Employment Tribunal Strikes Out Claims Over Process and Timing Issues

OUTCOME: Struck Out

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Case Number : 1307880/2022 (“Claim 3”) 1308563/2022 (“Claim 4”) 1309067/2022 (“Claim 5”) 1301884/2023 (“Claim 6”) 1303378/2023 (“Claim 7”) 1306534/2023 (“Claim 8”)

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Claimant: [redacted]

Respondent: [redacted]

Heard at: Birmingham (in public, by video)

On: 23, 24, 27 and 28 April 2026

Before:

Employment Judge Edmonds

Representation Claimant: [redacted]

Respondent: [redacted]

RESERVED JUDGMENT AND DEPOSIT ORDER

1. The Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to hear the claimant’s complaints as set out below (numbering from the draft List of Issues) because they are an abuse of process and therefore have no reasonable prospect of success.:

a. Claim 3: Issue 8.1.1 b. Claim 3: Issue 8.1.2 c. Claim 3: Issue 8.1.3 d. Claim 3: Issue 8.1.4 e. Claim 3: Issue 8.1.5 f. Claim 3: Issue 8.1.6 g. Claim 3: Issue 8.1.7 h. Claim 3: Issue 8.1.8 i. Claim 3: Issue 8.1.9 j. Claim 3: Issue 8.1.10 k. Claim 3: Issue 8.1.11 l. Claim 3: Issue 8.1.12 m. Claim 3: Issue 8.1.13

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n. Claim 4: Issue 14.1.1 o. Claim 4: Issue 14.1.2 p. Claim 4: Issue 16.6.3 q. Claim 4: Issue 16.6.4 r. Claim 4: Issue 16.6.5 s. Claim 5: Issue 19.1.1 t. Claim 5: Issue 19.1.3 u. Claim 5: Issue 19.1.4 v. Claim 5: Issue 19.1.5 w. Claim 5: Issue 19.1.8 x. Claim 5: Issue 19.1.9 y. Claim 6: Issue 24.1.1 z. Claim 7: Issue 30.1.1

2. The Employment Judge considers that the claimant’s allegations or arguments as set out in the draft List of Issues at Issues 24.1.12 and 24.1.13 (direct discrimination), and repeated at allegation 25.1.1 (harassment) that Sir [APPELLANT] failed to offer the claimant a meeting and/or breached her confidentiality have little reasonable prospect of success. The claimant is ORDERED to pay a deposit of £50 per allegations, totalling £200 for all allegations not later than 21 days from the date that the Judgment following the hearing currently listed for 6 to 17 June 2026 is sent as a condition of being permitted to continue to advance those allegations or arguments. The Judge has had regard to any information available as to the claimant’s ability to comply with the order in determining the amount of the deposit.

REASONS Introduction and Issues

1. This was a hearing to determine whether any of the claimant’s claims should be struck out by the Tribunal because of cause of action estoppel, issue estoppel and/or abuse of process in line with the rule in [[NAME]] v [[NAME]] (1843) 3 Hare 100. In addition, the respondent sought strike out and/or a deposit order in relation to certain allegations on the basis of time limit issues. The Tribunal had also listed certain issues of its own volition to be considered for a deposit order, namely those allegations involving Sir [RESPONDENT] of the respondent.

2. The issues to be determined, as recorded in paragraph 24 of the Record of Preliminary Hearing dated 12 November 2025, were as follows:

1.1 Whether any claim or allegation should be struck out on the grounds of abuse of process, cause of action or issue estoppel or the rule in [[NAME]] v [[NAME]] (1843) 3 Hare 100 because: 1.1.1 It was included in the proceedings in either Claim 1 or Claim 2; 1.1.2 It ought reasonably to have been included in either Claim 1 or Claim 2; 1.1.3 Mrs [APPELLANT] applied for, and was either granted or refused, amendments to her complaints and/or allegations in Claim 1

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and/or Claim 2 and therefore she could and should have raised such matters at that point (and/or she did raise such matters and permission to amend was refused); 1.1.4 It was included in one of the claimant’s earlier claims, and/or it ought reasonably to have been included in one of the claimant’s earlier claims? (e.g. if an allegation in Claim 7 was already made in Claim 3).

In considering these issues, to what extent is it relevant that Claim 2 was struck out (and not dismissed on its merits)?

1.2 In relation to time limits:

1.2.1 Whether any of the complaints (in any of the remaining claims) in relation to the period prior to [APPELLANT] becoming Mrs [APPELLANT]’s line manager should be struck out on the basis that they have no reasonable prospect of success under Rule 38(1)(a) of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024 because they have not been presented within the required time limits and there is no reasonable prospect of Mrs [APPELLANT] showing that: 1.2.1.1 There was a continuing act, the last act of which was in time; and/or 1.2.1.2 That it would be just and equitable to extend time; And therefore that these complaints have no reasonable prospect of success.

1.3 Whether any of the following should be subject to a deposit order of up to £1,000 per allegation on the basis that they have little reasonable prospect of success under Rule 40 of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024, as follows:

1.3.1 In the event that it is not found that there are no reasonable prospects of success in relation to the time limit points identified at paragraph 24.2 above, any allegations in relation to the period prior to [[NAME]] becoming Mrs [APPELLANT]’s line manager; 1.3.2 Any allegation made against any individual against whom there was an allegation in Claim 1; 1.3.3 At the Tribunal’s own motion, the allegations made against [[NAME]] (who appears to have had no direct involvement in the matters relating to the claimant).

3. There was a separate issue in relation to ACAS early conciliation compliance, however the respondent confirmed that this was no longer being pursued and I therefore did not consider that issue.

Procedure, Documents and Evidence

Applications to Postpone

4. Both before and during the hearing, the claimant made several applications to postpone the hearing on various grounds. Those have been addressed separately and the parties are referred to the following:

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a. Decision of Employment Judge Smart as sent to the parties on 17 April 2026; b. Decision of Employment Judge Edmonds dated 24 April 2026; and c. Record of Preliminary Hearing dated 15 May 2026.

5. As written reasons have already been provided for the decisions not to postpone the hearing, I do not repeat them here. However, for completeness, I record here that various adjustments (as set out in the Record of Preliminary Hearing dated 15 May 2026) were made for the claimant during the hearing. In considering the various issues, I bore in mind the provisions of the Equal Treatment Bench Book, the need to make reasonable adjustments, both parties’ right to a fair trial and the Overriding Objective, including the need to ensure that both parties were on an equal footing so far as practicable.

6. There were various other procedural matters that arose during the course of the hearing which have also already been addressed in the Record of Preliminary Hearing dated 15 May 2026 and the parties are referred to that document for details relating to those matters.

Documents for the hearing

7. There were substantial disputes between the parties as to what documents should be in the hearing file for this hearing. In essence, the claimant believed that all evidential documents and a witness statement which she intended to use at the final hearing (amounting to over 200 pages) should be in the hearing file. The respondent had, as I had previously directed them to do, restricted the hearing file to those documents relevant for the purposes of determining the specific issues at this hearing. Again, substantial details about document issues have been recorded in the Record of Preliminary Hearing dated 15 May 2026 and I do not repeat them here. The claimant’s objections to the hearing file formed part of the basis for her postponement applications and her subsequent refusal to give evidence (see below).

