First-tier Tribunal Rules on Mobile Home Site Services

OUTCOME: Dismissed

1

First-tier Tribunal

Property Chamber

(Residential Property)

Case Reference

: CAM/12UE/PHC/2025/0001 (0001) CAM/12UE/PHC/2025/0002 (0002) CAM/12UE/PHC/2025/0003 (0003)

CAM/12UE/PHC/2025/0005 (0005)

Site

: [ADDRESS] [POSTCODE]

Applicants

: [redacted]

0001, 0002 & 0003 [NAME_4]

0005 Occupiers of the [COMPANY_7] listed at Annex 1

Respondent as amended for all Applications : [COMPANY_8]

: [COMPANY_10] & [NAME_11] of Counsel

Date of Applications : 5 September 2024

0001 18 November 2024

0002 27 January 2025

0003

14 November 2024

0005

Type of application : To determine a question arising under the Mobile Homes Act 1983 or an agreement to which it applies – section 4 Mobile Homes Act 1983 as amended (“the Act”)

Tribunal

: Judge JR [NAME_14]

Date of Directions

: 31 March 2025 Date of Amended Directions : 16 April 2025 Date of Hearing

: 23 September 2025 Date of Decision

: 30 October 2025

____________________________________________

DECISION _________________________________ ©Decision

2

CORRECTION CERTIFICATE

The Tribunal exercises its powers under Rule 50 to correct a clerical mistake or other accidental slip or omission in its Decision dated 30 October 2025 as follows:

1) The Tribunal deletes from the Head Note the Respondents originally named in the Applications and replaces them with the Respondent as amended by its Decision at paragraph 15 of this Decision and Reasons.

2) The Tribunal amends the date of the Directions from the 20 December 2023 to 31 March 2025

3) The Tribunal deletes the words “garden Maintenance” in paragraphs 1(a), 27, 37, 39, 56 and 60 of this Decision and Reasons, to be in accordance with the wording of Application CAM/12UE/PHC/2025/0001 (0001)

4) The Tribunal corrects the typographical errors at paragraph 1 of the Decision in order that it clarifies and reflects its decision at paragraph 60 of this Decision and Reasons.

5) The Tribunal amends the wording to paragraph 73 to more accurately reflect what was said by the Respondent.

Corrections by amendments are set out in bold.

This correction was made on 21 November 2025.

Judge JR Morris

Decision

Application 1 - CAM/12UE/PHC/2025/0001 – Grass Cutting

1. The Tribunal determined that:

a) ‘All grass cutting and removal of green garden waste material from unfenced pitches is the responsibility of the Site Owner, the cost of which is included in the [NAME_16] fee,’ is not an implied term of the Written Statement of Agreement.

b) Therefore, the cost of this service cannot be in the [NAME_16] fee, and the Respondent’s refusal to continue with the service free of charge is not a breach of the Written Statement of Agreement. The grass cutting and ancillary removal of garden waste is a separate agreement outside the Written Statement of Agreement

Application 2 - CAM/12UE/PHC/0002 – Site Red Line Boundary

2. Application withdrawn as the Applicants accepted that the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction.

3

Application 3 - CAM/12UE/PHC/0003 – LPG Charges

3. The Tribunal determined that there was no new evidence adduced by the Applicants and the decisions of the previous tribunals should stand that: a) There is no requirement under the Occupiers’ Written statement of Agreement that the Site Owner is obliged to supply LPG gas cylinders to the Occupiers and the Occupiers are equally not obliged to purchase their LPG gas cylinders from the Site Owner. b) The delivery of gas bottles is a separate contractual matter between the provider of the service whether the Site Owner or other supplier. If the Site Owner supplies the LPG cylinders the cost of administration is not part of the [NAME_16] fee and an additional fee may be charged.

Application 4 - CAM/12UE/PHC/0005 – Electricity Charges

4. The Tribunal agreed the withdrawal of the Application in return for the Respondent’s undertaking not to pursue the prepayment meter Occupiers for the underpayments between 9 August and 28 October 2024 which together with not passing on the standing charge for the period 24 April 2023 to 1 October 2025 would compensate occupiers for any historic incorrect administrative or standing charges.

Reasons

Introduction

5. [NAME_18] made three Applications and one Application respectively under section 4 of the Mobile Homes Act 1983 (as amended) which enables an application by an Occupier of a Park Mobile Home or a Park Mobile Home Site Owner to be made to a Residential Property Tribunal for a determination of any question arising under the Mobile Homes Act 1983 or agreement to which it applies.

6. Although the Applications were made separately the Tribunal considered it appropriate that they should be dealt with together. Following making their Applications several [NAME_20] who occupy pitches on the Site sought to be joined to the Applications made by both [NAME_18].

Hearing

7. Both parties provided substantial written statements and a hearing was held on 23 September 2025 attended by the Applicants, [NAME_21] and [NAME_204], and the Respondent’s Representatives, [NAME_22], Solicitor to the persons named as Respondents, [NAME_24] sole Director of [NAME_187] and [COMPANY_8] and [NAME_26] of Counsel.

Preliminary Issues

8. Before considering the Applications the Respondent in its written statements prepared by [NAME_27] based on the witness statement of [NAME_28], Mr [NAME_13]’s

4

skeleton argument, and oral submissions at the hearing raised two preliminary points as follows:

(1) The Respondent

Respondent

9. The Respondent named by [NAME_17] in Application numbers CAM/12UE/PHC/2025/0001 regarding grass cutting and CAM/12UE/PHC/0002 regarding the Site boundary and the Respondent named by [NAME_19] in Application Number CAM/12UE/PHC/0005 regarding electricity charges was incorrect. It was submitted that the correct Respondent was [COMPANY_8] as the Site Owner. It was acknowledged that [COMPANY_29] owns [COMPANY_8] and that [NAME_24] is the sole director of both companies but a company is a separate artificial person and so [COMPANY_29] and [COMPANY_8] are separate persons. [NAME_28] is currently the sole director of both, he is a separate individual and cannot be treated as being the same person as the companies of which he is a director.

10. The Respondent was somewhat indignant that the Applicants had continued to maintain that [COMPANY_30] and [NAME_28] should remain as Respondents when it had been pointed out in the Respondent’s Statement of case and subsequent correspondence that [COMPANY_8] was the Site Owner and the proper Respondent. Reference was made to case number CAM/12UE/PHI/2023/0124 which was an earlier case in which [NAME_17] was involved where that tribunal found that on 23 April 2023 the Site Owner changed its name from [COMPANY_31] to [COMPANY_8].

Applicant

11. [NAME_18] accepted, just before the hearing and confirmed at the commencement of the hearing that the Respondent should be the Site Owner which was [COMPANY_8] and requested the Tribunal make the appropriate amendments.

12. [NAME_17] was equally aggrieved in that he said he had received correspondence from [NAME_28] regarding the Site which had been written on paper with the [COMPANY_32] name. He said he was therefore unclear at the time of applying who owned the Site or at least who he should put down as the Respondent.

Tribunal’s Decision

13. The Tribunal found that [COMPANY_8] was the Site Owner and the correct Respondent. It found that although [COMPANY_29] owns [COMPANY_8] and that [NAME_24] is the sole director of both companies the companies are separate artificial persons and that [NAME_28] is a separate individual and cannot be treated as being the same person as the companies of which he is a director.

5

14. In deciding whether to allow the amendment the Tribunal considered that [COMPANY_8] was named correctly as the Respondent for case number CAM/12UE/PHC/2023/0003. Also, [COMPANY_32] and [NAME_28] were identifiable as interested parties although not Respondents. In addition, in this case the amendment did not affect the possible outcomes, which would not always be the case.

15. The Tribunal therefore agreed to amend the Respondent to [COMPANY_8] for all Applications.

(2) Joinder of Parties

Respondent

16. The Respondent referred to the Amended Directions dated 16 April 2025 that for parties to be joined to the Applications evidence will need to be obtained of “(at least a signed letter or email from the relevant [NAME_20], setting out their full names and contact details) that each such owner consents to being joined to those proceedings and has nominated the applicant to represent them in these proceedings.” The Respondent said that this had not been followed for all those who were said to be parties. 24 had sent emails but 35 had only signed next to their names and road [NAME_16] number on a schedule which did not fully meet the Direction.

17. In addition, both the emails and the schedule stated that we the undersigned wish to be represented by [NAME_18].” It was said that representation is not the same as joinder. Also, the schedule referred to the FTT Applications dated 6th September 2024, 11th November 2024, 8th January 2025 and 27th January 2025 for Waters Edge, [ADDRESS], [ADDRESS], Lakeside, and Meadowside; 6th September 2024, 8th January 2025, and 27th January 2025for Quayside; 6th September 2024, 14th November 2024, 8th January and 27th January 2025 for [ADDRESS], Mill House, and [ADDRESS]. The emails referred to the FTT Applications dated 5th September 2024, 14th November 2024, 8th January 2025, and 27th January 2025. The actual dates of the Applications are 5 September 2024, 14 November 2024, 18 November 2024, and 27 January 2025.

18. [NAME_33] submitted that this was not a mere technicality. A person who is joined is not just represented by the persons who originally brought the action, in this case [NAME_18], but are also liable under any order that may be made against them. In the previous case the [NAME_20] were the Respondents and so were already parties to the case. [NAME_17] was only representing them, they were not being asked to join the proceedings.

Applicants

19. [NAME_17] said that in case number CAM/12UE/PHC/2023/0003 which was the previous case in which he was involved the tribunal had accepted a simple list of [NAME_16] numbers next to which were the names and signatures of those who wished to have him represent them. He questioned what was different on this occasion.

6

Tribunal’s Decision

20. The Tribunal found that in the previous case referred to by the parties the Site Owner was the Applicant who had brought separate cases against all the [NAME_20] who had not agreed to the [NAME_16] fee, which were dealt with together. They had no choice but to all be respondents. They had agreed to [NAME_17] representing them and presenting their respective cases which had been a collective response. In the present situation, [NAME_18] are the Applicants. The [NAME_20] have a choice whether to be part of the proceedings or not. If the [NAME_20] are joined as Applicants and an order is made in their favour, then as Applicants they will benefit from that order. However, if an order, say for costs, is made against the Applicants then they will be liable to contribute. [NAME_33] was questioning whether the [NAME_20] who were said to have agreed to be joined appreciated this effect.

21. The Tribunal considered the matter after the hearing. It noted that some of the issues affected all the [NAME_20] who had emailed or signed the schedule and others only some of them. How this would affect the decision would be a matter to be determined on hearing the evidence and submissions. The Tribunal found that in this instance the [NAME_20] who had emailed or signed the schedule did wish to be joined and represented by [NAME_18]. The Tribunal considered the failure to comply strictly with the Directions and the inaccuracies regarding the dates of the Applications in the emails and schedule. Nevertheless, the Tribunal was satisfied that those who had emailed and signed wished to participate in the proceedings and were prepared to take both the benefits and liabilities of doing so.

Issues Raised in the Applications

22. The Tribunal having read the written statements of the parties then heard the evidence and submissions of each. Although the respective cases were prepared and presented by [NAME_18] for the Applicants and by [NAME_27] and [NAME_33] based on [NAME_28]’s witness statements for the Respondents, the Tribunal refers to the respective parties collectively as the Applicants and the Respondent for ease.

