Unfair Dismissal Claim Rejected; Wages Compensation Awarded

OUTCOME: Dismissed

Case Number: 2500119/2025 v3 10.2.25 1

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Claimant: [redacted]

Respondent: [redacted]

Newcastle (by CVP) On: 9 - 11 March 2026 Before: Employment Judge Childe

REPRESENTATION:

Claimant: [redacted] Respondent: [redacted]

SUMMARY REASONS 1. The tribunal gave oral summary reasons at the hearing. 2. A written Judgment was issued to the parties. 3. The claimant requested summary reasons. 4. These are those reasons. 5. I refer to each of the issues that the tribunal had to decide, by reference to the original issue number in the original agreed list of issues, which is appended to this judgment. 2. Unfair dismissal

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2.1 Was the reason or principal reason for dismissal that the claimant made a protected disclosure?

2.2 Alternatively, was the reason or principal reason for dismissal that the claimant asserted her statutory right under the Working Time Regulations 1988?

2.3 Alternatively, was the reason or principal reason for dismissal that action was taken, or was proposed to be taken, by or on behalf of the claimant with a view to enforcing or otherwise securing the benefit of a right conferred by the National Minimum Wage Act 1998? 6. I have decided, as a finding of fact, that the only reason the claimant was dismissed was because she refused to carry out the [NAME] drop-in visits that she was recruited to do, and which she was required to do as a condition of her visa.

7. I have accepted the evidence of [NAME] [NAME], which was not effectively challenged by the claimant, that this was the reason that the claimant was dismissed. 8. [APPELLANT] [NAME]’s oral evidence is consistent with the documentary evidence available, which I summarise as follows: a. [APPELLANT] [NAME] told the claimant, by email on 12 November 2024, that if she could not attend the [NAME] drop-in visits in the timeframe set by the respondent, which required the claimant to have access to a car, her contract of employment would be terminated. b. On 22 November 2024 [APPELLANT] [NAME] wrote a long letter to the claimant addressing the concerns that she had raised in her letter of 20 November 2024 and made the following key points: i. Drop-in Shifts:

It was clearly communicated that drop-in shifts are an integral part of the role. Any refusal to perform tasks associated with this role, such as drop-in visits, is a breach of the COS regulations for [NAME] workers and home [NAME] workers (Code 6135).

ii. 13. Termination of Contract:

If you are unable to fulfil the requirements of the role, including attendance at local areas as specified in the contract, the company will have no choice but to terminate your contract with one week’s notice

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as per the terms of employment as you seriously breach your employment obligations.

Your role in [NAME] [NAME] is critical to ensuring the wellbeing of vulnerable individuals who depend on timely support for their daily needs. Refusal to fulfil your duties, risk breaching safeguarding protocols and endangering client [NAME]. c. On 22 November 2024 the claimant emailed [APPELLANT] [NAME] to say that she would provide a formal response to her letter by 27 November 2024 but said in the meantime she was unavailable for all drop-in shifts, until a mutual agreement or conclusion was reached. d. On 27 November 2024 the claimant wrote to the respondent to say that she could not do the drop-in visits within the timeframe required by the respondent.

9. The problem for the claimant was that although she had an Indian driving licence and could have obtained a UK driving licence to drive the car that she had access to in the UK, she had unfortunately previously been involved in an accident in India which meant that she did not want to drive again. This left the claimant with few attractive options to enable her to get to her next [NAME] drop-in visit on time, because she chose not to drive the car she had access to.

10. The claimant reasonably couldn’t dictate how long it would take her to travel between [NAME] [NAME] visits, for example according to a public transport timetable. The time travel was dictated by the respondent, considering the needs of the service users, and required the claimant to drive or be driven between visits. 11. [APPELLANT] [NAME] formed the view, which was reasonable given the email exchange described at paragraph 8, that the claimant was refusing to do the drop-in visits within the timeframe required by the respondent. This was [APPELLANT] [NAME]’s reason for the claimant’s dismissal.

12. The claimant submission that there is no written evidence that the claimant refused all drop-in duties misses the crucial point here, which is the claimant was refusing to do all drop-in duties within the timeframe required by the respondent, and she communicated this in her email of 27 November 2024.

13. Having reached this finding, I conclude that the reason or principal reason for dismissal was not because the claimant made a protected disclosure, nor was it because the claimant asserted her statutory right under the Working Time Regulations 1988, nor was it because action was taken, or was proposed to be taken, by or on behalf of the claimant with a view to enforcing or otherwise securing the benefit of a right conferred by the National Minimum Wage Act 1998. It was for the reason set out in paragraphs 6 and 11 above.

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4. Protected Disclosure 14. In fact, the claimant made no such protected disclosure at all. The only protected disclosure relied on for the purposes of this claim is set out in issue 4.2 and is the claimant’s disclosure to ACAS which she told the respondent about on 27 November 2025. The claimant’s own evidence was that she did not provide information of any kind to the respondent about what she said to ACAS, on 27 November 2025. For this reason, the disclosure cannot be protected because no information was disclosed.

