Rent Repayment Orders Granted for Unlicensed HMO Management

OUTCOME: Allowed

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FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL [NAME] ([NAME]) Case Reference : LON/00AZ/HSD/2024/0601 [NAME] : 9c [ADDRESS] [POSTCODE] Applicants :

[redacted] :

[NAME] of Justice for Tenants Respondent : [redacted] : Not represented Type of [NAME] :

[NAME] for Rent Repayment Order under the Housing and Planning Act 2016 Tribunal Members :

Judge P Korn Ms R Kershaw

Date of Hearing :

22 July 2025

Date of Decision : 15 August 2025

DECISION

Description of hearing

This was a face-to-face hearing.

2 Decisions of the tribunal

(1) The tribunal orders the Respondent to repay to the Applicants the following sums by way of rent repayment: • to [NAME] the sum of £2,670.00; • to [NAME] the sum of £5,812.50; • to [NAME] the sum of £5,887.50; and • to [NAME] [NAME] the sum of £5,786.75.

(2) The tribunal also orders the Respondent to reimburse to the Applicants jointly their [NAME] fee and hearing fee in the aggregate sum of £330.00.

(3) The above sums must be paid within 28 days after the date of this determination.

Introduction 1. The Applicants have applied for rent repayment orders against the Respondent under sections 40-44 of the Housing and Planning Act 2016 (“the 2016 Act”).

2. The basis for the [NAME] is that the Respondent committed an offence of having control of and/or managing a house in multiple occupation (“HMO”) which was required to be licensed but was not licensed, contrary to section 72(1) of the Housing Act 2004 (“the 2004 Act”). 3. [NAME] seeks a rent repayment order in the sum of £3,560.00 representing rent paid for the period from 1 September 2023 to 12 February 2024. [NAME] seeks a rent repayment order in the sum of £7,750.00 representing rent paid for the period from 1 September 2022 to 31 August 2023. [NAME] seeks a rent repayment order in the sum of £7,850.00 representing rent paid for the period from 1 January 2023 to 31 December 2023. [NAME] [NAME] seeks a rent repayment order in the sum of £7,715.67 representing rent paid for the period from 1 August 2023 to 31 July 2024. 4. [NAME] and [NAME] [NAME] attended the hearing and were represented by [NAME] of Justice for Tenants. The Respondent also attended the hearing. Applicants’ case 5. In written submissions the Applicants state that the [NAME] was a three-bedroom, two-storey flat with a shared kitchen and bathrooms located on the upper floor of a three-storey, semi-detached building. The Applicants were tenants of the [NAME], and during the relevant

3 period of 12 August 2022 to 31 August 2024 the [NAME] was occupied by at least three persons living in two or more separate households and occupying the [NAME] as their main residence. Their occupation of the [NAME] constituted the only use of the accommodation and they paid rent.

6. The [NAME] was situated within an additional licensing area as designated by the London Borough of Lewisham. The additional licensing scheme came into force on 5 April 2022 and will cease to have effect on 4 April 2027. The additional licensing scheme covers the entire area of the London Borough of Lewisham as shown on a map that has been included in the hearing bundle, and that area includes the ward in which the [NAME] is situated. The [NAME] met all the criteria to be licensed under the said designation and did not qualify for any licensing exemptions.

7. The [NAME] was occupied as follows: • [NAME] lived at the [NAME] from 1 September 2023 until 12 February 2024. [NAME] replaced [NAME] and lived at the [NAME] from 12 February 2024 until 31 August 2024. • [NAME] lived at the [NAME] from 12 August 2022 until 6 July 2023. [NAME] [NAME] replaced [NAME] and lived at the [NAME] from 6 July 2023 until 31 August 2024. • [NAME] lived at the [NAME] from 12 August 2022 until 16 March 2024. [NAME] [NAME] replaced [NAME] and lived at the [NAME] from 25 March 2024 until 31 August 2024. • [NAME] lived at the [NAME] from 26 August 2022 until 31 August 2023.

