Employment Tribunal Strikes Out Disability Discrimination and Unfair Dismissal Claims

OUTCOME: Struck Out

Case Numbers: 6003399/2025, 6004735/2025, 2400490/2025

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EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Claimant: [redacted]

Respondent: [redacted] Manchester (in private by video) On: 02/02/26

Before: EJ Shergill (sitting alone)

Representatives For the claimant: [redacted] For the respondent: [redacted]

PRELIMINARY HEARING RESERVED JUDGMENT

The judgment of the tribunal is that:-

i) The claimant was not at the material times a disabled person within the meaning of s6 Equality Act 2010 by reason of anxiety and depression.

ii) The claims of unfair dismissal in 2400490/2025 and 6004735/2025 are struck out under Rule 40(4).

iii) The claimant’s application to amend his claim to include detriment as a result of qualifying disclosures as defined in section 43B of the Employment Rights Act 1996, is refused.

REASONS

Introduction

(1) This preliminary hearing was listed following an initial preliminary hearing on 04/09/25 before EJ McDonald. The case appeared in my list as a full day’s hearing on 02/02/26 in order to consider four specific matters. These matters were in relation to:

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• whether the claimant was a disabled person within the meaning of the Equality Act 2010 by reason of anxiety and depression at all or any time relevant to the claims made;

• whether the claimant should be granted permission to amend his claim to add or substitute complaints of victimisation in breach of s.27 of the Equality Act 2010;

• whether either claim 2400490/2025 or claim 6004735/2025 should be dismissed on the basis it is a duplicate claim and, if so, which one; and

• to set a date for the final hearing of the case and make case management orders setting out the steps the parties must take to prepare for that final hearing.

(2) The hearing took place by video link and the claimant represented himself, the respondent was represented by [RESPONDENT] counsel. The history of the case was somewhat complicated and it required some additional reading time. We were able to deal with all matters before me, however, I indicated that I would not be in a position to give oral reasons at the end of the hearing and I required time to consider all of the evidence and produce a reserved judgement. I had hoped to complete this within a week or two of the hearing however, I have not been able to finalise it in that timeframe. There may well the further delay as a result of promulgation delays by the [NAME]. Onward case management directions have been dealt with in a separate case management order.

Background to the case

(3) The claimant has been self-representing throughout as I understand it. He has issued three claims against the respondent. The first claim (6003399/2025) complains of disability discrimination. The second and third claims (2400490/2025 and 6004735/2025) complain of unfair dismissal in near identical terms. They were both filed on 12 February 2025. There are some differences between the forms: there is additional information in box 14 of claim form 2400490/2025 which is not in box 14 of claim form 6004735/2025. Box 6.3 on claim form 6004735/2025 says the claimant did not work and was not paid notice, whereas the equivalent box on claim form 2400490/2025 says he was. As set out in [NAME]’s order, there is in fact no dispute that the claimant was paid three months’ pay in lieu of notice. It was agreed at that hearing that all three claims should be heard together.

(4) The claimant was employed by the respondent as a [NAME] from 05/12/22 until his dismissal on 18/12/24. He was a [NAME] within the [COMPANY], teaching on the MSc strategic business management and BSc business management courses. I note [APPELLANT] enquired with the claimant in the last hearing, and it is recorded that the claimant was broadly familiar with employment law but he was not a specialist in employment law nor in employment tribunal procedure.

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(5) In terms of a brief overview of what the case was about, the claimant claims that he is a disabled person by reason of anxiety and depression. He alleged that his line manager failed to make reasonable adjustments, particularly in relation to him having to work in the [NAME]. He says that he was placed under a substantial disadvantage because of his disability due to the levels of noise in the [NAME], which affected his ability to concentrate. He says that he spoke with his manager about this on 26/09/24 and 04/10/24.

(6) [NAME] identified two specific reasonable adjustments with the claimant last hearing, namely to remind staff that the [NAME] was supposed to be a quiet area to work in; and to allow the claimant to work from home on teaching days after he had finished delivering his lectures. The respondent’s policy was that lecturers were required to remain on site on teaching days, and were only allowed to work from home on non-teaching days. The claimant also referenced that his manager had bullied and harassed him on two occasions, namely 16/10/24 when she discussed his conduct in public in the presence of colleagues and students; and 29/10/24 when he says that he was shouted at in front of his students by her.

