Claimant Loses Appeal for CPP Disability Pension Due to Lack of Evidence

OUTCOME: Dismissed

Citation: SA  v  [RESPONDENT] and [NAME] , 2026  [NAME]  241 Social Security Tribunal of Canada Appeal Division Decision Appellant: [redacted] Representative: C. A. Respondent: [redacted] [RESPONDENT] and [NAME] under appeal: General Division decision dated October 24, 2025 (GP-25-1554) Tribunal member: [NAME] of hearing: Videoconference Hearing date: May 19, 2026 Hearing participants: Appellant Appellant’s representative Respondent’s representatives Decision date: June 8, 2026 File number: AD-25-736 On this page Decision Overview Issue Analysis Conclusion Decision [ 1 ] I am dismissing this appeal. The Appellant is not entitled to a [NAME] ( [NAME] ) [NAME] pension. Overview [ 2 ] The Appellant worked in the water department of a [NAME] for more than 30 years. Prior to his departure, he experienced workplace conflict in his role as a foreman, coinciding with the onset of depression and anxiety. He went on stress leave in March 2021 and has not worked since. He is now 57 years old. [ 3 ] The Appellant applied for a [NAME] [NAME] pension in July 2023. Footnote 1 In his application, he said that he was disabled from work by multiple sclerosis (MS), as well as mental Illness, including depression and anxiety. [ 4 ] Service Canada, the Minister’s public-facing agency, refused the application initially and on reconsideration after finding that the Appellant did not have a severe and prolonged [NAME]. In particular, Service Canada pointed to medical opinions indicating that the Appellant was likely to get better. Footnote 2 [ 5 ] The Appellant appealed Service Canada’s refusal to the Social Security Tribunal. The Tribunal’s General Division refused to consider the appeal after finding that it had been filed more than a year after the Service Canada issued its reconsideration decision. [ 6 ] The Appellant then applied for permission to appeal to the Appeal Division. In December 2025, one of my colleagues on the Appeal Division granted the Appellant permission to appeal. A few months later, the Minister conceded that the Appellant’s appeal to the General Division had been filed on time. Footnote 3 [ 7 ] Last month, I held a de novo hearing to discuss the merits of the Appellant’s [NAME] claim. Issue [ 8 ] For the Appellant to succeed, he had to prove that, more likely than not, he had a severe and prolonged [NAME] during his coverage period. A [NAME] is severe if it makes a claimant incapable regularly of pursuing any substantially gainful occupation. Footnote 4 A claimant isn’t entitled to a [NAME] pension if they are regularly able to do some kind of work that allows them to earn a living. A [NAME] is prolonged if it is likely to be long continued and of indefinite duration or is likely to result in death. Footnote 5 The [NAME] must be expected to keep the claimant out of the workforce for a long time. [ 9 ] The parties agreed that the Appellant’s coverage period will end on December 31, 2027. Footnote 6 As a result, I had to decide whether the Appellant has a severe and prolonged [NAME] as of the hearing date. Analysis [ 10 ] Now that I have considered submissions from both parties, I have concluded that the Appellant does not qualify for a [NAME] [NAME] pension. The evidence shows that, although he is subject to some functional limitations, he does not have a severe or prolonged [NAME]. The Appellant does not have severe [NAME] [ 11 ] [NAME] bear the burden of proving that they have a severe and prolonged [NAME]. Footnote 7 I have reviewed the record, I have concluded that the Appellant did not meet that burden according to the test set out in the [NAME] . [ 12 ] In his application for benefits, the Appellant said that, as a result of MS, he experienced numbness in his left hip, leg, and foot. He lacked balance and could not stand or walk for long periods of time. He sometimes used a cane or wore a foot brace. [ 13 ] He added that, as well as anxiety and depression, he suffered from extreme fatigue, loss of focus, nerve pain, bowel issues, and blurry vision. [ 14 ] The Appellant testified that he worked for the [NAME] for 35 years. For the last 12 of those years, he was a foreman in the water department. The job came with a car, a nice office, and a lot of responsibility. [ 15 ] Things started to go downhill when his department changed leadership. The new boss was not a good manager, and he was not well liked. For nearly two years, the Appellant said, he had to act as go-between between his staff and