Upper Tribunal Sets Aside Licence Revocation Due to Procedural Unfairness

OUTCOME: Allowed

1

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL

Appeal No. UA-2024-000078-T ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS CHAMBER [2025] UKUT 021 (AAC)

ON APPEAL from A DECISION of the [NAME] for the East of England [NAME]:

[APPELLANT] Appellant

Before: Upper Tribunal Judge Citron, Ms [NAME] and [NAME] date: 20 November 2024 Hearing venue: Field House, Breams Buildings, London EC4

Representation: Appellant: [redacted]

`

2 [COMPANY] UA-2024-000078-T [2025] UKUT 021 (AAC) SUMMARY OF DECISION

Goods Vehicles (Licensing of Operators) Act 1995; appellant’s [NAME]’s licence was revoked by the [NAME] under section 27 by reason the appellant’s nominated transport managers not satisfying the statutory requirements. Held (by a majority): the [NAME]’s direction to revoke was wrong because there had been material procedural unfairness: the [NAME] knew that a transport manager nominated by the appellant had a forthcoming public inquiry at which his good repute was to be considered; the appellant did not know this; the [NAME] did not tell the appellant this and also set the final ‘time limit’ (for expiration of the “period of grace”) a few days before the transport manager’s pubic inquiry, making it inevitable that the [NAME] would have material information at the date of its decision (the outcome of the public inquiry) which had not been available to the appellant prior to the time limit; and the [NAME] then made its direction to revoke on the basis of the outcome of that pubic inquiry (being the disqualification of that transport manager). Revocation direction of the [NAME] set aside; no further order by the Upper Tribunal, as the [NAME]’s revocation direction had been “stayed” and, in the interim, the appellant appeared to have put forward an alternative transport manager who satisfied the statutory requirements.

Please note the Summary of Decision is included for the convenience of readers. It does not form part of the decision. The Decision and Reasons of the Upper Tribunal follow.

`

3 [COMPANY] UA-2024-000078-T [2025] UKUT 021 (AAC) DECISION

The decision of the Upper Tribunal is to allow the appeal. We order that the direction of the [NAME] to revoke [COMPANY] [NAME]’s licence, conveyed in a letter of 22 December 2023, be SET ASIDE.

Subject matter

Revocation of licences Time limits for rectifying the situation (“periods of grace”) Procedural fairness

Cases referred to

[COMPANY] v Secretary of State for Transport [2010] EWCA Civ 695 [COMPANY] [2011] UKUT 358 (AAC) [COMPANY] [2022] UKUT 141 (AAC) [COMPANY] [2019] UKUT 0032 (AAC) R (Iran) v Secretary of State for Home Dept [2005] EWCA Civ 982 [COMPANY] [2024] UKUT 421 (AAC) [COMPANY] [2024] UKUT 425 (AAC)

REASONS FOR DECISION

1. In what follows, (unless the context otherwise indicates) references to “sections” (or “s”) or “Schedules” are to sections of, or schedules to, the Goods Vehicles (Licensing of Operators) Act 1995; and, to avoid having to say “he or she”, the [NAME] (the “[NAME]”) will be referred to as “it”. The revocation direction appealed against 2. The appellant appealed to the Upper Tribunal against a direction of [NAME] revoking the appellant’s [NAME]’s licence and notified to the appellant in a letter dated 22 December 2023 ([NAME]’s case number OF0079657). That letter

