Employment Tribunal Rejects Disability Discrimination Claims

OUTCOME: Dismissed

ETZ4(WR)

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS (SCOTLAND)

Case Nos: 8000754/2024 and 8001367/2024 Hearing at Edinburgh on 26, 27 and 28 November, and 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8 and 9 December 2025, and Members’ Meeting on 30 January 2026

Employment Judge: M A Macleod Tribunal Member: L Grime Tribunal Member: S [NAME_1]

Claimant

In [COMPANY_143]

Respondent

Represented by

[NAME_142]

JUDGMENT OF THE EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNAL The unanimous Judgment of the Employment Tribunal is that the claimant’s claims all fail, and are dismissed. REASONS

1. The claimant presented a claim to the Employment Tribunal on 31 May 2024 in which she claimed that she had been constructively unfairly dismissed and subjected to discrimination on the grounds of disability by the respondent. 2. The respondent submitted an ET3 in which they resisted all claims presented by the claimant.

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 2 3. Following a number of Preliminary Hearings, and postponement of an earlier scheduled Hearing, the Hearing on the Merits was listed to take place on 26 November 2025 and the 9 succeeding days.

4. The claimant appeared on her own behalf, and [NAME_7], barrister, appeared for the respondent.

5. A [NAME_8] was agreed and produced to the Tribunal by the parties. In addition, the claimant produced some further documents, which were referred to during the Hearing, together with a bundle of unredacted medical documents.

6. Evidence in chief of each of the witnesses called was taken by way of witness statements, with each witness, including the claimant, then available for cross-examination and questioning by the Tribunal. The claimant representing herself was permitted to take time to raise any evidence she considered appropriate as arising out of cross-examination, following the conclusion of questioning by [NAME_7].

7. The following witnesses gave evidence in this case for the claimant: [redacted] The claimant, [NAME_10]; • [NAME_12]; • [NAME_15]; • [NAME_18]; and • [NAME_20].

8. Counsel for the respondent confirmed that he had no questions for any of the claimant’s witnesses, other than the claimant herself, and accordingly they were each relieved of the obligation to attend at the Hearing. The Tribunal took their witness statements as read.

9. The following witnesses gave evidence for the respondent: [redacted] [NAME_23]; • [NAME_26]; and • [NAME_29].

10. The Tribunal agreed that the evidence of [NAME_32] should be taken by CVP to allow her to remain at home in order to care for her ill husband.

11. The Tribunal put in place a number of reasonable adjustments to assist the claimant in presenting her case, in light of her admitted disabilities, which

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 3 were set out in the Tribunal’s Order following Preliminary Hearing in October 2025, as follows: a. A hard copy of the finalised Bundle of Documents shall be provided to the claimant by no later than 7 March 2025; b. The claimant shall be permitted to take regular breaks every 40 to 50 minutes to help manage her focus and with processing information. In the event that she requires an earlier break, she should raise this with the Tribunal and explain why this is necessary. c. The claimant shall be permitted to take extra time to process questions and respond, with pauses before she is required to answer, when under questioning in cross-examination or by the Tribunal. In addition, when asking questions of the respondent’s witnesses in cross-examination, she shall be afforded the same extra time to reflect on the answer given and to consider her next question. d. The claimant is granted permission for an advocate or emotional support person to accompany her during the Hearing. e. The claimant will be given access to the Tribunal room prior to 26 November 2025 in order to familiarize herself with the facilities therein, and layout thereof.

12. These adjustments were implemented in the Hearing, though the claimant did not in the event have an advocate or emotional support person to accompany her during the Hearing. It is not clear, in addition, whether the claimant took up the opportunity to attend at the Tribunal to familiarize herself with the layout and facilities of the Tribunal.

13. The Hearing concluded within the scheduled dates listed, and the Employment Judge and Tribunal Members met on 30 January 2026 in order to deliberate upon the evidence and submissions, in order to reach a concluded view as to the issues.

14. The List of Issues was determined by the Tribunal in advance of the Hearing, and while the claimant sought on a number of occasions to amend the List of Issues, both parties at the Hearing adhered to the List set out by the Tribunal, which was of considerable assistance to the Tribunal. The List of Issues 15. The List of Issues is as follows (1706ff): Disability Discrimination

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 4 Disability Status 1. Did the respondent know, or reasonably could have been expected to know, that the claimant had the disability? 2. For the purposes of a claim under section 21 of the Equality Act 2010 (EqA), did the respondent know that the claimant had a disability and was likely to be placed at the disadvantage relied upon? Time Limits 3. Given the date the claim form was presented and the dates of early conciliation, any complaint about something that happened before 26 January 2024 may not have been brought in time.

4. Were the discrimination and victimisation complaints made within the time limit in section 123 of EqA? The Tribunal will decide: a. Was the claim made to the Tribunal within 3 months (plus early conciliation extensions under sections 207B (3) and (4) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (ERA)) of the act or omission to which the complaint relates? b. If not, was there conduct extending over a period? c. If so, was the claim made to the Tribunal within 3 months (plus early conciliation extension) of the end of that period? d. If not, were the claims made within a further period that the Tribunal thinks is just and equitable? The Tribunal will decide: i. Why were the complaints not made to the Tribunal in time? ii. In any event, is it just and equitable in all the circumstances to extend time? Direct Discrimination – Section 13 EqA 5. The acts of less favourable treatment alleged by the claimant are that the respondent: [redacted] placing her on a performance improvement plan and subjecting her to increased performance scrutiny. b. On 8 November 2023, imposed excessive performance targets of completing 15-20 items per day.

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 5 c. On 14 December 2023, criticised the claimant for spelling and grammar errors during a performance review. d. On 13 December 2023, refused to allow colleagues to assist the claimant with her workload.

6. In respect of each act who is the claimant’s comparator (actual or hypothetical) whose circumstances must be materially the same as the claimant’s? a. In respect of 6(a), the claimant’s alleged comparator is [NAME_33] b. In respect of 6(b), (c) and (d), the claimant relies on a hypothetical comparator.

7. Did each of the acts set out at 6 above occur in the manner alleged by the claimant? 8. If so, did it amount to less favourable treatment of the claimant? 9. If so, was the less favourable treatment because of or on the grounds of the claimant’s disability or for another reason? Indirect Discrimination 10. The claimant is seeking to rely upon the alleged provisions, criteria or practices ([NAME_36]) of: a. Uniform performance targets of completing 15-20 items per day, introduced on 8 November 2023. b. Mandatory office attendance of three days per week, enforced from 16 October 2023. c. Strict written communication standards by imposing uniform spelling and grammar requirements without providing assistive tools such as spell-check software, applied to the claimant on 14 December 2023 and 24 May 2024. d. Not providing pre-meeting agendas ahead of capability and probation review meetings, repeatedly applied to the claimant including on 18 April 2024 before the combined probation review and grievance hearing. e. Having inflexible work schedules with limited flexibility for breaks, applied to the claimant in December 2023.

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 6 f. Having absent or standard-form training materials without providing accessible formats or additional training support, applied to the claimant on 19 October 2023, 9, 14 and 21 November 2023 and 1 and 11 December 2023. g. On 12 January 2024, delivering the claimant’s year-end performance assessment by [NAME_37]. h. On 12 January 2023, giving the claimant an end-of-year rating of “inconsistent”. i. Refusing to move a probation review meeting to early January outside of the claimant’s probation period due to policy, applied to the claimant on 14 December 2023. j. Refusing to provide a welfare meeting before returning to work, due to practice of organising welfare meetings after a return to work, applied to the claimant on 6 March 2024 and 15 April 2024. k. An expectation for staff in the claimant’s department to work more hours (unpaid overtime) in December 2023, in particular 6, 12, 13 and 14 December 2023. l. Allowing performance expectations to be implied through employees observing other staff members, applied to the claimant on 24 May 2024. m. The respondent’s policy of having a limit of one month from the time the performance rating was issued to challenge a performance rating, applied to the claimant on 24 May 2024. n. The respondent’s policy of not hearing grievances about policy, applied to the claimant on 24 May 2024.

11. Are each of the alleged [NAME_36] a “provision, criterion or practice” for the purposes of section 18 of EqA? 12. If yes, did the respondent apply, or would apply, each of the [NAME_36] to all employees including those who did not have the claimant’s disability? 13. If yes, did any of those [NAME_36] put persons with the same disability as the claimant at a particular disadvantage when compared with persons not with such a disability but whose circumstances are otherwise not materially different to the claimant? 14. Did the PCP put the claimant at that particular disadvantage?

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 7 15. If so, can the respondent justify the [NAME_36] by showing a legitimate aim? 16. If so, were the [NAME_36] a proportionate means of achieving that legitimate aim?

Failure to Make Reasonable Adjustments – sections 20 and 21 [NAME_36]

17. The claimant is seeking to rely upon the alleged [NAME_36] set out at 11 above.

18. In respect of each: a. Is this a “provision, criterion or practice”? b. Did the respondent apply that PCP? 19. If yes, did any of those [NAME_36] put the claimant at a substantial disadvantage when compared with persons not with a disability but whose circumstances are otherwise not materially different to the claimant? 20. Did the respondent know, or could it reasonably have been expected to know, that the PCP put the claimant at the substantial disadvantage in question? 21. Did the respondent take such steps as it was reasonable for it to have to take to avoid the disadvantage? Physical Features of Premises 22. The claimant is seeking to rely upon the following physical features of the respondent’s premises: a. The open-plan layout of the office b. The hot-desking environment and booking system c. Lack of access to flexible seating arrangements d. Poor air quality and temperature control e. Non-accessible rest areas or quiet spaces f. Fluorescent lighting 23. In respect of each, is this a physical feature (under section 20(10) of EqA) of the respondent’s premises?

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 8 24. If yes, did any of those physical features put the claimant at a substantial disadvantage when compared with persons not with a disability but whose circumstances are otherwise not materially different to the claimant? 25. Did the respondent know, or could it reasonably have been expected to know, that the physical feature would put the claimant at the substantial disadvantage in question? 26. Did the respondent take such steps as it was reasonable for it to have to take to avoid the disadvantage? [NAME_38]

27. The claimant is seeking to rely on the alleged failure by the respondent to provide the following [NAME_38]: a. Assistive technology for written communication b. Pre-meeting agendas and talking points to prepare for capability and probation reviews. c. Accessible training materials that were tailored to accommodate the claimant’s needs.

28. Did the respondent provide any of the above to the claimant? 29. If not, without that auxiliary aid, was the claimant put at a substantial disadvantage when compared with persons not with a disability but whose circumstances are otherwise not materially different to the claimant? 30. Did the respondent know, or could it reasonably have been expected to know, that not providing the auxiliary aid would put the claimant at the substantial disadvantage in question? 31. Did the respondent take such steps as it was reasonable for it to have to take to provide the auxiliary aid? Discrimination Arising from Disability – Section 15 32. Did the respondent treat the claimant unfavourably? The unfavourable treatment alleged is as follows: a. Failing to provide reasonable adjustments; b. Delaying implementation of adjustments and implementing inadequate adjustments;

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 9 c. Subjecting the claimant to heightened performance scrutiny and a “de facto” performance improvement plan on 8 November 2023 without implementing reasonable adjustments; d. [NAME_41] consistently assigning the claimant workloads beyond her ability, adding late-day cases that required unpaid overtime, even on days when the claimant had already met her targets, including specifically: i. On 6 December 2023, reprimanding the claimant for leaving a non-urgent case despite completing all priority tasks; and ii. On 7 December 2023, forcing the claimant to work beyond her shift, while non-disabled colleagues were allowed to leave on time. e. Subjecting the claimant to unfair performance standards, specifically: i. On 14 December 2023 raising spelling and grammar issues as a capability concern; ii. On 14 December 2023, informing the claimant that her case targets needed to improve; and iii. On 12 January 2024, issuing the claimant with an end of year performance rating of “Inconsistent”. f. Refusing the claimant’s requests for reduced office attendance, specifically refusing to allow the claimant to attend the office less than three days per week. g. Subjecting the claimant to a hostile work environment, including specifically: i. Micromanaging the claimant and subjecting the claimant to procedural barriers; ii. Repeatedly failing to provide pre-meeting agendas for critical performance and capability, probation and grievance meetings; iii. Denying the claimant support from colleagues and excluding the claimant from workplace resources; iv. Subjecting the claimant to retaliatory actions and psychological harm by delivering her Year-End

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 10 Performance Review on 12 January 2024 while the claimant was on sick leave; and v. Subjecting the claimant to intentional delays in relation to the handling of her grievance. h. Mishandling the claimant’s grievance, including specifically: i. Subjecting the claimant to unreasonable delays and a failure to progress the grievance in a timely manner; ii. Repeatedly failing, on 2 April, 8 April, 11 April, 23 April 2024 to provide pre-meeting agendas or talking points, causing cognitive overload; iii. Implementing inflexible and disproportionate deadlines for reviewing and editing key documents by sending the claimant meeting notes to review on 23 April 2024 to be completed by 26 April 2024; iv. The bad-faith handling of probation findings and retaliatory actions; v. Failing to uphold the claimant’s grievance and acknowledge the harm caused; and vi. Recommending that the claimant be placed on a PIP immediately upon her return to work. i. Subjecting the claimant to “financial and psychological harm”, including specifically: i. Denying the claimant’s right to challenge her end of year performance rating; ii. Refusing the claimant’s requests for a welfare meeting while the claimant was absent; iii. Cumulative delays and untimeliness of the respondent’s grievance and probation processes, which the claimant says prolonged her sick leave. j. The respondent’s breaching its policies, including specifically: i. Failing to apply the respondent’s Capability Policy to provide for disability-related exceptions to performance evaluations by (i) subjecting her to increased performance scrutiny (ii) subjecting her to a de facto PIP

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 11 on 8 November 2023 and (iii) giving the claimant an “Inconsistent” End-of-Year rating on 12 January 2024; ii. Failing to apply the respondent’s Making Adjustments Policy to provide a supportive environment for disabled employees; and iii. Failing to apply the respondent’s Workplace Adjustment Guide by failing to recognise spelling errors as a disability-related indicator by (i) raising her dyslexia- related spelling and grammar errors as a capability concern on 14 December 2024, (ii) not providing her with assistive technology and (iii) applying non-disabled performance standards to address her written accuracy. k. Holding the claimant to the same performance standards as non-disabled colleagues while failing to implement reasonable adjustments, including specifically: i. Treating the claimant differently to a non-disabled colleague ([NAME_33]) in performance scrutiny; ii. Discriminating against the claimant in respect of her spelling and grammar; iii. The sudden introduction of capability concerns, which the claimant says were unsubstantiated; iv. Discriminatory and inconsistent application of the respondent’s policies.

33. If so, was the unfavourable treatment done because of something arising in consequence of the claimant’s disability? 34. If so, was there a legitimate aim to the unfavourable treatment? 35. If so, was the unfavourable treatment a proportionate means of achieving that legitimate aim? Harassment – Section 26 36. Did the respondent engage in unwanted conduct relating to the claimant’s disability for the purposes of EqA? The claimant alleges the following: a. From 4 October 2023, [NAME_23] deliberately withheld support, failed to implement timely adjustments and an [NAME_43] referral.

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 12 b. Unfounded performance criticism and increased targets by [NAME_23]: i. On 8 November 2023, during a performance meeting, she criticised the claimant’s performance without providing evidence, training or assistance around areas of concern; ii. On 14 December 2023, she insisted that the claimant grow her average items per day from 14 and scrutinised the claimant for spelling and grammar errors. c. On 12 December 2023, unrealistic performance standards were imposed and she was coerced into overtime by [NAME_39] assigning the claimant 2 non-urgent cases at 3.29pm before her 4pm finish despite the claimant having met her targets for the day. d. The claimant was excluded from support and policies were inconsistently applied, by: i. Between October 2023 and December 2023, not processing 3 flexible working requests or passing them to senior management as promised. ii. On 13 December 2023, [NAME_23] blocking the claimant’s request for help from her colleagues; iii. On 14 December 2023, [NAME_23] insisting that the claimant had had “quite a lot” of support in the form of training and development from colleagues. e. In December 2023, the claimant was targeted by rostering her on three weeks of consecutive early shifts. f. On 8 November 2023, a meeting was held with the claimant without warning as to the extent her performance would be subject to criticism and scrutiny. g. On 14 December 2023, [NAME_23] refused the claimant’s request to reschedule the probation review meeting so that she could secure union representation. h. [NAME_23] made disparaging comments to the claimant: [redacted] in an angry and belittling display in front of a fully populated, open plan, loud and busy department.

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 13 ii. On 8 November 2023, during a performance review meeting, she suggested that the claimant “get louder” due to her ADHD. iii. On 9 November 2023, she repeatedly told the claimant to “stay focused” despite no evidence of the claimant being off task. i. Refused to consider the claimant grievances about the policy and her Year End rating and assessment. j. Committing a repudiatory breach of the implied term of trust and confidence in the claimant’s employment contract in response to which the claimant resigned, and thus constructively dismissing the claimant, by: i. Failing to make reasonable adjustments (as detailed above at paragraphs 18 to 32); ii. Subjecting the claimant to harassment on grounds of her disability (as detailed above at paragraphs 33a to 33i); iii. Subjecting the claimant to indirect discrimination (as detailed above at paragraphs 11 to 17); iv. The outcome of the grievance process, which concluded on 24 May 2024; and v. Acknowledging the claimant’s appeal against the grievance outcome of 24 May 2024 on 3 June 2024.

37. Did each of the above occur in the manner alleged by the claimant? If so, was it unwanted conduct? 38. If so, was each instance of unwanted conduct? 39. If so, did it relate to the claimant’s disability? 40. If so, did each instance of unwanted conduct have the purpose or effect of: a. Violating the claimant’s dignity; or b. Creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for the claimant? 41. If so, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, was it reasonable for that conduct to have that effect on the claimant?

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 14 42. In respect of 33j, was the respondent’s conduct unlawful harassment that amounted to a repudiatory breach of the claimant’s contract of employment? 43. In particular, did the respondent, by the matters set out at paragraph 33j (if proven), without proper cause conduct itself in a manner which was calculated or likely to destroy or seriously damage the relationship of trust and confidence between itself and the claimant? 44. If so, did the claimant resign in response to that breach? The claimant alleges that the 33(j)(iv) and 33(j)(v) was the “final straw” in response to which she resigned.

45. If there was a repudiatory breach, did the claimant affirm the contract of employment and waive that breach? 46. Did the claimant resign because of any such repudiatory breach or for another reason? Victimisation – Section 27 47. Did the claimant perform a “protected act” as defined by section 27(2) of EqA. The protected act relied upon by the claimant is: a. Requesting reasonable adjustments on 4 October 2023.

48. Did the respondent subject the claimant to the following acts: a. On 27 October 2023, [NAME_23] insisted the claimant worked from the office when the claimant had a flood in her bedroom, and then deducted annual leave for half a day when the claimant was absent from work. b. Excluded the claimant from receiving assistance from her colleagues. On 13 December 2023, [NAME_23] blocked the claimant’s request for help with her workload. c. On 14 December 2023, [NAME_23] insisted that the claimant’s performance targets should be increased and focused on spelling and grammar error. d. On 12 December 2023, unrealistic performance standards were imposed and she was coerced into overtime by [NAME_39] assigning the claimant 2 non-urgent cases as 3.29pm before her 4pm finish despite the claimant having met her targets for the day.

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 15 e. On 14 December 2023, [NAME_23] refused the claimant’s request to reschedule the probation review meeting so that she could secure union representation. f. In December 2023, the claimant was targeted by rostering her on three weeks of consecutive early shifts.

49. If so, are each of these acts a detriment? 50. If the respondent did any of the things alleged, and they amounted to a detriment, was the claimant subject to that detriment because she had done a protected act? Remedy - Discrimination 51. What financial losses has the discrimination caused the claimant? 52. Has the claimant taken reasonable steps to replace lost earnings, for example by looking for another job? 53. If not, for what period of loss should the claimant be compensated? 54. What injury to feelings has the discrimination caused the claimant and how much compensation should be awarded for that? Are there grounds to award aggravated damages, and if so how much should be awarded? 55. Has the discrimination caused the claimant personal injury and how much compensation should be awarded for that? 56. Is there a chance that the claimant’s employment would have ended in any event? Should any compensation be reduced as a result? 57. Did the ACAS Code of Practice on Disciplinary and Grievance Procedures apply? 58. Did the respondent or the claimant unreasonably fail to comply with it? 59. If so, is it just and equitable to increase or decrease any award payable to the claimant? By what proportion, up to 25%? 60. Should interest be awarded, and if so, how much? Pay Claims Holiday Pay 61. Is the claimant due any sums in respect of accrued by untaken holiday pay outstanding as at 9 July 2024? The claimant alleges she is owed

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 16 holiday pay for 5 hours of accrued but untaken holiday on termination of employment.

62. In particular: a. Did the claimant receive payment in respect of any accrued but untaken holiday entitlement up to the end of her employment on 9 July 2024? b. If not, is the respondent entitled or authorised (by contract or otherwise) to withhold or deduct such sums or offset them against sums owed by the claimant to the respondent? Unlawful Deductions from Wages 63. Is the claimant due any sums in respect of enhanced company sick pay? The claimant alleges that she is owed 5 days’ pay in respect of company sick pay.