8. The appropriate HMO licence was not held during the relevant period, and no licence [NAME] was made at any point during the Applicants’ tenancy.

9. The Applicants state that the Respondent is believed to be an appropriate Respondent for this [NAME] because he is listed as the immediate landlord in the tenancy agreements and is the beneficial owner of the [NAME] as shown by the land registry title deed. He was also a “person having control” of the [NAME] within the meaning of section 263(1) of the 2004 Act as he is the person who received the rack-rent. He was also a “person managing” the [NAME] as defined by section 263(3) of the 2004 Act as he was the owner of the [NAME] who received rent from tenants in the [NAME].

4 10. The Applicants state that they conducted themselves well, whereas the Respondent broke the law and failed properly to deal with various problems at the [NAME]. In the second-floor bathroom, the shower consistently lacked adequate water pressure for use. This issue was reported to the Respondent repeatedly, who acknowledged multiple times that he was aware of the problem but found it too expensive to address. Furthermore, the light in the first-floor bathroom was broken from December 2022, leaving the Applicants to use the toilet and shower in darkness or with their phones. Due to a malfunctioning shower in the second bathroom, this was their only option for showering. The Applicants tried changing the light bulb, but this did not work and so they reported the issue to the Respondent who occasionally promised to send an electrician but did not follow through on this until over seven months later.

11. The Applicants further state that the [NAME] had a mould problem that was reported to the Respondent, but it took him more than two months to resolve the issue. In addition, there was no fire blanket, and the Respondent did not provide the Applicants with copies of the gas or electrical safety certificates or of the energy performance certificate and did not supply a ‘How to Rent’ guide.

12. The Applicants have provided a calculation together with copy bank statements as evidence of the rental amounts paid. The Applicants did not receive any housing element of Universal Credit or Housing Benefit. The hearing bundle contains various relevant items in support of their [NAME]. Respondent’s case 13. In written submissions the Respondent does not deny that he was the Applicants’ landlord or that the [NAME] required a licence. He accepted that the [NAME] had no HMO licence throughout the period of claim.

14. He states that he has since obtained an HMO licence and that he does have all certificates required for an HMO. He adds that he has always had a smoke alarm upstairs, one smoke alarm downstairs, a CO2 alarm downstairs in the kitchen above the boiler, a fire blanket in the kitchen, a fire action notice sign and an energy performance certificate. He also states that he is constantly updating and maintaining the [NAME], but he seems to acknowledge that there were some problems by stating that if the [NAME] had been “at the highest standard” he would have charged a higher rent.

15. Regarding the upstairs shower having low pressure, he states that it has always been like this and that he mentions the problem to every potential tenant when they view the [NAME]. He previously obtained a quote from a plumber and discovered that to resolve the problem he

5 would need an entire replumbing of the house and a replastering and painting of the walls at a cost of about £7,000 which he considers prohibitive.

16. With regard to the length of time taken to fix certain problems, he says that it took some time to consult with tradespeople and to get various quotes between answering and carrying out jobs. In addition, there have sometimes been time gaps because the job seemed to him to have been done. In relation to the mould, he arranged for various traders to come to the [NAME] in November 2023 to look at the problem, and after much consultation they said that a simple anti-mould spray could deal with the problem. There were also unexpected delays because builders suddenly pulled out after being booked. Witness evidence 17. [NAME] and [NAME] [NAME] were examined in chief and cross-examined on their witness evidence at the hearing. It was put to [RESPONDENT] by the Respondent that there was a fire blanket and there was a CO2 alarm, but he said that he did not see any. The Respondent also put it to him that he had warned the Applicants about the low water pressure, but he did not accept this. The Respondent also put it to him (a) that the Applicants had not informed him about the bathroom mould and (b) that he had handed relevant documents to the Applicants at the start of the tenancy but [NAME] did not accept this. 18. [NAME] [NAME] said that the mould was particularly bad in his bedroom, and the situation became sufficiently serious that he had to sleep in the living room for 3 to 4 weeks. He accepted that the Respondent had suggested using spray on the mould, but he said that it was not a permanent solution and in any event he could not reach the mould on the ceiling.

