Leeds Employment Tribunal Rejects Discrimination Case Against an Online Retailer

OUTCOME: Dismissed

Case No: 6000108/2022 & 6003494/2024 10.2 Judgment - rule 61

March 2017

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Claimant: [redacted]

Respondent: [redacted] Leeds

On: 30 March-2 April and 7-9 April 2026

Before: Employment Judge Maidment

Representation Claimant: [redacted] Respondent: [redacted]

JUDGMENT as to costs having been sent to the parties on 10 April 2026 summary reasons are provided as set out below:

SUMMARY REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AS TO COSTS

1. Pursuant to Rule 74 of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024, the tribunal must consider making a costs order where it considers that a party has acted unreasonably in either the bringing of proceedings or part of them. Pursuant to Rule 40(7) relating to deposit orders, if an allegation does not succeed for substantially the reasons given in a deposit order in respect of that allegation, the [APPELLANT] paying a deposit must be treated as having acted unreasonably in pursuing that specific allegation for the purposes of Rule 74 unless the contrary is shown.

2. The respondent’s application related to the claimant’s first claim and the pursuit of a complaint of unauthorised deductions from wages in the second claim. The tribunal did not consider that the wages claim was materially causative of additional costs for the respondent.

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3. The tribunal concludes that the claimant had acted unreasonably in pursuing the deposited claims in the first claim. They have all been found to have been brought outside the applicable time limit in circumstances where it was not just and equitable to extend time. That is the reason why they were subject to a deposit order. It had also been concluded that, even if the claimant succeeded in an allegation of discrimination which was recognised as having been brought “in time”, that would not assist the claims in respect of acts earlier in time. There was little reasonable prospect of them being shown to have been part of conduct extending over a period. The claimant believed, contrary to the reasons for the costs order made by Employment Judge James, that he would be able to show a linkage between the acts he complained of and/or that he had a good reason for any delay. The claimant did have a rationale for still believing he could succeed in those claims, but that is considered by the tribunal to be an unreasonable disregard of what he had been told by Employment Judge James. Indeed, the earlier claims were of a quite different nature, distant in time and involving different alleged perpetrators. The pursuit of these claims from the point the deposit orders were explained to the claimant, up to and during the final hearing, was unreasonable.

4. The tribunal still has a discretion whether or not to make an award of costs. It considers that it is appropriate to exercise its discretion in this case. The tribunal recognises that costs do not necessarily flow from the threshold for making an award having been met. The tribunal’s discretion is a wide one. Costs in employment tribunal proceedings are the exception rather than the rule. It is recognised that the claimant has been unrepresented throughout the proceedings and ought reasonably to be afforded some leeway in terms of how he might be criticised for pursuing these claims. However, the claimant has had it explained to him the significant difficulty in terms of the delay in pursuing the deposited individual claims and the difficulty he would face in linking up the historic acts complained of with the final act which was indisputably in time on its own. The claimant’s complaint in respect of this final act failed, but even if it had succeeded, there never been any reasonable prospect of the claimant showing how it was part of a continuing state of affairs. The claimant has, on no reasonable grounds, thought that he knew better and has proceeded despite the warnings given to him as to costs if he chose a pay the deposits ordered. It is appropriate for the tribunal to exercise its discretion in favour of making an order for costs.

5. The tribunal has assessed the costs of the respondent from the point of the deposit orders being made to the end of the final hearing as being in the sum of around £30,000. Those costs are further assessed as reasonably incurred. It considers that around half of those costs arise out of the

March 2017

deposited claims giving a potential of an order for costs in the sum of £15,000.

6. The claimant has, since leaving the respondent, been able to obtain agency work involving undertaking deliveries for a [COMPANY] earning typically up to around £1,000 per month for two or three shifts of work each week. He has not been able to undertake any shifts during his attendance at this tribunal hearing. In the last month he had only worked 1 shift and was not sure as to what shifts would be available in the future. There is no reason to conclude that the claimant, who is fit, intelligent and articulate will not be able to obtain future work. Otherwise, he is in receipt of universal credit of around £400 per month. He told the tribunal that he is behind on his bills, in debt in respect of his council tax and has no savings. He owns a house with a value of around £120,000 subject to a mortgage of around £70,000 costing £400 per month. The claimant is now divorced and, whilst still living in the matrimonial home, anticipates having to move out and rent alternative accommodation once financial issues between him and his ex- wife have been finalised through the family courts. The claimant has young children and considers it likely that his wife will remain in the home as part of any financial settlement.

