Employment Tribunal Rejects Disability Discrimination and Unfair Dismissal Claims

OUTCOME: Dismissed

RESERVED Case Number: 6016586/2024

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EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Claimant: [redacted]

Respondent:

[redacted]

Liverpool (in person hearing) ON: 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9 & 11 March 2026 (in chambers)

BEFORE:

Members:

Employment Judge [NAME_3] [NAME_3]:

Claimant:

[redacted]

In person

[NAME_4], counsel RESERVED JUDGMENT

The unanimous judgment of the Tribunal is that:

1. The respondent did not fail in its duty to make reasonable adjustments, the claimant’s complaint of [NAME_6] brought sections 20-21 of the [NAME_7] Act 2010 are not well-founded and is dismissed.

2. The claimant’s claim of discrimination arising from disability brought under section 15 of the [NAME_7] Act 2010 is not well-founded and is dismissed.

3. The claimant was not unfairly dismissed and his claim for unfair dismissal is not well founded and is dismissed.

RESERVED Case Number: 6016586/2024

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REASONS

Preamble

The hearing

1. This is a liability hearing held in person. The documents the Tribunal was referred to are in a bundle of 1218 pages together with additional documents produced by the respondent during the hearing marked “R1” to “R7”, the contents of which I have recorded where relevant below. As discussed with the parties, the Tribunal has only considered those documents to which it was taken. In addition, the Tribunal was provided with a bundle of witness statements, an agreed chronology and agreed list of issues that was discussed at the outset and referred to throughout.

2. The hearing was taken slowly in order that the claimant could make his own notes as and when required. We also had numerous breaks as adjustments for the claimant and offered the claimant various adjournments in accordance with the Equal Treatment Bench Book, including before making oral submissions. [NAME_4] agreed to provide the claimant with written closing submissions, note on the law and copies of case law highlighted before oral submissions were given the next day, and the claimant was offered a further adjournment before he made oral submissions.

Claimant’s disability

3. The claimant relies on attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (“ADHD”) and anxiety, which the respondent accepts are disabilities under section 6 of the [NAME_7] Act 2010 (“the EQA”). The date of knowledge is in issue.

The pleadings

4. The claimant entered into Early ACAS conciliation on the 27 June to 29 July 2024 before his dismissal.

5. In a claim form received on 28 October 2024, the claimant, who at the time was employed as journalist, claims the respondent unfairly dismissed him, treated the claimant unfavourably by dismissing him under section 15 of the EQA, and failed to make reasonable adjustments in respect of the claimant’s disability contrary to sections 20, 21 and 39 of the EQA.

Agreed issues

6. The parties agreed the issues as follows:

Time limits in discrimination complaints 1) Given the date the claim form was presented and the dates of early conciliation, any complaint about something that happened before 28 March 2024 may not have been brought in time 2) Were the complaints made within the time limit in [section 123 of the [NAME_7] Act 2010]? The Tribunal will decide:

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a) Was the claim made to the Tribunal within three months (plus early conciliation extension) of the act to which the complaint relates? b) If not, was there conduct extending over a period? (sometimes called a continuing act) c) If so, was the claim made to the Tribunal within three months (plus early conciliation extension) of the end of that period? d) If not, were the claims made within a further period that the Tribunal thinks is just and equitable? The Tribunal will decide: i) Why were the complaints not made to the Tribunal in time? ii) In any event, is it just and equitable in all the circumstances to extend time? Unfair dismissal 3) Was the claimant dismissed? The parties agree he was dismissed for gross misconduct on 25 July 2024.

Short agreed chronology of dismissal process

3 November 2023 C invited to a fact-finding meeting with [NAME_8] regarding an email sent to [NAME_2] colleague and social media use

8 November 2023 C requests postponement to allow preparation time

15 November 2023 claimant goes off sick serious mental health breakdown

8 December 2023 claimant again signed off sick claimant depression and anxiety

10 April 2024 C goes to [NAME_9] report says potential consequences to the individual include anxiety, fatigue, insomnia, relationship problems, emotional stability, poor lifestyle choices and mental ill-health. Report recommends return to work plan stress risk management tool reasonable adjustments in all Cremains off sick and never returns to work

29 May 2024 C receives disclosure in the post 2 June 2024 C requests electronic copies 20 June 2024 claimant breaks down during the disciplinary hearing he had sent written mitigation - he was represented at disciplinary hearing by union representative [NAME_10]

19 July 2024 claimant submits a formal grievance to [NAME_11]

23 July 2024 claimant emailed [NAME_11] about unfair and discriminatory process, not having ADHD or mental health taken into account

25 July 2024 access to employee services was removed at the outcome hearing

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25 July 2024 C told dismissed

8 August 2024 claimant submits SAR

24 August 2024 claimant submits internal appeal

4) What was the reason for dismissal? The respondent says it was conduct. It relied on the following allegations: 1) misuse of distribution list, 2) alleged sharing of company information, 3) alleged breach of the [NAME_2]'s Anti Bullying and Harassment policy, 4) alleged breach of social media guidelines, 5) alleged breach of [NAME_2] 6) alleged failure to follow a reasonable management request

5) If the reason was conduct, did the respondent act reasonably in all the circumstances in treating that as a sufficient reason to dismiss the claimant? The Tribunal will usually decide whether: i) there were reasonable grounds for that belief. ii) at the time the belief was formed the respondent had carried out a reasonable investigation. the reasonableness of investigations will be considered in the light of the claimant’s admissions in relation to the posts reposts and email. The claimant does not deny that he described the behaviour of one of his colleagues as “sociopathic” and referred to the Israeli / [NAME_12] conflict describing [NAME_12] as “murderous bastards”. He reposted tweets criticising [NAME_2]. He said “clearly awkward for me to comment but yes the poster is right…” referring to criticism of [NAME_2] coverage of [NAME_12] conflict. He responded to a question on X “is anyone ready to start a petition to get him (claimant’s broadcast colleague) out of a job” because of his views on the conflict. The claimant responded, “I’m ready”. The claimant liked a tweet in which his colleague was referred to as a “spoilt brat” There were more posts and reposts relating to Israeli / [NAME_12] conflict, issues around biological sex and the role of [NAME_2] as a public service broadcaster. The claimant says he has a right to hold his views, but he says that it was his disability (ADHD plus anxiety) that caused him to express views that he would otherwise have kept private. iii) the respondent otherwise acted in a procedurally fair manner; iv) dismissal was within the range of reasonable responses.

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The claimant says the respondent failed to attach adequate weight to mitigation. He speaks The posts and reposts and email arose out of a disability, that he always has ADHD and that speaking in a blunt way and being unfiltered in written communication arises out of his disability but that when he is also anxious his judgement is affected so that he does things (post, repost, send emails) that he would not otherwise do. He says that the respondent ought to have weighed his actions against his long service and high performance and not dismissed. He says the sanction is excessive and ought to have been mitigated so that he kept his job. Disability 6) The respondent concedes the claimant was disabled as defined in section 6 of the [NAME_7] Act 2010 at all material times by reason of ADHD and anxiety.

7) Did the respondent know the claimant was disabled? It concedes knowledge of ADHD from 2 April 2024. It disputes knowledge of anxiety at all material times.

Discrimination arising from disability ([NAME_7] Act 2010 section 15)

8) Did the respondent treat the claimant unfavourably by: a) Dismissing him 9) Did the following things arise in consequence of the claimant’s disability: Manner of expression i) Speaking in a blunt (truthful and to the point and unfiltered) way in written communications (emails and posts). ii) Lacking exercise of judgment so that when anxious he communicates things that he would otherwise have not said or written.

10) Was the treatment a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim? The respondent says that its aims were: a) Para 54 GOR upholding the respondent’s policies and values, b) Protecting and upholding the respondent’s reputation c) Maintaining public confidence in its impartiality and the standards expected of a public service broadcaster d) Protecting the welfare and safety of its staff

11) The Tribunal will decide in particular: a) was the treatment an appropriate and reasonably necessary way to achieve those aims.

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b) could something less discriminatory have been done instead. c) how should the needs of the claimant and the respondent be balanced?

Reasonable Adjustments ([NAME_7] Act 2010 sections 20 & 21) 12) Did the respondent have the following PCPs: FTRA: A

PCP respondent’s practice of informing employees as happened to the claimant that he would face a disciplinary hearing during the online Zoom welfare meeting with [NAME_8] on 1 May 2024

13) Was this PCP applied to the claimant and did it put him at a substantial disadvantage

The claimant says the substantial disadvantage was increased anxiety for claimant

14) Did the respondent know or could it reasonably have been expected to know that the claimant was likely to be placed at the disadvantage? 15) What reasonable steps should the respondent have taken to avoid substantial disadvantage

a) Deal with welfare and disciplinary matters separately

FTRA: B

PCP convening and holding a disciplinary hearing during sickness absence

16) Was this PCP applied to the claimant and did it put him at a substantial disadvantage

The claimant says he was unable to function properly and advocate for himself at the hearing and so was denied a fair hearing – see page 18 GOC

17) Did the respondent know or could it reasonably have been expected to know that the claimant was likely to be placed at the disadvantage? 18) What reasonable steps should the respondent have taken to avoid substantial disadvantage

a. [NAME_9] advice before requiring someone off sick to attend a disciplinary hearing

b. Follow Code of Conduct on neuro divergent employees with disabilities

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c. Consider a written process for disciplinary hearing for example sending questions in advance

FTRA: C

PCP: Respondent’s Practice of not seeking up to date [NAME_9] reports before dismissal 19) Was this PCP applied to the claimant and did it put him at a substantial disadvantage

The claimant says this was applied in his dismissal in July 2024. He says he was put to the substantial disadvantage of dismissal / losing employment.

20) Did the respondent know or could it reasonably have been expected to know that the claimant was likely to be placed at the disadvantage? 21) What reasonable steps should the respondent have taken to avoid substantial disadvantage

(a) Request an up to date [NAME_9] before dismissal (b) Consult claimant about neuro diversity before deciding to dismiss (c) Attach weight to mitigation of impact of ADHD and anxiety / (d) take into account broadcast history and performance

22) Was it reasonable for the respondent to have to take those steps [and when]? 23) Did the respondent fail to take those steps?

Remedy for discrimination or victimisation 24) If so, is it just and equitable to increase or decrease any award payable to the claimant? 25) What financial losses has the discrimination caused the claimant? 26) Has the claimant taken reasonable steps to replace lost earnings, for example by looking for another job? 27) If not, for what period of loss should the claimant be compensated? 28) What injury to feelings has the discrimination caused the claimant and how much compensation should be awarded for that? 29) Has the discrimination caused the claimant personal injury and how much compensation should be awarded for that? 30) Is there a chance that the claimant’s employment would have ended in any event? Should their compensation be reduced as a result? 31) Should interest be awarded? How much?

Evidence

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7. The Tribunal heard evidence under oath from the claimant, and on behalf of the respondent it heard from [NAME_8], executive editor for [NAME_13], the claimant’s line manager and investigating officer, [NAME_11], head of content commissioning, and dismissing officer, [NAME_14], senior HR advisor, and [NAME_14], Legal director heading the programme legal advice team, and appeal manager.

8. When it came to conflicts in the evidence the Tribunal preferred, on the balance of probabilities, the evidence given by the respondent’s witnesses supported by contemporaneous documentation, particularly on the issue of when the claimant informed the respondent he had a childhood diagnosis of ADHD, and when he attempted to link AHDH and anxiety with the posts he made and emails sent.

9. The Tribunal was referred to an agreed bundle of documents and having considered the oral and written evidence and written and oral submissions presented by the parties (the Tribunal does not intend to repeat all of the written and oral submissions, but has attempted to incorporate the points made by the parties within the body of this judgment with reasons), we have made the following findings of the relevant facts.

Facts

10. The respondent is the [NAME_2] established under Royal Charter and referred to in this Judgment as the “[NAME_2].” It is a large nationwide organisation with a human resource department who assist and advise managers when dealing with workplace issues.

11. The respondent issued several policies, guidance and procedures to employees, including journalists. The claimant was aware of his obligations under these policies and guidance.

Respondent’s policies and procedures relevant to this claim.

12. The “[NAME_2] of Conduct & Our Values (undated) sets out the “mandatory standards…Meeting our legal and regulatory obligations is an essential and non-negotiable part of that…this is why you need to take personal responsibility for ensuring you and your team understand the Code of Conduct and follow these standards consistently without fail….Trust if the foundation of the [NAME_2]. We’re independent, impartial and truthful” [the Tribunal’s emphasis.]