`

4 [COMPANY] UA-2024-000078-T [2025] UKUT 021 (AAC) a. noted that, per a letter from the [NAME] (“OTC”) of 24 November 2023, the appellant had been given until 8 December 2023 to complete its applications nominating [NAME] [NAME] and [NAME] [NAME] as transport managers, or to nominate an alternative transport manager; and told that this was the final deadline for the appellant to restore its professional competence; b. noted that the appellant’s response dated 6 December 2023 included the required information in support of Mr [NAME] application, but not in support of Mr [APPELLANT], suggesting that the appellant was not pursuing the latter application; c. stated that the appellant’s application to nominate Mr [APPELLANT] as transport manager had been refused owing to his disqualification as a transport manager with effect from 15 January 2024; d. stated that, in light of the above, [NAME] was not satisfied that the appellant met the requirements of Schedule 3; the extended period of grace had expired; as a result, [NAME] had revoked the appellant’s [NAME]’s licence with effect from 9 January 2024 pursuant to s27(1) on the grounds that it appeared to [NAME] that the appellant no longer satisfied one or more of the requirements of s13A. The letter cited the first and second requirements in s13A (s13A(2) and (3)), which include a requirement of good repute (s13A(2)(b)) and a requirement that the appellant designate a suitable number of individuals (each, a “transport manager”) who satisfy the requirements in paragraph 14A(1) and (3) of Schedule 3 (s13A(3)(b)). (In this decision, for convenience, we shall refer to such transport managers as “Schedule 3 compliant transport managers”).

3. On 13 February 2024, the Upper Tribunal issued a direction “staying” [NAME]’s revocation direction until the appellant’s appeal to the Upper Tribunal was disposed of,. Jurisdiction of the Upper Tribunal 4. The [NAME] of an [NAME]'s licence may appeal to the Upper Tribunal against a revocation direction given under section 27(1), in respect of the licence: s37(2).

`

5 [COMPANY] UA-2024-000078-T [2025] UKUT 021 (AAC)

5. The Upper Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear and determine all matters whether of fact or law for the purpose of the exercise of its functions under an enactment relating to transport. It has the power to make such order as it thinks fit or, in a case where it considers it appropriate, to remit the matter to a [NAME] for rehearing and determination.

6. The Upper Tribunal may not take into consideration any circumstances which did not exist at the time of the determination which is the subject of the appeal.

7. The task for the Upper Tribunal on an appeal is to conclude whether or not, on objective grounds, a different view from that taken by [NAME] is the right one or (meaning the same thing) whether reason and the law impel the Upper Tribunal to take a different view ([NAME] and anor v Secretary of State for Transport [2010] EWCA Civ 695 at [40]). The Upper Tribunal proceedings in this case 8. We had before us a bundle of 203 pages (which included a bundle of 144 pages prepared by OTC), a written skeleton argument of the appellant, a chronology prepared by the appellant, and 73 pages of additional evidence from the appellant.

9. The additional evidence included a letter of 8 March 2024 from the appellant’s solicitors to OTC, referring to the stay granted by the Upper Tribunal, and stating that the appellant wished to add a transport manager to its licence, [APPELLANT]; attached were a copy of a completed from [NAME], a statement by Mr [NAME] about how he would be continuing to manage his hours, and qualification and refresher training certificates from 2009 and 2021. There was also a printout dated 26 March 2024 from the OTC’s system, indicating that an online application had been made in respect of Mr [NAME].

10. We are grateful to Mr [NAME] for his submissions on the appeal and his clearly and carefully presented documentary material.

11. Mr [NAME] also sent the Upper Tribunal, at the same time as his skeleton argument, written “submissions relating to stay”. We note the following: a. the issue of “stay” was not before the Upper Tribunal in the hearing of the appeal itself; nor did the case management directions require or envisage submissions on that issue; however,

`

6 [COMPANY] UA-2024-000078-T [2025] UKUT 021 (AAC) b. in granting a stay at an earlier stage in the proceedings, Upper Tribunal Judge Mitchell had given as one of the reasons, that the Upper Tribunal may wish to address doubts expressed by [NAME], at the stay stage, as to the correctness of the Upper Tribunal’s decision in [NAME] (and if the appellant went out of business before the appeal was heard (on account of no stay having been granted), leading to withdrawal of the appeal, that opportunity would be lost); and the appellant had interpreted that as meaning that issues relating to stay would or could be considered in the Upper Tribunal’s appeal decision. Our view is that because the pre-hearing case management of this appeal has not envisaged a hearing of the “stay” issues at the appeal stage (by, for example, inviting observations from [NAME]), it would not be fair and just for us to give our views on those issues. We therefore decline to do so. Background about the appellant 12. The appellant’s business is the production, storage and distribution of its own farm produce, in particular potatoes, rhubarb and carrots; and the storage and distribution of farm produce, in particular potatoes, sugar and grain, for third party customers. The appellant remains a family business. As part of its distribution process, the appellant runs a fleet of lorries, employing five drivers and two workshop members of staff.

