Race Discrimination Complaint Against an Online Retailer Dismissed by Employment Tribunal

OUTCOME: [NAME]: 6016567/2024

- 1 -

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Claimant: [redacted]

Respondent: [redacted]

London East Employment Tribunal

On:

6 & 7 February 2026

(Part of PM on 7 February 2026 in chambers)

Before:

Employment Judge B Beyzade

Representation

For the Claimant: [redacted]

In person For the Respondent: [redacted]

Judgment having been issued to parties on 24 February 2026, written reasons are provided below pursuant to Rule 60(4D)(b) of The Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024 (as amended)

REASONS Introduction

1. The claimant presented an ET1 Form on 28 October 2024. Within that ET1 Form he indicated that he was bringing claims of [NAME] discrimination, whistleblowing, “breach of contract, discrimination, [and] unauthorised deduction’s wages”. He also attached a four-page internal grievance which included narrative complaints about a redundancy process conducted earlier in 2024. Although the ET1 made reference to that redundancy process, it did not articulate any statutory complaint under sections 188– 192 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 (“TULRCA”). Whether any such complaint was before the Tribunal is addressed below.

[NAME]: 6016567/2024

- 2 - 2. At a Preliminary Hearing on 24 March 2025 Employment Judge Gardiner provisionally identified two complaints: first, a complaint of direct [NAME] discrimination arising from an alleged delay in providing the claimant’s 20-year long-service award; and secondly, a complaint that the respondent had failed to consult with the claimant during the redundancy process. The claimant was directed to clarify whether he wished to pursue further issues, including those referred to in his lengthy written material. Parties were also provided until 25 April 2025 to write to the Tribunal to advise whether any part of the List of Issues was wrong or incomplete.

3. Following written representations from the respondent, who submitted that the ET1 did not contain a TULRCA complaint, the claimant contended that such a complaint was included and, alternatively, applied to amend his claim to add one. He also applied to add a complaint of indirect [NAME] discrimination.

4. On 1 August 2025 Employment Judge Gardiner ruled that the ET1 did not contain any complaint under sections 188–192 TULRCA and refused permission to amend to add such a complaint. He also refused permission to amend to add a complaint of indirect [NAME] discrimination. All other proposed amendments were refused.

Accordingly, the only complaint before the Tribunal at this Final Hearing is a complaint of direct [NAME] discrimination under section 13 of the Equality Act 2010 concerning the failure to issue the claimant’s long-service award when it fell due.

5. The Final Hearing took place on 05 and 06 February 2026 at the [COMPANY] (in person). I sat alone as the Employment Judge.

6. The claimant appeared in person. The respondent was represented by counsel, [RESPONDENT]. Two observers were present on the first day only; no objections were raised to their attendance.

7. I invited any requests for [NAME] adjustments. No [NAME] adjustments were sought by either party.

8. At the outset of proceedings, I confirmed that the hearing was listed to determine both liability and remedy. Parties agreed that the issues relating to both liability and remedy if appropriate shall be determined at this hearing, save that any losses relating to personal injury shall, if appropriate, be determined at a separate hearing.

9. The Tribunal had before it an agreed hearing [NAME] of 114 pages and three written witness statements. The claimant confirmed he had received the [NAME]. Parties confirmed that this was the agreed [NAME]. A short, agreed reading list was identified, and I undertook judicial reading at the start of the hearing.

10. Following representations from both parties I directed that page 115, comprising a single page from the respondent’s Handbook provided by the claimant by email sent to the Tribunal on the morning of the first day of the

[NAME]: 6016567/2024

- 3 - hearing be included in the file of documents. This was from Version 6 of the Handbook, although [NAME] [NAME] indicated that the newer version, Version 7 was the relevant Handbook for the purposes of the matters relating to the claimant’s claim.

11. An agreed timetable was adopted.

12. Both parties co-operated throughout in accordance with the overriding objective, ensuring that the hearing could be completed in the time allocated.

13. During preliminary discussions on the morning of 05 February 2026, I reviewed with the claimant and the [NAME] the List of Issues, in detail. I directed the [NAME] to file and serve the final amended List of Issues by 2.00pm on the same day. The List of Issues was filed and approved by the Tribunal, following which copies were provided to the parties. The Tribunal recorded that the List of Issues that require to be investigated and determined by the Tribunal were as follows, parties being in agreement with these (liability issues only set out below):

“1. Time limits

1.1 Given the date the claim form was presented and the dates of early conciliation, any complaint about something that happened before 18 May 2024 may not have been brought in time.

1.2 Were the discrimination complaints made within the time limit in section 123 of the Equality Act 2010? The Tribunal will decide:

1.2.1 Was the claim made to the Tribunal within three months (plus early conciliation extension) of the act to which the complaint relates?

1.2.2 If not, was there conduct extending over a period?

1.2.3 If so, was the claim made to the Tribunal within three months (plus early conciliation extension) of the end of that period?

1.2.4 If not, were the claims made within a further period that the Tribunal thinks is just and equitable? The Tribunal will decide:

1.2.4.1 Why were the complaints not made to the Tribunal in time? 1.2.4.2 In any event, is it just and equitable in all the circumstances to extend time?

2. [NAME] discrimination (Equality Act 2010 section 13)

2.1 The claimant identifies his ethnicity as Afro-Caribbean and compares the way he was treated with the way that those who were not Afro Caribbean were treated.

[NAME]: 6016567/2024

- 4 -

2.2 The Claimant relies on the following in terms of his complaints of direct discrimination:

2.2.1 Delay in making a service award to the claimant in [NAME] of his 20 years continuous employment with the respondent or its predecessors (being a voucher for £200 together with an achievement award certification). This delay occurred from the twentieth anniversary of his service on 6 May 2023 to about Christmas 2024 and was still ongoing at the time the proceedings were issued.

2.2.2 The respondent accepts that the alleged conduct at 2.2.1 took place.

2.3 Was that less favourable treatment?

The Respondent accepts that not paying someone an award that due was less favourable treatment on its face in that it amounts to a detriment. The Tribunal will decide whether the claimant was treated worse than someone else was treated. There must be no material difference between their circumstances and the claimant’s. If there was nobody in the same circumstances as the claimant, the Tribunal will decide whether they were treated worse than someone else would have been treated.

The claimant says they were treated worse than [APPELLANT] and [NAME] (incorrect spelling).

2.4 If so, was it because of [NAME]?

2.5 The Respondent accepts that the alleged conduct amounts to a detriment”

14. The claimant confirmed that the only issues for determination were those directed by Employment Judge Gardiner namely time limits, the allegation of direct [NAME] discrimination concerning the long-service award, and remedy (if appropriate). No other issues or complaints remained before the Tribunal.

15. The claimant confirmed that he relied solely upon the allegation that the respondent treated him less favourably by failing to provide his 20-year long-service award when it fell due. The respondent accepted that the award was not issued at that time and that this amounted to a detriment on its face.

16. The claimant gave oral evidence and adopted his written witness statement. The respondent called [NAME] [RESPONDENT] [NAME] ([NAME] [NAME] Director) and [NAME] [NAME] ([NAME] and [NAME]), who each adopted their written witness statements and gave oral evidence. All witnesses were questioned by the opposing party and by the Tribunal.

[NAME]: 6016567/2024

- 5 - 17. At the conclusion of the evidence, on the morning of 06 February 2026 and during the afternoon, both parties made oral submissions. Deliberations took place in private in the early afternoon of 06 February 2026. I gave the Tribunal’s judgment orally later that afternoon.

