Employment Tribunal Upholds Interim Relief for Protected Disclosures

OUTCOME: Allowed

Case Number: 6012309/2025 (CVP)

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Claimant [NAME_1] at:

Before:

Bury St Edmunds (CVP)

Employment Judge S Moore (sitting alone)

[COMPANY_2]

On: 20 June 2025

Appearances For the Claimant: [redacted] Respondent:

[redacted] [NAME_3], solicitor

JUDGMENT ON INTERIM RELIEF (1) The application for interim relief succeeds. (2) The Claimant’s contract of employment will continue in accordance with s.130(1) Employment Rights Act 1996 from the date of its termination until the determination or settlement of the complaint. (3) The Claimant is entitled to be paid £2,180.36 net pay on the last day of each month from June 2025 onwards, pursuant to ss.130(2) and 130(3)(a) Employment Rights Act 1996. (4) The Claimant is entitled to the sum of £4,360.72 by way of net pay for the months of April and May 2025, such payment to be made within 14 days of today, namely by 4 July 2025, pursuant to ss.130(2) and 130(3)(b) Employment Rights Act 1996.

Introduction 1. This is an application for interim relief made under s.128 Employment Rights Act 1996 (ERA) on the basis that the reason (or principal reason) for the Claimant’s dismissal is that he made a protected disclosure within the meaning of s.103A ERA. 2. [NAME_4] had prepared a bundle of documents, although they did not attend the hearing. The bundle of documents had been emailed to the

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Respondent the afternoon before the hearing, but at the outset of the hearing it transpired that [NAME_3], who only came on record shortly before the hearing, had not received it. Once the bundle had been sent to [NAME_3] I adjourned the hearing for thirty minutes to give him an opportunity to consider it, after which he said he was ready to proceed.

3. During the course of the hearing it transpired that the Claimant’s solicitor had omitted certain documents from the bundle, and in the course of hearing the following documents were sent to the Tribunal and [NAME_3]: an email from the Claimant to the Respondent dated 7 March 2025 tending his resignation, a letter from the Claimant to the Respondent dated 3 April 2025 raising certain matters and an email from the Respondent to the Claimant dated 3 April 2025 summarily dismissing him. Since these documents were short, I considered that [NAME_3] was able to deal with them during the course of the hearing and he did not suggest otherwise.

4. There were no witness statements and there was no application for anyone to give oral evidence.

5. The facts asserted in the ET1 are that the Claimant was employed by the Respondent as Practice Manager from December 2024 and was responsible for the daily operations and running of the [NAME_5].

6. The Claimant says that between mid-January to March 2025 he made protected disclosures pursuant to s.43A ERA in relation to the use of Kenalog injections for hay fever, which are not licensed in the UK, plans to use hair transplant technicians present in the UK on tourist visas, refusing to participate in sedating patients for procedure, refusing to launch weight loss injection services until CQC registration and insurance had been obtained, lack of DBS checks and identified relevant statutory obligations, disclosures relating to data protection and GDPR, financial misconduct including paying cash in hand to staff, use of personal accounts to pay a website developer, and refusal to enroll the Claimant in a workplace pension scheme, violating the Pensions Act 2008, as well as other governance failings.

7. The Claimant says that after his initial disclosures he began to experience escalating pressure from the owner of the Respondent, [NAME_6] ([NAME_6]) and his daughter [NAME_6] ([NAME_6]).

8. On 23 February 2025 he informed Dr A of his intention to resign due to the untenable working environment and ethical concerns and on 7 March 2025 he submitted his resignation by email.

9. He says that [NAME_6] and [NAME_6] subsequently asked him to withdraw his resignation, and he agreed to do so on the condition that he would no longer be subject to inappropriate pressure and would be able to perform his duties in accordance with legal requirements, professional standards and the primacy of patient safety. However, the Claimant says that the prior conduct of [NAME_6] and [NAME_6] resumed, and he was again pressured to facilitate unlawful practices.