19. The Respondent accepted in cross-examination that he did not respond quickly enough to the Applicants’ concerns about the toilet light. However, as regards the water pressure in the shower, whilst the Applicants’ evidence was that only a drip came out of the shower the Respondent did not accept that the position was that bad.

20. The Respondent accepted that the Applicants had paid for [NAME] themselves.

6 Relevant statutory provisions 21. Housing and Planning Act 2016 Section 40 (1) This Chapter confers power on the First-tier Tribunal to make a rent repayment order where a landlord has committed an offence to which this Chapter applies. (2) A rent repayment order is an order requiring the landlord under a tenancy of housing in England to – (a) repay an amount of rent paid by [NAME] ... (3) A reference to “an offence to which this Chapter applies” is to an offence, of a description specified in the table, that is committed by a landlord in relation to housing in England let by that landlord.

Act section general description of offence 1 Criminal Law Act 1977 section 6(1) violence for securing entry 2 Protection from Eviction Act 1977 section 1(2), (3) or (3A) eviction or harassment of occupiers 3 Housing Act 2004 section 30(1) failure to comply with improvement notice 4

section 32(1) failure to comply with prohibition order etc 5

section 72(1) control or management of unlicensed HMO 6

section 95(1) control or management of unlicensed house

7 7 This Act section 21 breach of banning order

Section 41 (1) [NAME] or a local housing authority may apply to the First-tier Tribunal for a rent repayment order against a person who has committed an offence to which this Chapter applies. (2) [NAME] may apply for a rent repayment order only if – (a) the offence relates to housing that, at the time of the offence, was let to the tenant, and (b) the offence was committed in the period of 12 months ending with the day on which the [NAME] is made. Section 43 (1) The First-tier Tribunal may make a rent repayment order if satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, that a landlord has committed an offence to which this Chapter applies (whether or not the landlord has been convicted). (2) A rent repayment order under this section may be made only on an [NAME] under 41. (3) The amount of a rent repayment order under this section is to be determined in accordance with – (a) section 44 (where the [NAME] is made by [NAME]) ... Section 44 (1) Where the First-tier Tribunal decides to make a rent repayment order under section 43 in favour of [NAME], the amount is to be determined in accordance with this section. (2) The amount must relate to rent paid during the period mentioned in the table. If the order is made on the ground that the landlord has committed the amount must relate to rent paid by the tenant in respect of an offence mentioned in row 1 or 2 of the table in section 40(3) the period of 12 months ending with the date of the offence

8 an offence mentioned in row 3, 4, 5, 6 or 7 of the table in section 40(3) a period, not exceeding 12 months, during which the landlord was committing the offence

(3) The amount that the landlord may be required to repay in respect of a period must not exceed – (a) the rent paid in respect of that period, less (b) any relevant award of universal credit paid (to any person) in respect of rent under the tenancy during that period. (4) In determining the amount the tribunal must, in particular, take into account – (a) the conduct of the landlord and the tenant, (b) the financial circumstances of the landlord, and (c) whether the landlord has at any time been convicted of an offence to which this Chapter applies. Housing Act 2004 Section 72 (1) A person commits an offence if he is a person having control of or managing an HMO which is required to be licensed under this Part … but is not so licensed. (5) In proceedings against a person for an offence under subsection (1) … it is a defence that he had a reasonable excuse … for having control of or managing the house in the circumstances mentioned in subsection (1) … . Section 263 (1) In this Act “person having control”, in relation to premises, means (unless the context otherwise requires) the person who receives the rack-rent of the premises (whether on his own account or as agent or trustee of another person), or who would so receive it if the premises were let at a rack-rent.

(2) In subsection (1) “rack-rent” means a rent which is not less than two-thirds of the full net annual value of the premises.