5. Unlawful deduction from wages 5.1 Did the respondent fail to pay the claimant the national minimum wage? Were the wages paid to the claimant on the following dates less than the national minimum wage she was entitled to? 5.1.1 19 October 2024; 5.1.2 26 October 2024 5.1.3 13 November 2024. 5.2 How much is the claimant owed? 15. The claimant’s complaint that there has been unlawful deduction from wages due to a failure on the respondent’s part to pay national minimum wage relates to three separate key periods on three separate days, as set out in the heading above. a. Firstly, whether the claimant should have been paid for travel time between [NAME] [NAME] visits. The respondent agrees it has made an unlawful deduction from the claimant’s wages by not paying her travel time in the sum of £48.62. I therefore uphold this claim. b. Secondly, the claimant says she should be entitled to one hour’s travel time from her home to her first client. This claim is not well-founded as travel time between the claimant’s home and place of work is specifically excluded from the national minimum wage calculation under section 27 (c) National Minimum Wage Regulations 2015 (“the NMW Regulations”). c. Thirdly, the claimant says she should be entitled to standby time, which is time that the claimant was not attending [NAME] visits, or travelling, but nonetheless is said to be time when the claimant had to be available at or near her place of work for the purposes of working. As to this claim: i. It is agreed by the respondent that the relevant part of the NMW Regulations that I must consider is section 27 (b). This section provides that hours a worker is available at or near the place of work

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for the purposes of working, unless the worker is at home, count towards hours worked for the purposes of the NMW Regulations. ii. The burden of proof is on the respondent to show that it has complied with this section of the NMW Regulations. iii. The respondent’s own evidence is as follows:

1. On 19 October 2024 the claimant was scheduled to carry out [NAME] [NAME] visits from 7 AM to 9 PM. There were three unpaid breaks between the actual [NAME] [NAME] visits and travel time of: a. 1.45 hours; b. 1.3 hours; and c. two hours.

2. On 26 October 2024 the claimant was scheduled to carry out [NAME] [NAME] visits from 7 AM to 9 PM. There were four unpaid breaks between the actual [NAME] [NAME] visits and travel time of: a. 2.3 hours; b. 1.15 hours; c. 3.3 hours; and d. 2 hours.

3. On 13 October 2024 the claimant was scheduled to carry out [NAME] [NAME] visits between 8 AM and 6 PM. There were three unpaid breaks between the actual [NAME] [NAME] visits and travel time of: a. 2.3 hours; b. 1.15 hours; and c. 2.15 hours. iv. The issue for me is therefore whether the time in between [NAME] visits and travel time on the three days identified by the claimant was when the claimant was available at or near a place of work for the purposes of working and not at home.

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v. [APPELLANT] sent a WhatsApp message to the claimant and other employees doing drop-in [NAME] work, on 28 September 2024, which said ‘can i remind everyone that if you are booked for the drop in visits, you should not organise anything on these days, as if any new packages start they will be automatically added to your booked days.’ vi. The claimant said in evidence that she interpreted this message as him saying that she needed to be on standby throughout the whole shift. vii. Mr [NAME] evidence was that he would always give workers 24 hours’ notice of any new packages of [NAME] that they were required to attend to on their drop-in days. viii. Mr [APPELLANT] accepted that this was not communicated to the claimant. ix. I have decided that it was reasonable of the claimant to conclude that she was required to be on standby on the three drop-in days to pick up any new packages of work, because that is what Mr [NAME] said to her in the WhatsApp message. x. No evidence has been advanced by the respondent to suggest that the claimant was not available or near a place of work for the purposes of working during this time. xi. No evidence has been advanced by the respondent to suggest that the claimant was at home during this time. xii.

I therefore conclude that the claimant was entitled to the unpaid breaks, where she was not attending the [NAME] visits or travelling, on the three days claimed. The figure set out in the judgment to compensate the claimant for this failure was agreed between the parties.

6. Breach of Contract 6.2 Did the respondent do the following: 6.2.1 fail to pay the claimant for a day’s induction training in November 2023; 6.2.2 deduct £53 for the cost of a DBS check in December 2023;

16. The respondent agrees that it breached the claimant’s contract by: a. failing to pay for eight days induction training in November 2023. It is agreed that the claimant is owed £75.55, and

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b. deducting £53 for the cost of a DBS check in December 2023. It is agreed this figure is owed. 6.2.3 in January 2024 pressure the claimant to purchase a car which cost her £2,600? 17. I agree with the respondent that the claimant has not proved any contractual right to a claim of £2,600 for the forced pressure to purchase a car. The claimant had no contractual entitlement under her contract of employment to be paid for the purchase of a car.

7. Claims under the Working Time Regulations 1998 7.1 Did the respondent fail to allow the claimant to take daily rest as required by Regulation 10 of the Working Time Regulations on the following dates: 7.1.1 between 11 and 17 February 2024; 7.1.2 9-10 September 2024; 7.1.3 15-16 October 2024? 18. The claimant’s claim is that the respondent failed to allow the claimant the right to 11 consecutive hours rest in each of the 24-hour periods set out.

19. This claim has been pursued without enthusiasm by the claimant. There is nothing, for example, in the claimant’s closing submissions about this claim.