10. On 20 March 2025 at 16.05 [NAME_6] sent the Claimant a [NAME_7] message purporting to accept the Claimant’s resignation on the basis the clinic was

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struggling financially and that it would focus only the aesthetic and beauty aspects of the business.

11. The Claimant replied stating that [NAME_6] could not accept his resignation as he had withdrawn it at [NAME_6]’s request and the same day [NAME_6] then dismissed the Claimant with 30 days’ notice.

12. On 3 April 2025 [NAME_6] then sent the Claimant an email summarily dismissing him with immediate effect, alleging, for the first time, a series of misconduct-related accusations: • That the Claimant had failed to pay a third-party web developer despite having received reimbursement; • Allegations of threatening behaviour and spreading false information; • Refusal to provide clinic-related business information; and • Continued “harassment” of clinic staff.

13. In its response the Respondent denied that the alleged disclosures met the definition of protected disclosures within the meaning of s.43B ERA and submitted that any concerns raised were grossly distorted or fabricated. The Respondent further submitted that the Claimant was dismissed on 3 April 2025 for the reason of gross misconduct as described in that email.

Legal Framework 14. Section 128(2) ERA provides that a tribunal shall not entertain an application for interim relief unless it is presented before the end of the period of seven days immediately following the effective date of termination.

15. The test for succeeding in an application for interim relief is whether it appears to the tribunal that it is likely that on determining the complaint the tribunal will find that the reason or principal reason for which the claimant was selected for dismissal is (so far as is relevant to this case) that he made a protected disclosure.

16. When considering the ‘likelihood’ of the claimant succeeding at tribunal, the correct test to be applied is whether he or she has a ‘pretty good chance of success’ at the full hearing (Taplin v [COMPANY_8] 1978 ICR 1068, EAT).

17. In Ministry of Justice v [NAME_9] 2011 IRLR 562, EAT, Mr Justice Underhill stated ‘likely’ does not mean simply ‘more likely than not’ but connotes a significantly higher degree of likelihood, i.e. ‘something nearer to certainty than mere probability’. He noted that it was understandable that Mr Justice Slynn in Taplin declined to express that higher degree in percentage terms, ‘since numbers can convey a spurious impression of precision in what is inevitably an exercise depending on the tribunal’s impression’.

18. In that latter respect, the EAT in [COMPANY_10] v [NAME_10] 2013 IRLR 610, EAT, stated that the tribunal is required to carry out an ‘expeditious summary assessment’ as to how the matter appears on the material available, doing the best it can with the untested evidence advanced by each party. This,

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it observed, necessarily involves a far less detailed scrutiny of the parties’ cases than will ultimately be undertaken at the full hearing. The basic task and function is to make ‘a broad assessment on the material available to try to give the tribunal a feel and to make a prediction about what is likely to happen at the eventual hearing before a full tribunal’.

19. As regards the meaning of “protected disclosure”, section 43A ERA says this means a “qualifying disclosure” as defined by section 43B which is made by a worker in accordance with any of sections 43C to 43H.

20. Section 43B provides that a “qualifying disclosure” means any disclosure of information, which, in the reasonable belief of the worker making the disclosure, is made in the public interest and tends to show one or more of the matters set out in ss.43B(1)(a)-(f).

21. Section 43C provides that a qualifying disclosure is made in accordance with this section if the disclosure is made to his employer.

22. In Cavendish Munro Professional Risks Management Ltd v Geduld [2010] ICR 325, the EAT stated that the ordinary meaning of providing ‘information’ is ‘conveying facts’ and that a mere allegation which did not convey any facts did not amount to a disclosure of information and could not be a protected disclosure. It posited a hypothetical example in the context of a hospital ward. If a hospital employee were to say ‘the wards have not been cleaned for the past two weeks’ or ‘yesterday, sharps were left lying around’, this would convey information. But an employee who simply stated ‘you are not complying with health and safety requirements’ would merely be making an allegation.