the new boss. Managing office politics was not a role that he enjoyed, and he felt that, in doing so, he went above and beyond the call of duty. [ 16 ] So, he was dismayed when, one day in March 2021, his boss made a big issue out of an innocuous remark that he had made in the presence of a young female co-worker. No one, including his colleague was offended, but his boss nevertheless reprimanded him for it. The Appellant was so upset by what he regarded as his boss’s “showboating” that he consulted his [NAME]. [ 17 ] He followed Dr. [NAME] advice to take some time off. He intended to go back after a week, but when the time came, he just couldn’t do it: “I was crying like a baby.” From there, everything got worse. He used up all his sick time and in February 2024 took early retirement. [ 18 ] He hasn’t looked for a job since. He knows he wouldn’t be able to perform regularly because his symptoms are so unpredictable. Some days, he can’t out of bed. He’s a man’s man, and he’d love to go back to work if he could, but he can’t. Footnote 8 [ 19 ] Although the Appellant may feel that he is disabled, I must base my decision on more than just his subjective view of his capacity. Footnote 9 In this case, the evidence, looked at as a whole, does not suggest a severe impairment that prevents him from performing suitable work. The Appellant’s [NAME] didn’t rule out all work [ 20 ] It was up to the Appellant to produce objective medical evidence demonstrating his incapacity to regularly pursue substantially gainful [RESPONDENT]. Footnote 10 He failed to do so. Despite his physical and mental functional limitations, he retains work capacity. The Appellant’s MS produces only mild symptoms [ 21 ] The Appellant has been diagnosed with relapsing remitting MS, but that doesn’t necessarily mean he is precluded from substantial gainful [RESPONDENT]. Footnote 11 Diagnosis cannot be equated with [NAME]; I have to look at whether the diagnosis produces functional limitations. Footnote 12 [ 22 ] In November 2023, the Appellant saw a neurologist after experiencing weakness and numbness in his left leg and foot. Footnote 13 Dr. [APPELLANT] [NAME] diagnosed the Appellant with MS but observed relatively mild and localized symptoms. He was able to walk, for instance, without the use of a leg brace. He could flex his left ankle and briefly stand on his toes and heels. His gait noticeably improved when he thought no one observing him. Footnote 14 [ 23 ] Dr. [NAME] added, “I explained that I think he has real left leg symptoms, but I also think there is a psychological component. He has almost no ankle movement on exam but when demonstrating his physiotherapy exercises, he was able to dorsiflex and plantar flex the foot. He could briefly stand on his toes and his heels. His gait looks psychogenic.” Footnote 15 [ 24 ] Most notably, Dr. [NAME] did not rule out a return to work: “I explained that a diagnosis of MS does not automatically qualify [the Appellant] for [NAME] benefits. I explained that many of my MS patients are not disabled.” Footnote 16 Later, she wrote: His prognosis for recovery is good. I think it's possible for the left leg to return to normal. He may also be left with permanent sensory symptoms and mild ankle/foot weakness. My understanding is that he has no plans to return to work and is receiving his pension. If he desires, he is able to return to some form of [RESPONDENT]. He would not be able to walk long distances, but he is able to walk in and out of a building and from room to room. Footnote 17 [ 25 ] I find it difficult to disregard Dr. [NAME] rather unequivocal opinion, which at the very least suggests that the Appellant had residual work capacity, despite some limitations. At the hearing, the Appellant adamantly denied Dr. [APPELLANT] suggestion that he may have been “embellishing” his symptoms, but I have no reason to believe a medical professional would offer anything other than an objective account of what she had observed. [ 26 ] Dr. [NAME] also saw scope for further recovery through various treatment options. As we will see, the Appellant did not fully avail himself of those options. The Appellant’s mental health does not significantly contribute to a [NAME] [ 27 ] A [NAME]’s condition must be considered in totality. Footnote 18 The Appellant’s primary heath condition appears to be MS, but I also have to look at how his psychological issues affect his ability to perform some form of regular work. However, the available medical evidence indicates that his depression and anxiety are mild, situational, and