7. Taking the claimant’s means into account and the tribunal finding that the claimant would be in substantial difficulty in paying a significant award of costs to the respondent, the tribunal considers an award of costs in the sum of £2,500 to be appropriate. A lack of ability to pay is not an absolute bar to the making of an award of costs. It is a factor to be taken into account in the tribunal’s assessment of an appropriate amount. The claimant may not be able to satisfy this award immediately, but may realistically be able to do so, for example, by staged payments over a period of time or if he gains access to other funds. An award in this sum recognises that there is a reasonable prospect of the claimant’s financial circumstances changing for the better.

Employment Judge Maidment

Date 6 May 2026

FOR THE TRIBUNAL OFFICE

Notes

March 2017

Full written reasons will not be provided unless a written request is presented by either party within 14 days of the sending of these written summary reasons.

Public access to employment tribunal decisions

Judgments (apart from judgments under rule 51) and reasons for the judgments (other than summary reasons) are published, in full, online at www.gov.uk/employment-tribunal-decisions shortly after a copy has been sent to the claimant(s) and respondent(s) in a case.

Recording and Transcription

Please note that if a Tribunal hearing has been recorded you may request a transcript of the recording, for which a charge may be payable. If a transcript is produced it will not include any oral judgment or reasons given at the hearing. The transcript will not be checked, approved or verified by a judge. There is more information in the joint Presidential Practice Direction on the Recording and Transcription of Hearings, and accompanying Guidance, which can be found here:

https://www.judiciary.uk/guidance-and-resources/employment-rules-and-legislation-practice- directions/

March 2017

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Claimant: [redacted]

Respondent: [redacted] Leeds

On: 30 March-2 April and 7-9 April 2026

Before: Employment Judge Maidment

Representation Claimant: [redacted] Respondent: [redacted]

JUDGMENT as to liability having been sent to the parties on 10 April 2026 summary reasons are provided as set out below:

SUMMARY REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AS TO LIABILITY

1. The first tribunal claim of the claimant, containing complaints of direct race and sex discrimination and harassment related to race, was submitted on 15 December 2022 after a period of ACAS early conciliation from 10 October – 21 November 2022. As a consequence, a complaint about any act arising prior to 11 July 2022 has been submitted outside the applicable time limit.

2. The only claim in time, when viewed in isolation, is that relating to Ms [APPELLANT] questioning the claimant’s relationship with his sister-in-law and confronting his brother and sister-in-law in relation to the use of the claimant’s colleague

March 2017

discount card on 30 October 2022. That is said to be an act of direct sex and race discrimination and harassment related to race.

3. When Ms [APPELLANT] approached the claimant’s brother and sister-in-law, she was unaware that it was the claimant who had swiped his colleague discount card. She was only aware that a colleague had been seen swiping a discount card at a till before leaving the store. What had been reported to [NAME] was considered by her (accurately) to be a clear breach of the discount card policy.

4. Either the colleague could use the discount for goods he was purchasing himself or the card could be used by a [NAME], who lived with him, in which case he would not need to swipe his own discount card as the [NAME] would have their own.

5. Ms [APPELLANT] approached the claimant’s brother and the female, his wife, who was with him, as she wanted to ascertain, from their receipt, which colleague had used his discount card.

6. That was the sole reason for her approach. It was in no sense whatsoever related to the claimant’s brother’s race or the ethnicity of his brother’s wife. Similarly, she then spoke to the claimant in the context of her belief that he was guilty of misusing his colleague discount card. She accepts that she shouted at him, but this was in the context of a very hostile reaction she had received from the claimant’s brother and the claimant’s own indignant response to her challenge – a response which was wholly unjustified given the legitimacy of it. Her actions were tainted in no sense whatsoever by any consideration or relation to the claimant’s race or sex. All claims of direct discrimination and race-related harassment in respect of this incident must fail.