23. However, in Kilraine v Wandsworth LBC [2018] ICR 1850, the Court of Appeal held that tribunals should not approach the matter as if there is a rigid distinction between information and allegations. In order for a disclosure to be a ‘qualifying disclosure’ within the meaning of s.43B(1) it had to have sufficient factual content and specificity so that a disclosure which is general and devoid of specific factual content cannot be said to be a disclosure of information tending to show a relevant failure. Nevertheless, ‘information’ in the context of s.43B is capable of covering statements that might also be characterised as allegations since very often information and allegation are intertwined.

Effective Date of Termination 24. The history of the termination of the Claimant’s employment is somewhat convoluted.

25. In an email to [NAME_6] dated 7 March 2025 he tended his resignation stating: “Following our last two meetings, I have made the difficult decision to give you my 30 days’ notice. I am afraid I can’t do all that you need me to do. Kindly let me know if you need me to work my notice or you prefer PILON (Payment in Lieu of Notice). I am happy either way and will attend work tomorrow upon your instructions.”

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26. The Claimant pleads that [NAME_6] and [NAME_6] subsequently asked him to withdraw his resignation, and that he did so. 27. [NAME_3] submitted that [NAME_6] and [NAME_6] did not ask the Claimant to withdraw his resignation, rather [NAME_6] accepted the Claimant’s resignation in a [NAME_7] message of 20 March 2025 timed at 16.10 (“the first [NAME_7]”) in which message he asked the Claimant to continue working to the end of the month to ensure a smooth transition.

28. However, I note that in its response the Respondent does not contest the Claimant’s assertion that he was asked to withdraw his resignation.

29. Further, a [NAME_7] message from the Claimant to [NAME_6] timed at 16.11 (“the second [NAME_7]”) shows that the Claimant’s response to the first [NAME_7] was to say, “You cannot accept initial resignation because it was withdrawn on your request”. [NAME_6] then replied (“the third [NAME_7]”) stating: “I acknowledge your position regarding your initial resignation”. In that third [NAME_7] message [NAME_6] also dismissed the Claimant stating: “I must formally provide you with a 30- day notice period, effective immediately, to conclude your employment with the clinic.” 30. The second and third [NAME_7] messages are consistent with the Claimant’s assertion that the Respondent agreed for him to withdraw his resignation, indeed that the Respondent had positively requested him to do so. That position is further supported by the Claimant’s letter to the Respondent of 3 April 2025 (see below).

31. I am therefore satisfied that the Claimant’s resignation of 7 March 2025 was withdrawn with the Respondent’s agreement and that (initially) he was dismissed on notice by way of [NAME_7] message dated 20 March 2025.

32. However that third [NAME_7] of 20 March 2025, was superseded by an email dated 3 April 2025 which terminated the Claimant’s employment with immediate effect on the grounds of gross misconduct.

33.

Accordingly, having been summarily dismissed on 3 April 2025 that was the effective date of termination of the Claimant’s employment and he therefore had until 10 April 2025 to bring an application for interim relief.

34. Since the application was brought on 10 April 2025, it was therefore brought in time within the meaning of s.128(2) ERA.

Conclusions 35. The Claimant claims that he made disclosures which fall within the following subsections of s.43B(1) ERA:

• 43B(1)(a): criminal offences (eg immigration fraud, tax evasion); • 43B(1)(b): breaches of legal obligations (eg GDPR, CQC, DBS, pensions); • 43B(1)(d): danger to health or safety (eg unauthorised sedation, unlicensed treatment);

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• 43B(1)(f): concealment of wrongdoing (eg disguising financial misconduct and immigration violations).

36. He further says he had a reasonable belief that the information disclosed tended to show the above matters and were made in the public interest.

37. The evidence before me is very limited, comprising mainly some [NAME_7] messages and emails and I anticipate that there will be a great deal more evidence following disclosure.