treatable. [ 28 ] In May 2023, the Appellant was seen by a psychiatrist for an independent medical evaluation. Footnote 19 Dr. [APPELLANT] noted that the Appellant was depressed by the loss of his job, adding that he was “normally very resilient and able to handle adversity and stress.” Dr. [APPELLANT] diagnosed the Appellant with major depressive disorder (single episode), suggesting that with aggressive treatment, there would be no reoccurrence. While he was guarded on the Appellant’s ability to return to his previous [RESPONDENT], [NAME] underscored his positive work history as a mitigating factor. [ 29 ] Four months later, the Appellant underwent another one-time psychiatric assessment. Footnote 20 Dr. [APPELLANT] [NAME] diagnosed the Appellant with major depressive disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, social anxiety disorder, panic disorder with agoraphobia, and insomnia. He said that the Appellant would be competitively disadvantaged in the workplace given his difficulties coping with work-like demands such as sustaining concentration, interpersonal functioning, and work-like demeanour. Dr. [APPELLANT] found the Appellant was “currently” unable to engage in any suitable [RESPONDENT], but he also determined that the Appellant had not yet achieved maximum psychiatric recovery and that further treatment was possible. The Appellant has not taken reasonable steps to get better [ 30 ] The Appellant bases his claim on MS and mental health conditions, but there are indications in the file that he didn’t fully comply with treatment advice. This matters, because there may have been unrealized scope for improvement in his psychological condition. [ 31 ] A case called  [NAME] says that [NAME] claimants must comply with their doctors’ recommendations. Footnote 21 It also requires [NAME] to consider whether a claimant’s refusal of recommended treatment is reasonable and, if not what impact that refusal is likely to have on the claimant’s [NAME]. Footnote 22 [ 32 ] In this case, the Appellant has repeatedly declined, abandoned, or failed to follow through with recommended medical treatment. I don’t doubt the Appellant has significant health condition, but he has not taken basic steps to try to get better. [ 33 ] As noted, Dr. [APPELLANT] was optimistic about the Appellant’s MS, and she suggested that his left leg might return to normal. Footnote 23 However, this prognosis was contingent on him pursuing drug therapy. The Appellant consented to one injection of [APPELLANT] but declined further treatment after experiencing side effects. He refused to try any suggested alternative: “He […] does not want to be on MS treatment.” Footnote 24 [ 34 ] At the hearing, I asked the Appellant to respond to Dr. [APPELLANT] account. He said that she didn’t like him and discharged him after her treatment didn’t work. He said that his leg swelled up after the first injection of [NAME], and he didn’t want to take it anymore, especially since it cost $10,000 per month and it was only partly covered by his drug plan. He noted that, besides medication, he had tried physiotherapy, massage, chiropractic, and exercise. He denied ruling out taking another drug. [ 35 ] I found it hard to believe that Dr. [APPELLANT] discharged the Appellant without cause. In fact, she made it clear that she stopped seeing him because he became abusive after she refused to fully support his [NAME] claim. Footnote 25 She insisted that his condition was likely to improve if he took the drugs that she prescribed. I don’t have any independent information on how much [NAME], or drugs of that class, cost in Canada, nor can I be sure how much of the Appellant’s private benefits covered it. However, I do note that Dr. [NAME] did not mention financial concerns in any of her reports. [ 36 ] In all, I am satisfied that the Appellant rejected his neurologist’s treatment plan for no good reason. All medications come with potential benefits, as well as side effects, that vary from individual to individual. It seems to me that, having rejected it after only one dose, the Appellant did not give [APPELLANT] much of a chance. It is possible his system would have adapted to it over time, and if [NAME] continued to cause him more harm than good, there were other options that might have struck a better balance. [ 37 ] I also note that the Appellant’s reported side effects from [APPELLANT] were inconsistent. At the hearing, he said his leg swelled up, but Dr. [NAME] reported only that he experienced flu-like symptoms. Footnote 26 