Social media last updated September 2023

13. Under the heading “Social Media” the Policy states: “…We have one set of rules that apply to every [NAME_2] colleague regardless of department whether you are in journalism or finance in all circumstances anything you post on social media on personal or @[NAME_2] account must adhere to our Social Media Guideline” [the Tribunal’s emphasis.]

14. The Code sets out six key values which shape the respondent’s culture including “Trust” and “Respect.”

Personal Use of Social Medial Policy last updated 8 May 2018

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15. The [NAME_2] of Social Medial Policy last updated 8 May 2018 provides staff were not “prohibited from using social medial platforms in a personal capacity. The [NAME_2]’s reputation for impartiality and objectivity is however crucial. Staff should take reasonable steps to ensure their activity on social media does not undermine the [NAME_2]’s nor their own, professional impartiality or reputation and/or bring the organisation into disrepute” [the Tribunal’s emphasis.]

16. Under the heading “Impartiality Guidance” journalists “have a particular responsibility to uphold [NAME_2]’s impartiality” there was a list of “dos and don’ts” which warns journalists from expressing support for any political party, views on controversial subjects, do not support campaigns, “think about your likes, shares, reposts, use of hashtags and who you follow say about you, your personal prejudices and opinions avoid temptation to post quickly without thinking about the language you are using, or about how it can be perceived…”

17. Under the heading “Avoiding bias” tips are given including avoiding reposts, likes and joining online campaigns to indicate a personal view, no matter how worthy.”

18. Under paragraph 5 titled “Enforcement” employees are warned that “Breach of this guidance may lead to disciplinary action…this could include possible termination of employment in serious circumstances” [the Tribunal’s emphasis].

The [NAME_2]’s Editorial Standards June 2019

19. The Editorial Standards set out the respondent’s regulatory and ethical obligations and set out the following; “knowledge of the Guidelines is essential professional skill and everyone who makes [NAME_2] content is contractually required to familiarise themselves with them and abide by them.”

20. Under the heading “impartiality” and “Contentious Views and possible offence” the respondent made it clear that “public expression by staff and presenters of personal offence or indignation, or the tone or attitude of an item, or programme as a whole may jeopardise the [NAME_2]’s impartiality…[NAME_2] staff and regular [NAME_2] presenters or reporters associated with news or public policy related output may offer professional judgments rooted in evidence. However, it is not normally appropriate for them to present or write personal view content on public policy, matters of political or industrial controversy or ‘controversial subjects’ in any area” [the Tribunal’s emphasis].

21. Under the Public Expression of Opinion at paragraph 15.3.13 it is set out; “where individuals identify themselves being linked with the [NAME_2]…their public expressions of opinion have the potential to compromise the [NAME_2]’s impartiality and damage its reputation. This includes the use of social media…opinions expressed on social medial are put into the public domain can be shared and are searchable” the Tribunal’s emphasis].

22. At para 15.3.24 “taking a public position on an issue of public policy, political or industrial controversy, or any other controversial subject is likely to be incompatible with some [NAME_2] roles. Advance discussion with line managers is essential in all genre areas” [the Tribunal’s emphasis].

23. Para 15.3.15 “Individuals must clear with the head or department and the press office any letters to the press or public expressions of opinion if they deal with the subject

RESERVED Case Number: 6016586/2024

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matter of their programmes, relate to the [NAME_2] or broadcasting, or concern matters of public policy, political or industrial controversy or any other “controversial subject.”

24. Under the heading Political Activities para 15.3.18 “Anyone is entitled to be a member of a political party or other organisation within the law. However, individuals in some roles need to consider whether public disclosure of such membership would risk undermining public confidence in their ability to fulfil some or all aspects of their job or otherwise risk the perception of the [NAME_2]’s impartiality.

25. The respondent also issued and Anti-Bullying and Harassment Policy dated 20 May 2021; Grievance Policy dated 20 September 2021 and 20 September 2021. The Grievance Policy does not specify who the grievance hearing manager will be, contrary to the claimant’s written submissions. The Tribunal found the Grievance Policy does not prevent the grievance hearing manager conducting the disciplinary appeal.

[NAME_2] dated 11 March 2020

26. The respondent has a separate [NAME_2] dated 11 March 2020 which forms part of the contract of employment. Under the heading “Principles” it is stated: “where employee’s appeal is relates to their disciplinary sanctions which resulted from a bullying and harassment disciplinary this will be heard by a hearing manager appointed from outside the employee’s division…Where the appeal is against a disciplinary or capability dismissal this will be heard at head of division level or by the nominated deputy.” There is no reference to an appeal hearing manager being unable to hear a grievance.

The Disciplinary Policy dated 20 September 2021

27. The Disciplinary Policy dated 20 September 2021 provided examples of misconduct “failure to observe [NAME_2] policies and procedures” and “unreasonable refusal to follow an instruction issued by manager.” Non-exhaustive examples of gross misconduct included “serious breach of confidence.”

The claimant

29 The claimant was 63 years old at the effective date of termination. The claimant was employed by the respondent as a broadcast journalist, presenter and producer working at [NAME_13] from 1 September 2006. The contract was signed by the claimant on the 18 February 2011. Clause 14a provides: “You ae expected to acquaint yourself with all the [NAME_2]’s rules, regulations, policies and procedures…in particular all staff involved in programme making are subject to and expected to observe and abide by the policies contained in the [NAME_2].”

30. The claimant was diagnosed as a child with ADHD. There is no satisfactory evidence before the Tribunal that the claimant informed the respondent of this diagnosis until the email sent to [NAME_8] on the 2 April 2024 and then in consultation with [NAME_9] who confirmed the position in a report dated 10 April 2024 which went to [NAME_8] acting in his capacity as the claimant’s line manager.

31. The claimant took part in staff training at various times, including on the issue of “Impartiality” on the 8 April 2021 Impartiality was a fundamental concept for the respondent. [NAME_15], the claimant’s line manager, raised the issue of social

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media posts in a discussion and by email dated 21 December 2022 which attached the Editorial Guidelines he referred to specific posts “which I think could breach the guidelines….But as I said I think it’s important that everyone checks their posts to make sure they are in line with the guidelines.”

32. The claimant’s evidence before the Tribunal was that he was fully aware of the respondent’s Guidelines when it came to social medial, he had been instrumental in setting up social media in [NAME_13] and as a reporter with over 22 years’ experience, it was “instinctive” for him to know how to apply the policies.

5 April 2023 meeting

33. The [NAME_2] reorganised and during the “mapping” exercise involving the claimant, who was not happy, had a discussion with [NAME_15] on the 5 April 2023 while the claimant was absent from work with mental health issues. The claimant’s recollection was that on this date he mentioned for the first time the ADHD prognosis at the meeting in [NAME_16]. The claimant’s recollection is not supported by any contemporaneous document. [NAME_15] uploaded his notes of the meeting on to the respondent’s case report which reflect a new manager was going to manage the claimant, [NAME_8]. Nowhere in the case reports is there a reference to ADHD until 2 April 2024. There are numerous references to mental health. The claimant was referred to a number of support services available including the [NAME_17] (“[NAME_17]”), mental health 1st aiders, [NAME_2] website, Wellness Recovery Plan and Mental Health related support document.

34. In a summary of the meeting with [NAME_15] on 5 April 2023 there is a reference to the following “I mentioned the [NAME_17] and he said he welcomes the advice but was being supported by his wife at home. He said he wanted to think about an [NAME_9] referral…We talked about the upcoming changes and his future role. He said he was happy with the idea of meeting with the new manager [NAME_8] in the next few weeks…I think he appreciated me providing him with more clarity about the possible timescale of the changs and his possible roles in the new template.”

35. In conclusion, on the balance of probabilities the Tribunal finds the claimant had not informed [NAME_15] he had been diagnosed with ADHD, and had he done so, the report would have read differently. The claimant has criticised the respondent for not obtaining an [NAME_9] report earlier than 10 April 2024. From the notes it appears it was offered and the claimant was thinking about it and so the Tribunal found.

37. In an email dated 26 June 2023 the claimant was sent a “Dear all” circular referring to “Our Social Media Guidelines, our Editorial Guidelines and our Code of Conduct are designed to protect and support us a individual, and as an organisation. Lately, some people have displayed behaviour on platforms like Twitter and elsewhere that is below expected standards and could be considered as breaches of that Code of Conduct and the Guidelines. I would urge you all to read the Guidance again to help you maintain your impartiality and to kept it in the uppermost of your minds.” There were links to the Guidance. [NAME_8] re-circulated the information to all [NAME_13] on 30 June 2023 repeating the [NAME_18] email in his newsletter and summarised the key points. The claimant was aware of this information.

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38. The claimant was informed on the 28 September 2023 that new Social Media Guidelines had been published and they were attached. It is undisputed the new Guidelines did not change any of the rules for journalists.

39. On the 29 September 2023 [NAME_8] emailed [NAME_13] employees, including the claimant, referring to the new social media guidelines as follows “The two biggest points for us are:

1. The strictest requirements for impartiality continue to apply to those working in news, current affairs, factual journalism and senior leaders of the [NAME_2],

2. Everyone working for the [NAME_2] has a responsibility to treat others with respect and courtesy at all times and to not bring the [NAME_2] into disrepute.”

40. On the 7 October 2023 [NAME_12] attacked Isreal and there were many reports in the news and press. The claimant was critical of the [NAME_2] and the way it reported on the attack. The claimant sent various X posts from 8 to 16 October 2023 on a number of subjects including [NAME_12] and expressing anti-trans views. An example in the agreed bundle was an undated post in which the claimant engaged and responded to a comment “…Truly, the cunning of the Jew knows no equal.”

41. On the 16 October 2023 the claimant emailed [NAME_19] and his production team dealing with the topic of Isreal under the subject heading “[NAME_19]’s Contextualising Murders Book Club.” The claimant wrote: “I felt I ought to step offline and take some time (a week is just enough) to consider how to express my thoughts on your tweet below…” it is remarkable that you have the hubris to instruct me to read a book so I can find out why these animals are such murderous bastards…these are actions of evil monsters…It’s sociopathic of you to suggest anyone should read a book to seek context…I don’t look for context for disgusting excuses for human beings. That being said, I am looking forward to your recommending books that give some context and understanding of [NAME_20], [NAME_20] and the Yorkshire ripper. I hear Stalin had a terrible childhood. You should do your own book club” [the Tribunal’s emphasis]. The claimant had sent [NAME_19] an earlier email on the same subject matter on 9 October 2023 a week before.

42. The claimant’s oral evidence was that he had held on to the email for a week to consider it before sending it to [NAME_19] and his production team on the16 October 2023, he was unable to cogently explain how ADHD and anxiety caused his behaviour when he had a week to think about it, and no medical evidence was produced to assist the respondent and Tribunal making a causal connection.

43. [NAME_8] consulted with HR over the claimant’s posts generally, and the email to send to [NAME_19] and his production team concerned him.

44. On the 18 October 2023 the claimant was “mapped” to the [NAME_2] role in the reorganisation, and he informed [NAME_8] it was unsuitable. The claimant was not happy, and he believed the reorganisation was destroying the [NAME_2].

45. On the 19 October 2023 [NAME_18], editorial standards, emailed [NAME_8] highlighting the claimant’s X posts which are of concern, attaching “the worst” examples from the previous “five days” which he identifies as being in breach of the old and new Social Media Guidance.

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46. In November 2023 the [COMPANY_21] (“[NAME_21]”) was set up to co-ordinate and address conduct (including social media activity) connected to the Middle East conflict. [NAME_14], HR advisor, was part of the group.

47. A few days before the 8 November 2023 at a 1-2-1 meeting the claimant was informed [NAME_8] intended to hold an investigation meeting to discuss the [NAME_19] email, and as the claimant objected to being given 2-days’ notice the investigation meeting which eventually took place on the 16 September 2023.

48. Between 9 to 13 November 2023 the claimant continued to post on X including the comment “Once again I am deleting tweets” and continued to repost including a post about a pro-Palestinian march, transgender and Jews being “forced to leave Israel.”

49. [NAME_8] on the 16 November 2023 sent the claimant copies of the posts he wanted to discuss at the investigation in addition to the [NAME_19] communication. The email sent on 16 November 2023 at 11.34 was titled “[NAME_22] Issues” and received by the claimant at the start of the investigation meeting. The notes taken at the investigation hearing (which are not in dispute) reflect the claimant, who was accompanied by his trade union representative, saying “I do apologise for whatever you say have done.” The claimant indicated he had taken the tweets down and “feel under a great deal of stress and anxiety because again [NAME_2] are having a pop at me when it is the talent that is the problem.” The claimant’s union representative acknowledged that there were some concerns and a need for a discussion with the claimant. At no stage did the claimant indicated he had ADHD. The claimant mentioned childhood trauma focused [NAME_8] referred him to [NAME_17], support from the union representative and offered “any help I can give.” The claimant indicated he was being supported by his GP and had contacted EPA. The Tribunal found that [NAME_8] was not aware the claimant had been diagnosed with ADHD until the 2 April 2024.