64. Did the claimant receive payment of all enhanced company sick pay properly due to her in respect of her sickness absences while employed by the respondent? 16. There are some adjustments to be made to the List of Issues, particularly with regard to the claimant’s payment claims, but these are addressed in the decision section below. Findings in Fact 17. Based on the evidence led and the information presented, the Tribunal was able to find the following facts admitted or proved.

18. The claimant commenced work with the respondent as a contractor in the role of Checker Account Servicing and Maintenance, in August 2022. In that role, she worked 100% of her time remotely. Her primary task was to carry out processing work in relation to share-trading.

19. Following an interview conducted by [NAME_23], currently [COMPANY_148], the claimant was appointed to the role of UKTA administrator for institutional [COMPANY_44], in [NAME_32]’s team. The team is responsible for dealing with queries from investors via telephone, email or letter. The claimant was appointed to commence employment with the respondent on 30 June 2023.

20. The respondent sent to the claimant an offer of employment dated 21 April 2023 (249ff). Her salary was noted to be £32,000 per annum. At paragraph 3.3, it was provided that “Your employment is subject to a probation period of six months, during which time your performance and suitability for this

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 17 role will be reviewed. The probationary period may be extended at the Company’s absolute discretion.” 21. During the probation period, her employment was said to be subject to one week’s written notice by either party.

22. The contract went on to say that she would be based at the respondent’s offices at [ADDRESS], Edinburgh “or such other office as we may reasonably require.” She was to be advised by her manager if her role was a “Hybrid” role, namely where an employee may work flexibly across their office, home and with clients.

23. She was to report to [NAME_45], and her normal working hours were to be 35 hours per week.

24. It was noted (262) that the claimant had electronically accepted the offer and terms and conditions of employment on 25 April 2023.

25. As part of the “onboarding” process to commence the claimant’s employment, the claimant completed a form including medical questions (449) on 30 May 2023. In answer to the question “Do you have a health condition or disability which may be relevant to your job application?”, she ticked yes, and confirmed that she had “ADHD” (Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder).

26. In answer to the next question, whether she was aware of any aids or adjustments which would assist her in performing her job, she answered “Not as yet”. 27. [NAME_46], Manager, [NAME_49], emailed [NAME_32]’s co- manager, [NAME_39], on 15 June 2023 (448) attaching a copy of the claimant’s responses, and recommending that a referral should be arranged through [NAME_43] ([NAME_50]) in order to provide the claimant with the support required. 28. [NAME_32] emailed [NAME_50] (via the respondent’s [NAME_50] providers, [NAME_145]) on 15 June 2023 (450) giving the claimant’s name and staff number: “The above staff member is moving from contractor to a permanent position. She disclosed in her vetting that she has ADHD, we were advised to reach out to yourselves as part of staff on boarding to make you aware. Please advise if you require anything further from us.” 29. In response, the [NAME_50] Manager said: “Many thanks for the enquiry, at present there is no need for [NAME_50] involvement, please feel free to refer back as needed.”

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 18 30. [NAME_32] considered that [NAME_50] were the experts, and accordingly took no further action at that stage. She did not discuss the claimant’s condition with her.

31. The claimant was initially introduced into the correspondence team, dealing with queries sent by email or post from investors. There was also a telephones team, similarly answering queries which were received by telephone. The respondent planned to train her to start taking telephone calls in time during the probation period.

32. The queries relate to products operated by a third party business, [NAME_51]. When the claimant started, as with all new starts, she was shown the [NAME_51] website to read up about the company and their products; she was also shown the [NAME_52] site used as a data repository containing information about the funds, processes, key facts, contact details and “how to” information. Queries from investors about how to deal from their account or how to update their address can be answered using the information contained there.

33. The team has access to a number of templated responses for correspondence, and identification and verification flowcharts to be followed. 34. [NAME_32] received feedback from colleagues of the claimant that she was unsure how to respond to certain queries, and was contacting them for advice but not necessarily taking it on board. She therefore arranged 1:1 training for the claimant to assist her.

35. The team used an online messaging tool, [NAME_53], to communicate with each other, asking questions or offering advice. [NAME_32] set up a [NAME_53] chat between the claimant and [NAME_54], an experienced administrator, to assist her. 36. [NAME_33] commenced employment in the team at the same time, and she was given some of the same training as the claimant. [NAME_32] also included her in the [NAME_53] chat with [NAME_57] and the claimant.

37. On 13 September 2023, the claimant was working in the open plan space within the respondent’s office. She alleges that while she was discussing a case with [NAME_58], [NAME_32] stood up from the other side of a partition and said loudly “Will you be quiet”, which the claimant considered to be humiliating as it was said in front of other staff. [NAME_32]’s evidence was somewhat different. She was speaking with a [NAME_140], a director who had travelled to the office from Dublin, when she noted that the claimant and [NAME_58] were having a conversation, and

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 19 talking extremely loudly. She said that she said to both of them “can you turn the volume down a bit”, and that was that. She denied that she used the words “Will you be quiet”, or that she was angry or loud when she said that.

38. When asked about this matter in cross-examination, she maintained that [NAME_32] had told her to be quiet, but denied that she was speaking loudly. However, on 8 November 2023, [NAME_32] discussed this issue with her in a meeting, that meeting was recorded by the claimant without confirming to [NAME_32] that she was doing so, and a transcript was produced to the Tribunal (512ff). The transcript records the following exchange (the timings are not noted here) (518ff): “[NAME_24]: …you know, if there’s some people who are maybe louder than others in the office. [NAME_9]: And that can tend to be me. I mean, you did tell me to “Be Quiet” a few weeks ago. So that’s more like I’m just considering my colleagues because I know that in that environment it is more stimulating. So I know that, yeah, I’m aware that I can be the person that contributes to noise. [NAME_24]: Do you think that’s partly to do with your ADHD? You get louder. [NAME_9]: That kind of environment. Well, no, it’s just that I, well, I do have strong projection. Well, I have a strong voice. And so then naturally, if we’re in conversation and if we’re talking sort of casually between things, yeah, I can. I can be louder.” 39. Before this Tribunal, the claimant maintained that her volume was related to her ADHD; in this transcript, she did not consider this to be the case.

40. We concluded that [NAME_32]’s evidence was to be preferred to that of the claimant in this regard. [NAME_32] spoke before us about this matter, and was clear in her recollection and denial of the claimant’s allegation. She confirmed that she spoke to both the claimant and [NAME_58], as they were both being loud in the conversation, because she was concerned that they would interrupt colleagues in the vicinity who were on calls, as well as herself and [NAME_61]. We accepted that [NAME_32] simply asked them to speak more quietly, an entirely reasonable instruction by a manager in the circumstances.

41. A number of [NAME_53] messages between the claimant and [NAME_58] were produced (470ff), starting on 27 September 2023. In these messages, it is apparent that they were asking each other questions about particular issues arising. On two occasions, [NAME_58] described herself as feeling “rattled”, partly due to being asked to do things she had not done before. She said to the claimant: [redacted]

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 20 42. On 3 October 2023, [NAME_62], [COMPANY_65] Manager, emailed all staff in [COMPANY_66], including the claimant (475/6): “Good Afternoon There was a message sent out last week (28th September) on the [NAME_53] chat by [NAME_67] advising that from 16 October all fulltime staff are required to work in the office 3 days a week. At this stage I am not sure how this will be monitored but thought everyone should be aware in case they are not part of the group chat. I appreciate that there have been some people who have had permission to do less but we need to make things a bit more formal. If you come into this category can you please email [NAME_71] and myself with the reasons and we can put this forward to senior management for approval. This means that going forward you will no longer be able to work from home on any more than 2 days a week.” 43. In response, the claimant emailed [NAME_32] on the following day (475): “Hi [NAME_24] I hope you are well. I would like to request an adjustment that permits me the flexibility to work one-two days a week in the office, as opposed to the mandatory three. Whilst I do appreciate the ability to get support from colleagues when in the office as well as building team relationships, my experience of ADHD means that I often experience eye strain and migraines from the lighting and air conditioning/heating and find the extra stimulation (noise and distraction of an open plan office) impact my work progress. An adjustment that would support my office working is if I could wear noise cancelling headphones. This helps with the distractions and keeping in flow with the correspondence, and disruptions to a minimum. I have also made a point of booking the same desk location every time I’m in the office to help with consistency familiarity which is also helpful for setting up my work day for success. And I have made desk bookings now for several weeks in advance to ensure I’m organised to be in the office now desk bookings seems to be more competitive. Thanks. [NAME_9]” 44. [NAME_32] called the claimant and confirmed to her that she would be able to work from the office 1 to 2 days a week. She did not consider it necessary to email in response nor to record her permission. She regarded the 3 day a week instruction as a business preference but considered that it

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 21 was for her to manage the team herself. She considered that she had granted the claimant’s request.

45. The claimant’s evidence was that she was met with silence when she made this request. [NAME_32] did not provide a written response. Thereafter, the claimant rarely, if ever, worked in the office for 3 days each week, and in practical terms, mainly worked 1 day a week in the office and remotely for the remainder of the week until she went off sick, and subsequently resigned.

46. On 6 October 2023, the claimant completed and submitted a workplace adjustment referral to [NAME_72], an external provider of workplace adjustment advice to the respondent, and the [NAME_72] team acknowledged this referral by email to the claimant and [NAME_32] on that date (477).

47. On 9 October 2023, [NAME_72] emailed [NAME_32] (479) to advise that they had been unsuccessful in their attempts to follow up with the claimant, and asking [NAME_32] to request the claimant to respond to the email to arrange to call her. An assessment was conducted by them on 6 November 2023.

48. On 16 October 2023, the claimant reported to [NAME_32] that she had had a leak in her flat. On the following day, she emailed again (482) to advise that she was having difficulty coordinating with her letting agent and the maintenance company and had to remain at home in case matters deteriorated. [NAME_32] emailed the following day hoping that she was okay and asking if she had had “any joy” about the leak.

49. An exchange took place between them on 27 October 2023 (460). The claimant indicated that she was very distressed and was trying to get the upstairs neighbour and landlord informed. [NAME_32] expressed the hope that she could get it sorted, and asked if she would be back on later. The claimant replied that she did not think so, as there was an electrical danger as water was coming through the light fixture. [NAME_32] replied: “Ok if not safe you could go to the office and leave them to work on your flat?” Then: “Or you will need to take a half day holiday”. Having received no reply for some 25 minutes, she asked again if the claimant was okay, and the claimant advised that contractors were coming to her property that afternoon, but that she needed to be in the flat. 50. [NAME_32] considered that she was simply asking the claimant to take time off as she would any other employee.

51. The [NAME_72] assessment was carried out, as indicated above, on 6 November 2023, and a report was produced to the respondent by [NAME_141], the assessor (336). This was sent to [NAME_32] by email on 5

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 22 December 2023 (580). In that email, Callum paddock, Workplace Support Co-ordinator, advised that the items being processed were detailed on the last page of the report, and that all items had been automatically ordered unless specifically identified as being for the respondent to action.

52. The report recorded that the claimant’s role was hybrid, with “mandated 3 days in the office but agreement at present is 2 days in the office, and the remainder of the week she is working from home.” 53. The report went on to set out the claimant’s symptoms as she reported them.

54. It then recommended a number of adjustments.

55. Firstly, the report recommended that the claimant be given ADHD coping strategy coaching, by way of 2 2 hour sessions.

56. Secondly, the report recommended that she be provided with a noise cancelling headset, to cut out background noise to help aid focus and attention when she was in the office and on calls.

57. Thirdly, in relation to her eye pain and tenosynovitis, a 4 port USB hub was recommended for the peripheral items to be used with her laptop.

58. Fourthly, a compact keyboard was recommended in order to allow her to attain natural working positions and minimise overstretching.

59. Fifthly, a visor to minimise glare was recommended.

60. Sixthly, a vertical computer mouse was recommended in order to manage her current discomfort.

61. Seventhly, certain recommendations were made in relation to her workstation set up.

62. Eighthly, [NAME_75] and activities during them were recommended for the claimant.

63. This report was received by the respondent on 5 December 2023.

64. In early November 2023, the respondent received a report on their workflow system setting out the volumes of work carried out by their employees (780/1). They noted that the claimant’s outputs were recorded as being generally lower than the remainder of the team, including [NAME_58], who had started at the same time as the claimant.

65. This was the first time the respondent had access to such data, and it was available to all of the managers and senior managers with responsibility for the area in which the claimant worked. [NAME_32] therefore arranged a

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 23 one-to-one meeting with the claimant on 8 November 2023. The claimant was in her probation period until the end of December 2023, and [NAME_32] wished to raise with her the concerns which she had about the report. They met by way of a [NAME_76] call, which was arranged at short notice by an invitation sent to the claimant approximately 40 minutes before it was due to begin, at 11am. The claimant attended with [NAME_32].

66. The claimant recorded the call without telling [NAME_32] that she was doing so. She prepared a transcript (512ff). 67. [NAME_32] raised with the claimant that she was now doing 1 day a week in the office. The claimant stated that she knew that her productivity was better when she worked at home, whereas in the office there were more distractions and a louder environment. She told the claimant that while they were awaiting the assessment (by [NAME_72]), “So I think what we really need to do is see you in the office two days a week. If we don’t, there could be more questions asked. So we really need to try and aim for those two days in the office. We have many people working three days a week in the office.” The claimant replied “Yeah”. 68. [NAME_32] went on to say that if there were issues with the booking system (relating to the booking of desks in the hot-desking system) she should tell her and she would take that up with the responsible individuals to see if it would be possible to block out certain desks.

69. She referred to two calls which the claimant had had, which she wished to discuss with her, and asked her if she felt there were gaps in her training as to how to deal with them. The claimant had indicated that she was not sure about what the query was. [NAME_32] indicated to the claimant that “what we need to look at is do you need more training. Is it just a matter of more practice and getting more comfortable with it…” She went on to say that she would send her the recordings of the 2 calls so that the claimant could listen to them, and then if she felt that more training was required, she should tell [NAME_32]. The claimant said that she found that sharing information with [NAME_58] was very helpful.

70. Following a discussion about how to handle email queries, [NAME_32] advised the claimant that what was expected from the team was 15 to 20 items to be dealt with a day. The claimant replied “Sure”. [NAME_32] continued: “And what we were seeing from you was maybe 6 a lot of days now this is reporting we’re pulling from [NAME_77] if you think those numbers are wrong please do challenge it OK. Because what I’m a bit concerned that we’ve we’ve done a lot of training with we did a lot of training with [NAME_78] you’d love one to one training with [NAME_78] your numbers are still looking quite low. We did see an improvement when I assigned a work to you.”

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 24 71. The claimant sought to explain that there may be delays which would hold her up, and she also said that her laptop, which had been slow, was moving much more quickly now, which helped.

72. The claimant also stressed that she wanted [NAME_32] to understand that she could feel confident that she was doing her best to participate and perform in the team: “Yeah, I hope that’s clear, I would hate to think that there is any question around that, you know, given there’s been quite a lot happening outside in my personal life with a, you know, two week leak and then a secondary leak and you know I’m dealing with some personal injury.” 73. The claimant also said that she needed more support for her ADHD, the first time when she advised that her condition was holding her back and having an impact on her productivity. [NAME_32] was concerned to ensure that the workplace assessment was carried out so that any adjustments could be put in place for her assistance. 74. [NAME_32] stated that her concern was partly as a result of the claimant’s probation being due to come to an end at the end of December. She said “So I think we just work together over the coming weeks and hopefully we’ll see that improvement and the issues at home will settle down and hopefully the Workplace Assessment will help as well. But I think we do need to see more. I think looking at the numbers, you do jump out and that’s where it’s in your management have questioned me on the numbers because when we look across the team and people with around the same amount of experience, your numbers are very low compared to them or much lower.” 75. She also advised the claimant that she was concerned about her tone of abruptness in the calls recorded. She encouraged the claimant, if she were unsure of anything, to speak to others in the team who would be available and able to help her, such as [NAME_79] or [NAME_55].

76. Following the meeting, [NAME_32] sent an email to the claimant on 8 November 2023 (533). In it she asked that the claimant complete the outstanding mandatory course which she had not yet completed. She also noted that the claimant was suggesting that the time she had needed to attend to the leak in her flat should have been treated as emergency leave, and said that she was seeking advice from HR about this.

77. She went on: “We discussed the number of days in the office and working from home. The expectation is 2-3 days a week in the office. You advised about pain in your wrist and also noise in the office. The workplace assessment should help with equipment to support your wrist and also headphones to help with the noise in the office. Please let me know how this assessment goes. You also mentioned it can be hard to book a desk for

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 25 some days, please book well in advance as others do and this should help with this issue. Please let me know if you encounter any further issues with booking a desk and I will raise with senior management.” 78. She also summarised the conversation with regard to the claimant’s handling of calls and correspondence. She concluded by saying that given her concerns she would not be comfortable passing the claimant’s probation at that time.

79. On 9 November 2023, [NAME_32] had an exchange of messages with the claimant on [NAME_53] (493). After a short greeting, she said: “we are v light on the ground today – [NAME_80] is off sick and [NAME_78], [NAME_81] w is off on hols. Please stay focused and let me know if any issues, if you can focus on day 3 then older items, thanks.” 80. The claimant replied: “yes – did see that in the corre chat. Will do…” 81. She then asked if it was correct that she could only see 4 items, to which [NAME_32] said that this was right, and asked her to attend to the older items with [NAME_58]. This received a “thumbs up” from the claimant, and [NAME_32] said “thanks”.

82. On 6 December 2023, [NAME_45] messaged the claimant (582) to remind her that there was a case assigned to her the previous day which was still left at close of business. He advised her that all cases allocated to her should be completed before she logged off. The claimant replied “Thanks for letting me know”. The claimant characterised this as a reprimand arising in consequence of her disability. We considered this not to be a reprimand but a reminder, and the claimant’s response does not indicate that she took it to be a reprimand.

83. On 7 December 2023, the claimant asserted that she was forced to work beyond her finishing time. Exchanges on that date indicate that the team was discussing the volume of work they were experiencing. [NAME_57] messaged at 3.23pm (584) to say “are we ok with items on day 3/10 today? Anyone need a hand completing these?” The claimant replied (as did others). She said that “I’ve got a few in my basket”, at 3.24pm. [NAME_86] messaged a minute before to say that she would be finished her items in about 2 minutes “if anyone needs a hand”. She repeated this offer shortly afterwards, as did [NAME_83]. [NAME_57] specifically replied to the claimant to inform her that he had picked an item out of her queue, and [NAME_32] replied to her to say “I will take a look if you can continue working through them please day 3 first” (585).

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 26 84. [NAME_32]’s evidence was that the work allocated to the claimant on that date was standard and not complex, and within the claimant’s competence and experience.

85. There was no evidence that the claimant was forced to work late on that date.

86. On 12 December 2023, [NAME_45] allocated the claimant 2 non-urgent cases at 3.35pm. She maintained in evidence that this meant that she required to stay beyond her scheduled finishing time of 4pm in order to complete these tasks. [NAME_32]’s evidence was that she was expected to attend to these cases but that it would have been acceptable for her to have done so the following day. There is no evidence that the claimant raised this at the time or asked whether the matters could wait until the next day.

87. We noted that [NAME_45] sent a note on 7 December 2023 at 10.20am to advise that [NAME_57] would assign the team, including the claimant, some work which was to be completed that day (582). A further message was sent by [NAME_45] at 4.08pm on telling the team that they had done great work, and that if they still had day 3 cases they should complete them before logging off. No such message was sent on 12 December 2023.

88. On 13 December 2023, the claimant alleged that the respondent refused to allow a colleague to assist with a particular task. A team chat on [NAME_53] demonstrates that on that day, at 2.43pm, [NAME_57] messaged to say that there were 6 tasks which were on their last day of “sla” (understood to mean the last day for completion of tasks according to their service level agreement), and 8 which were beyond that, so “we’re looking good to clear them today”. A number of encouraging messages followed, including one from [NAME_83] who said at 3.05pm that he was finished with what was assigned to him and offering for more to be assigned if needed. When the claimant noted at 3.09pm that some in her queue were taking her a while, and that she had 7, [NAME_85] asked if she wished to assign a couple to him. She thanked him, and then [NAME_32], at 3.11pm, said “please hang fire for now -@[NAME_83] please can you get the dealing callback”. [NAME_32] explained that he was required to carry out another urgent task as dealing calls required to be made that day, and so asked him to attend to that.

89. It is apparent that the claimant considers that this was the colleague whom the respondent refused to allow to assist the claimant, though it is also apparent that [NAME_86], on the same chat, had offered the same assistance, and there is no evidence as to whether or not the claimant took up that offer. [NAME_32] confirmed that she had assisted the claimant

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 27 (accepted by the claimant) for some 20 minutes on another matter earlier that day.

90. In addition, on 14 December 2023, (the next day) [NAME_85] offered the same assistance which was gratefully received by the claimant, without any intervention to prevent this assistance being provided (591).

91. On 13 December 2023, [NAME_32] wrote to the claimant (605) to invite her to a meeting at 11am on 28 December 2023 with her, by [NAME_87], to discuss her probation period and her ongoing employment with the respondent. She confirmed that the claimant was entitled to be accompanied to the meeting by a colleague or a trade union representative.