18. I record that both parties worked constructively and efficiently throughout the hearing in accordance with the overriding objective (Rule 3), for which the Tribunal is grateful.

Findings of fact

19. On the documents and oral evidence presented the Tribunal makes the following essential findings of fact restricted to those necessary to determine the agreed List of Issues:

Introduction

20. The claimant, [APPELLANT], is employed by the respondent as a Security Officer at [NAME], [ADDRESS]. His employment is continuous from 6 May 2003, preserved through successive TUPE transfers. He began his employment with [NAME], transferred in 2004 to [NAME], then in 2013 to [NAME], and subsequently transferred to the respondent in 2018, with his continuity of employment maintained throughout.

21. The claimant identifies his [NAME] as Afro-Caribbean and relies upon [NAME] as his protected characteristic for the purposes of his claim under section 13 of the Equality Act 2010.

22. The respondent, a [COMPANY] that provides security personnel across a substantial workforce, operates a long-service [NAME] scheme under which a 20-year service milestone attracts a [NAME] award (a £200 voucher administered via the “[NAME]” together with [NAME] materials).

23. Long-service awards are administered centrally and intended to operate automatically through scheduled monthly reports feeding the [NAME] process, such that employees reaching the relevant milestone are ordinarily identified and provided with the award without the need for any application.

24. The claimant’s 20-year long-service anniversary fell on 6 May 2023. I find as a fact that no long-service award was issued to him at or around that date. No award was provided to him during 2023 or during the first nine months of 2024. The matter was only acted upon in October 2024, during the claimant’s grievance process, and the award was uploaded and dispatched later in 2024. The claimant advises that he did not actually receive the award until December 2024.

25. The omission occurred because the claimant’s long-service milestone was not captured in the respondent’s internal reporting processes, resulting in no award being generated or issued when due. The later action taken in

[NAME]: 6016567/2024

- 6 - October–December 2024 was the first time the respondent processed the claimant’s long-service entitlement.

Redundancy consultation background in 2024 (context to grievance)

26. In June–July 2024, the site where the claimant worked underwent a restructuring following changes in client occupancy. Group consultations were held on 25 June 2024; emails were sent to staff on 26–27 June 2024; and a first individual consultation for [NAME] [APPELLANT] took place on 11 July 2024 (the claimant was on annual leave from 10–28 June 2024). The redundancy process concluded without the claimant being made redundant after two colleagues took voluntary redundancy.

[NAME]’s issue raised relating to long service award 27. I find that by November 2023 the respondent had already received at least one formal query from [NAME] concerning a missing long-service award ([NAME] p.55). That employee reported not having received their award when due. This establishes that such issues were occurring prior to 2024 and that omissions were not confined to one isolated instance relating to the claimant.

[APPELLANT] attempts to raise the matter

28. The claimant gave evidence that he had sought to raise concerns regarding the absence of his long service award prior to 2024. However, there is no contemporaneous documentary evidence of any grievance or formal complaint in 2023, nor was any such documentation produced. The first documented and substantiated complaint concerning the long service award appears within the claimant’s written grievance submitted on or around 16 July 2024. On the balance of probabilities, I do not accept that any formal grievance concerning the long service award was lodged in 2023.

[APPELLANT] grievance

29. The claimant submitted a written grievance on or around 16 July 2024, which included complaints about the redundancy process that took place within June and July 2024, and he also made reference to a complaint that his long-service award remained outstanding. There were correspondences between the respondent and the claimant between August and October 2024 in relation to arranging a grievance hearing. There was a significant delay between the date of the receipt of the grievance and the first communication from the respondent acknowledging the same, during which time the grievance officer had a period of leave. A grievance hearing took place on 14 October 2024, and the outcome letter of 17 October 2024 upheld his complaint regarding the missing long-service award and directed that it be issued. The claimant appealed that outcome on 22 October 2024.

30. On 14 October 2024, shortly before the claimant’s grievance hearing, and having previously sent an email dated 04 October 2024 attempting to

[NAME]: 6016567/2024

- 7 - secure the claimant’s award, [NAME] [APPELLANT] emailed the Reward Team (specifically [APPELLANT[NAME]) noting that the claimant had not received his long-service award.

31. At 07:43 on 14 October 2024, [NAME] [NAME] emailed [NAME[NAME] (Reward Manager) informing her that she was dealing with a grievance relating to the claimant, stating that she could not locate any response from [COMPANY], and asking for confirmation that the claimant’s award had been added to the [NAME].

32. On 14 October 2024 at 16:47, [APPELLANT], Reward Manager responded stating that the claimant’s 20-years’ service fell in 2023, and his start date for the purposes of continuous employment was in May 2003, the Reward Team had checked the system, and no award had been uploaded in 2023, they were undertaking internal investigations to see what has happened, and she confirmed “…[NAME] will receive a long service award for his 20 years and I will confirm as soon as possible, thanks”.

33. At 16.59 on 14 October 2024 [NAME] [APPELLANT] requested that [APPELLANT] confirm when the claimant’s award had been added to the [NAME]. She also referred to having no idea why the original response from [COMPANY] had been missed by her.

34. On 16 October 2024, at 11:13, [NAME] confirmed: “…[NAME] long service award will be uploaded to [NAME] today…”, and the certificate and badge “will be sent out in the post, so he should receive this in the next few days, thanks.”

35. At 18:23 on 16 October 2024, [NAME] [NAME] emailed thanking [NAME].

Long-service award delay and subsequent action

36. Accordingly, the claimant’s long-service award was not provided in or shortly after May 2023 when due. It was addressed only after the grievance process in October 2024, with the upload and dispatch taking place thereafter (the exact date of upload is not material to this finding given the admitted delay).

37. The omission formed part of a broader data/reporting failure affecting other colleagues. The [NAME] & [NAME] ([NAME] [NAME]) became aware of missed long-service entries from November 2023, monitored queries through October 2024, and compiled a remedial dataset.

38. On 17 December 2024, [NAME] [NAME] (Lead Analyst) explained that the report used to generate long-service awards had been failing to refresh due to attempting to process an excessively large dataset. He rebuilt the report to limit it to employees within 200 days of their milestone date and deployed a new file (“Service Awards – Countdown 200.xlsx”) to ensure awards were captured reliably going forward.

[NAME]: 6016567/2024

- 8 - Respondent’s subsequent documents: dataset analysis ([NAME] p.102) and remedial steps

39. The document titled “Employee Long Service Data” at [NAME] p.102 was compiled by [NAME] [NAME] in November or December 2024 for the purpose of identifying colleagues who had not received long-service awards. The spreadsheet contains multiple rows of employees and lists, for each, their payroll number, name (redacted except for the claimant), ethnicity (where disclosed), continuous service date, intended award date and years-of-service milestone. The rows highlighted in yellow correspond to employees whose 20-year anniversaries fell in May 2023 and who had not received their long-service awards when due. There are a number of such highlighted entries, representing individuals omitted from the long-service award reporting during that period. The ethnicities recorded for those highlighted employees vary and include several different categories.

40. In addition, the spreadsheet contains white (non-highlighted) rows, representing employees who had missed long-service awards in other months or for different milestone years. Those individuals were also omitted from the automated reporting process, but their long-service anniversaries did not fall within May 2023.