Application 1 - CAM/12UE/PHC/2025/0001 – Grass Cutting

Applicant’s Case

23. The Application, written statement and response to the Respondent’s Case was confirmed at the hearing.

The Issue

24. The Applicants stated that since the Site opened approximately seven years ago, it has been custom and practice for the Site Owner to cut the grass around the [NAME_16], the only exclusion to this which has always been the case, is that if a garden is fenced off, it is the Occupiers who cut the grass.

7

25. On 5th September 2024, the Applicants said that the Occupiers received a letter from the Site Owner the salient points of which were:

Following the acquisition of [COMPANY_35] (freehold owner of [ADDRESS]) by [COMPANY_36], in August 2024, and its subsequent reviews of the management and operation of the park, we would like to inform you that the park groundsmen will no longer be maintaining your [NAME_16] and disposing of your garden waste which legally is an occupiers’ obligation.

…Occupiers’ obligations under paragraph 21 of our written statement, quoting (d) maintain.... (i) the outside of the mobile home, and (ii) the [NAME_16], including all fences and outbuildings belonging to, or enjoyed with it and the mobile home in a clean and tidy condition.

It is clear from the above that residents are legally responsible under (d) (i) and (ii) to maintain their [NAME_16] and outside of their home. Therefore, from 13th October 2024, you will be responsible for the upkeep and maintenance of the grassed areas on you [NAME_16] and any cost incurred in the disposal of green waste.

26. The Site Owner went onto say that they could provide this service as a paid option to residents for the sum of £400 per annum, but insisted on residents signing a disclaimer against all damage caused by the parks grounds people whilst cutting and strimming the gardens. It was also suggested by the site owner, that under this agreement, preventative measures will be taken by the company to minimise the risk of damage, by training their employees on good strimming techniques, and using equipment designed to reduce the likelihood of any incidental damage.

27. The Tribunal found that the issue the Applicants wanted determined was that the following was an implied term of the Written Statement of Agreement:

All grass cutting and removal of green garden waste material from unfenced pitches is the responsibility of the Site Owner, the cost of which is included in the [NAME_16] fee.

28. They also wanted the Tribunal to determine that the cessation of the service in the manner stated in the letter dated 5 September 2024 from the Site Owner to the Occupiers was a breach of the Written Statement of Agreement.

29. In addition, a direction under Section 231A of the Housing Act 2004 was requested for the Site Owner to pay compensation for those Occupiers who had purchased gardening equipment or paid for the local authority to dispose of green waste in response to the letter.

30. An additional issue was noted by the Tribunal which was not raised in the Application but which was introduced in the written statement of case, regarding the Site Owner’s maintenance of the water’s edge in respect of weeding and subsidence around the lake and mill stream.

31. The Tribunal found that it was a different matter and not a natural extension of the issues set out in the Application Form. The Tribunal therefore determined that it could not consider it in these proceedings.

8

32. The Tribunal found that the issue the Applicants wanted determined divided into two questions:

1. Whether cutting the grass of the pitches of unfenced pitches is an implied term? 2. Whether grass cutting is included in the [NAME_16]?

which the parties addressed in turn.

1. Whether cutting of the grass of the unfenced pitches is an implied term

33. The Applicants said that it had been a long-standing custom and practice that if a [NAME_16] was not enclosed i.e. fenced then the Site Owner cut the grass on the [NAME_16] and removed the cuttings and waste for disposal. It was submitted that this practice had become a part of the Written Statement of Agreement and a determination was sought that the Site Owner is now obliged to continue to cut the grass of open pitches without further charge as the cost was already met in the [NAME_16] fee.

34. The Applicants submitted that 33 Occupiers have their grass cut and only 26 do not. He said the service of grass cutting at the Site had been seen as a contractual obligation since the Site’s inception. In response to the tribunal’s questions it was said that the Site operatives had never had any difficulty in identifying those areas which were to be cut and those which were not as the areas which were excluded were fenced off.

35. Notwithstanding that new Site Rules had been introduced in 2019, the Applicants referred to the Site Rules for 2018 which they said might still be extant as no Notice of Deletion had been served on the Local Authority. The 2018 Rules stated:

Rule 11 We will move any objects obstructing our ground staff from grass cutting, you are not permitted to cut or trim hedges, bushes, or trees, this will be done by our ground staff if they feel it necessary.

Rule 12 If you have fenced off your garden area it will then be your responsibility to maintain the area i.e. grass cutting.

Rule 14 The area around your park home, caravan or motorhome and trailer tent must be kept presentable.

36. The Applicants said that by including these statements in the 2018 Site Rules, the Site Owner believed they had a contractual duty to cut the grass and that this had become an Implied Term of the Written Statement.

37. In addition, the Applicants argued that the Site Owners own the Site and the Occupiers only own their Mobile Homes and all grassed areas are communal except when homeowners legally fence off any part of this grassed area around their [NAME_16]. Therefore, all grass cutting and removal of green garden waste material is the

9

responsibility of the Site Owner, the cost of which is included in the [NAME_16] fee. The [NAME_16] fee payable by the occupier is consideration for the performance of all such obligations of the owner and is in return for all the benefits received by the occupier under the agreement.

2. Whether grass cutting is included in the [NAME_16]

38. In support of the argument that the cost of grass cutting was in the [NAME_16] fee, the Applicants referred to the Upper Tribunal decision of [NAME_37], (2024) UKUT 294 (LC) in which Judge Elizabeth Cooke said at Paragraph 18,

[NAME_38]’s and [NAME_40]’s written statement are quite different from [NAME_42]’s and Mr. [NAME_44] W’s. They do not contain clause 3 as set out above and indeed say nothing about utilities. They require payment of a [NAME_16] fee, and each agreement in a box headed “Additional Charges” it says Nil” but [NAME_45] and Mr. and Mrs. [NAME_41] do not dispute that the [NAME_16] fee does not include payment for electricity and LPG.

The Judge goes on to say at paragraph 19 that:

a. There is nothing to prevent written statements relating to mobile homes from making provision for a separate service charge payment by the occupier; analogous to those commonly found in long leases of flats and suchlike, but few written statements do so and none of the agreements in question in this appeal does so.

b. There is therefore no scope for the site owner to make a separate charge for communal services such as maintenance of estate roads or gardens.

39. The Applicants said that there is no reference to a charge for grass cutting, garden maintenance or green garden waste removal written into the box headed “Additional Charges” contained within his Written Statement. Therefore, all grass cutting and removal of green garden waste material are all included in the [NAME_16] fee agreement, and this service should be reinstated by the Site Owner.

40. In addition, they said that in the statement: “There is therefore no scope for the site owner to make a separate charge for communal services such as maintenance of estate roads or gardens” there is no mention of ‘[ADDRESS]’, which is covered within the obligations of the site owner, as per the Written Statement of Agreement. Therefore, it was submitted that the reference is to the occupier’s gardens. It was said that it had been established that the words ‘other services’ within the Written Statement of Agreement covers any other services the Site Owner delivers, and not just utilities such as gas, electricity, water, and sewage. Any other costs the Site Owner wishes to pass onto the Occupiers, should therefore be listed within the box marked “Additional Costs.”

41. Reference was again made to [NAME_46], (2024) UKUT 294 (LC) in which Judge Elizabeth Cooke said at Paragraph 60

10

The RPT was correct in its conclusion in paragraph 33 of the decision, that the cost to the park owner of administering the utilities was included in the [NAME_16] fee. In the absence of a right for the park owner to charge a separate fee for the provision of some service which the agreement obliges the owner to provide, the [NAME_16] fee payable by the occupier is consideration for the performance of all such obligations of the owner and is in return for all the benefits received by the occupier under the agreement

Paragraph 61 goes on to say,

There is no restriction on the rights conferred on the occupier which may be taken to be included in the [NAME_16] fee. In this case for example, in addition to the rights to occupy the [NAME_16] the occupier receives in return for the [NAME_16] fee the benefit of obligations by the owner to keep the common parts of the park in a good state of repair, to provide and maintain the facilities and services available to the [NAME_16] from time to time.

Later in the paragraph, Judge Cooke states,

Each of these is an example of a service which can only be provided at a cost to the owner, yet for which there is no separate entitlement to charge; each must therefore be taken to be included in the [NAME_16] fee. The same is true in my judgement, of the service provided by the owner in reading meters and calculating and administering bill for each of the utilities.

Conclusion

42. Therefore, if the grass cutting etc is an implied obligation for which no charge has been made and there is no express provision to make a charge in the Written Statement of Agreement the service must be included in the [NAME_16] fee.

Respondent’s Case

The Issue

43. The Respondent addressed the two main aspects of the Application that: (a) It has been custom and practice for the site owner to cut the grass on Occupier’s pitches and to remove the garden waste. (b) In reliance on the decision in [NAME_47] as the cost of this (grass cutting) is not included in the box marked “additional charges,” it is something which is included in the [NAME_16] fee and the grass cutting should be reinstated as a service.

44. The Respondent said that it appeared to be agreed that there was no express contractual obligation to cut the grass and to remove the waste in respect of Occupier’s pitches. It is the Occupiers who have a contractual obligation under paragraph 21 (d) of the Implied Terms of the Written Statement of Agreement which states:

The Occupier shall - (d) maintain –

11

(i) The outside of the mobile home, and (ii) The [NAME_16] including all fences and outbuildings belonging to, or enjoyed with, it and the mobile home in a clean and tidy condition …

45. In addition, Part 3 clause 3(h) of the express terms as set out in the Applicants’ written statements provides that the occupier has agreed with the site owner to comply with the park rules. Site rules came into effect on 7 May 2019.

Rules 11 and 12 provide:

You are responsible for the disposal of all household, recyclable, and garden waste in approved containers through the local authority service. Where provided by the local authority, you must use the approved containers. You must not overfill containers and must place them in the approved position for the local authority collections.

You must not deposit any waste or rubbish other than in local authority approved containers on any part of the Park (including any individual [NAME_16]).

46. It was added that any charge which the Site Owner chooses to make for grass cutting and garden waste removal cannot be included within the payment of the [NAME_16] fee because it is not anything which the site owner is obliged under the agreement to provide. The grass cutting and removal of garden waste is something which has taken place outside of the 1983 Act Agreement and forms a separate arrangement. It is not an implied term either by statute or caselaw.

1. Whether cutting the grass of the pitches that are unfenced is an implied term

47. In its written statement the Respondent said that terms can only be implied by statute or through established principles as set out in caselaw. Judge Cooke set out these principles in Stanton v Fury Developments Ltd, (2024) UKUT 294 (LC) quoting from the relevant cases as follows:

48. In relation to arguments made by the site owner that it was implied into the agreement that the site owner could recover administration charges the [NAME_48] at paragraphs 65 — 68 if Britaniacrest Limited [2013] UKUT 0521 (LC) said:

65. The modern [NAME_49] on the implication of terms in contracts was authoritatively discussed by the Privy Council in Attorney General of Belize v Belize Telecom Ltd [2009] 1 WLR 1988. The relevant jurisprudence is reviewed in detail in [NAME_50], The Interpretation of Contracts, (5” Edition, 201]) at chapter 6. A further useful treatment, focussing on the implication of terms relating to service charges in leases, can be found in Rosenthal, Commercial and Residential Service Charges (2013) pp. 36—53.