50. Between 23, 24 and 30 November 2023 the claimant sent various posts on controversial subjects including [NAME_12], transgender, [NAME_19] and his newly mapped role in a posts dated 3 December 2023.

51. On the 28 November 2023 [NAME_8] completed his investigation report and did not give the claimant’s the outcome of the investigation as the claimant went of long-term sick from which he did not return, on 29 November 2023.

52. In an email sent on 6 December 2023 [NAME_8] offered to inform the claimant of his investigation outcome when he was well enough. The claimant did not respond and sent in a sick note [NAME_24] confirming he was not well enough to work due to anxiety and low mood from 8 December 2023 to 8 January 2024 with no adjustments recommended.

53. On 6 December 2023 [NAME_11] was appointed disciplinary manager.

54. The claimant was due to return to work on the 8 January 2024 and he did not turn up. [NAME_8] attempted to call the claimant unsuccessfully, and on the 10 January 2024 left a message which the claimant responded to with a fit note taking him to the 5 February 2024. The fit note was identical to the last and valid until 5 February 2024. Between 10 January and 2 February 2023 [NAME_8] attempted to contact the claimant, who confirmed he was sending in another fit note. [NAME_8] informed the

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claimant he was going to arrange an [NAME_9] report. A fit note was provided to 3 March 2024. HR advised [NAME_8] about the questions to be asked in the [NAME_9] referral.

55. Between the 18 to 26 January and around the 10 February 2024 the claimant continued to post from X expressing anti-trans sentiments, and in two different posts referred to [NAME_8]’s instruction that all posts should be deleted: “Once again I am deleting tweets” and “Once again I am posting truths.”

56. On the 8 February 2024 [NAME_8] attempted to set up a welfare meeting, which the claimant did not join and instead sent a sick note for “mixed anxiety and depressive disorder” from 12 February spanning 5 February to 3 March 2024. There are several communications from [NAME_8] attempting to meet up with the claimant, including a re-scheduling, which culminated in an informal welfare meeting held on the 28 February 2024.

58. Two days later on the 16 February 2024 the claimant posts criticised the [NAME_2] with the comment; “hang your head in shame.”

59. A meeting took place to discuss the claimant’s sickness absence on the 28 February 2024. The claimant confirmed he would attend [NAME_9] on one of his three [NAME_2] working days. [NAME_8] discussed with the claimant his concerns “If we go back to before you were on sick leave, I’d had a fact find investigation into your social media. You’re yet to have an outcome for that we are waiting for a return to work or a suitable time. I have concerns about your recent activity there have been posts about the [NAME_2] and [NAME_25] – do you have any thoughts on that?” The claimant’s response was “I’ve not had any response from the [NAME_2] in 3 months. I would like an email so I can digest – I won’t go into detail why I’m off sick you have that, if you don’t know I suggest you read back.” The claimant did not mention ADHD and nor did he point out that there was a link between ADHD and sending out the posts. The claimant was reminded by [NAME_8] that “I understand why you’re off [NAME_23] and I can follow up with an email with regards to social activity, but I want to remind you that although you are off sick the policy and guidelines still apply.”

60. Immediately after the meeting the claimant continued to post in early March 2024 about transgender and criticises the respondent.

61. On the 5 March 2024 [NAME_8] referred the claimant to [NAME_9]. The content of the referral reflects [NAME_8]’s state of understanding at the time. He wrote “[NAME_23] states his mental health is poor due to my treatment at work, [NAME_2] did not provide trauma focused [NAME_2]…[NAME_23] has demonstrated frustration with colleagues – especially around the commissioning process and overall changes across [NAME_2] local.” In a response to a question about disciplinaries [NAME_8] wrote “[NAME_23] is awaiting the results of a fact find meeting to see if it has progressed to a disciplinary, due to sickness [NAME_23] has not had the outcome. [NAME_23] has changed shift tasks from being a reporter journalist to sounds journalist. [NAME_23] is yet to start the new shift task due to sickness” [the Tribunal’s emphasis].

62. The claimant missed the 11 March 2024 [NAME_9] appointment, and it was rearranged for 10 April 2024.

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63. On the 22 March 2024 [NAME_8] took advice from [NAME_14] and copied in [NAME_11] (who did not read the entry) concerning the claimant not removing posts as requested.

64. On the 2 April 2024 [NAME_8] sent “updated set of tweets/blog which seem to have escalated” and [NAME_21] were looking at the case.

The first disclosure to the respondent of ADHD.

65. In an email sent on 2 April 2024 from the claimant to [NAME_8] the claimant for the first time disclosed the following “I was diagnosed as ADHD as a child and have spent my life finding the coping mechanism for the downsides of being ADHD which I won’t list now but they are relevant to what role I am able to fulfil” [the Tribunal’s emphasis]. There was no suggestion the claimant was linking emails, his use of social media and the posting with ADHD, and his sole concern was the new role and the culture of the radio station including alleged bullying.

66. [NAME_8] responded on the 3 April 2023 in an email to which the claimant responded on the 12 April in red font. [NAME_8] was concerned there had been no [NAME_9] assessment and he wrote, “I was not aware of your medical ADHD diagnosis and it’s important that you mentioned this to [NAME_26] as part of your [NAME_9] report so they can advise any reasonable adjustments….” It is notable in the claimant’s red font response there was no reference to the respondent, particularly, [NAME_15], possessing knowledge of ADHD. The claimant’s concern was the inappropriate role he was mapped to and made no mentioned that his posting on social medial and emails to colleagues was linked to the ADHD.

67. [NAME_8] made it clear he intended to prioritise the [NAME_9] appointment and wrote: “following on from my email on 5 March, I still have cause of concern regarding your [NAME_2] related social medial activity. As you know you’ve not had the outcome to your investigation meeting conducted on 16/11/23, however whilst signed off work by your GP you were still required to adhere to all [NAME_2] policies including the social medial guidelines. I will refer you again to the guidance on gateway and encourage you to remove all posts that contravene the guidance”. The claimant had an opportunity to link the ADHD with the posts; he does not. Instead, he wrote “please send me the outcome of my disciplinary instead of telling me every time you are in contact with me that you have said outcome…In previous emails you have screenshot of the tweet I have either posted or linked and then cut and pasted some words from [NAME_2] policy. Can you please be more specific in what you are accusing me of doing. In some cases (as my union rep pointed out) I have used the words “crumbs” or merely liked a tweet. Therefore, to understand any charges against me I need you to express precisely what is wrong with any offending tweets and explain why the words or emojis transgress any policies that might apply. This does not mean merely cutting and posting a rather lose and ill-defined [NAME_2] policy near to my tweet, you have to spell it out and tell me what I’ve done to transgress the rules…” [the Tribunal’s emphasis].

69. [NAME_8] continued to gather X uploads sent by the claimant over this period including criticism of the respondent’s coverage of transgender issues, when the claimant posted the following: the “abysmally absent WPATH files reporting. I’ve tried internally; they don’t even reply other than to threaten staff with concerns.”

[NAME_9] report dated the 10 April 2024

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70. [NAME_9] provided a report on the 18 April 2024. It had been reviewed by the claimant who authorised its release before sent to [NAME_8] who forwarded it to HR. This is an important point as the claimant relies on the 10 April 2024 [NAME_9] report and at no point did he question the fact that [NAME_9] does not causally link ADHD and anxiety with the emails and posts that were made. [NAME_9] confirmed the claimant had been absent due to work-related stress. The ADHD childhood diagnosis was referenced, but not in the context of the claimant’s use of social media. The claimant was found unfit for work and adjustments were recommended “when fit to return.” A full recovery “was anticipated.”

71. [NAME_8] had asked the question whether there was anything in the claimant’s condition that would “prevent them from being complaint with processes or rules.” [NAME_9]’s opinion was “[NAME_1]’s condition, particularly his ADHD and the anxiety stemming from workplace stress, may sometimes make it challenging for him to consistency comply with strict processes or rules, especially if these require prolonged focus or are in a high-pressure environment. However, with reasonable adjustments and understanding from the workplace these difficulties can be managed effectively” [the Tribunal’s emphasis]. [NAME_9] did not advise that the claimant’s ADHD and anxiety were linked to him sending social medial posts in breach of policy before and during his sickness absence. There is nothing in the [NAME_9] report linking that possibility, the claimant was not in a high-pressure environment nor required prolonged focus whilst he was off sick.

72. The claimant was found to be “medically fit for meetings with management as he is able to understand the reason for the meeting, is able to understand the difference between right and wrong, is able to follow the proceedings/respond to questions. However, it is generally accepted that such meetings can be distressing as you may wish to consider measures to help alleviate distress and promote perceived ‘fitness’ to attend such as: allowing the person to be accompanied by a suitable person, allowing conform breaks to enable them to retain composure, absorb/process content etc, considering holding the meeting at a neutral location or remotely.” [NAME_9] did not say the claimant was unable to understand the difference between right and wrong when sending posts and emails in breach of the respondent’s policies because of ADHD and anxiety.

73. [NAME_8] correctly interpreted the report to give him the go ahead to proceed with the disciplinary process. The claimant’s position at this liability hearing was that given the [NAME_9] report did not refer specifically to a disciplinary process or hearing then [NAME_9] had not addressed their mind to that possibility. The Tribunal did not agree, the referral made the position clear and the Tribunal found that references made in the report to “distressing meetings and such meetings” included disciplinary meetings. In any event, all the adjustments suggested were put in place, The claimant did not question the report and nor did he raise any issue with the fact that his social medial posts were not linked in any way to ADHD and there was nothing to put the respondent on notice that this could be a possible explanation for the claimant’s behaviour..

74. On the 24 April 2024 [NAME_8] invited the claimant to a welfare meeting to discuss the [NAME_9] report. The claimant’s trade union representative was unavailable, and the meeting therefore took place on the 1 May 2024.

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75. In the month of April 2024, the claimant continued to post on X. [NAME_8] sent the tweets on to [NAME_14].

Welfare meeting 1 May 2024

76. At this meeting with [NAME_8] the claimant attended supported by his union representative. The claimant was informed at the outset that the outcome of the fact- finding investigation was to be discussed at the claimant’s request, and neither the claimant nor his union representative objected to this course of action. [NAME_8] was entitled to assume there was no issue with him discussing the outcome of the investigation.

77. The claimant’s focus throughout the meeting was the mapping, the job he was expected to return to, and his perception that his new role a lack of reasonable adjustment and “you’re still not considering me for anything else. You’ve destroyed local radio.” The claimant was looking for a different job; he remained unhappy with the role he had been mapped to and not undertaken due to sickness absence. The claimant was critical of the respondent.

78. [NAME_8] informed the claimant that the investigation had been passed over to a hearing manager, [NAME_11]. [NAME_8] confirmed it was his decision, and when the claimant said “you haven’t told me what I’ve done wrong” [NAME_8] replied “I think that perhaps is where you and I differ. I think it’s really quite clear…”

79. On the 28 May 2024 [NAME_11] was informed by [NAME_14] about recommendations and reasonable adjustments set out within the [NAME_9] report. A copy was not provided. [NAME_14] did not refer to the claimant’s ADHD diagnosis, and the explanation given by [NAME_14] at this liability hearing was that the reason for this was confidentiality which made no sense to the Tribunal, given the claimant had consented to the release of the report to the respondent without limit, and [NAME_14] could not point to any policy or procedure limiting the use of [NAME_9] reports and/or preventing HR from disclosing relevant medical conditions such as ADHD. [NAME_14] was fully aware of the claimant’s ADHD diagnosis, and this was relevant information for any disciplinary manager as it could determine how the hearing was conducted and the questions asked. For his part [NAME_11] relied unquestioningly on HR, he was happy not to see the report and rely on the advice given, including the reasonable adjustments that were to be put in place. If [NAME_11] was curious about the contents of the [NAME_9] report, he could have asked the claimant to confirm there was no issue with a copy being disclosed to him, but he was not. As matters transpired, it would have made no difference had [NAME_11] been informed of the ADHD prognosis, the same adjustments would have been carried out and the same outcome reached as neither the [NAME_9] report nor the claimant raised any possibility of the social medial breaches being causally linked to the effects of ADHD and anxiety. The procedural unfairness arising out of [NAME_14] failing to inform [NAME_11] of the ADHD diagnosis was put right on appeal and so the Tribunal found.