41. Having considered the document in detail I make the following findings:

A. “Yellow” proxy cohort — Intended Award Date 01 May 2023 (total: 62)

I find the following numbers of employees recorded for each ethnicity within the May 2023 cohort:

1. Prefer not to say: 54.

2. Mixed/Multiple ethnic background – Any other Mixed/Multiple ethnic background: 3.

3. Asian or Asian British – Any other Asian/Asian British: 1.

4. Asian or Asian British – Pakistani: 1.

5. White – English/Welsh/Scottish/Northern Irish/British: 1.

6. Black African/Caribbean/Black British – African: 1.

7. Black African/Caribbean/Black British – Any other Black African/Caribbean/Black British: 1.

B. Non-highlighted cohort — all other intended award dates/milestones on p.102 (total: 32) 1. Prefer not to say: 16. 2. White – English/Welsh/Scottish/Northern Irish/British: 9.

[NAME]: 6016567/2024

- 9 - 3. White – Any other White background: 2. 4. Any other Ethnic group: 2. 5. Mixed/Multiple ethnic background – Any other Mixed/Multiple ethnic background: 1. 6. Black African/Caribbean/Black British – African: 1. 7. White – Irish: 1.

C. Entire p.102 sheet (yellow-proxy plus non-highlighted) (total: 94)

1. Prefer not to say: 70.

2. White – English/Welsh/Scottish/Northern Irish/British: 10.

3. Mixed/Multiple ethnic background – Any other Mixed/Multiple ethnic background: 4.

4. White – Any other White background: 2.

5. Any other Ethnic group: 2.

6. Black African/Caribbean/Black British – African: 2.

7. White – Irish: 1.

8. Asian or Asian British – Any other Asian/Asian British: 1.

9. Asian or Asian British – Pakistani: 1.

10. Black African/Caribbean/Black British – Any other Black African/Caribbean/Black British: 1.

42. I find that the omission affecting the claimant was one instance within this wider systemic failure, affecting a substantial number of employees across different ethnicities and service dates, and was not an isolated incident confined to the claimant.

ACAS Early Conciliation and presentation of the claim

43. ACAS Early Conciliation was commenced on 17 August 2024, and the Certificate was issued on 28 September 2024.

44. The claimant presented his ET1 on 28 October 2024. For the purposes of this hearing, following earlier case-management rulings, the only complaint before the Tribunal is direct [NAME] discrimination under section 13 of the Equality Act 2010 concerning the delay in issuing his 20-year long-service award. The claimant also identified actual comparators ([NAME] [APPELLANT], [NAME] [NAME], and [NAME] “[NAME]/[NAME]” [NAME]—spelling uncertain) and, in the alternative, relies upon a hypothetical [NAME]. The respondent accepts that the delayed award amounted to a detriment on its face.

[NAME]: 6016567/2024

- 10 - 45. The claimant identified alleged comparators only during oral evidence. He stated that these individuals worked at the same site and received their awards in a timely manner; however, he was unable to provide precise dates, supporting documentation, or sufficient detail as to their relevant circumstances, including their service dates or the timing of their awards.

46. In answers to Tribunal questions, the claimant stated that:

(i) [NAME] [APPELLANT] (who was Asian) long-service award fell a couple of months before his own; (ii) [NAME] (who was White British) received his award seven or eight months before the claimant; (iii) [NAME]’s (who was White Algerian) long-service award fell about five months after his own; (iv) all three men worked at [NAME], held security roles, and, so far as the claimant was aware, received their awards in a timely manner; and (v) he could not recall the exact dates any [NAME] received their award or were due to receive their award but believed that none experienced the delay that he did. No details were provided in relation to their employment dates or other details relating to their employment. He stated that, to his knowledge, each [NAME] received their award without delay. The Tribunal records this as the extent of the claimant’s evidence concerning those individuals; no further detail or supporting evidence was provided, and the significance of this evidence is addressed below. Losses claimed and impact described 47. In his witness statement and at the hearing the claimant described distress, upset and a sense of being unvalued by reason of the delay, including low mood, anxiety and strain associated with having to chase [NAME] that should have been automatic. He remains employed. [NAME] [NAME] acknowledged in her evidence, quite properly, that not receiving a long service award after 20 years in a timely manner is very upsetting.

48. The claimant’s schedule/statement sought:

48.1 £18 (loss of value of benefit); 48.2 Injury to feelings (he advanced figures in the low Vento band in his submissions, identifying between £12,600 and £25,800 in his written narrative totals);

48.3 Out-of-pocket items, including £750 for legal research/preparation, and a flight cost (figure to be confirmed).

[NAME]: 6016567/2024

- 11 - Time limits 49. The claimant accepted in his evidence that long service awards were ordinarily issued automatically and within a short period of the relevant anniversary. I find that by shortly after May 2023 the claimant was aware, or ought reasonably to have been aware, that he had not received the award when it fell due and that no step had been taken by the respondent to provide it.

50. Notwithstanding that awareness, the claimant did not pursue any formal complaint or take steps to advance the matter by way of grievance or legal claim for a substantial period thereafter. The first contemporaneous and documented complaint pursued by him was the grievance submitted in July 2024. I further find that the claimant did not provide any clear or satisfactory explanation, supported by contemporaneous evidence, for that delay.

51. By the time the claimant submitted his grievance in July 2024, more than one year had elapsed since the date on which the award should have been issued, and well beyond the primary time limit for presenting a claim.

Observations

52. On the documents and oral evidence presented, the Tribunal makes the following essential observations on the evidence, restricted to those matters necessary to determine the agreed List of Issues.

53. The standard of proof is the civil standard, namely the balance of probabilities. If, having considered all the evidence, I am satisfied that it is more likely than not that an event occurred, then I am entitled to find that it did occur.

54. Where there was a dispute of fact, I resolved that dispute by considering which [NAME] was clearer, more consistent, and better supported by the contemporaneous documents. I also took into [NAME] the internal consistency of each witness’s evidence and whether their answers reflected an appreciation of the limits of their own knowledge and to what extent.

55. A significant proportion of the material facts in this case were established through contemporaneous documents, including internal emails, grievance materials, and the dataset produced at [NAME] p.102. Those documents were generally reliable and were consistent with the evidence of the respondent’s witnesses.

56. The claimant asserted in his oral evidence that he had raised a grievance about his long-service award in 2023. There was no documentary record of any grievance being submitted in 2023, nor was any such document produced to the Tribunal. The claimant did not refer to such a grievance in his witness statement. He made this assertion in the course of questioning, and he was unable to identify any supporting email, correspondence or

[NAME]: 6016567/2024

- 12 - internal record. On the balance of probabilities, I did not accept that the claimant lodged any grievance in 2023. The first documented grievance was that submitted on or around 16 July 2024. This finding is relevant to the Tribunal’s assessment of the claimant’s explanation for the delay in bringing his claim.

57. The claimant gave evidence that he believed he was the only person affected by a delayed long-service award. This was at odds with the documentary material, including the November 2023 email from [NAME] raising the same concern ([NAME] p.55) and the remedial spreadsheet subsequently compiled by the [NAME] and [NAME] team. The claimant maintained his belief despite being taken to the contrary documentary evidence, and despite his acknowledgement that he had not reviewed the relevant documents in detail. I therefore approached his assertions on this point with caution. This inconsistency materially reduced the weight that I attached to his evidence on the wider context in which the omission occurred.

58. The claimant provided the names of three colleagues as actual comparators only in his oral evidence, and only following Tribunal questioning. His witness statement did not identify comparators, nor did it provide any detail about their roles, employment dates, award eligibility, or whether they were affected by any reporting issues. His oral evidence was [COMPANY] to broad recollections without specific dates. I therefore treated the [NAME] evidence as [COMPANY] in scope, and insufficient on its own to establish detailed factual parallels. I attach [COMPANY] evidential weight to that [NAME] evidence for the purposes of assessing whether there was less favourable treatment.