7. The claimant’s remaining allegations involve a delay to around August 2020 in the claimant being provided with his discount card and a termination of employment in July 2020. As stand-alone claims, his tribunal complaint has been brought almost 2 years out of time.

8. There are then complaints all concerning his shift allocations from August 2020 to January 2021. The most recent of these remaining complaints is therefore some 18 months out of time. The majority of the allegations suggest, on the claimant’s case, less favourable treatment by the then store manager Mr [NAME]. There is an allegation that Ms [APPELLANT] refused to allow the claimant to work Wednesdays on 12 January 2021, but Ms

March 2017

[NAME] was not responsible for work allocations and acted simply as a messenger.

9. The tribunal concludes that Mr [APPELLANT], the claimant’s immediate line manager, was in fact responsible for selecting the claimant for the termination of his temporary contract and for the allocation of hours between individual colleagues. Mr [NAME] involvement was in the higher-level allocation of overall staff hours between departments in the store. He was not unaware of the claimant’s working patterns, but was not the primary decision maker in terms of the claimant’s work allocation.

10. Even had the allegation regarding Ms [NAME] conduct on 30 October 2022 been well-founded, there was no conduct extending over a period of time which would have allowed the earlier acts complained of to have been brought within the applicable time limits. The events of 30 October 2022 were quite distinct and separate from the earlier matters complained of with no suggestion (and certainly no evidence) of a continuing state of affairs in the sense of any individual or individuals conspiring to ill-treat the claimant.

11. The claimant has not alleged any discriminatory conduct between early 2021 and October 2022 relating to his shift patterns. The termination of the claimant’s temporary contract and the delay in providing him with a discount card are, again, of a completely different character to the alleged misuse of the discount card on 30 October 2022 and individually to each of the other allegations.

12. Time can be extended to give the tribunal jurisdiction to determine these other allegations if just and equitable to do so. The claimant has raised, as the primary reason for his delay, the time it took to conclude his grievance. The claimant’s decision to pursue his complaint through the respondent’s internal procedures is a factor to consider in the balance involved in the exercise of the tribunal’s discretion.

13. There was, however, no fault on the part of the respondent in the length of time the grievance took to resolve. The grievance was first raised on 19 May 2021 with the claimant receiving an outcome on 16 July. He did not appeal the grievance outcome until 30 May 2022 providing grounds of appeal only on 9 June 2022. He received his appeal outcome at the appeal meeting on 19 August 2022 and in writing by letter of the subsequent day. The tribunal notes that there is no complaint in these proceedings regarding the respondent’s handling of the grievances. The claimant had no basis for believing during the period between his grievance and grievance appeal

March 2017

that there was going to be any further and different consideration or determination of his grievances.

14. The claimant did have periods of sickness absence, but did not suffer from any medical impairment which prevented him from raising an earlier tribunal claim. He took a career break for a number of reasons unrelated to his health. If he was able to pursue his grievance and grievance appeal as he did, he could, if he had wished, have brought an employment tribunal complaint.

15. The claimant had access from an early stage to trade union advice and had made early contact with ACAS. The claimant said that he was seeking legal advice from 4 January 2021. He felt he had been discriminated against at this time. He told Ms [NAME] of HR in February 2021 that he had already sought legal advice. The claimant was a GMB union member had was represented by the union in meetings in early 2021. He had been alerted then to the fact that some of his claims were too far in the past for the GMB to become involved in taking them forward. This should reasonably have put the claimant on notice that time limits applied to the bringing of tribunal claims and this might be something he ought to look into further. When he spoke to ACAS in early 2022 it was about his attendance at a meeting, but in circumstances where it was his choice not to raise his other concerns.

16. The claimant told his GMB representative that he had some legal knowledge. He could have conducted his own research both as to his option to bring his complaints to an employment tribunal and as to relevant time limits. The claimant is intelligent, was not in ignorance of employment tribunals or his ability to complain if he believed he had been discriminated against. He was in a position to access all relevant information to assist him in bringing a claim. At no stage did the respondent mislead him.