Later, the Appellant provided another explanation for refusing [APPELLANT] — its active ingredient ofatumumab is also used in [NAME], a treatment for chronic lymphocytic leukemia. Footnote 27 But I don’t see how this justifies the Appellant's refusal to take a second dose of a drug that promised to reduce his MS symptoms. Ofatumumab is a monoclonal antibody that targets classes of cells with common receptors, and it is not very surprising that such a drug would have multiple applications. A drug’s usefulness for one disease doesn’t mean it’s useless or harmful to take for another. [ 38 ] The Appellant’s precipitous rejection of MS drug therapy leads me to conclude that he didn’t do everything reasonably possible to get better. What’s more, I see this pattern repeated elsewhere. The Appellant acknowledged that gabapentin was effective in managing his MS symptoms, and both Dr. [NAME] and Dr. [NAME] recommended that he continue taking that particular painkiller. Footnote 28 However, the Appellant told his doctors that he wanted to take himself off gabapentin, variously blaming it for mental fogginess and erectile dysfunction. Footnote 29 [ 39 ] Dr. [APPELLANT], the Appellant’s new [NAME], declared the Appellant unable to return to any type of work in the future and noted that he had requested an outstanding neurology referral. Footnote 30 However, he didn’t mention that the Appellant required the referral only because Dr. [APPELLANT], his previous neurologist, had discharged him a year earlier. Nor did he mention that Dr. [NAME] did so, not because she had run out of treatment options, but because the Appellant reacted negatively to her refusal to support his [NAME] claim as he saw fit. [ 40 ] The Appellant has likewise unreasonably rejected antidepressant and anti-anxiety medications that offered at least some prospect of improving his mental health. [ 41 ] Dr. [APPELLANT] noted that the Appellant’s family doctor had prescribed him with two SSRI antidepressants, paroxetine and then escitalopram. “These were taken only for a period of a few days, two weeks at best, as [the Appellant] endorsed that these medications both made him highly irritable.” Footnote 31 Dr. [APPELLANT] found that the Appellant's depression and anxiety would improve with a structured combination of medication and cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT). Footnote 32 Although he declared the Appellant was “in no way ready to return to work at the present time,” he did so noting “the complete absence of any present treatment.” With therapy and medication, Dr. [APPELLANT] expected the Appellant to fully recover, predicting a return to modified work as early as four to six months and to full duties within seven to nine months. [ 42 ] But it’s not clear that the Appellant followed through with Dr. [APPELLANT] recommendations. Dr. [NAME] initially recommended desvenlafaxine, or, failing that, “an agent that he can tolerate, without side effects, that is able to push his symptoms into remission and facilitate a full recovery.” Footnote 33 The Appellant tried desvenlafaxine but eventually gave it up, even though he told Dr. [NAME] that it was producing partially effective results. Footnote 34 Later, in April 2025, Dr. [APPELLANT] prescribed the Appellant with Sertraline, but he stopped taking it after only six weeks, citing lack of efficacy and difficulty sleeping. Footnote 35 [ 43 ] The Appellant testified that he took desvenlafaxine for nine months but can only remember six of them. He said it was a bad experience, and it left him skeptical of mind-altering drugs. In September 2024, Dr. [NAME] noted that he was trying to wean himself off desvenlafaxine: “It is prescribed 100 mg daily. He reduced it to 50 mg daily and then 50 mg every two days. Today is day three of not taking it. He said if his head starts to scream too bad he will start it again.” Footnote 36 [ 44 ] This suggests that Appellant terminated desvenlafaxine without consulting a mental health professional. What’s more, he has only briefly tried another antidepressant since and appears to have given up on pharmacological treatment for his depression altogether. However, Dr. [NAME] described the process of finding the right antidepressant or mix of antidepressants as one of “trial and error.” Depending on the individual, some drugs may work and others may not; some may produce unintended or unwanted results, and others may cause few side effects or none at all. But the only way to hit on the optimal combination, if any, is to persist with trials under medical