(7) The previous order notes the respondent’s position as regards to all of this, that the manager had offered the ability for the claimant to work in alternative work spaces on campus. The respondent denies that the claimant said he needed to work from home due to a disability. The respondent also denied that there was any bullying and harassment, and that in October or November, the claimant was subject to an investigation by his manager for misconduct. This included allegations of leaving the campus during teaching days, failing to attend a meeting and being late for lectures and workshops. The claimant had also been issued with a final written warning in February 2024, and that this warning was still live at the relevant time.

(8) The respondent says that the claimant’s dismissal was by reason of redundancy, following a fair consultation and selection process on a scoring matrix. It was asserted that the claimant scored the lowest of the 16 employees and the redundancy pool.

(9) The claimant says that there was favouritism in the way the process was carried out, particularly because the managers conducting this exercise were ones with which the claimant had previous professional differences with. In October 2024, the claimant raised a grievance against one of those managers, and the other therefore carried out the redundancy consultation process with the claimant. As a result of concerns raised by the claimant in relation to the fairness of the scoring, his assessment was reviewed by the director of the [COMPANY], but he was still the lowest in the pool and the decision to dismiss was not overturned.

Relevant clarifications at the last hearing

(10) The order also records matters that were discussed with the claimant about the failure to make reasonable adjustments by the respondent. He was able to clarify the substantial disadvantage, and said that the PCP of working in

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the [NAME] placed him under a substantial disadvantage compared to a [NAME], and was able to identify to reasonable adjustments that should have been taken.

(11) There was also a discussion about the harassment and victimisation claim. There was some discussion as to whether the complaints were disability - related harassment under section 26, which is what the respondent had understood them to be. After some discussion with the claimant, he thought that his case was about complaints of victimisation. There was a discussion about the elements of victimisation under section 27, and that in order to succeed under that the claimant would need to satisfy the tribunal that he had done a protected act, and have been subjected to detriments were doing so.

(12) Ms [RESPONDENT] had also represented at that hearing, and it is recorded that she pointed out that the claimant would need to apply to amend his claim if he wanted to substitute a complaint of section 27 victimisation instead of a complaint of section 26 disability related harassment.

(13) It is recorded that the claimant was unsure whether he wanted to amend his claim, and he was therefore ordered to write to the tribunal and the respondent by 17/10/25 to say whether he wants to bring a complaint of section 27 victimisation, and if so, to identify the ‘protected act’ that he relies on.

(14) I consider it important to reproduce two specific paragraphs that [NAME] included in the previous order:

’33. To assist the claimant, s.27(2) Equality Act 2010 provides that: “Each of the following is a protected act— (a) bringing proceedings under [the Equality Act 2010]; (b) giving evidence or information in connection with proceedings under [the Equality Act 2010]; (c) doing any other thing for the purposes of or in connection with [the Equality Act 2010]; (d) making an allegation (whether or not express) that [the person alleged to have subjected the claimant to a detriment] or another person has contravened [the Equality Act 2010].

34. If the claimant does not apply to amend his claim then the case will proceed on the basis that the incidents on 16 and 29 October 2024 are said to be incidents of disability related harassment in breach of s.26 of the Equality Act 2010.’

(15) There was also a discussion in relation to victimisation and the dismissal process, and it was noted that in neither the second or third claim forms, had the appellant ticked the box to indicate he was bringing a discrimination complaint about his dismissal. There was a discussion in relation to these matters, and the claimant indicated that the dismissal was an act of victimisation. [APPELLANT] told the claimant that he would need to apply to amend his case if he wanted to add that complaint and made directions to that effect.

(16) There was also a discussion about disability, and that the claimant relies on the impairment of anxiety and depression, but the respondent did not concede

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that the claimant was a disabled person at the relevant time, though this would be considered following the claimant providing ‘a statement of impacts and appropriate medical records’. Directions were made in relation to that as well.