80. As a result of the claimant’s continued use of social media in breach of policy the allegations were “positioned” as “gross misconduct” by [NAME_11] on a call with [NAME_8] and [NAME_14].

Invite letter to disciplinary hearing 28 May 2024

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81. Six allegations were set out as follows:

1) Breach of the [NAME_2] (Personal Use of Social Media) and [NAME_2] in relation to your X (Twitter) activity (posts, retweets, likes etc) during the period October 2023 to present day 2) Breach of the [NAME_2] specifically the [NAME_2] in relation to your X (Twitter) activity during the period October 2023 to present day, specifically the [NAME_2] of Respect and Trust.

3) Misuse of a [NAME_2] list for communication.

4) Failure to follow a reasonable management request in that you were asked verbally and in writing by your manager to remove social media posts you had made which breached the [NAME_2]’s Social Media Guidelines and Editorial Guidelines. You did not remove the posts and continued to post in a way that breached the guidelines.

5) Sharing sensitive company information externally. This relates to your post sharing results from a [NAME_2] internal staff survey.

6) Breach of the [NAME_2]’s Anti Bullying and Harassment Policy. This relates to you sharing a post about a petition to get 2 [NAME_2] colleagues “out of their jobs” onto which you added a picture captioned “I’m ready.” 82. The claimant was warned “these allegations to be a serious breach of discipline and that your employment may be at risk if these allegations are upheld…” The Tribunal was satisfied that the invite letter complied with the ACAS Code of Practice. A bundle of documents was attached as a hard copy, which the claimant complained about. The claimant was provided with an electronic copy and given a new date for the disciplinary meeting, rearranged for the 7 June 2024 and was told that if he failed to attend the meeting would be held and evidence reviewed in his absence.

83. The claimant continued to use social media during this period.

Disciplinary hearing 20 June 2026

84. The disciplinary hearing took place before [NAME_11] on 20 June 2024 with the reasonable adjustments suggested by [NAME_9] were put in place. The claimant was supported by his union representative.

85. At the outset [NAME_11] informed the parties that he had not seen the [NAME_9] report. It is undisputed by the parties that when the hearing started the reasonable adjustments were discussed, the claimant was informed 3 hours had been set aside and because of the claimant being upset there was a 20- minute break described as a “reset.” The Tribunal took time to consider the uncontroversial notes taken at the disciplinary hearing in detail. It was satisfied the claimant took an active role in the meeting, defending his use of social medial rather than mitigating it, minimising the effect on colleagues, and not apologising. A thorough investigation into every allegation was made by [NAME_11], who gave the

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claimant a full opportunity to comment on how colleagues would feel and whether he had thought about editorial guidelines.

86. The notes reflect the claimant was angry with the respondent and his perception that “it’s been destroyed. I’m really angry. If I known it was going to be like this I would have taken redundancy…” When asked by [NAME_11] “Why do you think you’ve done what you’ve done” the claimant responded “I think its anger. The therapy I’m going through is hard. If my life had been different I wouldn’t.” There was no reference to ADHD or the claimant’s belief that ADHD and anxiety had caused him to act as he did.

87. In relation to a blog about gender change, referred to as “Doc 46 blog 1” in the documents provided to the claimant concerning the WPATH files, the claimant explained “when I saw them thought I had to change the [NAME_2]’s reporting.” The claimant stated he had challenged an editor in the past and got no response, he had not got a sign off from a [NAME_2] manager or press office prior to publication of his blog “because they would have said no…. People would judge me as using words other gender critical people use. They would say no because I think whole swathes of the [NAME_2] have been captured. There is a real passion and belief that a very difficult subject, the whole. What’s changed at the [NAME_2] is that it seems to have accepted men become women and women men. It doesn’t let other views on air, so when it came to the WPATH files I was really shocked” [the Tribunal’s emphasis].

88. When asked “did you consider the [NAME_2]’s social medial guidance and the [NAME_2] editorial guidelines prior to posting”, the claimant responded “No but I feel others are able to for money so hey. They can comment on the [NAME_2] and other things, senior presenters, but when I put a tweet out to 2000 people, maybe 60 see it” [the Tribunal’s emphasis]. The claimant’s union representative at this point said, “a lot of this is about [NAME_27] wanting to express his lived experience and some of that has fallen into controversial territory.” [NAME_11] commented “we all have frustrations. Is sharing them in this way right?” The claimant’s response was “yes on this subject yes” and [NAME_11] took this to mean the claimant would not change his conduct in the future. [NAME_11] was concerned with the claimant’s response when he was asked “What was your understanding of the reason why you were asked to remove the post? What action did you take following the requests for you to remove the posts?” The claimant replied “I have at various times gone private nobody, but my followers could see. I don’t know if I took them down. I don’t know if they are still up. I don’t know what I replied” [the Tribunal’s emphasis].

89. [NAME_11]’s conclusion was that several of the posts had not been taken down. The claimant’s evidence at this liability hearing was the respondent had no evidence the posts had not been taken down, it must follow they had been taken down. The Tribunal concluded [NAME_11] was entitled to take the claimant’s answers into account when deciding whether or not to dismiss for gross misconduct, including that he did not know whether the posts had been taken down and reach the conclusion that the claimant changed the way he posted to hide it from the respondent, and had not taken down the posts as instructed..

90. At this liability hearing the claimant sought to persuade the Tribunal that the investigation report and the swathes of documents setting out the posts side by side to the relevant policy did not explain how each post had breached the guidelines and/or policy. The Tribunal has read through the lengthy notes of the disciplinary

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hearing and the pack. It is clear from the disciplinary notes the claimant understood the allegations, and [NAME_11]’s conclusion that he had he had wilfully ignored the Guidelines was genuinely held. [NAME_11] was correct in his analysis that a journalist of over 22 years standing would understand the allegations levied against the claimant. The claimant was given a full and unfettered opportunity to answer the allegations over the lengthy disciplinary hearing. It is notable that the claimant’s trade union representative raised no issue with process or the way the disciplinary hearing was conducted. In direct contrast to the claimant’s response, the trade union representative knew there was an issue with the claimant’s posting. In oral evidence the claimant acknowledged all the supported he had been given by his trade union representative, who he did not criticise until it came to written submissions at the end of this case.

91. [NAME_11] gave the claimant the opportunity to put in any further information within a period of 7 days, reduced to 48 hours on the advice of HR as reflected in the bundle. As it transpired the claimant provided further information in an email dated 27 June 2024 which was accepted after the expiry of 48-hours and within the 7-day period.

92. In the claimant’s email sent on the 27 June 2024 the claimant described the disciplinary hearing, acknowledging he had been listened to: “after I came off the zoom because you eventually listened to me…” The claimant’s email is a three page complaint about the way he thinks the respondent has treated him, including not offering alternative employment and salary payments when “it would appear the [NAME_2] has unlimited budget when it comes to scouring my online presence and offence mining my X posts and all other social media…to hound a mentally ill employee because he says inconvenient truths on X is quite the low point in my relationship with Auntie Beeb and one I am not sure I can recover from.” The claimant does not link the ADHD diagnosis with anxiety and the posts.

93. The claimant continued posting including posts about his own gross misconduct and anti-trans views, maintaining the respondent was destroying local radio, “sooo kind to men who think they’re women but happy to besmirch and hound me even after a mental breakdown over workplace toxicity.” When asked by his followers “what supposed crime have you committed” the claimant posted “My@X timeline I guess! Mainly gender issues but also critiquing the [NAME_2] as they destroy local radio (the love of my career life).” When another follower remarks “well done for standing up to them and standing by your principles. Not many do…it’s people like yourself who make the difference in the end” the claimant sent two prayer emojis in response.

94. In a separate post the claimant wrote “I am about to get sacked by the [NAME_2] for gross misconduct for stating biological and journalistic truths” on the 27 June 2024.

95. On the same date, 27 June 2024 before the disciplinary outcome, the claimant entered into ACAS early conciliation.

96. [NAME_14] forwarded the posts to a lawyer for review and was provided with advice on how they breached the guidelines.

97. In the trial bundle there are a substantial number of posts including comments about politicians. The claimant’s relationship with [NAME_8] broke had clearly broken down and the evidence reflects the claimant was insubordinate, rude, ignoring invites for welfare meetings, expressing unhappiness with the mapping alleging “you and your

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accomplices have tried to drive me out of a job I loved and in December 2023 I almost took my own life because of it…” The thrust of the claimant’s communication is his anger with the way he believes the respondent had treated him, and there was no reference to there being a link between ADHD, anxiety and the posts. The claimant showed no hint of an apology, contriteness, or an “understanding of what he had done was wrong and needed to put right.”

98. The claimant raised a grievance on the 19 July 2024.

99. On the 25 July 2024 the claimant attended a disciplinary outcome hearing at which he was dismissed for gross misconduct without notice. [NAME_11] held a genuine belief that the claimant was guilty of the six allegations alleged, and he had no faith the claimant would change his behaviour going into the future. In arriving at this decision [NAME_11] had not considered the social medial posts sent by the claimant after the 29 May 2024. [NAME_11] took into account the fact the claimant had a clean employment record and was an experienced journalist of 22 years employment with the respondent, concluding the claimant was aware he was continually breaching policy and angry as a result of his reorganised post.

100. The 25 July 2024 outcome letter runs to a detailed 17-pages setting out a number of examples of the posts sent, as opposed to all of the posts included in the disciplinary bundle. [NAME_11] considered the mitigation and concluded that “at no point during our meeting or in evidence have you suggested that your email to [NAME_19]’s production team or actions on social media or your blogs arose from your mental health and so I do not consider it is appropriate mitigation for the allegations in this claim.” [NAME_11] referred to some of the answers given by the claimant in the disciplinary hearing including the explanation referred to be the Tribunal above “I think its anger.”

101. [NAME_11] took the view that the claimant had behaved as he did because he was angry over the respondent’s actions. With reference to sanction, [NAME_11] considered whether a less severe sanction should be given, and in five well-reasoned points explained why it would not be appropriate. Part of the claimant’s case at this liability hearing was that the sanction should have been a warning/final written warning. In short, [NAME_11] viewed the content and volume of the allegations to be a serious breach of policy and guidance, the importance the respondent “attaches to impartiality” especially in relation to journalists, the claimant’s failure to remove posts and activity (which the claimant admitted) and the fact that the claimant continued to act in breach “after concerns were raised with you.”

Appeal letter dated 23 August 2024

102. The claimant appealed. In the appeal letter dated 23 August 2024 the claimant wrote: “My pattern of behaviour changed as a result of my mental health condition and my serious complaints not being recognised.” For the first time the claimant links the online activity with his ADHD. However, the 9 points of the appeal does not record that the ADHD condition was causative. In total, the claimant’s appeal ran to 45 pages.

103. It is uncontroversial that the claimant was informed [NAME_14] would consider the grievance and appeal and there were no objections to this course of action.

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104. On the 13 September 2024 [NAME_14] met with the claimant and his union representative to discuss his grievance. In this meeting the claimant referred to his ADHD and the uncontroversial notes of the meeting reflect the claimant stating that “it was not easy to share such private details. He recalled meeting with [NAME_16] in [NAME_16] in Preston sharing details of his breakdown…he described his ADHD during the meeting…”

First disciplinary appeal meeting 7 October 2024.

105. In total three disciplinary appeal meetings took place, the first on 7 October, the second and third on 8 and 15 November 2024 respectively. The claimant was supported throughout by his union representative. The Tribunal found that the disciplinary appeal invite letter complied with the ACAS Code of Practice and the hearings took into consideration the reasonable adjustments suggested by [NAME_9]. The claimant was provided with notes taken at the hearing, which he amended with track changes. The agreed notes reflect [NAME_14] observation that “[NAME_28] had not followed reasonable management requests when asked verbally to remove social medial posts. [NAME_28] said [NAME_2] had never expressed this to him and had only highlighted a few tweets that was subsequently deleted by [NAME_28]” [the Tribunal’s emphasis]. The claimant’s response did not reflect the evidence considered by [NAME_14] (or before the Tribunal at this liability hearing).

106. The first disciplinary appeal meeting took approximately 2 hours, and the notes reflect the claimant took an active role and was given an opportunity to explore the grounds of appeal and ADHD diagnosis without limit. David Atfield asked open questions and gave the claimant every opportunity to say what he needed to say. The claimant’s union representative was supportive and at times arguing points in favour of the claimant. The claimant referred to his intention to issue proceedings, and the ET1 was presented on the 28 October 2024.