8. References in this Reserved Judgment to page numbers are to the relevant page number of the 827 page hearing file, unless otherwise specified.

9. In addition to the documents in the file, during the course of the hearing the claimant sent through various pieces of medical evidence. She sent two letters through on the first day of the hearing and then on the final morning of the hearing she sent a significant number of emails, attaching various medical evidence. I have reviewed that medical evidence when reaching my decision. I add at this stage that the claimant has suggested that the Tribunal and/or the respondent should go back through the extensive number of emails that she has sent to the Tribunal and/or the respondent in respect of Claims 1 and 2 to seek out all of the medical evidence that she provided in relation to those claims and review it to see if it is relevant to the issues I am determining at this hearing. I have declined to do that, and I have declined to order the respondent to do that. Whilst I appreciate the claimant’s health conditions and disabilities, it is not for the Tribunal or the respondent to make the claimant’s case for her and to go through

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previously proceedings to try to identify for itself whether any of the previously provided medical evidence is relevant to this particular issue.

Evidence

10. Specific directions had been issued to the parties for the preparation of a witness statement by the claimant. However, she did not do so, which she said was because she had not realised she had to (despite this being clearly set out in the Record of Preliminary Hearing dated 12 November 2026). Time was made available to her during the course of the hearing for her to prepare a witness statement (the second day of the hearing was converted to a non-sitting day to allow the claimant time to prepare). The claimant sent various correspondence to the Tribunal on 24 April 2026, one of which was an email sent at 6.50pm that day amounting to 9 pages in length. The first five and a half pages or thereabouts were about other matters, but part way down the sixth page the email started to set out a witness statement for the purposes of this hearing. That email was used as the claimant’s witness statement.

11. She also provided a witness statement amounting to over 200 pages, which was based on a witness statement that she had sought to use at previous hearings and which covered the entirety of her issues with the respondent across all of her claims. I declined to read that statement, on the basis that it was not in the interests of justice nor in accordance with the Overriding Objective to do so, given that I was aware that this statement had been prepared for a different purpose and that its contents related primarily to matters which were not the subject matter of this hearing. The respondent’s representative did identify two new paragraphs within that witness statement which did appear to be relevant to the issues I had to determine and which I assume the claimant added for the purpose of this hearing, and I agreed to consider those paragraphs. I told the claimant that, if she wished me to consider any other aspects of it she should direct me to the specific paragraph numbers of the statement. She did not do so.

12. Ultimately, we were ready to start the claimant’s evidence on the afternoon of the third day of the hearing (27 April 2026): the Record of Preliminary Hearing dated 15 May 2026 sets out the background to why it was not possible to start evidence before that time. However, the claimant requested that her evidence be delayed until the following morning because she said that her health meant that it was harder for her to give evidence in the afternoons. Whilst I did not accept that this was an adjustment that the Tribunal were required to make for her (and there was no current medical evidence to support it), as there were other case management matters to attend to in relation to listing the next hearing I agreed to spend the afternoon dealing with that and delay her witness evidence until the morning of the final day of the hearing.

13. However, on the morning of that final day (and in correspondence sent overnight after the third day of the hearing concluded), the claimant then indicated that she was refusing to give evidence under oath. This was extremely frustrating given that the hearing had been timetabled specifically so that she could give oral evidence at that time. She said that she was not willing to give evidence under oath in case she gave an incorrect answer

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and therefore committed perjury, but that she was willing to answer questions as long as it was not under oath. This concerned me because, if she was not confident in the answers she would give, in any case the Tribunal could not be confident that those answers would be correct even if she gave them not under oath (taking aside the fact that evidence should be given under oath). I indicated to the claimant that the solution in that case would be for her to give evidence under oath, and when she was not sure of something, she could simply say that she was not sure. I also explained to her that if she did not give evidence under oath, I would need to consider how much (if any) weight to attach to her written evidence. Ultimately, however she continued to refuse to give evidence under oath, which she stated was because the file was incomplete, and therefore we moved directly to submissions.

14. I have considered how much weight to attach to the claimant’s written evidence, given the absence of oral evidence. She did not swear the contents of her statement under oath, and the respondent (and the Tribunal) did not have the opportunity to ask her questions about her evidence. I also bear in mind that, on her own account, she was not confident in her recollection of events given that this was the basis upon which she refused to give evidence under oath. I recognise that the reason why she says she struggles to remember things accurately is due to her health, and I bear this in mind, however ultimately she was present at the hearing and able to give evidence, and yet refused to do so. I had explained to her that she could simply say that she could not remember when she was unsure about anything, and therefore her difficulties with recollections should not have presented her from at least attempting to answer the questions that might have been put to her. In those circumstances, I decline to attach any weight to her written witness statement, save where I know that it has been corroborated by other evidence during the course of my dealings on her various claims (I heard Claim 1 and have conducted many of the preliminary hearings in relation to Claims 2 to 8).

Submissions

15. The intention had been for both parties to give their submissions during the hearing so that I could deliver an oral judgment. The respondent had prepared a written Note in advance of the hearing which had been sent to the claimant electronically before the hearing, but which only reached her in hard copy on the Saturday. Ultimately, for reasons which are set out more fully in the Record of Preliminary Hearing dated 15 May 2026, matters were delayed such that it became apparent that I would need to reserve my judgment.

16. My intention at that point had still been to hear submissions, and then reserve my judgment. However, at the start of her oral submissions, the claimant requested permission to provide written submissions. I asked her specifically how long she would need if I granted permission for this and she said that she could do it the following day. Despite the respondent’s objections to the claimant’s application, I decided to grant it and to allow her until the end of that week (three working days) to send them to the Tribunal. I therefore gave her longer than she requested.

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17. In the circumstances, I also decided that the respondent should have the opportunity to comment on those submissions as, if they had been given orally then they would have been able to respond to them at the hearing. I allowed the respondent until the following Friday to do that (4 working days given the bank holiday). At the time the claimant thanked me. However, subsequently she has written to the Tribunal objecting to what she sees as unfair treatment as the respondent had longer than her and three days was insufficient. The three days was longer than the claimant had actually requested. At that time, I had already been allocated specific time in mid May to prepare my Record of Preliminary Hearing and to deliberate in private on my reserved judgment, so I needed to ensure that I had the paperwork in time for that. Given that the respondent was in effect being put to additional work in having to review written submissions after the hearing, I felt that it was appropriate to allow the respondent sufficient time to review those submissions and respond to them, and it seemed to me that the following Friday was the most appropriate day (and bearing in mind that the submissions would be sent by the claimant to the respondent’s instructing solicitor and they were not present at the hearing so I had no knowledge of their diary commitments). I do not accept that the claimant was disadvantaged in any way by only having three days, this being two days longer than she requested at the time.

18. Mrs [APPELLANT] did send written submissions by email on Thursday 30 April 2026 (one day in advance of the deadline I had given her), followed by a further submission on the evening of 1 May 2026 and I have taken these into account in reaching my decision. The respondent ultimately declined to provide any further submissions in response.

19. Both parties also gave oral submissions during the hearing.

20. Further information about documents, evidence and issues that arose during the hearing are again included in the Record of Preliminary Hearing dated 15 May 2026.