92. However, on 14 December 2023, [NAME_32] had a one-to-one meeting with the claimant, to follow up on the previous meeting and to discuss setting up the probation review meeting. The claimant recorded this meeting without seeking permission or advising [NAME_32] that she was doing so. She then arranged for a transcript of the recording to be produced and it was presented in the [NAME_8] for this Hearing (607ff). 93. [NAME_32] pointed out at the start of the meeting that the respondent was asking everyone to do extra hours due to pressure on the business due to being short-staffed and also having staff off sick. She observed that the claimant was doing between 10 and 18 items depending on the complexity of the query, and asked her “Where do you think you’re struggling a bit? It’s because you’ve had quite enough training with [NAME_88] and other people, [NAME_55]. I was just hoping that would have dropped a bit.” The claimant replied that it definitely had, but that she was completely unfamiliar with the complaints process which she had had to deal with the day before. She accepted that she deferred to her colleagues when she had a question, but pointed out that with some of the queries she had to look at two or three processes. She said she was doing her best. 94. [NAME_32] pointed out that she saw a lot of “reworks” coming back (that is, work done by the claimant which was then returned to the team on the basis that it needed to be redone). The claimant replied: “Yes. It’s a bit of a puzzle to me actually, because I usually make sure I’m going to complete it correctly and ask someone else in the team, so like a senior member of the team before I complete it. I got a rework on the one that we spoke about together yesterday.” [NAME_32] stressed to the claimant that she needed to adapt depending on the scenario. 95. [NAME_32] also observed that there seemed to be a lot of spelling mistakes or grammar, which she had seen in the feedback. The claimant expressed surprise about this, and [NAME_32] said that she would share some of the feedback with her from the checkers, though she did say that

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 28 sometimes they simply amend the work themselves rather than send back too many pieces of work.

96. The claimant said that because she was trying to get the numbers up and trying to move more quickly, and “then I guess that’s where the compromise is. I’m not spending as much time on the finer details. So yes, sorry about that.” 97. There was a coaching session scheduled for the following Wednesday for the claimant. 98. [NAME_32] then told the claimant that she could not defer the probation review until January, because her probation ran until 31 December 2023. The claimant advised that [NAME_89], her trade union, would be closed over the festive period and had no-one to accompany her. [NAME_32] suggested that she would see if another manager could carry out the review so it could be arranged sooner. However, she insisted that the review had to be carried out in December.

99. She went on to confirm that if the claimant needed more training “we would need to look at more training. Like I said you’ve had quite a lot of training.” The claimant said that she did not know if that was true, in terms of formal training. [NAME_32] stressed that training would be “on the job”, speaking to [NAME_85] or [NAME_90]. The claimant responded that she was aware of that, but that these were new query questions beyond her foundational knowledge. When she was pointed to [NAME_52], an internal information source, the claimant said that when she looked at documentation it was not as comprehensive as it needed to be, and she still needed to ask for clarity. [NAME_32] advised that it was not possible to tailor a procedure for every single scenario, but went on to say that the aim was for the claimant to get to the point where she was more self-sufficient, able to source those answers herself. She also said that she expected the claimant to be producing more pieces of work each day. 100. The discussion turned to the workplace assessment and to the adjustments put in place, including the coaching sessions. [NAME_32] said that “I was looking to increase you to three days a week once you’ve completed that coaching because that was to help you with ways of coping with the office environment.” [NAME_32] said that 3 days a week in the office was what was expected, and that she would have to discuss this matter with her manager, as the workplace assessment had been designed to assist her in the office, as well as the coaching. She said that if the claimant was unable to attend at the office 3 days a week, then they would require to speak to [NAME_50] as well.

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 29 101. Following the conclusion of this meeting, [NAME_32] sent the claimant an email at 4.37pm on 14 December 2023 (631), in which she cited a number of issues which related to the claimant’s work from 10 November to 14 December 2023. There were 22 items on the list, including issues relating to spelling, amended wording, grammar, incorrect references and other matters. 102. The claimant felt very strongly that the meeting, which she had anticipated would be a short meeting, was conducted in a formal, critical tone, which was unpredictable and caused her considerable anxiety. She felt it was destabilising, and that [NAME_32] failed to take account of the extra hours which she had been working and diminished her efforts. 103. The claimant also felt that [NAME_32]’s decision not to move the probation review meeting into January 2024 was unfair and distressing, in light of what she saw as the respondent’s failure to provide any reasonable adjustments by that date. 104. On 15 December 2023, the claimant attended for work, but she felt distressed and debilitated, so she signed off work shortly thereafter. [NAME_32] sent the claimant a message at 9.47am by [NAME_37] (460): “Hi [NAME_9], how are you? I need to send you an email today regarding your year end review. Please can you advise the best email address to contact you on. Many thanks [NAME_70].” Immediately thereafter she sent a further message: “Hope you are ok.” 105. The claimant regarded this as a dehumanising message which ignored her disability. 106. On 19 December 2023, the claimant attended her GP, and was certified as unfit for work due to “Stress and Anxiety” (643), for a period of 10 days until 29 December 2023. She subsequently submitted fitness to work notes from her GP dated 29 December 2023 (644); 11 January 2024 (661); 7 February 2024 (700); 6 March 2024 (765); 16 April 2024 (794) and 29 May 2024 (975). These notes covered the claimant’s absence until 10 July 2024, the day after she resigned. 107. Following 15 December 2023, therefore, the claimant never returned to work with the respondent. 108. On that date, [NAME_32] emailed the claimant (637) to say: “Hi [NAME_9] As you logged off unwell today and did not confirm your availability for 28 Dec, I have pushed out your probation period to Jan to allow for our meeting to go ahead on 9 Jan.

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 30 I will send you a separate letter of invite and would like to draw your attention to the 2 January deadline. Many thanks, [NAME_70]” 109. On 5 January 2024, [NAME_32] sent the claimant an invitation to a probation review meeting which was rearranged for 25 January 2024 (642). The letter was dated 15 December 2023, but was sent to the claimant by email on 5 January. 110. On 8 January 2024 (679), the claimant emailed [NAME_32] asking for an agenda or talking points in advance of the probation review meeting (652), in order to minimise her stress and anxiety relating to the meeting. She copied in her trade union representative, [NAME_91], who was to accompany her to the meeting. She also asked that any action plans, PIPs or other performance plans be shared with her in advance. 111. [NAME_32] replied on 12 January 2024 (678) to say that there was no PIP or action plan in place. She attached a copy of the [NAME_50] referral and response from the point when the claimant became an employee with the respondent, together with copies of [NAME_53] chats and notes from their recent meetings. She also stressed that apart from mandatory training within [NAME_93] and the initial system and product training when she joined, the remainder of the training was on the job training within the team, which was standard for [COMPANY_44] roles, in addition to the [NAME_52] site. 112. [NAME_94] responded on 18 January 2024 (678) to say: “Thanks for the information, its appreciated.” 113. The respondent conducts annual assessments of its staff, usually carrying out the end of year assessment during the course of December. [NAME_32] was unable to give the claimant her end of year rating due to her absence on sick leave, but sent it to the claimant by email on 12 January 2024. 114. The claimant’s assessment (645) resulted in a performance rating of “Inconsistent Performer” and a behaviour rating of “Good”. 115. [NAME_32] noted: “I have rated [NAME_9]’s performance as inconsistent due to her level of output since joining the team. [NAME_9] to date has not been able to demonstrate that she can complete all aspects of the role, despite extensive training and support being provided. [NAME_9] has recently undergone a work place assessment and had equipment delivered to the office. [NAME_9] also has coaching sessions scheduled to assist her with her ADHD. I am hopeful that with the additional support being offered to

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 31 [NAME_9] she will have the opportunity to demonstrate she can fulfil the requirements of the role.” 116. [NAME_32] considered that even considering her ADHD the difference in output between the claimant and her colleagues was too big. She decided that due to concerns about her overall productivity, the additional support time now in place following the workplace assessment and the volume of repeat reworks and errors after feedback, it was appropriate to extend the claimant’s probation by a period of 2 months to allow her to meet the standards expected. She drafted a letter to the claimant (657) setting out this decision, but it was never sent to the claimant (for reasons which were unclear to us). 117. [NAME_32] decided, in addition, that the claimant should be referred to [NAME_50] to review her and establish whether or not she would be fit to attend the probation review meeting. 118. On 11 January 2024, the claimant wrote to [NAME_91], her trade union representative (658), to advise that she had had 3 unanswered emails sent to [NAME_32] about her illness. She explained that she felt that her illness and mental health were not being taken seriously, and that she could not feel less valued or respected. 119. On 12 January 2024, [NAME_32] also wrote to the claimant attaching her notes from the meeting of 14 December (669), and summarising the terms of the meeting. She referred to the fact that the claimant had had a significant amount of on the job training; to repeat errors of spelling and grammar; to the number of pieces of work which she was able to complete each day; to the need to assess the full extent of each query, and when passing to a colleague to disclose the full details. 120. With regard to the number of days worked in the office, [NAME_32] said: “We discussed working from the office 3 days a week given you now have all the equipment arranged by the workplace assessment team. You felt this was not necessary and preferred to work days a week. This is something we will need to discuss further as given the support provided and the upcoming coaching we have arranged for you. The hybrid working model within [NAME_4] is that you work at least 3 days a week in the office from the start of 2024. Please confirm why you believe this is not feasible. We have been very flexible with your days in the office. The issues you raised re being in the office should have been resolved by the wpa. I am keen to understand more about your concerns about working in the office 3 days a week.” 121. The claimant was referred to [NAME_50], and had a telephone consultation with [NAME_95], [NAME_50] Manager, on 8 February 2024. Her report (359/360) set out the current situation as reported by the claimant:

[redacted] “[NAME_9] has advised how they had become increasingly anxious and overwhelmed toward the end of last year and a new hybrid policy came into effect October 16th, where 60% attendance was mandatory. As a result, they requested one or two days at the office rather than three, predominantly to reduce the symptoms relating to ADHD such as distraction, over-stimulation and to reduce her migraine. At this time, she reports to seeing an increase in performance management. They were also advised that they may not pass probation at this time. We discussed how they became overwhelmed and reached a point where they were unable to sleep without medication and that they reported a negative impact to their cognitive function…” 122. [NAME_97] went on to set out a number of recommendations in her conclusion: “[NAME_9] reports symptoms of and has received a diagnosis of work related stress from their GP. Current medication of zopiclone are only to be used on a temporary basis to assist with sleep as these can become highly addictive. [NAME_9] reports that with appropriate support, they would be able to return to the workplace. I am optimistic that this return could occur within the next four weeks. • [NAME_9] is likely to benefit from contacting the Employee Assistance Programme via [NAME_98]: [NAME_98] Employee Assistance Programme Helpline: [PHONE]. Option 1 is available 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. • [NAME_9] is likely to benefit from maintaining a routine on a daily basis. I suggest the following temporary adjustments for your consideration: • The business may wish to offer a phased return to work, starting at half their normal hours, and increasing to their full contractual hours over 2 weeks period; Week 1: 50% of contractual weekly hours followed by Week 2: 75% of contractual weekly hours, gradually increasing to their full hours by the end of the second week • Some useful tools that may assist [NAME_9] include • Use of checklists, ‘post-it notes’ and templates would be recommended as well as mind maps to help to visualise tasks and procedures. Break down tasks into manageable chunks. Careful scheduling of workload, setting short term goals to reduce the risk of becoming overwhelmed. Ensure each task is completed before starting another. Avoid switching between tasks. Visual prompts such as wall charts, whiteboards and ‘post-it notes’ for routines and reminders. More time to understand documents and procedures, or complex tasks but importantly, it should be recognised that individuals with ADHD can find it difficult working to high targets and are unlikely to achieve these in line with their peers who do not have

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 33 neuro-diverse traits. A reduction in workload may allow [NAME_9] to revisit their work and allow time to check for errors. You may wish to consider a 20% reduction for a three month period and assess/increase accordingly. • [NAME_75] to prevent feelings of being overwhelmed may be prudent. • Working from home where operationally feasible, may reduce distraction for [NAME_9]. They report three days would be too challenging. It is for the business to consider whether these adjustments are reasonable.” 123. On 22 February 2024, [NAME_32] wrote to the claimant to invite her to a probation review meeting by [NAME_87] on 23 February 2024 (715). Later that day, she emailed the claimant (714) to advise that the purpose of the meeting was to review her probation period, looking to discuss areas of concern such as productivity, level of reworks and call handling. She also advised that she would wish to discuss the recent [NAME_50] review. 124. The meeting took place on 23 February 2024. [NAME_32] chaired the meeting, and [NAME_45] attended to take notes (719ff). the claimant also attended and was accompanied by [NAME_94] as her trade union representative. 125. The claimant recorded the call (without advising anyone that she was doing so) and a transcript of her recording appears at 723ff. 126. Following the meeting [NAME_94] emailed [NAME_32] (copying the claimant) (747) to say: “Thanks for today everyone, appreciate your time and the empathy shown to [NAME_9]. These meetings can often be difficult for all parties, and often challenging.” 127. [NAME_32] emailed the claimant on 29 February 2024 (752), copying [NAME_94]: “Further to last week’s probation review meeting, I am contacting you to share the attached update. We are extending your revised probation end date from today (29 February) by two months. this is to allow one month of phased return and one month to implement and make use of the tools provided as a result of the workplace assessment. I am happy to reconvene for a short call to confirm the above outcome, please let me know if you would like to reconvene for a call tomorrow.” 128. [NAME_32] gave evidence, which we accepted, that she intended to discuss proposed adjustments on her return to work, at that call, though she

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 34 does not say so in her email. However, the claimant did not respond to the offer of a call set out in the email. 129. On 22 February 2024, just prior to the probation review meeting, the claimant raised a grievance, which she sent to the Human Resources & Employment Relations department of the respondent (716ff). [NAME_32] was unaware of the grievance until after the probation review meeting, and once she became aware of it, she ceased dealing with the claimant’s probation. 130. In her grievance, the claimant alleged that a marked deterioration in her relationship with [NAME_32] took place following her request for reasonable adjustments on 4 October 2023 by way of disability support, and she said that a series of detrimental incidents took place, including a year- end performance review which took place while the claimant was on disability-related sick leave. 131. Further, she alleged that at a meeting of 8 November, without warning, [NAME_32] raised “an imminent probation fail”, and performance improvement deadlines were raised less than 28 days prior to the probation deadline of 30 December. 132. She alleged that from 27 October until she went on sick leave, she was subjected to intensive monitoring and scrutiny, inadequate and untimely reasonable adjustments, inconsistent feedback and insufficient training. Her performance was constantly measured against that of non-disabled colleagues. 133. Finally, the claimant stated that she experienced an unsafe and unsupportive workplace, which resulted in stress and anxiety, which exacerbated her physical and mental symptoms of ADHD, culminating in a prolonged period of burnout. 134. She asked that the respondent set up a grievance hearing as soon as possible. 135. [NAME_99], UK Employee Relations Manager for the respondent, corresponded with the claimant about the arrangements for the grievance hearing, and confirmed that [NAME_26] was identified as the manager to hear the grievance. She provided [NAME_102] with a set of papers relating to the background of the case, including a copy of the grievance, details of the probation review meetings, the [NAME_50] and [NAME_72] reports, together with other documents relating to performance discussions between the claimant and [NAME_32]. 136. [NAME_102] determined that it was appropriate to deal with the claimant’s grievance as well as her probation review at the same time, so as to avoid

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 35 the need for two separate hearings in circumstances where there was considerable overlap between the two matters. 137. On 11 April 2024, [NAME_45] emailed the claimant (791) noting that her sick line was due to end the following week. He said he was reaching out to see how she had been, and if she would be returning to work then. The claimant replied on 15 April 2024 (791) to say that she had yet to receive confirmation from [NAME_32] for a welfare meeting to support her return to work. [NAME_45] replied that day (792) to advise that they would normally set that up on her return to work. 138. The grievance hearing took place on 18 April 2024 by [NAME_87]. The claimant attended and was accompanied by [NAME_103], [NAME_89] representative. [NAME_102] chaired the hearing, and [NAME_106] attended to provide advice to him. [NAME_107] attended and took minutes (798ff). The hearing lasted from 12.00 until 1.50pm. 139. Once again, the claimant recorded the hearing without disclosing to anyone present that she was doing so. A transcript of her recording was produced (808ff). 140. The claimant was upset, and emphasised that she was unhappy with the level of support provided during her probationary period. 141. At the conclusion of the hearing, [NAME_102] wished to carry out further investigation before reaching a decision. He considered that some of the allegations she made were serious but that they were not supported by the evidence. 142. The claimant was provided with a copy of the minutes from the grievance hearing by email on 23 April 2024 (854) and was invited to mark any changes on the minutes and return them to [NAME_106]. She responded by saying that she considered there were a significant number of inaccuracies and excluded information, and presented tracked changes to the minutes (854) on 26 April 2024. 143. The claimant considered that she was placed under significant pressure in being required to provide her comments by 26 April, and regarded this as evidence of how the business continued to discount her unique needs and disability and applied [NAME_36] to her (852). However, she did provide those comments by that date, and confirmed that she would be able to meet with [NAME_102] on 29 April 2024 to receive the outcome of her grievance. 144. The claimant also provided additional documentation to allow [NAME_102] to consider her position further, on 26 April 2024.

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 36 145. [NAME_102] considered that sufficient time was given to the claimant to review the minutes, while seeking to ensure that progress was made with the process. 146. As part of his investigation, he spoke to [NAME_58] (842). She had had what she described as a positive working relationship with [NAME_32], and passed her probation. He also spoke with [NAME_32] (862), and obtained her comments on the minutes of the grievance hearing as well as further evidence about her concerns about the claimant’s performance. 147. After the Hearing, and conducting further investigations, [NAME_102] took some time to review the information and reach his conclusions. He wrote to the claimant on 24 May 2024 to confirm his decision (962). 148. With regard to the claimant’s probation review, he accepted the genuine concerns of the business relating to the claimant’s performance and noted that there was evidence that her output had been continually lower than her colleagues’ throughout her probation. However, he also advised that his investigation had led him to conclude that she did not have clearly defined standards set at the start of the probation. In this, he recognised that this was not in line with the respondent’s policy, and did not set her up to succeed at the start of her probation. He also said that he was not clear that she had had regular, formal 1:1 meetings to discuss her progress against performance expectations prior to 4 October when concerns were first raised with her. 149. He also observed that while adjustments had been put in place for her, she had had insufficient time to demonstrate that the adjustments had allowed her to make significant improvements in her performance. 150. [NAME_102] therefore concluded: “As I do not believe it would be in the best interest of either you or the business to continue to extend your probation, considering the length of time the probation period has already been extended, I will be making a recommendation to the business that they clearly set out your performance expectations when you return to the office, under a Performance Improvement Plan (PIP) and formally provide feedback against role performance on at least a monthly basis and as per the plan. This is a positive tool to support your success and ensure that there are clear and achievable goals in place, and an action plan to get there. As a result, my decision is that, by default, your probation period is passed.” 151. With regard to the grievance, [NAME_102] set out his decision in relation to different aspects raised by the claimant.

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 37 152. He addressed the claimant’s complaint that the respondent made inadequate reasonable adjustments relating to the claimant’s ADHD, but did not uphold this, while recognising the claimant’s concerns about returning to the office 3 days a week relating to the office environment and its impact upon her. While making a recommendation about this, he did not uphold this aspect of the grievance. 153. With regard to her complaint that in December 2023 a directive was given that all work had to be completed on the same day, which was alleged to demonstrate that the business did not take proper account of her disability, he was satisfied that the example she provided was a reasonable business decision as to how to utilise the people in the team, and not evidence of the business failing to make reasonable adjustments for her.

Accordingly, he did not uphold this aspect of the grievance. 154. The focus on spelling and grammar was, he considered, reasonable, and an adjustment would be recommended in order to allow her more time to check her work. He did not uphold this aspect of the grievance. 155. He did not uphold the claimant’s grievance about the respondent’s failure to make adjustments to allow her to work in the office, nor about alleged comments made to her about wearing a visor in the office. He also concluded that there was no requirement to work overtime by the respondent and did not uphold this aspect of the grievance. He found that [NAME_32] had not placed the claimant on a formal PIP. 156. [NAME_102] took the view that the business had put in place reasonable adjustments but needed to articulate better her performance expectations on her return to work, and as a result a PIP would be put in place to allow her to understand this. He did not uphold this aspect of the grievance. 157. He decided not to uphold the grievance insofar as criticising [NAME_32] for not challenging the original [NAME_50] report which said no further action was required, nor for referring matters back to [NAME_50] after October. 158. The claimant’s grievance raised a complaint that she was being measured against non-disabled peers, but [NAME_102] considered that the [NAME_50] recommendation of a reduction of 20% in her expected output addressed this concern. He did not uphold this aspect of the grievance. 159. [NAME_102] found that the business had not failed to provide adequate support and training for the claimant, and had not been guilty of deliberately preventing senior staff from helping her where sought. He did not uphold this aspect of the grievance, nor did he consider that the respondent had failed to provide sufficient training to the claimant, which followed the model used across the bank.

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 38 160. He addressed a number of concerns raised about a lack of support by [NAME_32], but concluded that these grievances were not to be upheld. He did not find that the reason why [NAME_58] passed her probation and the claimant did not was related to the claimant’s disability. 161. [NAME_102] then set out his conclusion and recommendations: “As set out above, in my reaching my decision I have taken into consideration all the information available to me and on this basis I can find no evidence to support your allegation(s). However, as advised, I have decided that you should pass your probation to allow a more structured review of your performance and outline the following recommendations and adjustments to support your return to work. In light of my findings I make the following recommendations to be implemented upon your return to work:

1. The business is recommended to fully consider your request for flexible working, including to consider the possibility of you attending the office once per week (20%) rather than the standard requirement of 60%.