Relevant documents before me

(17) I have read the key documents in a preliminary hearing bundle running to 178 PDF pages. All page references are PDF page references of this bundle unless otherwise indicated. Of particular note are:

• a skeleton argument dated 30/01/26, from Ms [RESPONDENT] entitled ‘respondents note for preliminary hearing’;

• an email dated 12/11/25 from the claimant including four attachments relating to the medical evidence he was relying on; and his disability impact statement of one and ½ pages; and

• two documents entitled ‘Case Amendments Clarifications’ . The first was from October 2025; and the second had an additional element to the title ‘January 2026’.

Limited evidence relating to disability

(18) It is relevant to note at this stage, what [APPELLANT] noted about the claimant’s familiarity with employment law, and the respondent’s observations about this. Reference was made on a number of occasions by Ms [RESPONDENT] that the claimant was an educated man. I am mindful that the claimant should not be held to a higher standard because of his professional background. I accept it can be difficult to represent oneself as a litigant in person. However, the relevance of the claimant being an educated person in my view is that he ought to have been able to navigate the various orders and to have understood what was required from him. The reason it is important to set out this finding is that there is a significant lacuna in the evidence relating to disability.

(19) Standard orders were made in relation to the disability issue. In terms of the disability impact statement, the claimant states his disability is anxiety and depression, that it started in February 2020, which I understood was when he first experienced significant symptoms ‘leading to symptoms of anxiety and depression’ and stated that these have been present for more than 12 months. He sets out under the title ‘detailed impact’, a very brief synopsis of cognitive difficulties, sleep disturbances, social withdrawal, household and personal tasks, mobility confidence issues. He then includes under the title ‘adjustments and prognosis’, three short sentences. He then sets out his conclusion that: ‘I believe that the combined effects of my depression and anxiety create a substantial and long-term adverse effect on my ability to perform normal day-to-day activities, and therefore, I am disabled.’

(20) I am not satisfied that this statement was sufficiently detailed taking into account, in particular, whether the claimed examples, related to the material

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time of the events that the claim is about i.e. 05/12/22 until his dismissal on 18/12/24; and perhaps the conclusion of the appeal on 16/01/25.

(21) Of particular relevance in the timeline, is September and October 2024, because these are when the claimant says he spoke with his line manager about his disability issues, and that he had been bullied and harassed on two occasions.

(22) There is nothing to indicate in the disability impact statement, as to when the effects of the impairment started and stopped, and if they have not stopped, how long they are expected to last. If the effects lasted 12 months, the claimant had not explained why he considered the effects were long-term.

(23) The claimant was ordered to provide information as to whether he had had medical treatment including medication or other measures to treat or correct the impairment. There is scant reference to this in his statement, and in particular there is a failure to set out ‘what and when’. It was also not possible to glean from this statement what the effects of the impairment would be without any treatment or other measures. One might have expected that given what the appellant states in his prognosis, that he is working with his GP to manage his symptoms but the effects of anxiety and depression are ongoing, that there would have been records from his NHS GP to support his case.

(24) Indeed, the standard order for the claimant being required to send ‘copies of the parts of his GP and other medical records that are relevant to whether he had the disability at the time of the events the claim is about’ have not been produced. There are no records from his NHS GP. I found this to be a surprising omission. It is relevant to note at this stage that this standard order goes on to state ‘he may blank out anything that is clearly not relevant’ (my emphasis).

(25) It is unclear whether the claimant looked up the guidance from the link provided in the CMO or not. Whatever the position, the failure to provide relevant GP records was a significant weakness in the evidence before me, because the rest of his evidence was also weak.

(26) The claimant relied on a screenshot relating to appointments in November 2024 from [COMPANY]. There is nothing to confirm what any of this was about. I asked the appellant about this area, and also why he had not provided any GP records. He said that he presumed the referral would be sufficient. I note that is despite a clear direction at paragraph 3.2.1 for him to provide ‘GP and other medical records’. It was not his election to decide what was more appropriate in order to comply with that direction in my assessment.

(27) There is a photograph of a box of 28 sertraline tablets, which I am aware is an antidepressant. There is no photograph relating to the reverse of the box where one might expect to see the prescription details relating to that medication. However, there is a photograph of a paper bag with the label from [NAME] dated 21/11/24 with the claimant’s name, though there is no reference to the medication. It is unclear why the claimant relied simply on

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these photographs. Taken at their highest they suggest that he was prescribed and then issued antidepressants on 21/11/24.