13. The appellant obtained its [NAME]’s licence in 1993. Events leading up to [NAME]’s direction to revoke 14. On 25 March 2023, the appellant’s transport manager, who had been in post since 2015, unfortunately died, after a short illness. OTC was informed on 28 March 2023.

15. On 1 April 2023 OTC wrote to the appellant under the heading, “Loss of transport manager”. The opening paragraph stated in bold type that failure to address the concerns raised in the letter would result in [NAME] revoking the licence; it said that this applied even if the appellant had already submitted an application to nominate a new transport manager which had not yet been granted by [NAME]. The letter cited s27(1) and stated that it appeared to [NAME] that the second requirement in s13A was no longer satisfied (designating a suitable number of Schedule 3 compliant transport managers). It said that the letter was notification

`

7 [COMPANY] UA-2024-000078-T [2025] UKUT 021 (AAC) under s27(2) that [NAME] was considering giving a revocation direction under s27(1). It said that the appellant could make written representations to [NAME], by 22 April 2023. It said that s29(1) allowed the appellant to request a public inquiry, in order to offer further evidence as to why the licence should not be revoked. It said that the representations could include an application to add a replacement transport manager to the licence. It said that [NAME] may consider granting a period of grace to enable the appellant to find a replacement or whilst its nomination of a new transport manager was being considered – but the appellant had to ask.

16. On 18 April 2023 the appellant wrote to OTC asking for a period of grace to allow the appellant to complete its plan over the next six months. That plan involved the appellant’s longstanding general manager, Mr [APPELLANT], attending a course in May 2023 to qualify as a transport manager; and the appellant seeking to employ a suitable candidate in the next few weeks whilst Mr [NAME] completed the course. Once Mr [NAME] passed the course, he would take over the day to day responsibilities and develop the role through CPD on a continuous basis.

17. On 15 May 2023 OTC wrote to the appellant giving a period of grace until 12 August 2023.

18. On 20 July 2023 the appellant wrote to OTC saying that Mr [APPELLANT] had failed part of the course for qualifying as a transport manager. It said that he was booked to re-sit the exam on 2 October 2023. The appellant asked OTC to grant “the full 9 months grace period” to allow him to retake the exam and receive the results. It said that they had been conducting interviews with prospective candidates to fill the position, regardless of [NAME]’s results, and would have someone in place before the end of September.

19. On 24 July 2023 OTC wrote to the appellant saying that the period of grace would now end on 12 November 2023.

20. On or around 30 October 2023, the appellant submitted an application to add Mr [APPELLANT] as a transport manager. OTC wrote to the appellant on 31 October 2023 saying that the application was incomplete (including that Mr [NAME] had attained his relevant certificate more than 10 years ago).

21. On 9 November 2023, the appellant submitted an application to add Mr [APPELLANT] as transport manager.

`

8 [COMPANY] UA-2024-000078-T [2025] UKUT 021 (AAC)

22. On 24 November 2023, OTC wrote to the appellant, referring to its application to nominate Mr [APPELLANT] and Mr [NAME] as transport managers; the letter said that [NAME] had declined to accept the nominations, as both required additional information/documents. The letter said that the appellant’s extended period of grace had expired on 12 November; it said that “this may be the final deadline the [NAME] will grant you to restore your professional competence”. It said that the information had to be provided by 8 December 2023. The letter said that the issue with regard to Mr [NAME] was that his certificate was more than 10 years old. It said that he needed to provide details of any professional development undertaken, or the appellant needed to offer an undertaking for Mr [APPELLANT] to attend training within three months. The letter said that the issues with regard to Mr [NAME] were (i) the proposed working hours for him were less than OTC recommended (ii) he had other responsibilities which might impact his availability; under this heading, the letter also said that Mr [NAME] had ongoing issues due to his involvement with a previous licence; in the following line, it said Mr [NAME] was involved with another licence with adverse history (iii) OTC needed more information about the arrangement between the appellant and Mr [APPELLANT]. The letter said that what the appellant had to do as regards Mr [APPELLANT] was (1) for him to confirm that he would be dedicating a minimum number of hours to reflect the licence’s vehicle authorisation (2) for him to provide a document explaining how he would meet the requirements of the role, to ensure continuous and effective management of the appellant’s and any other licence he was specified on and (3) upload the contract for services signed by Mr [APPELLANT] and the appellant.