59. The respondent’s witnesses, in contrast, were generally clear, careful, and consistent in their evidence. [NAME] [NAME] and [NAME] [NAME] readily acknowledged the limits of their knowledge. Their accounts were supported by contemporaneous documents, including internal emails dated 14–16 October 2024, the grievance documentation, and the spreadsheet at [NAME] p.102. Where there was a direct conflict of evidence between the claimant and the respondent’s witnesses, for example, whether any earlier grievance existed or whether the claimant’s award could have been actioned earlier, I preferred the respondent’s evidence.

60. In particular, I accepted the evidence of [NAME] [NAME] (and the supporting correspondence of the Lead Analyst, [NAME] [NAME]), regarding the extent and nature of the reporting failures affecting long-service awards. Their explanations were consistent with the documentary material showing missed awards across a large cohort of employees, including the email of 17 December 2024 describing technical issues with data refresh and scaling. The respondent’s evidence was detailed, internally coherent, and supported by the remedial steps taken later in 2024.

61. I also noted that the internal investigation undertaken in October 2024, triggered by the claimant’s grievance, aligned with the finding that awards

[NAME]: 6016567/2024

- 13 - for a wider group of employees had been omitted from the automated reporting process. This was consistent with the spreadsheet at [NAME] p.102 and the evidence of [NAME] [NAME], and I was satisfied that this represented a credible explanation of what had occurred.

62. Nothing in the contemporaneous documents suggested that the claimant was singled out or treated differently in the operation of the long-service award process. The documents supported the respondent’s [NAME] of a reporting failure affecting many employees across different sites, service years, and ethnicities. The documentary evidence does not support any inference that the claimant’s treatment was unique or attributable to a protected characteristic.

63. [NAME] of all the evidence, I preferred the respondent’s evidence on the key disputed issues: whether a 2023 grievance existed; and the scope of any systemic issues with long-service award processing. Their evidence was consistent with the documentation and with each other, and it withstood cross-examination.

64. I also find that the claimant did not provide a clear, consistent, or contemporaneously supported explanation for the delay in pursuing his complaint, which further affects the weight to be attached to his evidence on matters relevant to time limits.

The law

65. To those facts the Tribunal applied the law.

Direct discrimination 66. Direct discrimination is defined at Section 13(1) of the Equality Act 2010 (“EqA”) as follows: - “A person (A) discriminates against [NAME] (B) if, because of a protected characteristic, A treats B less favourably than A treats or would treat others.” The protected characteristic of [NAME] is listed at section 4 of the EqA, and is defined in section 9 in the following terms:

“(1)[NAME] includes— (a)colour; (b)nationality; (c)ethnic or national origins. (2)In relation to the protected characteristic of [NAME]— (a)a reference to a person who has a particular protected characteristic is a reference to a person of a particular racial group; (b)a reference to persons who share a protected characteristic is a reference to persons of the same racial group.

[NAME]: 6016567/2024

- 14 - (3)A racial group is a group of persons defined by reference to [NAME]; and a reference to a person's racial group is a reference to a racial group into which the person falls.

(4)The fact that a racial group comprises two or more distinct racial groups does not prevent it from constituting a particular racial group.”

67. The concept of treatment being less favourable inherently suggests some form of comparison and in such cases section 23(1) applies: “On a comparison of cases for the purposes of section 13, 14, 19 or 19A there must be no material difference between the circumstances relating to each case.”

68. The effect of section 23 of the EqA as a whole is to ensure that any comparison made must be between situations which are genuinely comparable. The case law, however, makes it clear that it is not necessary for a claimant to have an actual [NAME] to succeed. The comparison can be with a hypothetical person.

69. Further, as the Employment Appeal Tribunal (“EAT”) and appellate courts have emphasised in a number of cases, including [NAME] v Ahmed [2009] IRLR 884, in most cases where the conduct in [NAME] is not overtly related to the protected characteristic, the real [NAME] is the “reason why” the decision maker acted as he or she did.

70. Answering that [NAME] involves consideration of the mental processes (whether conscious or subconscious) of the alleged discriminator, and it may be possible for the Tribunal to make a finding as to the reason why a person acted as he or she did without the need to concern itself with constructing a hypothetical [NAME].

71. The basic [NAME] in a direct discrimination case is: what are the grounds or reasons for treatment complained of? In [NAME] v Ahmed [2009] IRLR 884 the EAT recognised two different approaches from two (then) [NAME] authorities - (i) in [NAME] v Eastleigh Borough Council [1990] IRLR 288 and (ii) in [NAME] v London Regional Transport [1999] IRLR 572. In some cases, such as [NAME], the grounds or reason for the treatment complained of is inherent in the act itself.

72. In other cases, such as [NAME], the act complained of is not discriminatory but is rendered so by discriminatory motivation, being the mental processes (whether conscious or unconscious) which led the alleged discriminator to act in the way that he or she did. The intention is irrelevant once unlawful discrimination is made out. That approach was endorsed in R (on the application of E) v Governing Body of the [NAME] [2009] UKSC 15.

73. The Tribunal should draw appropriate inferences from the conduct of the alleged discriminator and the surrounding circumstances (with the assistance, where necessary, of the burden of proof provisions) – as

[NAME]: 6016567/2024

- 15 - explained in the Court of Appeal case of [NAME] v University of Oxford [2001] IRLR 377.

74. In Glasgow City Council v Zafar [1998] IRLR 36, also a (then) [NAME] case, it was held that it is not enough for the claimant to point to unreasonable behaviour. He must show less favourable treatment, one of whose effective causes was the protected characteristic relied on.

75. Thus the reason for the treatment need not be the main or sole reason but must have at least a significant (or more than trivial) influence on the treatment to amount to an effective cause of it. In “reason why” cases the matter is dispositive upon determination of the alleged discriminator’s state of mind. In “criterion cases” there is no need to consider the alleged discriminator’s state of mind when the treatment complained of is caused by the application of a criterion which is inherently or indissociably discriminatory (R (E) v Governing Body of JFS [2010] 2AC 728, SC).

76. In [NAME] v [NAME] of the RUC [2003] IRLR 285, a (then) [NAME] authority, Lord [NAME] said that a Tribunal may sometimes be able to avoid arid and confusing debate about the identification of the appropriate [NAME] by concentrating primarily on why the complainant was treated as she was and leave the less favourable treatment issue until after they have decided what treatment was afforded. Was it on the prescribed ground or was it for some other reason? If the former, there would usually be no difficulty in deciding whether the treatment afforded to the claimant on the prescribed ground was less favourable than afforded to [NAME].

77. Direct discrimination may be intentional, or it may be subconscious (based upon stereotypical assumptions). The Tribunal must consider the conscious or subconscious mental processes which caused the employer to act. This is not necessarily a [NAME] of motive or purpose and is not restricted to considering ‘but for’ the protected characteristic would the treatment have occurred (see [NAME]).

Burden of proof

78. The burden of proof provisions in relation to discrimination claims are found in Section 136 of the EqA. Section 136(2) of the EqA provides that “(2) If there are facts from which the court could decide, in the absence of any other explanation, that a person (A) contravened the provision [NAME], the court must hold that the contravention occurred.”

79. However, Section 136(3) of the EqA goes on to provide that: “But subsection (2) does not apply if A shows that A did not contravene the provision.