supervision. [ 45 ] There is also the fact that the Appellant has never submitted to sustained psychological counselling. He told Dr. [NAME] that he had been referred to, and seen by, a psychiatrist: “He spoke of “three or four appointments with Dr. [NAME] […] but didn't find that helpful at all.” Footnote 37 Dr. [APPELLANT] urged the Appellant to pursue a robust course of at least 20 CBT sessions, but he did not follow through with this recommendation citing cost. However, a CBT course had already been prepared for the Appellant the previous year; he only attended three of them. Footnote 38 [ 46 ] As with the Appellant’s too-hasty abandonment of [APPELLANT] and other MS drugs, a pattern emerges of a person who has real psychological problems but who repeatedly fails to adhere to his doctors’ recommendations. With treatment options still available, the Appellant’s depression can’t be considered severe. The Appellant’s condition, looked at as a whole, does not prevent him from working in the real world [ 47 ] I find that, despite the Appellant’s mental health condition, he still has at least some ability to work. I am reinforced in this belief when I look at his overall employability. [ 48 ] The leading case on the interpretation of “severe” is [NAME] , which requires the Tribunal, when assessing [NAME], to consider a [NAME] as a “whole person” in a real-world context. Footnote 39 Employability is not to be assessed in the abstract, but rather in light of all circumstances. Those circumstances fall into two categories: The claimant’s medical condition — this is a broad inquiry, requiring that the claimant’s condition be assessed in its totality; Footnote 40 and The claimant’s background — matters such as age, education level, language proficiency and past work and life experience are relevant. [ 49 ] In this case, the Appellant claims that he is disabled by MS and depression. However, close examination of the available medical evidence leads me to doubt that the Appellant is completely incapable of pursuing suitable [RESPONDENT]. As we have seen, the Appellant’s problems are, for the most part, manageable. I don’t believe that they render the Appellant unemployable. [ 50 ] The Appellant has submitted recent reports from some of his [NAME]: [APPELLANT], massage therapist, wrote that [APPELLANT] walked with an obvious limp, showing clear signs of pain with every step. There was muscle atrophy in his left leg. Footnote 41 [APPELLANT], [NAME], wrote that the Appellant complained of severe left leg pain and walked with an antalgic gait. In Dr. [APPELLANT] ‘s opinion, the Appellant was severely disabled and unable to work. Footnote 42 However, Dr. [APPELLANT], the Appellant’s current [NAME], wrote that the Appellant’s MS and depression produced symptoms such as numbness and weakness in both legs, as well poor mood, poor concentration and mild impairment of executive functioning. Dr. [APPELLANT] notably found no limitations to the Appellant’s ability to stand, sit or drive. He also found only moderate limitations to the Appellant’s cognition and psychology. Footnote 43 [ 51 ] The Appellant’s background and personal characteristics are not barriers to his continued participation in the workforce either. It’s true that the Appellant is 57 years old — well past what most people would regard as a prime hiring age. However, he has assets that would help him in a job search. He is fluent in English and has more than 30 years working for a [NAME] in positions of increasing responsibility. This experience would mark him as a potentially reliable employee to employers. [ 52 ] In all, I am satisfied that, even with his MS, his depression, and his anxiety, the Appellant is equipped to at least attempt to return to the labour market, should he wish to do so. Given his experience, he is well positioned to pursue an alternative occupation — particularly one with fewer psychological demands than the managerial position he held at the water department. The Appellant has not attempted alternative [RESPONDENT] [ 53 ] I was unable to properly assess the severity of the Appellant’s [NAME]. That’s because he has not attempted to look for a job that might be more compatible with his fragile mental health. [ 54 ] A Federal Court of Appeal decision called [NAME] says that [NAME] claimants must do what they can to find alternative [RESPONDENT] that is better suited to their impairments: Consequently, an applicant who seeks to bring himself within the definition of severe [NAME] must not only show that he (or she) has a