66. The implication of terms into a contract is part of the interpretative process of understanding the presumed intention of the parties when they entered

12

into the contract. The ordinary rules of contractual interpretation apply. As Lord [NAME_3] explained in the Belize case:

“The court has no power to improve upon the instrument which it is called upon the construe, whether it be a contract, a statute, or articles of association. It cannot introduce terms to make it fairer or more reasonable. It is concerned only to discover what the instrument means. In every case in which it is said that some provision ought to be implied in an instrument, the question for the court is whether such a provision would spell out in express words what the instrument, read against the relevant background would reasonably be understood to mean.”

67. In paragraph 17 of his advice Lord [NAME_3] returned to this fundamental point:

“But the implication of the term is not an addition to the instrument. It only spells out what the instrument means.”

68. In my judgment it is impossible to accept that the written statement containing the terms agreed between the parties has the effect of requiring the occupiers to make a further payment to the site owner to reimburse costs incurred in relation to the provision of utilities.

49. The Respondent also referred to [COMPANY_52]) v [NAME_63] (Number 2) [2022] UKUT 322 (LC) in which the [NAME_48] summarised the position in [NAME_49] as to when terms can be implied. In the case [NAME_55] submitted that there was an implied contractual obligation for [NAME_51] to provide a statement of account to him. At paragraphs 37-43 the [NAME_48] stated:

37. The [NAME_49] concerning the implication of terms into a contract is very extensive. For quite understandable reasons none of it was cited in any detail by [NAME_55] in his submissions. Nor is it necessary to go into great detail in order to address [NAME_55]'s case. However, it is first necessary to distinguish between two different situations in which terms will be implied. The first is where terms are implied by [NAME_49] into all contracts of a certain type, such as contracts for the sale of goods, or contracts of employment, or contracts for the letting of flats and houses. The second situation is where the court or tribunal is asked to imply a term to fill a gap in a particular contract. (This distinction is very well recognised; for example, by Lord Cross in Liverpool City Council v Irwin [1977] AC 239; by Lady Hale in Geys v Société Genérale [2013] 1 AC 523, at [55]; and by Lord Neuberger, in [COMPANY_56] (Appellant) v BNP Paribas Securities Services Trust Company (Jersey) Ltd [2015] UKSC 72, at [15]).

38. Terms in the former category, which include the statutory implied terms in Schedule 1 to the 1983 Act, are implied, or imposed, because the relationship between the parties is of a type which either Parliament or the common [NAME_49] has decided should be regulated by standard terms which are considered to

13

be reasonable; those terms will apply whenever the contract is of the relevant type.

39. Terms in the latter category are much less common and are found only where the suggested term “would spell out in express words what the instrument, read against the relevant background, would reasonably be understood to mean” (Attorney General of Belize v Belize Telecom Ltd [2009] 1 WLR 1988. at [21], per Lord Hoffmann). In such cases the question is not whether the suggested term would be reasonable; it must also be necessary to fill a gap in the express terms of the contract which, if not filled, would leave the contract unworkable.

40. In [COMPANY_59] v [NAME_48], Councillors and Ratepayers of the [NAME_61] (1977) 52 ALJR 20, 26, Lord Simon (speaking for the majority) summarised the circumstances in which a term can be implied into a particular contract: “For a term to be implied, the following conditions (which may overlap) must be satisfied: (1) it must be reasonable and equitable; (2) it must be necessary to give business efficacy to the contract, so that no term will be implied if the contract is effective without it; (3) it must be so obvious that ‘it goes without saying’; (4) it must be capable of clear expression: (5) it must not contradict any express term of the contract.”

41. The term which [NAME_55] suggests should be implied is not one of the terms which the [NAME_49] implies into every agreement for the occupation of a [NAME_16] on a protected site. Parliament has identified those terms in Schedule I of the 1983 Act, and it is not possible for the Tribunal to add to them. Nor is there any relevant term which the common [NAME_49] (as opposed to statute) requires to be read into every such agreement.

42. For an appropriate term to be implied it would therefore be necessary for the conditions, or considerations, identified by Lord Simon in [NAME_58] v Hastings to be present. [NAME_55] submitted that they were, and that in particular the provision of regular statements of account was necessary to give business efficacy to the agreement and was so obvious that it went without saying. I disagree.

43. Like the FTT, I have no difficulty in accepting that a term along the general lines [NAME_55] proposed would be reasonable. Such a term could be expressed clearly in a way which did not contradict any of the other terms of the agreement. But I do not accept that the agreement cannot work effectively without it, or that it is so obvious that it goes without saying. If [NAME_55] is correct that the imbalance between site owners and occupiers, the vulnerability of many of them, and the opportunity for abuse which exists in the relationship between owner and occupier, means that a term for the provision of statements of account is essential for the proper working of the agreement, it is surprising that Parliament did not include it as one of the statutory implied terms. No such implied term is found in a residential tenancy agreement (which creates a similar sort of relationship), nor is it invariably, or even usually incorporated by express agreement. The fact that

14

tens of thousands of pitches on protected sites are occupied without the suggested term yet without apparent difficulty makes it impossible to accept that business efficacy requires that it be implied.

50. The Respondent stated that it is insufficient for the Applicants to allege that grass cutting on Occupier’s gardens is “custom and practice" without explaining the legal grounds in support of this submission. The Respondent submitted that there were no principles in above cases which supported the Applicant’s claim that there was an implied term that obliged the Site Owner to cut the grass of the Occupier’s pitches where they were unfenced.

2. Whether grass cutting is included in the [NAME_16]

51. The Respondent said that, taking the above case [NAME_49] into account, the Site Owner is not contractually obliged to cut the grass on Occupiers’ pitches. However, by virtue of paragraph 21 (d) of the Implied Terms and Part 3 clause 3(h) of the Express Terms requiring Occupiers to comply with rules 11 and 12 of the Site Rules, Occupiers are respectively obliged to cut the grass on their pitches and dispose of their garden waste.

52. Any charge which the site owner chooses to make for grass cutting and garden waste removal cannot be included within the payment of the [NAME_16] fee because it is not anything which the site owner is obliged under the agreement to provide. The Respondent referred to Britaniacrest Limited [2013] UKUT 0521 (LC) Paragraph 61 which states:

In the absence of a right for the Park Owner to charge a separate fee for the provision of some service which the agreement obliges the owner to provide, the [NAME_16] fee payable by the occupier is consideration for the performance of all such obligations of the owner and is in return for all of the benefits received by the occupier under the agreement.

The grassing cutting and removal of garden waste is something which has taken place outside of the 1983 Act Agreement. Its provision and any payment for this is capable of forming a separate arrangement. It is not an arrangement under the agreement and the caselaw relied upon by the Applicants does not apply.

53. The Respondent said that the appeal in [NAME_62], (2024) UKUT 294 (LC) referred to by the Applicants was not applicable to the present case. It was to do with the liability of occupiers to pay administration charges which a third-party company was charging in connection with the metered supply of electricity and bulk gas supplied by the owner to occupiers’ pitches under their agreements to which the 1983 Act applies. The administration charges were for reading the meters. There was no dispute between the parties that the site owner was contractually obliged to supply electricity and gas to occupiers under their 1983 Act agreements.

54. There were two types of written statements involved. One type was a version of the written statement without any amendments to the standard express terms to allow for the contractual recovery of administration charges incurred in connection with

15

the provision of utilities. The other type was a version of the written statement under the 1983 Act under Part IV clause 3(b) with the following standard express term:

(b) To pay and discharge all general and/or water rates which may from time to time be assessed charged or payable in respect of the mobile home or the [NAME_16] (and /or a proportionate part thereof where the same are assessed in respect of the residential part of the park) and charges in respect of electricity gas water telephone and other services

55. The decision followed and applied previous decisions of Upper Tribunal cases including the decisions in Britaniacrest Limited [2013] UKUT 0521 (LC) and Hardman v Fox [2015] UKUT 0587 (LC), [2017] EWCA Civ 52 and [2019] UKUT 0248 (LC) regarding the interpretation of paragraph 3(b). In these cases it was held that paragraph 3(b) is not an agreement that the occupiers shall pay charges imposed by the site owner for his own services. It simply requires that the site owner pay charges in respect of electricity, gas, water, telephone and "other services", which are provided by third parties for the utility (i.e. the unit cost), directly to the third party and for the reimbursement of the site owner for such direct payments. Unless the written statement expressly provides otherwise, the site owner’s administrative charges are included in the [NAME_16] fee.

Tribunal’s Decision re Application 1 - CAM/12UE/PHC/2025/0001 – Grass Cutting

56. The Tribunal firstly considered the first question of whether it is an implied term of the Written Statement of Agreement that:

57. If the answer to this question is that the cutting of the grass is not an implied term then the cost of this service cannot be in the [NAME_16] fee, and the Respondent’s refusal to continue with the service free of charge is not a breach of the Written Statement of Agreement. The grass cutting and ancillary removal of garden waste would be a separate agreement outside the Written Statement of Agreement.

58. In addressing the first question the Tribunal took account of paragraphs 37-43 of [COMPANY_52]) v [NAME_63] (Number 2) [2022] UKUT 322 (LC) to which it was referred by the Respondent and which the Tribunal has repeated in full from the Respondent’s written representations. The extracts quoted deal quite comprehensively with the implication of contractual terms with reference to the Written Statement of Agreement. The Tribunal applied the principles set out to the present case. Initially there are two categories of implied term, those implied by [NAME_49] such as those implied into the Written Statement of Agreement by the Mobile Homes Act 1983, and those implied to ‘fill a gap’ sometimes referred to as implied by fact. In the present case the term referred to by the Applicants is not one implied into the Written Statement of Agreement by the Mobile Homes Act 1983 and it could not be implied into every mobile home contract and so comes within the second category of those implied to fill a gap. Terms in this category must not just be reasonable but “necessary to fill a gap in the express terms of the contract which, if

16

not filled, would leave the contract unworkable.” Therefore, the term referred to by the Applicants would have to fulfil all the conditions, or considerations, identified by Lord Simon in [NAME_58] v Hastings to be present. On applying these the Tribunal found that:

(1) The term would not be equitable in that those who had fenced their pitches would not receive the benefit of having their grass cut and their garden waste removed and yet would be paying for the service in their [NAME_16] fee

(2) The term is not necessary to give business efficacy to the contract. If the term were omitted the obligation to maintain the unfenced pitches would fall to the Occupiers under paragraph 21 (d) of the Implied Terms of the Written Statement of Agreement.

(3) The term is not so obvious that ‘it goes without saying’;

(4) The term may be clearly expressed although there are issues of interpretation as to whether it includes pitches which have fencing that may be removed.

(5) The term contradicts paragraph 21 (d) of the Implied Terms of the Written Statement of Agreement which requires Occupiers to maintain their own pitches and paragraph 12 which restricts the Site Owner’s right to entry to a [NAME_16].