Medical referral

(28) The appellant relies on a medical referral (report) arising from a private referral from ‘[NAME]’. It has the appellant’s details on it and shows that he saw a Dr [APPELLANT]. It is unclear if there was an onward referral to a consultant, or whether Dr [NAME] was himself a consultant referenced at the top of the narrative. The key aspects that I have noted from this document are as follows: • the claimant reports that he had noticed ‘he has been suffering from anxiety recently’; and • somewhat confusingly, ‘he has noticed anxiety symptoms for almost 2 years’; • further confusion arises ‘Earlier this year he has needed to take time off work for one month in March. He thinks this is when his symptoms began’.

(29) I found this evidence to be contradictory in terms of whether symptoms had arisen in the past two years, or whether it was earlier in the year in March. There was also a contradiction between whether the anxiety was recent, which suggests much closer in time to the appointment, or whether it was as long ago as ‘almost 2 years’ or when he was off work one month in March. Taking this evidence at its highest, it is weak documentary evidence because it is contradictory.

(30) There are further entries which tend to suggest things went back to March, because of the reference that he gets ‘irritated very quickly and agitated, both of which have been more prominent since March’.

(31) There is reference to him being made redundant in 2020, which seems to be when he struggled to sleep. The report goes on to say that ‘this year has not been a great year for him’ which tends to frame an uptick in terms of the what the claimant was presenting with from my understanding. That is because it goes on to state ‘he has also noticed physical symptoms’ in the present perfect tense, rather than past historic.

(32) The fact that the report states ‘he is currently contemplating medication’ suggests that prior to this report being written, he was not ‘currently’ on medication. There are various other references in this report, which suggest symptoms were ‘triggered by being told he was at risk of being made redundant’. It is unclear if that was 2020 or around the time of the report. At page 156, the doctor has noted the term ‘nil’ for past medical history and medications. I am satisfied that the doctor would have enquired about this and would have recorded this information as part of his professional obligation to properly assess the claimant, particularly in light of the referral ‘to a psychiatric team to enable discussion about medication and counselling’. This was part of the recommended action because the doctor concluded that the claimant had ‘moderate anxiety and depression and would benefit from some

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interventions’. The absence of past medical history and treatment is a relevant issue.

(33) As at the date of this report, I am satisfied that the claimant was not on any medication or counselling. If he had been on ‘medication and therapy’ at the time as stated in the disability impact statement, I would have expected to see some reference to this in the doctor’s report. Similarly, what is set out in the statement as regards the history, is contradicted by the medical report and/or the chronology is contradictory itself in the report. The impact on daily life, to the extent it is recorded in the report, is predominantly related to matters arising at work, and predominantly anchored in time to the events in 2024. The matters set out in ‘detailed impact’ in the statement, are reflected to a minimal degree in the medical report, but there is little that is set out in this statement which materially correlates to matters in the medical report.

(34) This report is the only objective medical evidence of any probative weight. It was obtained in the weeks before he was dismissed. Whilst it confirms that there is a mental impairment in terms of anxiety and depression, it did not satisfactorily set out the substantial adverse effect on his ability to carry out day-to-day activities. It also did not adequately set out whether the effects were long-term in nature due to the confusing chronology.

(35) Taking the report at its highest, the claimant has failed to establish that he had a disability as defined in section 6 of the equality act 2010 at the time of the events the claim is about.

(36) I would reach the same conclusion, based on the various submissions made about the reactive nature of any mental health condition that is evidenced in the medical report. That was the main premise of the submissions made by counsel along with the mainstay of her cross examination i.e. matters set out in the skeleton relating to J v DLA Piper UK LLP [2010] ICR 1052 and so forth.

Assessment in the round

(37) That assessment of this medical record taken at its highest was appropriate in the circumstances of this case, to demonstrate the inherent weaknesses in the evidence before me. Unfortunately, the claimant’s oral evidence only served to further undermine his claims.

(38) The appellant was cross-examined about the content of the report in terms of the difference between noticing symptoms two years ago and the reference to more recently et cetera. Even taking his accounts at its highest, he was commenting on what is recorded in more contemporaneous records. The contemporaneous records leave the [NAME] having to sift through contradictions. In any event, I am not satisfied the claimant gave a credible account as to these differences.