20. The claimant has not provided enough evidence to satisfy me that there has been a breach of regulation 10 of the Regulations. The claimant accepted that she agreed to work on 10 September 2024, rather than the claimant refusing to allow her to take rest on this day, which undermines her claim.

7.2 Did the respondent interrupt the claimant’s daily rest by telephone calls and, if so, were those telephone calls working time? 21. This is another claim pursued without enthusiasm by the claimant. There is nothing, for example, in the claimant’s closing submissions about this claim.

22. The claimant has not provided enough evidence to satisfy me that there has been a breach of the daily rest provisions in the Regulations. On the contrary, the claimant was simply receiving calls at times when she had indicated she was available regarding extra shifts, and these calls did not amount to working time.

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7.3 Did the respondent fail to allow the claimant rest breaks as required by Regulation 12 of the Working Time Regulations? 23. The eight shifts identified by the claimant all relate to a period where the claimant, along with another staff member, were on duty at the same time caring for resident [NAME], overnight.

24. The allegation relates to the respondent not providing the claimant with an uninterrupted rest break of 30 minutes when working more than six hours, under regulation 12 of the Regulations.

25. The claimant has not provided enough evidence to satisfy me that regulation 12 of the Regulations has been breached.

26. I have accepted [NAME] [NAME]’s evidence, which was clear, honest and supported by common sense, that the claimant could take 30-minute rest breaks during each 12 hour shift as [NAME] was in bed and required only a once every two hour check to ensure she was breathing, but otherwise required very little intervention during the night.

27. There were two members of staff looking after [NAME] overnight.

28. There was therefore plenty of time for the claimant to take a 30-minute rest break.

29. Having reached the conclusions I have in this summary judgment I do not need to determine the time limit point at issue 1.

Approved by: Employment Judge Childe 26 March 2026

Note These are written summary reasons for the judgment. Full written reasons will not be provided unless a party makes a written request within 14 days of the sending of this written record of the decision.

Public access to employment tribunal decisions Judgments (apart from judgments under rule 51) and reasons for the judgments are published, in full, online at www.gov.uk/employment-tribunal-decisions shortly after a copy has been sent to the claimant(s) and respondent(s) in a case.

Case Number: 2500119/2025 v3 10.2.25 1 EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS Claimant: [redacted] Respondent: [redacted] Newcastle (by CVP) On: 9 - 11 March 2026 Before: Employment Judge Childe REPRESENTATION: Claimant: [redacted] Respondent: [redacted]

REASONS Introduction 1. The tribunal gave oral summary reasons at the hearing.

2. A written Judgment was issued to the parties.

3. The claimant requested summary reasons.

4. Those reasons were provided.

5. The claimant has now requested full written reasons.

6. These are those reasons.

7. This is a case where the claimant, a [NAME] who was recruited on a skilled worker visa and is from India, was dismissed by the respondent, a [COMPANY] which provides [NAME] [NAME] services, supporting individuals at home with personal [NAME], daily living tasks, medication support and companionship as

Case Number: 2500119/2025 v3 10.2.25 2 well as assistance in [NAME] homes in Middlesbrough, because she refused to carry out the [NAME] drop-in visits that she was recruited to do, and which she was required to do as a condition of her visa. The claim is also about breach of contract, the rest breaks and daily rest the claimant was given by the respondent and whether the claimant received the national minimum wage for the period between her [NAME] drop-in visits on particular days.

8. I refer to each of the issues that the tribunal had to decide, by reference to the original issue number in the original agreed list of issues, which is appended to this judgment. The parties agreed at the outset of the hearing that these were the issues to be determined.

9. On behalf of the claimant, I heard evidence from the claimant herself. Mr [APPELLANT], the claimant’s husband, produced a witness statement but was not questioned on it. On behalf of the respondent, I heard evidence from [RESPONDENT] [NAME], [NAME] Manager, [RESPONDENT], the registered manager for the respondent, [RESPONDENT], Owner and Director of the respondent and [RESPONDENT], support [NAME] worker employed by the respondent.

10. At the start of the hearing, we discussed the documents available in this case. The claimant was concerned that documents had been added to the bundle by the respondent, without the claimant’s consent. After a discussion, the claimant agreed to us using a 427-page bundle containing all those documents. These were the documents I had reference to at the final hearing.

Case Number: 2500119/2025 v3 10.2.25 3 The Law Automatic unfair dismissal 11. The relevant parts of the following sections of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (“[NAME]”) are as follows: 103A Protected disclosure An employee who is dismissed shall be regarded for the purposes of this Part as unfairly dismissed if the reason (or, if more than one, the principal reason) for the dismissal is that the employee made a protected disclosure. 104 Assertion of statutory right (1) An employee who is dismissed shall be regarded for the purposes of this Part as unfairly dismissed if the reason (or, if more than one, the principal reason) for the dismissal is that the employee— (a) brought proceedings against the employer to enforce a right of his which is a relevant statutory right, or (b) alleged that the employer had infringed a right of his which is a relevant statutory right. (2) It is immaterial for the purposes of subsection (1)— (a) whether or not the employee has the right, or (b) whether or not the right has been infringed; but, for that subsection to apply, the claim to the right and that it has been infringed must be made in good faith.