2. The business is to make clear that overtime isn’t mandatory. In addition, the business is to further consider how to best allocate work so it is not assigned late in the day (therefore avoiding the situation where the only way for staff to clear their tasks is to work late).

3. On your return to the office the business is recommended to set out clear and transparent performance expectations in the form of a PIP to address performance concerns, and to ensure formal, regular 1:1s are in place to allow robust performance management and support. In addition to the above, the following adjustments should be implemented, based on the advice from [NAME_43] (in addition to the tools provided by the WPA):

1. Rehabilitated return to work (Week 1: 50% of contractual weekly hours followed by Week 2: 75% of contractual weekly hours, gradually increasing to their full hours by the end of the second week) 2. 20% reduction in performance targets, to be reviewed in 3 months, allowing you more time to revisit work 3. Additional ‘[NAME_75]’ 4. Setting short term goals and, where possible, scheduling workload to be broken down into manageable chunks.” 162. He confirmed that if the claimant were unhappy with the outcome of her grievance, she could submit an appeal within ten working days of the date of his letter.

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 39 163. On 3 June 2024, the claimant submitted an appeal against the grievance outcome by email (978) attaching a letter setting out the basis for her appeal (980ff). 164. The appeal was acknowledged by [NAME_106] on 6 June 2024 (987). She apologised to the claimant for the “slight delay” in acknowledging the appeal, and confirmed that the appeal would be passed to a manager who would be responsible for hearing the appeal. 165. On 6 June 2024, the claimant emailed the respondent (988) to submit her letter of resignation (990ff). 166. She stated: “Following my grievance appeal letter of 3 June 2024 and enduring eight months of continuous and pervasive disability discrimination, I am compelled to resign from my position at [NAME_4], with notice. During my tenure at [NAME_4], I appreciated the invitation to become a permanent member and looked forward to a future with the company. However, it is now evident that [NAME_4] fails to uphold the values it promotes in its Inclusion and Diversity Agenda. When I disclosed my disability and proactively requested reasonable adjustments, I expected to be met with respect, empathy and timely support. Instead, my repeated requests were denied, and the lack of support exacerbated my condition. Consequently, I initiated a formal grievance on 23 February 2024. [NAME_4] then took 13 weeks (91 days) to address my disability needs and allegations. As of today, 6 June 2024, I have not received acknowledgement of my Grievance Appeal letter dated 3 June 2024. The response to my requests have been consistently discriminatory, insensitive, unreasonable and untimely, and negatively impacting my mental health and leading to financial penalties due to being placed on SSP since February.” 167. She went on to list a number of examples which, she said, illustrated how continuing to work at [NAME_4] was untenable but also harmful to her. 168. The examples were set out as follows: “ 1. Grievance Process Failures: The grievance process itself has contributed to the deterioration of my health and well-being, compounding disability injury and absence. [NAME_4] took 13 weeks (91 days) to conclude the grievance, and as of 6 June 2024, I have not received acknowledgement of my Grievance Appeal dated 3 June 2024. The organisation’s lack of duty of care and contractual obligations, as evidenced in the Grievance report provided on 24 May 2024, reveals an intent to ignore systemic and cultural biases related to failings in

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 40 disability support, training and workplace adjustments. This dehumanising report and its implied attitude demonstrates a culture of corporate ‘diversity and inclusion washing’ where promotion and public image are prioritised over practice and implementation of disabled employees’ well-being and safety.

2. Factual Inaccuracies: The Grievance Report contained numerous factual inaccuracies and upheld none of my allegations, yet still passed my probation. The contradictory terms of the report highlight a disingenuous and unreliable approach to my serious and distressing experience. This undermines confidence in the process and the company’s competence in understanding and addressing discriminatory incidents and supporting neurodivergent employees.

3. GDPR Violations: Failure by [NAME_110] and the GDPR department to securely send private and confidential, sensitive personal data via password-protected or secure mail, as stipulated by GDPR guidelines, exemplifies negligence and causes significant distress as to internal compliance protocols, and the safety of my data.

4. Unreasonable delays in Reasonable Adjustments: [NAME_4]’s astonishing 246-day delay in agreeing to non-physical disability adjustments, coupled with the necessity of escalating the request through a Grievance process, highlights a severe operational and managerial failure. This delay has significantly undermined my ability to perform my duties and represents a profound breach of trust and confidence.

5. Managerial Failures: Throughout the process, my functional manager consistently failed to provide adequate support, empathy or proper policy guidance. The refusal to address extenuating circumstances, such as health issues and major life disruptions (house leak, tenosynovitis, migraines) underscores a fundamental failure to fulfil managerial responsibilities.

6. Denial of Grievances and Contradiction to Inclusion and Diversity Principles: [NAME_4]’s public commitment to diversity and inclusion, my experience contradicts these principles. Discriminatory treatment related to my disability, including the refusal to address grievances regarding both the policy and the received rating and assessment of my Year-End performance policy and performance assessments, undermines the company’s stated values.

7. Unsubstantiated Capability Concerns: Despite my compliance with all expectations as an employee by attending two capability meetings, two probation reviews and an [NAME_43] consultations, and providing substantial evidence for my grievance, [NAME_4] has failed to provide case-specific evidence to substantiate alleged capability concerns. The suspicion of my capability is unwarranted and has caused reputational harm, hindering future employment opportunities.

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 41 8. Bad Faith: My Functional Manager’s dismissal of my experiences and [NAME_4]’s consistent failure to display empathy and reasonableness demonstrate a pattern of bad faith as evidenced through the Data Subject Access Request, reporting shows a misrepresentation of facts, which tarnished my reputation. They also neglected proper management of my probation. The refusal to acknowledge challenges and provide reasonable adjustments exacerbated my disability-related issues, leading to burnout and long-term disability-related leave.” 169. She complained about the discrepancy between the respondent’s public stance on diversity and inclusion and its practices, and concluded by saying that “My resignation is a result of the cumulative detriment experienced over these 246 days, involving numerous incidents that constitute a fundamental breach of contract by [NAME_4], particularly the implied term of trust and confidence. Being repeatedly subjected to an inaccessible, unsafe, unsupportive workplace and grievance process has caused additional psychiatric and disability injury, rendering my return to the role unviable and hazardous to my health. The conduct of the company has irrevocably damaged the employment relationship, amounting to constructive dismissal.” 170. [NAME_45] acknowledged receipt of the claimant’s resignation on 12 June 2024 (994), and advised her that her final day would be 9 July 2024. 171. [NAME_29], Senior Employee Relations Manager, took up the claimant’s grievance appeal, and emailed her on 11 June 2024 (993) to advise that she had been assigned the case. She advised the claimant that an appeal hearing would be arranged, and also that she had appointed [NAME_111] as hearing manager. The claimant replied on 14 June 2024 (996) to advise that she was unfit to attend a hearing, and that she remained signed off “due to the severe impact this experience has had on my disability and mental health.” She went on: “You are welcome to handle the appeal process on paper if you wish, but I see no point in participating further.” 172. [NAME_112] wrote again to the claimant on 24 June 2024 to suggest that she would hold a review of her cases, and focus on the 8 points detailed in the claimant’s letter of resignation. She invited the claimant to submit any further information to the points in her resignation letter by 28 June. 173. [NAME_112] decided that while she would not normally take the role of appeal manager, this was not a normal situation in that the claimant had indicated that she did not want to participate in a hearing. However, she did not want to leave the appeal without giving the claimant a response, and accordingly she decided that she would review the appeal and provide the claimant with an outcome to her appeal.

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 42 174. The claimant did not provide any further information in addition to her resignation letter. 175. [NAME_112] reviewed the papers and provided the claimant with a response on 8 July 2024 (999) by email. 176. With regard to the grievance process, she concluded that while there had been a slight delay, proper process had been followed; that the outcome letter was appropriate and did not support her allegations about the alleged intent to ignore systemic and cultural biases; and that the timeframe for handling the grievance was in line with the normal timeframes for concluding cases. 177. She found that the outcome letter was not contradictory, as the claimant alleged, and that there was no evidence that the outcome was discriminatory, but a fair opportunity to help her improve her performance levels. 178. [NAME_112] advised that she was unable to understand the claimant’s complaints about GDPR breaches, but that the documents sent to her during her grievance did not require to be password protected and therefore did not breach any rights of the claimant. 179. [NAME_112] did not reconsider the point made about the allegedly unreasonable delays in making reasonable adjustments as this had been dealt with and explained by [NAME_102] in his grievance response. The claimant had not provided any further evidence in this regard. 180. Similarly, she took the view that the claimant’s point about a general lack of support or empathy and proper policy guidance, as well as a failure to take into account major life disruptions, had already been addressed by [NAME_102]. 181. The claimant complained that the respondent had failed to address her grievance, and had acted inconsistently with its own diversity and inclusion principles, but [NAME_112] concluded that there was nothing which had not already been dealt with by [NAME_102]. 182. [NAME_112] then considered whether or not the claimant had been subjected to unsubstantiated capability concerns. She noted that the claimant was sent a pack ahead of the hearing which had detailed performance issues, showing volumes of work compared with her colleagues, and reworks required. She considered that nothing new arose from the decision made by [NAME_102], and disagreed with the claimant’s assertion that this would affect her future employment prospects.

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 43 183. Finally, [NAME_112] addressed the claimant’s point that there had been bad faith on the part of the respondent in dealing with her, which had led to her resignation. She found that this was not based on evidence that it was intentional or that management had acted inappropriately. She pointed out that the hearing manager had passed her probation, rather than causing constructive dismissal, and encouraged her to return to work with a number of recommendations and supportive measures in place. She concluded that [NAME_102] had followed a thorough process in line with the respondent’s expectations. 184. She concluded by saying: “It is with regret that you decided to tender your resignation when the outcome reached gave a clear path for you to continue with your career at [NAME_4] and detailed a number of helpful recommendations.” 185. The claimant’s employment with the respondent ended on 9 July 2024. 186. Following the claimant’s resignation, she had not, to the date of the Tribunal hearing, secured significant alternative employment. The claimant submitted statements of fitness to work from her GP marking her as unfit for work between 22 July and 23 October 2025 (1645-1647). She gave evidence to the effect that she participated in a production at the Edinburgh Festival Fringe in the late summer of 2025 (paragraph 285, claimant’s witness statement). 187. The claimant did find short-term employment with [NAME_113], and a one- month temporary contract with [NAME_114]. She sought to carry out self-employed work between October 2024 and April 2025. 188. The respondent conducted a redundancy exercise in which 3 of the claimant’s colleagues, namely [NAME_35], [NAME_116] and [NAME_117], were all made redundant by the respondent by 27 December 2024. They were all on the same grade as the claimant and carried out the same role as her. Under cross-examination, the claimant accepted that it was more likely than not that she would have been made redundant at the same time as her colleagues. 189. In June 2025, the claimant applied for a position with [NAME_118], a catering company providing hospitality services to Edinburgh Castle, in the Redcoat Cafe. She did not attend for the first interview she was offered, but after clarification was offered a second interview, to which she did attend. On 11 June 2025, she was emailed by [NAME_119], the tearoom manager, (1510) to advise that the rate of pay was £12.21 per hour; the contract was full time permanent; and the contracted hours would be 39 per week, working 5 days out of 7 with a flexible shift pattern. On being advised this, she confirmed that she wished to proceed with her application.

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 44 190. The claimant’s evidence before us was that the contract was in fact only for the period of the Edinburgh Festival, which she discovered during the interview. On 20 June 2025, following her interview, [NAME_122] of [NAME_118] emailed the claimant (1533) to advise her of the uniform to be worn, and to confirm that no annual leave would be authorised during the month of August due to the high volume of customers during the Tattoo season. 191. Notwithstanding the terms of the email of 11 June 2025, the claimant insisted in her evidence before us that she discussed with the manager the length of contract and the likely hours to be worked. She believed following those discussions that her contract would be for one month only (though she acknowledged that that was not what the email said and that she may have misunderstood), but also that there would be occasions when she would be required to work a 10+ hour day, and this was not feasible for her. As a result she did not take up this employment. 192. The claimant applied for a number of other jobs in that time, but was unsuccessful in obtaining any employment. 193. The claimant was accepted to start a Diploma in a Psychotherapy course starting in September 2025, but due to the debts she had accrued, and the impact of her depression and physical deterioration, she was unable to take up this place. From December 2023, the claimant has suffered recurrent migraines, insomnia, fatigue and an aggravation of tenosynovitis. 194. The claimant applied for [NAME_125], but was refused. She also applied twice for [NAME_126] but it is unclear from her witness statement whether or not she was successful in either of these applications. Submissions 195. Both parties presented lengthy written submissions, which were taken carefully into account by the Tribunal, but which are not summarised here. Where appropriate, reference is made to submissions in the Discussion and Decision section below. The Relevant Law 196. Section 123(1) of the Equality Act 2010 provides that:

“Proceedings on a complaint within section 120 may not be brought after the end of – (a) the period of three months starting with the date of the act to which the complaint relates, or

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 45 (b) such other period as the employment tribunal thinks just and equitable.”

197. Section 123(3)(a) provides that “conduct extending over a period is to be treated as done at the end of the period.” Section 123(3)(B) provides that “failure to do something is to be treated as occurring when the person in question decided on it.” 198. We also had regard to the authorities to which I was referred and which are of assistance in relation to this point. 199. We had reference to the well-known case of [NAME_127] v [COMPANY_144] t/a Leisure Link [2003] IRLR 434, in which the court confirmed that it is of importance to note that time limits are exercised strictly in employment and industrial cases. “When tribunals consider their discretion to consider a claim out of time on just and equitable grounds there is no presumption that they should do so unless they can justify failure to exercise the discretion. Quite the reverse. A tribunal cannot hear a complaint unless the applicant convinces it that it is just and equitable to extend time. So, the exercise of discretion is the exception rather than the rule.” 200. We also considered the important decision in British Coal Corporation v Keeble and Others [1997] IRLR 336, in which the EAT set out the factors which the Tribunal should consider in determining whether or not to exercise its discretion, namely the length of and reasons for the delay, the extent to which the cogency of the evidence is likely to be affected by the delay, the extent to which the party sued had cooperated with any requests for information, the promptness with which the claimant acted once she knew of the facts giving rise to the action and the steps taken by the claimant to obtain advice once she knew of the possibility of taking action. 201. We had regard to Abertawe Bro Morgannwg University Local Health Board v Morgan [2018] EWCA Civ 640 as demonstrating that the discretion is intended to be broad and unfettered. The discretion is intended to be broad, with which the appellate courts should be slow to interfere ([NAME_128] v Secretary of State for Health and Social Care [2024] EAT 2). The respondent referred to the explanation, in paragraph 15 of Morgan, where it was said that “If time began to run on [the date an adjustment was requested], a claimant might be unfairly prejudiced. In particular, the claimant might reasonably believe that the employer was taking steps to seek to address the relevant disadvantage, when in fact the employer was doing nothing at all. If this situation continued for more than three months, by the time it became or should have become apparent to the claimant that

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 46 the employer was in fact sitting on his hands, the primary time limit for bringing proceedings would already have expired.” 202. We also referred to Kingston-Upon-Hull City Council v Matuszowicz [2009] IRLR 288, as authority for the proposition that the failure to make adjustments is an omission, and not a continuing act. This decision was considered in [NAME_129] v Department for Work and Pensions [2023] EAT 114, by HHJ Beard. At paragraph 34, he stated: “In the absence of a finding that the employer has made a specific decision not to alleviate a disadvantage there must be judicial analysis to identify the notional date. It appears to me that this analysis must begin with the identification of the feature which causes disadvantage. This could be a PCP but could also be a physical feature or auxiliary aid. This will be a fact which dates the start of disadvantage. The next element to be considered is when it would be reasonable for the employer to have to take steps to alleviate the disadvantage. This is a factual finding and will vary. For instance, the date by which it would be reasonable to have to provide a chair could depend on whether a chair is already commercially available or the chair in question must be purpose built. That date would also amount to a finding of fact as to when a breach occurred. As such it would also assist the judge in identifying the notional date. The ET would then have to ask if there are facts which would allow it to conclude that the employer has acted inconsistently with the duty to make adjustments, if there are, then the notional date would arise at that point. Finally, if there is no inconsistent act, there will come a time when it would be reasonable for the employee, on the facts known to them, to conclude that the employer is not going to comply with the duty.” 203. At paragraph 37, he stated: “I conclude that the Employment Judge did misdirect himself as to the law when he indicated that it was the ET’s function to determine when the respondent might reasonably have been expected to make the adjustments as the start date for bringing the claim. It was appropriate for him to determine when the reasonable employer would have made the adjustment, however the ET would need to go on to consider when the reasonable employee, based on the facts known to the claimant, would conclude that the duty would not be complied with.” 204. Section 13(1) of the 2010 Act provides: “A person (A) discriminates against another (B) if, because of a protected characteristic, A treats B less favourably than A treats or would treat others.” 205. Section 20 of the 2010 Act sets out requirements which form part of the duty to make reasonable adjustments, and a person on whom that duty is imposed is to be known as A. The relevant sub-sections for the purposes of this case are sub-section (3) and (5). Sub-section (3): “The first requirement

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 47 is a requirement, where a provision, criterion or practice of A’s puts a disabled person at a substantial disadvantage in relation to a relevant matter in comparison with persons who are not disabled, to take such steps as it is reasonable to have to take to avoid the disadvantage.” Sub-section (5): “The third requirement is a requirement, where a disabled person would, but for the provision of an auxiliary aid, be put at a substantial disadvantage in relation to a relevant matter in comparison with persons who are not disabled, to take such steps as it is reasonable to have to take to provide the auxiliary aid.” 206. Section 21 of the 2010 Act provides as follows: “(1) A failure to comply with the first, second or third requirement is a failure to comply with a duty to make reasonable adjustments. (2) A discriminates against a disabled person if A fails to comply with that duty in relation to that person…” 207. Section 15 of the Equality Act 2010 provides: “ (1) A person (A) discriminates against a disabled person (B) if – a. A treats B unfavourably because of something arising in consequence of B’s disability, and b. A cannot show that the treatment is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. (2) Subsection (1) does not apply if A shows that A did not know, and could not reasonably have been expected to know, that B had the disability.” 208. In Trustees of Swansea University Pension and Assurance Scheme and another v [NAME_130] [2018] UKSC 65, the Supreme Court gave consideration to the relevant questions to be asked in relation to section 15 claims, at paragraph 12, in which they said (Lord [NAME_131]) that “…section 15 appears to raise two simple questions of fact: what was the relevant treatment and was it unfavourable to the claimant?” 209. In that case, a disabled employee argued that he had been subjected to discrimination on the grounds of disability following ill health retirement. Having reduced his hours due to disability, the claimant was entitled, following retirement, to immediate access to pension. His entitlement to an enhancement to the lump sum and annuity was calculated based on his salary immediately prior to his retirement (that is, his lower salary based on reduced hours). The Supreme Court dismissed his appeal and held, at paragraph 28, that “The only basis on which [NAME_132] was entitled to any award at that time was by reason of his disabilities. As [NAME_133] says, had

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 48 he been able to work full time, the consequence would have been, not an enhanced entitlement, but no immediate right to a pension at all.” 210. The “guidance” in that case is found in a passage quoted from Langstaff J’s Judgment in the Employment Appeal Tribunal, which was endorsed by the Court of Appeal and then the Supreme Court, to the effect that treatment which is advantageous cannot be found to be unfavourable merely because it could have been more advantageous, or, put another way, because it was insufficiently advantageous. 211. We also referred to Cowie and others v Scottish Fire and Rescue Services [2022] EAT 121, in which the EAT found that while the advantage provided in that case by the paid special leave policy could have been improved by removing certain pre-conditions for entitlement, it did not amount to unfavourable treatment by virtue of the fact that it could, hypothetically, have been even more favourable. It also found that there is a relatively low threshold for a finding of unfavourable treatment. 212. Section 19 of the Equality Act 2010 provides: “(1) A person (A) discriminates against another (B) if A applies to B a provision, criterion or practice which is discriminatory in relation to a relevant protected characteristic of B’s. (2) For the purposes of sub-section (1), a provision, criterion or practice is discriminatory in relation to a relevant protected characteristic of B’s if – (a) A applies, or would apply, it to persons with whom B does not share the characteristic, (b) it puts, or would put, persons with whom B shares the characteristic at a particular disadvantage when compared with persons with whom B does not share it, (c) it puts, or would put, B at that disadvantage, and (d) A cannot show it to be a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.” 213. Section 23(1) of the 2010 Act provides that “On a comparison of cases for the purposes of section 13, 14 or 19 there must be no material difference between the circumstances relating to each case.” 214. The Supreme Court decision in Essop & Others v Home Office (UK Border Agency) [2017] ICR 640 formed an important part of the submissions of both parties. We were referred by the respondent, in particular, to paragraphs 24 and 25, though it is useful to refer to paragraph 23 in order to place this in context:

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 49 “23. It is instructive to go through the various iterations of the indirect discrimination concept because it is inconceivable that the later versions were seeking to cut it down or to restrict it in ways which the earlier ones did not. The whole trend of equality legislation since it began in the 1970s has been to reinforce the protection given to the principle of equal treatment. All the iterations share certain salient features relevant to the issues before us.