(3) In this Act “person managing” means, in relation to premises, the person who, being an owner or lessee of the premises – (a) receives … rents or other payments from … persons who are in occupation as tenants or licensees of parts of the premises, or of the whole of the premises; or (b) would so receive those rents or

9 other payments but for having entered into an arrangement … with another person who is not an owner or lessee of the premises by virtue of which that other person receives the rents or other payments ...

Tribunal’s analysis 22. The Applicants’ uncontested evidence is that the [NAME] was an HMO which was required to be licensed (by virtue of the local housing authority’s additional licensing scheme) but was not licensed at any point during the period of the claim. Having considered that uncontested evidence we are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that for the whole period of claim the [NAME] required a licence and it was not licensed.

23. We are also satisfied that the Respondent was a “landlord” for the purposes of sections 40 and 43 of the 2016 Act. He was named as landlord in the tenancy agreements and is shown as the registered proprietor in the Land Registry title document, and there is also clear evidence that he received rent from the Applicants. The Respondent does not contest these points.

24. We are also satisfied that the Respondent was a “person having control of or managing” the [NAME] within the meaning of section 263 of the 2004 Act. The evidence shows that he received the rack-rent of the [NAME] and received rents or other payments from the occupiers. Again, the Respondent does not contest this point. The defence of “reasonable excuse” 25. Under section 72(5) of the 2004 Act, it is a defence that a person who would otherwise be guilty of the offence of controlling or managing an HMO which is licensable under Part 2 of the 2004 Act had a reasonable excuse for the failure to obtain a licence. The burden of proof is on the person relying on the defence.

26. In this case, the Respondent has not sought to argue that he had a reasonable excuse for failing to license the [NAME], and in any event we do not consider that the facts of the case indicate that he had a reasonable excuse. Therefore, the Respondent did not have a reasonable defence excuse under section 72(5) of the 2004 Act. The offence 27. Section 40 of the 2016 Act confers power on the First-tier Tribunal to make a rent repayment order where a landlord has committed an offence listed in the table in sub-section 40(3), subject to certain conditions being satisfied. An offence under section 72(1) of the 2004

10 Act is one of the offences listed in that table. Section 72(1) states that “A person commits an offence if he is a person having control of or managing an HMO which is required to be licensed under this Part … but is not so licensed”.

For the reasons given above we are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt (a) that the Respondent was a “landlord”, (b) that he was a “person having control” of and a “person managing” the [NAME] for the purposes of section 263 of the 2004 Act, (c) that the [NAME] was required to be licensed throughout the period of claim and (d) that it was not licensed at any point during the period of claim.

28. Under section 41(2), [NAME] may apply for a rent repayment order only if the offence relates to housing that, at the time of the offence, was let to the tenant and the offence was committed in the period of 12 months ending with the day on which the [NAME] is made. On the basis of the Applicants’ uncontested evidence on these points we are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the [NAME] was let to the Applicants at the time of commission of the offence and that the offence was committed in the period of 12 months ending with the day on which their [NAME] was made. Process for ascertaining the amount of rent to be ordered to be repaid 29. Based on the above findings, we have the power to make a rent repayment order against the Respondent.

30. The amount of rent to be ordered to be repaid is governed by section 44 of the 2016 Act. Under sub-section 44(2), the amount must relate to rent paid by the tenant in respect of a period, not exceeding 12 months, during which the landlord was committing the offence. Under sub- section 44(3), the amount that the landlord may be required to repay in respect of a period must not exceed the rent paid in respect of that period less any relevant award of housing benefit or universal credit paid in respect of rent under the tenancy during that period.

31. The evidence before us also indicates that no part of the rent was covered by the payment of housing benefit, and the Respondent has not disputed that the rental amounts claimed were in fact paid by the Applicants.

32. We are satisfied on the basis of their uncontested evidence that the Applicants were in occupation for the whole of the period to which their respective rent repayment applications relate and that the [NAME] required a licence for the whole of that period. Therefore, the maximum sums that can be awarded by way of rent repayment are the sums referred to in paragraphs 3 above, these being the amounts paid by the Applicants by way of rent in respect of the period of claim.