serious health problem but where, as here, there is evidence of work capacity, must also show that efforts at obtaining and maintaining [RESPONDENT] have been unsuccessful by reason of that health condition. Footnote 44 [ 55 ] This passage suggests that, if a [NAME] retains at least some work capacity, the [NAME] must conduct an analysis to determine (i) whether they attempted to find another job, and (ii) if so, whether their impairments prevented them from getting and keeping that job. [ 56 ] On top of that, [NAME] claimants must make meaningful attempts to return to work. Footnote 45 They can’t limit their job search to the type of work that they were doing before they became impaired. That is because they must show that they are regularly incapable of pursuing any substantially gainful occupation. Footnote 46 [ 57 ] The Appellant has at least some work capacity — enough to trigger the obligation to pursue alternative [RESPONDENT]. However, he has never attempted to find another job, one that might have been better suited to his limitations. [ 58 ] As the Appellant described it, his last job was uniquely challenging in that he was expected to act as a liaison between staff and a particularly difficult department head. An interpersonal conflict was probably inevitable. [ 59 ] But not all jobs are so stressful. Most of them are considerably less demanding than the one he had. Most of them don’t involve managing both up and down in the service of providing a critical public utility. The problem for the Appellant is that, after leaving [NAME], he has never looked for a job that might have been easier on his body and his nerves. In the end, I couldn’t get a clear reading of his impairment because he failed to demonstrate that (i) he made an effort to obtain and maintain [RESPONDENT] and that (ii) that effort was unsuccessful because of his health condition. The Appellant does not have a prolonged [NAME] [ 60 ] A [NAME] must be severe and prolonged. Footnote 47 The Appellant has not proved that his [NAME] is severe, so there is no need for me to assess whether it is also prolonged. However, as I have already mentioned, the Appellant’s failure to comply with reasonable treatment recommendations makes me doubt that his condition is long continued and of indefinite duration. Conclusion [ 61 ] The Appellant has physical and mental health conditions, but the available evidence suggests that they don’t prevent him from regularly pursuing a substantially gainful occupation. What’s more, the Appellant has not adequately followed treatment recommendations, nor has he attempted to seek [RESPONDENT] that might have been better suited to his limitations, For these reasons, I am not convinced that the Appellant has a severe and prolonged [NAME]. [ 62 ] The appeal is dismissed. Footnotes Footnote 1 See the Appellant’s application for [NAME] [NAME] benefits dated July 9, 2023, GD2-11. Return to footnote 1 referrer Footnote 2 See Service Canada’s initial refusal letter dated January 16, 2024 (GD2-59) and its reconsideration refusal letter dated August 12, 2024 (GD2-40). Return to footnote 2 referrer Footnote 3 See the Minister’s letters dated February 20, 2026 (AD15) and March 18, 2026 (AD19). Return to footnote 3 referrer Footnote 4 See section 42(2)(a)(i) of the [NAME] . Return to footnote 4 referrer Footnote 5 See section 42(2)(a)(ii) of the [NAME] . Return to footnote 5 referrer Footnote 6 Under section 44(2) of the [NAME] , a “minimum qualifying period” is established by making threshold contributions to the [NAME] . The Appellant’s [NAME] contributions are listed on his record of earnings at GD2-79. Return to footnote 6 referrer Footnote 7 See section 44(1) of the [NAME] . Return to footnote 7 referrer Footnote 8 [APPELLANT], the Appellant’s mother-in-law, also testified. She said that she had known the Appellant for 25 years and had witnessed his decline. She said that he used to be very physically capable, doing things such as repairing the roof and removing tree stumps. Now, he has trouble climbing stairs. He forgets things easily. He sleeps a lot. He can’t even shovel the driveway. “He’s in a fight for his life.” Return to footnote 8 referrer Footnote 9 A [NAME] [NAME] has to provide a report of any physical or mental [NAME], including its nature, extent and prognosis; the findings upon which the diagnosis and prognosis were made; any limitation resulting from the [NAME], and any other pertinent information. See section 68(1) of the [NAME]. Return to footnote 9 referrer Footnote 10 [NAME] , section 