59. The Applicants referred to the term being implied by custom and usage. This is a separate category of implied terms which only relates to specific markets, trades, or localities. Such terms must be certain, notorious, reasonable, recognised as legally binding and consistent with the express terms of any contract. The Tribunal found that this category would not be applicable to the present circumstances

60. The Tribunal determined that grass cutting and removal of green garden waste material from unfenced pitches is not the responsibility of the Site Owner. Therefore, the cost of this service cannot be in the [NAME_16] fee, and the Respondent’s refusal to continue with the service free of charge is not a breach of the Written Statement of Agreement. The grass cutting and ancillary removal of garden waste is a separate agreement outside the Written Statement of Agreement.

Application 2 - CAM/12UE/PHC/0002 – Site Red Line Boundary

Applicant’s Case

61. The Applicant’s application, written statement of case and response to the Respondent’s Case was confirmed at the hearing.

The Issue

62. The Applicants sought a declaration as to the location of the site Red Line Boundary for the eastern perimeter and the extended southern Red Line Boundary which terminates alongside the River Nene as shown on the site licence and the certificate of lawfulness originally granted.

17

It was submitted that there is no ambiguity at all within the site licence and certificate of lawfulness and drawings which identify exactly where the red line is.

It was said that the Site Owner has sited and sold homes knowingly outside the red line and set out marker posts along the southern perimeter, which runs alongside the River Nene for Future expansion.

They said that North Northamptonshire Planning Department are fully aware of the Site Owner’s actions and have confirmed they would like to take action but they have not the resources to do so.

It was accepted that the pitches which have been granted and the homes sold outside the red line boundary cannot be taken from the purchasers but the Tribunal should be able to stop what the Applicants considered was an illegal site expansion and to order the removal of the 12 bases outside of the red line on [ADDRESS], and the 4 pitches Quayside and the erection of a permanent boundary.

63. At the hearing [NAME_17], representing the Applicants said that he had informed the local authority of this but they had not enforced the planning permission or related site licence regarding the extent of the Site (copies of emails were provided).

64. The Applicants provided Site Plans and the original Certificate of Lawfulness, Ref APP/ (32815/X/04/1154763. They referred to Chelmsford City Council v Leisure Parks Real Estate (Holdings) Ltd [2021] EWHC 613 (QB), in which [NAME_212] stated at paragraph 19,

In most cases the identification of a boundary can be readily ascertained by simple reference to a site plan that is incorporated within the planning permission”. He went on to say, “The very purpose of a site plan is to permit relevant parties and the public to readily understand the geographical limits of a permission without the need to reference extrinsic materials.

Later, at paragraph 40, he said I start by looking at Boundary Line A in isolation from Boundary Line B. Taken in isolation there can be little doubt that Boundary Line A is clear and unambiguous. It plainly shows a boundary drawn closely to the existing structures and over which is, an existing boundary line. It is reinforced by the fact that this section is a plan is drawn over an OS marked plan. i.e. denoting an intent at accuracy and purpose. There is nothing ambiguous with Buidary Line A, this s all consistent with the site pan (as agreed) being unquestionably incorporated into the 2004 permission.

65. It was submitted that the Tribunal could carry out a similar exercise to that in Chelmsford City Council v Leisure Parks Real Estate (Holdings) Ltd [2021] EWHC 613 (QB) and make a declaration confirming the Site boundary with a view to preventing unlawful development.

66. At the hearing, before addressing the evidence adduced, the Tribunal asked Respondent to comment on the Application.

18

Respondent’s Case

67. The Respondent said that there is planning permission for caravan site use in respect of the land known as [ADDRESS] and a site licence granted to [COMPANY_35]. The Local Planning Authority under the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 is North Northamptonshire Council. The Site Licensing Authority under the Caravan Sites and Control of Development Act 1960 is also North Northamptonshire Council. The relevant planning permission for caravan site use is the pre-condition of the grant of a site licence.

68. The Respondent said that there was no dispute with the Local Planning Authority over the extent of the land with planning permission for caravan site use and the extent of the eastern boundary of the caravan site was agreed with the Local Planning Authority in 2024. It was accepted by the relevant parties that there are two homeowners (numbers 24 and 26 Quayside) who live in [COMPANY_7] outside the red line boundary and the Local Planning Authority and the residents concerned are fully aware of this. There is no planning enforcement action being taken against the Respondent under the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 and the local authority has not expressed any concerns over compliance with the conditions of the site licence, the last inspection taking place on 7 May 2025.

69. The Respondent acknowledged at the hearing that there had been discussions with the local authority about the extent of the Site and the planning permission and provided the copy of a recent letter in support of this.

70. The Respondent went on to state that irrespective of these discussions the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction under section 4 of the 1983 Act, to determine: any question of planning [NAME_49] or enforcement under the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 including: • the extent of the caravan site under the certificate of lawfulness, • if there is a breach of planning control, • whether there should be enforcement, • to grant injunctive relief by directing for the removal of concrete bases; or any question of caravan site licensing under the Caravan Sites and Control of Development Act 1960 including: • if there is any breach of the condition of the site licence, • to require a licence holder to remedy any proven breach of the conditions, or • to direct for any proven breach of the conditions of the site licence to be remedied.

71. Any dispute over the extent of the land with planning permission for a caravan site and its use is a matter for the Local Planning Authority and the Caravan Site Licensing Authority.

19

Tribunal’s Decision re Application 2 - CAM/12UE/PHC/0002 – Site Red Line Boundary

72. The Tribunal considered both parties submissions and found that the Applicants were seeking a declaration as to the boundary of the Site as a precursor to a declaration that there has been a breach of the planning permission or certificate of lawfulness and perhaps Site Licence. The Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to make declarations. There are occasions when the Tribunal has had to take account of planning matters in deciding a section 4 Application, however, the issues concerned related to whether a structure was a mobile home and whether it was on a protected site. They did not relate to breaches and enforcement of planning control which are the preserve of the local authority and other judicial bodies. The Tribunal told [NAME_17], representing the Applicants that, as was stated by the Respondent’s Representatives, the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to deal with the Application.

73. [NAME_17] accepted on behalf of the Applicants that the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction and applied to have the Application withdrawn to which the Respondent did not raise any objection but said that the question of costs was something to be decided on a different day was supported by the Respondent. The Tribunal agreed that the Application be withdrawn.

Application 3 - CAM/12UE/PHC/0003 – LPG Charges

Applicant’s Case

74. The Applicants’ written statement of case and response to the Respondent’s Case was confirmed at the hearing.

75. The Applicants said that on 12 September 2022 the Site Owner informed all Occupiers that their LPG supplier, [COMPANY_66] ([NAME_67]) were to charge a £3.82 ex vat surcharge on each cylinder from 1 October. 2022.

76. On the 16 September 2022, all residents were sent a letter from the site manager, together with a copy of the [NAME_67] surcharge notification, increasing each cylinder of LPG by the sum of £3.82 + vat at 5% totalling £4.11, increasing the cost of an LPG cylinder to Occupiers from £75.00 to £79.11.

77. In response to the Applicants’ inquiry [NAME_67] stated that they first instigated a surcharge from 24 March 2022 on purchases by the Site Owner of £2.96 plus 5% vat (£3.11) The charge increased to £3.92 plus 5% vat (£4.11) from 13 October 2022, until [NAME_67] ceased applying this surcharge in June 2023. However, the Site Owner has continued charging this surcharge to Occupiers since June 2023, when the Site Owner was no longer being charged it.

78. The Site Owner has maintained that their charges take into account the fact that they can buy LPG cylinders in bulk, they store the LPG cylinders on site, deliver the cylinders to Occupiers’ homes, connect the new cylinders and remove the old cylinders.

20

79. The Applicants submit that the Site Owner is a supplier of LPG under the terms of the Written Statement of Agreement, which it purchases from [NAME_67] and resells to the Occupiers. As a reseller of a utility the Site Owner can only charge the Occupier the same unit price for LPG as that which it pays its supplier unless there is an express term allowing the Site Owner to charge for the administration of providing LPG to the Occupiers. The Applicants stated that there is no such term in their Written Statements of Agreement and referred to Stanton v Fury Developments [2024] UKUT 294 (LC) paragraph 60 which states:

I also consider that the RPT were correct in its conclusion in Paragraph 13 of the decision, that the cost to the park owner of administering the Utilities was included in the [NAME_16] fee. In the absence of a right for the park owner to charge a separate fee for the provision of some service which the agreement obliges the owner to provide, the [NAME_16] fee payable by the Occupier is consideration for the performance of all such obligations of the owner and is in return for all the benefits received by the Occupier under the agreement.

80. The Applicants therefore submit that the Site Owner should repay the administration fee levied since June 2023 when the supplier, [NAME_67] ceased to charge the Site Owner the surcharge. They therefore seek an order under Section 231A of the Housing Act 2004 for reimbursement of administration fees paid in the past.

Respondent’s Case

81. The Respondent’s written statement of case was confirmed and developed at the hearing.

82. The Respondent said that all [COMPANY_7] are supplied with a metered supply of electricity to their home. The Site Owner supplies electricity to these homes under the Applicants’ Written Statements of Agreement and Occupiers pay to the Site Owner for what they use plus an element of the standing charge. The Site Owner is a reseller of electricity under the Ofgem Decision and is subject to maximum resale price. The Respondent is responsible for supplying and maintaining the supply of electricity to the homes.

83. The Respondent said that in addition all [COMPANY_7] use LPG gas bottles. Each park home has the ability to connect to LPG gas bottles. Each park home tends to have two 47 kg propane gas bottles. One which is being used and one as a back up for when the other runs out. There is no piped supply or metred supply of LPG to the [COMPANY_7]. The Applicants are responsible for purchasing their own gas bottles and for maintaining their own supply. They are responsible for keeping track of the amount of gas which they use. Applicants may purchase gas bottles from [COMPANY_35] which are delivered and connected, but Applicants are not obliged to purchase gas bottled from the Site Owner under their agreements. They are free to purchase gas bottles from whoever they want.

84. The Respondent added that [COMPANY_35], the Site Owner, buys LPG gas bottles in bulk from [NAME_67] which they store on site for the purpose of fulfilling orders placed by residents for gas bottles. As a result of bulk purchases, [NAME_67] give the Site Owner a discount on the retail price of a gas bottle. The Site Owner is not

21

contractually obliged to sell and to deliver gas bottles under the Written Statements of Agreement with Occupiers.

85. The Respondent referred to a tribunal decision from 2019 (case number CAM/34UDIPHCI2019/0003) which was about the terms of a written statement of another Occupier regarding the purchase of gas bottles and whether the resident in that case could only buy LPG bottles from the Site Owner, the Tribunal said:

The Tribunal determines that the agreement does not provide that the applicant may only buy LPG gas from the respondent, nor does it prohibit deliveries by other gas suppliers to the [NAME_16]. The agreement, the Written Statement, signed but undated, made between the applicant and the respondent's predecessor in title does not expressly provide that the applicant may only buy LPG gas from the respondent. Nor does the agreement expressly prohibit deliveries by other gas suppliers to the [NAME_16]. This application is for the Tribunal to determine a question or questions under the Act or the agreement to which it applies. However, the application does not extend to the Tribunal considering, making, or otherwise amending, an existing agreement. Such request would have to be the subject of a separate application to the Tribunal. If such an application were to be made. then a priced, quantified and un-redacted copy of the contract between the respondent and the supplier of bottled gas, is likely to be relevant information and should be made available.