24. The first salient feature is that, in none of the various definitions of indirect discrimination, is there any express requirement for an explanation of the reasons why a particular PCP puts one group at a disadvantage when compared with others. Thus there was no requirement in the 1975 Act that the claimant had to show why the proportion of women who could comply with the requirement was smaller than the proportion of men. It was enough that it was. There is no requirement in the Equality Act 2010 that the claimant show why the PCP puts one group sharing a particular protected characteristic at a particular disadvantage when compared with others. It is enough that it does. Sometimes, perhaps usually, the reason will be obvious: women are on average shorter than men, so a tall minimum height requirement will disadvantage women whereas a short maximum will disadvantage men. But sometimes it will not be obvious: there is no generally accepted explanation for why women have on average achieved lower grades as chess players than men, but a requirement to hold a high chess grade will put them at a disadvantage.

25. A second salient feature is the contrast between the definitions of direct and indirect discrimination. Direct discrimination expressly requires a causal link between the less favourable treatment and the protected characteristic. Indirect discrimination does not. Instead it requires a causal link between the PCP and the particular disadvantage suffered by the group and the individual. The reason for this is that the prohibition of direct discrimination aims to achieve equality of treatment. Indirect discrimination assumes equality of treatment - the PCP is applied indiscriminately to all - but aims to achieve a level playing field, where people sharing a particular protected characteristic are not subjected to requirements which many of them cannot meet but which cannot be shown to be justified. The prohibition of indirect discrimination thus aims to achieve equality of results in the absence of such justification. It is dealing with hidden barriers which are not easy to anticipate or to spot.” 215. In addition, [NAME_7] referred us to paragraphs 28 and 29 of the Judgment: “28. A fifth salient feature is that it is commonplace for the disparate impact, or particular disadvantage, to be established on the basis of statistical evidence. That was obvious from the way in which the concept was expressed in the 1975 and 1976 Acts: indeed it might be difficult to establish that the proportion of women who could comply with the requirement was smaller than the proportion of men unless there was statistical evidence to that effect. Recital (15) to the Race Directive recognised that indirect discrimination might be proved on the basis of statistical evidence, while at the same time introducing the new definition. It cannot have been

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 50 contemplated that the “particular disadvantage” might not be capable of being proved by statistical evidence. Statistical evidence is designed to show correlations between particular variables and particular outcomes and to assess the significance of those correlations. But a correlation is not the same as a causal link.

29. A final salient feature is that it is always open to the respondent to show that his PCP is justified - in other words, that there is a good reason for the particular height requirement, or the particular chess grade, or the particular CSA test. Some reluctance to reach this point can be detected in the cases, yet there should not be. There is no finding of unlawful discrimination until all four elements of the definition are met. The requirement to justify a PCP should not be seen as placing an unreasonable burden upon respondents. Nor should it be seen as casting some sort of shadow or stigma upon them. There is no shame in it. There may well be very good reasons for the PCP in question - fitness levels in fire-fighters or policemen spring to mind. But, as Langstaff J pointed out in the EAT in [NAME_135], a wise employer will monitor how his policies and practices impact upon various groups and, if he finds that they do have a disparate impact, will try and see what can be modified to remove that impact while achieving the desired result.” 216. The Tribunal also had reference to section 26(1) of the 2010 Act: “A person (A) harasses another (B) if – (a) A engages in unwanted conduct related to a relevant protected characteristic, and (b) the conduct has the purpose or effect of-

(i) violating B’s dignity, or

(ii) creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for B…” 217. Section 27(1) of the 2010 Act provides: “A person (A) victimizes another person (B) if A subjects B to a detriment because – (a) B does a protected act, or (b) A believes that B has done, or may do, a protected act.” 218. The Tribunal also took into account other cases to which we were referred in submission. Discussion and Decision 219. We consider it appropriate to make some observations about the evidence which we heard from the different witnesses called in this case. Evidence in

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 51 chief was taken by way of witness statements, but we were able to observe each witness under cross-examination. 220. The claimant’s witness statement was very lengthy, and at times strayed into repetition and argument, and in her evidence before us she frequently became argumentative and insistent upon making the points which she considered were to her advantage rather than answering directly the question put to her. She raised the point, repeatedly, that she was both disabled and a party litigant, but in our view was articulate and intelligent enough to understand and respond to the questions put to her. At one point, she complained to the Employment Judge that the questioning being put to her by [NAME_7] was making her uncomfortable. The Judge had to advise that it was entirely appropriate for [NAME_7] to put his client’s case, that he was doing so in an appropriate manner and that it is not uncommon for parties to feel uncomfortable when challenged. 221. We observe, in passing, that [NAME_7] conducted himself in this case with exemplary courtesy, patience and professionalism, including during his cross-examination, and at no stage sought to exploit his greater familiarity with the surroundings or the proceedings. 222. The claimant was argumentative and unwilling, at times, to accept the plain meaning of written communications. Her approach was to challenge every conclusion reached by her employer, and to seek to convey the impression that her line manager in particular was very unsympathetic and that she failed to understand her own difficulties due to disability. 223. The claimant made a number of allegations which could not be sustained by the evidence, but was undeterred in persisting with those allegations in the face of the contemporaneous communications. For example, she insisted that when she had a leak in her flat, [NAME_32] insisted that she come into the office. This was simply not the case. [NAME_32] sought to suggest an alternative to her working in an unpleasant and unsafe environment. It was never part of the claimant’s case that she could not or would not attend the office under any circumstances, and therefore it was not inappropriate for her to suggest that she could work in the office. The claimant, however, sought to characterise this as [NAME_32] instructing her to come to the office, and we did not regard that as fair or accurate. 224. We also noted that in the course of the Hearing the claimant made an accusation against [NAME_7] which had to be dealt with at the time. During the evidence of [NAME_102], who was in attendance in person at the Tribunal, the claimant had sought to refer to 2 documents. She asked [NAME_7] to assist her in identifying where in the voluminous productions these documents were. [NAME_7] very helpfully identified where the first document was, and the claimant asked questions about that document.

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 52 There was then a short break, consistent with the reasonable adjustment agreed for the claimant, and upon returning, the claimant complained to the Tribunal that [NAME_7] had told the witness the page number of the [NAME_136] (1649), and had thus improperly assisted the witness. [NAME_7] explained that during the adjournment he had simply found the second of the 2 documents the claimant was looking for and told her before the Tribunal returned where it was. He denied that he was trying to help the witness. His sole purpose was to help the claimant. The Tribunal accepted [NAME_7]’s explanation and rejected the claimant’s criticisms. 225. We understood that the claimant experiences certain consequences of her ADHD, and sought to take account of this during our assessment of her evidence. We also observed that the claimant was generally well-organised, well-prepared, articulate and intelligent in her bearing, and that by use of the adjustments put in place for her she was able to put her points to each of the respondent’s witnesses and to set out her arguments in submission. 226. It was our conclusion that the claimant’s evidence required to be treated with a degree of caution, and could not be considered to be completely reliable. Our findings below will demonstrate that at times we considered the claimant’s evidence to amount to a misinterpretation of written or other communication, or to be inaccurate in other ways. We did not consider that the claimant was necessarily attempting to mislead the Tribunal, but it was clear to us that the strong sense of injustice which caused her to raise these proceedings meant that she was unwilling or unable to see her employer’s perspective upon her performance or the way in which she was going about her job. 227. For the respondent we found [NAME_102] to be an excellent witness, clear and straightforward in his evidence, and willing to accept that there were some areas in which the respondent could have dealt better with the claimant. We regarded his evidence as entirely honest and reliable. 228. [NAME_112]’s evidence we also found to be honest and credible. She gave her evidence in a straightforward and open manner and we found no difficulty in believing her evidence. 229. [NAME_32] appeared, initially, slightly nervous, though she became more assured as time went on. We considered that she was an honest witness who was seeking to assist the Tribunal, but that there were areas where her evidence was unclear or did not fully address the issues before her. For example, she was not clear as to the process which was followed in extending the claimant’s probation, or the reason why it was important to ensure the probation review took place before the end of December 2023; and the claimant’s criticism that she was not clear with her about why she

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 53 was not passing her probation, or how her instruction not to spend so much time asking questions of colleagues dovetailed with her assertion that the claimant was free to consult with senior colleagues if she were uncertain about particular issues. 230. We then addressed the List of Issues in turn. Disability Discrimination Disability Status 1. Did the respondent know, or reasonably could have been expected to know, that the claimant had the disability? 2. For the purposes of a claim under section 21 of the Equality Act 2010 (EqA), did the respondent know that the claimant had a disability and was likely to be placed at the disadvantage relied upon? 231. The respondent has conceded that at the material time the claimant was a disabled person within the meaning of section 6 of EqA by reason of ADHD. 232. However, it remains the respondent’s position that they did not know, or did not have constructive knowledge, that the claimant was a disabled person for this reason until receipt of the [NAME_72], which they received on 5 December 2023. 233. The claimant was diagnosed as having ADHD in February 2023, and had worked as a contractor with the respondent since August 2022. She did not disclose her condition to the respondent until she completed a form including medical questions as part of the onboarding process when she became an employee. The form was completed on 30 May 2023 (449). When asked if she had a health condition or disability which may be relevant to her job application, she ticked yes, and confirmed that she had ADHD. 234. At that time, however, when asked if she was aware of any aids or adjustments which would assist her in performing her job, she answered “Not as yet”. This was, in our view, rather a curious answer. She had been working in the same place doing similar work as a contractor for some months, and accordingly it might be thought that she would be aware by that point what aids or adjustments she would require. When [NAME_50] were consulted about this, they advised that no further action was required at that point. 235. The claimant did have in her possession a report from February 2023 setting out a detailed diagnosis of ADHD and the claimant’s potential functional impacts arising therefrom, describing the claimant as having a moderate level of impairment and disruption to her life including work

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 54 (Confidential Medical Bundle 11), but that report was not shared with the respondent. 236.

Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the respondent knew or ought reasonably to have known that the claimant was a disabled person within the meaning of EqA when she commenced employment with them. The assessment of whether or not an employee is a disabled person is dependent on the way in which it affects their ability to carry out normal day- to-day activities, but also on the information which that employee provides. There was no information available to the respondent in May 2023 that the claimant’s condition amounted to a disability. The respondent was also entitled to take account of the response of [NAME_50] to the provision of this information. We did not consider that it was unreasonable for the respondent to proceed on the basis that the claimant was not disabled at that time. 237. On 4 October 2023, the claimant emailed [NAME_32] (475) to advise that her ADHD meant that she often experienced eye strain and migraines from the lighting and air conditioning/heating systems, and that she found that the extra stimulation had an impact on her work progress. The respondent’s position is that this was insufficient to demonstrate constructive knowledge of disability. We accept this submission by the respondent. What this disclosure did was to alert the respondent to the need to investigate further, and the [NAME_72] report was thereby prompted. As at 4 October 2023, however, we were not persuaded that the claimant’s statement was sufficient to demonstrate to the respondent that she had, or should be reasonably taken by the respondent to have, a disability within the statutory meaning. 238. The respondent accepts that the [NAME_72] report, received on 5 December 2023, provided them with further sufficient information to allow them to understand that the claimant’s ADHD affected her in such a way that she was a disabled person within the meaning of EqA. They deny that they had constructive knowledge of the claimant’s disability until that point. 239. In our judgment, the claimant’s ADHD was known to the respondent from May 2023, but the true nature of that condition was not known to them until 5 December 2023, and they did not have actual or constructive knowledge of the nature and effect of that condition until that date. It is important to note that they would require to understand that the condition was one which had a substantial adverse long-term effect on her ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities. On the basis of the information available, and reasonably available, to the respondent before 5 December 2023, it was entirely unclear to them that the condition had a substantial – that is, more than trivial – effect on the claimant. What the claimant said in October 2023

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 55 was that certain features of the office environment had an impact on her work, but did not go beyond that to demonstrate that the impact was substantial and adverse. 240. It is our conclusion that the respondent had no actual or constructive knowledge that the claimant was a disabled person due to her ADHD prior to 5 December 2023. 241. Even after that point, we were not persuaded that the respondent could be taken to have understood that her condition would have a substantial adverse impact on her ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities outwith the workplace, nor that it had any impact on her spelling and grammar, for which there was no medical evidence before the Tribunal. 242.

Accordingly, until 5 December 2023, the respondent could not have known that the claimant would suffer the disadvantage relied upon, and thereafter only to the extent that that disadvantage would arise in the workplace. Time Limits 3. Given the date the claim form was presented and the dates of early conciliation, any complaint about something that happened before 26 January 2024 may not have been brought in time.

4. Were the discrimination and victimisation complaints made within the time limit in section 123 of EqA? The Tribunal will decide: a. Was the claim made to the Tribunal within 3 months (plus early conciliation extensions under sections 207B (3) and (4) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (ERA)) of the act or omission to which the complaint relates? b. If not, was there conduct extending over a period? c. If so, was the claim made to the Tribunal within 3 months plus (plus early conciliation extension) of the end of that period? d. If not, were the claims made within a further period that the Tribunal thinks is just and equitable? The Tribunal will decide: i. Why were the complaints not made to the Tribunal in time? ii. In any event, is it just and equitable in all the circumstances to extend time? 243. The Tribunal has considered, firstly, which of the claims may be said to be out of time. Given that the claimant was absent from work from 15 December 2023, and that any complaint arising prior to 26 January 2024

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 56 was presented out of time, (subject to any continuing acts) the claims relating to the period when the claimant was in attendance at the workplace are clearly out of time. 244. We then sought to determine whether any of the claims were part of a series of continuing acts. The claims in time all related to issues arising while the claimant was absent from work, whereas the out of time claims related to the period when the claimant was still at work. The later allegations concerned different individuals, being the decision-makers in the grievance and appeal process, whereas the out of time claims largely related to [NAME_32] and decisions which she took or was responsible for. 245. We recognise that there is a basis for distinguishing between the claimant’s complaints prior to and after she commenced sick leave. However, we find this to be a slightly artificial distinction, in that it is plain that the claimant’s complaints all share a similar theme, namely the manner in which she was treated due to her ADHD, and her dispute with her employer as to what steps they were taking in order to address her difficulties at work. 246. As to the reason for the delay, and whether the claims were made within such a period as the Tribunal regards as just and equitable, we accept that the claimant did not expressly set out an explanation for why she was unable to present her claims in time. 247. It is correct to say that the claimant is an unrepresented party, though at various stages during these proceedings she was able to have access to legal advice. It is also correct to note that the claimant has a disability, namely ADHD, which we have found to have had a substantial adverse impact upon her ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities. On the other hand, as we have observed, the claimant is plainly a resourceful, intelligent and determined person who was able to set out her grievances clearly when she chose to do so, and to advance her claim to the Tribunal. She presented a claim over a long Hearing with no little skill and resolution, and this is evidence that she could have taken some steps to investigate her right to make a claim, and the time limits involved. She could also have taken reasonable steps to obtain legal advice, since she was able to do so once the claim had been presented. 248. We note that while the just and equitable jurisdiction affords a wider discretion than that applicable to unfair dismissal claims (not reasonably practicable), the exercise of the discretion is the exception rather than the rule, on the basis that time limits are in place for a reason and are to be enforced by the Tribunal.

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 57 249. We must take account of the relative prejudice of each party. If we were to exclude the claimant’s claims of direct discrimination, together with a number of the indirect discrimination, discrimination arising from disability and harassment claims on the basis that they were out of time, it would prejudice the claimant in that she would be deprived of the right to proceed with her claim, under normal circumstances. However, we are conscious that we are considering this at the point where the full evidence has been heard by the Tribunal, and to have allowed the claimant to proceed to that extent and then exclude her claims, or some of them, on the grounds of jurisdiction, might be seen to be very unfair. 250. Further, while the respondent may be said to have been prejudiced by the need to defend a very lengthy and complex claim, that prejudice would not be removed by our finding at this stage that the claims were time-barred and should be excluded. The respondent has demonstrated that they were able to provide a comprehensive and skilful defence to the claims made, and as a result, it would be incongruous to find that they were prejudiced in that sense. Obviously, they had to proceed to that lengthy hearing, but since the issue of time bar was embedded within the full Hearing, the prejudice was thereby minimised. 251. It is our conclusion therefore that the claims were presented within such time as we consider to be just and equitable, and that we were not of the view that it would be in the interests of justice to exclude some of those claims at this stage in the proceedings. Direct Discrimination – Section 13 EqA 5. The acts of less favourable treatment alleged by the claimant are that the respondent: [redacted] her on a performance improvement plan and subjecting her to increased performance scrutiny. b. On 8 November 2023, imposed excessive performance targets of completing 15-20 items per day. c. On 14 December 2023, criticised the claimant for spelling and grammar errors during a performance review. d. On 13 December 2023, refused to allow colleagues to assist the claimant with her workload.

6. In respect of each act who is the claimant’s comparator (actual or hypothetical) whose circumstances must be materially the same as the claimant’s?

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 58 a. In respect of 6(a), the claimant’s alleged comparator is [NAME_33] b In respect of 6(b), (c) and (d), the claimant relies on a hypothetical comparator.

7. Did each of the acts set out at 6 above occur in the manner alleged by the claimant? 8. If so, did it amount to less favourable treatment of the claimant? 9. If so, was the less favourable treatment because of or on the grounds of the claimant’s disability or for another reason? 252. Taking the allegations of direct discrimination in turn, we addressed the allegation that the claimant was treated less favourably in comparison to [NAME_58], by placing her on a performance improvement plan and subjecting her to increased performance scrutiny. 253. We did not accept that the claimant was placed on a performance improvement plan. The claimant consistently sought to refer to the actions taken by [NAME_32] as a performance improvement plan, but [NAME_32]’s evidence, which we accepted, and the contemporaneous correspondence, simply do not allow for that conclusion. We considered that the claimant was exaggerating the actions of the respondent in order to justify her reaction to criticisms directed towards her. 254. The claimant was subject to performance scrutiny, but in our judgment this was reasonable and proportionate in light of the need for the respondent to maintain both its standards and the productivity of its staff. The claimant’s role was a responsible one, involving communications with customers and senior colleagues. If [NAME_32] had not raised with the claimant her concern about her accuracy and productivity, she herself would have been the subject of justifiable criticism from her senior managers. 255. It is also our view that [NAME_58] is not an appropriate comparator. [NAME_58] is not a disabled person, her performance was not at the same level as the claimant, and [NAME_32] found that she was performing well in her role. The evidence relied upon by the claimant in [NAME_53] chats with [NAME_58] are no more, in our view, than a colleague sympathising with another about the difficulty of engaging in unfamiliar work in a new setting. They do not amount to evidence that [NAME_58] was not performing well, and [NAME_32] was clear that she was. 256. The meeting of 8 November 2023, at which [NAME_32] and the claimant discussed her performance, must be seen in the context of the claimant’s

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 59 probation. Again, we do not accept that the claimant was placed on a performance improvement plan at this meeting, but [NAME_32] did raise with her the productivity of her daily output. She indicated to her that she should be doing 15 to 20 items per day (to which the claimant replied “sure”), but that the claimant was only managing approximately 6 per day. The claimant’s response was not that she was inhibited by her ADHD in the number of items she could produce, but that her laptop was slow or that delays outwith her control would hold her up. 257. [NAME_32] plainly put this point in the context of finding a way to help the claimant improve her performance and pass her probation. She also encouraged her to seek help, where she was unclear about anything, from [NAME_137] in the team. 258. We cannot conclude that raising this matter in this way and at this time amounted to anything other than reasonable management by [NAME_32]. An employer is entitled to address what they consider to be performance concerns with any employee. In addition to the encouragement given by [NAME_32] that she needed to improve the number of items she dealt with, she also pointed to the steps to be taken under the [NAME_72] report. She also pointed out that the claimant had been given a lot of training on the job. The claimant clearly disputed that, but [NAME_32]’s view was that the claimant had been provided with a lot of training and should have been in a position to carry out a larger number of items of work each day. 259. We do not consider that the claimant was treated less favourably in relation to this matter in comparison with a hypothetical comparator not suffering from a disability. In our judgment, [NAME_32] would have addressed what she perceived to be performance concerns with another employee not suffering from ADHD. It was simply part of her job as a line manager to do so, particularly with an employee on probation and coming to the end of that time. In any event, there was no reason for the respondent to believe at that time that the reason for her performance was related to her disability. 260. On 14 December 2023, [NAME_32] did raise with the claimant the number of spelling and grammatical errors. When the claimant expressed surprise about this, [NAME_32] said that she would share the feedback with her, and did so. It was clear from that feedback that the number of errors identified by way of spelling and grammar were higher for the claimant than for others in the team. 261. The claimant maintained that this amounted to less favourable treatment on the grounds of disability. In our judgment, this is simply not demonstrated by the evidence. [NAME_32] would have raised this matter with another employee not suffering from a disability, as spelling and grammar, and their

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 60 accuracy, are important to the respondent in their communications with customers and third parties. It is, in our judgment, entirely reasonable for an organisation to impose standards upon the work which their employees carry out, especially where the work carried out reflects upon the organisation. 262. In any event, there is no evidence that the claimant’s poor spelling and grammar were associated with her disability of ADHD. The claimant made reference in her evidence to dyslexia, but does not rely upon dyslexia as a disability in these proceedings. We are not persuaded that the claimant has demonstrated a causal connection between spelling and grammatical errors and ADHD. Again, we considered that a line manager in [NAME_32]’s position was entirely justified in raising this matter as a performance concern relating to the claimant. 263. On 13 December 2023, there is evidence on a [NAME_53] chat that [NAME_83] offered to help the claimant clear off her workload for that day, but that [NAME_32] intervened to say to him to “hang fire for now”. The reason she did this, in our judgment, was simply that there was another urgent task which she required to carry out that day. 264. The claimant’s claim is that this was an act of unlawful discrimination. In our view, this is a gross overstatement. It was a minor incident. There is no suggestion that [NAME_32] refused to allow the claimant to be helped at all that day, and indeed the same chat indicates that [NAME_86] had offered to help without any intervention from [NAME_32]. It is not clear, further, that the claimant required to take up that offer or was able to clear the backlog herself. Further, the claimant had been given assistance by [NAME_32] for some 20 minutes on another matter earlier that day. 265. The claimant seeks to isolate and magnify this incident into an act directed specifically at her, but in our judgment this is simply an ordinary management interaction, in which she has to ensure that a number of tasks are carried out in a particular timeframe. 266. There is no evidence that this was related to the claimant’s disability, nor that [NAME_32] would not have diverted [NAME_85] to the other urgent task if he had offered to help someone without a disability, and accordingly there is no basis upon which it can be found that the respondent treated the claimant less favourably on the grounds of disability in this regard. 267. We have therefore concluded that the claimant’s claim of direct discrimination on the grounds of disability fails, and must be dismissed. Indirect Discrimination

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 61 10. The claimant is seeking to rely upon the alleged provisions, criteria or practices ([NAME_36]) of: a. Uniform performance targets of completing 15-20 items per day, introduced on 8 November 2023. b. Mandatory office attendance of three days per week, enforced from 16 October 2023. c. Strict written communication standards by imposing uniform spelling and grammar requirements without providing assistive tools such as spell-check software, applied to the claimant on 14 December 2023 and 24 May 2024. d. Not providing pre-meeting agendas ahead of capability and probation review meetings, repeatedly applied to the claimant including on 18 April 2024 before the combined probation review and grievance hearing. e. Having inflexible work schedules with limited flexibility for breaks, applied to the claimant in December 2023. f. Having absent or standard-form training materials without providing accessible formats or additional training support, applied to the claimant on 19 October 2023, 9, 14 and 21 November 2023 and 1 and 11 December 2023. g. On 12 January 2024, delivering the claimant’s year-end performance assessment by [NAME_37]. h. On 12 January 2024, giving the claimant an end-of-year rating of “inconsistent”. i. Refusing to move a probation review meeting to early January outside of the claimant’s probation period due to policy, applied to the claimant on 14 December 2023. j. Refusing to provide a welfare meeting before returning to work, due to practice of organising welfare meetings after a return to work, applied to the claimant on 6 March 2024 and 15 April 2024. k. An expectation for staff in the claimant’s department to work more hours (unpaid overtime) in December 2023, in particular 6, 12, 13 and 14 December 2023. l. Allowing performance expectations to be implied through employees observing other staff members, applied to claimant on 24 May 2024.