107. [NAME_14] carried out his own investigation. He interviewed [NAME_15] on the 4 November 2024. Tim Pafield stated he did not “recall specifically” the claimant mentioning ADHD and “I have personal experience…but I don’t recall he said ADHD.” [NAME_15] attributed the claimant’s mental health with the reorganisation and the change in his role.

108. On the 5 November 2024 [NAME_14] met with [NAME_8] who discussed the issues he had with the claimant and described the claimant’s quality of work. On the same day [NAME_14] met with [NAME_29], executive editor, who described the culture of the department denying there had been bullying.

109. The disciplinary appeal meeting continued on the 8 November 2024, and not much headway was made for several reasons unrelated to these issues in this case.

110. The third and final disciplinary appeal meeting was held on the 15 November 2024. The claimant took an active part and was given the opportunity to address each of the tweet posts, which he did giving an explanation, for example, for liking the cat meme indicating a willingness to sign a petition to have [NAME_2] fired, and with reference to the “[NAME_30]” post and the claimant’s comment “I’ll be there” the claimant explained “the tweet was not a comment, or a view, or a debate, or any other controversial subject – it was a remembrance.“ In relation to the claimant’s position on transgender the claimant’s union representative “noted that

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when [NAME_28] was asked about this, [NAME_28] had said that it was probably a bad joke rather than a public comment.”

111. [NAME_14] asked the claimant “to explain his ADHD and how he had managed it successfully throughout his career. He asked why it was provoking this behaviour when previously it had been a managed condition. [NAME_28] said he was unsure if he was expressing it poorly. He notes that two therapists had performed cognitive behavioural therapy with him, and both explained that the frustration and mental depletion experienced by [NAME_28] intersected with his ADHD and other stress including feelings of being unheard and victimisation. [NAME_28] explained that this spikes when he feels out of control of his environment…” At the end of the hearing the claimant was invited to send further comments within 7-days, which he did in an email dated 25 November 2024 that ran to 7 pages also referred to this litigation.

112. On the 13 December 2024 [NAME_14] met with [NAME_11] who described the disciplinary hearing and the claimant’s conduct during it including “it was clear he was upset and he was aggressive to begin with…the tone of the meeting changed across the course of the duration, and it did soften as it we went through…” With reference to post “Stand with Israel” [NAME_11] felt it showed a clear breach of impartiality…by default means you are registering your position with Israel and by default you are against Palestine…as a broadcaster around such a contentious issue which you know it is and its fundamentally got to be based on impartiality he has to be really careful and he hasn’t got time to explain his sentiments in the Twitter format. He had given his position there loud and clear…in terms of being a [NAME_2] journalist he shouldn’t have published it.” [NAME_11] went through a number of posts and explained his reasoning. With reference to the removal of posts [NAME_11] explained “we know he hasn’t removed a large chunk of posts and may have removed one or two but couldn’t tell us he had and actually it’s his responsibility.” [NAME_11] confirmed “I didn’t enter this process thinking it was cut and tried” and his thought processes were set out which reflected the evidence given to the Tribunal. It was apparent to the Tribunal that [NAME_11] had not been looking to dismiss the claimant, but felt he had no choice but to dismiss given the way the claimant had approached the disciplinary allegations “with no mitigation or explanation.” [NAME_11] emailed [NAME_14] confirming the timeline regarding notifications on Social Media Guidelines.

113. [NAME_14] decided the appeal and grievance at the same time, and produced the outcomes on the same day, taking a holistic approach including the background information on the department and the claimant’s complaints about it. The Tribunal accepted [NAME_14]’s evidence as to his thought processes when he decided to dismiss the claimant’s appeal. When cross-examining [NAME_14], the claimant described the appeal process in the following terms “you were super fair and very kind, quite excellent and you drew great responses. Deeply grateful for the professionalism. Everything I was concerned about came to pass – heard in parallel, closed on same date, rejected grievance which removed context and mitigation, 2 separate people really matters because it gives independence.” The claimant was unhappy with the outcome, and the fact that [NAME_14] had heard both the grievance and appeal and had no other complaint about the way the appeal had been conducted.

Appeal outcome letter dated 13 February 2025

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114. The appeal outcome letter dated 13 February 2025 running to 20-pages dismissed the claimant’s appeal. [NAME_14] did not uphold everything [NAME_11] had decided, he concluded the claimant was guilty of gross misconduct and dismissal was an appropriate sanction because of the seriousness of the breaches, pattern of behaviour over a period of time and the likelihood that the same conduct would be repeated. Paraphrasing the allegations and different findings between the disciplinary and appeal hearing the Tribunal found as follows:

1. Misuse of distribution list was found at disciplinary stage and uphold on appeal.

2. Alleged sensitive sharing of company information externally was found at disciplinary stage but overturned on appeal.

3. Alleged breach of the [NAME_2]'s Anti Bullying and Harassment policy was found at disciplinary stage and overturned on appeal.

4. Alleged breach of social media policy and editorial guidelines was found at disciplinary stage and upheld on appeal. One of the breaches was downgraded to a technical breach but a breach, nevertheless. With reference to “blog posts” the breaches were upheld [NAME_14] overturned [NAME_11] “finding your blog activity alone amounts to gross misconduct.” 5. Alleged breach of [NAME_2] of respect and trust breached Guidance and Guidelines at disciplinary stage and upheld on appeal.

6. Alleged failure to follow a reasonable management request disciplinary stage and upheld on appeal.

115. [NAME_14] had read the [NAME_9] report and took it into account. He concluded “the issue around how the difficulties you were experiencing in late 2023 and in 2924 should impact my assessment of your conduct and any appropriate sanction is complex. I have thought deeply about this. Whilst you were not able to work for much of the period in question, my finding is that you were likely in control of your actions and, as the [NAME_9] advisor observed in April 2024, able to distinguish right from wrong. Some of your conduct shows signs of having been considered, either through its timing or through the fact you were engaging online in discussions that you were choosing to follow. The views you presented were also genuinely and often deeply held ones, such that you struggled in our meetings to reconcile your belief in the validity of your views with how they were seen under the [NAME_2]’s policies and the impact they could have on others. My conclusion is that your stress and anxiety did not cause you to post nor did that determine the underlying points you wanted to convey. What your ADHD, anxiety and stress may have done was to make you care less about the possible consequences of your behaviour…It is also consistent with how, whilst you have since conveyed apologies, I see these primarily as amounting to a regret that your behaviour has caused the situation you are in rather than a recognition that, as a [NAME_2] journalist, impartiality and respect should be part of all your public discourse. In short, I doubt that you believe or accept that these should apply to you. If your ADHD or mental health had an impact, it was that it caused a disregard for consequences for your conduct but it did not cause your conduct and, despite months of reflection and several meetings where this has been

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in focus of discussion, in my view the way in which you regard your conduct has not changed…in that stress and anxiety may well have resulted from work related stress and made you care free about the consequences of your conduct, they provide some mitigation because, with greater focus on the consequences I accept you may have chosen not to engage in the way you did. However, your actions continued around 9 months despite concerns being raised with you repeatedly. In my view these were deliberate acts undertaken with disregard of the expectations placed on you as a [NAME_2] journalist…I consider that there is a high likelihood of similar conduct in the future” [the Tribunal’s emphasis].

116. At this liability hearing the claimant referred to comparators in respect of the unfair dismissal claim, arguing that a number of presenters such as [NAME_25] (who was not a journalist) has been dealt with more leniently than the claimant. There appears to be no reference to this ground in the reasons given by the claimant for his appeal, and if there is the Tribunal was not taken to it and nor did [NAME_14] deal with it in his decision. The Tribunal was not taken to any specific documentary evidence about comparators, and it appears neither was [NAME_14].

117. [NAME_14] took into account the fact that the claimant would repeat the action, there was a loss of trust and concluded that dismissal was a reasonable decision for [NAME_11] to reach. In oral evidence [NAME_14] explained that whilst he had not accepted there was a link between the ADHD and the posting of information, he was not a medical expert and the claimant made no reference to any medical information with the exception of the April 2024 [NAME_9] report, which he relied on. [NAME_14] not interpret the [NAME_9] report in the same way the claimant had, and he was satisfied that even had that causal link existed the dismissal should be upheld. In oral evidence [NAME_14] on cross- examination explained why he did not believe the claimant would stop, and the only way to stop the claimant posting in the way he did, risking the reputation of the respondent and further breaches of its policies, was to dismiss the claimant so that he was no longer a journalist linked to the [NAME_2]. [NAME_14] concluded “viewed cumulatively, I consider that your failure to adhere to the expected standards regarding impartiality and respect in your public discourse, and your failure to seek the necessary approval before writing publicly about the [NAME_2] in your blogs, amount to gross misconduct. For the reasons I have outlined above you have not shown and understanding or acceptance that these standards shall apply to you…”

118. The Tribunal found [NAME_14] carefully considered the claimant’s appeal, and he objectively considered the disciplinary process, the claimant’s actions and the adverse effect on the respondent objectively having given the claimant a full opportunity to deal with the appeal points and have his say.

Law

Unfair dismissal

119. Section 94(1) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (“the 1996 Act”) provides that an employee has the right not to be unfairly dismissed by his employer. Section 98(1) of the 1996 Act provides that in determining whether the dismissal is fair or unfair, it is for the employer to show the reasons for the dismissal, and that it is a reason falling within section 98 (2) of the 1996 Act. Section 98(2)(a)) includes conduct of the employee as being a potentially fair reason for dismissal.

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120. The legal principles are well-established and set out in key case law such as British Home Stores Ltd v Burchell [1978] IRLR 37, Iceland Frozen Foods v Jones [1982] IRLR 439, Polkey v AE Dayton Services Ltd [1987] IRLR 503 and a number of other cases. The Tribunal had in mind the legal principles throughout, including not substituting its decision for that of the employer.

[NAME_6] arising from disability

121. Section 15(1) of the EQA provides- A person (A) discriminates against a disabled person (B) if –

(a) A treats B less favourably because of something arising in consequence of B’s disability, and

(b) A cannot show that the treatment is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.

122. When considering discrimination arising from disability there is no need to compare a disabled person’s treatment with that of another person. It is only necessary to demonstrate that the unfavourable treatment is because of something arising in consequence of the disability. This is a key point in [NAME_1]’s case whilst it is uncontroversial dismissal is unfavourable treatment; the claimant has failed to demonstrate that [NAME_11] took the decision to dismiss him because of something arising in consequence of ADHD and anxiety.

123. In order for the claimant to succeed in his claims under s.15, the following must be made out:

1.1 there must be unfavourable treatment.

1.2 there must be something that arises in consequence of claimant’s disability.

1.3 the unfavourable treatment must be because of (i.e. caused by) the something that arises in consequence of the disability.

1.4 the alleged discriminator cannot show that the unfavourable treatment is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim

124. Useful guidance on the proper approach to a claim under s.15 was provided by Mrs Justice Simler in [NAME_31] v NHS England and anor [2016] IRLR, EAT:

1.1 A tribunal must first identify whether there was unfavourable treatment and by whom: in other words, it must ask whether A treated B unfavourably in the respects relied on by B. No question of comparison arises.

1.2 The tribunal must determine what caused the impugned treatment, or what was the reason for it. The focus at this stage is on the reason in the mind of A. An examination of the conscious or unconscious thought processes of A is likely to be required, just as it is in a direct discrimination case. Again, just as there may be more than one reason or cause for impugned treatment in a direct discrimination context, so too, there may be more than one reason in a s.15 case. The “something” that causes the unfavourable treatment need not be the main or sole reason but

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must have at least a significant (or more than trivial) influence on the unfavourable treatment and so amount to an effective reason for or cause of it [the Tribunal’s emphasis].

1.3 Motives are irrelevant. The focus of this part of the enquiry is on the reason or cause of the impugned treatment and A's motive in acting as he or she did is simply irrelevant: see Nagarajan v London Regional Transport [1999] IRLR 572. A discriminatory motive is emphatically not (and never has been) a core consideration before any prima facie case of discrimination arises…”

1.4 The tribunal must determine whether the reason/cause (or, if more than one), a reason or cause, is 'something arising in consequence of B's disability'. That expression 'arising in consequence of' could describe a range of causal links. Having regard to the legislative history of s.15 of the Act (described comprehensively by Elisabeth Laing J in Hall), the statutory purpose which appears from the wording of s.15, namely to provide protection in cases where the consequence or effects of a disability lead to unfavourable treatment, and the availability of a justification defence, the causal link between the something that causes unfavourable treatment and the disability may include more than one link. In other words, more than one relevant consequence of the disability may require consideration, and it will be a question of fact assessed robustly in each case whether something can properly be said to arise in consequence of disability [the Tribunal’s emphasis].