38. However, there is a partial transcript of a recorded conversation that took place on 22 February 2025, which appears to be between the Claimant, [NAME_6], and two doctors who were working or providing services for the [NAME_5]. The transcription is incomplete because, the Claimant says, some of the conversation was in Turkish which he does not understand. However it is plain that the conversation is about the [NAME_5] potentially using individuals who are present in the UK only on tourist visas to carry out hair implants.

39. In the course of that meeting the Claimant is recorded as saying, “Yeah but, [NAME_6], if they are on visit visa, they can’t operate in the clinic. This is…This is a little bit…You will get into trouble, not me.” 40. Later “Two wrongs don’t make a right. If [name of another clinic] is doing something wrong…we can’t do it wrong also. Without visa and licence. Then if they close the clinic. If someone, CQC, someone finds out, they will close the clinic.” 41. Later: “You know, when they come, I have to like every doctor, every player, doctor, and then I took their GMC number, I took their passport, proof of address. I have to take everything. That is my role. If I don’t do it, I will get into trouble.” 42. Finally: “He’s doing for his business. I have to do my job. I’m not going to…I will not be part of this meeting because I will not go to prison for someone. You do this on your own.” 43. The documents before me also contain a letter from the Claimant to the Respondent dated 3 April 2025 and sent by email timed at 12.43.

44. That letter begins: “While I withdrew my resignation at your request, I want to be honest that the current situation is causing me a great deal of stress, impacting both my personal life and well-being.”

45. And in the course of the letter the Claimant makes the following statements: “…I must emphasize that I require proper payslips and cannot accept cash-in-hand payments for you to cut cost. I already took cash in hand for December, which was a mistake. Therefore, I kindly request that my salary payments be made via the usual payroll system for clarity and compliance…. As discussed in the past, I would kindly request that you begin contributing to my pension. You said last time you don’t understand 6 of 8

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pension and these things but your accountant must explain you these things, as required by law. As per the Pensions Act 2008, all employers must automatically enrol employees into a workplace pension scheme within 3 months of their start date. Given that I have been with the clinic since December 2024, I believe this requirement now applies. If there is any confusion, your accountant should be able to clarify and set up this process for you…. Furthermore, regarding payments, I was asked to pay the developer from my personal account, and while I covered an initial payment over $100.00, I am not comfortable handling clinic/business transactions through my personal accounts. I will return the entire amount, minus the amount I already paid, to you and kindly request that you make future payments directly from your account to avoid any complications. I want to clarify that there are certain tasks and processes I cannot engage in due to regulatory, ethical and legal requirements. My role requires that I ensure all actions within the clinic align with compliance standards, patient safety guidelines and UK laws….I am not able to fulfil all requests and that is not out of unwillingness to do my job or cooperate, but because my professional and ethical standards do not allow me to proceed in certain situations. It is important that I work within legal and ethical guidelines.” 46. Taking a broad assessment of the material available, in particular the transcript of the meeting of 22 February 2025 and the Claimant’s letter of 3 April 2025, I consider it likely that a tribunal will find he made a protected disclosure, namely a disclosure of information which, in the reasonable belief of the Claimant, was made in the public interest, and tended to show a matter falling with the subsections of s.43B(1) relied upon.

47. In particular I consider that the Claimant made statements in the meeting of 22 February 2025 and in the letter of 3 April 2025 that are likely to be regarded as having sufficient factual content to amount to the disclosure of information, for example that individuals in the UK on a visit visa can’t operate in the clinic, that it is wrong for a clinician to operate in the clinic without a visa and licence, that it was necessary to take the GMC number, passport details and proof of address of doctors performing services in the clinic, that he (the Claimant) hasn’t been given proper pay slips and has been paid cash in hand, that the Respondent is under an obligation to contribute to his pension, but hasn’t done so, and that he has been asked to make business payments from his personal account.