17. In terms of the balance of prejudice, clearly the claimant is prejudiced if he cannot pursue his complaints. On the other hand, the historic nature of the complaints is suggestive of the claimant having had no intention to bring a claim to the employment tribunal had it not been for the challenge made by Ms [NAME] regarding his use of the discount card.

18. The prejudice to the respondent is in having to respond to and defend claims which it would otherwise not have to. More fundamental, however, in this case is the prejudice which has in fact been caused to the respondent arising out of the delay. The tribunal considers the prejudice in terms of the delay in bringing the claim in December 2022 rather than the passage of time in this matter coming to a final hearing. Mr [NAME] left his employment

March 2017

only after proceedings had been commenced and after he had been interviewed as part of the claimant’s grievance appeal. Ms [APPELLANT], however, left around five years ago and certainly, had the claimant presented his claim when he told her in early 2021 that he was going to seek legal advice, the respondent would have been in a better position to have defended many of the allegations and not just those in which she was said by the claimant to have been directly involved.

19. Whilst grievances were raised, the level of scrutiny in an internal grievance is not comparable with that to which the employer is subjected through an employment tribunal process. Mr [NAME] was faced with giving evidence significantly after the event in respect of matters which would have been entirely unmemorable to him at the time they occurred given the number of colleagues he was responsible for and how he delegated tasks. Documentary evidence was not always available in circumstances where resource documents are overridden each quarter with earlier versions not retained. He was forced into a position when cross-examined of not being able to recall conversations which he admitted may or may not have occurred. Such conversations were about matters of detail as to what shifts the claimant may have been offered or potentially assigned to at a particular point in time some years previously.

20. All of the claimant’s remaining complaints in his first claim therefore were brought out of time in circumstances where it would not be just and equitable to extend time. The prejudice of the respondent having to defend late claims outweighs that suffered by the claimant. The claims must, therefore, fail by reason of the tribunal having no jurisdiction to determine them.

21. The tribunal has nevertheless heard much evidence about the allegations and is in a position to make determinations on them.

22. The claimant did suffer a detriment in the delay in the provision to him of his discount card. He has shown no facts, however, from which the tribunal could reasonably conclude that this was in any sense whatsoever related to race or sex. There is no true comparator the claimant can rely upon. On the balance of probabilities, the respondent having no reason to delay the provision of the card, the delay was because of the claimant moving stores prior to the discount card being issued to his first place of work. The evidence is of discount cards being generated automatically after 12 weeks’ service and sent to the workplace. There is no evidence of any particular individual having a role in the production of the card and being responsible for the delay, whether arising out of any mistake, poor administration, but certainly not arising out of the claimant’s race or sex.

March 2017

23. The claimant was dismissed, prior to a reinstatement, which again amounts to a detriment. The tribunal has not heard from Ms [APPELLANT] as to the reason for the claimant’s reinstatement, but the evidence is of the claimant being still regarded as a temporary member of staff in circumstances of a downturn in work post the peak Covid period and the respondent having a practice of letting temporary staff go before permanent employees and, then, on the basis of the respondent’s evaluation of each temporary worker’s performance. There is no contradiction in that as a reason for the claimant’s termination. The evidence is of him being selected by Mr [APPELLANT] and of the claimant surviving longer than 2 white male temporary workers and one white female. The claimant’s dismissal was in no sense whatsoever because of his race or sex.

24. The remaining allegations relate to the allocation of shifts. Mr [NAME], again, was the manager responsible for the individual allocation of shifts.

25. There were periods where the claimant was not given his preferred shift pattern, working nights on Sundays, Mondays and Tuesdays, after August 2021. Clearly, it was detrimental not to be given those shifts as they did not involve a weekend shift, as defined, and allowed the working of 3 consecutive shifts. Saying that, allowing any employee not to work at least one weekend shift was contrary to the respondent’s standard policy.