Case Number: 2500119/2025 v3 10.2.25 4 (3) It is sufficient for subsection (1) to apply that the employee, without specifying the right, made it reasonably clear to the employer what the right claimed to have been infringed was. (4) The following are relevant statutory rights for the purposes of this section— (a) … (b)… (c) … (d) the rights conferred by the Working Time Regulations 1998, …, and (e) ... (5) ... 104A The national minimum wage. (1)An employee who is dismissed shall be regarded for the purposes of this Part as unfairly dismissed if the reason (or, if more than one, the principal reason) for the dismissal is that— (a)any action was taken, or was proposed to be taken, by or on behalf of the employee with a view to enforcing, or otherwise securing the benefit of, a right of the employee’s to which this section applies; or (b) … or (c) … (2)It is immaterial for the purposes of paragraph (a) or (b) of subsection (1) above— (a)whether or not the employee has the right, or (b)whether or not the right has been infringed,

Case Number: 2500119/2025 v3 10.2.25 5 but, for that subsection to apply, the claim to the right and, if applicable, the claim that it has been infringed must be made in good faith. (3)The following are the rights to which this section applies— (a)any right conferred by, or by virtue of, any provision of the National Minimum Wage Act 1998 for which the remedy for its infringement is by way of a complaint to an employment tribunal; and (b)any right conferred by section 17 of the National Minimum Wage Act 1998 (worker receiving less than national minimum wage entitled to additional remuneration).

12. The principal reason is the reason that operated on the employer’s mind at the time of the dismissal: [NAME] v [NAME], Hay and Anderson [1974] ICR 323, CA.

13. S.103A [NAME] requires the protected disclosure to be the ‘primary motivation’ for a dismissal – setting a relatively high bar for a claimant to prove the claim: [APPELLANT] and others v NHS Manchester ([NAME]) [2012] ICR 372, CA. Disclosure qualifying for protection 14. The relevant parts of the following sections of the [NAME] are as follows: 43B Disclosures qualifying for protection (1) In this Part a “qualifying disclosure” means any disclosure of information which, in the reasonable belief of the worker making the disclosure, is made in the public interest and tends to show one or more of the following— (a) that a criminal offence has been committed, is being committed or is likely to be committed, (b) that a person has failed, is failing or is likely to fail to comply with any legal obligation to which he is subject, (c) that a miscarriage of justice has occurred, is occurring or is likely to occur,

Case Number: 2500119/2025 v3 10.2.25 6 (d) that the health or safety of any individual has been, is being or is likely to be endangered, (e) that the environment has been, is being or is likely to be damaged, or (f) that information tending to show any matter falling within any one of the preceding paragraphs has been, is being or is likely to be deliberately concealed. (2) ... (3) ... (4) ... (5) ...

15. As a consequence, for a disclosure to qualify there are five conditions: a. there must be a disclosure of information; b. the worker must believe that the disclosure is made in the public interest; c. such a belief must be reasonably held; d. the worker must believe that the disclosure tends to show one or more of the matters listed in s43B(1) [NAME] – the ‘wrongdoing’; and e. such a belief must be reasonably held. [NAME] v London Borough of Southwark UKEAT/0239/20/JOJ (HHJ Tayler).

16. Turning to the issue of the disclosure of information. The most important principle here is that there must be the disclosure of information as such rather than simply making allegations. The key case in this area is [NAME] [COMPANY] v Geduld [2010] IRLR 38, EAT which says the ordinary meaning of giving information is conveying facts. As [NAME] J put it in that case: ''… the ordinary meaning of giving “information” is conveying facts. In the course of the hearing before us, a hypothetical was advanced regarding communicating information about the state of a hospital. Communicating “information” would be “The wards have not been cleaned for the past two weeks. Yesterday, sharps were left lying around.” Contrasted with

Case Number: 2500119/2025 v3 10.2.25 7 that would be a statement that “You are not complying with Health and Safety requirements”. In our view this would be an allegation not information.'' Unlawful deduction from Wages 17. The relevant parts of the following sections of [NAME] are as follows: 13 Right not to suffer unauthorised deductions (1) An employer shall not make a deduction from wages of a worker employed by him unless— (a) the deduction is required or authorised to be made by virtue of a statutory provision or a relevant provision of the worker’s contract, or (b) the worker has previously signified in writing his agreement or consent to the making of the deduction. (2) … (3) Where the total amount of wages paid on any occasion by an employer to a worker employed by him is less than the total amount of the wages properly payable by him to the worker on that occasion (after deductions), the amount of the deficiency shall be treated for the purposes of this Part as a deduction made by the employer from the worker’s wages on that occasion. (4) ... (5) ... (6) ... (7) ...

18. The relevant part of the National Minimum Wage Act 1998 is as follows: National Minimum Wage Act 1998 s. 28 Reversal of burden of proof.

Case Number: 2500119/2025 v3 10.2.25 8 (2) Where— (a) a complaint is made— (i) to an employment tribunal under section 23(1)(a) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (unauthorised deductions from wages), or (ii) … it shall be presumed for the purposes of the complaint, so far as relating to the deduction of that amount, that the worker in question was remunerated at a rate less than the national minimum wage unless the contrary is established.