48. The next question is whether it is likely that the making of a protected disclosure (or disclosures) was the reason or principal reason for the Claimant’s dismissal.

49. In this respect the Claimant was summarily dismissed by email of 3 April 2025 timed at 14.06 alleging the matters set out in paragraph 12 above.

50. However, there is no evidence before me to support any of the allegations made by the Respondent in the email of 3 April 2025 or to suggest that the Claimant had been advised of any of those allegations prior to the sending of that email.

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51. I also note the timing of the email, namely that it was sent less than an hour and ½ after the Claimant’s email of the same date, making what I consider are likely to be found to be protected disclosures.

52. Further, the evidence before me shows the Claimant’s letter of 3 April 2025 was not the first time that he had made it known to the Respondent that he was unhappy about the practices adopted at the clinic and raised concerns about them. This is evident from the transcript of the meeting of 22 February 2025 and the fact the Claimant had resigned on 7 March 2025. There is also a [NAME_7] message dated 23 February 2025 from Dr A to the Claimant which supports the Claimant’s assertion that he had told him (Dr A) that he intended to resign following the meeting on 22 February 2025.

53. Again, making a broad assessment on the available material, I think it likely that the Tribunal will find that the reason or principal reason for which the Claimant was dismissed was because he had made a protected disclosure (or protected disclosures) and not for any of the reasons given in the Respondent’s email of 3 April 2025 (or for any other reason).

54. It follows that the claim for interim relief succeeds.

Remedy 55. Having given judgment, I was informed that the Respondent was not prepared to reinstate or re-engage the Claimant. I therefore made an order for the continuation of the Claimant’s contract of employment pursuant to s.130 ERA.

56. In this respect it was agreed that the Claimant’s monthly pay was £2,676 gross and £2,180.36 net, and that he was paid on the last day of each month. It was further agreed that he had been paid until the end of March 2025 and that his net salary for April and May 2025 (which he had not been paid) came to the total of £4,360.72.

Approved By: Employment Judge S Moore Date: 20 June 2025

Sent to the parties on: 7 July 2025

For the Tribunal N Gotecha

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Case Number: 6012309/2025

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EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Claimant: [redacted] Respondent: [redacted] Watford Employment Tribunal On: 17 & 18 March 2026 Before: Employment Judge Arullendran

REPRESENTATION:

Claimant: [redacted] Respondent: [redacted]

JUDGMENT ON REMEDY

The Judgment of the Employment Tribunal is as follows:

1. The continuation of contract order dated 20 June 2025 is revoked.

2. As the respondent is no longer contesting the claim, the claim of automatic unfair dismissal is well-founded. By consent, the respondent shall pay to the claimant a compensatory award in the sum of £7,194.00.

3. The Employment Protection (Recoupment of Jobseekers Allowance and Income Support) Regulations 1996 do not apply. Approved by: Employment Judge Arullendran 18 March 2026 Judgment sent to the parties on: 11 May 2026……………………… For the Tribunal: ……………..………………………

Case Number: 6012309/2025

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Notes Reasons for the judgment having been given orally at the hearing, written reasons will not be provided unless a request was made by either party at the hearing or a written request is presented by either party within 14 days of the sending of this written record of the decision. If written reasons are provided they will be placed online. If summary reasons are requested, these shall not be placed online. All judgments (apart from judgments under Rule 51) and any written reasons for the judgments are published, in full, online at https://www.gov.uk/employment-tribunal-decisions shortly after a copy has been sent to the claimants and respondents. If a Tribunal hearing has been recorded, you may request a transcript of the recording. Unless there are exceptional circumstances, you will have to pay for it. If a transcript is produced it will not include any oral judgment or reasons given at the hearing. The transcript will not be checked, approved or verified by a judge. There is more information in the joint Presidential Practice Direction on the Recording and Transcription of Hearings and accompanying Guidance, which can be found at www.judiciary.uk/guidance-and-resources/employment- rules-and-legislation-practice-directions/