26. The claimant has, however, shown no facts from which the tribunal could reasonably conclude that race or sex was the reason to any extent whatsoever, as opposed to the respondent simply allocating available and fluctuating hours between a group of colleagues. The claimant has made assertions regarding temporary workers being given consecutive shifts without the need to work more than one weekend shift, but the tribunal has only the claimant’s distant observances as evidence. Such temporary workers had often as few as one single designated shift with other shifts picked up dependent on the amount of work available. A busy period in store might well have involved a temporary worker working a number of consecutive shifts.

27. Similarly, there are no facts from which the tribunal could reasonably conclude less favourable treatment because of race or sex in Mr [APPELLANT] giving the claimant non-consecutive shifts in August, October and December 2020 and February and March 2021.

28. The claimant’s complaint that his shifts were changed 3 times a year, whilst all other colleagues continued to work on the same shifts, is a mere

March 2017

assertion without identification of the specific shift changes complained of or the exact period his complaint relates to. The tribunal has noted a number of colleagues whose shifts altered over time and there are no facts shown from which an inference of discrimination because of race or sex could reasonably be made. The tribunal observes that around 70% of the West Bradford store’s workforce is of Asian ethnicity. There is no evidence of any disparity of treatment which might be related to a colleague’s race.

29. On 31 December 2020, the claimant was told to work Thursday, Friday and Saturday nights. The evidence is of that working pattern having been proposed arising out of the claimant seeking to work 3 consecutive shifts. At least Mr [APPELLANT] and Ms [APPELLANT] worked 2 weekend shifts and the claimant’s clearer objection to working on weekends came afterwards. Occupational health recommendations had been in respect of allocating consecutive shifts only. The claimant was subsequently then offered alternative options. Again, no facts have been shown from which the tribunal could conclude less favourable treatment because of race or sex.

30. The claimant alleges that on 12 January 2021, Ms [APPELLANT] refused to allow the claimant to work Wednesdays and told him that only 6 colleagues were required to work that night shift. However, other colleagues had been allocated Wednesday shifts after the claimant had been offered to work the three consecutive shifts from Thursday – Saturday. The claimant was told that shift allocations would be reviewed quarterly.

31. The claimant has made a distinct and separate allegation that in August 2020, as an act of direct sex discrimination, the respondent failed to give the claimant a role involving light duties similar to that given to Ms [NAME]. At that point in time, she had been assigned to a [NAME] by a supervisor at a level below Mr [APPELLANT]. The claimant had never made a request to work on this aisle. Even if it did involve lighter duties, there is no evidence that Ms [APPELLANT] was preferred to the claimant as someone who could work shifts on that aisle because of her sex.

32. These discrimination complaints would have failed regardless of time limits.

33. The tribunal then turns to the second tribunal complaint. The tribunal concludes that the claimant was dismissed arising out of the respondent’s conclusion that he had been guilty of serious misuse of colleague discounts with an intention to defraud the respondent.

34. His dismissal was not in any sense whatsoever related to his race. There are no facts from which the tribunal could reasonably reach that conclusion.

March 2017

The commencement and continuance of disciplinary proceedings up to the point of dismissal was solely because the respondent believed that the claimant might and ultimately was responsible for the misuse of its discount scheme.

35. Similarly, the claimant was not dismissed, as an act of victimisation, because of his earlier tribunal complaint. The reason for dismissal was solely Mr [NAME] belief in his gross misconduct. When he made his decision, Mr [APPELLANT] was unaware of the claimant’s tribunal complaint or that he had assisted colleagues to raise issues of alleged acts of race discrimination.

36. Was this conclusion then reached on reasonable grounds and after a reasonable investigation? Mr [APPELLANT] and the security team certainly interrogated the claimant’s transactions over the festive discount periods and, indeed, looked for similar patterns of behaviour amongst other colleagues at the store.