Facts and Background

History of the claims

21. This hearing relates to six separate claims presented by the claimant against the respondent in relation to her employment. These six claims form part of a sequence of nine claims which the claimant has presented to the Tribunal: Claim 1 (1306130/2019) was dismissed following a ten day final hearing in April and May 2023 and Claim 2 was struck out by the Tribunal on 16 July 2025 at a public preliminary hearing, having been subject to extensive case management prior to that point. The claimant’s ninth claim was presented to the Tribunal in October 2025 but has been rejected by the Tribunal for reasons which have been communicated to the claimant separately. This reserved judgment concerns Claims 3 to 8.

22. The claimant is a vulnerable individual with a number of medical conditions, some of which have been accepted to amount to a disability within the meaning of the Equality Act 2010. At the time that each of her claims was submitted to the Tribunal, she suffered from ill health in various ways,

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although the exact nature of that ill health and the conditions that it related to varied over time.

23. The sequence of the claimant’s litigation is as follows, insofar as relevant to the applications before me:

a. Claim 1 was presented to the Tribunal in July 2019.

b. On 7 January 2020, Employment Judge Butler held a preliminary hearing, following which he set out a draft List of Issues in respect of Claim 1. That included issues which went to 31 December 2019, and therefore necessarily must have included permission to amend the claim, given that those allegations had not occurred at the time of submission of the claim form.

c. In October 2020 the claimant provided a “[[NAME]]”, being a detailed table setting out the allegations that she wished to pursue in relation to Claim 1. Whilst I was not provided with a copy of the [[NAME]] I can see that this [[NAME]] was recorded as being 17 pages long by Ms [RESPONDENT] in her subsequent note prepared for a preliminary hearing on 22 to 24 June 2022 (page 44). It can therefore be assumed that it was extensive.

d. A further set of [[NAME]] in relation to Claim 1 was provided by the claimant on 21 April 2021, on this occasion running to 120 pages (again as referred to at page 44 in Ms [RESPONDENT]’ note preparing for the preliminary hearing on 22 to 24 June 2022). Whilst I do not have a copy of it, it appears to be split into two sections: one which purported to be further particulars of the existing Claim 1, and one which was an amendment application (the amendment section amounting to 65 pages). Given its length, it can reasonably be assumed that this was extremely extensive and detailed.

e. Claim 2 was presented on 2 July 2021 (to the Bristol Employment Tribunal).

f. Claim 1 was listed for a preliminary hearing on 22 to 24 June 2022 in which the [[NAME]] were considered (page 54 and 67). This records that the [[NAME]] amounted to nearly 500 complaints. The claimant’s amendment application was refused. In addition, certain allegations were struck out as having no reasonable prospect of success, and certain others were made subject to a deposit order, which was not paid by the claimant and therefore those allegations were also struck out on 26 April 2023 (page 84).

g. There was a preliminary hearing in relation to Claim 2 on 3 August 2022 (page 215) before Employment Judge Midgley at which a further preliminary hearing was listed with one of the topics to be addressed at it being whether to permit the claimant to amend Claim 2, and whether any claim or allegation should be struck out on the grounds of cause of action or issue estoppel or the rule in [[NAME]] v [[NAME]] because it was or ought reasonably to have been included in Claim 1 (i.e. similar to the issue which I am considering here).

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Directions were issued including a direction that the claimant make any application to amend by 16 September 2022.

h. On 15 August 2022 the claimant wrote to the Tribunal, saying that the List of Issues did not reflect all of her allegations within her claim, and that she believed she needed to amend her claim due to “errors and omissions the following lines from ET1 form I submitted”. She then set out a number of allegations which she wished to include in her claim across four A4 pages, and it appears that this was a mixture of clarification points and amendment points.

i. On 19 August 2022 the claimant sent a further application to amend Claim 2 (page 234). This was a detailed application amounting to 12 A4 pages of text.

j. Claim 3 was presented to the Tribunal on 24 September 2022.

k. At a preliminary hearing on 9 March 2023, Employment Judge Livesey dismissed certain allegations from Claim 2 as being an abuse of process, issued a deposit order in relation to some of the other complaints from Claim 2, and refused permission for the claimant to amend Claim 2 (page 269 and 282).

l. The remaining allegations from Claim 1 proceeded to a final hearing from 24 April to 9 May 2023 and were dismissed by the Tribunal (page 85).

m. I do not record all of the Preliminary Hearings in relation to Claim 2 here, but there were a number of them (including further Preliminary Hearings at which the topic of amendments was discussed), ultimately culminating in a public preliminary hearing in July 2025 at which Claim 2 was struck out.

24. It is also relevant to note the respective time periods covered by the various claims. I should add at this point that in respect of Claims 3 to 8, the List of Issues remains in draft form, because the claimant did not attend the preliminary hearing in October 2025 at which the draft List of Issues was produced. The entirety of Claims 3 to 8 is currently subject to a separate strike out application from the respondent (to be heard on 16 and 17 June 2026), but if those claims are not struck out, there will be a separate further preliminary hearing to try to finalise the List of Issues in respect of Claims 3 to 8. However, the draft List of Issues that we do have is based on the allegations as set out in the claimant’s claim forms and I consider that it provides sufficient particularity for the purposes of this hearing. The time periods covered by the allegations in each claim are:

a. Claim 1: June 2018 to the end of 2019 (although the period between July 2019 and December 2019 were added by way of amendment given that they post date the claim form). b. Claim 2: July 2019 to July 2021 c. Claim 3: November 2019 to September 2022 d. Claim 4: July 2022 (possibly December 2020 in relation to reasonable adjustments) to October 2022

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e. Claim 5: July 2022 to November 2022 f. Claim 6: 2018 to February 2023 g. Claim 7: July 2022 to April 2023 h. Claim 8: start date of relevant period not yet clear but appears to be 2023, to October 2023

25. As set out above, Claim 1 proceeded to a final hearing and the complaints were all dismissed by the Tribunal. Claim 2 was struck out at a private preliminary hearing under Rules 38(1)(b) and (e) of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024, namely on the grounds that the manner in which the proceedings had been conducted by the claimant had been scandalous, unreasonable or vexatious, and because the Tribunal considered that it was no longer possible to have a fair hearing in respect of the claim.

The claimant’s health

26. The claimant relies primarily on health grounds as to why she did not file some of her later allegations at an earlier time, and this is therefore relevant to both the res judicata / abuse of process issues, and to the time limit issues. Whilst I have made observations above about the weight I attach to her evidence, I nevertheless find as follows:

a. The claimant has been disabled by reason of anxiety, plantar fasciitis, and type 2 diabetes at all material times. She also developed covid in November 2020 which subsequently became long covid: it is accepted that at some point this became a disability under the Equality Act, however the date on which that happened remains in dispute (and is an issue to be determined in Claims 3 to 8). She has also referred to having other medical conditions, such as arthritis.

b. What is clear is that, at the point in time at which Claims 2, 3 and following were submitted, the claimant suffered from various disabilities, and whether or not her long covid amounted to a disability at that time, she had long covid at the point in time at which Claim 2 was submitted to the Tribunal (and thereafter).

c. The claimant has also referred to menopausal / pre-menopausal symptoms although we do not have medical evidence to show the impact that this had on her or the time period of such symptoms.

d. Through the period from when she submitted Claim 1 to her dismissal in 2023, the claimant considered that she was subjected to ongoing, repeated discriminatory treatment. She was engaged in ongoing disputes with the respondent internally throughout the period, and had periods of extended sick leave.

e. The claimant has said that she was particularly affected by lockdown due to her anxiety, although we do not have medical evidence to support that and as she declined to give oral evidence I do not attach any weight to that statement.