80. Finally, in terms of Section 136(6), a reference to “the court” includes a reference to an Employment Tribunal.

[NAME]: 6016567/2024

- 16 - 81. The burden of proof is considered in two stages. Giving the judgment of the Court of Appeal in [COMPANY] v Wong [2005] ICR 931 (CA), Peter Gibson LJ said in paragraph 17:“The statutory amendments clearly require the employment tribunal to go through a two-stage process if the complaint of the complainant is to be upheld. The first stage requires the complainant to prove facts from which the tribunal could, apart from the section, conclude in the absence of an adequate explanation that the respondent has committed, or is to be treated as having committed, the unlawful act of discrimination against the complainant. The second stage, which only comes into effect if the complainant has proved those facts, requires the respondent to prove that he did not commit or is not to be treated as having committed the unlawful act, if the complaint is not to be upheld.”

82. [ADDRESS] of Appeal, in [COMPANY] v Wong, set out the position with regard to the drawing of inferences in discrimination cases.

83. It is unusual to have direct evidence as to the reason for the treatment (discrimination may not be intentional and may be the product of unconscious bias or discriminatory assumptions) ([NAME] v London Regional Transport [1999] 4 All ER 65). Evidence of the reason for the treatment will ordinarily be by [NAME] inference from primary facts. At Stage 1 proof is of a prima facie case and requires relevant facts from which the Tribunal could infer the reason. Relevant facts in appropriate cases may include evasive or equivocal replies to questions or requests for information; failure to comply with a relevant code of practice; the context in which the treatment has occurred including statistical data; the reason for the treatment (see [NAME] v [NAME] [2007] ICR 867 (CA)). “In so far as this [information] was in the hands of the employer, the claimant could have identified the information required and requested that it be provided voluntarily or, if that was refused, by obtaining an order from the Tribunal” ([NAME] v Royal Mail Group [2019] EWCA Civ 19).

84. Assessment of Stage 1 is based upon all the evidence adduced by both the claimant and the respondent but excluding the absence of an adequate (i.e. non-discriminatory) explanation for the treatment (which is relevant only to Stage 2) ([NAME]). All relevant facts should be considered but not the respondent’s explanation, or the absence of any such explanation ([NAME] v Manchester City Council [2006] ICR 1519, [NAME]). The respondent’s explanation for its conduct provides the reason why he has done what could be considered a discriminatory act. “Most cases turn on the accumulation of multiple findings of primary fact, from which the court or tribunal is invited to draw an inference of a discriminatory explanation of those facts” (see [NAME]). “In considering what inferences or conclusions can be drawn from the primary facts, the tribunal must assume that there is no adequate explanation for those facts” (see Igen v Wong [2005] ICR 935).

85. The employer must seek to rebut the inference of discrimination by explaining why he has acted as he has ([NAME]). The treatment must be “in no sense whatsoever” because of the protected characteristic ([NAME] v

[NAME]: 6016567/2024

- 17 - Investec [2003] IRC 1205 EAT). The explanation must be sufficiently adequate and cogent to discharge the burden and this will depend on the strength of the Stage 1 prima facie case ([COMPANY] v [NAME] [NAME] [2006] IRLR 865). The Tribunal may elect to bypass Stage 1 and proceed straight to Stage 2, if they are satisfied that the reason for the less favourable treatment is fully adequate and cogent (see [NAME]).

86. In [NAME], the Court of Appeal found that the words “could conclude” must mean “a [NAME] Tribunal could properly conclude” from all the evidence before it, meaning that the claimant had to “set up a prima facie case”. That done, the burden of proof shifted to the respondent (employer) who had to show that they did not commit (or is not to be treated as having committed) the unlawful act. The bare facts of a difference in status and a difference in treatment only indicate a possibility of discrimination. They are not, without more, sufficient material from which a Tribunal could conclude that, on balance of probabilities, the respondent had committed an unlawful act of discrimination.

87. The Supreme Court, in [NAME] v Grampian Health Board [2012] ICR 1054 (SC), held that Tribunals should be careful not to approach the Igen guidelines in too mechanistic a fashion, and the Court of Appeal has confirmed that approach under the EqA in its Judgment in Ayodele v Citylink [2018] IRLR 114 (CA). The Supreme Court stated at paragraph 32 of their decision: “The points made by the Court of Appeal about the effect of the statute in these two cases could not be more clearly expressed, and I see no need for any further guidance. Furthermore, as Underhill J pointed out in [NAME] v Devonshires Solicitors [2011] ICR 352, para 39, it is important not to make too much of the role of the burden of proof provisions. They will require careful attention where there is room for doubt as to the facts necessary to establish discrimination. But they have nothing to offer where the tribunal is in a position to make positive findings on the evidence one way or the other.”

Time limits

88. Section 123 of the EqA deals with time limits. Section 123(1) provides that proceedings on a complaint under Section 120 may not be brought after the end of (a) the period of 3 months starting with the date of the act to which the complaint relates, or (b) such other period as the Employment Tribunal thinks just and equitable.

89. Section 123(3) provides that (a) conduct extending over a period is to be treated as done at the end of the period, and (b) failure to do something is to be treated as occurring when the [NAME] decided on it.

90. The time limit in Section 123 is, however, subject to Section 140B, which provides for an extension of the time limit to facilitate conciliation before institution of Tribunal proceedings.

91. Day A is the day on which the [NAME] complies with the requirement of Section 18A of the Employment Tribunals Act 1996 to

[NAME]: 6016567/2024

- 18 - contact ACAS in relation to the matter in respect of which the proceedings are brought, and Day B is the day on which the worker receives or is treated as receiving the ACAS certificate issued under Section 18A.

92. In working out when the time limit expires, the period beginning with the day after Day A and ending with Day B is not to be counted. If the time limit set would, if not extended, expire during the period beginning with Day A and ending one month after Day B, the time limit expires instead at the end of that period.

93. As to conduct which 'extends over a period' the Court of Appeal in [NAME] v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [2003] IRLR 96, sets out that the burden is on the claimant to prove, either by direct evidence or inference, that the numerous alleged incidents of discrimination were linked to one [NAME] and were evidence of a continuing discriminatory state of affairs covered by the concept of 'an act extending over a period'.

94. In [NAME] Service NHS Foundation Trust (appellant) v [NAME] (respondent) - [2020] IRLR 168 [NAME] in the EAT stated in the context of a continuing act at [36-38] “It will be necessary, in my judgment, for at least the last of the constituent acts relied upon to be in time and proven to be an act of discrimination in order for time to be enlarged.”

95. Whether there is conduct extending over a period was considered to include where an employer maintains and keeps in force a discriminatory regime, rule, practice, or principle which has had a clear and adverse effect on the complainant - [APPELLANT] v Kapur [1989] IRLR 387. [ADDRESS] of Appeal has cautioned Tribunals against applying the concepts of 'policy, rule, practice, scheme or regime' too literally, particularly in the context of an alleged continuing act consisting of numerous incidents occurring over a lengthy period ([NAME] v Metropolitan Police Commissioner, [2003] IRLR 96).

96. Where a claim is submitted out of time, the burden of proof in showing that it is just and equitable to allow it to be received is on the claimant (Robertson v Bexley Community Centre [2003] IRLR 434).

97. Moreover the EAT stated in [NAME] v The Secretary of State For Health and Social Care [2024] EAT 2 that: “It remains a common practice for those who assert that the primary time limit should not be extended to rely on the comments of Auld LJ at paragraph 25 of Bexley Community Centre (t/a [NAME]) v Robertson [2003] EWCA Civ 576, [2003] IRLR 434, that time limits in the Employment Tribunal are “exercised strictly” in employment cases and that a decision to extend time is the “exception rather than the rule” as if they were principles of law. Where these comments are referred to out of context, this practice should cease. Paragraph 25 must be seen in the context of paragraphs 23 and 24”. The EAT stated that the propositions of law for which [NAME] is authority are

[NAME]: 6016567/2024

- 19 - that the Employment Tribunal has a wide discretion to extend time on just and equitable grounds and that appellate courts should be slow to interfere.