1.5 This stage of the causation test involves an objective question and does not depend on the thought processes of the alleged discriminator”.

125. It is no defence if the respondent did not know that the ‘something’ leading to the unfavourable treatment was a consequence of the disability. In submissions the claimant referred the Tribunal to the Court of Appeal decision in City of York Council V Grosset [2018] 4 ALLER 77 which did not assist him given the Tribunal’s findings in his case. It is notable that in [NAME_32]’s case the Tribunal had found a causal link; he had shown the film due to exceptionally high stress arising from his disability under increased work demands. [NAME_1] did not satisfy the burden of proof in this respect, and the Tribunal found there was no causal connection between his disability and the gross misconduct [NAME_1] was accused of.

Objective justification

126. With regard to the objective justification test, when assessing proportionality, the Tribunal must reach its own judgment, that must in turn be based on a fair and detailed analysis of the working practices and business considerations involved, having particular regard to the business needs of the employer: [NAME_33] v Ministry of Defence UKEAT/0067/14/DM.

127. The Tribunal was referred to Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police v Homer [2012] UKSC 15; [2012] ICR 704. In particular:

11.1. The objective of the measure must correspond to a real and legitimate business need ([19]–[20]);

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11.2. The dismissal must be both appropriate and (reasonably) necessary to achieve that objective; “proportionate” requires both elements and they are not interchangeable ([20]–[22]); 11.3. The Tribunal must weigh the importance of the respondent’s objective against the seriousness of the detriment to the Claimant in conducting that assessment ([20]).

128. In Birtenshaw v Oldfied [2019] IRLR 946 at [38], the EAT warned that in assessing proportionality Tribunals should give a substantial degree of respect to the judgment of the employer as to what is reasonably necessary to achieve the legitimate aim, provided he has acted rationally and responsibly.

[NAME_6] – failure to make reasonable adjustments

129. The duty to make reasonable adjustments is set out in S 20 and 21 of the EQA. Section 20(3) sets out the first requirement, where a provision, criterion or practice of A's puts a disabled person at a substantial disadvantage in relation to a relevant matter in comparison with persons who are not disabled, to take such steps as it is reasonable to have to take to avoid the disadvantage. Section 21(1) provides that a failure to comply with the first, second or third requirement is a failure to comply with the duty to make reasonable adjustments. Schedule 8 of the EQA 2010 applies where there is a duty to make reasonable adjustments in the context of 'work' and the Statutory Code of Practice on Employment is to be read alongside the EQA

130. The EHRC’s Employment Code states that the term PCP ‘should be construed widely so as to include, for example, any formal or informal policies, rules, practices, arrangements, criteria, conditions, prerequisites, qualifications or provisions. A PCP may also include decisions to do something in the future — such as a policy or criterion that has not yet been applied — as well as a “one-off” or discretionary decision’ -para 4.5. The protective nature of the legislation meant that when identifying the PCP, a Tribunal should adopt a liberal rather than an overly technical or narrow in order to identify what it is about the employer’s operation that causes disadvantage to the disabled employee.

131. In the well-known case Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (Job Centre Plus) v Higgins [2013] UKEAT/0579/12 the EAT held at paragraphs 29 and 31 of the [NAME_34]’s judgment that the Tribunal should identify (1) the employer’s PCP at issue, (2) the identity of the persons who are not disabled in comparison with whom comparison is made, (3) the nature and extent of the substantial disadvantage suffered by the employee, and (4) identify the step or steps which it is reasonable for the employer to have to take and assess the extent to what extent the adjustment would be effective to avoid the disadvantage.

The PCP

132. In Lamb v The Business Academy Bexley EAT 0226/15 the EAT commented that the term “PCP” is to be construed broadly “having regard to the statute’s purpose of eliminating discrimination against those who suffer disadvantage from a disability”.

133. [NAME_4] submitted that the terms PCP generally connote “some form of continuum in the sense that it is the way in which things generally are or will be done”: [NAME_35] v [NAME_36] for London [2020] EWCA Civ 112; [2020] ICR 1204 at [38].

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134. The purpose of the comparison exercise is to test whether the PCP has the effect of producing the relevant disadvantage as between those who are and those who are not disabled, and whether what causes the disadvantage is the PCP. It must be a disadvantage which is linked to the disability. That is the purpose of the comparison required by section 20 –[NAME_37] v University of Edinburgh [2018] IRLR 1090: “The purpose of the comparison exercise with people who are not disabled is to test whether the PCP has the effect of producing the relevant disadvantage as between those who are and those who are not disabled, and whether what causes the disadvantage is the PCP. That is not a causation question. For this reason, also, there is no requirement to identify a comparator or comparator group whose circumstances are the same or nearly the same as the disabled person’s circumstances…The fact that both groups are treated equally and that both may suffer a disadvantage in consequence does not eliminate the claim. Both groups might be disadvantaged but the PCP may bite harder on the disabled or a group of disabled people than it does on those without disability. Whether there is a substantial disadvantage as a result of the application of a PCP in a particular case is a question of fact assessed on an objective basis and measured by comparison with what the position would be if the disabled person in question did not have a disability” [the Tribunal’s emphasis].

135. A substantial disadvantage is one which is more than minor or trivial – s.212(1) EQA 2010. The ET must be satisfied that the PCP has placed the disabled person not simply at some disadvantage viewed generally, but at a disadvantage which is substantial - Royal Bank of Scotland v Ashton [2011] ICR 632.

Knowledge

133. With reference to the knowledge defence in paragraph 20 of Schedule 8 EQA for the defence will succeed unless the Tribunal is satisfied that the employer had knowledge (either actual or constructive) of both the disability and the substantial disadvantage.

134. [NAME_4] submitted a respondent will be fixed with knowledge of disability or substantial disadvantage if it had actual knowledge or could reasonably have been expected to know (constructive knowledge): A Ltd v Z [2020] ICR 199 at [38].

Reasonableness of adjustments

135. The statutory duty is for R to take such steps as are reasonable, in all the circumstances of the case, for it to have to take in order to avoid the disadvantage. The test of “reasonableness” imports an objective standard - Smith v Churchills Stairlifts plc [2005] EWCA 1220. It is important to identify precisely the step which could remove the substantial disadvantage complained of - General Dynamics Information Technology Ltd v Carranza [2015] IRLR 43.

136. Consulting an employee or arranging for an [NAME_9] or other assessment of his or her needs is not in itself a reasonable adjustment because such steps do not remove any disadvantage: Tarbuck v Sainsbury’s Supermarkets Ltd [2006] IRLR 664, EAT; Project Management Institute v Latif [2007] IRLR 579, EAT.

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Burden of proof

137. Section 136 of the EQA provides: (1) this section applies to any proceedings relating to the contravention of this Act. (2) If there are facts from which the court could decide, in the absence of any other explanation, that a person (A) contravened the provisions concerned, the court must hold that the contravention occurred. (3) Subsection (2) does not apply if A shows that A did not contravene the provisions. (4) The reference to a contravention of this Act includes a reference to a breach of an [NAME_7] clause or rule.”

138. In determining whether the respondent discriminated the guidelines set out in Barton v Investec Henderson Crossthwaite Securities Limited [2003] IRLR 332 and [COMPANY_38] v Wong [2005] IRLR 258 apply, as affirmed in Ayodele v CityLink Ltd [2018] ICR 748. The claimant must satisfy the Tribunal that there are primary facts from which inferences of unlawful discrimination can arise and that the Tribunal must find unlawful discrimination unless the employer can prove that it did not commit the act of discrimination. The burden of proof involves the two-stage process identified in [NAME_38]. With reference to the respondent’s explanation, the Tribunal must disregard any exculpatory explanation by the respondent and can take into account evidence of an unsatisfactory explanation by the respondent, to support the claimant’s case. Once the claimant has proved primary facts from which inferences of unlawful discrimination can be drawn the burden shifts to the respondent to provide an explanation untainted by sex (or in the present case disability) failing which the claim succeeds.

Conclusion – applying the law to the facts

Burden of Proof

139. The claimant has not proved, on the balance of probabilities, facts from which the Tribunal could decide, in the absence of any other explanation, that the respondent subjected her to the discrimination and the burden has not shifted. If the Tribunal is wrong on its application of the burden of proof, and the burden shifted to the respondent to prove on the balance of probabilities that the claimant’s disability was no part of the reason: [NAME_38] cited above, it would have gone on to find the explanation given on behalf of the respondent untainted by [NAME_6]. In the alternative, with reference to allegation 8 (section 15 claim) the respondent satisfied the Tribunal it had met the burden of proving the claimant’s dismissal was an appropriate and reasonably necessary means of achieving a legitimate aim that was objectively justifiable.

Conclusion applying the law to the facts Unfair dismissal 140. With reference to the first issue (numbered 4) the parties agree the claimant was dismissed for gross misconduct on 25 July 202, the effective date of termination. The respondent relied on the following allegations at dismissal stage:

1. misuse of distribution list was found at disciplinary stage (upheld on appeal),

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2. alleged sensitive sharing of company information externally was found at disciplinary stage (overturned on appeal). 3. alleged breach of the [NAME_2]'s Anti Bullying and Harassment policy was found at disciplinary stage (overturned on appeal). 4. alleged breach of social media policy and editorial guidelines was found at disciplinary stage and upheld on appeal. Once of the breaches was downgraded on appeal to a technical breach but a breach, nevertheless. With reference to “blog posts” the breaches were upheld but [NAME_11]’s “finding your blog activity alone amounts to gross misconduct” overturned on appeal. 5. alleged breach of [NAME_2] of respect and trust breached Guidance and Guidelines at disciplinary stage (upheld on appeal). 6. alleged failure to follow a reasonable management request disciplinary stage (upheld on appeal). 141. With reference to the second issue (numbered 5), if the reason was conduct, did the respondent act reasonably in all the circumstances in treating that as a sufficient reason to dismiss the claimant, the Tribunal was satisfied there was. There were reasonable grounds for that belief and at the time the belief was formed the respondent had carried out a reasonable investigation during which the claimant did not dispute he had sent posts, reposts and email in breach of policy as set out in detail within the finding of facts. The evidence before the Tribunal was that the claimant does not deny that he described the behaviour of one of his colleagues as “sociopathic” and referred to the Israeli/[NAME_12] conflict describing [NAME_12] as “murderous bastards”. He reposted tweets criticising [NAME_2]. He said “clearly awkward for me to comment but yes the poster is right…” referring to criticism of [NAME_2] coverage of [NAME_12] conflict. He responded to a question on X “is anyone ready to start a petition to get him (claimant’s broadcast colleague) out of a job” because of his views on the conflict. The claimant responded, “I’m ready”. The claimant liked a tweet in which his colleague was referred to as a “spoilt brat” There were more posts and reposts relating to Israeli/[NAME_12] conflict, issues around biological sex and the role of the [NAME_2] as a public service broadcaster. 142. The claimant says he has a right to hold his views and there is no disputing that he indeed had this right. The problem for the claimant was communicating his views to the wider public in breach of fundamental constraints imposed on him given the fact he was employed as a journalist and subjected to policies, which if breached, could result in disciplinary proceedings and dismissal. The claimant says that it was his disability (ADHD plus anxiety) that caused him to express views that he would otherwise have kept private and yet he did not put this forward as an explanation until after the decision to dismiss had been made. When he arrived at the decision to dismiss [NAME_11] had no knowledge of the claimant’s ADHD diagnosis. He was aware of the claimant’s mental health and had put in place the adjustments suggested by [NAME_9] in respect of it. The fact that [NAME_11] did not read the [NAME_9] report and relied on [NAME_39] which did not disclose the claimant’s ADHD disability amounts to a procedural and substantive unfairness which was put right on appeal. The Tribunal found on the balance of probabilities the respondent otherwise acted in a procedurally fair manner and the dismissal fell well within the range of reasonable responses.