(39) A significant point of contention between the parties was the fact that this medical report had redactions on it. The reductions are limited in nature because all they remove is any reference to the date of the report which was

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19/11/24. This has only become apparent because the respondent was able to remove the redactions. The date at the top of the report is 19/11/24, and the date and time of the appointment details, is 11:40 p.m. on the day before.

(40) The appellant was asked whether this appointment took place in November 2024 and he confirmed that it had. He was asked about page 174 which is the unredacted version of it. He took great umbrage at this point in terms of why the respondent had removed the redactions and enquired why they were allowed to do so. I indicated that he ought to answer the question otherwise I might be invited to make adverse inferences. He was taken to the document again and objected to why there had been redactions. I said he can make submissions about this matter. He said that he had redacted it because the information was sensitive. He was asked about why that was the case, and he indicated that the previous judge’s order had said that he can blank out sensitive information. He was then questioned why he considered the date of the appointment to be sensitive, to which his response was, ‘it was sensitive to me’. When pressed again why the sensitive, he said ‘it was a personal issue’. [COUNSEL] then enquired that he had discussed many other personal issues in that report but they remained unredacted, but he indicated that he had nothing further to say on the matter.

(41) The appellant became animated about this issue at a later point in the hearing as well. I do not know what the previous judge indicated as to sensitive matters, but the wording at paragraph 3.2.1 of the order states that the appellant ‘may blank out anything that is clearly not relevant’. Even if the judge had said that he could blank out anything ‘sensitive’ then the claimant has failed to give a credible answer as to why the date of the consultation and/or the report was sensitive. There is a plethora of information in that report which could be considered awkward, embarrassing and/or more sensitive than the date that the consultation took place. I have declined to this cite any of that content, but the content in there is much more sensitive and may have been more appropriately redacted than the date in my assessment.

(42) I asked the appellant about when he first went to the GP about mental health issues and any prescriptions for antidepressants and he said that was all in 2020. He confirmed that he took sertraline for a year and then stopped and then restarted in 2024. That is consistent with what is in the medical report. It is also consistent with there being a long gap between incidence of depression in my assessment. Indeed, he was asked about this period of time and he said that he was ’just trying to cope’.

(43) I asked whether he had been to see his GP in that three-year period, he thought he had been twice in 2021. He also told me that he had been in and out of therapy collectively for a year, but it was unclear when this was and with whom. When I asked other questions to assess who he had been to see, he said he had been referred to a [NAME] about a year ago, though he did not remember the exact date, and then when I pressed the matter further he said that he ‘did not go’ and just ‘stuck with the medication’. He had referenced a number of other matters which were not mentioned anywhere

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else, I asked him ‘did you not think that this evidence might have been relevant to his case’, he said ‘I have provided the latest evidence’.

(44) I also asked him whether he had anything else to tell me about the redactions, and he said he had ‘nothing further to say’.

(45) When asked about when he first told his manager about his mental health issues, he references that it was when he raised issues about not being able to work in the [NAME]. He confirmed that he did not tell the manager that it was due to a disability, he did not request any reasonable adjustments or requests to be referred to occupational health. I asked him whether the manager asked about why he needed to be in a quieter area, he said that she did and when she asked him what he told her he said ‘categorically that I cannot be productive in a noisy environment’. I asked him whether he mentioned anything about mental health issues, at this point he said ‘yes I did’ that seemed to contradict his accounts that his employers were not told about his disability. When I said what issue did you say it related to, he said ‘I just mentioned about concentration issues at work’. I found his evidence to be confusing. I clarified again if he mentioned anything about his disability to his employer and he said ‘I did not mention the content as I was uncomfortable talking about it’.

(46) [COUNSEL] framed this issue in submissions by addressing the lack of other supporting medical evidence. She said that the date is the least sensitive content, and why would he seek to redact that. She said his sensitivity about this was evasive and he was clearly very unhappy about having to answer these questions. She said that there was a consciousness of timing, that he was aware that this was an ‘unhelpful date’; that it would have been more helpful for his case if it had been an earlier date. She said that all of this makes the lack of earlier dated evidence all the more compelling.