37. It was not unreasonable not to alert the claimant on the first suspicion that he was misusing the discount scheme. There was no deliberate delay in investigation. A suspicion had arisen which was referred to the [NAME] and, in the meantime, the claimant’s use of the discount voucher continued as before. There was no suggestion from the claimant of any involvement by his colleague, [APPELLANT], which might have been exculpatory of the claimant’s own conduct. It was not unreasonable not to further investigate the claimant’s allegation of a setup which was made in vague terms in circumstances where the claimant’s own evidence was of his discovery of the voucher and use of it without the assistance or advice of anyone else. The colleagues who initially reported their suspicions of the claimant were not suggested to be part of any conspiracy and there was no evidence of Ms [APPELLANT] involvement at all.

38. The claimant did not ultimately deny that he had used the voucher in a manner which he ultimately accepted he should not have. He recognised that he had gained a discount beyond the maximum allowed. The key determination for the respondent was whether the claimant possessed an intention to defraud the respondent.

39. Mr [APPELLANT] reasonably did not believe that the claimant had not seen the clear banner on the voucher the claimant had used saying that it was for use when there was no discount card present and was for a discount of 20% only. He reasonably concluded that the claimant knew that it was not for use with the colleague discount card. He was reasonable in concluding that

March 2017

the claimant had chosen this particular voucher to use and not other vouchers, which provided for a lesser discount. It was reasonable to believe that the claimant had made a conscious choice aware of what he was entitled to. He was not unreasonable in concluding that the claimant had deliberately cropped the voucher to remove the headline banner when screenshotting it. He further reasonably concluded that there was ample information available and visible to the claimant that the vouchers were not to be used by colleagues themselves. He reasonably considered there to be support for that conclusion in the claimant only gaining a 20% (rather than a 30%) discount when he went through the main tills.

40. The respondent then operated a fair disciplinary and appeal procedure where the claimant had a full opportunity to state his case and where all the available evidence had been disclosed to him and was available to consider at the hearings. Mr [NAME] was clear that the Scottish discount voucher in the investigation pack was not the one which the claimant could have used. The wording was not materially different from the voucher which the claimant had used, but at the disciplinary hearing the voucher which he agreed he had screenshotted was accessed and discussed. The claimant was able to attend all meetings in terms of his health. He was given the right to be accompanied and was fully aware of the allegations and that they may be viewed as amounting to gross misconduct potentially resulting in his dismissal. There was no failure to comply with the ACAS code of practice on disciplinary procedures.

41. Having formed that reasonable belief, dismissal in this case was certainly within the band of reasonable responses open to an employer.

42. There was no inconsistency of treatment in that there was no other employee exhibiting a pattern of behaviour with the discount vouchers similar to that of the claimant. Had there been, then any such employee would also have been dismissed. The fact that the respondent’s systems were not set up to prevent the obtaining of an effective double discount was not exculpatory of the claimant’s actions.

43. On the respondent’s reasonable conclusions, the claimant’s actions amounted to a breach of trust. Mr [APPELLANT] reasonably concluded that he had acted dishonestly and that he might do so again. Whilst the claimant had apologised, this was without any recognition of misconduct and in circumstances where he believed that he was not personally responsible for what had occurred. The claimant was fairly dismissed.

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44. The tribunal must then determine for itself whether, on the balance of probabilities, the claimant was guilty of an act of gross misconduct. The tribunal considers Mr [NAME] analysis of the evidence to be fundamentally sound. The claimant’s evidence before the tribunal lacked consistency. The tribunal considers that the claimant was well aware that any discount event was subject to strict rules, as was the use of his colleague discount card. The claimant had misused his discount card in October 2022 when he sought to apply it to his brother’s shopping. His suggestion that he thought the respondent to be still applying a Covid “[NAME]” discount scheme, which had endured for a single week in 2020, was not credible. He was certainly aware, arising out of that incident, of there being limits to how a discount card could be used. It is difficult not to conclude that he had been abusing the discount scheme in the period up to that incident. The tribunal concludes that he was guilty of further abuse in respect of the 2024 festive period. Such abuse must be viewed as gross misconduct entitling the respondent to terminate the claimant’s contract without notice. The claimant’s claim of wrongful dismissal fails.

45. The claimant’s complaint in respect of unpaid sick pay, holiday pay and wages arising during the period from November 2023 to February 2024, up to and including the termination of his employment, must also fail, the claimant having shown no evidence of any outstanding amounts due to him.