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f. The claimant says that the impact of her conditions on her affected her ability to focus and concentrate on legal matters. Whilst I do not doubt that her conditions, particularly her long covid, was likely to affect her ability to focus in some respects, I have not been provided with medical evidence to support that assertion in relation to the time period in question (although I do note that her difficulties with concentration was noted in an intermediary report in March 2024). During 2021 and 2022, whilst suffering from long covid, the claimant was able to not only submit claims to the Tribunal, and participate in hearings, but also provide an extraordinarily detailed [[NAME]] and make applications to amend Claims 1 and 2, as set out in the timeline above. I therefore do not find that her conditions impacted her ability to concentrate on legal matters such as to mean that she could not apply to amend her claims or consider what to include in each one.

g. The claimant has provided various medical evidence largely in the form of GP records, fit notes, and letters from treating clinicians with whom she had appointments. What these show is that it is clear that from late 2020 onwards the claimant had regular contact with her GP about a range of matters and that she is recorded as having long covid, amongst other things. She had a number of fit notes recording that she was unfit for work at various times due to work related stress, anxiety and long covid. She had an appointment with an Occupational Therapist in April 2023 who made various suggestions about potential mobility aids for her. She was receiving treatment from the Community Dietitian in around May 2023. She had an appointment with the Department of Radiology in June 2023. In addition, it is clear that the claimant suffered from a particular period of ill health in around August 2025 such that an Employment Appeal Tribunal hearing was postponed.

h. What the medical evidence does not indicate is what impact her health would have had on her specifically at the time of presenting her Tribunal claims, or on her ability to present claims / amendment applications and to include in her claims / amendment applications the relevant matters.

The claimant’s financial situation

27. This is relevant to her ability to pay any deposit ordered. As outlined above, we have no oral evidence from the claimant on this point. She also did not provide any documentary evidence such as bank statements, benefit statements, credit card bills etc, despite having been ordered to do so (further information on this is set out in the Record of Preliminary Hearing dated 15 May 2026). I do however have some limited information from what was provided at previous hearings which has been drawn to my attention:

a. At the preliminary hearing in Claim 2 on 9 March 2023 it was found that the claimant had substantial equity in a property (page 275).

b. The claimant was dismissed from the respondent’s employment on 6 October 2023 and it does not appear to be in dispute that she is

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currently unemployed.

c. She has referred to being on benefits, although we do not know the specific details of what benefits she is in receipt of.

Law

Abuse of process / res judicata

28. In [COMPANY] v [COMPANY] (formerly known as [COMPANY]) [2013] UKSC 46 Lord Sumpton JSC described res judicata as “a portmanteau term which is used to describe a number of different legal principles with different juridical origins”. He also said “Res judicata and abuse of process are juridically very different. Res judicata is a rule of substantive law, while abuse of process is a concept which informs the exercise of the court’s procedural powers”. He set out six key principles, as follows:

“[1] The first principle is that once a cause of action has been held to exist or not to exist, that outcome may not be challenged by either party in subsequent proceedings. This is “cause of action estoppel”. It is properly described as a form of estoppel precluding a party from challenging the same cause of action in subsequent proceedings.

[2] Secondly, there is the principle, which is not easily described as a species of estoppel, that where the claimant succeeded in the first action and does not challenge the outcome, he may not bring a second action on the same cause of action, for example to recover further damages: see Conquer v Boot [1928] 2 KB 336.

[3] Third, there is the doctrine of merger, which treats a cause of action as extinguished once judgment has been given on it, and the claimant's sole right as being a right on the judgment. Although this produces the same effect as the second principle, it is in reality a substantive rule about the legal effect of an English judgment, which is regarded as “of a higher nature” and therefore as superseding the underlying cause of action: see King v Hoare (1844) 13 M & W 494, 504 ([[NAME]]).

[4] Fourth, there is the principle that even where the cause of action is not the same in the later action as it was in the earlier one, some issue which is necessarily common to both was decided on the earlier occasion and is binding on the parties: [[NAME]]'s Case (1776) 20 State Tr 355. “Issue estoppel” was the expression devised to describe this principle by [[NAME]] J in [[NAME]] v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1921) 29 CLR 537, 561 and adopted by [[NAME]] LJ in Thoday v Thoday [1964] P 181, 197–198.

[5] Fifth, there is the principle first formulated by [[NAME]] in [[NAME]] v [[NAME]] (1843) 3 Hare 100, 115, which precludes a party from raising in subsequent proceedings matters which were not but could and should have been raised in the earlier ones.

[6] Finally, there is the more general procedural rule against abusive

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proceedings, which may be regarded as the policy underlying all of the above principles with the possible exception of the doctrine of merger. A party may be bound by an earlier decision affecting another party where there is a sufficient degree of identification, or privity, between the two to make it just to hold that the decision to which one was party should be binding in proceedings to which the other is party (per Megarry VC in Gleeson v J Wippell & Co Limited [1977] 1 WLR 510, at 515).”

29. For cause of action estoppel to operate, there must have been a judicial decision, order or judgment in the previous proceedings. However, that does not need to necessarily be a determination of the claim on its merits ([[NAME]] v Staffordshire County Council [1996] IRLR 209).

30. Issue estoppel will only arise where the finding in the previous proceedings were necessary for the purposes of disposing of those proceedings. There may also be special circumstances which disapply the doctrine ([NAME] v (1) London Borough of Lambeth (2) Mr [[NAME]] [2022] EAT 94).

31. Where an individual seeks to raise a different type of claim to that which has already been determined, but the subject-matter is such that the claimant could with reasonable diligence, have put that forward at the original hearing, the claimant may be barred from pursuing that new claim ([[NAME]] v [[NAME]] (1843) 3 Hare 100). There is public interest in the finality of litigation, and a party “should not be twice vexed or harassed in the same matter”.

32. In [[NAME]] v [[NAME]] & Co [2000] UKHL 65, Lord Bingham said that:

“'The bringing of a claim or the raising of a defence in later proceedings may, without more, amount to abuse if the court is satisfied (the onus being on the party alleging abuse) that the claim or defence should have been raised in the earlier proceedings if it was to be raised at all. I would not accept that it is necessary, before abuse may be found, to identify any additional element such as a collateral attack on a previous decision or some dishonesty, but where those elements are present the later proceedings will be much more obviously abusive, and there will rarely be a finding of abuse unless the later proceeding involves what the court regards as unjust harassment of a party. It is, however, wrong to hold that because a matter could have been raised in earlier proceedings it should have been, so as to render the raising of it in later proceedings necessarily abusive. That is to adopt too dogmatic an approach to what should in my opinion be a broad, merits-based judgment which takes account of the public and private interests involved and also takes account of all the facts of the case, focusing attention on the crucial question whether, in all the circumstances, a party is misusing or abusing the process of the court by seeking to raise before it the issue which could have been raised before. As one cannot comprehensively list all possible forms of abuse, so one cannot formulate any hard and fast rule to determine whether, on given facts, abuse is to be found or not. … While the result may often be the same, it is in my view preferable to ask whether in all the circumstances a party's conduct is an abuse than to ask whether the conduct is an abuse and then, if it is, to ask whether the abuse is excused or justified by special circumstances. Properly applied, and whatever the legitimacy of its descent, the rule has in

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my view a valuable part to play in protecting the interests of justice.”