98. In any event, exceptional circumstances are not required for the Tribunal to exercise its discretion and the test remains what the Tribunal considers to be just and equitable ([NAME] v [NAME]/0312/13).

99. Even if the Tribunal disbelieves the reason put forward by the claimant it should still go on to consider any other potentially relevant factors such as the balance of convenience and the chance of success: [NAME] v [COMPANY] [2016] IRLR 278, following [NAME] v [NAME]/0312/13 and [NAME] v [COMPANY]/0291/14. I also considered the EAT’s decision in [COMPANY] [COMPANY] v Holleran UKEAT/0274/14 holding that where there was no explanation for the delay tendered that was fatal to the application of the extension, which was followed. In [NAME] v La Retraite RC Girls School UKEAT/0180/16 in which the Judge added that she did not “understand the supposed distinction in principle between a case in which the claimant does not explain the delay and a case where he or she does so but is disbelieved. In neither case, in my judgment, is there material on which the Tribunal can exercise its discretion to extend time. If there is no explanation for the delay, it is hard to see how the supposedly strong merits of a claim can rescue a claimant from the consequences of any delay.”

100. [APPELLANT] J in Abertawe Bro Morgannwg University Local Health Board v [NAME]/0305/13 (18 February 2014, unreported), a litigant can hardly hope to satisfy that burden unless he provides an answer to two questions (paragraph 52): ''The first [NAME] in deciding whether to extend time is why it is that the primary time limit has not been met; and insofar as it is distinct the second is [the] reason why after the expiry of the primary time limit the claim was not brought sooner than it was.''

101. In [COMPANY] (2) [NAME] [NAME] [NAME] v (1) [NAME] [NAME] (2) Ms [NAME]: EA-2020-000801 the EAT did not directly address those authorities but stated that, in relation to the issue of delay, “it is not always essential that the tribunal be satisfied that there is a particular reason that it would regard as a good reason”.

102. In [NAME] there was a review of authority on the issue of the just and equitable extension, as it is often called, including the Court of Appeal case of London Borough of Southwark v Afolabi [2003] IRLR 220, in which it was held that a Tribunal is not required to go through the matters listed in s.33(3) of the Limitation Act, in the context of a personal injury claim, provided that no significant factor is omitted. There was also reference to [NAME] v [NAME] [1992] 1 WLR 964, a personal injury claim, where it was held to be appropriate to consider the plaintiff's (claimant's) prospect of success in the action and evidence necessary to establish or defend the claim in considering the balance of hardship. The EAT concluded “What has emerged from the cases thus far reviewed, it seems to me, is that the

[NAME]: 6016567/2024

- 20 - exercise of this wide discretion (see [NAME] v [COMPANY] [1977] IRLR 69) involves a multi-factoral approach. No single factor is determinative.”

103. That said, the Limitation Act checklist as modified in the case of [COMPANY] v [NAME] includes as possible relevant factors: i) the relative prejudice to each of the parties; ii) all of the circumstances of the case which includes: iii) The length and reason for delay; iv) The extent that cogency of evidence is likely to be affected; v) The cooperation of the respondent in the provision of information requested, if relevant; vi) The promptness with which the claimant had acted once she knew of facts giving rise to the cause of action, and vii) Steps taken by the claimant to obtain advice once she knew of the possibility of taking action.

104. In Abertawe Bro Morgannwg University Local Health Board v [NAME] [2018] ICR 1194 the Court of Appeal held: “First, it is plain from the language used ("such other period as the employment tribunal thinks just and equitable") that Parliament has chosen to give the employment tribunal the widest possible discretion.” Recently in [NAME] v [COMPANY] [2021] EWCA Civ 23, Tribunals were recommended not to use the [NAME] factors as the framework for their thinking, and that the Tribunal has a very broad general discretion, and further that “The best approach for a tribunal in considering the exercise of the discretion under section 123 (1) (b) is to assess all the factors in the particular case which it considers relevant to whether it is just and equitable to extend time, including in particular (as Holland J notes) "the length of, and the reasons for, the delay".”

Complaints under the EqA and Remedy 105. Section 120 of the EqA provides that an Employment Tribunal has jurisdiction to determine a complaint relating to a contravention of Part 5 (work) of that Act and, subject to the time limit provisions of Section 123, as detailed above, are subject to the remedies set forth in Section 124 of the EqA, if an Employment Tribunal finds that there has been a contravention of the EqA.

106. In that event, the Tribunal may, as per Section 124(2), (a) make a declaration as to the rights of the complainant and the respondent in relation to the matters to which the proceedings relate; (b) order the respondent to pay compensation to the claimant; and (c) make an appropriate recommendation, as defined in Section 124(3) of the EqA.

107. In terms of Section 124(6) of the EqA, the amount of compensation which may be awarded under Section 124(2)(b) of the EqA corresponds to the amount that could be awarded by the County Court under Section 119 of the EqA and, as per Section 119(4) of the EqA, an award of damages may include compensation for injured feelings (whether or not it includes compensation on any other basis).

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- 21 - 108. The Tribunal is empowered to award interest under the Employment Tribunals (Interest on Awards in Discrimination Cases) Regulations 1996 (SI 1996/2803).

Submissions

Respondent’s submissions

109. [NAME] [RESPONDENT], on behalf of the respondent, submitted that the claimant had not discharged the burden of establishing facts from which the Tribunal could conclude, in the absence of an explanation, that the delay in issuing the long-service award was because of [NAME]. He emphasised that the claimant’s assertion that he alone had been affected was incorrect, pointing to contemporaneous documentation including the November 2023 email at [NAME] p.55 and the dataset at [NAME] p.102 showing what the respondent says were a significant number of varying ethnicities whose long-service awards were delayed. He submitted that the claimant had provided no meaningful [NAME] evidence, had been inconsistent in his [NAME] of whether he had complained earlier, and had misstated key elements of the factual background, including asserting a 2023 grievance that did not exist. He submitted that these matters undermined the claimant’s credibility and meant that no prima facie case of discrimination had been established.

110. He contended that the evidence of the respondent’s witnesses was clear and consistent, and that the explanation for the delay, a wider system reporting error, was credible, well-supported and unrelated to [NAME]. He further submitted that the claim was substantially out of time, that there was no continuing act, and that the claimant had provided no satisfactory explanation for the delay in bringing his claim. He invited the Tribunal to dismiss the claim as out of time, misconceived, and unsupported by prima facie evidence. These paragraphs are not intended to be a complete record of the respondent’s submissions, all of which I took fully into [NAME].

Claimant’s submissions

111. The claimant submitted that the central issue was the significance of the 20-year milestone and the loss of timely [NAME]. He argued that a long-service award derives its meaning from being issued at the correct time, and that the delay of approximately eighteen months constituted a serious detriment which caused him disappointment, distress and a sense of being devalued after dedicating two decades of service to the respondent. He submitted that he was the only individual within his immediate team affected in this way and suggested that this supported his case that the treatment was discriminatory. He also relied on the ethnicity data in the spreadsheet at [NAME] p.102 and submitted that the composition of those affected supported an inference of discrimination. He contended that the grievance process had been slow and unsatisfactory, that the respondent had never provided him with a meaningful explanation at the time, and that the eventual issuing of the award did not remedy the harm already caused. He further submitted that the delay in issuing the award

[NAME]: 6016567/2024

- 22 - was not a single act but a continuing omission, such that his claim was brought in time.

