply with reasonable requests relating to the spreadsheet and the out of office message, and then used the fact that she was being chased for them as a reason for making what appears to be a wholly unfounded allegation about a witch hunt.

111. I find that [NAME]’s email of 11 March 2024 did not contain any criticism of the claimant and all [NAME] was doing was to reiterate what had been agreed and to ask the claimant to do what was required, all of which was fairly minimal.

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Subsequent relevant chronology

112. The claimant resigned on 29 April 2024 [425 – 427].

113. The claimant commenced early conciliation on 9 May 2024.

114. The early conciliation certificate was issued on 20 June 2024.

115. The ET1 was presented on 17 July 2024.

Discussion and conclusions

116. The issues for me to determine, broadly are:

116.1. whether the allegations set out above amounted to harassment related to race and/or disability, and/or

116.2. whether the respondent treated the claimant unfavourably because of something arising from disability, and/or

116.3. whether the respondent breached the implied term of trust and confidence and thus constructively dismissed the claimant.

Harassment

117. It is understood that where direct reference is made to an employee’s protected characteristic or he or she has been subjected to overtly, for example, racist language, the link between the conduct complained of and the protected characteristic is obvious. But where the link between the conduct and the protected characteristic is less obvious, we need to analyse the precise words used, or what was done, together with the context, in order to establish whether there is any (negative) association between the two.

118. All of the concerns raised in this case contain no language, acts or omissions which are overtly related to either race or disability.

119. Having considered the evidence, I conclude as follows:

119.1. the annual leave issue arose because the claimant wanted to go on extended leave and to carry over more than 5 days holiday in circumstances which were outside of policy, along with the fact that she left the request until almost the last minute by which time other team members had booked holidays. The annual leave and carry over requests were not related to either race or disability. The claimant had returned from sick leave in September 2023. The sickness absence in March 2024 related to a thumb injury, not her race or disability either directly, indirectly, expressly or impliedly, and in the circumstances this allegation fails,

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119.2. the spreadsheet issue related to the claimant being off for over 5 weeks, and was not related to her race or disability either directly, indirectly, expressly or impliedly, and in the circumstances the allegation related to the spreadsheet fail,

119.3. the fit note issue related to the claimant’s absence for her thumb injury, and was not related to her race or disability either directly, indirectly, expressly or impliedly, and in the circumstances this allegation fails,

119.4. there was no referral to [NAME], and in the circumstances this allegation fails,

119.5. the emails of 11 and 13 March 2024 to the [NAME] team about the claimant’s upcoming absence were matters of fact and were not related to her race or disability (given the planned sickness absence was not related to a disability) either directly, indirectly, expressly or impliedly, and in the circumstances this allegation fails,

119.6. the email of 12 March 2024 referring to a further period of absence might, at a pinch, be found to implicitly include a reference to any previous disability related absence but I do not consider that this alone or in connection with any of the other matters complained about, comes close to conduct which had the purpose or effect of violating the claimant’s dignity or creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for her, and in the circumstances this allegation fails,

119.7. the collection of the laptop was agreed by the claimant and was necessary because it was required for her cover and she had refused to return it herself, it was therefore not related to her race or disability (again, given the planned sickness absence was not related to a disability) either directly, indirectly, expressly or impliedly, and in the circumstances this allegation fails,

119.8. the return-to-work meeting on 24 April 2024 was not a formal performance management meeting, there was no “severe” disappointment and no lack of empathy. What took place was not related to the claimant’s race or disability either directly, indirectly, expressly or impliedly, and in the circumstances this allegation fails.

120. In summary, all the allegations of harassment fail and are dismissed.

S.15 claim

121. The claimant pleads two “somethings arising” from disability as follows:

121.1. the claimant undertaking therapy for trauma she experienced due to her admission to the ICU in 2023 as a result of her Sickle Cell Anaemia,

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121.2. the claimant's sickness absence in March 2024 and extended absence from 3 June 2023 until 18 September 2023.

122. I have found no evidence to support the contention that the claimant’s sickness absence in March 2024 arose from her disabilities. She was absent because of a thumb injury.

123. None of the matters complained of related to the claimant having undertaken therapy for trauma she experienced due to her admission to the ICU in 2023 as a result of her Sickle Cell Anaemia.