19. The relevant part of the National Minimum Wage Regulations 2015 (“the NMW Regulations”) is as follows: Hours treated as worked for the purpose of determining whether the worker works more than the basic hours in the calculation year and, where the worker does, the number of salaried hours work in that year 27.—(1) The hours listed in sub-paragraphs (a) to (c) are treated as worked for the purposes of determining whether the worker works more than the basic hours in the calculation year (in accordance with regulation 26(1)(d)) and, where the worker does, the number of hours of salaried hours work in that year (in accordance with regulation 28)— (a)…; (b)hours a worker is available at or near a place of work for the purposes of working, unless the worker is at home; (c)hours a worker spends travelling for the purposes of working, when the worker would otherwise be working, unless the travelling is between— (i)the worker’s home, or a place where the worker is temporarily residing other than for the purposes of working, and (ii)a place of work or a place where an assignment is carried out. (2) … (3) In paragraph (1)(c), hours treated as hours when the worker would otherwise be working include—

Case Number: 2500119/2025 v3 10.2.25 9 (a)hours when the worker is travelling for the purpose of carrying out assignments to be carried out at different places between which the worker is obliged to travel, and which are not places occupied by the employer; (b)hours when the worker is travelling where it is uncertain whether the worker would otherwise be working because the worker’s hours of work vary either as to their length or in respect of the time at which they are performed. Breach of Contract 20. I have jurisdiction to hear this claim by virtue of section 3 of the Employment Tribunal’s Act 1996. The relevant part of the section provides:

3. Power to confer further jurisdiction on employment tribunals. (1)The appropriate Minister may by order provide that proceedings in respect of— (a)any claim to which this section applies, or (b)any claim to which this section applies and which is of a description specified in the order, may, subject to such exceptions (if any) as may be so specified, be brought before an employment tribunal. (2)Subject to subsection (3), this section applies to— (a)a claim for damages for breach of a contract of employment or other contract connected with employment, (b)a claim for a sum due under such a contract, and (c)a claim for the recovery of a sum in pursuance of any enactment relating to the terms or performance of such a contract, if the claim is such that a court in England and Wales or Scotland would under the law for the time being in force have jurisdiction to hear and determine an action in respect of the claim. (6)In this section a reference to breach of a contract includes a reference to breach of— (a)a term implied in a contract by or under any enactment or otherwise, (b)a term of a contract as modified by or under any enactment or otherwise, and (c)a term which, although not contained in a contract, is incorporated in the contract by another term of the contract.

Case Number: 2500119/2025 v3 10.2.25 10 21. I have jurisdiction to hear this claim by virtue of The Employment Tribunal’s Extension Of Jurisdiction (England and Wales) Order 1994. Section 3 provides: Extension of jurisdiction 3. Proceedings may be brought before an employment tribunal in respect of a claim of an employee for the recovery of damages or any other sum (other than a claim for damages, or for a sum due, in respect of personal injuries) if— (a)the claim is one to which section 131(2) of the 1978 Act applies and which a court in England and Wales would under the law for the time being in force have jurisdiction to hear and determine; (b)the claim is not one to which article 5 applies; and (c)the claim arises or is outstanding on the termination of the employee’s employment. Working Time Regulations 1998 22. The relevant part of the Working Time Regulations 1998 (“the Regulations”) is as follows: Daily rest 10.—(1) A worker is entitled to a rest period of not less than eleven consecutive hours in each 24-hour period during which he works for his employer. (2) ... (3) … Rest breaks 12.—(1) Where a worker's daily working time is more than six hours, he is entitled to a rest break. (2) ... (3) Subject to the provisions of any applicable collective agreement or workforce agreement, the rest break provided for in paragraph (1) is an uninterrupted period of not less than 20 minutes, and the worker is entitled to spend it away from his workstation if he has one.

Case Number: 2500119/2025 v3 10.2.25 11 (4) ... (5) ...

Case Number: 2500119/2025 v3 10.2.25 12 Finding of fact, analysis and conclusion 2. Unfair dismissal 2.1 Was the reason or principal reason for dismissal that the claimant made a protected disclosure? 2.2 Alternatively, was the reason or principal reason for dismissal that the claimant asserted her statutory right under the Working Time Regulations 1988? 2.3 Alternatively, was the reason or principal reason for dismissal that action was taken, or was proposed to be taken, by or on behalf of the claimant with a view to enforcing or otherwise securing the benefit of a right conferred by the National Minimum Wage Act 1998? 23. I find as a fact that the only reason the claimant was dismissed was because she refused to carry out the [NAME] drop-in visits within the timeframe set by the respondent and that she was recruited to do, and which she was required to do as a condition of her visa.