23. OTC’s letter of 22 December 2023 stated that the appellant’s response to OTC’s 24 November 2023 letter, dated 6 December 2023, included the required information in support of Mr [NAME] application (but not Mr [APPELLANT]). One of the documents uploaded to OTC by the appellant on 6 December 2023 was a one- page document signed by Mr [NAME] on 4 December 2023, which states, under the heading “Statement of Fact”: “It is known to [NAME] regarding issues with previous company that I was external transport manager. This being [COMPANY]. There was almost no knowledge of what was happening within the business, as the director kept everyone at arm’s length, and decided to deal with issues themselves. As a result, I am now undertaking a transport manager refresher (2 day) from Thursday 7th – Friday 8th December, with National Compliance Training. Meeting with [NAME] on Monday 11th December.”

`

9 [COMPANY] UA-2024-000078-T [2025] UKUT 021 (AAC)

24. An internal OTC memo from 14 November 2023, created by a member of staff, includes that [NAME] had ongoing compliance issues, including a pending public inquiry due to be held on 11 December 2023; it was called specifically due to Mr [NAME] reluctance to attend a ‘PH’ that was set for October 2023; the memo said that good repute was in question in the inquiry on 11 December.

25. An internal OTC memo from later the same day, created by the OTC decision- maker, includes the observation that the second application, to add Mr [NAME], was more problematic (than the application for Mr [NAME]), as not only would [NAME] require additional evidence in relation to how he intends to maintain continuous and effective control, but in addition he was due to attend a transport manager only public inquiry (on 11 December) and his repute remains in question. The internal memo indicates that the decision-maker envisaged a final extension of 14 days to complete the applications in their entirety or nominate a suitable alternative.

26. An internal OTC memo from 19 December 2023 says, amongst other things, that Mr [NAME] apparently chose not to attend the public inquiry on 11 December; and the deputy [NAME] disqualified him to take effect on 15 January 2024. Events subsequent to [NAME]’s direction to revoke 27. The appellant’s solicitors wrote to [NAME] on 4 January 2024 seeking reconsideration of [NAME]’s direction to revoke. This represented that the appellant did not appreciate (and had not been told by Mr [APPELLANT]) that Mr [NAME] “meeting” with [NAME] on 11 December 2023 (as Mr [NAME] described it in the document he signed on 4 December 2023) was in fact a public inquiry at which his good repute was at issue.

28. The letter said that the appellant had taken steps to identify a suitable alternative candidate for transport manager, Mr [NAME], who was available and qualified; in the alternative, it asked for a public inquiry.

29. OTC responded on 5 January 2024, refusing the appellant’s requests, other than extending the date on which revocation would take effect, to 22 January 2024. The appellant’s case in brief 30. The appellant’s grounds of appeal were:

`

10 [APPELLANT] UA-2024-000078-T [2025] UKUT 021 (AAC) a. [NAME] paid insufficient regard to relevant matters which militated against revocation in this case (such as prior conduct, the reason why there was no transport manager, and conduct since the loss of the transport manager); b. the decision to revoke was unlawful because the declared ground of revocation was not known to law; (this was because [NAME]’s letter of 22 December 2024 referred to a failure by the appellant itself to be professionally competent (tracking section 13A(3)(a)), rather than a failure to designate one or more Schedule 3 compliant transport managers (and so track s13A(3)(b)) (emphasis in italic and bold by us); c. the decision to revoke was unlawful because there was no effective opportunity to make written representations because: i. revocation took place on a different ground to that of which notice had been given (the reason given in the 22 December 2024 letter was the appellant’s own lack of professional competence (as opposed to the failure to designate suitable transport managers – see b. above)); ii. [NAME] failed in his duty to seek written representations at the time of the decision to revoke (due to the long gap between [NAME]’s letter inviting representations as required under s27(3) (1 April 2023) and the making of the decision to revoke (over eight months later), natural justice required that the appellant be given an opportunity to comment on the reasons the efforts to rectify the situation had failed, and any culpability in that regard); d. [NAME] was wrong to revoke without first granting the [NAME] a further period of grace (up to the maximum nine months permitted by law); e. it was unlawful to revoke without first holding a public inquiry (natural justice compelled the holding of a public inquiry in this case); f. it was unlawful to revoke without giving sufficient reasons; g. it was unlawful to revoke because it was a disproportionate to do so.