124. It is, as I have set out above, possible to conclude that the email of 12 March 2024 referring to a further period of absence might, at a pinch, be said to include a reference to previous disability related absence, but the treatment here was not unfavourable, there was no express or implied criticism of the claimant, merely the recital of a fact – that the claimant was on a further period of sick leave.

125. Looking at the evidence, I find that none of the matters complained of amount to unfavourable treatment and this claim fails and is dismissed.

126. Even if I am wrong about that, and I do not consider that I am, the respondent has made out its justification that what was done in each case was the effective and appropriate management of the claimant’s absence and the [NAME] team.

Constructive dismissal

127. It is important to remember how the implied term of trust and confidence is expressed, i.e. that the employer shall not:

128. This is a last straw case, the last straw being the return-to-work meeting on 24 April 2024. I find that to have been entirely run of the mill in both content and manner, and thus falls well within the category of innocuous. Indeed, it is possible to apply the word innocuous to all of the alleged straws which seem to me to be no more than standard management issues dealt with in a calm, reasonable and measured was particularly by [NAME].

129. In my judgment, everything done by the respondent in this case was done with reasonable and proper cause. I repeat my findings above about each of the straws here but it is clear that nothing unusual or untoward happened over the period covered by the claimant’s allegations, that is broadly February to April 2024.

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130. I would add that even if there was no reasonable and proper cause for what happened, nothing that happened over the relevant period either separately or together came remotely close to evidencing conduct by the respondent which was calculated or likely to destroy or seriously damage trust and confidence.

131. For those reasons the claim for unfair constructive dismissal fails and is dismissed.

Employment Judge M Brewer

Dated: 20 March 2026

Public access to employment tribunal decisions All judgments (apart from judgments under Rule 51) and any written reasons for the judgments are published, in full, online at https://www.gov.uk/employment-tribunal-decisions shortly after a copy has been sent to the claimant(s) and respondent(s).

Recording and Transcription Please note that if a Tribunal hearing has been recorded you may request a transcript of the recording, for which a charge may be payable. If a transcript is produced it will not include any oral judgment or reasons given at the hearing. The transcript will not be checked, approved or verified by a judge. There is more information in the joint Presidential Practice Direction on the Recording and Transcription of Hearings, and accompanying Guidance, which can be found here: https://www.judiciary.uk/guidance-and-resources/employment-rules-and-legislation-practice-directions/

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Appendix

Agreed list of issues

1. The factual allegations

1.1 The claimant says the respondent did the following things:

1.1.1 On 21 February 2024 the respondent refused the claimant’s request to carry over her remaining annual leave for 2023/2024 to use at the beginning of the 2024/2025 annual leave year.

1.1.2 On 6 March 2024 the claimant was asked by [NAME] to update the case spreadsheet before commencing her period of sickness absence, despite the claimant having updated the [NAME] system, placing the claimant under undue pressure.

1.1.3 On 11 March 2024, [APPELLANT] called the claimant and made an unreasonable request that the claimant return her work laptop to the office while off sick.

1.1.4 On 11 March 2024, [APPELLANT] requested the claimant provide a Fit Note for her sickness absence before the 7-day self-certification period.

1.1.5 On or around 11 March 2024, [APPELLANT] referred the claimant to [NAME] due to PTSD associated with the claimant’s Sickle Cell health condition.

1.1.6 On 11 and 13 March 2024, [APPELLANT] emailed to the [NAME] team. The claimant alleges these emails publicly undermined her and portrayed her as “reckless and “irresponsible” for being off sick and allegedly accused the Claimant of leaving her work in disarray.

1.1.7 On the 12 March 2024 [APPELLANT] sent an email to the claimant referring to a "further period of absence" suggesting a pattern of unreliability.

1.1.8 On 12 March 2024, a member of the respondent’s HR Team/the claimant’s colleague attended the claimant’s home to collect her work laptop which the claimant alleges caused her humiliation and embarrassment.

1.1.9 On 24 April 2024, [APPELLANT] invited the claimant to an unjustified formal performance management meeting, without providing any evidence of poor performance management. In that meeting [APPELLANT] expressed severe disappointment with the claimant’s request

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to carry over annual leave, demonstrating a lack of empathy about the claimant’s condition.

1.2 The claimant says that all of the above are harassment related to disability and/or race, unfavourable treatment arising out of disability and conduct which she says breached her contract of employment.