24. I have accepted the evidence of [NAME] [NAME], which was not effectively challenged by the claimant, that this was the reason that the claimant was dismissed. 25. [APPELLANT] [NAME]’s oral evidence is consistent with the relevant documentary evidence available, which is as follows: a. [APPELLANT] [NAME] told the claimant, by email on 12 November 2024, that if she could not attend the [NAME] drop-in visits in the timeframe set by the respondent, which required the claimant to have access to a car, her contract of employment would be terminated. b. On 22 November 2024 [APPELLANT] [NAME] wrote a long letter to the claimant addressing concerns raised by the claimant in a letter of 20 November 2024 and made the following key points: i. Drop-in Shifts: It was clearly communicated that drop-in shifts are an integral part of the role. Any refusal to perform tasks associated with this role, such as drop-in visits, is a breach of the COS regulations for [NAME] workers and home [NAME] workers (Code 6135). ii.

13. Termination of Contract:

Case Number: 2500119/2025 v3 10.2.25 13 If you are unable to fulfil the requirements of the role, including attendance at local areas as specified in the contract, the company will have no choice but to terminate your contract with one week’s notice as per the terms of employment as you seriously breach your employment obligations (sic). Your role in [NAME] [NAME] is critical to ensuring the wellbeing of vulnerable individuals who depend on timely support for their daily needs. Refusal to fulfil your duties, risk breaching safeguarding protocols and endangering client [NAME]. c. On 22 November 2024 the claimant emailed [APPELLANT] [NAME] to say that she would provide a formal response to her letter (referred to in paragraph b above) by 27 November 2024 but said in the meantime she was unavailable for all drop-in shifts, until a mutual agreement or conclusion was reached. d. On 27 November 2024 the claimant wrote to the respondent to say that she could not do the drop-in visits within the timeframe required by the respondent.

26. The claimant had an Indian driving licence. The claimant agreed this in evidence.

27. The claimant could have taken steps to obtain a UK driving license but did not do so. The claimant agreed this in evidence.

28. The claimant had access to a car in the UK. The claimant’s evidence was that she and her husband had bought a car in January 2024 (which she claims in this claim that the respondent should have paid for (see issue 6.2.3 below)).

29. The claimant gave evidence that she had unfortunately previously been involved in an accident in India which meant that she did not want to drive again and therefore did not want to obtain a UK driving licence.

30. This left the claimant with few attractive options to enable her to get to her next [NAME] drop-in visit with the time frame required by the respondent, because she chose not to obtain a UK driving licence and chose not to drive the car she had access to.

31. The claimant couldn’t dictate how long it would take her to travel between [NAME] [NAME] visits, for example according to a public transport timetable. The time travel was dictated by the respondent, considering the needs of the service users, and required the claimant to go quickly to the next [NAME] [NAME] visit. This required the claimant to drive or be driven between visits. 32. [APPELLANT] [NAME] formed the view, which was reasonable given the email exchange described at paragraph 25, that the claimant was refusing to do the drop-in visits

Case Number: 2500119/2025 v3 10.2.25 14 within the timeframe required by the respondent. As I have said at paragraph 23, this was [APPELLANT] reason for the claimant’s dismissal.

33. The claimant submission that there is no written evidence that the claimant refused all drop-in duties misses the crucial point here, which is the claimant was refusing to do all drop-in duties within the timeframe required by the respondent, and she communicated this in her email of 27 November 2024 as set out in paragraph 25. d above.

34. Having reached the finding at paragraph 23, I conclude that the reason or principal reason for dismissal was not because the claimant made a protected disclosure, nor was it because the claimant asserted her statutory right under the Working Time Regulations 1988, nor was it because action was taken, or was proposed to be taken, by or on behalf of the claimant with a view to enforcing or otherwise securing the benefit of a right conferred by the National Minimum Wage Act 1998. It was for the reason set out in paragraph 23 above.

4. Protected Disclosure 4.1 Did the claimant make one or more qualifying disclosures as defined in section 43B of the Employment Rights Act 1996? 4.2 The claimant says they made disclosures on 25 November 2025 to ACAS which she told the respondent about on 27 November 2025. The Tribunal will decide: 4.2.1 Did they disclose information? 4.2.2 Did they believe the disclosure of information was made in the public interest? 4.2.3 Was that belief reasonable? 4.2.4 Did they believe it tended to show that: 4.2.4.1 a person had failed, was failing or was likely to fail to comply with any legal obligation; 4.2.4.2 the health or safety of any individual had been, was being or was likely to be endangered; 4.2.5 Was that belief reasonable? 4.3 If the claimant made a qualifying disclosure, was it made to the claimant’s employer? 4.4 Alternatively, was it made in accordance with the requirements of section 43G of the Employment Rights Act 1996? If so, it was a protected disclosure.

35. The only protected disclosure relied on for the purposes of this claim is set out in issue 4.2 and is the claimant’s disclosure to ACAS which she told the respondent about on 27 November 2025.

Case Number: 2500119/2025 v3 10.2.25 15 36. The claimant’s own evidence was that she did not provide information of any kind to the respondent about what she said to ACAS, on 27 November 2025. This is a key requirement for there to be a protected disclosure to the respondent, as set out in issue 4.2.1.