`

11 [APPELLANT] UA-2024-000078-T [2025] UKUT 021 (AAC)

31. The appellant submitted that if the appeal were allowed, the Upper Tribunal should simply quash the revocation direction (and make no further order); this was on the basis that a. Mr [APPELLANT] had been acting as the appellant’s transport manager since January 2024; b. Mr [APPELLANT] clearly met the criteria in Schedule 3; c. Mr [NAME] application (to be appointed as a transport manager for the appellant) has been pending since April (2024); and d. the appellant’s good compliance record has continued. Was [NAME]’s direction to revoke wrong? 32. The statutory scheme relevant to the events set out above is that of sections 27 and 29: [NAME] is required by statute to direct revocation of a licence where, amongst other things, the licence-[NAME] no longer has a Schedule 3 compliant transport manager; the statute itself sets out certain procedural requirements, such as the giving of notice by [NAME], with its grounds; a 21-day period for the licence [NAME] to make representations, which [NAME] must consider; a power of [NAME] to set a time limit (not to exceed, in this case, 9 months after the giving of notice by [NAME]) for the licence [NAME] to rectify the situation, with a prohibition on [NAME] making the direction if the licence [NAME] rectifies the situation within the time limit (the period up to the end of the time limit is known as a “period of grace”); and the right of the licence [NAME] to require that [NAME] first hold an inquiry (known as a “public inquiry”).

33. In this case, a period of grace was granted, albeit in increments – ultimately, the time limit set by [NAME] was 8 December 2023 – and the way in which the appellant was trying to “rectify the situation” was to designate one or more Schedule 3 compliant transport managers. In a nutshell, [NAME]’s reasoning for directing revocation was that, by the time limit, no Schedule 3 compliant transport manager had been designated. That was because, in simple terms, the appellant had not, following [NAME]’s letter of 24 November 2023, pursued the nomination of Mr [APPELLANT] – and [NAME] had decided that Mr [APPELLANT], the appellant’s other candidate, did not meet the Schedule 3 requirements owing to his imminent disqualification as a transport manager.

`

12 [COMPANY] UA-2024-000078-T [2025] UKUT 021 (AAC)

34. We note case law that shows that the onus was on the appellant to persuade [NAME] that its transport manager candidates were Schedule 3 compliant: a. “The starting point for consideration of this issue is that in the case of an applicant for an [NAME]’s licence, who nominates a transport manager, or the nomination of a new transport manager by an existing [NAME], it is for the applicant or [NAME] to satisfy the [NAME] that the person concerned can fulfil the role of transport manager.” [COMPANY] [2011] UKUT 358 (AAC) (under the Public Passenger Vehicles Act 1981) at [15]; b. “We reject the proposition that an [NAME] can simply designate a new transport manager and acquire professional competence from that moment without reference to a [NAME] (the something else to be done). Operators will not be professionally competent unless the proposed transport manager is formally nominated and a [NAME] is satisfied of all the required matters whether at the outset when an application for a licence is applied for or when the [NAME] is proposing to replace or add a transport manager or has lost professional competence and is given a period of grace to rectify the position within the period given ...” [COMPANY] [2022] UKUT 141 (AAC) at [37]; c. “It is for the [NAME] to determine within the period allowed whether to request a public inquiry or make representations (including the nomination of a new transport manager) and/or request a period of grace”. [NAME] at [39]. The decision of the majority of the panel

35. As we have been unable to reach a unanimous decision, what follows in this sub- section is the reasoning of the majority of the panel (Judge Citron and Ms [NAME]) – which, under regulation 8 of the First-tier Tribunal and Upper Tribunal (Composition of Tribunal) Order 2008, is the decision of the Upper Tribunal. In the following sub-section, the views of the minority (Mr [APPELLANT]) are summarised.