11 33. Under sub-section 44(4), in determining the amount of any rent repayment order the tribunal must, in particular, take into account (a) the conduct of the landlord and the tenant, (b) the financial circumstances of the landlord, and (c) whether the landlord has at any time been convicted of an offence to which the relevant part of the 2016 Act applies.

34. The Upper Tribunal decision in Vadamalayan v Stewart (2020) UKUT 0183 (LC) is one of the authorities on how a tribunal should approach the question of the amount that it should order to be repaid under a rent repayment order if satisfied that an order should be made. Importantly, it was decided after the coming into force of the 2016 Act and takes into account the different approach envisaged by the 2016 Act.

35. In her analysis in Vadamalayan, Judge Cooke states that the rent (i.e. the maximum amount of rent recoverable) is the obvious starting point, and she effectively states that having established the starting point one should then work out what sums if any should be deducted. She departs from the approach of the Upper Tribunal in Parker v Waller (2012) UKUT 301, in part because of the different approach envisaged by the 2016 Act, Parker v Waller having been decided in the context of the 2004 Act. Judge Cooke notes that the 2016 Act contains no requirement that a payment in favour of [NAME] should be reasonable. More specifically, she does not consider it appropriate to deduct everything that the landlord has spent on the [NAME] during the relevant period, not least because much of that expenditure will have repaired or enhanced the landlord’s own [NAME] and/or been incurred in meeting the landlord’s obligations under the tenancy agreement. There is a case for deducting [NAME], but otherwise in her view the practice of deducting all of the landlord’s costs in calculating the amount of the rent repayment should cease.

36. In Judge Cooke’s judgment, the only basis for deduction is section 44 of the 2016 Act itself, and she goes on to state that there will be cases where the landlord’s good conduct or financial hardship will justify an order less than the maximum.

37. Since the decision in Vadamalayan, there have been other Upper Tribunal decisions in this area, notably those in [NAME] and others v [NAME] (2021) UKUT 0038 (LC) and Awad v Hooley (2021) UKUT 0055 (LC). In [NAME] v [COUNSEL], in [NAME] his decision [COUNSEL] QC stressed that whilst the maximum amount of rent was indeed the starting point the First-tier Tribunal (FTT) still had discretion to make deductions to reflect the various factors referred to in section 44(4) of the 2016 Act. In addition, he stated that neither party was represented in Vadamalayan, that the Upper Tribunal’s focus in that case was on the relevance of the amount of the landlord’s profit to the amount of

12 rent repayment and that Vadamalayan should not be treated as the last word on the exercise of discretion required by section 44.

38. In Awad v Hooley, Judge Cooke agreed with the analysis in [NAME] v [NAME] and said that it will be unusual for there to be absolutely nothing for the FTT to take into account under section 44(4).

39. In [NAME] v [NAME] & Ors [2021] UKUT 244 (LC), Mr Justice Fancourt stated that the FTT had in that case taken too narrow a view of its powers under section 44 to fix the amount of the rent repayment order. There is no presumption in favour of the maximum amount of rent paid during the relevant period, and the factors that may be taken into account are not limited to those mentioned in section 44(4), although the factors in that subsection are the main factors that may be expected to be relevant in the majority of cases.

40. Mr Justice Fancourt went on to state in [NAME] that the FTT should not have concluded that only meritorious conduct of the landlord, if proved, could reduce the starting point of the (adjusted) maximum rent. The circumstances and seriousness of the offending conduct of the landlord are comprised in the “conduct of the landlord”, and so the FTT may, in an appropriate case, order a lower than maximum amount of rent repayment if what a landlord did or failed to do in committing the offence was relatively low in the scale of seriousness, by reason of mitigating circumstances or otherwise.

41. In [NAME] v [NAME] and others [2022] UKUT 165 (LC), the Upper Tribunal did not accept a submission that the fact that the local authority has decided not to prosecute the landlord should be treated as a “credit factor” which should reduce the amount to be repaid.