(47) I sought clarification from counsel as to whether it was asserted that the redaction was a misrepresentation of the evidence. Counsel said it was his reactions, that he was clearly unhappy and that it was open to the tribunal to draw conclusions why he redacted the dates. She said that there was sufficient in her submissions without making out the case about misrepresentation as I understood it. The claimant stated that he did not believe un-redacting the document was lawful; and made submissions in brief on other points in relation to the case.

(48) Overall, I found the claimant’s evidence to be evasive at times and somewhat contradictory. He was rather animated when the issue of the date redactions came up. I do not accept his account that he redacted this because the date was sensitive to him. He failed to give any plausible account as to why he would make such a redaction.

(49) The date the report was obtained, in the month before he was dismissed as a result of the redundancy process, may not have been particularly relevant for the purposes he obtained it or for any purposes that it might have been disclosed to his employer at that time. However, the date being redacted for

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the purposes of an employment tribunal claim when specific directions have been given in relation to the type of material needed to be disclosed is a different matter. Despite being ordered to obtain GP records and release them, the claimant failed to do so. He did not give a credible explanation as to why that did not happen. He unilaterally decided to only rely on a report he obtained regarding a private appointment. The report read in conjunction with the disability impact statement, with the date of the report being redacted, has the potential to mislead the [NAME]. The report on its own, also has the potential to mislead the [NAME] because there are no real references that clearly show the timeframe concerned, something which is material for the consideration in these proceedings.

(50) Taken together with a lack of credibility in key aspects of cross examination in particular, lead me to conclude that the claimant had tried to mislead as regards his ability to meet the criteria of disability.

(51) For all of the reasons above, I am not satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the claimant has shown he had a disability as defined in section 6 of the Equality Act 2010 at the time of the events in the claim.

Non-compliance with the deposit order

(52) [NAME] made a deposit order on 04/09/24 on the basis that:

‘The Employment Judge considers that the claimant’s allegations or arguments that he was unfairly dismissed by the respondent have little reasonable prospect of success. The claimant is ORDERED to pay a deposit of £50.00 not later than 31 October 2025 as a condition of being permitted to continue those allegations or arguments in claims number 2400490/2025 and 6004735/2025. The Judge has had regard to any information available as to the claimant’s ability to comply with the order in determining the amount of the deposit.’

(53) The respondent has set out detailed arguments in the skeleton argument as to why the deposit was paid after the deadline of 31/10/25. It was asserted that the deposit was paid on 3 November 2025, by postal order (pg 144). It was submitted that this is the day for the purposes of when payment is made. Reliance was placed on [NAME] v London Borough of Croydon & Others [1999] IRLR 349 the EAT which discussed the distinction between ‘remittance’ of funds, namely their sending off, and the ‘payment of funds’, as in put in the hands of the Tribunal.

(54) The claimant sent a postal order and stated in submissions as I understood them, that he was relatively new to how things worked in the UK and that he paid the amount on 31/10/25, and that there must have been postal delays. He said that he paid by the deadline, was not aware of any delay, and that it was not in the interests of justice and unfair to strike out the case.

(55) I made enquiries with counsel as to whether there was any other legal principle or discretion that should be applied to a case such as this. I also clarified that this deposit order had been applied to both the second and third cases and whether that had any relevance to my consideration of which to strike out. My concern was that the circumstances before me indicated that

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strike out appeared to be a Draconian step, for what appears to have been minor non-compliance because the claimant is likely to have sent it at the latest on the date required. I note that rule 40 does not give any leeway and indicates that if the [NAME] fails to pay the deposit by the specified date, the tribunal ‘must strike out the specific allegation or argument to which the deposit order relates’. That is therefore mandatory.

(56) The claimant was ordered to pay a deposit of £50 following a preliminary hearing held on 04/09/25. Payment was not made by the date ordered of 31/10/25. The complaint of unfair dismissal in 2400490/2025 and 6004735/2025 are therefore struck out under rule 40(4) of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024.

Refusal of application to amend

(57) The claimant seeks to amend his ET1. The application seeks to introduce a new complaint framed as detriment for having made a protected disclosure (public interest disclosure/‘whistleblowing’). For the reasons set out below, the application is refused in the exercise of the Tribunal’s discretion, applying the principles in [NAME] [COMPANY] v Moore [1996] ICR 836.