36. The strand of the appellant’s case which the majority has found persuasive is that which points to unfairness in the procedure which culminated in [NAME] directing revocation because Mr [NAME] was not a Schedule 3 compliant transport manager. There are two aspects to the procedure followed by [NAME], following the appellant’s nomination of Mr [APPELLANT] in mid-November 2023, that appear to the majority of the panel unfair, both linked to the fact that [NAME] knew that Mr

`

13 [COMPANY] UA-2024-000078-T [2025] UKUT 021 (AAC) [NAME] had a public inquiry on 11 December 2023 at which his good repute was to be considered: a. first, that [NAME] did not share this important information with the appellant (or confirm that the appellant was aware of it) at any time prior to the time limit set by [NAME]; and b. second, that [NAME] set a time limit that fell three days before [NAME]’s public inquiry was due to be held.

37. The reason the first aspect above is, in the majority’s view, procedurally unfair is based on the following factual findings, which we make unanimously a. the fact that, prior to the time limit, the appellant did not know this important information; in making this finding, we note that in the letter to the appellant of 24 November 2023, OTC stated that Mr [APPELLANT] had ongoing issues due to his involvement with a previous licence with adverse history – however, this omits the important details of the forthcoming public inquiry at which Mr [NAME] good repute was at issue; we also note Mr [NAME] statement in his 4 December 2023 document that he had a meeting with [NAME] on 11 December 2023 – this too omits important details; and we accept the appellant’s evidence that it did not know that what Mr [APPELLANT] had on that date was a public inquiry in which his good repute was at issue; b. the fact that the outcome of Mr [NAME] public inquiry was determinative of [NAME]’s decision to direct revocation; and c. our finding, based on all the circumstances of the case and the statutory framework as described above, that if the appellant had known this information prior to the time limit, it would have taken steps that could well have changed the outcome, including one or more of the following: i. withdrawing Mr [NAME] nomination and instead pursuing that of Mr [NAME] by providing what was required in that regard in [NAME]’s letter of 24 November 2023; ii. requiring that [NAME] hold a public inquiry;

`

14 [COMPANY] UA-2024-000078-T [2025] UKUT 021 (AAC) iii. requesting that [NAME] extend the period of grace (the maximum 9 month period would have been until the beginning of January 2024).

38. In the view of the majority of the panel, the procedural unfairness in the context of the findings above is essentially that [NAME]’s decision was made on the basis of information that it had, but the appellant did not; and that, had the appellant had the information, it is reasonable to suppose that the outcome would have been different (because the appellant would have nominated a Schedule 3 compliant transport manager by the time limit, or by the time of the holding of a public inquiry).

39. In the majority’s view, the second aspect of procedural unfairness identified at paragraph 36 above – [NAME]’s setting the time limit three days before [NAME]’s public inquiry – stands in addition to the first. In other words, even if the appellant had, in fact, known, prior to the time limit, about Mr [NAME] forthcoming public inquiry, it would still have been procedurally unfair to set the time limit at three days prior to that inquiry. This is because, even though, prior to the time limit, the appellant knew about Mr [APPELLANT] public inquiry, it did not know (and could not possibly have known) its outcome; and the outcome was determinative of [NAME]’s revocation direction. The procedural unfairness is that the time limit set made it inevitable that [NAME] would have information before it, when deciding whether to direct revocation, that the appellant did not have (and could not have had) prior to the time limit. To put it in positive terms: given the importance of the outcome of Mr [NAME] public inquiry to [NAME]’s decision as to whether to direct revocation, procedural fairness required that the appellant be given chance to react to it (including by one of the steps at paragraph 37c above), prior to the making of any decision by [NAME]; this could have been achieved by setting a later time limit (to the extent allowed by law) and/or holding a public inquiry.