42. In its decision in Acheampong v [NAME] and others [2022] UKUT 239 (LC), the Upper Tribunal recommended a four-stage approach to determining the amount to be repaid, which is paraphrased below:- (a) ascertain the whole of the rent for the relevant period; (b) subtract any element of that sum that represents payment by the landlord for [NAME] that only benefited the tenant; (c) consider how serious this offence was, both compared to other types of offence in respect of which a rent repayment order may be made and compared to other examples of the same type of offence; and (d) consider whether any deduction from, or addition to, that figure should be made in the light of the other factors set out in section 44(4).

43. Adopting the Acheampong approach, the whole of the rent means the whole of the rent paid by the Applicant out of her own resources, which is the whole of the rent in this case as no part of the rent was funded by housing benefit.

13 44. In relation to [NAME], we are satisfied on the evidence before us that the Applicants paid for [NAME] themselves and therefore that no deduction from the maximum amount of rent repayable should be made on account of [NAME].

45. As regards the seriousness of the type of offence, whilst it could be argued based on the maximum criminal penalty available that there are offences covered by section 40(3) of the 2016 Act which can give rise to a greater criminal sanction, a failure to license is still a serious offence. Failure to license leads – or can lead – to significant health and safety risks for often vulnerable tenants, and sanctions for failure to license have an important deterrent effect on future offending as well as encouraging law-abiding landlords to continue to take the licensing system seriously and inspiring general public confidence in the licensing system.

46. In addition, there has been much publicity about licensing of privately rented [NAME], and there is an argument that good landlords who apply for and obtain a licence promptly may feel that those who fail to obtain a licence gain an unfair benefit thereby and therefore need to be heavily incentivised not to let out licensable properties without first obtaining a licence. Furthermore, even if it could be argued that the Applicants did not suffer direct loss through the Respondent’s failure to obtain a licence, it is clear that a large part of the purpose of the rent repayment legislation is deterrence. If landlords can successfully argue that the commission by them of a criminal offence to which section 43 of the 2016 Act applies should only have consequences if tenants can show that they have suffered actual loss, this will significantly undermine the deterrence value of the legislation.

47. As for the seriousness of the offence in this particular case compared to others of the same type, in our view a comparable case is the decision of the Upper Tribunal in [NAME] v [NAME] and another (2024) UKUT 181 (LC). [NAME] v [NAME] was a case where the offence was committed by the landlord of a single [NAME] and was the result of inadvertence, or lack of attention, rather than being deliberate, although the failure was prolonged. The accommodation provided was generally of a good standard which attracted [NAME] term residents and which the tenants were disappointed to leave. There was insufficiently persuasive information on the parties’ conduct for this to be taken into consideration and no evidence of the landlord’s financial circumstances. The Upper Tribunal decided that the appropriate order in the circumstances was for the repayment of 60% of the rent received.

48. In our view, whilst no two cases are identical, [NAME] v [NAME] represents a logical starting point as there is no evidence before us that the failure to license was deliberate and the factual matrix is reasonably analogous. Our starting point therefore is that 60% of the maximum rent repayable should be paid by the Respondent. Because it was

14 unable to do so on the facts of the case, the Upper Tribunal did not make any adjustments in [NAME] v [NAME] for any specific aggravating factors and/or the conduct of the parties. In the present case, though, there are some aggravating factors.

49. The Respondent has admitted that he did not deal with the toilet light issue as quickly as he should have done, and it is clear that this issue had a materially adverse impact on the Applicants’ quality of accommodation. In relation to the mould, whilst the Respondent did not ignore the issue the facts indicate that he was slow to act and then did not take the issue nearly as seriously as he should have done, and again it had a big impact on the Applicants’ standard of accommodation, particularly that of [NAME] [NAME]. The shower water pressure issue is another aggravating factor. There is a factual dispute as to how bad the water pressure was, and on this we prefer the evidence of the Applicants. However, even on the Respondent’s own evidence it is common ground that there was a problem. In addition, whilst it may be that the Respondent possessed all relevant safety documents during the period of claim we are not persuaded that he provided copies of all of these to the Applicants. In relation to the Applicants’ other complaints, either the Respondent has a plausible defence and/or they are not such key issues. Overall, we consider that the abovementioned aggravating factors justify increasing the award from 60% to 75%.