112. He invited the Tribunal to find that he had been subjected to direct discrimination, to award compensation for injury to feelings within the lower Vento band, to award such financial loss as arose from the delay, and to make a recommendation concerning the respondent’s long-service procedures. In the alternative, the claimant submitted that, even if the claim was out of time, it would be just and equitable to extend time given the ongoing grievance process, the respondent’s delay in addressing his concerns, and the impact of the omission upon him. Once again, these paragraphs are not intended to be a complete record of the claimant’s submissions; the Tribunal took full [NAME] of the entirety of the submissions made.

Discussion and Decision

113. On the findings of fact made, and having applied the law to those facts, the Tribunal disposes of the matters contained in the agreed List of Issues as follows.

114. In coming to its decision in this case, the Tribunal has carefully reviewed and analysed the whole of the evidence before it, including the oral evidence given at the Final Hearing, witness statements, and the contemporaneous documents to which the parties referred, including but not [COMPANY] to the grievance and internal reward correspondence from October 2024 onwards, and the “Employee Long Service Data” spreadsheet at [NAME] p.102.

Issue 1 – Time limits (List of Issues §1.1–1.2.4.2) 1.2.1 Was the claim made in time?

115. Although the complaint is framed in the List of Issues (§2.2.1) as a delay extending from May 2023 to December 2024, the Tribunal finds that it is, in substance, a failure to do something, namely the failure to issue the claimant’s 20-year long service award. On the Tribunal’s findings, the claimant’s anniversary fell on 6 May 2023 and no award was issued at or around that time. In accordance with section 123(3)(b) of the EqA, that failure is to be treated as occurring when the respondent decided not to do the act, or, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, on the expiry of the period in which it might reasonably have been expected to do so. On the evidence, long service awards were intended to be processed automatically through scheduled monthly reports, and the Tribunal therefore finds that the failure is to be treated as occurring, at the latest, by the end of June 2023, being the expiry of a [NAME] period within which the award should have been issued following the May 2023 anniversary. The ET1 was presented on 28 October 2024. Even taking into [NAME] (17 August 2024 to 28 September 2024), the claim was brought approximately 16 to 17 months after that date. It is therefore out of time on the face of section 123(1)(a) of the EqA.

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- 23 -

116. Even if the claimant’s evidence that he raised a grievance in May 2023 were accepted (which it was not), the Tribunal would nevertheless find that, by no later than June 2023, a [NAME] in the claimant’s position would have appreciated that no long service award had been issued and that there were grounds to bring a claim. On that footing, time would still have expired well in advance of the date the ET1 was presented on 28 October 2024, and the claim would accordingly remain out of time even on the claimant’s own case.

Is there conduct extending over a period, and (if so) is the claim in time by reference to the end of that period?

117. The Tribunal does not find that there was conduct extending over a period within the meaning of section 123(3)(a) of the EqA. The complaint is properly characterised as a failure to do something, namely the failure to issue the award when it fell due. The fact that the claimant did not receive the award for a prolonged period thereafter represents the continuing consequences of that earlier omission, rather than a continuing act or a series of acts. The evidence shows a failure to issue the award when due, which was later addressed in October–December 2024 following the claimant’s July 2024 grievance. That sequence does not create a fresh discriminatory act within the primary limitation period, nor does it establish a course of discriminatory conduct extending over a period so as to bring the claim within time. Although the complaint is framed in the List of Issues (§2.2.1) as a delay extending from May 2023 to December 2024, the Tribunal does not accept that this constitutes a series of discriminatory acts or conduct extending over a period. Properly analysed, the delay reflects the consequences of that single omission, rather than a succession of decisions continuing into the limitation period. The fact that the claimant did not receive the award for a prolonged period thereafter, and that the effects of that omission endured until it was remedied, does not convert that omission into conduct extending over a period for the purposes of section 123(3)(a). It follows that section 123(3)(a) does not apply, and the claim therefore cannot be rendered in time by reference to any alleged continuing act.

Just and equitable extension

118. The Tribunal declines to extend time on a just and equitable basis. As to why the complaint was not presented in time (§1.2.4.1), the claimant advanced no satisfactory explanation for failing to bring his claim promptly after May 2023. The Tribunal has considered the claimant’s reliance on the grievance process, including his position that he was awaiting a response and that the matter remained ongoing. However, I find that this does not constitute a satisfactory explanation for the delay. The absence of a long service award was a discrete and readily identifiable omission, and there was no impediment to the claimant presenting a claim notwithstanding the existence or progress of a grievance process. Even if (contrary to the Tribunal’s finding) the claimant had raised a grievance in May 2023, the

[NAME]: 6016567/2024

- 24 - Tribunal would have expected an omission of this sort, plainly apparent to the claimant and any [NAME] in the claimant’s circumstances, to lead to a claim being presented within a relatively short period thereafter. A delay of approximately 16 to 17 months before issuing proceedings (28 October 2024), despite the obvious and self-contained nature of the alleged wrong, is not consistent with acting reasonably promptly.

119. The Tribunal has taken [NAME] of the merits as they appear on the evidence. For the reasons given under the second issue later in this Judgment, the case on causation is not established: there is no adequate [NAME] evidence, and the documents disclose a system-wide reporting problem unconnected with [NAME]. That assessment weighs against extending time.

120. The Tribunal has also taken into [NAME] prejudice to the respondent, both general and forensic. General prejudice arises where employers are required to defend rather dated claims long after an event allegedly took place: the passage of time impairs recollection, makes it more difficult to locate and collate evidence, and may increase the cost and complexity of defence. Those features are present here to a degree: the claimant introduced new assertions at the hearing (including an alleged 2023 grievance and additional [NAME] material) which the respondent could not test against contemporaneous records because no such records were produced and the claimant’s witness statement contained no [NAME] particulars. The respondent would face the practical difficulty of investigating alleged 2023 steps without documents, in circumstances where the claimant’s own [NAME] changed in oral evidence and where memories could well have faded. The Tribunal also notes the late emergence of [NAME] details ([COMPANY] and undated) and the alleged 2023 grievance, both raised for the first time in any meaningful way during the hearing, which adds to the forensic prejudice of defending a late-presented and shifting case.

121. The Tribunal has considered all the circumstances of the case and has weighed the relevant factors in the exercise of its discretion (§1.2.4.2). In particular, it has considered the length of the delay, the explanation advanced by the claimant (and the lack of a satisfactory explanation), the merits of the claim as they appear from the evidence, and the position of the respondent in having to defend a late claim. While the Tribunal recognises that refusing an extension prevents the claimant from having his complaint determined on the merits, that factor is not determinative. Taking all matters into [NAME], the balance lies in favour of refusing to extend time. The Tribunal therefore declines to extend time under section 123(1)(b) of the EqA.

122. Accordingly, the claim is out of time, there is no continuing act that renders it in time, and the Tribunal declines to extend time on a just and equitable basis. The complaint is therefore dismissed on the basis that it was not presented within the time limit prescribed by section 123(1)(a) of the EqA,

[NAME]: 6016567/2024

- 25 - with the consequence that the claimant has no title to present the complaint and the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to determine it.

Issue 2 – [NAME] discrimination (List of Issues §2.1–2.5) (Dealt with in the alternative, in case the time limits decision above is wrong.)