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 62 m. The respondent’s policy of having a limit of one month from the time the performance rating was issued to challenge a performance rating, applied to claimant on 24 May 2024. n. The respondent’s policy of not hearing grievances about policy, applied to claimant on 24 May 2024.

11. Are each of the alleged [NAME_36] a “provision, criterion or practice” for the purposes of section 18 of EqA? 12. If yes, did the respondent apply, or would apply, each of the [NAME_36] to all employees including those who did not have the claimant’s disability? 13. If yes, did any of those [NAME_36] put persons with the same disability as the claimant at a particular disadvantage when compared with persons not with such a disability but whose circumstances are otherwise not materially different to the claimant? 14. Did the PCP put the claimant at that particular disadvantage? 15. If so, can the respondent justify the [NAME_36] by showing a legitimate aim? 16. If so, were the [NAME_36] a proportionate means of achieving that legitimate aim? 268. We sought to determine, firstly whether or not the respondent applied [NAME_36] as alleged by the claimant. a. The claimant alleges that she was treated less favourably in the imposition of the target of 15 to 20 items per day, but also that this was uniformly imposed. Clearly, it must be one or the other. In any event, to allege that a performance target was imposed puts it too strongly. It was identified by [NAME_32] that this was an expectation, to help the claimant understand that she was well below the expected level of performance. It is not clear that it was a requirement imposed by the respondent. b. “Mandatory office attendance of three days per week” was a theme which the claimant returned to on a number of occasions. In our judgment, this was not mandatory. It was expected that staff would attend the office on 3 days each week, but this was not the case for the claimant, who at no stage after 16 October 2023 actually worked 3 days in the office, without any sanction applied to her.

Accordingly, there was no PCP of “mandatory” office attendance for 3 days each week applied by the respondent.

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 63 c. Applying strict written communication standards to the claimant in the imposition of uniform spelling and grammar requirements. Again, the claimant seeks to suggest that such standards were imposed upon her and this amounted to less favourable treatment of her, and yet also suggests that it was a uniformly applied condition. The respondent did require that staff avoided spelling and grammatical errors, using the usual spell-check features within [NAME_138]. It is not clear, in our view, that these were applied “strictly”, but more broadly it may be said that the respondent saw it as an essential aspect of the work carried out by the claimant and her colleagues that anything which they issued should contain no spelling or grammatical errors. d. The respondent did not have a practice of providing agendas in advance of meetings for any staff. However, there is no basis for the complaint that agendas were withheld in relation to capability meetings, since the claimant never attended a capability meeting. There were 1:1 meetings at which her probation was discussed but no capability meeting. However, the meetings which the claimant had with [NAME_32] did not include the prior provision of agendas and to that extent this PCP was applied by the respondent. e. There is insufficient evidence, in our judgment, that the respondent imposed inflexible work schedules with insufficient breaks, either to the claimant or any other members of staff. It may be that the claimant is suggesting that she was not given sufficient breaks, but there is no evidence to support the assertion that this went beyond her and was applied to any other staff. That the claimant worked beyond her scheduled finish time is clear; however, there is no evidence that she was required by the respondent to do so.

Accordingly, we do not conclude that this PCP was applied by the respondent. f. We heard considerable evidence that the training provided to the claimant was available by means of “on the job” training, whereby colleagues were available to answer her questions, by training sessions and via the [NAME_52] facility operated by the respondent. The claimant may have expected that training materials or guidance should be available in a particular format, but it is not our conclusion that the respondent failed to provide training materials in accessible formats to the claimant, nor that the respondent applied a PCP to that effect. g. The assertion that the claimant’s performance assessment was delivered by [NAME_37] does not amount to a PCP. There is no

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 64 evidence that any other staff received their assessment by [NAME_37]. The claimant was absent from work on sick leave on 12 January 2024, and accordingly some form of remote communication was likely to be used. However, this appears to be a complaint about the claimant’s own treatment rather than a reference to a wider PCP. In any event, there is no evidence (and the claimant’s own witness statement (paragraph 147) makes no reference to it) that the performance assessment was issued by [NAME_37]. [NAME_32]’s witness statement, at paragraph 58, expressly denies that this was the case. She did send a [NAME_37] message asking for the best email address to send it to her, and then emailed it to her (668). h. A personal performance assessment of “inconsistent” provided to the claimant in January 2024 does not amount to a PCP. This was an assessment by the respondent of the claimant’s performance. The claimant disagreed with it, but the respondent did provide evidence to the effect that her performance was inconsistent. However, there is no basis upon which it can be found that the respondent applied a PCP to any other staff in this way. Each performance assessment is personal to the employee concerned. This does not amount to a PCP. i. The respondent did not in fact refuse to move the probation meeting to January, though they did seek to arrange it to take place prior to the end of the claimant’s probation period. This did not amount to a PCP applied to the claimant or any other individual. The general principle that a probation period must be assessed shortly before it concludes is a standard practice. However, although the respondent sought to arrange the meeting before the end of December, and tried to persuade the claimant to attend with a different representative or colleague than her unavailable trade union representative, the claimant’s absence from work meant that it did not ultimately prove possible to conduct the probation review meeting until [NAME_102] carried out the task on 23 February 2024.

Accordingly, this PCP was not applied to the claimant. In any event, it amounts to a complaint of personal discrimination or less favourable treatment. j. [NAME_32] offered the claimant the opportunity to have a call with her at which she intended to discuss proposed adjustments with her for her return to work, though she did not clarify that in the email inviting her to have the call (752/3). The claimant did not respond to that offer. As a result, the respondent intended to have a discussion at the return to work meeting to go over the proposed adjustments. The claimant considered this to be unacceptable, though she never in fact returned to work. [NAME_45] exchanged emails with the

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 65 claimant in April 2024 (790ff) in which the claimant indicated that she had yet to receive confirmation from [NAME_32] for a welfare meeting to support her return to work. [NAME_45] responded to say that this would be discussed on her return, as they would normally do. In our judgment, the respondent did not refuse to conduct a discussion in advance of her return to work. In any event, there was no PCP applied here as [NAME_32]’s position was that she could have that discussion before the return to work meeting. If the claimant had agreed to it, that would have represented a departure from the alleged PCP, and accordingly we do not find that it was applied by the respondent. In addition, the claimant did not return to work, and accordingly the matter was not resolved, and the respondent did not apply a PCP to her as alleged. In any event, we do not consider that this placed the claimant at a substantial disadvantage due to her ADHD. In our view, the claimant’s position as to her return to work would have been discussed at the meeting on her return and due consideration could then have been given to her circumstances in light of the [NAME_50] report. k. There was no requirement or mandate that staff should work additional hours by way of unpaid overtime in December 2024. It was made clear that due to annual leave and illness, the team was somewhat depleted and therefore if staff could assist by working additional hours, the respondent would be grateful. However, there was no compulsion upon staff to do so. In these circumstances, we do not find that the respondent applied this PCP. l. This is a curious complaint. The respondent did apply a PCP in general terms that performance expectations were implied through being observed by other staff members. In other words, when a new member of staff entered the team, their colleagues would assist them in understanding the processes and work to be carried out, and remain available to answer questions. However, they did not apply this PCP to the claimant in May 2024. m. The respondent did apply the PCP across the board to their employees, including the claimant, that any challenge to a performance rating should be submitted within 1 month of receiving it. n. The respondent did apply the PCP across the board to their employees, including the claimant, that they would not hear grievances about the terms of their policies. 269. It is therefore our conclusion that the respondent applied the [NAME_36] under paragraphs c, d, l, m and n above.

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 66 270. Next, we required to consider whether or not the application of these [NAME_36] put persons with the same disability as the claimant at a substantial disadvantage when compared to employees not sharing that disability, but whose circumstances were not materially different to the claimant’s. 271. The claimant has not demonstrated that employees with ADHD, and particularly herself, were placed at a substantial disadvantage by reason of that disability by the imposition of the PCP relating to strict communication standards. She sought to introduce evidence about being affected in this regard by her dyslexia, but that is not argued by her as a disability, and there was no evidence that persons with ADHD would be disadvantaged by such a PCP. 272. With regard to the PCP that no agendas were provided to the claimant prior to capability and probation review meetings, the claimant has not, in our judgment, demonstrated that she was in any way placed at any substantial disadvantage in comparison with those who do not have ADHD. There were no capability meetings. [NAME_32] did not consider it necessary to have an agenda for the 1:1 meetings which were largely informal in nature. On the evidence we heard, the claimant was able to participate fully in each of the meetings, and had union representation in support at her probation review meetings. The claimant demonstrated before us an ability to respond quickly and effectively to points raised either in cross-examination or by the Tribunal. We do not suggest that this means that the claimant does not have ADHD or is not affected by it in the way she says: what we find, however, is that on the basis of the evidence we have before us, there is insufficient to demonstrate that she was disadvantaged by the absence of any agendas. Following the meetings, summaries were sent to her, and she was able to respond to those summaries with observations of her own. 273. Leaving aside the apparent error in paragraph l relating to the date upon which the PCP was applied to the claimant (it was clearly not 24 May 2024), we have accepted that there was a PCP applied whereby performance expectations were implied through observing other staff. However, there is no basis upon which it can be found that this caused the claimant, with ADHD, any substantial disadvantage. [NAME_32] communicated frequently with the claimant and encouraged her to find support where it was made available among her colleagues and on [NAME_52]. The meetings which [NAME_32] conducted with the claimant in November and December 2023 formed part of the process of making the claimant aware that there were concerns about the number of reworks being returned, the spelling and grammatical errors being made and the number of items being processed by her each day.

Accordingly, we have not concluded that the application of the PCP here subjected the claimant or

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 67 any other person with ADHD to any substantial disadvantage in comparison with those not sharing the claimant’s disability. 274. The application of the PCP that any challenge to the performance rating must be submitted within 1 month did not on the evidence show that those with ADHD would be subjected to a substantial disadvantage in comparison to those who did not experience that condition. The claimant herself was capable, as we saw in her grievance and other correspondence to the respondent, of setting out complex and detailed arguments in her favour to the respondent, within relatively short timescales. In this case, she has not made out a case that the period of 1 month, which in our judgment is a reasonably lengthy period, would subject her to a substantial disadvantage due to ADHD. 275. We are aware, and take account, of the fact that the claimant was absent on sick leave at the time when she received the rating, but agree with the respondent’s submission that this is related to her particular circumstances and not to her ADHD.

Accordingly, we do not find that this PCP placed the claimant at a substantial disadvantage. 276. The respondent did apply a PCP of not hearing grievances about policy, but there is no basis upon which it could be suggested that this would create a substantial disadvantage for those with ADHD, or for the claimant because of her ADHD. 277. It is therefore our conclusion that the claimant has failed either to prove that the respondent applied the claimed [NAME_36] or that if they did, they subjected her to any substantial disadvantage on the basis of her ADHD. 278. The claimant’s claims of indirect discrimination in this case therefore fail, and are dismissed. Failure to Make Reasonable Adjustments – sections 20 and 21 [NAME_36]

18. In respect of each: a. Is this a “provision, criterion or practice”? b. Did the respondent apply that PCP? 19. If yes, did any of those [NAME_36] put the claimant at a substantial disadvantage when compared with persons not with a disability but

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 68 whose circumstances are otherwise not materially different to the claimant? 20. Did the respondent know, or could it reasonably have been expected to know, that the PCP put the claimant at the substantial disadvantage in question? 21. Did the respondent take such steps as it was reasonable for it to have to take to avoid the disadvantage? Physical Features of Premises 22. The claimant is seeking to rely upon the following physical features of the respondent’s premises: a. The open-plan layout of the office b. The hot-desking environment and booking system c. Lack of access to flexible seating arrangements d. Poor air quality and temperature control e. Non-accessible rest areas or quiet spaces f. Fluorescent lighting 23. In respect of each, is this a physical feature (under section 20(10) of EqA) of the respondent’s premises? 24. If yes, did any of those physical features put the claimant at a substantial disadvantage when compared with persons not with a disability but whose circumstances are otherwise not materially different to the claimant? 25. Did the respondent know, or could it reasonably have been expected to know, that the physical feature would put the claimant at the substantial disadvantage in question? 26. Did the respondent take such steps as it was reasonable for it to have to take to avoid the disadvantage? [NAME_38]

27. The claimant is seeking to rely on the alleged failure by the respondent to provide the following [NAME_38]: a. Assistive technology for written communication b. Pre-meeting agendas and talking points to prepare for capability and probation reviews.

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 69 c. Accessible training materials that were tailored to accommodate the claimant’s needs.

28. Did the respondent provide any of the above to the claimant? 29. If not, without that auxiliary aid, was the claimant put at a substantial disadvantage when compared with persons not with a disability but whose circumstances are otherwise not materially different to the claimant? 30. Did the respondent know, or could it reasonably have been expected to know, that not providing the auxiliary aid would put the claimant at the substantial disadvantage in question? 31. Did the respondent take such steps as it was reasonable for it to have to take to provide the auxiliary aid? 279. The claimant relies upon the [NAME_36] set out at paragraph 11 of the List of Issues, which we addressed in the section 19 claim section immediately preceding this one. 280. We found that the respondent did apply the [NAME_36] set out at paragraphs c, d, l, m and n above. 281. We did not, however, find that any of those [NAME_36] placed the claimant at a substantial disadvantage in comparison to others without the condition of ADHD. 282. Notwithstanding those findings, we considered it appropriate to consider whether the respondent could know, or be reasonably taken to know, that the PCP would put the claimant at a substantial disadvantage. In our judgment, the respondent could not know this or be reasonably taken to have known this, in light of our finding that they did not place the claimant at a substantial disadvantage. 283. We considered the physical features of the premises, in order to determine whether they may be said to have amounted to reasonable adjustments which the respondent failed to implement for the claimant. The claimant did not raise her ADHD in November and December as being the reason for the difficulties which she was experiencing at that time. 284. By the time the claimant was due to return to work after her sickness absence, in February 2024, the respondent had received the workplace assessment and the [NAME_50] report and accordingly were putting in place adjustments to assist her in returning to the workplace. [NAME_102] set out recommendations, including that the business consider fully the claimant’s request to attend the office on 1 day per week, a phased return to work, a 20% reduction in her performance targets, additional [NAME_75] and

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 70 setting short term goals and where possible scheduling the claimant’s workload to be broken down into manageable chunks. 285. The claimant relied upon a number of physical features of the office. The respondent, by December 2023, had put in place noise-cancelling headphones, ADHD coaching recommended by [NAME_72] and [NAME_75]. While there was some doubt as to whether or not the sensory difficulties experienced in the office by the claimant were related directly to her ADHD, and no clear medical evidence supported that assertion, the fact that the claimant was not required to attend at the office for more than 1 day a week for a considerable time before going off on sick leave meant that her exposure to the office environment was considerably reduced. The claimant did not dispute that it would be appropriate for her to attend at the office for some time each week, but the respondent never enforced any PCP upon her to the effect that she required to attend for 3 or even 2 days a week. In reality the claimant became absent on sick leave and never returned to work before the full adjustments could take effect, but they were put in place in order to assist the claimant achieving an effective return to work. 286. With regard to the [NAME_38], we considered each in turn. 287. The respondent’s position is that the claimant had assistive technology for written communication, namely the facility to spell-check any work which she was issuing. In any event, the claimant has failed to prove that any difficulties with communication were related to her disability of ADHD, and accordingly this would not amount to a reasonable adjustment to ameliorate any disadvantage arising from disability. 288. The Tribunal has already determined that the fact that the respondent did not provide pre-meeting agendas for probation review meetings did not amount to a substantial disadvantage in relation to her ADHD. There was no need for such agendas and the claimant did not identify this at the time as an issue to be addressed in relation to disability. 289. The Tribunal has already identified that the claimant was provided with training materials and support in her role. The claimant has not identified precisely what materials she sought to be provided to her, though she did refer in evidence to the need to have scripted responses to queries from customers making telephone calls, and clear protocols for different situations which may arise. In our judgment, it cannot be said, on the evidence that these would amount to reasonable adjustments, in the sense that many unusual situations arise when dealing with dynamic queries and it was the respondent’s evidence that it would be impossible to provide such a guide for the claimant or any other individual.

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 71 290. In our judgment, the claimant has not demonstrated that her concern to have more detailed training materials was related to her ADHD or any disadvantage arising from the application of any PCP. While we do not make any comment about the claimant’s competence to do her job, it is plain that the respondent considered that there was a limit to the training and support which could be provided in advance, and that the issue related to the claimant’s capacity to do the tasks provided to her, unrelated to her disability. 291. It is our conclusion that the claimant’s claim under section 20/21 must fail, and be dismissed, on the basis that she has not proved either that the respondent applied the alleged [NAME_36] to her and others, or that if they did, they resulted in a substantial disadvantage to her in comparison with others not suffering from ADHD. 292.