Employment Judge Maidment

Date 6 May 2026

Case Number: 6000108/2022 6003494/2024

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Claimant: [redacted]

Respondent: [redacted]

Hull (by video) On: 8 September 2025

Before:

Employment Judge Miller

Representation Claimant: [redacted]

Respondent: [redacted]

JUDGMENT

1. The respondent’s application for costs is successful. The claimant shall pay the respondent the sum of £500.

2. Time for payment of the award is extended under rule 64 until 8 May 2026.

Approved by:

Employment Judge Miller

8 September 2025

JUDGMENT SENT TO THE PARTIES ON

................................................................

................................................................ FOR THE TRIBUNAL OFFICE

Notes Reasons for the judgment having been given orally at the hearing, written reasons will not be

provided unless a request was made by either party at the hearing or a written request is presented by either party within 14 days of the sending of this written record of the decision. If written reasons are provided they will be placed online. All judgments (apart from judgments under Rule 51) and any written reasons for the judgments are published, in full, online at https://www.gov.uk/employment-tribunal-decisions shortly after a copy has been sent to the claimants and respondents. If a Tribunal hearing has been recorded, you may request a transcript of the recording. Unless there are exceptional circumstances, you will have to pay for it. If a transcript is produced it will not include any oral judgment or reasons given at the hearing. The transcript will not be checked, approved or verified by a judge. There is more information in the joint Presidential Practice Direction on the Recording and Transcription of Hearings and accompanying Guidance, which can be found here:

www.judiciary.uk/guidance-and-resources/employment-rules-and-legislation-practice-directions/

March 2017

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Claimant: [redacted]

Respondent: [redacted] Leeds

On: 30 March-2 April and 7-9 April 2026

Before: Employment Judge Maidment

Representation Claimant: [redacted] Respondent: [redacted]

JUDGMENT

The claimant’s complaints of unfair dismissal, direct discrimination because of sex and race, race-related harassment, victimisation, unauthorised deductions from wages and seeking damages for breach of contract fail and are dismissed.

Employment Judge Maidment

Date 9 April 2026

March 2017

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Claimant: [redacted]

Respondent: [redacted] Leeds

On: 30 March-2 April and 7-9 April 2026

Before: Employment Judge Maidment

Representation Claimant: [redacted] Respondent: [redacted]

JUDGMENT AS TO COSTS

The claimant is ordered to pay to the respondent the sum of £2,500 in respect of its costs, such sum being inclusive of the payment of £30 he has made to the tribunal pursuant to deposit orders made, which the tribunal shall refund to the respondent.

Employment Judge Maidment

Date 9 April 2026

March 2017

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Claimant: [redacted]

Respondent: [redacted] RECONSIDERATION

The claimant’s application for a reconsideration of the Tribunal’s Judgment as to costs sent to the parties on 10 April 2026 is refused as there is no reasonable prospect of the Judgment being varied or revoked.

REASONS

The claimant in his application is seeking to re-argue points which were fully argued at the final hearing and which the tribunal has determined.

It was not determined that the claimant had acted vexatiously. The fact that the claimant’s claims were allowed to proceed does not show that the claimant was not acting unreasonably. They were only allowed to proceed, conditional on his payment of a deposit in circumstances where they had been considered to have little reasonable prospect of success. Whilst issues relating to time limits may be fact sensitive, the deposits were ordered, taking the claimant’s case at its highest.

The claimant was afforded an opportunity in an adjournment to consider the respondent’s schedule of costs. He did not seek a further adjournment. In the context of the tribunal taking the claimant’s means into account, he has suffered no prejudice. The tribunal substantially reduced any potential order for costs taking into account his means – a sum of £2500 was awarded rather than the £15,000 considered to flow from the claimant’s pursuance of the deposited claims from the date the deposits were determined. The tribunal has already explained the extent to which the claimant’s means were taken into account in making the award.

Employment Judge Maidment

March 2017

Date 5 May 2026

JUDGMENT SENT TO THE PARTIES ON