86. The Respondent also referred to another tribunal decision in 2023 (case number CAM/12UE/PHI/2023/o124) which related to a [NAME_16] fee review. In respect of the issue that there was a loss of amenity due to a charge being levied for the delivery of gas bottles the tribunal said at Paragraphs 133 — 135

6) Gas Bottle Delivery

Respondent’s Case

133. The Respondents said that Gas bottle delivery to [COMPANY_7] was 7 days a week 52 weeks a year. Delivery is now only twice per week with an additional cost of £25 per bottle if one is required as an emergency. 47kg bottles to were sold to [NAME_20] which the ground staff would supply and fit. This service is now only available to [NAME_20] who are considered by the Applicant to be vulnerable and/or pay £5 extra for each bottle each time.

Applicant’s Reply

134. The Applicant said that gas bottles are delivered twice a week to [NAME_20] after an order is placed. The regularity of the supply is not something which is prescribed under the Mobile Homes Act agreement. The regularity of the supply is not a contractual obligation. It was denied that there has been a decrease in amenity and reduction in service.

22

Tribunal’s Findings and Determination

135. The Tribunal found that the delivery of gas bottles is a separate contractual matter between the provider of the service, which in this case is the Site Owner or [NAME_20]. The Tribunal determined that it is not a part of the Written Statement of Agreement and so not related to the [NAME_16] fee.

87. In both cases the tribunals found that the delivery of gas bottles is "a separate contractual matter" and is not part of the "Written Statement of Agreement” and decided that the supply of gas bottles is not something which falls under the written statement or agreement. The Site Owner is not obliged to supply gas bottles as a service to the Applicants under their agreements and the charges for gas bottles are not sums due under the agreement. Occupiers may purchase their LPG from any supplier they choose including the Site Owner.

88. The Respondent said that the cases of Stanton v Fury Developments [2024] UKUT 294 (LC), Britaniacrest Limited [2013] UKUT 0521 (LC) and Hardman v Fox [2015] UKUT 0587 (LC), [2017] EWCA Civ 52 and [2019] UKUT 0248 (LC)62 did not apply.

Tribunal Decision re Application 3 - CAM/12UE/PHC/0003 – LPG Charges

89. The Tribunal found that the questions arising from the Written Statement of Agreement which the Applicants wanted to be determined is:

a) Whether the Site Owner is a supplier of LPG under the Written Statement of Agreement?

b) If the Site Owner is obliged to supply LPG under the Written Statement of Agreement then, in the absence of an express term stating otherwise, it can only charge the unit price, any cost of administration for the supply is within the [NAME_16] fee.

c) If the Site Owner is a supplier of LPG under the Written Statement of Agreement the Applicants seek an order under Section 231A of the Housing Act 2004 for reimbursement of administration fees paid in the past.

d) It follows that if the Site Owner is not a supplier of LPG under the Written Statement of Agreement, the supply of LPG is a separate agreement for which the Site Owner may make an administration charge over and above the price paid by the Site Owner for the LPG from the Site Owner’s supplier.

90. The Tribunal found, as determined by the previous tribunals, that there is no requirement under the Occupiers’ Written statement of Agreement that the Site Owner is obliged to supply LPG gas cylinders to the Occupiers and the Occupiers are equally not obliged to purchase their LPG gas cylinders from the Site Owner. The Occupiers may purchase their LPG cylinders from any independent supplier e.g. directly from [NAME_67] or any other supplier. The Site Owner is itself an independent supplier it purchases cylinders from [NAME_67], and offers them for sale to the Occupiers

23

in an arrangement where [NAME_67] is a wholesaler and the Site Owner a retailer. It is a free market.

91. The cases of Stanton v Fury Developments [2024] UKUT 294 (LC), Britaniacrest Limited [2013] UKUT 0521 (LC) and Hardman v Fox [2015] UKUT 0587 (LC), [2017] EWCA Civ 52 and [2019] UKUT 0248 (LC)62 do not apply. The determining that the cost of administering the supply of a utility being included in the [NAME_16] fee, unless there is an express provision, only applies where the Site Owner is obliged under the Written Statement of Agreement to supply a utility.

92. The Tribunal therefore confirms the previous decisions that the supply of LPG is a separate agreement for which the Site Owner may make an administration charge over and above the price paid by the Site Owner for the LPG from the Site Owner’s supplier.

93. In summary, the Tribunal determined that there was no new evidence adduced by the Applicants and the decisions of the previous tribunals should stand that: a) There is no requirement under the Occupiers’ Written statement of Agreement that the Site Owner is obliged to supply LPG gas cylinders to the Occupiers and the Occupiers are equally not obliged to purchase their LPG gas cylinders from the Site Owner. b) The delivery of gas bottles is a separate contractual matter between the provider of the service whether the Site Owner or other supplier. If the Site Owner supplies the LPG cylinders the cost of administration is not part of the [NAME_16] fee and an additional fee may be charged.

Application 4 - CAM/12UE/PHC/0005 – Electricity Charges

Applicants’ Case

94. The Applicants raised two issues: a) The first related to Occupiers who have prepay meters not being informed of an increase in the unit charge and the failure of the Site Owner to update the tariff portal causing Occupiers to go into arrears b) The second related to the Site Owner not having charged the correct percentage of the standing charge over a period said to be 7 years.

95. The second issue was not stated on the Application form but the Tribunal considered that it was sufficiently associated with the first issue as to consider a further elaboration of it.

Prepayment Meters

96. Regarding the first issue the Applicants said that the Site Owner is a re-seller of electricity to Occupiers. The Site has a combination of prepay and non-prepay meters. The prepay meters operate on the basis that the Site Owner pays the electricity bill. The non-prepay meter Occupiers are billed and charged in arrears. The prepay meter Occupiers pay by the Site Owner going on to the customer [NAME_68] tariff portal and setting the new tariff. The Occupiers then buy their electricity at the new rate in advance when they need it.

24

97. If the Site owner fails to update the tariff promptly when there is an increase, the prepay Occupiers will be buying their electricity in advance at the old rate and will be paying too little. The Site Owner will have to pay the supplier the difference until the meters are reset through the portal and the Site Owner will be left to claim the difference from the Occupiers. The prepay meter Occupiers will not know that there has been a change in tariff unless the Site Owner tells them. They also will not know that they have underpaid if the portal is not changed until they receive a demand from the Site Owner for the underpayment.

98. In February 2022 prepayment meter Occupiers were informed that a four-year contract had been negotiated and therefore the Occupiers believed they had certainty of their rate until January 2026.

99. In August 2024 a new Site Owner took over and the previous contract was terminated and a new contract with new rates was negotiated. The new rates were higher but because the prepay meter Occupiers were not informed of the change by the new Site Owner they were not aware that there had been a change or of the new rates until they were required to pay more for their pre-payments.

100. The problem was compounded because the new Site Owner omitted to update the [NAME_68] tariff portal and therefore the prepay meter Occupiers were underpaying. They were not aware of this until they received a demand from the Site Owner for the period from when the tariffs changed to the time the [NAME_68] portal was updated.

101. The Applicants considered that it was unfair to charge the underpayment when they had no means of finding out what the charge should be or that they were in arrears. They asked the Tribunal to order that the Site Owner should be required to give the prepayment meter Occupiers 30 days’ notice of a change in tariff as there appears to be a gap in the [NAME_49].

Standing Charge

102. Regarding the second issue the Applicants said that the Site Owner has not charged the correct percentage of the standing charge over a period said to be 7 years. The Applicants allege that they have been overcharged the standing charge because “as [COMPANY_7] have been sold the amount of the standing charge should have come down".

103. The Applicants accepted that the Site Owner has a legal right to charge each Occupier a percentage of the standing charge the Site Owner is charged by the supplier. However, they believed the Site Owner has not paid due diligence to the number of homes being connected to the electricity supply on a regular basis, when setting the standing charge for any period throughout the past seven years. For instance, there have only been a small number of standing charge increases or decreases over this seven-year period, when approximately 130 new homes have been connected periodically during this period.

104. Two such periods, from 04/01/2017 until 04/10/2019 the standing charge remained at 0.2325 per day, and then from 04/01/2020 until 06/10/2021 there was a rate of

25

0.118 charged per day. Therefore, over a 56-month period, there was only one change in the standing charge with many new homeowners being connected to the supply, which should have meant a steady decline in the standing charge for each Occupier.

105. The Applicants [NAME_44] the Tribunal to direct that Site Owner refer to their financial records held over the past six years" and “adjust the standing charge” and “refund each Occupier accordingly over this six-year period. or alternatively to refund an acceptable amount."

106. Regarding both Issues [NAME_19] on behalf of the Applicants said that she was open to a pragmatic settlement.

Respondent’s Case

Prepayment Meters

107. The Respondent stated that, notwithstanding that the Site Owner failed to update the [NAME_68] portal, Occupiers are obliged to pay for the electricity consumed whether on a pre-payment meter or whether they are invoiced afterwards for what they use upon reading their meters and calculating the invoice. The period of underpayment was between 9 August and 28 October 2024 (approximately 3 months) and was picked up in October 2024.

108. At the hearing [NAME_28] explained that the existing contract for electricity, which should have run from February 2022 to January 2026, was automatically terminated when there was a new site owner. The new site owner entered a 12-month contract with [NAME_69] form 2 November 2023 until 2 November 2024. On 4 November 2024 the Site Owner entered another contract with [NAME_70] having shopped around for the best value supplier.

109. [NAME_28] said that he had been in discussions with the Qualifying Residents’ Association and would in future be informing all Occupiers of changes in tariffs.

110. Standing Charge

111. [NAME_28] said that the previous Site Owner had not kept a clear record of electricity connections. He understood the difficulty of this because the number of connections to the supply is a constantly changing number and includes moorings and touring caravans. The Current Site Owner has therefore been seeking to calculate a fair proportion to charge Occupiers. Whilst doing so no standing charge has been made by the current Site Owner since taking over the Site on 24 April 2023. This will change in October 2025 now that a system has been calculated.

Conclusion

112. [NAME_28] said that he too would seek a pragmatic settlement of the financial issues raised regarding both the prepayment meters and the standing charge. On behalf of the Respondent Site Owner, he offered not to pursue the prepayment meter Occupiers for the underpayments between 9 August and 28 October 2024 which together with not passing on the standing charge for the period 24 April 2023 to 1

26

October 2025 would compensate occupiers for any historic incorrect administrative or standing charges.

113. [NAME_19] on behalf of the Applicants agreed the settlement and in return for the undertaking would withdraw the Application.

Tribunal Decision re Application 4 - CAM/12UE/PHC/0005 – Electricity Charges

114. The Tribunal found that the settlement was pragmatic and reasonable. A consent order was not considered appropriate as it would necessitate a detailed financial account which the settlement was intended to avoid. Therefore, the Tribunal agreed the withdrawal of the Application in return for the Respondent’s undertaking not to pursue the prepayment meter Occupiers for the underpayments between 9 August and 28 October 2024 which together with not passing on the standing charge for the period 24 April 2023 to 1 October 2025 would compensate occupiers for any historic incorrect administrative or standing charges.