Accordingly, the Tribunal finds that the claimant’s claim of failure to make reasonable adjustments fails, and is dismissed. Discrimination Arising from Disability – Section 15 32. Did the respondent treat the claimant unfavourably? The unfavourable treatment alleged is as follows: a. Failing to provide reasonable adjustments; b. Delaying implementation of adjustments and implementing inadequate adjustments; c. Subjecting the claimant to heightened performance scrutiny and a “de facto” performance improvement plan on 8 November 2023 without implementing reasonable adjustments; d. [NAME_41] consistently assigning the claimant workloads beyond her ability, adding late-day cases that required unpaid overtime, even on days when the claimant had already met her targets, including specifically: i. On 6 December 2023, reprimanding the claimant for leaving a non-urgent case despite completing all priority tasks; and ii. On 7 December 2023, forcing the claimant to work beyond her shift, while non-disabled colleagues were allowed to leave on time. e. Subjecting the claimant to unfair performance standards, specifically:

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 72 i. On 14 December 2023 raising spelling and grammar issues as a capability concern; ii. On 14 December 2023, informing the claimant that her case targets needed to improve; and iii. On 12 January 2024, issuing the claimant with an end of year performance rating of “Inconsistent”. f. Refusing the claimant’s requests for reduced office attendance, specifically refusing to allow the claimant to attend the office less than three days per week. g. Subjecting the claimant to a hostile work environment, including specifically: i. Micromanaging the claimant and subjecting the claimant to procedural barriers; ii. Repeatedly failing to provide pre-meeting agendas for critical performance and capability, probation and grievance meetings; iii. Denying the claimant support from colleagues and excluding the claimant from workplace resources; iv. Subjecting the claimant to retaliatory actions and psychological harm by delivering her Year-End Performance Review on 12 January 2024 while the claimant was on sick leave; and v. Subjecting the claimant to intentional delays in relation to the handling of her grievance. h. Mishandling the claimant’s grievance, including specifically: i. Subjecting the claimant to unreasonable delays and a failure to progress the grievance in a timely manner; ii. Repeatedly failing, on 2 April, 8 April, 11 April, 23 April 2024 to provide pre-meeting agendas or talking points, causing cognitive overload; iii. Implementing inflexible and disproportionate deadlines for reviewing and editing key documents by sending the claimant meeting notes to review on 23 April 2024 to be completed by 26 April 2024;

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 73 iv. The bad-faith handling of probation findings and retaliatory actions; v. Failing to uphold the claimant’s grievance and acknowledge the harm caused; and vi. Recommending that the claimant be placed on a PIP immediately upon her return to work. i. Subjecting the claimant to “financial and psychological harm”, including specifically: i. Denying the claimant’s right to challenge her end of year performance rating; ii. Refusing the claimant’s requests for a welfare meeting while the claimant was absent; iii. Cumulative delays and untimeliness of the respondent’s grievance and probation processes, which the claimant says prolonged her sick leave. j. The respondent’s breaching its policies, including specifically: i. Failing to apply the respondent’s Capability Policy to provide for disability-related exceptions to performance evaluations by (i) subjecting her to increased performance scrutiny (ii) subjecting her to a de facto PIP on 8 November 2023 and (iii) giving the claimant an “Inconsistent” End-of-Year rating on 12 January 2024; ii. Failing to apply the respondent’s Making Adjustments Policy to provide a supportive environment for disabled employees; and iii. Failing to apply the respondent’s Workplace Adjustment Guide by failing to recognise spelling errors as a disability-related indicator by (i) raising her dyslexia- related spelling and grammar errors as a capability concern on 14 December 2024, (ii) not providing her with assistive technology and (iii) applying non-disabled performance standards to address her written accuracy. k. Holding the claimant to the same performance standards as non-disabled colleagues while failing to implement reasonable adjustments, including specifically:

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 74 i. Treating the claimant differently to a non-disabled colleague ([NAME_33]) in performance scrutiny; ii. Discriminating against the claimant in respect of her spelling and grammar; iii. The sudden introduction of capability concerns, which the claimant says were unsubstantiated; iv. Discriminatory and inconsistent application of the respondent’s policies. 293. We addressed each of these points individually in turn, primarily addressing the fundamental question whether the respondent treated the claimant unfavourably in respect of the complaints made. 294. As we have found above, we do not consider that the respondent failed to make reasonable adjustments in relation to the claimant, and accordingly this would not amount to unreasonable treatment. 295. We recognised that the claimant may mean something different under this heading in her reference to reasonable adjustments, but considered that the primary focus under the section 15 claim arose in relation to her allegation that the respondent delayed implementation of adjustments, and implemented inadequate adjustments. 296. We did not conclude that the respondent delayed implementing adjustments in relation to the claimant. The starting point of that process was that during the onboarding process, the claimant identified, in May 2023, that she had a health condition which was relevant to her employment, namely ADHD, but when asked whether she was aware of any aids or adjustments which would assist her in performing her job, she replied “Not as yet”. 297. Notwithstanding that response, a referral was made to [NAME_50], who simply advised that there was no need for their involvement at that stage. While it may have, in hindsight, been better if there had been an attempt to obtain further assistance from [NAME_50] at that stage, it did not amount to unfavourable treatment not to have implemented adjustments at that stage. [NAME_32] is not a medical practitioner, and was entitled to proceed on the basis of both what the claimant said and the advice of [NAME_50] at that time. 298. The claimant sought an adjustment on 4 October 2023 that she be permitted to work no more than one to two days a week in the office rather than three. That request was granted verbally by [NAME_32], and in practice that was the adjustment which was applied for the remainder of the claimant’s time, during the period when she was at work before she went off on sick leave.

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 75 299. The respondent arranged for a workplace assessment by [NAME_72] by a referral dated 6 October 2023, and this was carried out on 6 November 2023. Any delay in this period cannot, in our view, be attributed to the respondent, as [NAME_72] contacted them to advise that they had not been able to communicate with the claimant. The report from [NAME_72] was received by the respondent on 5 December 2023, and set out a number of recommendations for the claimant. The claimant went off sick from work on 15 December 2023, and never returned to work before her resignation. [NAME_50] carried out a telephone consultation with the claimant on 8 February 2024, and further recommendations of adjustments were made following that. Those adjustments were agreed to by [NAME_102] and set out in his response to the claimant’s grievance and probation review. 300. We considered, therefore, whether the respondent delayed the implementation of adjustments for the claimant. In our judgment, they did not. They had no indication of any adjustments being required or requested by the claimant at the outset of her employment with them; when she requested to restrict the number of days she would have to be in the office, they granted this request to her, in effect; they provided her with the equipment which was recommended by [NAME_72], and agreed the adjustments which were proposed by [NAME_149]. We recognised that the claimant felt that the adjustments, particularly relating to the number of days she was permitted to work from home, were never set out in writing or any formal sense, which left her feeling uncertain as to whether or not they had been granted, but the reality was that that adjustment was granted to the claimant when she requested it, and never withdrawn. While communication may have been more effective, the substance of the arrangement was that the adjustment was put in place. 302. We considered, next, whether subjecting the claimant to heightened performance scrutiny and a de facto performance improvement plan on 8 November 2023 amounted to unfavourable treatment. 303. We did not find that the steps taken by [NAME_32] on that date amounted to “heightened performance scrutiny” in a detrimental sense, but simply a line manager taking the necessary steps to draw to the claimant’s attention areas in which her performance required to be improved, and discussing with her what she needed to effect that improvement. 304. We reject the claimant’s suggestion that there was a “de facto” performance improvement plan imposed. There was no such plan put in place. 305. In any event, the evidence does not support the claimant’s contention that this was related to or arising in consequence of her disability. An employer is entitled, in our judgment, to manage its employees, and to expect certain

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 76 performance standards from them, in exchange for their salary. To ignore deficiencies in the claimant’s performance would have drawn criticism not only from senior management or customers, but the claimant would herself have been entitled to complain that she was not told that there were concerns about her performance and given the opportunity and support to improve that performance. There was no clear correlation between the performance issues which were arising in the claimant’s case and her ADHD. 306.

Accordingly, we do not consider that the claimant was treated unfavourably by [NAME_32], since she was being given the opportunity to address difficulties she was having with her work, nor that that treatment arose in consequence of her disability, namely ADHD. 307. We did not find that [NAME_45] and [NAME_32] assigned the claimant workloads beyond her ability in general. The claimant’s allegation that she was reprimanded by [NAME_45] on 6 December 2023 does not reflect the reality of the exchange. As we have found above (paragraph 82), we did not consider [NAME_45] to have issued a reprimand but a reminder, and in any event it was clear that the claimant did not regard it as a reprimand at the time. So far as the allegation that she was forced to work beyond her standard hours on 7 December, we did not accept that contention on the part of the claimant. We considered that she was able to leave at her normal finishing time, and there was no evidence that she was ever instructed to work late or reprimanded for not having done so. 308. We accepted [NAME_32]’s evidence that the work allocated to the claimant was standard and not beyond her competence. 309. We did not find that the claimant was subjected to unfair performance standards by the respondent. We considered that the claimant was overstating the nature of the exchanges on these matters, and seeking to exaggerate their significance. 310. The claimant alleged that [NAME_32] raised spelling and grammar issues “as a capability concern”, which gives the flavour of formality to it. [NAME_32] simply pointed out to her that her spelling and grammar was causing reworks to be sent back, and drew this to her attention in order to ensure that she addressed this point. It was not raised as a capability concern, in that formal sense – the claimant was never taken to a capability hearing – but simply as an ordinary issue raised by a manager with an employee. 311. In any event, as we have established, spelling and grammar issues did not arise out of the claimant’s disability, on the evidence which we heard.

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 77 312. Informing the claimant that her case targets needed to improve on 14 December 2023 did not, in our judgment, amount to unfavourable treatment arising from the claimant’s disability. The respondent is entitled to expect a certain level of performance, and this was raised entirely reasonably by her manager in a meeting with her to alert her to the need to improve. The fact that an employee has a disability does not mean that performance standards cannot be expected of them, and in our judgment, it did not amount to treatment which arose in consequence of anything relating to her disability of ADHD, on the evidence before us. 313. Issuing the claimant with an “inconsistent” performance rating amounted to a reasonable assessment of her performance, in our judgment, but acknowledged that that performance would be reviewed once the impact of adjustments to be implemented could be assessed. This did not amount, on the evidence, to unfavourable treatment arising in consequence of her disability of ADHD. There were a number of factors to be taken into account in relation to her performance, and the claimant has not provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the inconsistent rating should not have been issued to her. We were not persuaded that her performance was inconsistent because she was disabled by ADHD. No adverse consequence arose out of the rating. 314. The claimant persisted in alleging that the respondent refused her request to work less than three days in the office. On the facts, this is simply incorrect. The respondent permitted the claimant to work less than three days in the office each week over an extended period of time. That they did not set it down formally in writing as an agreed arrangement does not mean they did not implement it. This was not unfavourable treatment on any ground. 315. Next, we addressed the claimant’s assertion that she was subjected to a hostile work environment. 316. She alleged that she was micromanaged. This allegation is difficult to understand. The claimant also complained that she was not properly supported, or that she had support withdrawn from her. It was plain that she felt that she needed a lot of support in carrying out her functions, as she was struggling to understand all of the processes to be followed, and that she sought that support from colleagues in the team. In our judgment, she was not micromanaged, but provided with a great deal of support from a manager who had clearly understood that she was struggling with aspects of the job and needed her input. In any event, there is no basis upon which it could be found that she was subjected to any form of micromanagement as a result of her disability.

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 78 317. The claimant also suggests that she was subjected to procedural barriers. In our judgment, this is not an accurate reflection of the ordinary and appropriate level of management which was required of her line manager in seeking to help her improve her performance to an acceptable level, and to do her job. 318. We have addressed above the claimant’s complaint that she was not provided with pre-meeting agendas for critical meetings. In our judgment, this was not unfavourable treatment, as there was no need for agendas to be provided. The claimant was able to articulate her position at each meeting which she had with the respondent, and was clearly aware of the purpose of each meeting when she attended it. This did not in any event arise out of anything in consequence of her disability. 319. The claimant was not, in our judgment, denied support from colleagues – indeed, she was encouraged to seek that support, but over time from a smaller group of more senior managers after her colleagues began to complain that she was asking them questions on a very frequent basis – nor was she excluded from workplace resources. The evidence did not show that she was excluded from any workplace resources, and on the contrary was granted access to [NAME_52] as well as on the job training. 320. In any event, there is no basis for the allegation that this amounted to unfavourable treatment arising from her disability of ADHD. 321. The claimant makes a very strong allegation that she was subjected to “retaliatory actions” and psychological harm by being delivered her year end performance review on 12 January 2024 while on sick leave. The claimant has not demonstrated that there was any element of retaliation about the delivery of her year end performance rating. The respondent provides year end performance ratings to all employees: it is a standard process throughout the business. The claimant was on sick leave, but remained in contact with the respondent during that time. The Tribunal can find no detriment or unfavourable treatment in this. The respondent was in communication with the claimant, and there is nothing about the timing of its delivery that makes the performance rating in some way unfavourable treatment arising from her disability. The reason for her absence was “stress and anxiety”, not ADHD, and was therefore not related to her disability. 322. We did not find that this amounted to any form of retaliatory action by the respondent, nor could we detect any act to which it might amount as retaliation. 323. The claimant complained that she was subjected to intentional delays in the handling of her grievance. We heard evidence from [NAME_102], who

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 79 explained that he required to take time in order to investigate the different allegations made by the claimant in a detailed grievance. In our judgment, he took a legitimate amount of time in order to produce a careful and thorough decision on the grievance.

In all the circumstances, we did not consider that the grievance was delayed, nor dealt with in an unreasonable timescale. Further, the evidence falls far short of demonstrating that the respondent acted intentionally to delay matters relating to the grievance. 324. We then moved to consider the claimant’s allegation that the grievance was mishandled by the respondent. 325. We have already determined that the respondent did not subject the claimant to unreasonable delays in the handling of the grievance. 326. We do not consider that the lack of agendas in advance of grievance meetings amounted to unfavourable treatment in any way. Any grievance meeting was arranged in order to address the claimant’s own grievance. That was the subject of each meeting, and there was therefore no need for any pre-meeting agendas to be issued. The evidence does not support the claimant’s contention that she was subjected to cognitive overload in the course of the grievance hearings, and she was represented on each occasion by her trade union representative. 327. We do not find that the respondent implemented inflexible and disproportionate deadlines for reviewing and editing key documents, within 3 days. The claimant was able to review and edit the document sent to her on that day within the timescale provided. She had the assistance of her trade union representative to check the terms of the document. This did not amount to unfavourable treatment in relation to the claimant. 328. The claimant alleged that there was bad faith in the handling of the grievance, though this was not put by her to [NAME_102]. She also accepted that [NAME_102]’s conclusions were genuine, in cross-examination. An allegation of bad faith must inherently require a finding by the Tribunal that the grievance handler had no interest in reaching genuine conclusions but had effectively determined the matter without considering all of the evidence. It was our view that [NAME_102] acted in good faith, and as we have set out above, we considered him to be an impressive witness and to have acted appropriately throughout his involvement in the case. He was prepared to make criticisms of the manner in which the claimant had been managed by [NAME_32], and passed her probation in spite of a lack of evidence to justify that conclusion. His decision demonstrated his good faith towards the claimant in his desire to ensure fairness for her. 329. This was not, therefore, unfavourable treatment.

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 80 330. The fact that the claimant’s grievance was not upheld does not amount to unfavourable treatment. In our judgment, [NAME_102] carried out a careful and thorough process. It is not uncommon for an employee whose grievance has not been upheld to retain a sense of grievance, but it is legitimate for an employer, following a full and careful investigation, to reach conclusions which do not uphold the grievance. In this case, we were satisfied that [NAME_102] was entitled to reach the decision he did. 331. The recommendation that the claimant be placed on a performance improvement plan on her return to work is one which the claimant regarded as unfavourable treatment. In our judgment, in its context, it did not amount to unfavourable treatment of the claimant. The claimant’s performance had been the subject of a number of discussions in an attempt to assist her to improve. Alongside that, there was a process of assessing and implementing reasonable adjustments to enable her to address positively the performance concerns which had been (legitimately) raised with her. The decision to issue her with a PIP must be seen in context of the fact that [NAME_102] had passed her probation, even though he had some misgivings about doing so, but also put in place clear adjustments to be implemented in order to support her as she had been suggesting. He indicated that the claimant’s performance would be reviewed, as would the adjustments, in order to establish their effectiveness. Placing her on a PIP was not a punitive act, nor an unfavourable one, but a process of ensuring that the respondent would be in a position to assess whether or not the adjustments being put in place would be of assistance to the claimant in the improvement of her performance. 332. In all of these grievance-related complaints, we have been unable to establish any connection between the claimant’s treatment and anything arising in consequence of the claimant’s disability of ADHD. 333. We moved to the next section, in which the claimant complained that she was subjected to financial and psychological harm in a number of ways. 334. She complained that she was denied the right to challenge her end of year performance rating. This is factually incorrect. She was given one month to do so. The fact that she was absent on sick leave is unrelated to her disability and therefore cannot amount to unfavourable treatment arising from disability, but in any event it is clear, in our judgment, that the claimant was still able, while absent on sick leave, to produce a complex grievance and correspond with the respondent about it. She was certainly not denied that right to challenge her year end rating. 335. There was a disagreement between the respondent and the claimant as to whether or not the welfare meeting should take place at the same time as the return to work meeting, in order to address the implementation of the

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 81 proposed reasonable adjustments set out by [NAME_102]. However, we have found that [NAME_32] offered the claimant the opportunity to have a meeting prior to the return to work meeting at which they could discuss the reasonable adjustments. When she did not take that up, the respondent proceeded on the basis that the discussion about reasonable adjustments could take place. We did not consider this to amount to unfavourable treatment, and the claimant has not demonstrated that this was in any way related to her ADHD. Her absence was related to stress and anxiety, a condition she does not rely upon as a disability. 336. In any event, the claimant never returned to work from sick leave. 337. We have rejected the claimant’s claim about untimeliness of the respondent’s grievance processes. As to the probation process, the claimant criticised the respondent for seeking to arrange a probation meeting before the end of December 2023, and accordingly any delays were caused by the claimant’s wish to have her chosen union representative with her, and by her absence on sick leave. We do not consider that any criticism of the timing of the claimant’s probation review is fair. 338. In any event, there is no basis for suggesting that any delays arose in consequence of the claimant’s disability. 339. Next, the claimant argued that the respondent breached their own policies. Firstly, the claimant alleged that the respondent had failed to apply their Capability Policy to provide for disability-related exceptions to performance evaluations. The claimant appears to suggest that she should not be subject to any performance evaluations on the basis that she was a disabled person, which is not a suggestion which we could sustain. 340. We have not concluded that the respondent was engaging in a capability process with the claimant, but simply seeking to manage and assist her with the performance issues which were arising in her work. The Capability Policy (299ff) sets out the process which is to be followed in the event that the employer chooses to do so. The claimant’s reference to “disability- related exceptions to performance evaluations” does not appear expressly in the Policy, though under “Exceptions” “Disability”, it provides that additional consideration will be given as to whether any failure to meet the required standards may be related to a disability, and if so, whether there were reasonable and sustainable adjustment which could be made to support the colleague further. 341. It is our view that the respondent did take into account the claimant’s ADHD and sought to establish what adjustments should be made, through the [NAME_139] reports which were carried out. In the absence of a formal

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 82 capability process, however, it is our judgment that there was no unfavourable treatment by the respondent on the grounds of disability in the management of the claimant’s performance, nor was there any breach of the Capability Policy. 342. The claimant also asserted that the respondent breached their Making Adjustments Policy (understood to be a reference to the Workplace Adjustments Policy (305ff)), in that they were required to provide a support environment for disabled employees. In our judgment, the respondent did apply the Workplace Adjustments Policy, and sought to make referrals to [NAME_139] in line with its terms. 343. Further the claimant asserted that that Policy was not applied in relation to her spelling errors. As we have previously found, this is not an argument which can succeed in this case. the claimant made reference to dyslexia and dyslexia-related spelling, but never sought to rely upon dyslexia as a disability in this case, nor provided any medical evidence to the effect that it should be regarded as a disability. In our judgment, this means two things: firstly, that the claimant was not seeking to rely upon ADHD in this argument, but upon dyslexia; and secondly, that the claimant therefore clearly understands that any issues relating to spelling were more associated with possible dyslexia than with ADHD. 344. Nevertheless we did not find that the respondent raised spelling errors as a “capability concern” with her; we found that assistive technology in the form of the spell-check function on [NAME_138] was in fact available to her, as well as a reduction in the number of tasks she was expected to perform in a day which would allow her more time to check over her work; and the respondent applied reasonable standards of performance to the claimant. The Tribunal is entirely unclear from the evidence as to what the claimant believes should have been the performance standards applied to her, if any. 345. Finally, under the section 15 claim, we addressed the section in which the claimant complained that she had been held to the same performance standards as non-disabled colleagues while failing to implement reasonable adjustments. 346. She complained that she was treated differently to [NAME_58] in performance scrutiny, which is slightly contradictory to her overall assertion that she had the same performance standards applied to her as non- disabled colleagues. In our judgment, the claimant was not treated differently to [NAME_58] in that they were both subject to performance scrutiny, but their circumstances and performance were different. While the claimant was subject to some criticism by [NAME_32] and advised that she required to improve her performance, she was given adjustments in order to assist with her improvement, such as working more from home than

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 83 in the office. [NAME_58] was not given such adjustments, on the evidence. 347. The claimant complained that she was discriminated against in relation to her spelling and grammar. Since this did not relate to her ADHD, the Tribunal did not conclude that she was discriminated against on the grounds of her disability in this regard. 348. The claimant did consider that the performance concerns were unsubstantiated. The respondent did not follow a capability process, but they were entitled to raise performance concerns with the claimant, and in our judgment those concerns were substantiated. The number of reworks required in the claimant’s work, and the number of items which she got through each day, were different to her colleagues and were established as fact, and accordingly they cannot be said to be unsubstantiated. 349. The claimant complained that there was discriminatory and inconsistent application of the respondent’s policies, but we did not find this to be the case. 350.