Treatment and detriment

123. The respondent accepts that the claimant was not provided with his long service award when it fell due and accepts that this amounted to a detriment. For the purposes of this claim, the Tribunal identifies the relevant treatment as the failure to issue the award at or shortly after the claimant’s 20-year service anniversary in May 2023. The central issue is causation, namely whether that treatment was because of the claimant’s [NAME] within the meaning of section 13 of the EqA.

Prima facie case and burden of proof

124. The Tribunal finds that the claimant has not shown facts from which it could properly conclude, in the absence of any other explanation, that the treatment complained of occurred because of [NAME]. The claimant’s witness statement identified no comparators. In oral evidence, comparators were first provided only when asked by the Tribunal; the claimant could not provide dates or circumstances of their anniversaries or receipt of awards, and no records were produced. The Tribunal therefore had no reliable [NAME] data with which to perform a like-for-like analysis, whether of timing or process. In those circumstances, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the claimant has established that he was treated less favourably than an actual or hypothetical [NAME]. This applies equally to the individuals identified by the claimant, including [NAME] [APPELLANT], [NAME] [APPELLANT] and [NAME] [APPELLANT] (or [NAME]) [NAME], as well as any other individuals referred to in oral evidence, in respect of whom the claimant provided no sufficient or reliable evidence as to the timing of their long service awards or the surrounding circumstances to permit any meaningful comparison.

125. The claimant’s central assertion that he alone was affected is contradicted by the documents. First, there was an earlier complaint from [NAME] in November 2023 about a missing long-service award ([NAME] p.55). Secondly, the “Employee Long Service Data” at [NAME] p.102 identifies a cohort of 94 employees whose long service anniversaries were not picked up by the automated reports, of whom 62 had 1 May 2023 as the intended award date (the “yellow cohort”); the data records a range of ethnicities across those employees. The mere fact that two employees in that sheet identify as “Black African/Caribbean/Black British” does not establish [NAME] as a cause of the claimant’s delay as suggested by the claimant in his submissions, particularly in circumstances where the sheet predominantly records other ethnicities (including many “Prefer not to say”). The documents are inconsistent with a case that the claimant was singled out because of [NAME]. The Tribunal has also considered the claimant’s submissions regarding the delay in the grievance process and the absence

[NAME]: 6016567/2024

- 26 - of an earlier explanation from the respondent. While those matters are relevant to the claimant’s perception of the circumstances, they do not support an inference that the treatment was because of [NAME]. The Tribunal has also considered the claimant’s submission that he was the only individual within his immediate team who did not receive his award at the relevant time; however, no sufficient or reliable evidence was provided as to the composition of that team or the circumstances of those individuals to permit any reliable comparison. Standing back, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the facts established give rise to any inference of [NAME] discrimination.

Accordingly, the Tribunal finds that no prima facie case of [NAME] discrimination has been established.

Respondent’s explanation (in the alternative in case the burden shifted)

126. If the Tribunal is wrong and the burden did pass, the respondent has provided a cogent, clear and consistent explanation supported by contemporaneous documents and credible witness testimony:

126.1 In October 2024, the Reward team investigated, confirmed the claimant’s 20-year anniversary fell in May 2023, and confirmed that no award had been uploaded at that time; they then actioned the award. This is recorded in internal emails from 14–16 October 2024.

126.2 The [NAME] & [NAME] ([NAME] [NAME]) compiled the dataset at [NAME] p.102 (in November/December 2024) identifying employees whose long-service awards had not been captured, including 62 employees in the May 2023 “yellow” cohort. Her evidence was clear and consistent, and aligned with the spreadsheet entries.

126.3 On 17 December 2024, the Lead Analyst ([NAME] [NAME]) explained that the original reporting file had failed to refresh reliably due to scale/refresh constraints and that he rebuilt the report to limit it to employees within 200 days of their milestone date, deploying a new file (“Service Awards – Countdown 200.xlsx”). This contemporaneous explanation is consistent with a systemic reporting error rather than any [NAME]-based treatment.

127. The Tribunal accepts that explanation. It is consistent with the earlier November 2023 complaint from a different employee (showing the problem pre-dated the claimant’s grievance) and with the breadth of the omissions across ethnicities of employees on p.102. It is also consistent with the later remedial steps taken in December 2024, including the identification of affected employees by [NAME] [NAME] and the rebuilding of the award-generation report by [NAME] [NAME] to ensure that long service milestones were captured reliably going forward. The Tribunal therefore finds that the claimant’s delayed award was because of a data/reporting failure, not [NAME].

128. For those reasons, even if the claim were in time and even if the burden of proof had shifted, the respondent has discharged any burden to show that the treatment was in no sense whatsoever connected with [NAME]. The claim would therefore fail on the merits.

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- 27 -

Issue 3 – Remedy (List of Issues §3.1–3.10)

129. In light of the decisions above, no remedy arises.

Conclusion

130. The claim is out of time by approximately 16 to 17 months and the Tribunal declines to extend time on a just and equitable basis, having considered the absence of a satisfactory explanation, the merits as they appear on the evidence, and the prejudice to the respondent (both general and forensic) of litigating a late and shifting case long after the event, weighed against the prejudice to the claimant of not having his case determined on the merits.

131. If the Tribunal is wrong about time limits, the discrimination complaint would in any event be dismissed: the claimant did not establish facts from which, in the absence of any other explanation, the Tribunal could properly conclude that the treatment complained of was because of [NAME], and, in any event, the respondent provided a credible and well-supported explanation relating to a system-wide reporting error, which had no connection whatsoever with the claimant’s [NAME], and which explanation the Tribunal accepts. The claim is therefore dismissed.

Approved By: Employment Judge B Beyzade

Dated: 18 May 2026

[NAME]: 6016567/2024

- 1 -

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Claimant: [redacted]

Respondent: [redacted]

London East Employment Tribunal

On:

6 & 7 February 2026

(Part of PM on 7 February 2026 in chambers)

Before:

Employment Judge B Beyzade

Representation

For the Claimant: [redacted]

In person For the Respondent: [redacted]

JUDGMENT OF THE EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNAL

The judgment of the Tribunal is that:

1. The claimant’s complaint of direct [NAME] discrimination contrary to section 13 of the Equality Act 2010 was not presented to the Tribunal within the time limit set out at section 123(1)(a) of the Equality Act 2010, the act complained of having occurred on 6 May 2023 and the claim not being presented until 28 October 2024. There was no continuing act, and the Tribunal declines to extend time on a just and equitable basis. In these circumstances, the claimant has no title to present the complaint, and the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to hear the claimant’s complaint. The claim is accordingly dismissed.

[NAME]: 6016567/2024

- 2 -

Approved By: Employment Judge B Beyzade

Dated: 06 February 2026

Notes Reasons for the judgment having been given orally at the hearing, written reasons will not be provided unless a request was made by either party at the hearing or a written request is presented by either party within 14 days of the sending of this written record of the decision.

Public access to employment tribunal decisions Judgments and reasons for the judgments are published, in full, online at www.gov.uk/employment-tribunal-decisions shortly after a copy has been sent to the claimant(s) and respondent(s) in a case.

Recording and Transcription Please note that if a Tribunal hearing has been recorded you may request a transcript of the recording, for which a charge may be payable. If a transcript is produced it will not include any oral judgment or reasons given at the hearing. The transcript will not be checked, approved or verified by a judge. There is more information in the joint Presidential Practice Direction on the Recording and Transcription of Hearings, and accompanying Guidance, which can be found here:

https://www.judiciary.uk/guidance-and-resources/employment-rules-and-legislation- practice-directions/