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143. The claimant says the respondent failed to attach adequate weight to mitigation. The main plank of the claimant’s case is that the posts and reposts and email arose out of a disability, that he always had ADHD and that speaking in a blunt way and being unfiltered in written communication arises out of his disability but that when he is also anxious his judgement is affected so that he does things (post, repost, send emails) that he would not otherwise do. [NAME_4] argued that the claimant’s argument that his conduct was attributed to his disabilities does not stand scrutiny. The Tribunal agreed. The claimant relies on his own analysis after he was dismissed with no supporting medical evidence. The clear evidence before [NAME_11] was that the claimant had control, after all, he held onto an abusive email for 7-days and he continued to give reasons why he was entitled to continue using social media against a factual matrix in which the claimant was angry and upset over the reorganisation, his new role and the direction of travel for [NAME_13]. 144. The Tribunal agrees with [NAME_4] that there is no medial evidence whatsoever establishing the claimant’s case, and the [NAME_9] report relied on by the claimant undermines his evidence that there exists a causal link. The reference to ADHD and anxiety relates to when the claimant is at work requiring “prolonged focus in high pressure environments” not when he is at home emailing, posting and tweeting to his followers about his dissatisfaction with the respondent both on a personal basis and generally. The Tribunal agreed with [NAME_4]’s submission that [NAME_9]’s observation does not extend to voluntary use of personal social media in the claimant’s own time. When the claimant attended [NAME_9] the investigation into his social medial use had taken place, and yet the claimant continued to tweet and post beyond the appeal hearing. Given the claimant had the final decision on whether the [NAME_9] report would be disclosed to the respondent or not, it was a straight-forward matter for the claimant to discuss his emails and posts with [NAME_9] in order that the possibility of a causal link could be explored by a qualified medic. On the 2 April 2024 [NAME_8] on being told by the claimant that he had been diagnosed with ADHD as a child, urged the claimant to have a discussion with [NAME_9] about it, which the claimant did, hence to reference in the report. 145. [NAME_14], when considering whether a causal link existed between ADHD, anxiety and the claimant’s behaviour, concluded that there was no medical evidence supporting this and the claimant had been criticised for breaching social medial guidelines in December 2022 before his mental health crisis and sickness absence from work, which was one of the factors in the case before [NAME_14]. [NAME_4] suggested that the claimant’s use of social medial in breach of policies and guidance was a pattern of behaviour predating the episode of acute mental health. The Tribunal found that contemporaneous documents support this analysis, including the claimant’s deliberate attempt to circumvent managerial control by failing to inform higher management and the press office of his proposed communications before they were made public because he knew that “they would say no.” Objectively assessed, such behaviour cannot fall under the definition of impulsivity, and for the claimant to limit his posts so that they can be read by his followers alone (and not viewed by the respondent) suggested calculated conduct and not impulsive behaviour. Both the dismissing and appeal officer were entitled to taken into account not just the seriousness of the claimant’s communications but also the length of time over which he sent them against a backdrop of managerial orders telling him to stop and delete, and the claimant’s sustained conduct does not suggest impulsive behaviour.

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146. The claimant says that the respondent ought to have weighed his actions against his long service and high performance, which it did before concluding the claimant should have known better due to his experience. .[NAME_11] did not have any information about the claimant’s ADHD diagnosis before him at the time he made the decision to dismiss, and it is notable that neither the claimant nor his union representative raised it. It is incomprehensible to the Tribunal that the claimant’s ADHD and anxiety was not raised by the claimant, and further, that it was not linked to his posting and emails at the disciplinary hearing, especially given the claimant’s description of himself as being “blunt” and “outspoken” and his reliance on the [NAME_9] report’s reference to ADHD. From the outset of the disciplinary hearing the claimant and his union representative were made aware that [NAME_11] had not seen or read the [NAME_9] report, and this is apparent from the absence of any reference to ADHD during the disciplinary hearing. 147. There have been a number of criticisms from the claimant about the disciplinary hearing conduct by [NAME_11], including whether or not it should have continued in the face of the claimant’s distress at the outset of the meeting. The Tribunal has spent over two days reading the documents in this case, including the notes taken at the disciplinary hearing which reflect the claimant was eager to proceed, breaks were given, the claimant took an active part, and the trade union representative did not ask for it to stop. After the first 20 minutes or so there were a “re-set” and the hearing calmed down, followed by the claimant explaining his position and putting forward his arguments in respect of the posts without limit. The Tribunal did not agree with the claimant that the process was unfair (with the exception of [NAME_11] not requesting and/or not being provided with the [NAME_9]). [NAME_8] knew before he handed over the investigation report that the claimant had been diagnosed with ADHD as a child, and yet he was silent about this condition. The Tribunal takes the view that an investigating officer, acting reasonably, would have disclosed the ADHD diagnosis by email or an addendum to the investigation report, putting [NAME_11] on notice when it came to conducting the disciplinary hearing. [NAME_14] should have disclosed the ADHD diagnosis and the report; it was not sufficient for [NAME_11] to have merely been made aware of the adjustments suggested by [NAME_9]. 148. The claimant criticised the respondent for not obtaining an up-dated [NAME_9] report before the decision to dismiss was made. [NAME_4] submitted that the [NAME_9] report was 2 months old, and no identified or material change in circumstance or deterioration in the claimant’s health. The Tribunal agreed, and it is notable that at the disciplinary hearing the claimant did not question the validity of the [NAME_9] report whose content he accepted without question. 149. The appeal made good the procedural unfairness in respect of the ADHD diagnosis and [NAME_9] report, which was taken into account and thoroughly explored by [NAME_14] who conducted the appeal hearing in a objective and fair manner, he was prepared to reach a different decision in respect of a number of the allegations and the claimant at the time believed he had been given a fair hearing. 150. The claimant also complained that the disciplinary bundle included documents that were difficult to read, and it is undisputed the respondent immediately provided him with a satisfactory electronic bundle before the disciplinary hearing and the claimant could refer to both. There was no complaint by the claimant or his union

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representative about the documents at the outset of the disciplinary hearing. The Tribunal concluded there was no procedural or substantive unfairness. 151. Turning to the allegations and the posts themselves, the claimant complained that he did not understand the allegations, either the context of them or how they breached the Guidelines. This was an issue he had raised during the disciplinary process, and the Tribunal found the respondent held a reasonable belief that annexing part of the policy that was breached against each post made the position very clear, especially for an experienced journalist with 22 years working for the respondent. The contemporaneous notes of the disciplinary and appeal meeting reflect the claimant fully understood what was being alleged, the procedures and guidance referred to, which were discussed, before responding to the points and arguing his position. 152. The claimant complained about delays during the investigation and disciplinary process and welfare meeting being used to give him the outcome of the investigation. With reference to the delays, considering the factual matrix above, it is evident [NAME_8] found it difficult to arrange a meeting with the claimant, who gave the appearance of avoiding his line manager. For example, when [NAME_8] left a message, the claimant answered by sending him a [NAME_24] sickness note. This happened on a number of occasions. The respondent cannot be criticised for delays in this case, given the Tribunal’s findings of fact and the part played by the claimant who was unhappy with the reorganisation and the disciplinary process which involved serious allegations that could result in his dismissal. 153. The claimant complained about the welfare meeting being used to give the claimant the investigation outcome, and yet the claimant had asked for the outcome beforehand, and the Tribunal found it was reasonable for [NAME_8] to believe the claimant wanted to be told as soon as possible. On the 12 April 2024 the claimant wrote “please send me the outcome of my disciplinary instead of telling me every time you are in contact with me that you have said outcome…” The claimant could not have been clearer, and [NAME_8] cannot be criticised for informing the claimant of the investigation outcome at a welfare meeting given the difficulties [NAME_8] had experienced previously in contacting the claimant. 154. The Tribunal was not convinced that the claimant would have been less upset had two different meetings taken place, i.e. a welfare meeting followed by an investigation update meeting, concluding that once the claimant had indicated he wanted the outcome the decision by [NAME_8] to assume he could use the meeting and provide the outcome fell within the band of reasonable responses open to an employer acting reasonably. 155. Turning to the appeal hearing, the claimant referred to no procedural issues other than the respondent’s refusal to record the hearing. The evidence before the Tribunal was that the respondent had a policy of no recording, instead notes were taken and circulated for agreement, which is what happened in this case. There were three separate appeal meetings, and it is clear the claimant and his union representative were fully engaged and had an input in all thus undermining any suggestion that the claimant was at a disadvantage because the respondent refused to record. The claimant had a union representative to take notes, and after the appeal hearing he was given an opportunity to submit further information, which he did. The Tribunal concluded there was no procedural or substantive unfairness in respect of this complaint.

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156. Finally, the claimant argued that the sanction was excessive and ought to have been mitigated so that he kept his job. Without substituting its opinion for that of the respondent, the Tribunal found the dismissal fell well within the band of reasonable responses because of the impartiality rules the respondent is bound by, the respondent could not have contentious and sensitive biased posts made public by a journalist who would continue to do so into the future because he was not accepting he was wrong, strongly holding personal views that overrode the [NAME_2]’s restrictions on journalists. The claimant was posting between the investigation and dismissal, the dismissal and appeal, and did not stop there. The respondent was right to conclude that the claimant would not stop, and he had breached the implied term of trust and confidence through his actions over a period of approximately 9 months with no end in sight. 157. The claimant was not unfairly dismissed and his claim for unfair dismissal is not well-founded and is dismissed.

[NAME_6] 158. With reference to the first allegation (number 6 and 7) in respect of the [NAME_6] claim, the respondent concedes the claimant was disabled as defined in section 6 of the [NAME_7] Act 2010 at all material times by reason of ADHD and anxiety. The respondent concedes knowledge of ADHD from 2 April 2024. It disputes knowledge of anxiety at all material times. The Tribunal accepted on the evidence before it that the first time the respondent had knowledge of ADHD was 2 April 2024. With reference to the claimant’s anxiety, the respondent was put on notice when it received the claimant’s first sick note dated 8 December 2023 stating “anxiety/low mood” and the Tribunal was satisfied that it had knowledge of the claimant’s anxiety from this date onwards through to dismissal. Discrimination arising from disability ([NAME_7] Act 2010 section 15) 159. With reference to the second issue (issue number 8), namely, did the respondent treat the claimant unfavourably by dismissing him, the Tribunal found that it did. 160. With reference to the third issue (issue number 9), the Tribunal found there was no satisfactory evidence that the claimant’s “manner of expression speaking in a blunt (truthful and to the point and unfiltered) way in written communications (emails and posts and lacking exercise of judgment so that when anxious he communicates things that he would otherwise have not said or written arose in consequence of the claimant’s disability” was made out. The Tribunal had no evidence linking the claimant’s ADHD and anxiety to his manner of expression other than the claimant’s say so after the event. As discussed with the parties, the Tribunal is aware that ADHD can affect individuals in several different ways and it does not accept the claimant’s suggestion that the “manner of expression” relied upon him generally arises in consequence of ADHD. Each person is an individual. Had the claimant genuinely believed there was causal link between his disability and

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behaviour he would have said so at the disciplinary hearing, and he was silent on this point with the effect that it was not possible for the dismissing officer to take it into account before arriving at the decision to dismiss. 161. If the Tribunal is wrong on this point, it would have found with reference to issue number 10, in the alternative, the claimant’s dismissal was a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim taking into account the factual matrix above. Given the clear policies, procedures and guidance it found all of the respondent’s aims were legitimate with a view to not only protecting its reputation as a “trusted and impartial public service broadcaster” but also maintaining public confidence in its impartiality and the standards it was expected to meet. The respondent says that its aims were: a) Para 54 GOR upholding the respondent’s policies and values, b) Protecting and upholding the respondent’s reputation c) Maintaining public confidence in its impartiality and the standards expected of a public service broadcaster d) Protecting the welfare and safety of its staff 162. [NAME_4] submitted each of the stated aims satisfied the requirements set out in [NAME_33] (above). The Tribunal agreed with [NAME_4] on the evidence before it that “they are legitimate in principle, rooted in statutory and regulatory obligations placed upon public service broadcasters and employers, and reflect fundamental aspects of the [NAME_2]’s function, public remit and editorial independence. They are neither peripheral nor speculative; they go to the heart of the [NAME_2]’s ability to operate effectively and to retain the trust of its audience and stakeholders- para 47.” 163. It is undisputed by the claimant that impartiality was a fundamental value required by the Royal Charter. On a straight-forward interpretation of the claimant’s public communications the social medial posts breached the respondent’s impartiality rules and could undermine its reputation. The claimant argues that there was no evidence of anyone complaining about his public communications including colleagues, which misses the point that his posts were controversial and at times political, and by their very nature went to the heart of the appearance of bias and a lack of impartiality. 164. With reference to the issue, namely, was the treatment an appropriate and reasonably necessary way to achieve those aims, the Tribunal found that it was objectively assessed based on a detailed analysis of the respondent’s statutory and business needs: [NAME_33], [NAME_33] and [NAME_33] above. 165. Given the position adopted by the claimant, the length of time he had been posting inappropriately in breach of the respondent’s Polices and Guidance, and the continuation of these breaches throughout the disciplinary and appeal process, nothing less discriminatory have been done instead taking into account balancing the needs of the claimant and the respondent. The claimant was given a number of warnings and told to stop posting, albeit informally, which he ignored, and he had an opportunity to change his behaviours, but he did not see the need to so against a background of his disenchantment with the respondent and change of role resulting from the reorganisation. The claimant was told to take the posts down when he had not done so, and the claimant was told on a number of occasions there were