Accordingly, we have not found that the claimant was treated unfavourably by the respondent in relation to each of the above complaints, for a reason arising in consequence of the claimant’s disability of ADHD. These claims therefore fail, and are dismissed. Harassment – Section 26 36. Did the respondent engage in unwanted conduct relating to the claimant’s disability for the purposes of EqA? The claimant alleges the following: a. From 4 October 2023, [NAME_23] deliberately withheld support, failed to implement timely adjustments and an [NAME_43] referral. b. Unfounded performance criticism and increased targets by [NAME_23]: i. On 8 November 2023, during a performance meeting, she criticised the claimant’s performance without providing evidence, training or assistance around areas of concern; ii. On 14 December 2023, she insisted that the claimant grow her average items per day from 14 and scrutinised the claimant for spelling and grammar errors. c. On 12 December 2023, unrealistic performance standards were imposed and she was coerced into overtime by [NAME_40]

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 84 [NAME_42] assigning the claimant 2 non-urgent cases at 3.29pm before her 4pm finish despite the claimant having met her targets for the day. d. The claimant was excluded from support and policies were inconsistently applied, by: i. Between October 2023 and December 2023, not processing 3 flexible working requests or passing them to senior management as promised. ii. On 13 December 2023, [NAME_23] blocking the claimant’s request for help from her colleagues; iii. On 14 December 2023, [NAME_23] insisting that the claimant had had “quite a lot” of support in the form of training and development from colleagues. e. In December 2023, the claimant was targeted by rostering her on three weeks of consecutive early shifts. f. On 8 November 2023, a meeting was held with the claimant without warning as to the extent her performance would be subject to criticism and scrutiny. g. On 14 December 2023, [NAME_23] refused the claimant’s request to reschedule the probation review meeting so that she could secure union representation. h. [NAME_23] made disparaging comments to the claimant: [redacted] in an angry and belittling display in front of a fully populated, open plan, loud and busy department. ii. On 8 November 2023, during a performance review meeting, she suggested that the claimant “get louder” due to her ADHD. iii. On 9 November 2023, she repeatedly told the claimant to “stay focused” despite no evidence of the claimant being off task. i. Refused to consider the claimant grievances about the policy and her Year End rating and assessment. j. Committing a repudiatory breach of the implied term of trust and confidence in the claimant’s employment contract in

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 85 response to which the claimant resigned, and thus constructively dismissing the claimant, by: i. Failing to make reasonable adjustments (as detailed above at paragraphs 18 to 32); ii. Subjecting the claimant to harassment on grounds of her disability (as detailed above at paragraphs 33a to 33i); iii. Subjecting the claimant to indirect discrimination (as detailed above at paragraphs 11 to 17); iv. The outcome of the grievance process, which concluded on 24 May 2024; and v. Acknowledging the claimant’s appeal against the grievance outcome of 24 May 2024 on 3 June 2024.

37. Did each of the above occur in the manner alleged by the claimant? If so, was it unwanted conduct? 38. If so, was each instance of unwanted conduct? 39. If so, did it relate to the claimant’s disability? 40. If so, did each instance of unwanted conduct have the purpose or effect of: a. Violating the claimant’s dignity; or b. Creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for the claimant? 41. If so, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, was it reasonable for that conduct to have that effect on the claimant? 42. In respect of 33j, was the respondent’s conduct unlawful harassment that amounted to a repudiatory breach of the claimant’s contract of employment? 43. In particular, did the respondent, by the matters set out at paragraph 33j (if proven), without proper cause conduct itself in a manner which was calculated or likely to destroy or seriously damage the relationship of trust and confidence between itself and the claimant? 44. If so, did the claimant resign in response to that breach? The claimant alleges that the 33(j)(iv) and 33(j)(v) was the “final straw” in response to which she resigned.

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 86 45. If there was a repudiatory breach, did the claimant affirm the contract of employment and waive that breach? 46. Did the claimant resign because of any such repudiatory breach or for another reason? 351. We addressed the particular allegations in the List of Issues under this heading. 352. We have not concluded that [NAME_32] deliberately withheld support from the claimant; indeed, we considered that [NAME_32] provided support to the claimant on a number of occasions, and was available to her in the period following 4 October 2023. With regard to the implementation of timely adjustments, the respondent sought to investigate the need for adjustments following the meeting of 6 October 2023 with the claimant by way of a referral to [NAME_72], and subsequently to [NAME_50]. In the meantime, the claimant was not, in fact, required to attend at the office more than one to two days a week, as she had requested. Further adjustments were put in place following receipt of the [NAME_72] report in early December 2023, approximately 10 days after which the claimant went off sick and did not return.

Accordingly, we did not conclude that the respondent failed to make timely adjustments. 353. Similarly, we were of the view that the respondent acted appropriately in relation to the institution of an [NAME_50] referral. [NAME_32] had corresponded with [NAME_50] at the outset of the claimant’s employment following receipt of the form on which she indicated that she had ADHD. That form also indicated that no adjustments were required at that stage for the claimant.

Accordingly, it was reasonable for the respondent to act once the claimant had raised the question of adjustments herself, but also to await the [NAME_72] report since that was designed to address the question of adjustments (as it did). 354. We did not consider that this conduct by [NAME_32] was of such a character as to amount to unwanted conduct related to the claimant’s disability, nor did it have the purpose or effect of violating the claimant’s dignity or creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for the claimant (which we shall refer to as a harassing purpose or effect). There was no evidence that the claimant was pressing the respondent for a referral to [NAME_50] or [NAME_72]; the claimant did not initially respond to [NAME_72] when they got in touch with her; and the claimant and her trade union representative appeared to be generally satisfied with the level of support being given to her by [NAME_32]. 355. The claimant asserted that the conversations with [NAME_32] on 8 November and 14 December amounted to harassment in purpose and

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 87 effect. We did not accept this. [NAME_32] was entitled, as a line manager, to present to the claimant concerns about her performance which were based on evidence she had available to her. The transcript of the meetings, which were recorded without [NAME_32]’s knowledge, demonstrated that she acted in a supportive and constructive manner in raising criticisms but also assuring the claimant of her support in seeking to improve her performance. To make a criticism of an individual does not of itself amount to harassment. There is no basis upon which the Tribunal could find that [NAME_32] acted in a hostile or aggressive manner, and once again it is clear that the claimant was to some extent grateful for the support which she received from her. 356. There is no basis upon which it may be said that the claimant was subjected to harassment, on the grounds of her disability, in relation to these two meetings and the actions of [NAME_32]. 357. We have already found that the claimant was not coerced into working overtime on 12 December 2023. She was reminded, not reprimanded, in relation to carrying out a task. We considered this to be a normal management interaction with an employee. So far as allocating two non- urgent cases at 3.29pm, there is no basis upon which the Tribunal could find that the claimant was instructed to conclude those cases by the time she finished up that night.

Accordingly, we cannot find that this amounted to harassment on the grounds of disability. 358. The claimant asserted that she was excluded from support and policies were applied inconsistently. She argued that between October and December 2023, 3 flexible working requests were not processed or passed to senior management. We understand this to relate to the claimant’s request to be allowed to work from home for 1 to 2 days a week. In our judgment, there was no requirement to address this further as [NAME_32] had allowed the claimant to do so, and never insisted that she should attend on 3 days a week. It is recognised that the claimant believed that the matter had not been formalised, and that it may have been better if the respondent had confirmed the position in writing, but in reality the claimant’s request was granted and never withheld. 359. She also alleged that on 13 December 2023 [NAME_32] blocked the claimant’s request for help from her colleagues. This is a reference to the conversation on [NAME_53] (see paragraph 88 above) in which [NAME_83] offered to help her with a couple of tasks, but [NAME_32] intervened to tell [NAME_85] to “hang fire for now” as there was another urgent task he needed to carry out. 360. In our judgment, [NAME_32] did not subject the claimant to any form of harassment on the grounds of disability in this regard. She merely carried

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 88 out a normal management task of ensuring that the workload of the team under her responsibility was covered on the day. She did not “block” [NAME_85] from helping the claimant on that day. She simply advised him that he required to do something else at that point. It is of importance that [NAME_86] had offered help on the [NAME_53] chat and [NAME_32] was content that that offer should remain in place. The claimant herself accepted that earlier that day [NAME_32] had spent some 20 minutes on a matter with her.

Accordingly, this allegation is not proved. 361. In the meeting of 14 December 2023, [NAME_32] did say (though it would be to overstate it to say that she “insisted”) that she considered that the claimant had had “quite a lot of support” in the form of training and development from colleagues. This was [NAME_32]’s genuine view. We considered that this fell far short of amounting to conduct which could have the purpose or effect of violating the claimant’s dignity or creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for the claimant. We appreciate that the claimant’s position before us was that she was not given the necessary training and support from her employers, but [NAME_32] was of the view that she was, and the expression of that did not amount to harassment. Further, there is no basis upon which it could be found that this was related to the claimant’s disability. 362. We accepted [NAME_32]’s evidence that the claimant was rostered for 2, but not 3, consecutive early shifts. The claimant raised no objection at the time, and there is no basis for finding that this was in any way related to the claimant’s disability of ADHD. 363. The claimant asserts that the meeting of 8 November 2023 was held without warning as to the extent her performance would be subject to criticism and scrutiny. It is our conclusion that [NAME_32]’s conduct of this meeting cannot be objectively found to amount to harassment on the grounds of disability. It is correct that there was no agenda provided in advance of the meeting, but it was arranged by way of an invitation about 40 minutes beforehand to a Teams meeting. The claimant was still in her probationary period, and [NAME_32] wished to raise with her, informally, some concerns about her performance. To characterise [NAME_32]’s approach here is unfair, in our view. She was acting as a responsible manager required to do in the circumstances where issues were arising in the course of the probation of an employee who was not performing to the requisite standard. In our judgment, [NAME_32] acted in a supportive manner, but as a manager she was entitled to raise issues which had become apparent with the claimant’s performance and to discuss them with the claimant. It appears to us that this was a generally supportive meeting in tone, and that the claimant understood what was required afterwards.

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 89 364. In any event, we do not consider that the actions of the respondent were related to the claimant’s disability, and therefore we did not find that the claimant was harassed on the grounds of disability in or prior to this meeting. 365. It is simply incorrect to suggest that [NAME_32] refused the claimant’s request to reschedule the probation review meeting so that the claimant could secure union representation. [NAME_32] was anxious to ensure that the probation review was carried out prior to the end of the probationary period, which in our view is entirely understandable. However, she sought to establish whether or not the claimant could be accompanied by someone else prior to the end of that period, and in the event, the meeting did not take place until the new year, with the claimant’s union representative in attendance. We do not therefore find that this took place, nor that it amounted to harassment on the grounds of disability. 366. The claimant alleges that on 3 occasions [NAME_32] made disparaging remarks to her. 367. Firstly, on 13 September 2023, she “exclaimed ‘will you be quiet’ in an angry and belittling display’. Our findings in fact above (paragraphs 37 to 40) are that [NAME_32]’s version of events – that she did not raise her voice, but asked both the claimant and [NAME_58] to “turn the volume down a bit”. This was in an open-plan space, and [NAME_32] found that they were speaking loudly (both of them) in a manner which was disturbing. We did not find that [NAME_32] was loud and angry, or that she used the words “will you be quiet”. The allegation is therefore unproved. 368. Secondly, the claimant alleged that on 8 November 2023 in the meeting [NAME_32] suggested that the claimant got louder due to her ADHD. The exchange, fully quoted here, provides an entirely different impression to what has been alleged: “[NAME_24]: …you know, if there’s some people who are maybe louder than others in the office. [NAME_9]: And that can tend to be me. I mean, you did tell me to “Be Quiet” a few weeks ago. So that’s more like I’m just considering my colleagues because I know that in that environment it is more stimulating. So I know that, yeah, I’m aware that I can be the person that contributes to noise. [NAME_24]: Do you think that’s partly to do with your ADHD? You get louder. [NAME_9]: That kind of environment. Well, no, it’s just that I, well, I do have strong projection. Well, I have a strong voice. And so then naturally, if we’re in conversation and if we’re talking sort of casually between things, yeah, I can. I can be louder.”

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 90 369. The claimant herself had accepted that she could be the person who contributed to noise in the office, to which [NAME_32], concerned to establish the position, asked her if this could be connected to her ADHD. The claimant responded in a slightly unclear way, but accepted that she could be louder. 370. We cannot sustain the assertion that this amounted to harassment of the claimant in any way, or was because of her ADHD. [NAME_32] was having an open discussion with the claimant about her behaviour in the office environment, without making accusations, and the claimant responded openly in return. It would not be fair to characterise this as [NAME_32] saying that the claimant got louder due to her ADHD: she was simply asking a question in response to what the claimant herself had said. It was not a stereotypical or pejorative remark, in our judgment, but an attempt by a manager to find out more about the effect of the claimant’s declared condition upon her. 371. Thirdly, the claimant asserted that on 9 November 2023, she was repeatedly told to “stay focused”. She was not. She was told by [NAME_32] to stay focused, and to focus on particular pieces of work, but this was not a reference to the claimant’s ability to focus in general, but an instruction as to what she should attend to during that day in the absence of other colleagues. This was standard and helpful guidance by a manager to an employee, and it is clear that at this time it was received as such. [NAME_32]’s evidence was that the claimant was not the only person who was told to stay focused that day. 372. In our judgment, this remark was not a reference to the claimant’s ADHD, nor was intended to be. It falls far short of amounting to an example of harassment on the grounds of disability, and in our view the claimant did not see it in such a way at the time, but has sought to reframe it for the purposes of this claim. 373. The claimant alleged that the respondent refused to hear her grievances about the policy or about her Year End rating. The policy of the respondent was not to hear grievances about the policy itself. This was a neutral provision applied to the whole workforce. There is no basis upon which it could be found to amount to harassment of the claimant on the grounds of disability. Further, the issue relating to her Year End rating was very difficult to understand; the claimant was given the right to challenge her Year End rating but did not take that right up. There is no evidence that there was anything remotely inappropriate about the fact that the respondent did not deal with either of these matters. 374. Having dealt with all of the claimant’s allegations of harassment, we have concluded that the claims do not succeed, as the claimant has not

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 91 demonstrated that the conduct, even if unwanted, took place the way the claimant alleged, or was in any way related to the claimant’s disability of ADHD. Further, it did not, in any instance, have the purpose or effect of violating the claimant’s dignity, nor of creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for the claimant. 375. The claimant’s claims of harassment on the grounds of disability are therefore dismissed. 376. The claimant makes allegations that the respondent committed repudiatory breaches of the implied term of trust and confidence by subjecting the claimant to a failure to make reasonable adjustments, harassment on the grounds of disability and indirect discrimination on the grounds of disability. We have not sustained the claimant’s complaints under those headings, and accordingly they cannot, in our judgment, amount to breaches, or repudiatory breaches, of the implied term of trust and confidence. 377. The claimant also complains that the outcome of the grievance process on 24 May 2024, and acknowledging her appeal against the grievance outcome on 3 June, amounted to repudiatory breaches of the implied term of trust and confidence. In our judgment, these complaints must fail. The handling of the claimant’s grievance by [NAME_102] was comprehensive, careful and balanced, in our judgment, and the claimant has not identified any basis upon which it could be said to amount to a breach of trust and confidence. The delay, if it was that, in acknowledging the appeal is a trivial matter, in our view, and cannot properly be said to amount to a breach of contract, far less a repudiatory breach of the implied term of trust and confidence. 378. The claimant’s claim of constructive unfair dismissal fails for these reasons. Victimisation – Section 27 47. Did the claimant perform a “protected act” as defined by section 27(2) of EqA. The protected act relied upon by the claimant is: a. Requesting reasonable adjustments on 4 October 2023.

48. Did the respondent subject the claimant to the following acts: a. On 27 October 2023, [NAME_23] insisted the claimant worked from the office when the claimant had a flood in her bedroom, and then deducted annual leave for half a day when the claimant was absent from work. b. Excluded the claimant from receiving assistance from her colleagues. On 13 December 2023, [NAME_23] blocked the claimant’s request for help with her workload.

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 92 c. On 14 December 2023, [NAME_23] insisted that the claimant’s performance targets should be increased and focused on spelling and grammar error. d. On 12 December 2023, unrealistic performance standards were imposed and she was coerced into overtime by [NAME_39] assigning the claimant 2 non-urgent cases as 3.29pm before her 4pm finish despite the claimant having met her targets for the day. e. On 14 December 2023, [NAME_23] refused the claimant’s request to reschedule the probation review meeting so that she could secure union representation. f. In December 2023, the claimant was targeted by rostering her on three weeks of consecutive early shifts.

49. If so, are each of these acts a detriment? 50. If the respondent did any of the things alleged, and they amounted to a detriment, was the claimant subject to that detriment because she had done a protected act? 379. The respondent accepted in submissions that the claimant did a protected act when she requested reasonable adjustments on 4 October 2023. 380. The claimant complained that there were a number of detriments to which she was subjected by the respondent because she did the protected act. 381. Firstly, she complained that on 27 October 2023, [NAME_32] insisted that she attend the office when she had a flood in her bedroom, then deducted annual leave for half a day. This complaint is not sustainable. [NAME_32] told the claimant (see findings paragraph 49) that if it was not safe she could go to the office and leave the tradesmen to work on her flat, with a question mark against it. [NAME_32] did not insist the claimant do anything; she suggested an alternative for her, but it was only a suggestion. She also suggested that the claimant could take a half day of annual leave. This meant that the claimant would be paid for a period when she was not able to work. This did not amount to a detriment, in our judgment. 382. Secondly, she complained that on 13 December 2023, she excluded the claimant from receiving assistance from her colleagues. As we have previously made clear, we do not uphold this allegation. No detriment was visited upon the claimant in this regard. 383. Thirdly, she complained that [NAME_32] insisted on 14 December 2023 that her performance targets should be increased and focused on spelling and grammar errors. Again, our findings are that [NAME_32] discussed

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 93 with the claimant issues with her performance in her probationary period, including the amount of work which she was completing each day, and reminded her of the respondent’s expectations. This was legitimate, in our judgment, as was the reference to spelling and grammar errors, which were unrelated to the claimant’s disability of ADHD, and which affected the work which was then being issued to customers. The respondent was entitled to require the claimant to improve her performance where that was seen to be problematic. This did not amount to a detriment, and there is no basis upon which it could be found to have been done because the claimant did a protected act. There is no connection in the evidence before us. 384. Fourthly, she complained about the work allocated to her on 12 December 2023. Our findings are, as above, that [NAME_45]’s actions were appropriate, and that the claimant was not required to complete the tasks before she departed from the office at the end of her shift that day. There is no basis for finding that unrealistic performance targets were imposed upon her on that day.

Accordingly, no detriment was visited upon the claimant in this regard, and there is no basis for finding that it arose because she had done a protected act. 385. Fifthly, the claimant alleged that on 14 December 2023, [NAME_32] refused the claimant’s request to reschedule the probation review meeting so she could secure union representation. We have found above that this is not an accurate representation of what happened, and accordingly we find that the claimant was not subjected to any detriment in this regard, nor that it arose out of her doing a protected act. 386. Sixthly, the claimant alleged that in December 2023, she was “targeted” by being rostered on 3 weeks of consecutive early shifts. The evidence only supports the claimant being rostered on 2 consecutive early shifts, but there is no basis upon which it can be found that this amounted to a detriment, and no causal link available to us to show that this was done because of her doing a protected act. 387.

Accordingly, it is our judgment that the claimant’s claims that she was victimised contrary to section 27 of the Equality Act 2010 must fail, and be dismissed. Remedy - Discrimination 51. What financial losses has the discrimination caused the claimant? 52. Has the claimant taken reasonable steps to replace lost earnings, for example by looking for another job? 53. If not, for what period of loss should the claimant be compensated?

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 94 54. What injury to feelings has the discrimination caused the claimant and how much compensation should be awarded for that? Are there grounds to award aggravated damages, and if so how much should be awarded? 55. Has the discrimination caused the claimant personal injury and how much compensation should be awarded for that? 56. Is there a chance that the claimant’s employment would have ended in any event? Should any compensation be reduced as a result? 57. Did the ACAS Code of Practice on Disciplinary and Grievance Procedures apply? 58. Did the respondent or the claimant unreasonably fail to comply with it? 59. If so, is it just and equitable to increase or decrease any award payable to the claimant? By what proportion, up to 25%? 60. Should interest be awarded, and if so, how much? 388. On the basis that the Tribunal has not upheld any of the claimant’s discrimination claims, no remedy is to be awarded to her. Pay Claims Holiday Pay 61. Is the claimant due any sums in respect of accrued by untaken holiday pay outstanding as at 9 July 2024? The claimant alleges she is owed holiday pay for 5 hours of accrued but untaken holiday on termination of employment.

8000754/2024 & 8001367/2024 Page 95 64. Did the claimant receive payment of all enhanced company sick pay properly due to her in respect of her sickness absences while employed by the respondent? 389. During the course of her evidence before us, the claimant accepted that she was not entitled to any sums in respect of enhanced company sick pay or holiday pay, having been taken through the details of her entitlements by [NAME_7].

Accordingly, we regard these claims as abandoned, notwithstanding that the claimant made reference to them in her written submissions. Conclusion 390. We have therefore concluded that the claimant’s claims do not succeed, and are all dismissed. 391. We appreciate that the claimant will be disappointed with this outcome, particularly given the enormous effort she put into pursuing her claims. We would simply repeat what we said at the end of the Hearing, that the claimant was commendably able to present her own case, with the adjustments granted to her, and demonstrated courtesy and respect towards the Tribunal. She also showed respect to her opponent, with one unfortunate exception. 392. We would also pay tribute to [NAME_7], for his professionalism, patience, thoroughness and courtesy in the complex and extensive task before him. He provided great assistance to the Tribunal, and to the claimant, and helped us to navigate the voluminous bundle of documents with elan. In addition we would thank his instructing agents for the considerable preparatory work which they put into this Hearing. 393. Finally, we acknowledge that this Judgment is very long, and also that it has taken a long time for us to issue it. We regret this, but were also concerned to ensure that we addressed all of the issues in this case both factually and legally in as concise and comprehensive a manner as we could.

Date sent to parties ____________________________

16 April 2026