1.3 The claimant also says the following was unfavourable treatment arising out of a disability:

1.3.1 On 18 March 2024, the claimant received an email from [APPELLANT] criticising her for not sending her the completed spreadsheet as requested, and criticising the claimant’s out of office message.

2. Time limits

2.1 The respondent accepts that the claims that were identifiable within the ET1 were submitted within time.

2.2 At the preliminary hearing on 5 December 2024 an amendment was allowed. This added factual allegation 1.1.1. The amendment was allowed at this hearing, on 5 December 2024. In respect of that allegation the Tribunal will need to determine the following:

2.2.1 Was the claim made to the Tribunal within three months (plus early conciliation extension) of the act to which the complaint relates?

2.2.2 If not, was it part of conduct extending over a period?

2.2.3 If so, was the claim made to the Tribunal within three months (plus early conciliation extension) of the end of that period?

2.2.4 If not, was the claims made within a further period that the Tribunal thinks is just and equitable? The Tribunal will decide:

2.2.4.1 Why were the complaints not made to the Tribunal in time?

2.2.4.2 In any event, is it just and equitable in all the circumstances to extend time?

3. Discrimination arising from disability (Equality Act 2010 section 15)

3.1 Did the respondent treat the claimant unfavourably as set out in section paragraphs 1.1.1 to 1.1.9 and 1.3.1 above.

3.2 Did the following things arise in consequence of the claimant’s disability:

3.2.1 The claimant undertaking therapy for trauma she experienced due to her admission to the ICU in 2023 as a result of her sickle cell anaemia.

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3.2.2 The claimant’s sickness absence in March 2024 and extended absence from 3 June 2023 until 18 September 2023.

3.3 Was the unfavourable treatment because of any of those things?

3.4 Was the treatment a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim? The respondent says that its aims were:

3.4.1 effective management of the respondent’s [NAME] team;

3.4.2 ensuring appropriate management and usage of the respondent’s IT equipment;

3.4.3 effective management of employee sickness absence;

3.4.4 effective management of employee annual leave (across the [NAME] team and in line with the rest of the Trust); and

3.4.5 obtaining prompt and relevant [NAME] advice with respect to employees.

3.5 The Tribunal will decide in particular:

3.5.1 was the treatment an appropriate and reasonably necessary way to achieve those aims;

3.5.2 could something less discriminatory have been done instead;

3.5.3 how should the needs of the claimant and the respondent be balanced?

3.6 Did the respondent know or could it reasonably have been expected to know that the claimant had the disability? From what date?

4. Harassment related to race and/or (Equality Act 2010 section 26)

4.1 Did the respondent do as set out at 1.1.1 to 1.1.9 set out above.

4.2 If so, was that unwanted conduct?

4.3 Did it relate to race?

4.4 Did it relate to disability?

4.5 Did the conduct have the purpose of violating the claimant’s dignity or creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for the claimant?

4.6 If not, did it have that effect? The Tribunal will take into account the claimant’s perception, the other circumstances of the case and whether it is reasonable for the conduct to have that effect.

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5. Constructive dismissal

5.1 Was the claimant dismissed?

5.1.1 Did the respondent do the following:

5.1.1.1 breach the Equality Act 2010 as set out above;

5.1.1.2 act as alleged as 1.1.1 to 1.1.9 above.

5.1.2 Did that breach the implied term of trust and confidence? The Tribunal will need to decide:

5.1.2.1 whether the respondent behaved in a way that was calculated or likely to destroy or seriously damage the trust and confidence between the claimant and the respondent; and

5.1.2.2 whether it had reasonable and proper cause for doing so.

5.1.3 Did the claimant resign in response to the breach? The Tribunal will need to decide whether the breach of contract was a reason for the claimant’s resignation.

5.1.4 Did the claimant affirm the contract before resigning? The Tribunal will need to decide whether the claimant’s words or actions showed that they chose to keep the contract alive even after the breach.

6. Unfair and/or discriminatory dismissal

6.1 If the claimant was dismissed, the respondent does not advance a potentially fair reason for dismissal.

6.2 If the claimant was dismissed and the breach of the implied term was a breach of the Equality Act 2020, the respondent accepts that it was a constructive discriminatory dismissal (section 39(7)(b) Equality Act 2010).