Judge JR Morris

Appendix 1 - Applicants

Address Applicant 6 [NAME_71] 7 [NAME_73] 9 [NAME_75] 14 [NAME_77] 15 [NAME_79] 16 [NAME_82] 19 [NAME_84] 21 [NAME_87] 28 [NAME_205] [NAME_91] [NAME_93] 2 [NAME_95] 3 [NAME_97] 7 [NAME_99] 8 [NAME_101] 9 [NAME_103] 10 [NAME_105] 11 [NAME_107] 22 [NAME_108] 25 [NAME_110] 27 [NAME_112] 30 [NAME_114] 32 [NAME_116] 33 [NAME_117]

27

35 [NAME_119] 38 [NAME_121] 40 [NAME_123] 42 [NAME_125] 43 [NAME_127] 44 [NAME_129] 45 [NAME_130] 6 [NAME_132] 10 [NAME_134] 11 [NAME_136] 12 [NAME_138] 13A [NAME_140] 13C [NAME_142] 1 [NAME_147] 2 [NAME_149] 25 [NAME_151] 2 [NAME_153] 3 [NAME_155] 4 [NAME_156] 6 [NAME_158] 9 [NAME_160] 14 [NAME_162] 15 [NAME_164] 16 [NAME_165] 17 [NAME_166] 18 [NAME_168] 24 [NAME_170] 26 [NAME_172] 29 [NAME_174] [ADDRESS] [NAME_115] & Ms M & Ms D Cooke 15 [NAME_176] 18 [NAME_178] 26 [NAME_179] 28 [NAME_181] 1 [NAME_183] 2 [NAME_185] 2 – The [NAME_49]

1. Section 4 of the Mobile Homes Act 1983 (as amended)

(1) In relation to a protected site in England, a tribunal has jurisdiction – (a) to determine any question arising under this Act or any Statement to which it applies, and (b) to entertain any proceedings brought under this Act or any such Statement subject to subsection (2) to (6).

28

(2) Subsection (1) applies in relation to a question irrespective of anything contained in an arbitration Statement, which has been entered into before that question arose.

(3) In relation to a protected site in England, the court has jurisdiction— (a) to determine any question arising by virtue of paragraph 4, 5 or 5A(2)(b) of Chapter 2, or paragraph 4, 5 or 6(1)(b) of Chapter 4, of Part 1 of Schedule 1 (termination by owner) under this Act or any Statement to which it applies; and (b) to entertain any proceedings so arising brought under this Act or any such Statement, subject to subsections (4) to (6).

(4) Subsection (5) applies if the owner and occupier have entered into an arbitration Statement before the question mentioned in subsection (3)(a) arises and the Statement applies to that question.

(5) A tribunal has jurisdiction to determine the question and entertain any proceedings arising instead of the court.

(6) Subsection (5) applies irrespective of anything contained in the arbitration Statement mentioned in subsection (4).

2. Owner’s right of entry to the [NAME_16]

12. The owner may enter the [NAME_16] without prior notice between the hours of 9 a.m. and 6 p.m. (a) to deliver written communications, including post and notices, to the occupier; and (b) to read any meter for gas, electricity, water, sewerage or other services supplied by the owner.

13. The owner may enter the [NAME_16] to carry out essential repair or emergency works on giving as much notice to the occupier (whether in writing or otherwise) as is reasonably practicable in the circumstances.

14. Unless the occupier has agreed otherwise, the owner may enter the [NAME_16] for a reason other than one specified in paragraph 12 or 13 only if he has given the occupier at least 14 clear days' written notice of the date, time and reason for his visit.

15. The rights conferred by paragraphs 12 to 14 above do not extend to the mobile home.

3. Section 231A of the Housing Act 2004 provides:

Additional Powers of First-tier Tribunal and Upper Tribunal (1) The First-tier Tribunal and Upper Tribunal exercising any jurisdiction conferred by or under the Caravan Sites and Control of Development Act 1960, the Mobile Homes Act 1983, the Housing Act 1985 or this Act has, in

29

addition to any specific powers exercisable by them in exercising that jurisdiction, the general power mentioned in subsection (2). (2) The tribunal’s general power is a power to give such directions as the tribunal considers necessary or desirable for securing the just, expeditious and economical disposal of the proceedings or any issue in or in connection with them. (3) When exercising jurisdiction under this Act, the directions which may be given by the tribunal under its general power include (where appropriate)— (a) directions requiring a licence to be granted under Part 2 or 3 of this Act; (b) directions requiring any licence so granted to contain such terms as are specified in the directions; (c) directions requiring any order made under Part 4 of this Act to contain such terms as are so specified; (d) directions that any building or part of a building so specified is to be treated as if an HMO declaration had been served in respect of it on such date as is so specified (and such a direction is to be an excluded decision for the purposes of section 11(1) and 13(1) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007); (e) directions requiring the payment of money by one party to the proceedings to another by way of compensation, damages or otherwise. (3A) … (4) When exercising jurisdiction under the Mobile Homes Act 1983, the directions which may be given by the tribunal under its general power include (where appropriate)— (a) directions requiring the payment of money by one party to the proceedings to another by way of compensation, damages or otherwise; (b) directions requiring the arrears of [NAME_16] fees or the recovery of overpayments of [NAME_16] fees to be paid in such manner and by such date as may be specified in the directions; (c) directions requiring cleaning, repairs, restoration, re-positioning or other works to be carried out in connection with a mobile home, [NAME_16] or protected site in such manner as may be specified in the directions; (d) directions requiring the establishment, provision or maintenance of any service or amenity in connection with a mobile home, [NAME_16] or protected site in such manner as may be specified in the directions.

Appendix 3 – Rights of Appeal

1. If a party wishes to appeal the decision to the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) then a written application for permission must be made to the First-tier Tribunal at the Regional office which has been dealing with the case.

2. The application for permission to appeal must arrive at the Regional Office within 28 days after the Tribunal sends written reasons for the decision to the person making the application.

3. If the application is not made within the 28-day time limit, such application must include a request for an extension of time and the reason for not complying with the 28-day time limit; the Tribunal will then look at such reason(s) and decide whether

30

to allow the application for permission to appeal to proceed despite not being within the time limit.

4. The application for permission to appeal must identify the decision of the Tribunal to which it relates (i.e., give the date, the property and the case number), state the grounds of appeal, and state the result the party making the application is seeking.

31

Appendix 3 – Right of Appeal

5. If a party wishes to appeal this decision to the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) then a written application for permission must be made to the First-tier Tribunal at the Regional office which has been dealing with the case.

6. The application for permission to appeal must arrive at the Regional office within 28 days after the Tribunal sends written reasons for the decision to the person making the application.

7. If the application is not made within the 28 day time limit, such application must include a request for an extension of time and the reason for not complying with the 28 day time limit; the Tribunal will then look at such reason(s) and decide whether to allow the application for permission to appeal to proceed despite not being within the time limit.

8. The application for permission to appeal must identify the decision of the Tribunal to which it relates (i.e. give the date, the property and the case number), state the grounds of appeal, and state the result the party making the application is seeking.

32

1

Case Reference

: CAM/12UE/PHC/2025/0002 (0002) CAM/12UE/PHC/2025/0003 (0003)

Site

: [ADDRESS] [POSTCODE]

Applicants

: [redacted]

Occupiers of the [COMPANY_7] listed at Annex 1

Respondent : [redacted]

: [COMPANY_10]

Date of Applications : 18 November 2024

0002 27 January 2025

0003

Original Application : To determine a question arising under the Mobile Homes Act 1983 or an agreement to which it applies – section 4 Mobile Homes Act 1983 as amended (“the Act”)

Current Application : Application by the Respondent for Costs

under Rule 13 of the Tribunals Procedure

(First Tier Tribunal) Property Chamber)

Rules 2013

Tribunal

: Judge JR [NAME_14]

Date of Directions

: 23 September 2025 Date of Decision

: 30 October 2025 Corrections under Rule 50 : 21 November 2025 Date of Costs Application : 25 November 2025 Date of Directions

: 29 December 2025 Date of Costs Decision : 9 February 2026

__________________________________

DECISION ____________________________________ © CROWN COPYRIGHT 2026

FIRST - TIER TRIBUNAL PROPERTY CHAMBER (RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY)

2

Decision

1. The Tribunal decided that the Applicants had not acted unreasonably and would not make a costs order under Rule 13 of the Tribunals Procedure (First Tier Tribunal) Property Chamber) Rules 2013 in respect of either Application CAM/12UE/PHC/2025/0002 or Application CAM/12UE/PHC/2025/0003.

Reasons

Original Application

2. [NAME_17] representing 60 Applicants made two Applications under section 4 of the Mobile Homes Act 1983 (as amended) which enables an application by an Occupier of a Park Mobile Home or a Park Mobile Home Site Owner to be made to a Residential Property Tribunal for a determination of any question arising under the Mobile Homes Act 1983 or agreement to which it applies.

3. The Applications were heard together on 23 September 2025 at a hearing attended by the Applicants’ Representative, [NAME_21] and the Respondent’s Representatives, [NAME_22], Solicitor to the Respondent, [NAME_24] sole Director of [NAME_187] and [COMPANY_8] and [NAME_26] of Counsel.

Application CAM/12UE/PHC/2025/0002

4. In Application CAM/12UE/PHC/2025/0002, the Applicants sought a declaration as to the location of the site Red Line Boundary for the eastern perimeter and the extended southern Red Line Boundary which terminates alongside the River Nene as shown on the site licence and the certificate of lawfulness originally granted.

5. Having read the written submissions of both parties the Tribunal found that the Applicants were seeking a declaration as to the boundary of the Site as a precursor to a declaration that there has been a breach of the planning permission or certificate of lawfulness and perhaps Site Licence. The Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to make declarations. There are occasions when the Tribunal has had to take account of planning matters in deciding a section 4 Application, however, the issues concerned related to whether a structure was a mobile home and whether it was on a protected site. They did not relate to breaches and enforcement of planning control which are the preserve of the local authority and other judicial bodies. The Tribunal told [NAME_17], representing the Applicants that, as was stated by the Respondent’s Representatives, the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to deal with the Application.

6. [NAME_17] accepted on behalf of the Applicants that the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction and applied to have the Application withdrawn to which the Respondent did not raise any objection but said that the question of costs was something to be decided on a different day. The Tribunal agreed that the Application be withdrawn.

3

Application CAM/12UE/PHC/2025/0003

7. In Application CAM/12UE/PHC/2025/0003 the Applicants submitted that the Site Owner is a supplier of LPG under the terms of the Written Statement of Agreement, which it purchases from [NAME_67] and resells to the Occupiers. As a reseller of a utility the Site Owner can only charge the Occupier the same unit price for LPG as that which it pays its supplier unless there is an express term allowing the Site Owner to charge for the administration of providing LPG to the Occupiers. The Applicants stated that there is no such term in their Written Statements of Agreement. Therefore the Site Owner should repay the administration fee levied since June 2023 and sought an order under Section 231A of the Housing Act 2004 for reimbursement.