(58) The Tribunal has a wide discretion to permit or refuse amendments. In exercising that discretion it should consider, in particular: (i) the nature of the amendment; (ii) the timing and the explanation for delay; and (iii) the balance of prejudice and the overall interests of justice. No single factor is determinative; the Tribunal must undertake a holistic assessment.

(59) The claimant lodged three claims in 2025. None pleaded a whistleblowing basis. At earlier preliminary hearings, directions addressed potential amendments focused on discrimination (including discussion of section 27 Equality Act 2010). In response to directions in October 2025 asking whether he wished to amend, the claimant confirmed:

‘DISCRIMINATION

Cases of Bullying and Harassment: 16 & 29th October 2024

I am not going to apply for any amendments.

UNFAIR DISMISSAL

Dismissal and/or acts done during the dismissal process

I am not going to apply for any amendments.’

(60) He then wrote to the tribunal which prompted another judge to give the claimant a further 21 days (as I understood that letter as the position was confused). This led to the claimant issuing a January 2026 version of his case amendments clarification. The claimant now seeks to add a whistleblowing detriment complaint. He explained in the hearing, that he had since realised this would be a ‘better angle’ for his case and said he had not previously understood how to draft the point. The respondent resists the application.

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(61) Nature of the Amendment - the amendment seeks to introduce a wholesale new statutory cause of action (protected disclosure detriment). It is legally and factually distinct from the pleaded claims. It raises different legal tests (including section 43B ERA ‘qualifying disclosure’, the public interest element, and causation under section 47B), and would require investigation of different factual matters concerning the content and recipients of any alleged disclosures, employer knowledge, and the causal link to alleged detriments. This is not a mere re‑labelling or provision of particulars. It would materially change, indeed significantly expand, the case the respondent has to meet. I find the amendment to be a wholesale new claim.

(62) Timing and Explanation - The amendment is sought roughly a year after the claimant issued his original three claims, none of which indicated a whistleblowing basis. Amendments were expressly canvassed at earlier hearings, to the point of the judge setting out the wording of section 27 in the order to assist the claimant with what had been discussed. In October 2025 the claimant stated that he did not wish to amend, and now thinks that this new claim is a ‘better angle’ in his own words. That strikes me as opportunistic. While the explanation forms part of the picture, it does not justify the significant delay or the nature of the wholesale new claim. The claimant has had over a year to raise and particularise the point.

(63) Balance of prejudice - the balance of hardship and injustice weighs heavily in the respondent’s favour. Allowing the amendment would require the respondent to undertake substantially different factual inquiries into alleged disclosures, knowledge, and causation together with consequential case management and further delay. I am satisfied that the prejudice to the respondent is real and material. Those separate inquiries may well be resource extensive. By contrast, refusing the amendment maintains the pleaded landscape for which the parties have prepared. The claimant retained his existing claims until the determination of the live matters before me. He has not demonstrated hardship or injustice arising from refusal.

(64) Without determining merits, I observe that the January 2026 draft identifies matters which, at their highest, concern alleged breaches of internal policies. On their face they do not identify disclosures meeting the statutory categories or public‑interest requirement in section 43B ERA 1996. This reinforces that the proposed amendment is neither straightforward nor obviously meritorious, which weighs against permitting a very late, wholesale change.

(65) This amendment was a substantial alteration to the case pleading a wholly new cause of action. The balance of injustice and hardship in allowing the amendment at this stage was heavily in the respondent’s favour. The real and practical consequences of allowing the amendment would be disproportionate to the respondent. The prejudice to the claimant is as a result of other matters that have arisen in the case that he has brought, including one which was also due to tardiness. It is not in the interests of justice to allow the amendment.

Case Numbers: 6003399/2025, 6004735/2025, 2400490/2025

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(66) The application to amend to now include a differently pleaded ‘Cases of Bullying and Harassment: 16 & 29th October 2024’ under section 43B ERA, is refused.

________________________________

Employment Judge Shergill

Date: 28/02/26

ORDER SENT TO THE PARTIES ON

15 April 2026

FOR THE TRIBUNAL OFFICE