37. For this reason, the disclosure cannot be protected because no information was disclosed.

5. Unlawful deduction from wages 5.1 Did the respondent fail to pay the claimant the national minimum wage? Were the wages paid to the claimant on the following dates less than the national minimum wage she was entitled to? 5.1.1 19 October 2024; 5.1.2 26 October 2024 5.1.3 13 November 2024. 5.2 How much is the claimant owed? 38. The claimant’s complaint that there has been unlawful deduction from wages due to a failure on the respondent’s part to pay national minimum wage relates to three separate key periods on three separate days, as set out in issues 5.1.1 to 5.1.3. a. Firstly, whether the claimant should have been paid for travel time between [NAME] [NAME] visits. The respondent agrees it has made an unlawful deduction from the claimant’s wages by not paying her travel time in the sum of £48.62. I therefore uphold this claim. b. Secondly, the claimant says she should be entitled to one hour’s travel time from her home to her first client. This claim is not well-founded as travel time between the claimant’s home and place of work is specifically excluded from the national minimum wage calculation under section 27 (1) (c) NMW Regulations (see paragraph 19 above). c. Thirdly, the claimant says she should be entitled to standby time, which is time that the claimant was not attending [NAME] visits, or travelling, but nonetheless is said to be time when the claimant had to be available at or near her place of work for the purposes of working. As to this claim: i. It is agreed by the respondent that the relevant part of the NMW Regulations that I must consider is section 27 (1) (b). This section provides that hours a worker is available at or near the place of work for the purposes of working, unless the worker is at home, count towards hours worked for the purposes of the NMW Regulations.

Case Number: 2500119/2025 v3 10.2.25 16 ii. The burden of proof is on the respondent to show that it has complied with this section of the NMW Regulations, as provided for in s. 28 of the National Minimum Wage Act 1998, referred to in paragraph 18 above. iii. The respondent’s own evidence is as follows:

1. On 19 October 2024, the claimant was scheduled to carry out [NAME] [NAME] visits from 7 AM to 9 PM. There were three unpaid breaks between the actual [NAME] [NAME] visits and travel time of: a. 1.45 hours; b. 1.3 hours; and c. two hours.

3. On 13 October 2024 the claimant was scheduled to carry out [NAME] [NAME] visits between 8 AM and 6 PM. There were three unpaid breaks between the actual [NAME] [NAME] visits and travel time of: a. 2.3 hours; b. 1.15 hours; and c. 2.15 hours. iv. The issue for me is therefore whether the time in between [NAME] visits and travel time on the three days identified by the claimant was when the claimant was available at or near a place of work for the purposes of working and not at home. v. [APPELLANT] sent a WhatsApp message to the claimant and other employees doing drop-in [NAME] work, on 28 September

Case Number: 2500119/2025 v3 10.2.25 17 2024, which said ‘can i remind everyone that if you are booked for the drop in visits, you should not organise anything on these days, as if any new packages start they will be automatically added to your booked days.’ vi. The claimant said in evidence that she interpreted this message as him saying that she needed to be on standby throughout the whole shift. vii. Mr [NAME] evidence was that he would always give workers 24 hours’ notice of any new packages of [NAME] that they were required to attend to on their drop-in days. viii. Mr [APPELLANT] accepted that this was not communicated to the claimant. ix. I have decided that it was reasonable of the claimant to conclude that she was required to be on standby on the three drop-in days to pick up any new packages of work, because that is what Mr [NAME] said to her in the WhatsApp message. x. No evidence has been advanced by the respondent to suggest that the claimant was not available or near a place of work for the purposes of working during this time. xi. No evidence has been advanced by the respondent to suggest that the claimant was at home during this time. xii.

39. The respondent agrees that it breached the claimant’s contract by: d. failing to pay for eight days induction training in November 2023. It is agreed that the claimant is owed £75.55, and e. deducting £53 for the cost of a DBS check in December 2023. It is agreed this figure is owed.

Case Number: 2500119/2025 v3 10.2.25 18 6.2.3 in January 2024 pressure the claimant to purchase a car which cost her £2,600? 40. My role is to determine whether the respondent committed a breach of contract.

41. I do so by firstly constructing the relevant terms of the claimant’s contract of employment and then determining whether the respondent acted in fundamental breach of that contract of employment.

42. The claimant had no contractual entitlement under her contract of employment to be paid for the purchase of a car.

43. The claimant has not been able to identify any other contractual provision; express, implied, given orally or in writing, under which she had the contractual right to be paid for the purchase of a car.

44. It therefore follows that the respondent was not in breach of contract by not paying the claimant £2,600 for the purchase of a car as the claimant had no contractual entitlement to this payment.

7. Claims under the Working Time Regulations 1998 7.1 Did the respondent fail to allow the claimant to take daily rest as required by Regulation 10 of the Working Time Regulations on the following dates: 7.1.1 between 11 and 17 February 2024; 7.1.2 9-10 September 2024; 7.1.3 15-16 October 2024? 45. The claimant’s claim is that the respondent failed to allow the claimant the right to 11 consecutive hours rest in each of the 24-hour periods set out in issues 7.1.1 – 7.1.3.

46. The claimant accepted that she agreed to work on 10 September 2024, rather than the respondent refusing to allow her to take rest on this day.