33. The burden of proof to show abuse is therefore on the party alleging abuse (in this case, the respondent). A broad merits based judgment should be adopted by the Tribunal and the Tribunal must not only ask itself whether the claim could have been brought in earlier proceedings, but whether it should have been. This includes consideration of all the circumstances, including why the matters arising in the later claim were not raised at the time of the earlier claim. Could the issue in question, with reasonable diligence, have been discovered and raised in the earlier proceedings? Does the later action constitute unjust harassment or oppression of the party sued? ([[NAME]] v [COMPANY] [2019] EWHC 1229)

34. In carrying out that broad merits based judgment, the Tribunal should consider both the public and private interests involved, carrying out a balancing act, and consider whether the raising of the matter in the subsequent proceedings amounts to unjust harassment of a party. It is an evaluative exercise (see, for example Wirral University Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v Moriarty [2026]). However, it is not a discretionary matter, either there is abuse or there is not, once that balancing exercise has been carried out.

35. Abuse of process can occur not only where a claim could and should have been brought at the time of presenting the original claim, but also where the complaint could have been presented prior to the date of the liability hearing of that earlier claim as those complaints could have been sought to be added by way of amendment (Haringey LBC v O’Brien [2016], [[NAME]] v [COMPANY] [2025])

36. Orji v Nagra [2023], whilst not being an employment case, makes clear that for a complaint to be struck out as abuse of process, there must be a determination or judgment. This is not necessarily a determination on the merits, but simply a determination (see also King v Hoare (1844) 13 M & W 494).

Time limits, no reasonable prospects and deposit order

37. Rule 38(1) of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024 states that:

“The Tribunal may, on its own initiative or on the application of a party, strike out all or part of a claim, response or reply on any of the following grounds –

(a) that it is scandalous or vexatious or has no reasonable prospect of success

38. Rule 40 states that:

(1) “Where at a preliminary hearing the Tribunal considers that any specific allegation or argument in a claim, response or reply has little reasonable prospect of success, it may make an order requiring a party (“[[NAME]]”) to pay a deposit not exceeding £1,000 as a condition of continuing to advance that allegation or argument (“a deposit order”).

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(2) The Tribunal must make reasonable enquiries into [[NAME]]’s ability to pay the deposit and have regard to any such information when deciding the amount of the deposit.”

39. It will be rare to strike out a claim on the grounds that it has no reasonable prospect of success ([COMPANY] ([[NAME]]) v [APPELLANT]) [2012] IRLR 755). The claimant’s case should be taken at its highest and cases should not generally be struck out where the facts are in dispute, particularly in discrimination cases ([[NAME]] v [COMPANY]’ Union [2001] IRLR 305). However, the position may be different if there is no real substance to the factual assertions made, such as where the contemporaneous documentation contradicts them ([NAME] [COMPANY] v Patel [2003] EWCA Civ 472).

40. In order to identify whether there is any reasonable prospect of success, there must be a reasonable attempt to first identify the claim and the issues which are relevant ([NAME] v [COMPANY] [NAME] and [NAME] 2021 ICR 1307 EAT).

41. In relation to deposit orders, whilst the threshold for issuing a deposit order is clearly lower than for striking out a claim, there must still be a proper basis for finding that the claim has little reasonable prospects of success ([[NAME]] v Royal Borough of [[NAME]]-upon-[NAME] 0096/07).

42. Issuing a deposit order is a matter of discretion having regard to all the circumstances and the Overriding Objective. Its purpose is to identify claims with little prospect of success and to discourage the claimant from pursuing those claims by requiring a sum to be paid with the risk of costs against that claimant if the claim fails for the reasons why the deposit was issued ([[NAME]] v [[NAME]] and anor 2017 ICR 486).

43. The amount of any deposit order should be such that it does not disproportionately restrict the right of the claimant to a fair trial, or hinder access to justice. In short, the amount of the deposit should be capable of being complied with.

Conclusions

Res Judicata / Abuse of Process

44. Claim 3 was submitted to the Tribunal on 24 September 2022. Claims 4 to 8 post date that date. At the time that Claim 3 was submitted, the current status of Claims 1 and 2 was as follows:

a. Claim 1: the List of Issues had been initially discussed at a preliminary hearing on 7 January 2020 (and although only partially prepared at that point, the draft Issues relating to the victimisation complaint included allegations postdating the claim form, so must have included amendment). There had been further case management hearings, with the claimant subsequently submitting two separate [[NAME]] in 2020 and 2021, one being 17 pages and one being approximately 120 pages, including 65 pages

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of requested amendments to her claim. Those were considered at a further preliminary hearing from 22 to 24 June 2022 and the amendment application had been refused, as set out in a Record of Preliminary Hearing dated 1 July 2022. The claim had been case managed and was awaiting final hearing (which later took place in April to May 2023).

b. Claim 2: there had been a preliminary hearing on 3 August 2022, at which a further preliminary hearing had been listed to deal with various issues, including whether to permit the claimant to amend Claim 2. She was ordered specifically to provide any amendment application to the Tribunal and the respondent by 16 September 2022. She then sent an amendment application to the Tribunal on 15 August 2022, supplemented by a further amendment application on 19 August 2022. This was just over one month prior to the submission of Claim 3 and it is noted that the deadline for her to apply to amend Claim 2 was only just over one week before Claim 3 was submitted.

45. In submissions (both oral and written), the respondent did not take me to any individual cause of action or issue, and demonstrate that this had been specifically or necessarily determined in Claim 1, or was included specifically in the List of Issues to be determined in Claim 2. There does appear to be some overlap: for example, I can see that the List of Issues in relation to Claim 3 includes an allegation that the claimant was accused of flexi-fraud in November 2019. As the Judge who heard Claim 1 (alongside members), I recall the issue of flex-time arising, and the Reserved Judgment shows that the relevant issue in those proceedings was whether there was “over-scrutinising of flex-time from September 2019 onwards”. It appears to me that these appear to be clearly related allegations, however they are not identical and so I would need to analyse to what extent these are the same allegations, and (in the case of issue estoppel) to what extent the question of accusations of flexi fraud was necessary to the determination of the over-scrutiny point. The respondent has not made any specific submissions on the point and given that the burden of proof rests on the respondent, I do not find that there was cause of action or issue estoppel.

46. However, the question of abuse of process requires careful consideration. This is a broader question, balancing public and private interests and taking account of all the circumstances. I consider this issue against all of the specific allegations that the respondent relies upon in its application for strike out.