8. The Respondent referred the Tribunal to a tribunal decision from 2019 (case number CAM/34UD/PHC/2019/0003) which concerned whether the occupier in that case could only buy LPG bottles from the Site Owner, and to another tribunal decision in 2023 (case number CAM/12UE/PHI/2023/o124) which concerned whether there was a loss of amenity due to a charge being levied for the delivery of gas bottles. The decisions determined that the Written Statement of Agreement does not provide that the applicant may only buy LPG gas from the Site Owner, nor does it prohibit deliveries by other gas suppliers to the [NAME_16]. In both cases the tribunals found that the delivery of gas bottles is "a separate contractual matter" and is not part of the "Written Statement of Agreement” and decided that the supply of gas bottles is not something which falls under the written statement or agreement.

9. The Tribunal determined that there was no new evidence adduced by the Applicants and the decisions of the previous tribunals should stand that: a) There is no requirement under the Occupiers’ Written statement of Agreement that the Site Owner is obliged to supply LPG gas cylinders to the Occupiers and the Occupiers are equally not obliged to purchase their LPG gas cylinders from the Site Owner. b) The delivery of gas bottles is a separate contractual matter between the provider of the service whether the Site Owner or other supplier. If the Site Owner supplies the LPG cylinders the cost of administration is not part of the [NAME_16] fee and an additional fee may be charged.

Application for Costs

8. The Respondent sought an award of costs under Rule 13 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Property Chamber) Rules 2013. In accordance with Rule 13(5), this application is made within 28 days of the Tribunal sending its final decision.

9. The Tribunal sets out the parties’ respective cases regarding costs for each Application.

4

Application CAM/12UE/PHC/2025/0002

Respondent’s Case for Costs

10. The Respondent provided a statement of case in respect of which the Respondent submitted that the Applicant had acted unreasonably.

11. The Respondent said that on 18 November 2024, the Applicant applied for the Tribunal to “confirm and declare the actual and true extent of the site red line boundary”. The Respondent said a Response Bundle filed and served on 13 June 2025 addressed the matters raised by the Applicants in detail including, amongst other things, an explanation as to why the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction.

12. The Respondent said it invited the Applicants to withdraw their application, in order to save on the costs of a hearing and on the Tribunal’s time and resources. The Applicants were also alerted to the rules on costs.

13. The Respondent referred to the case of [ADDRESS] Company (1985) Limited v [NAME_188]; [NAME_190] v [COMPANY_200]; [NAME_194] v [ADDRESS], London SW5 Management Limited [2016] UKUT 0290 (LC), LRX/90/2015, LRX/99/2015, LRX/88/2015, in which the Upper Tribunal set out a three stage process for making an order for costs under Rule 13(1)(b) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Property Chamber) Rules 2013. The three stages are applied by a tribunal asking three questions:

1. Did the party against whom costs are claimed act unreasonably, the test being objective? 2. If so in the [NAME_146] of the unreasonable conduct ought the tribunal make an order for costs? 3. If so what should the order be?

14. The Respondent addressed the three stages as follows:

1. Did the Applicant act unreasonably?

15. The Respondent stated as follows:

16. The Applicant had only made the Application because they were annoyed at the [NAME_197] failure to take action against the Site Owner at what the Applicants perceived to be a breach of planning [NAME_49]. Making an application to the Tribunal to commence litigation because one is “mad” or angry at the lack of progress made by an LPA or LA (as the site licensing authority), is not a reasonable basis to commence legal proceedings and were without any reasonable foundation.

17. The Respondent said that it had been made clear in its Response to the Applicants that the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to determine the application. Only on the day of the hearing, after having introduced their case and when invited by the Tribunal, did the Applicants acknowledge that the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction and apply to withdraw.

5

18. The Applicants did not approach the Respondent in the course of the proceedings before the hearing to ask whether, if they did apply to withdraw, the Respondent would apply for costs. If contact had been made then on this basis, the Respondent would have agreed to the withdrawal and would have agreed not to pursue a costs application. The Applicants could and should have given notice to withdraw their application after being invited to do so, therefore saving on the Respondent’s costs and the resources of the Tribunal in preparing for the hearing of their application.

19. The Respondent acknowledged that the Applicants are litigants in person, but submitted that they were familiar with the Tribunal’s procedure having been party to the proceedings for the determination of a new level of [NAME_16] fee in 2023. A reasonable person, after reading the Respondent’s Response would have taken legal advice which the Respondent encouraged them to do.

20. The Respondent submitted that the Applicants had acted unreasonably.

2. Is it reasonable to make a costs order?

21. The Respondent said that this was not a case where any of the Applicants had made concessions following the Respondent’s Response and none of the Applicants were justified in making the application. The Applicants only conceded that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction at the hearing on the basis that they would not be charged costs. No apology or remorse was shown for incurring the Respondent in expense.

22. In addition, it was said that the Applicants had made serious allegations of fraud against the Respondent.

23. Therefore the Respondent submitted that it was reasonable to make a costs order.

3. What should be the terms of the order?

24. The Respondent had prepared a statement of costs calculating the amount for each Application by dividing the total costs incurred for all four applications by dividing the amount by four on the basis that equal time had been spent on each.

Applicants’ Response

25. The Applicants stated that they made the Applications with a reasonable hope of success.

26. The Applicants’ Representative said that he had searched on the Internet to the question: “Can I take a Park Home site boundary dispute problem to the FTT property court”. He said that the answer he received affirmed that this was the correct course. A copy of the answer was provided, presumably generated by Artificial intelligence, which included the following statements: Yes, you can take many park home boundary and site issues to the First-Tier Tribunal (Property Chamber) in England…

6

Regarding Boundary Disputes Specifically • Boundary disputes can be complex; while the Tribunal has wide powers, you often need to link the boundary issue to a breach of the site agreement, site rules, or the site owner's responsibilities under the Mobile Homes Act, says [NAME_198] Home Living. • For boundary issues that don't neatly fit the Tribunal's standard park home applications, you might need to frame it as a breach of the site owner's duty or an interpretation of the site agreement/rules, notes [NAME_209].

Yes, you absolutely can take park home boundary/site issues to the First-Tier Tribunal (Property Chamber) in England, as it's the designated body for most park home disputes, including disagreements over [NAME_16] agreements, site rules, repairs, and even ownership transfers, with legally binding decisions. You'd apply using specific forms (like PH1-PH19) found via [NAME_198] or [NAME_199], especially if you can't resolve it directly with the park owner, though boundary physical issues might also involve the owner or Land Registry for title plans.

Why the FTT (Property Chamber) is the [ADDRESS]: • Specific Jurisdiction: The Tribunal handles cases under the Mobile Homes Act 1983, covering protected sites and residents. • Wide Range of Issues: They resolve [NAME_16] fee disputes, site rules, agreements, repairs, sales/transfers, and even resident association recognition. • Legally Binding: Their decisions are enforceable, unlike informal agreements.

Steps for a Boundary Issue:

1. Check Your Documents: Get copies of your title register and plan (from HM Land Registry) and your [NAME_16] agreement to understand the defined boundaries.

2. Talk to the Owner/Neighbour: Discuss the issue first to see if it can be resolved informally.

3. Gather Evidence: Photos, surveys, and correspondence are crucial.

4. Apply to the Tribunal: Use forms from the [NAME_198] or [NAME_199] websites for park home matters (Form PH series).

27. The Applicants stated that in the Application they referred to items 1-4 in detail. purchasing a full copy of the HM Land Registry plan showing the exact location of the site, as well as all the park boundaries, checking this with the Land Registry document attached to the original Certificate of Lawfulness issued to the Site Owner. These both proved that homes and bases were being built and sold beyond the official Site boundary. These answers found on the Internet were the Applicants’ reasons for bringing the application to the Tribunal and are bewildered as to why it was not the right way forward.

28. The Applicants’ Representative said he had spoken to the previous Site Owner, the current Site Owner and the Planning Department arguing that since 2021 the red line as detailed in the original Certificate of Lawfulness, was being infringed by the placement of dwellings and concrete bases fully equipped with all services being laid

7

outside of this boundary line. The Planning Enforcement Department had informed him that they were aware of these problems but staff shortages and financial restraints made it very difficult to enforce therefore the Applicants applied to the Tribunal.

Application CAM/12UE/PHC/2025/0003

29. The Respondent said that in its Response Bundle filed and served on 13 June 2025, it addressed in detail the issues raised by the Applicants regarding the LPG bottle charges. In defence of its position, the Respondent explained with reference to two previous sets of legal proceedings where the question of whether LPG bottles were supplied under the Mobile Homes Act agreement had already been determined. In those cases it was made clear that residents are not compelled to buy their gas bottles from the site owner and that they were not supplied under the Mobile Homes Act agreements. The purchase and delivery of gas bottles on the Site was a separate agreement. The matter was res judicata (a matter that had been judged) and it was an abuse of process to continue as the Tribunal could not adjudicate upon it again. It was also noted by the Respondent, that [NAME_17], the Applicants’ Representative, had also commenced legal proceedings in the County Court in December 2024 for a refund of LPG bottle charges, the same outcome as he (and 59 others) had sought from the Tribunal Application.

30. The Respondent said it invited the Applicants to withdraw the Application to save on further time and legal costs and the resources of the Tribunal. The Applicants were alerted to the rules on costs sending an email to [NAME_17] recommending that the Applicants take independent legal advice from a qualified legal professional.

31. As regards the Application above the Respondent referred to the case of [ADDRESS] Company (1985) Limited v [NAME_188]; [NAME_190] v [COMPANY_200]; [NAME_194] v [ADDRESS], London SW5 Management Limited [2016] UKUT 0290 (LC), LRX/90/2015, LRX/99/2015, LRX/88/2015, and addressed the three stages as follows:

1. Did the Applicant act unreasonably?

32. The Respondent submitted that the Application was unreasonable because:

a) There had been two previous sets of legal proceedings, the latter of which many Applicants were a party, where the Tribunal had already determined that LPG bottles were not supplied under the Mobile Homes Act agreement. b) The Applicants had admitted in their Reply that they were not compelled to buy bottled gas from the site owner which was on all fours with the evidence in the previous proceedings to which many Applicants were party. c) During the hearing it was stated that many of the Applicants were paying less to the Respondent than they would be paying to [NAME_201], making the application frivolous and vexatious. d) For failing to withdraw the application when invited to do in June 2025 even though there had been two judicial decisions which said that LPG bottles were not supplied under the Mobile Homes Act.

8

2. Is it reasonable to make a costs order?

33. The Respondent said that the Applicants had not made concessions. The Applicant had requested documentary evidence from the Respondent in relation to the supply of LPG gas following the previous decisions. When it was pointed out that the supply was not under the Mobile Homes Act agreement [NAME_17] commenced proceedings in the County Court as well as in the tribunal.

34. The Respondent submitted that a letter sent by [NAME_17] to the Respondent stating that “once these FTTs are decided and the only financial losers will be the site owners” implied that regardless of the outcome the Respondent would lose because it would have incurred legal costs showing an intent to cause the Respondent financial harm.