47. The claimant says in her witness statement my records show that [there are] some [shifts] where the rest between the end of one shift and the start of the next was less than the 11 hours required by the Working Time Regulations. No further evidence was advanced in this regard.

48. The claimant has not provided enough evidence to satisfy me that there has been a breach of regulation 10 of the Regulations.

49. This claim has been pursued without enthusiasm by the claimant. There is nothing, for example, in the claimant’s closing submissions about this claim.

Case Number: 2500119/2025 v3 10.2.25 19 7.2 Did the respondent interrupt the claimant’s daily rest by telephone calls and, if so, were those telephone calls working time? 7.2.1 18 August 2024: 6:03 AM 7.2.2 17 August 2024: 7:30 AM 7.2.3 27 September 2024: 6:51 AM and 6:52 AM 7.2.4 28 September 2024: 5:26 AM and 5:27 AM 7.2.5 10 October 2024: 5:53 AM, 5:54 AM, 7:10 AM, and 7:11 AM 18 October 2024: 7:05 AM and 7:06 AM 7.2.6 27 October 2024: 5:07 AM and 5:08 AM 7.2.7 11 November 2024: 6:33 AM 50. The claimant says in her witness statement across my employment I worked 212 shifts. My records show that there were a number of shifts with zero or minimal recorded breaks. No further evidence was advanced in this regard. T 51. he claimant has not provided enough evidence to satisfy me that there has been a breach of the daily rest provisions in the Regulations.

52. This is another claim pursued without enthusiasm by the claimant. There is nothing, for example, in the claimant’s closing submissions about this claim.

53. I also find that the claimant was simply receiving calls at times when she had indicated she was available regarding extra shifts, and these calls did not amount to working time and therefore the respondent was not interrupting the claimant’s daily rest. 7.3 Did the respondent fail to allow the claimant rest breaks as required by Regulation 12 of the Working Time Regulations? 7.3.1 15 September 2024 7.3.2 14 October 2024 7.3.3 15 October 2024 7.3.4 26 November 2024 7.3.5 28 November 2024 7.3.6 30 November 2024 7.3.7 2 December 2024 7.3.8 3 December 2024? 54. The claimant says in her witness statement On certain days, I worked 12-hour shifts without any proper break. On those days I did not have time to sit down, eat

Case Number: 2500119/2025 v3 10.2.25 20 or rest during the working day. I came home exhausted and depleted. No further evidence was provided.

55. The claimant has not provided enough evidence to satisfy me that regulation 12 of the Regulations has been breached.

56. The eight shifts identified by the claimant in issues 7.3.1 – 7.3.8 all relate to a period where the claimant, along with another staff member, were on duty at the same time caring for resident [NAME], overnight.

57. The allegation relates to the respondent not providing the claimant with an uninterrupted rest break of 30 minutes when working more than six hours, under regulation 12 of the Regulations.

58. I have accepted [NAME] [NAME]’s evidence, which was clear, honest and supported by common sense, that the claimant could take 30-minute rest breaks during each 12 hour shift as [NAME] was in bed sleeping and required only a once every two hour check to ensure she was breathing, but otherwise required very little intervention during the night.

59. There were two members of staff looking after [NAME] overnight.

60. There was therefore plenty of time for the claimant to take a 30-minute rest break.

61. Having reached the conclusions I have in this judgment I do not need to determine the time limit point at issue 1. Approved by: Employment Judge Childe 29 April 2026 Public access to employment tribunal decisions Judgments (apart from judgments under rule 51) and reasons for the judgments are published, in full, online at www.gov.uk/employment-tribunal-decisions shortly after a copy has been sent to the claimant(s) and respondent(s) in a case.

Case Number: 2500119/2025 v3 10.2.25 1

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Claimant: [redacted]

Respondent: [redacted]

REPRESENTATION:

Claimant: [redacted] Respondent: [redacted]

JUDGMENT The judgment of the Tribunal is as follows:

1. The complaint of unfair dismissal is not well-founded and is dismissed.

2. The complaint of unauthorised deductions from wages is well-founded. The respondent made an unauthorised deduction from the claimant's wages in the periods: a. 19 October 2024. b. 26 October 2024. c. 13 November 2024.

3. The respondent shall pay the claimant £284.85, which is the gross sum deducted and is a figure agreed between the parties. The claimant is responsible for the payment of any tax or National Insurance.

4. The complaint that the respondent breached the claimant’s contract by:

Case Number: 2500119/2025 v3 10.2.25 2

a. failing to pay the claimant for a day’s induction training in November 2023; and b. deducting £53 for the cost of a DBS check in December 2023, is agreed by the respondent. The respondent shall pay to the claimant £78.15, which the parties agree is the correct figure of compensation for the breach of contract.

5. The claim that the respondent breached the claimant’s contract by, in January 2024 pressuring the claimant to purchase a car which cost her £2,600, is not well founded and is dismissed.

6. The claim that the claimant was in breach of the Working Time Regulations 1998 is not well founded and is dismissed.

Approved by: Employment Judge Childe 11 March 2026

Note Reasons for the judgment were given orally at the hearing. Written reasons will not be provided unless a party asked for them at the hearing or a party makes a written request within 14 days of the sending of this written record of the decision.