50. As regards the specific matters listed in section 44, the tribunal is particularly required to take into account (a) the conduct of the parties, (b) the financial circumstances of the landlord, and (c) whether the landlord has at any time been convicted of a relevant offence. We will take these in turn. Conduct of the parties 51. There is no evidence before us that the Applicants’ conduct has been anything other than satisfactory. The Respondent’s own conduct has already been referred to above in the context of the problems experienced by the Applicants, and it would not be appropriate to increase the amount of the rent repayment further to reflect any concerns about his conduct as this would constitute double counting. Financial circumstances of the landlord 52. The tribunal is required to take the Respondent’s financial circumstances into account when [NAME] its decision. The Respondent has not provided any information on his financial circumstances, and the Applicants have not made any submissions on financial circumstances. At the hearing the tribunal asked the Respondent about his financial circumstances and about the value of the [NAME] (and he estimated that there was currently £120,000 to £130,000 of equity).

15 On the basis of the information before the tribunal, there is no proper basis for reducing the award on the basis of the Respondent’s financial circumstances but neither are his financial circumstances such that the award should be increased on the basis of those circumstances. Whether the landlord has at any time been convicted of a relevant offence 53. The Respondent has not been convicted of a relevant offence, but it is clear from the Upper Tribunal decision in Hallett v [NAME] that this by itself should not be treated as a credit factor. Other factors 54. It is apparent from the wording of sub-section 44(4) itself that the specific matters listed in sub-section 44(4) are not intended to be exhaustive, as sub-section 44(4) states that the tribunal “must, in particular, take into account” the specified factors. However, in this case we are not aware of any other specific factors which should be taken into account in determining the amount of rent to be ordered to be repaid. Amount to be repaid 55. The four-stage approach recommended in Acheampong has already been set out above. The amounts arrived at by going through the first three of those stages is to reduce them to 75% of the maximum amount payable to each Applicant, subject to any adjustment for the section 44(4) factors referred to above.

56. As noted above, in part to avoid double counting, there is nothing to add or subtract for any of the other section 44(4) factors.

57. Therefore, taking all of the factors together, the rent repayment order should be for 75% of the maximum amount payable to each of the Applicants, namely for £2,670.00 in respect of [NAME], £5,812.50 in respect of [NAME] [NAME] [NAME], £5,887.50 in respect of [NAME] and £5,786.75 in respect of [NAME] [NAME]. Cost applications 58. The Applicants have applied under paragraph 13(2) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) ([NAME]) Rules 2013 for an order that the Respondent reimburse their [NAME] fee and the hearing fee in the aggregate amount of £330.00.

59. As the Applicants’ claims have been successful, albeit that there has been a deduction from the maximum payable, we are satisfied that it is

16 appropriate in the circumstances to order the Respondent to reimburse these fees.

Name:

Judge P Korn

Date:

15 August 2025

RIGHTS OF APPEAL

A. If a party wishes to appeal this decision to the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) a written [NAME] for permission must be made to the First-tier Tribunal at the regional office dealing with the case.

B. The [NAME] for permission to appeal must arrive at the regional office within 28 days after the Tribunal sends written reasons for the decision to the [NAME].

C. If the [NAME] is not made within the 28 day time limit, such [NAME] must include a request for extension of time and the reason for not complying with the 28 day time limit; the Tribunal will then look at such reason and decide whether to allow the [NAME] for permission to appeal to proceed despite not being within the time limit.

D. The [NAME] for permission to appeal must identify the decision of the Tribunal to which it relates (i.e. give the date, the [NAME] and the case number), state the grounds of appeal, and state the result the party [NAME] the [NAME] is seeking.