47. At the time Claim 3 was presented, both Claims 1 and 2 were already in progress within the Tribunal system. Both had been subject to amendment application: Claim 1 had had that amendment application determined, in respect of Claim 2 it was listed for a preliminary hearing for that purpose. Her amendment application in respect of Claim 2 had been made only approximately one month prior to Claim 3 being submitted, and the deadline given to her for that amendment application was only approximately one week prior to Claim 3 being submitted. The allegations in Claim 3 relate to things that happened between 2019 and September 2022 (although in

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fairness to the claimant that is a draft List of Issues and the dates are still to be identified in relation to her reasonable adjustments complaint). Overall, however, it appears to me that Claim 3 could have been presented by way of an amendment application to Claim 2 or Claim 1.

48. I note for completeness that I have not been provided with the amendment applications in respect of Claims 1 or 2 and therefore I do not actually know whether it was included within that amendment application, or simply could have been given that it related to the same broad time period. Again, as the burden of proof rests with the respondent, I have proceeded on the basis that these were new allegations and not repeats of allegations already made as part of the earlier amendment applications.

49. The timing of Claim 3 is particularly stark given the significant proximity in time between the submission of Claim 3 and the amendment applications in Claims 1 and 2, however similar points do arise in relation to Claims 4 to 8, to the extent that they relate to allegations arising prior to September 2022. Whilst those claims were raised at a later date and therefore not so close in time to the amendment application being submitted in relation to Claim 2, or to the amendment application being dealt with by the Tribunal in Claim 1, the point still remains that she could have presented those allegations within Claims 1 and/or 2. Claim 4 was presented on 28 October 2022, only just over one month after Claim 3, with Claim 5 following shortly thereafter on 18 November 2022, Claim 6 on 6 February 2023, Claim 7 on 13 April 2023 and Claim 8 on 17 October 2023. It is only Claim 8 that was presented after the final hearing in Claim 1, and even that claim pre-dated the striking out of Claim 2 by a over a year and a half. No application for strike out on the basis of abuse of process is in any case made by the respondent in relation to Claim 8.

50. Therefore, when Claims 3, 4, 5, 6, and even 7 were presented to the Tribunal, Claim 1 was still awaiting final hearing and Claim 2 was still a long way off from a final hearing. Even if the claimant had not realised that she could pursue those particular allegations until the dates on which she submitted those claims (which I do not accept), she could have applied for further amendment to Claims 1 and/or 2 at that stage. She was well aware of the process for doing so, and had done so in respect of both Claims 1 and 2. She also knew that she was not limited to one amendment application, given that she had made two separate ones in Claim 1 which had been considered, and therefore that she was not prevented from seeking to re-amend Claim 1 or Claim 2.

51. One further consideration is the approach that the claimant takes to litigation, which could in my view fairly be described as a “scattergun approach” (to use the same language as was used in the case of [[NAME]], above). She presented six separate claims to the Tribunal between 24 September 2022 and 17 October 2023, with many overlapping features between them and them not flowing neatly from one to the next in terms of time periods (i.e. the time periods in respect of the claims overlapped with each other). As was noted in [[NAME]], above (at paragraph 36), a scattergun approach “expands substantially the time and expense in defending claims by Respondents (private interest) it also takes up considerable tribunal time which impacts on the resources of the Employment Tribunal service and

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cases brought by others (public interest)”.

52. The claimant was of course ill throughout the relevant period with various health conditions, including from November 2020 covid which turned into long covid. She asserts that this caused her to have memory issues and that this should be taken into account.

53. Whilst not specifically directed to it by the parties, I have also reviewed the intermediary reports dated 5 March 2024 and 28 March 2024 because they also address the subject of the claimant’s memory. Whilst not prepared at the time of the submission of Claims 3 to 7, they do provide some insight. I note for example that there is reference to tiredness, communication difficulties, difficulties with concentration, issues with reading skills where there is unfamiliar language, writing skills, difficulty answering questions with multiple parts, difficulties processing verbal information, difficulties referring to specific dates, difficulties answering questions referring to numbers and difficulties staying on topic and turn-taking in conversations.

54. I fully accept that the claimant has been (and continues to be) unwell. That has been the state of affairs since before she even submitted Claim 1, and I accept that since submitting Claim 1 her long covid has caused her additional difficulties. At some points in time she has been fit to work (with adjustments), at others she has been off sick (or would have been unable to work had she not been dismissed). I also do not doubt that her ill health makes it harder for her to participate in Tribunal proceedings and that adjustments should be made for her, as they have been and as will continue to be the case.

55. However, despite her ill health, the claimant was nevertheless able to deal with all the case management in respect of Claim 1, and to submit Claim 2 and deal with the amendment (and other) issues in relation to that claim. Her amendment applications in relation to both Claim 1 and Claim 2 were very detailed. Claim 2 was also submitted to the Tribunal initially whilst she was suffering from long covid. She has shown herself throughout all of the proceedings to be very capable of sending lengthy correspondence to the Tribunal. Again, I note that the timing of her application to amend Claim 2 was only a number of weeks before the submission of Claim 3. I also note that the claimant has a habit (as she did in both Claim 1 and Claim 2, and as I have seen her do subsequently in Claims 3 to 8) of sending one amendment application and then supplementing that with another amendment application if she thinks of something else. She therefore could have taken the same approach in relation to the matters subsequently presented in Claims 3 to 7. I have not seen evidence which suggests to me that she would have been capable of doing the things she did manage to do in Claims 1 and 2, but not of including within her applications to amend those points which she then pursued in her later claims (to the extent that they relate to the time period prior to September 2022).

56. There is no medical evidence which suggests that the claimant would not have been able to present her full claims in Claims 1 and 2 containing all of the issues arising up to the date of the submission of those claims. Nor is there any medical evidence which indicates that she would not have been able to amend her claims after those dates, to include new allegations

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which had subsequently arisen. I absolutely accept that she has difficulties with concentration and focus as a result of her health conditions, and I take that on board. However, she still managed to put together extensive amendment applications despite those health conditions and they certainly did not prevent her from focusing on ensuring that those amendment applications were detailed or that they were considered by the Tribunal: her Tribunal proceedings have always been a key focus for her.

57. I also accept that the claimant has difficulties with dates and, for example, staying on topic. I have considered whether this means that she might have concentrated on certain topics but omitted to include others. However, in circumstances where she has submitted such detailed amendment applications, covering a wide range of allegations over an extended period of time, I do not accept this to be the case. Nor is there medical evidence to support that.

58. The burden of proof is on the respondent to establish abuse of process and the simple fact that an allegation could have been presented in the earlier claim with reasonable diligence does not mean that there has necessarily been an abuse of process. I also recognise that, if I do find that there has been abuse of process and strike out the relevant allegations, this will result in the claimant not getting a final determination on those issues.