35. Therefore the Respondent submitted that it was reasonable to make a costs order.

3. What should be the terms of the order?

36. The statement of costs prepared by the Respondent included this Application and similarly attributed a quarter of the total costs to the matter.

Applicants’ Response

37. The Applicants said they based their Application upon the decision of [NAME_202], (2024) UKUT 294 (LC). In that case it was said that where site owners supplied utilities to occupiers whether the utility was electricity, gas or LPG cylinders, they had to resell it to the Occupiers at the same price of which they purchased the utility. They could not make an administration charge unless the Written Statement of Agreement allowed them to and they had to account for the cost of the utility and any administration charge to the occupiers.

38. The Applicants said they therefore sincerely believed that what was held in that case applied to them and that the cost of administering these utilities including LPG were not able to be passed on to the occupier. They thought it applied to all forms of LPG and did not know it did not apply to LPG cylinders.

Decision

39. Before considering whether the Applicants acted unreasonably the Tribunal again seeks briefly to explain why they were unsuccessful in their Applications, as their response to this application for costs gives a clearer account of their motivation for bringing the case and indicates that they do fully understand the Tribunal’s decision.

40. The written statement of agreement is a contract between the site owner and a specific occupier. An occupier can only bring a case under section 4 with regard to their own agreement with the site owner. This is the principle of privity of contract i.e. the contract is private between the site owner and the occupier (the first and second parties). It is only these persons who stand in a position to enforce the

9

agreement i.e. have locus standi. Other occupiers are third parties and are not entitled to enforce the agreement of others.

41. Regarding Application CAM/12UE/PHC/2025/0002 a distinction needs to be drawn between [NAME_16] and site boundaries. The position of the [NAME_16] boundary and the maintenance of any marker such as a fence or hedge, including the circumstances where a [NAME_16] boundary coincides with the site boundary, is a matter that is dealt with in the written statement of agreement between a site owner and an individual occupier. Any dispute relating to the [NAME_16] boundary is a matter that can be dealt with by a tribunal under section 4 of the Mobile Homes Act 1986 because it comes within the written statement of agreement, which includes the site rules, between the site owner and the specific occupier. Only that occupier can make an application. It is these situations to which the internet information was referring.

42. In this particular case, the specific mobile home owners, who had written statements of agreement enabling them to occupy the pitches that were apparently outside the boundaries of the protected site, may have been able to apply to the Tribunal under section 4 of the Mobile Homes Act 1986. It is these situations to which the internet information was referring. However, no evidence was adduced to show that these occupiers were joined as Applicants, or what the question arising under their agreement was which they wanted determined.

43. Issues concerning a site planning permission and Certificate of Lawfulness or a site licence, including where the site boundaries lie, are a matter for the planning authority and the licensing authority respectively and not an individual occupier or group of occupiers.

44. Regarding Application CAM/12UE/PHC/2025/0002 a distinction needs to be drawn between services which a site owner must provide under the terms of the written statement of agreement under the Mobile Homes Act 1986, and those that are offered by a separate arrangement or agreement. The written statement of agreement under the Act is not just any agreement between the site owner and occupier. It is one that must be provided to an occupier and sets out the terms of the occupation of the mobile home owner. The Written Statement of Agreement in this case (capitalised as it is a specific document) requires the Site Owner to provide electricity, water and sewerage. There is no requirement to provide LPG (liquid propane gas). The obligation not to charge an administration charge or to provide details of administration charges, if allowed under the Written Statement of Agreement, only apply if the Site Owner was required under the Written Statement of Agreement to provide LPG. [NAME_47] v [NAME_39] only applies to those sites owners who are required to provide services, including LPG, under the Written Statement of Agreement.

45. The Tribunal then addressed the three stages as referred to in the case of [ADDRESS] Company (1985) Limited v [NAME_188]; [NAME_190] v [COMPANY_200]; [NAME_194] v [ADDRESS], London SW5 Management Limited [2016] UKUT 0290 (LC), LRX/90/2015, LRX/99/2015, LRX/88/2015.

46. Firstly, the Tribunal considered whether the Applicants had acted unreasonably regarding Application CAM/12UE/PHC/2025/0002.

10

47. The motivation for bringing the Application appeared to be twofold. Firstly, an altruistic concern by the Applicants for those mobile home owners who occupied pitches apparently outside the boundary of the protected site. Secondly, the Applicants believed the Site had already reached it furthest extent and were concerned that further development might affect the facilities and ambience of the Site.

48. The Applicants proceeded with the Application because of the information on the internet. Knowledgeable and experienced lawyers such as the Respondent’s Representatives would be circumspect if not sceptical of any internet legal advice. However, the Tribunal recognises the pressure put on all members of the public to use the internet to solve issues of daily life and are encouraged by both private companies and public bodies to use the internet for self-help. In this case the advice failed to set out some basic principles which had a significant effect on the Applicants’ case. Notwithstanding the Respondent’s Representatives recommendation to seek professional advice, due to the strength of the internet advice and the way it set out how the case might be prepared, which the Applicants followed, the Tribunal understands why the Applicants pursued the matter. The Tribunal finds that it is reasonable for a lay person to follow advice given on an Internet site where reference is made to legislation, Government sites and in this case LEASE.

49. In addition, the Local Authority did not make it clear to the Applicants’ Representative in the correspondence he had with the Authority, that Site boundary issues are, notwithstanding the Authorities lack of resources, a matter for the planning and licensing authority to pursue and not the Applicants.

50. Secondly, the Tribunal considered whether the Applicants had acted unreasonably regarding Application CAM/12UE/PHC/2025/0003. It was apparent that they were convinced that the Upper Tribunal case of [NAME_203], (2024) UKUT 294 (LC) overruled the decisions of case number CAM/34UD/PHC/2019/0003 and case number CAM/12UE/PHI/2023/o124 it being decided after those cases. The Applicants quoted passages from the decision which they believed relevant and ‘proved’ their case. The Tribunal found the cases were to be distinguished from [NAME_39] v [NAME_47] and the Applicants’ interpretation to be wrong but not unreasonable.

51. The Tribunal also took into account the meaning of “unreasonable” in Ridehalgh v Horsefield [1994] Ch. 205 which dealt with a wasted costs order, the principles of which we consider apply in this case:

“Unreasonable” means what it has been understood to mean in this context for at least half a century. The expression aptly describes conduct which is vexatious, designed to harass the other side rather than advance the resolution of the case, and it makes no difference that the conduct is the product of excessive zeal and not improper motive. But conduct cannot be described as unreasonable simply because it leads in the event to an unsuccessful result or because other more cautious legal representatives would have acted differently. The acid test is whether the conduct permits of a reasonable explanation. If so, the course adopted

11

may be regarded as optimistic and as reflecting on a practitioner’s judgement, but it is not unreasonable.

52. The Tribunal found that the pursuit of the two cases to the hearing permitted of a reasonable explanation. From the Applicants’ response to this costs application the Tribunal found that the Applicants were still unclear as to why they were unsuccessful based upon the advice that they had read and their interpretation of the case which formed the basis of their argument.

53. The Respondent on the other hand with the benefit of knowledgeable and experienced legal representatives was, like the Tribunal, clear that the Applications would not be successful. Therefore, very little time and effort needed to be spent on arguing against the evidence and submissions of the Applicants.

54. The Tribunal decided that it was not reasonable to make a costs order under Rule 13 of the Tribunals Procedure (First Tier Tribunal) Property Chamber) Rules 2013 in respect of either Application CAM/12UE/PHC/2025/0002 or Application CAM/12UE/PHC/2025/0003.

Judge JR Morris

Appendix 1 - Applicants

Address Applicant 6 [NAME_71] 7 [NAME_73] 9 [NAME_75] 14 [NAME_77] 15 [NAME_79] 16 [NAME_82] 19 [NAME_84] 21 [NAME_87] 28 [NAME_205] [NAME_91] [NAME_93] 2 [NAME_95] 3 [NAME_97] 7 [NAME_99] 8 [NAME_101] 9 [NAME_103] 10 [NAME_105] 11 [NAME_107] 22 [NAME_108] 25 [NAME_110] 27 [NAME_112] 30 [NAME_114] 32 [NAME_116] 33 [NAME_117] 35 [NAME_119]

12

38 [NAME_121] 40 [NAME_123] 42 [NAME_125] 43 [NAME_127] 44 [NAME_129] 45 [NAME_130] 6 [NAME_132] 10 [NAME_134] 11 [NAME_136] 12 [NAME_138] 13A [NAME_140] 13C [NAME_142] 1 [NAME_147] 2 [NAME_149] 25 [NAME_151] 2 [NAME_153] 3 [NAME_155] 4 [NAME_156] 6 [NAME_158] 9 [NAME_160] 14 [NAME_162] 15 [NAME_164] 16 [NAME_165] 17 [NAME_166] 18 [NAME_168] 24 [NAME_170] 26 [NAME_172] 29 [NAME_174] [ADDRESS] [NAME_115] & Ms M & Ms D Cooke 15 [NAME_176] 18 [NAME_178] 26 [NAME_179] 28 [NAME_181] 1 [NAME_183] 2 [NAME_185] 2 – The [NAME_49]

55. Rule 13 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Property Chamber) Rules 2013 states: (1) The Tribunal may make an order in respect of costs only— (a) under section 29(4) of the 2007 Act (wasted costs) and the costs incurred in applying for such costs; (b) if a person has acted unreasonably in bringing, defending or conducting proceedings in— (i) … (ii) a residential property case, or (iii) …

13

(2) The Tribunal may make an order requiring a party to reimburse to any other party the whole or part of the amount of any fee paid by the other party which has not been remitted by the Lord Chancellor.

56. The relevant sections of the Tribunals courts and Enforcement Act 2007 states: Section 29 Costs or expenses (1) The costs of and incidental to— (a) all proceedings in the First-tier Tribunal, and (b) all proceedings in the Upper Tribunal, shall be in the discretion of the Tribunal in which the proceedings take place. (2) The relevant Tribunal shall have full power to determine by whom and to what extent the costs are to be paid. (3) Subsections (1) and (2) have effect subject to Tribunal Procedure Rules. (4) In any proceedings mentioned in subsection (1), the relevant Tribunal may— (a) disallow, or (b) (as the case may be) order the legal or other representative concerned to meet, the whole of any wasted costs or such part of them as may be determined in accordance with Tribunal Procedure Rules. (5) In subsection (4) “wasted costs” means any costs incurred by a party— (a) as a result of any improper, unreasonable or negligent act or omission on the part of any legal or other representative or any employee of such a representative, or (b) which, in the [NAME_146] of any such act or omission occurring after they were incurred, the relevant Tribunal considers it is unreasonable to expect that party to pay. (6) In this section “legal or other representative”, in relation to a party to proceedings, means any person exercising a right of audience or right to conduct the proceedings on his behalf.

Appendix 3 – Rights of Appeal

2. The application for permission to appeal must arrive at the Regional office within 28 days after the Tribunal sends written reasons for the decision to the person making the application.

3. If the application is not made within the 28 day time limit, such application must include a request for an extension of time and the reason for not complying with the 28 day time limit; the Tribunal will then look at such reason(s) and decide whether to allow the application for permission to appeal to proceed despite not being within the time limit.

14