Case No: 6006043/2024 11.6C Judgment – Reconsideration refused – claimant - rule 72

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Claimant: [redacted]

Respondent: [redacted]

JUDGMENT

The claimant’s application dated 14 April 2026 for reconsideration of the judgment sent to the parties on 7 April 2026 is refused.

REASONS

1. There is no reasonable prospect of the original decision being varied or revoked for the following reasons.

2. The claimant was given time to present the evidence required to justify adjourning this case on medical grounds.

3. I repeat what was set out in the judgment:

1. The hearing started as scheduled, and we took regular breaks. At the claimant’s request we stopped early for lunch on day 1. On resumption at 2.00 pm the claimant said she was in pain but wanted to continue. I mentioned that if at any point the claimant wished to adjourn for medical reasons, she would need to provide relevant evidence. There was a further short break, but the claimant wanted to, and did continue. The claimant was tired as the hearing progressed and so we ended the first day at around 2.50 pm.

2. Day 2 started at the scheduled time, 10.00 am. We had received an email from the claimant’s daughter, timed at 7.22 am, to say that the claimant had been admitted to hospital. No further details were given, and the email contained no application to adjourn.

3. I caused an email to be sent to the claimant asking for further details, including documentary confirmation of the hospital admission. That

email was sent at 9.50 am. It confirmed that in the absence of further information the hearing would continue.

4. Nothing further was heard from the claimant before 10.00 am. Having heard submissions from Mr [RESPONDENT] and considering the amount of time left for the hearing, I determined to adjourn until 10.00 am on Friday 20 March. I caused an email to be sent to the parties in the following terms:

In the light of whatever information is available on Friday a decision will be taken on how to proceed but the claimant ought to be aware that a decision may be made to strikeout the claim under Rule 38 of the 2024 Tribunal Rules”

5. In the event further correspondence was received from the claimant’s daughter on the afternoon of 19 March. The salient points are as follows:

Her condition deteriorated later that evening, resulting in hospital admission. She remains under medical care and is

currently medically unfit to attend or participate in proceedings.

The Tribunal has requested formal confirmation of:

This is entirely outside of [APPELLANT]’s control.

6. This email did not even attempt to provide the information requested. The claimant must have known what time she was admitted to hospital, which hospital and, broadly, why. The claimant was aware of the requirements for a postponement/adjournment application based on medical grounds. I do not accept that it was not possible to get a short email from the hospital with at least the basic information required by my order. As it was, no attempt appears to have been made to assist the Tribunal to determine how to proceed.

7. I started the hearing at 10.00 am. Mr [RESPONDENT], assuming the claimant was admitted to one of the two hospitals operated by the respondent confirmed, having taken instructions, that neither hospital was experiencing excessive demand and that in the circumstances either a ward manager or a [NAME] would be able to, and would be expected to assist by providing a [NAME] with a short letter setting out the type of information we required.

8. Mr [RESPONDENT] submitted that in the circumstances the application to postpone be refused and the case continue.

9. I took into account all of the information I had available, the claimant’s accepted disabilities, the Tribunal Rules/Guidance and the case law. I have had particular regard to [NAME] v London Borough of Wandsworth 2002 ICR 1471, CA, [NAME] v Metropolitan Police Service [NAME] 0186/12, [NAME] v London Borough of Islington 2024 EAT 118 and [NAME] v [COMPANY] 2024 EAT 195.

10. In brief, the onus is on a party seeking a postponement on grounds of ill health to demonstrate that they are not well enough to attend. Particularly, where the party says that this is due to mental health, that will usually require medical evidence.

11. The claimant had sufficient time to provide some basic information and, in my view, made no effort to do so.

12. In the circumstances I refused the application. Rather than consider striking out the claim I proceeded to hear the respondent’s evidence and submissions from Mr [RESPONDENT].

4. I would also point out that in the documentation provided as part of this application,

4.1. the document at page 45 seems to be no more than a text message asking the claimant to return a heart monitor,

4.2. the discharge papers at page 47 pre-date the hearing, and

4.3. the document headed Exhibit EL4 is a duplicate of page 47.

5. Thus, even at this stage the claimant has not provided information which would have been sufficient to justify the postponement requested.

6. For those reasons the application is refused.

Employment Judge Brewer

Date: 29 April 2026