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concerns about his posts against a background of an investigation and disciplinary process when the claimant knew he was in danger of dismissal. 166. The Tribunal accepted [NAME_4]’s submission that the dismissal was reasonably necessary and, taking all relevant circumstances into account, a fair balance was struck between the [NAME_2]’s objectives and the detriment to the claimant” given the gravity of the misconduct, the repeated acts of non-compliance resulting in the breach of the implied term of trust and confidence, the failure to heed prior warnings, management’s reasonable instructions and the fact that reasonable adjustments were put in place which give the claimant an opportunity to consider his behaviour. [NAME_11] positively looked for mitigation when none was present, and the Tribunal accepts as credible Mr [NAME_11]’s evidence that his decision to dismiss the claimant was not an easy one. 167. As indicated above, the Tribunal was not satisfied the claimant had established the burden of proof in respect of showing that the reason or because of his dismissal is something arising in consequence of his disability: [NAME_31] above. Had the claimant satisfied the Tribunal that his conduct arose in consequence of ADHD and anxiety (which he did not) the Tribunal would have gone on to conclude that the respondent would have been entitled to enforce the professional standards that bind journalists, even if the conduct in question was connected to a disability. The Tribunal agreed with [NAME_4] that there were no measures short of dismissal that would have equally achieved the respondent’s aims given the factual matrix in this case and the loss of trust and confidence the respondent had in the claimant. Had the Tribunal found the claimant’s dismissal constituted unfavourable treatment arising in consequence of disability (which it did not) it is satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the respondent had discharged the burden of showing that the dismissal was a proportionate means of achieving its legitimate aims. 168. The claim brought under s. 15 EQA is dismissed. Reasonable Adjustments ([NAME_7] Act 2010 sections 20 & 21) 169. With reference to the first issue (issue number 12), namely, did the respondent have the following PCPs the Tribunal found the following on the balance of probabilities: First reasonable adjustment FTRA: A 170. PCP A: the respondent’s practice of informing employees as happened to the claimant that he would face a disciplinary hearing during the online Zoom welfare meeting with [NAME_8] on 1 May 2024. The Tribunal found that the respondent did not have this practice: [NAME_35] above. If we are wrong on this point, it did not put the claimant at a substantial disadvantage between those who are and those who are not disabled - [NAME_37] above. [NAME_11] took this step in the particular circumstances of this case, and there was no evidence that had a PCP existed (which it did not) it had the effect of producing the relevant disadvantage in the comparison exercise with people who are not disabled.

171. With reference to the second issue (issue number 13), namely, was this PCP applied to the claimant, and did it put him at a substantial disadvantage, the Tribunal

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did not find that it did. As indicated above, the circumstances of this case are particular to the claimant, who was absent on sick leave. The claimant had asked for the outcome in an email prior to the welfare meeting, and his anxiety would have increased whether he was informed of the outcome at the welfare meeting or at a separate meeting. The claimant says the substantial disadvantage was increased anxiety for claimant. The Tribunal accepted the claimant would experience anxiety at the prospect of a disciplinary hearing, but this had nothing to do with the method of communication, rather it was the fact that the investigation had resulted in the continuation of the disciplinary procedure.

172. With reference to the third issue (issue number 14), namely, did the respondent know or could it reasonably have been expected to know that the claimant was likely to be placed at the disadvantage, the Tribunal found that it could not especially given the fact that the claimant had firmly asked for the outcome before it was given, and neither he nor his experienced union representative had raised an issue about being told at the welfare meeting when both were put on notice at the outset that this information would be given. 173. With reference to the fourth issue (issue number 15), namely, what reasonable steps should the respondent have taken to avoid substantial disadvantage, had the PCP relied on existed (which it did not) in the alternative the Tribunal would have gone on to find that the adjustment suggested by the claimant of dealing with welfare and disciplinary matters separately was not a reasonable one. The adjustment suggested by the claimant would have made no difference to the anxiety experienced by the claimant on belong told that the allegations would proceed to disciplinary hearing:

Second reasonable adjustment

FTRA:B

174. With reference to the first issue (issue number 16) in respect of the second PCP, namely, convening and holding a disciplinary hearing during sickness absence, the Tribunal accepts that this PCP exists, albeit on a case-by-case basis.

175. With reference to the second issue, namely, was this PCP applied to the claimant the tribunal found that it was.

176. With reference to the third issue, namely, did it put him at a substantial disadvantage the Tribunal found that it did not. The claimant says he was unable to function properly and advocate for himself at the hearing and so was denied a fair hearing. The claimant’s case was not borne out by the reality supported by undisputed contemporaneous documents. The Tribunal found that the PCP did not put the claimant at a substantial disadvantage because the respondent had taken advice from [NAME_9] and put in place reasonable adjustments. The contemporaneous evidence reflects that the claimant was able to function properly and advocate for himself, which he did at several hearings with the support of union representation from an experienced union officer who was praised both by the claimant and respondent for his input during the disciplinary process. The Tribunal does not accept the claimant was denied a fair hearing because he was absent due

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to illness, and taking the claimant’s argument to its logical conclusion, had the claimant remained absent with no foreseeable return to work, a disciplinary hearing could not have been held indefinitely until he was well enough to return to work, even if [NAME_9]’s advice was that the claimant was well enough to attend with adjustments in place.

177. The Tribunal found that the respondent did have this practice but it did not put the claimant at a substantial disadvantage between those who are and those who are not disabled - [NAME_37] above and the claimant was not disadvantaged in any way.

178. With reference to the fourth issue (issue number 17), namely, did the respondent know or could it reasonably have been expected to know that the claimant was likely to be placed at the disadvantage, the Tribunal found that it did not have actual or constructive knowledge of any substantial disadvantage given its reliance of [NAME_9] advice consented to be the claimant, which he had unquestioningly adopted and not disputed at any stage. The claimant had authorised the release of the [NAME_9] report and did not dispute that he could attend a disciplinary hearing. [NAME_4] reminded the Tribunal that the claimant “agreed to attend without objection after receiving the hearing pack electronically and, during the meeting, commended [NAME_11] and thanked him for “listening to what I have to say.”

179. With reference to the fifth issue (issue number 18), namely, what reasonable steps should the respondent have taken to avoid substantial disadvantage the claimant relies on 3 adjustments as follows:

1. [NAME_9] advice before requiring someone off sick to attend a disciplinary hearing – this was done and [NAME_9] knew from the referral form that the claimant could be attending a disciplinary hearing, suggesting reasonable adjustments which were followed. It is clear from the way the [NAME_9] report is written with references to “understanding right from wrong” and venue, that [NAME_9] was addressing “difficult meetings” which could be upsetting to employees, such as a disciplinary hearing. The claimant also criticises the respondent for not obtaining a more up to date report and relies on this as one of the procedural acts of unfairness (see above). The Tribunal did not agree. The occupational report was dated 10 April 2024, and the disciplinary hearing took place two months later on 20 June 2024 when nothing had changed in connection with the claimant’s medical condition. The claimant also criticises venue despite claimant choosing to zoom, which was an adjustment suggested by [NAME_9].

2. Follow Code of Conduct on neurodivergent employees with disabilities. The [NAME_2] has no such code. In oral evidence the claimant explained that he was referred to guidance in the public sector, relating to his wife, and could not point to any guidance issued by the respondent.

3. A written process. Consider a written process for disciplinary hearing, for example, sending questions in advance. The claimant agreed to a zoom

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meeting which fell in line with the reasonable adjustment suggested by [NAME_9]. There is no evidence before the Tribunal that the claimant was disadvantaged in any way by not having questions in advance. In his written statement before this Tribunal the claimant argues that it would have removed the stress. The claimant was provided with a substantial pack of documents that included posts and guidelines, and the claimant has failed to explain how written questions in advance would have made any difference to how he approached the disciplinary hearing. By the time the claimant reached the appeal hearing the claimant was aware of the likely questions he would be asked, on the basis that he had been asked them before. There was nothing to put the respondent on notice that the claimant was likely to be placed at the disadvantage, the opposite given the content of the [NAME_9] report.

180. [NAME_4] submitted that the adjustment suggested by the claimant was not reasonable. He argued “proceeding by way of written representations alone, without first convening a meeting, would not have been a reasonable or effective alternative in the circumstances. Given the issues and the scale of the evidence, a meeting was necessary to explore those matters in a structured way, to test C’s account, and to ensure that the decision-maker properly understood his position.” The Tribunal agreed and is supported in this by the claimant’s criticism of the respondent’s decision to set out in writing the alleged conduct annexed to the breach of the Guidance/Policy which the claimant said he did not understand. A hearing was necessary in order that the respondent was satisfied the claimant understood the allegations and had the ability to respond to them in full. Three hours was set aside for the process, and a written process would not test the evidence in the same way given the complexity and extent of the allegations. The claimant had advance notice of the evidence, the relevant policies and/or guidance that had been breached and there was nothing that would have taken him by surprise at the disciplinary hearing.

181. Finally, give the claimant did not request written questions at any stage during the disciplinary process, and there was no reference to such an adjustment in the [NAME_9] report, had there been any disadvantage to the claimant (which for the avoidance of doubt there was not) the Tribunal would have gone on to find that the respondent did not know or could not reasonably have been expected to know that the claimant was likely to be placed at the disadvantage. As indicated above, the Tribunal has spent a great deal of time reading though the disciplinary hearing notes during deliberations, and the claimant not only advocated for himself and was fully functioning, but his union representative also advocated for him including acknowledging that there were issues with the claimant’s behaviour.

[NAME_40]: C

182. With reference to [NAME_40] relied on, namely (issue number 19), the respondent’s practice of not seeking up to date [NAME_9] reports before dismissal, the Tribunal found there was no such practice, and the respondent had obtained an [NAME_9] report on the claimant prior to proceeding with the disciplinary hearing and dismissing the claimant. [NAME_9] found the claimant as fit to attend the disciplinary hearing and knew right from wrong. In any

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event arranging an [NAME_9] report is not in itself a reasonable adjustment. What is important are the adjustments [NAME_9] advises, and in the claimant’s case the recommended adjustments were implemented.

183. Having made this finding, there is no requirement for the Tribunal to address the adjustment sought by the claimant, other than to comment as follows: with reference to consulting the claimant about neuro diversity/ADHD before deciding to dismiss, the claimant was aware that [NAME_41] had not seen or read the [NAME_9] report and yet he failed to draw [NAME_41]’s attention to his neuro-diversity, which could not be taken into account as [NAME_41] did not know about it. [NAME_41] did consider the claimant’s anxiety condition, his broadcast history and performance before concluding that a reporter of 22 years’ experience should have known better than to act as he did, and the claimant had consistently ignored managerial instructions to stop posting and delete over a substantial period. [NAME_14] did consider objectively and in detail the claimant’s neurodiversity and possibly effect on his actions. The claimant, who was represented by his union, made no attempt to provide any independent medical evidence of the causal link he now seeks to establish, either prior to the appeal or at this liability hearing. Given the fact that [NAME_9] had advised on ADHD, which was not questioned by the claimant, his suggestion that the respondent should have obtained yet another [NAME_9] report has little force, even if the claimant had established such a PCP existed and he was disadvantaged by it (which he did not).

184. In conclusion, the respondent was not in breach of its duty to make reasonable adjustments, and the claimant’s claims brought under section 20-21 are dismissed.

185. Finally, with reference to the issue concerning the time limits in discrimination complaints, the Tribunal has not heard any submissions from the parties. It is agreed that given the date the claim form was presented and the dates of early conciliation, any complaint about something that happened before 28 March 2024 may not have been brought in time. The Tribunal was satisfied that the complaints made within the time limit in section 123 of the [NAME_7] Act 2010.

Approved by: Employment Judge Shotter 20 March 2026 Reserved Judgment & Reasons sent to the parties on: 7 May 2026 For the Tribunal:

……………………………………

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All judgments (apart from judgments under Rule 51) and any written reasons for the judgments are published, in full, online at https://www.gov.uk/employment-tribunal-decisions shortly after a copy has been sent to the claimants and respondents. If a Tribunal hearing has been recorded, you may request a transcript of the recording. Unless there are exceptional circumstances, you will have to pay for it. If a transcript is produced it will not include any oral judgment or reasons given at the hearing. The transcript will not be checked, approved or verified by a judge. There is more information in the joint Presidential Practice Direction on the Recording and Transcription of Hearings and accompanying Guidance, which can be found at www.judiciary.uk/guidance-and-resources/employment-rules-and-legislation-practice-directions/