68(1)(a). See also  [NAME]  v  Canada (Attorney General) , 2008  FCA  377. Return to footnote 10 referrer Footnote 11 [NAME]  v  Canada (Minister of Human Resources Development) , 2005  FCA  55. Return to footnote 11 referrer Footnote 12 [NAME]  v  Canada (Minister of [NAME]), 2008  FCA  33. Return to footnote 12 referrer Footnote 13 See initial consultation note dated November 14, 2023, by Dr. [NAME] [NAME], neurologist, GD2-128. Return to footnote 13 referrer Footnote 14 See Dr. [NAME] note dated September 22, 2024, GD2-139. Return to footnote 14 referrer Footnote 15 See Dr. [NAME] note dated September 22, 2024, GD2-141. Return to footnote 15 referrer Footnote 16 See Dr. [NAME] note dated September 22, 2024, GD2-141. Return to footnote 16 referrer Footnote 17 See Dr. [NAME] note dated October 22, 2024, GD2-126. Return to footnote 17 referrer Footnote 18 [NAME]  v  Attorney General of Canada , 2011  FCA  47. Return to footnote 18 referrer Footnote 19 See report dated May 11, 2023 by Dr. [NAME], psychiatrist, AD30-2. Return to footnote 19 referrer Footnote 20 See psychiatric evaluation dated October 11, 2023 by Dr. [NAME] [NAME], psychiatrist, AD29-2. Return to footnote 20 referrer Footnote 21 [NAME]   v  Canada (Minister of Human Resources Development) , 2002  FCA  211. Return to footnote 21 referrer Footnote 22 [NAME]  v  Canada (Attorney General) , 2018  FCA  48. Return to footnote 22 referrer Footnote 23 See Dr. [NAME] report dated October 22, 2024. GD2-126. Return to footnote 23 referrer Footnote 24 See Dr. [NAME] report dated October 22, 2024. GD2-126. Return to footnote 24 referrer Footnote 25 See Dr. [NAME] report dated September 22, 2024, GD2-141. Return to footnote 25 referrer Footnote 26 See Dr. [NAME] report dated September 22, 2024, GD2-139. Return to footnote 26 referrer Footnote 27 See written submission by [COUNSEL], the Appellant’s wife and representative, AD22-8. See also printouts from the [NAME]’s website, AD23-7. Return to footnote 27 referrer Footnote 28 See report dated April 23, 2024 by Dr. [NAME], physical medicine GD2-147. See also Dr. [NAME] report dated December 11, 2023, GD2-134. Return to footnote 28 referrer Footnote 29 See Dr. [NAME] report dated September 22, 2024 (GD2-140) and Dr. [NAME] report dated April 23, 2024 (GD2-147). Return to footnote 29 referrer Footnote 30 See Dr. [NAME] [NAME]'s Statement for Canada [NAME] dated June 18, 2025, AD24-5. See also Dr. [NAME] clinical note dated September 3, 2025, AD7-3. Return to footnote 30 referrer Footnote 31 See Dr. [NAME] report dated May 11, 2023. AD30-4. Return to footnote 31 referrer Footnote 32 See Dr. [NAME] report dated May 11, 2023. AD30-17. Return to footnote 32 referrer Footnote 33 See Dr. [NAME] report dated May 11, 2023. AD30-10. Return to footnote 33 referrer Footnote 34 See Dr. [NAME] report dated October 11, 2023, GD2-195. Return to footnote 34 referrer Footnote 35 See clinical notes dated April 28, 2025 (AD7-8) and June 18, 2025 (AD7-5) by Dr. [NAME], [NAME], Return to footnote 35 referrer Footnote 36 See Dr. [NAME] report dated September 24, 2024, GD2-140. Return to footnote 36 referrer Footnote 37 See Dr. [NAME] report dated May 11, 2023, AD30-4. Return to footnote 37 referrer Footnote 38 See letter dated April 27, 2022 by [NAME], counsellor, AD30-24. Ms. [APPELLANT] wrote that she had seen the Appellant in three CBT counselling sessions designed to help him develop coping strategies addressing PTSD and anxiety following a work-related incident. Return to footnote 38 referrer Footnote 39 [NAME]  v  Canada (Attorney General) 2001  FCA  248. Return to footnote 39 referrer Footnote 40 [NAME]  v  Attorney General of Canada , 2011  FCA  47. Return to footnote 40 referrer Footnote 41 See letter dated April 29, 2026 by [NAME], massage therapist, AD22-2. Return to footnote 41 referrer Footnote 42 See letter from [NAME], [NAME], dated April 29, 2026, AD22-3. Return to footnote 42 referrer Footnote 43 See Dr. [NAME] attending [NAME]’s statement dated June 18, 2025, AD24-6. Return to footnote 43 referrer Footnote 44 [NAME]  v  Canada (Attorney General) , 2003  FCA  117. Return to footnote 44 referrer Footnote 45 [NAME]  v  Canada (Attorney General) , 2015  FC  1300, in which the Federal Court stated that the onus is on claimants to show that they made “sincere” efforts to meet the [RESPONDENT] efforts test. Return to footnote 45 referrer Footnote 46 See Canada (Attorney General)  v  [NAME] , 2008  FCA  164. Return to footnote 46 referrer Footnote 47 [NAME] , section 42(2)(a). Return to footnote 47 referrer