59. However, taking a broad, merits-based assessment and taking account of the public and private interests and all the facts and circumstances, I conclude that the allegations in Claims 3 to 8 which pre-date September 2022 could and should have been included either in Claims 1 or 2 when they were initially presented to the Tribunal, or in the amendment applications to those claims. Whilst Claim 2 was subsequently struck out without a final hearing, it nevertheless had a determination and I conclude that it would be an abuse of process to permit her to pursue allegations which could and should have been brought in Claim 2 (either initially or by way of amendment), through Claims 3 to 8. I conclude that there has been unjust harassment of the respondent through the repeated bringing of new claims raising matters which could and should have been raised through the earlier claims. The claimant has had the opportunity to have issues relating to the period prior to December 2019 determined in Claim 1, and would have done so in Claim 2 had it not been struck out due to her conduct of the proceedings. In particular:

a. Allegations in relation to the period prior to July 2019 could and should have been presented in Claim 1; b. Allegations in relation to the period between July 2019 and April 2021 could and should have been presented as part of the claimant’s amendment applications in Claim 1 and/or as part of Claim 2; c. Allegations in relation to the period between April 2021 and 22 June 2022 could and should have been presented prior to the amendment application in Claim 1 being heard by Employment Judge Noons on 22-24 June 2022 (i.e. could and should have been added to the amendment applications) and/or included in Claim 2 (either initially or by way of amendment application). d. Allegations which pre-dated 19 August 2022 could and should have

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been included in the amendment application for Claim 2 and/or should have been made by way of further amendment application in Claim 1. e. Allegations which occurred between 19 August 2022 and September 2022 could and should have been presented by way of further amendment application to Claim 2 and/or Claim 1, neither of those claims having progressed to final hearing at that stage, and the amendment application in relation to Claim 2 not yet having been determined.

60. The Tribunal therefore does not have jurisdiction to hear the claimant’s complaints against the respondent which pre-date September 2022, as set out in the following paragraphs of the draft List of Issues dated 12 November 2023. The following issues are therefore struck out as an abuse of process as they have no reasonable prospects of success:

a. Claim 3: Issue 8.1.1 b. Claim 3: Issue 8.1.2 c. Claim 3: Issue 8.1.3 d. Claim 3: Issue 8.1.4 e. Claim 3: Issue 8.1.5 f. Claim 3: Issue 8.1.6 g. Claim 3: Issue 8.1.7 h. Claim 3: Issue 8.1.8 i. Claim 3: Issue 8.1.9 j. Claim 3: Issue 8.1.10 k. Claim 3: Issue 8.1.11 l. Claim 3: Issue 8.1.12 m. Claim 3: Issue 8.1.13 n. Claim 4: Issue 14.1.1 o. Claim 4: Issue 14.1.2 p. Claim 4: Issue 16.6.3 q. Claim 4: Issue 16.6.4 r. Claim 4: Issue 16.6.5 s. Claim 5: Issue 19.1.1 t. Claim 5: Issue 19.1.3 u. Claim 5: Issue 19.1.4 v. Claim 5: Issue 19.1.5 w. Claim 5: Issue 19.1.8 x. Claim 5: Issue 19.1.9 y. Claim 6: Issue 24.1.1 z. Claim 7: Issue 30.1.1

61. The draft List of Issues can be updated at a future private preliminary hearing, if the remainder of the claims are not struck out (there being a separate preliminary hearing listed to consider an application from the respondent for further strike out in June 2026).

Time Limits

62. In the respondent’s submissions, the respondent seeks strike out (or alternatively, a deposit order) on the basis of time limits in relation to certain allegations in Claim 3 and Claim 7. In oral submissions, Ms [RESPONDENT] added

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one further allegation, from Claim 6. The relevant allegations from Claims 3 and 6 have now been struck out for abuse of process, as set out above, as was issue 30.1.1 from Claim 7. This therefore leaves only allegations 30.1.2 and 30.1.8 to consider from Claim 7. These are:

a. Issue 30.1.2: [APPELLANT] deliberately delayed dealing with [APPELLANT] formal request for contractual home working, in October 2022; and b. Issue 30.1.8: Not providing the claimant with a return to work interview following her return to work in July 2022.

63. I note that Issue 30.1.8 was not included in the list of issues in respect of which the respondent sought strike out for abuse of process, despite the relevant date being specified as being from July 2022 (pre-dating the August 2022 cut off from the respondent’s submissions). That said, the exact date of this allegation is not clear given that it is “from July 2022” and therefore I have not considered it as a potential abuse of process.

64. Claim 7 was presented on 13 April 2023. The respondent submits that allegations which relate to the period prior to 29 December 2022 are out of time (based on early conciliation having commenced on 28 March 2023 and ended on 30 March 2023). The respondent submits that they will not be found to be part of a continuing act given a change in personnel, the gaps in time and the scattergun nature of the claimant’s complaints generally. The respondent also argues that it is extremely unlikely that an extension of time on just and equitable grounds would be granted, given the history of the proceedings and the claimant’s knowledge about how to enforce her rights, as considered more fully in relation to the abuse of process issues above.

65. In Issue 30.1.2 the [[NAME]] was [[NAME]], however in Issue 30.1.8 the [[NAME]] has not as yet been specified.

66. I cannot say that the claimant has no reasonable prospect of showing that it is just and equitable to extend time. However, I do consider that she has little reasonable prospect of doing so. Whilst the claimant was vulnerable, disabled, with ongoing health issues at that time, she was well versed in Tribunal procedure, having presented six prior claims and having attended a number of preliminary hearings, including to consider substantial amendment applications in relation to Claim 1 and Claim 2. Her health did not prevent her from doing those things, nor did it prevent her from attending the liability hearing in respect of Claim 1 later in April 2023. In those circumstances, it seems to me to be unlikely that she will be able to show that it would be just and equitable to grant an extension of time. I refer to my conclusions in respect of abuse of process above in support of those conclusions.

67. However, without hearing evidence, I cannot say that Mrs [[NAME]] has no reasonable prospect of showing that there was conduct extending over a period, the last act of which was in time. I also do not conclude that she has little reasonable prospect of doing so. Allegation 30.1.3 from the draft List of Issues, which would be in time, relates to whether [[NAME]] refused her application to work from home on 30 January 2023. Given that this is the same [[NAME]] as the allegations immediately preceding it, I conclude that it is at least arguable that they formed conduct extending over

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a period. I note the gap in time between each allegation, and it may be that the claimant does fail to show that there was conduct extending over a period for that reason, but I do not conclude that she has little reasonable prospect of doing so. No deposit order is issued, nor are these allegations struck out.

Allegations against Sir [[NAME]]

68. This was included in the issues to be considered at this hearing of the Tribunal’s own volition, as Sir [[NAME]] had appeared to have no direct involvement with matters relating to the claimant. This relates to Claim 6, specifically issues 24.1.12 and 24.1.13 on the draft List of Issues (which in turn would be repeated as allegations of harassment), namely that he failed to offer the claimant a meeting after she sent him HRACC1 and HRVI01 forms on 13 January 2023, and that he breached her confidentiality by forwarding those forms on that date.