40. In that regard, we note the Upper Tribunal’s decision in [COMPANY] [2019] UKUT 0032 (AAC) where, in a complex factual matrix that engaged the same statutory framework as this case, it was held (at [34]) that “the circumstances and matters of fairness dictated that a PI ought to have been held”.

41. As to whether the procedural unfairness we have identified engages our jurisdiction, we believe it does: we have jurisdiction to hear an appeal against [NAME]’s revocation direction; and, in the words of R (Iran) v Secretary of State for Home Dept [2005] EWCA Civ 982 at [9], “committing or permitting a procedural

`

15 [COMPANY] UA-2024-000078-T [2025] UKUT 021 (AAC) or other irregularity capable of making a material difference to the outcome or fairness of the proceedings” is a legal error; indeed, it is well established in appeals of this kind that breaches of the rules of natural justice in the procedure adopted by [NAME] render [NAME]’s decision wrong and susceptible to set-aside. Here, the unfairness (in the view of the majority) in the procedure leading to the revocation direction (and which was material to the making of that direction) means that the direction itself was in error of law.

42. It follows from the above that [NAME]’s decision was, in the view of the majority (and therefore of the Upper Tribunal), legally flawed and so wrong, and falls to be set aside. Summary view of the minority of the panel

43. The view of the minority, in summary, is that, viewed in context, [NAME]’s decision to revoke the appellant’s licence did not involve material procedural unfairness. The contextual facts on which the minority places particular weight are: a. the fact that on 20 July 2023 the appellant told OTC that it was conducting interviews and would have a transport manager in place before the end of September b. the fact that OTC had consistently urged the appellant to take action and that the result of failure to take action within the time limit would be revocation of the appellant’s licence c. the fact that, despite this, the appellant’s nominations of Mr [APPELLANT] and Mr [APPELLANT] were made very close to the expiry of the period of grace granted d. the fact that the appellant did not explain to OTC why Mr [APPELLANT] nomination was not pursued, following OTC’s letter of 24 November 2023 e. the fact that (as stated in the appellant’s grounds of appeal) Mr [APPELLANT] had worked for the appellant between 2009 and 2017.

44. The minority takes the view that, even though [NAME] had, and relied on, information that the appellant did not, that was not procedurally unfair, as it was for the licence-[NAME] to discover, by its own diligence, relevant information about its nominated transport managers, including, in this case, the information about Mr [NAME] known to OTC.

`

16 [COMPANY] UA-2024-000078-T [2025] UKUT 021 (AAC) Disposal

45. Having decided to allow the appeal and set aside the revocation direction for error of law, we have considered whether to make any further order. We note that because a stay was granted in this case, our allowing the appeal and setting aside the revocation direction continues, rather than alters, the status quo. On the evidence before us, the appellant has made reasonable endeavours to designate Mr [APPELLANT] as its transport manager. We agree with the appellant’s submission that it is unnecessary for us to make any further orders, as it will now be for [NAME] to respond, if it has not done so already, to that nomination. We are aware that in [COMPANY] [2024] UKUT 421 (AAC) and [COMPANY] [2024] UKUT 425 (AAC) (published on 18 December 2024 and 8 January 2025 respectively i.e. subsequent to the hearing of this appeal), the Upper Tribunal, in factual matrices engaging the same statutory framework as this case, did make orders upon allowing the appeal; but it seems to us that was the result of the different facts in those cases, including that there had been no stay of [NAME]’s revocation directions in those cases.

46. In the light of the above, it is unnecessary for us to consider the appellant’s other arguments and grounds. We would however make clear that we did not accept the argument that the revocation direction was in error of law by reason of the 22 December 2023 letter seemingly referring to a failure to satisfy s13A(3)(a) (because it referred to the appellant itself not being professionally competent), when that provision could not apply, given that the appellant was not an individual; in our view, it was obvious from the context that the provision being invoked was s13A(3)(b) (which applies to companies, and cross refers to the requirements of Schedule 3, which include the professional competence of the designated transport managers). The letter expressed itself clumsily; but that does not in our view amount to a material legal error, as the context made clear what was meant.

Zachary Citron

Judge of the Upper Tribunal

[NAME] [NAME] Members of the Upper Tribunal

Authorised by the Judge for issue on 20 January 2025