69. Sir [[NAME]] was, at the relevant time, Chief Executive of the respondent and [[NAME]] Secretary. It is highly unlikely that he had anything at all to do with the specifics of the claimant’s issues within the respondent. At its highest, he is [[NAME]] to have

a. Not offered the claimant a meeting after she sent him her forms. Bearing in mind his status within the [NAME], I consider that she has little reasonable prospect of showing that someone of his status with an [NAME] the size of the respondent would meet with any employee of her level of seniority personally to discuss an individual complaint. In any event, at no time has the claimant identified any reason why his [[NAME]] failure to do so was in any way because of or related to a protected characteristic. It is her own case that he did not reply to her at all and therefore did not provide any rationale for why he did not respond personally. Her position, as she put it in her oral submissions, is simply that the forms in question have a line at the bottom saying that the employee can send them to any officer within the respondent. In light of that, she says that it was his duty as a civil servant to reply to her. It seems to me that it is highly unlikely that she will be able to show firstly that he ought to have replied directly to her or met with her personally (given his seniority), and secondly that the reason he did not do so was because of or related to her disabilities, race, age, sex, and/or religion or belief.

b. Forwarded the forms she sent him to someone else. Given that he was unlikely to deal with the matter himself, it seems to me that the claimant is also likely to have difficulty in showing that it was inappropriate for him to forward the emails on, unless the [APPELLANT] he forwarded them onto was inappropriate for some reason. However, the claimant said in her oral submissions that she does not even know who he sent it to. In addition, again the claimant has provided nothing to suggest why such conduct on his part would be because of or related to any protected characteristic. A bare assertion of discrimination without something more (even if she could show differential treatment), is not sufficient.

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70. I therefore consider that these allegations have little reasonable prospects of success. I have considered whether to exercise my discretion to make a deposit order. I have decided to do so. If this allegation proceeds to hearing, the respondent will need to decide whether to call Sir [RESPONDENT] to give evidence on these points. It is important that the claimant understands the limited prospects of this allegation so that she can properly consider whether to continue with it.

71. I have also considered the claimant’s ability to pay any deposit order. She has not provided any oral evidence, nor has she provided copies of any documents about her financial means, such as bank statements, benefit statements, credit card bills etc. We know from the preliminary hearing in Claim 2 on 9 March 2023 that at that time the claimant had substantial equity in a property (page 275). Whilst that may be the case, she would not be able to utilise that equity within the timeframe required to pay any deposit order. We also know that she has since been dismissed from the respondent’s employment and I do not think it is in dispute that she is currently unemployed. She has referred to being on benefits, although we do not know the specific details of what benefits she is in receipt of. In March 2023 however, whilst still employed, she was on nil pay due to her absence from work, and was not in receipt of benefits other than child benefit. She had the opportunity to provide evidence (both documentary and oral) if she is unable to pay a deposit order (either generally or at a particular level but she declined to do so).

72. The deposit order should be set at a level where I consider that the claimant will be able to secure the funds to pay it should she wish to do so, but equally set at a level that will encourage her to consider carefully whether to pursue those allegations, in light of their limited prospects. There are two allegations relating to Sir [[NAME]], each of which is pleaded as direct discrimination and harassment (so four allegations) and I consider that a deposit should be paid in respect of each of them if the claimant wishes to continue to pursue those allegations.

2. Having regard to the limited information I do have about the claimant’s financial means, I have decided that the appropriate level is £50 per allegation, i.e. £200 in total if she wishes to continue to pursue both allegations about Sir [[NAME]], as both allegations of direct discrimination and harassment. I do not split the allegations up into the separate protected characteristics (i.e. race, sex, religion or disability) given that they are exactly the same allegations but repeated for each characteristic and the claimant does not appear to distinguish between the protected characteristics in her allegations.

3. Whilst ordinarily I would order payment of the deposit within a fixed number of days from the date of this Deposit Order, on this occasion I consider it appropriate to defer the payment of the deposit order until the respondent’s application for strike out has been considered (listed currently for 16 and 17 June 2026). If the claims are struck out, then there is no need for her to pay any deposit. Therefore, I order that the deposit be paid no later than 21 days from the date on which Judgment is sent to the parties confirming that the claims (or at least this part of Claim 6) has not been struck out due to the claimant’s conduct of the proceedings

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and/or because a fair hearing is no longer possible.

Approved by:

Employment Judge Edmonds

22 May 2026

JUDGMENT SENT TO THE PARTIES ON

22 May 2026

[[NAME]] FOR THE TRIBUNAL OFFICE

Notes All judgments (apart from judgments under Rule 51) and any written reasons for the judgments are published, in full, online at https://www.gov.uk/employment-tribunal-decisions shortly after a copy has been sent to the claimants and respondents. If a Tribunal hearing has been recorded, you may request a transcript of the recording. Unless there are exceptional circumstances, you will have to pay for it. If a transcript is produced it will not include any oral judgment or reasons given at the hearing. The transcript will not be checked, approved or verified by a judge. There is more information in the joint Presidential Practice Direction on the Recording and Transcription of Hearings and accompanying Guidance, which can be found here:

www.judiciary.uk/guidance-and-resources/employment-rules-and-legislation-practice-directions/

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NOTE ACCOMPANYING DEPOSIT ORDER

1. The Tribunal has made an order (a “deposit order”) requiring a party to pay a deposit as a condition of being permitted to continue to advance the allegations or arguments specified in the order.

2. If [[NAME]] pays the deposit and continues to advance the allegations or arguments specified in the order, but the Tribunal decides those allegations or arguments against [[NAME]] for substantially the reasons given in the order, [[NAME]] would then lose their deposit. In addition, the Tribunal might make an award of costs or preparation time against [[NAME]] for unreasonably pursuing those allegations or arguments.

What happens if you do not pay the deposit?

3. If the deposit is not paid the complaint or response to which the order relates will be struck out on the date specified in the order.

When to pay the deposit?

4. The party against whom the deposit order has been made must pay the deposit by the date specified in the order.

5. If the deposit is not paid within that time, the complaint or response to which the order relates will be struck out.

What happens to the deposit?

6. If the Tribunal later decides the specific allegation or argument against the party which paid the deposit for substantially the reasons given in the deposit order, [[NAME]] shall be treated as having acted unreasonably, unless the contrary is shown, and the deposit shall be paid to the other party (or, if there is more than one, to such party or parties as the Tribunal orders). If a costs or preparation time order is made against the party which paid the deposit, the deposit will go towards the payment of that order. Otherwise, the deposit will be refunded.

How to pay the deposit?

7. Payment of the deposit must be made by cheque or postal order only, made payable to HMCTS. Payments CANNOT be made in cash.

8. Payment should be accompanied by the tear-off slip below or should identify the Case Number and the [NAME] of the party paying the deposit.

9. Payment must be made to the address on the tear-off slip below.

10. An acknowledgment of payment will not be issued, unless requested.

Enquiries

11. Enquiries relating to the case should be made to the Tribunal office dealing with the case.

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12. Enquiries relating to the deposit should be referred to the address on the tear-off slip below or by telephone on [PHONE]. The [[NAME]] will only discuss the deposit with the party that has been ordered to pay the deposit. If you are not the party that has been ordered to pay the deposit you will need to contact the Tribunal office dealing with the case.

13. You have the right to appeal against the decision to make a deposit order if you consider that the decision, or the amount ordered, is wrong in law. The time for appealing is 42 days from the date on which the deposit order was sent out in writing by the Tribunal. Details of how to appeal can be found here:

HMCTS Booklet T440:

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/how-to-appeal-to-the-employment-appeal- tribunal-t440

The website of the Employment Appeal Tribunal:

https://www.judiciary.uk/courts-and-tribunals/tribunals/employment-appeal-tribunal/

"----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPOSIT ORDER

To: [NAME]) Team Magistrates’ Court & [ADDRESS] [POSTCODE]

Case Number _____________________________________

[[NAME]] _____________________________________

I enclose a cheque/postal order (delete as appropriate) for £__________